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Home , Battle of Ilovaisk, Normandy format, Sergey Lavrov

NO. 27 APRIL 2021 Introduction

The Russian Military Escalation around ’s Donbas Risks and Scenarios for a Revised EU Policy Dumitru Minzarari

The ongoing military and political escalations in and around Donbas – including the increase in Russian military deployments near Ukraine’s borders – represent one of the most severe security crises in Europe since ’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. The patterns of Russian military deployments, the structure of forces, and the types of observed military hardware strongly suggest the risk of an offensive opera- tion rather than an exercise. Given the existing political costs, that operation is likely to take indirect forms by using the cover of Russian military proxies in Donbas. This crisis represents both a major challenge and an opportunity for the (EU) to conduct practical work on developing its strategic autonomy and offer leader- ship in strengthening the security in its immediate neighbourhood. What should the EU do in practical terms to discourage further military escalation around Donbas, or at least increase the costs for such a development?

By the end of March, the international pub- as, the Russian foreign minister, Sergey lic was alarmed by reports of an ongoing Lavrov, issued a very strong statement, say- military escalation in Ukraine’s Donbas. ing that any attempt to renew the military The New York Times wrote that an intensive conflict in Donbas “could destroy Ukraine”. exchange of artillery and machine-gun fire Interestingly, the data on the nature and had occurred, killing four Ukrainian soldiers. intensity of ceasefire violations, as reported Several high-profile political statements were by the Organization for Security and Co- issued. The Ukrainian president, Volodymyr operation in Europe (OSCE), revealed an Zelensky, urged and – even higher spike in shelling incidents on two participants of the Normandy Format 12 March (around 200). However, it did not talks – to make efforts to help preserve receive as much attention as the number the ceasefire regime. Russia’s presidential of shelling incidents on 25 March (around spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, acknowl- 150), which was the highest at the end of edged the increasing tension along the Con- that month. tact Line and expressed hope that this will This could be explained by differences in not escalate into full-fledged fighting. Where- observation data – as collected by the OSCE

and the combatant sides – because OSCE Against the backdrop of these develop- observers do not have access to, nor a pres- ments, various experts and observers have ence along, the whole Line of Contact. Most attempted to understand Russia’s actions likely though, the general distress at the and their desired outcomes. Some of the end of March was caused by a combination most frequently quoted interpretations of factors, including the shelling incidents, have suggested that Russia’s actions could the killing of Ukrainian soldiers, and, most be posturing and a test by the Kremlin of importantly, the reports about Russian the Biden administration; that the develop- troops amassing near the Ukrainian border. ments represent Russia’s coercive posturing in its attempt to pressure Ukraine and the West over the lack of progress in imple- Western Reactions menting the II agreement; that Russia’s actions reveal its diplomatic pres- In response to the failure of the Russian sure against the EU as well as an attempt military to leave the border area with to decouple the from its Euro- Ukraine after it finished drills on 23 March, pean allies; or that Russia is likely trying the US European Command reportedly to provoke Ukraine to escalate a military elevated its watch level to the highest one – confrontation in Donbas, which it conse- indicating a potential imminent crisis. quently intends to use as a pretext to move These concerns proved credible when mul- in its “peacekeepers”. An often presented tiple social media sources reported exten- perspective of Russian experts indicates that sive movements of Russian military hard- the recent military escalations reveal Rus- ware from various military districts towards sia’s efforts to demonstrate that it would Ukraine and the occupied . The re- respond with force to any attempts to ports were aggregated by the Conflict Intel- change the status quo in Donbas. ligence Team, which has been monitoring Considering these and other expert the recent movements of troops across views, there seems to be significant con- Russia. More recently, the Russian military vergence towards the idea that overt aggres- has been setting up military camps with sion of the Russian military against Ukraine field hospitals in the proximity of Ukraini- is not very likely. In fact, there seems to be an borders, which may be a sign of prepa- broad agreement that the Kremlin’s escala- ration for combat operations. The move- tory actions indicate an attempt by Russia ment of more than 10 amphibious and to threaten the EU and the United States artillery boats from the Caspian to the Black into pressing Ukraine to make concessions Sea, “for military drills”, is another dis- over the implementation of the 2015 Minsk turbing step. documents. More precisely, that view im- This Russian military build-up around plies that Russia is implicitly blackmailing Ukrainian borders led to German Chancel- the West – to either push Ukraine’s lor requesting that President authorities into giving special status to the withdraw troops to deesca- Kremlin’s proxies in eastern Ukraine, or late the emerging crisis. The situation is be faced with further military escalation. indeed perceived as critical, given that US President Joe Biden had earlier called Presi- dent Zelensky to express his support for The Failure of Russia’s Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integ- Political Tool rity. NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg and the EU’s foreign policy chief, There are a few important nuances that , also reached out to Ukraine’s these assessments may be overlooking. By leadership, revealing the deep concerns carefully examining the political context in the West about Russian military move- behind the escalation, the military postur- ments. ing, the deployment patterns of Russian

