NO. 27 APRIL 2021 Introduction The Russian Military Escalation around Ukraine’s Donbas Risks and Scenarios for a Revised EU Policy Dumitru Minzarari The ongoing military and political escalations in and around Donbas – including the increase in Russian military deployments near Ukraine’s borders – represent one of the most severe security crises in Europe since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. The patterns of Russian military deployments, the structure of forces, and the types of observed military hardware strongly suggest the risk of an offensive opera- tion rather than an exercise. Given the existing political costs, that operation is likely to take indirect forms by using the cover of Russian military proxies in Donbas. This crisis represents both a major challenge and an opportunity for the European Union (EU) to conduct practical work on developing its strategic autonomy and offer leader- ship in strengthening the security in its immediate neighbourhood. What should the EU do in practical terms to discourage further military escalation around Donbas, or at least increase the costs for such a development? By the end of March, the international pub- as, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey lic was alarmed by reports of an ongoing Lavrov, issued a very strong statement, say- military escalation in Ukraine’s Donbas. ing that any attempt to renew the military The New York Times wrote that an intensive conflict in Donbas “could destroy Ukraine”. exchange of artillery and machine-gun fire Interestingly, the data on the nature and had occurred, killing four Ukrainian soldiers. intensity of ceasefire violations, as reported Several high-profile political statements were by the Organization for Security and Co- issued. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr operation in Europe (OSCE), revealed an Zelensky, urged Germany and France – even higher spike in shelling incidents on two participants of the Normandy Format 12 March (around 200). However, it did not talks – to make efforts to help preserve receive as much attention as the number the ceasefire regime. Russia’s presidential of shelling incidents on 25 March (around spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, acknowl- 150), which was the highest at the end of edged the increasing tension along the Con- that month. tact Line and expressed hope that this will This could be explained by differences in not escalate into full-fledged fighting. Where- observation data – as collected by the OSCE and the combatant sides – because OSCE Against the backdrop of these develop- observers do not have access to, nor a pres- ments, various experts and observers have ence along, the whole Line of Contact. Most attempted to understand Russia’s actions likely though, the general distress at the and their desired outcomes. Some of the end of March was caused by a combination most frequently quoted interpretations of factors, including the shelling incidents, have suggested that Russia’s actions could the killing of Ukrainian soldiers, and, most be posturing and a test by the Kremlin of importantly, the reports about Russian the Biden administration; that the develop- troops amassing near the Ukrainian border. ments represent Russia’s coercive posturing in its attempt to pressure Ukraine and the West over the lack of progress in imple- Western Reactions menting the Minsk II agreement; that Russia’s actions reveal its diplomatic pres- In response to the failure of the Russian sure against the EU as well as an attempt military to leave the border area with to decouple the United States from its Euro- Ukraine after it finished drills on 23 March, pean allies; or that Russia is likely trying the US European Command reportedly to provoke Ukraine to escalate a military elevated its watch level to the highest one – confrontation in Donbas, which it conse- indicating a potential imminent crisis. quently intends to use as a pretext to move These concerns proved credible when mul- in its “peacekeepers”. An often presented tiple social media sources reported exten- perspective of Russian experts indicates that sive movements of Russian military hard- the recent military escalations reveal Rus- ware from various military districts towards sia’s efforts to demonstrate that it would Ukraine and the occupied Crimea. The re- respond with force to any attempts to ports were aggregated by the Conflict Intel- change the status quo in Donbas. ligence Team, which has been monitoring Considering these and other expert the recent movements of troops across views, there seems to be significant con- Russia. More recently, the Russian military vergence towards the idea that overt aggres- has been setting up military camps with sion of the Russian military against Ukraine field hospitals in the proximity of Ukraini- is not very likely. In fact, there seems to be an borders, which may be a sign of prepa- broad agreement that the Kremlin’s escala- ration for combat operations. The move- tory actions indicate an attempt by Russia ment of more than 10 amphibious and to threaten the EU