SWP Comment 27 April 2021

2 forces, and their structure, one could bring against businesses and the media structures more clarity about the sought outcomes. of Medvedchuk in February 2021, thus con- To start with, we shall consider that any siderably undermining his influence on military operation is simply a tool for Ukraine’s political processes. This has been advancing a specific political goal. a severe blow against Russian attempts However, the essential political objec- to bring the Donbas war to a conclusion it tives of Russia in relation to the war in Don- prefers, via direct control over Ukraine’s bas have not changed since the initiation domestic politics. The control was to be of that armed conflict in 2014. In his recent achieved by bringing Medvedchuk and his videoconference with Chancellor Merkel “Opposition Platform – For Life” political and French President , party into power. The logic of this political the Russian president insisted that the most approach is similar to the idea that if you important step is the establishment of a cannot conquer a fortress, you can corrupt direct dialogue between Ukraine’s authori- it and erode its ability to defend itself. ties and the “Lugansk and regions” That approach basically copies Russia’s on their special status. strategy in Moldova, where funded This is the same key message that Putin and supported the accession into power of had advanced previously, in 2015. Earlier, another of its proxies – former Moldovan in January of this year, the Russian foreign president Igor Dodon and his Party of minister, Sergey Lavrov, threatened that Socialists. Russian authorities were very Russia will change its approach towards critical of sanctions against Medvedchuk, Ukraine if France and Germany do not revealing his importance to the Kremlin’s “bring to reason” Ukraine’s leadership and political designs in Ukraine. For instance, make it fulfil its obligations in line with Chairman of the Russian Security Council the Minsk agreements. These steps seem to and former president reveal Russia’s key goals in the negotiations expressed public dissatisfaction with the over the . sanctions against Medvedchuk following First, it is to provide legally binding their phone conversation. and effective autonomy to its proxies in By eroding Medvedchuk’s growing in- Ukraine’s and Donetsk regions. fluence in Ukraine, the Zelensky adminis- Then, it is to legally conceal its role as the tration significantly undermined Russia’s main protagonist of the armed aggression plans to legalise its military proxies in in Ukraine’s Donbas by establishing formal Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donbas regions in direct talks between the Ukrainian govern- the near future. This would likely happen ment and Moscow’s proxies in Donbas, if Medvedchuk and his party were to come which will solidify the “civil conflict” myth to power, which would then allow Russia to advanced by Russia. acquire effective influence over Ukraine’s At the time of Lavrov’s statements in domestic processes and politics. January, these Russian aims in Ukraine It does not mean that a Russian proxy were implemented via two approaches: in Ukraine needs to openly express pro-Rus- a military one – through the conflict sian beliefs. It can acquire public support mechanism in Donbas – and a political by adopting the label of a “party of peace” one. The political aim has been advanced and by exploiting the growing war fatigue particularly through the activities of the of the average Ukrainian voter. Having Ukrainian oligarch and politician Viktor failed in that political design, Russia reverted Medvedchuk, who is a “personal friend” to the option of military threats. For in- of Vladimir Putin and has been a driving stance, Dmitry Peskov directly connected political proxy that Russia has cultivated the two issues by stating that sanctions over the last few years in Ukraine. To close against Medvedchuk “could lead to a mili- that channel of Russian influence, the tary solution in Donbas”. It is within this Ukrainian authorities imposed sanctions wider political context that a spike in cease-

SWP Comment 27 April 2021

3 fire violations in Donbas is emerging in par- Russian military stockpiles its old military allel with an unprecedented concentration equipment – would suggest that Russia of Russian forces around Ukraine’s borders. is transporting older types of combat plat- forms. Russia has upgraded the Western and Southern Military Districts with its The Viable Military Proxy Option most modern combat hardware. Russian military planners prefer not to use its It is difficult for policy analysts to accurately modern combat platforms to equip its mili- observe military and security-related activ- tary proxies in Ukraine’s Donbas, as this ities. However, the earlier referred to reac- would easily reveal Moscow’s involvement, tion of the US military’s European Com- creating extra irritations between Russia mand in response to the deployments of and the West, and undermining Russia’s Russian military troops to Ukraine’s borders deniability efforts. Therefore, we are very was very revealing. Given the US military’s likely observing an ongoing supply of Rus- intelligence capabilities, this suggests that sian proxies in the Luhansk and Donetsk the deployments are out of the ordinary, de- regions with older Soviet-made military spite the latest attempts by Russian author- hardware and munitions, suggesting the ities to claim routine military activities. preparation for combat activities. Russia’s explanations are not credible for Based on this, the existing assertions by a number of reasons. Considerable evidence many policy experts – that a Russian mili- indicates that Russia is conducting an exten- tary operation against Ukraine is unlikely – sive logistical operation to transport mili- are not accurate. Although Russia’s political tary hardware in the direction of Ukraine costs for overt military aggression against from large distances, including from other Ukraine are indeed very high – making military districts. It makes no sense to bring this type of military action less feasible – the military units of the Central Military it has an alternative course of action. Russia District to the Western or Southern ones for conducted a few military operations in routine exercises, or to move troops from Ukraine by disguising its regular troops as the Western to the Southern Military Dis- “Donetsk rebels”, moving Russian military trict for the same purpose. As a rule, each troops and hardware across the Ukrainian military district conducts its training and border. A few of the most well-known cases verifications inside its designated geographic are the August 2014 battle of and area, except during strategic exercises. the January–February 2015 fighting over Moreover, the scale of these movements is , including several cases of Rus- so large that Russia’s producers of agricul- sian artillery strikes against Ukraine from tural equipment have insufficient railway Russian territory. transportation capacity and complain that Moreover, the prolonged combat opera- the Ministry of Defence has exhausted these tions that have been sustained by the for its own use. Finally, it is important to “Donetsk rebels” during the last seven years explore the nature of the deployment, which would have been impossible without the includes multiple launch rocket systems, constant resupply of munitions for rifles, self-propelled artillery, tanks and infantry artillery, fighting vehicles, and tanks, as fighting vehicles, fuel trucks, and mobile well as fuel. The massive concentration of hospitals. This suggests preparations for Russian troops at Ukraine’s borders makes offensive military activities, consistent with it easier to conceal the movement of these previous major engagements in Ukraine military supplies into Ukraine’s Donbas. In by Russia – such as the offensive against fact, this is the most likely explanation for Debaltseve, for instance. Russia’s choice to conduct the exercises and Importantly, the deliveries of military movements in the proximity of Ukraine’s hardware from the Central Military District borders. It provides cover for transporting – which covers parts of Siberia, where the its troops and munitions to the border area.