and the United States artillery boats from the Caspian to the Black into pressing Ukraine to make concessions Sea, “for military drills”, is another dis- over the implementation of the 2015 Minsk turbing step. documents. More precisely, that view im- This Russian military build-up around plies that Russia is implicitly blackmailing Ukrainian borders led to German Chancel- the West – to either push Ukraine’s lor Angela Merkel requesting that President authorities into giving special status to the Vladimir Putin withdraw troops to deesca- Kremlin’s proxies in eastern Ukraine, or late the emerging crisis. The situation is be faced with further military escalation. indeed perceived as critical, given that US President Joe Biden had earlier called Presi- dent Zelensky to express his support for The Failure of Russia’s Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integ- Political Tool rity. NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg and the EU’s foreign policy chief, There are a few important nuances that Josep Borrell, also reached out to Ukraine’s these assessments may be overlooking. By leadership, revealing the deep concerns carefully examining the political context in the West about Russian military move- behind the escalation, the military postur- ments. ing, the deployment patterns of Russian SWP Comment 27 April 2021 2 forces, and their structure, one could bring against businesses and the media structures more clarity about the sought outcomes. of Medvedchuk in February 2021, thus con- To start with, we shall consider that any siderably undermining his influence on military operation is simply a tool for Ukraine’s political processes. This has been advancing a specific political goal. a severe blow against Russian attempts However, the essential political objec- to bring the Donbas war to a conclusion it tives of Russia in relation to the war in Don- prefers, via direct control over Ukraine’s bas have not changed since the initiation domestic politics. The control was to be of that armed conflict in 2014. In his recent achieved by bringing Medvedchuk and his videoconference with Chancellor Merkel “Opposition Platform – For Life” political and French President Emmanuel Macron, party into power. The logic of this political the Russian president insisted that the most approach is similar to the idea that if you important step is the establishment of a cannot conquer a fortress, you can corrupt direct dialogue between Ukraine’s authori- it and erode its ability to defend itself. ties and the “Lugansk and Donetsk regions” That approach basically copies Russia’s on their special status. strategy in Moldova, where Moscow funded This is the same key message that Putin and supported the accession into power of had advanced previously, in 2015. Earlier, another of its proxies – former Moldovan in January of this year, the Russian foreign president Igor Dodon and his Party of minister, Sergey Lavrov, threatened that Socialists. Russian authorities were very Russia will change its approach towards critical of sanctions against Medvedchuk, Ukraine if France and Germany do not revealing his importance to the Kremlin’s “bring to reason” Ukraine’s leadership and political designs in Ukraine. For instance, make it fulfil its obligations in line with Chairman of the Russian Security Council the Minsk agreements. These steps seem to and former president Dmitry Medvedev reveal Russia’s key goals in the negotiations expressed public dissatisfaction with the over the war in Donbas. sanctions against Medvedchuk following First, it is to provide legally binding their phone conversation. and effective autonomy to its proxies in By eroding Medvedchuk’s growing in- Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk regions. fluence in Ukraine, the Zelensky adminis- Then, it is to legally conceal its role as the tration significantly undermined Russia’s main protagonist of the armed aggression plans to legalise its military proxies in in Ukraine’s Donbas by establishing formal Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions in direct talks between the Ukrainian govern- the near future. This would likely happen ment and Moscow’s proxies in Donbas, if Medvedchuk and his party were to come which will solidify the “civil conflict” myth to power, which would then allow Russia to advanced by Russia. acquire effective influence over Ukraine’s At the time of Lavrov’s statements in domestic processes and politics. January, these Russian aims in Ukraine It does not mean that a Russian proxy were implemented via two approaches: in Ukraine needs to openly express pro-Rus- a military one – through the conflict sian beliefs. It can acquire public support mechanism in Donbas – and a political by adopting the label of a “party of peace” one. The political aim has been advanced and by exploiting the growing war fatigue particularly through the activities of the of the average Ukrainian voter. Having Ukrainian oligarch and politician Viktor failed in that political design, Russia reverted Medvedchuk, who is a “personal friend” to the option of military threats.