SWP Comment 27 April 2021

4 Russia then has the liberty of moving them some eight autonomous battalion tactical across the more than 400 km segment of groups (a 6,000–7,000-strong force), with border shared with Ukraine, which is con- massive artillery support, which significantly trolled by Russian proxies in Donbas – the changed the course of the operation. OSCE only monitors two border crossing Moreover, Russian forces fighting on points in the Gukovo area. behalf of the “separatist republics” in Don- bas would only have to concentrate a mili- tary strike against a small front in Ukrain- Military Actions Revive the ian defences to break through. By gradually Political Option gaining limited terrain, Russia would inflict political costs on the incumbent Ukrainian Therefore, the existing public discussions authorities, who would lose popular sup- over the risks of a full-scale Russian inva- port. This would also bring back Russia’s sion in Ukraine are misleading and unhelp- political option for Ukraine into play, by ful. They cannot contribute to the building increasing the popularity of a political force of an effective strategy to discourage and that is sympathetic to Russia and marketed counter Russian military involvement in as a “party of peace”. Donbas. Russia can lead and conduct mili- Of course, this option has intermediate tary operations against Ukraine – includ- stages over a continuum of military options, ing for limited territorial conquest – by in which Russia can attempt to obtain con- using the “civil war” cover and its armed cessions by threatening military escalation, proxies in eastern Ukraine. Any analysis of gradually escalating violence in Donbas, Russian military attacks against Ukraine and then further increasing the scope and should be conducted predominantly within intensity of its military actions there. What the framework of this option. could the West do to assist Ukraine in Discarding the risk of a Russian military managing and mitigating this security chal- operation against Ukraine based solely on lenge? the publicly reported numbers of Russian troops near Ukraine’s borders is also erro- neous. For instance, the often seen refer- Strategic Context and ence to “additional 4,000 Russian troops” Strategy Options and the consequent conclusion that this number is not sufficient for offensive op- As a defence alliance, NATO has concrete erations is missing the point. The number is mechanisms and tools to deal with crises a conservative estimate by US intelligence similar to the one developing around and only provides a snapshot of the overall Ukraine’s Donbas. In fact, the Alliance has picture. It represents incomplete informa- been engaging Ukraine in diverse defence tion – a suggestion that is confirmed by cooperation programmes. However, NATO the fact that the US military command in is less equipped to address the political Europe elevated its watch level to the dimension related to this crisis, which is highest status. Moreover, what should not of chief importance, since Ukraine is not be ignored is that there are Russian troops a NATO member state. in Donbas on permanent rotation. Other- Under these challenging conditions, wise, it would be impossible to man much what would be the most effective policy of the high-tech military equipment, the options for the EU? Given its overall passive presence of which is routinely reported reaction to the war in Nagorno-Karabakh based on OSCE unmanned aerial vehicle last year, the EU should use this crisis as an observations in Donbas. Finally, numbers opportunity. It provides the EU with the should be analysed in context. For instance, chance to constructively and practically at one point during the August 2014 Ukrain- engage its strategic autonomy framework. It ian offensive, Russia reportedly deployed should do this by operating as a leader that

SWP Comment 27 April 2021

5 brings its member states, but also its part- EU’s eastern flank, it has been deploying ners, around the table. This can be done by forces to the Baltic states as part of the driving the agenda and designing a course NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). of action to manage this crisis that has The issue-linking mechanism that encour- developed in its immediate neighbourhood. aged French participation was, among The emergence of revisionist regional others, the Estonian contribution to the powers has brought back into relevance and French-led Operation Barkhane in Mali. The prominence the question of hard power in EU could explore that logic and apply it to foreign policy. It proved effective in creat- compensate for the costs of some member ing new facts on the ground, despite the states, thus encouraging their more active political opposition of other states and the involvement in assisting Ukraine. For this restrictions of international law. Therefore, purpose, the EU could offer its institutional the EU would benefit from learning how to framework as a coordination hub for such effectively deal with countries that use hard compensations. power to bring changes that are detrimental to the EU’s interests. Because of the growing influence of hard power in international Outlook and Policy Options affairs, and given the logic of sunk costs that drives its economic lobby groups, the In practice, this can take different shapes EU risks being forced to gradually accept and build on already existing platforms, the new changes imposed by Russia (and such as the Baltic states’ efforts on defence other similar actors), albeit tacitly. assistance for Ukraine. The EU’s permanent Given its past experience with the EU, structured cooperation mechanism could Russia understands well this dynamic and serve as the legal and operational channel is eager to exploit it. Hence, the EU needs to for increased defence cooperation between break down this vicious circle and change selected EU member states and Ukraine, Russia’s way of thinking. The most optimal including on domains such as capabilities course of action for the EU, then, would be and operations. As another concrete option, to communicate credibly that it is willing article 44 of the Treaty on European Union and capable of elevating the costs if Russia presents the opportunity for the Council to attempts to change the status quo through launch an emergency operation of a mili- military means. tary nature just with the support of a group Even if this fails in one instance – and of willing member states. This tool is par- it may be costly to implement – this ap- ticularly useful for the EU should Russia proach will significantly increase the EU’s decide to militarily escalate the ongoing deterrence capability in future crises. The crisis around Donbas, as it allows for a biggest challenge is the fact that, from the quicker reaction and response. point of view of the Russian authorities, the It is very important for the EU to lead collective EU is not credible in its commit- and coordinate this kind of support and ment to impose costs. To counter this, the engagement because this would allow it to EU leadership would have to cultivate and develop and consolidate the appropriate encourage “coalitions of the willing” among mechanisms, procedures, and tools for its its member states, which would provide strategic autonomy process. Fortunately, military assistance and perhaps the assur- the EU has recently approved a new Com- ance of defence support to Ukraine. To facili- mon Foreign and Security Policy financial tate that, the EU could explore its individ- instrument – the European Peace Facility – ual members’ niche interests or use issue- which extends its practical abilities to assist linkage strategies to help member states Ukraine. With its €5 billion in funds over converge their interests on specific areas or the next seven years (2021–2027), the Euro- policies. As an example, although France pean Peace Facility can cover the costs of has limited policy interests related to the EU military missions and operations; it can

SWP Comment 27 April 2021

6 also provide bilateral military and defence of partnership in defence and security areas assistance, including via military equip- between the EU and Ukraine would not be ment, to any EU partner that faces major as threatening to Russia as Ukraine’s mem- security challenges and that the EU decides bership in NATO, it would receive less oppo- to support. sition from the more conservative Ukrain- Of course, the institutional framework ian audience, and it would allow the EU to for such EU–Ukraine engagements is not actually transition from sterile discussions yet fully developed. However, the EU could about developing its strategic autonomy to establish a bilateral partnership with Ukraine concrete exercises that actually establish on defence and security policy along the its related mechanisms, procedures, and lines of what was proposed recently by capabilities. Portugal vis-à-vis the , and Another creative option for EU engage- comparable to those in place with Norway ment would be the exploration of an and Canada. Under this partnership, if existing international legal framework. For Ukraine were willing to accept, individual instance, the EU could initiate and lead a EU member states (or a group of states) follow-up stage of negotiations – in line could sign an agreement with to with the Budapest Memorandum on Secu- deploy forces on a rotational basis to the rity Assurances – and discuss concrete Ukrainian– border, thereby assist- defence assistance for Ukraine in line with ing Ukraine in covering this segment, that agreement, attracting eventually the similar to the work of the NATO EFP. This United States, the United Kingdom, and would allow Ukraine to free up additional Canada. This may look like a less traditional troops for deployment to the Donbas Con- approach for the EU, but it encompasses its tact Line, increasing its deterrence capacity preference for legal solutions with the urge against Russian military escalations. In a to develop a more robust strategic culture similar fashion, individual EU countries and capabilities. Besides, while the pre- could assist Ukraine in the patrolling of its viously listed measures contributed to the Black Sea shores on a rotational basis. “hardware” element of the EU’s strategic Although these and some similar options autonomy, this step would allow the EU to may seem striking at first glance, they rep- develop its related “software” – to initiate resent completely legitimate partnerships and lead international legal frameworks in accordance with international law and that consolidate the security in its neigh- would increase the EU’s engagement in bourhood and the wider Eurasia region. securing its neighbourhood though bilat- Furthermore, the EU could engage eral assistance to Ukraine. Creativity may Ukraine in negotiations that identify ways be required in order to build the concrete for providing as well as the stages of con- policy tools necessary for this to happen crete defence assistance to Ukraine, the in the framework of the EU’s existing pro- establishment of early warning and trigger cedures. As an example of a creative and mechanisms for crisis response, as well as confident approach, the EU could design a a clear process for the involvement of guar- different type of EU Common Security and antor states. In times of crisis escalation, Defence Policy mission to assist Ukraine in this involvement may take a number of dealing with Russian-led military escalation forms, including the deployment of an in Donbas; or it could change the mandate operation similar to the EU Monitoring of one of the existing missions in Ukraine Mission in that can discourage a (EU Advisory Mission or EU Border Assis- further Russian military offensive. If this tance Mission). Both a voiced intention and necessity arises, it will likely mean the the development of these mechanisms would withdrawal of Ukraine, the EU, and their strengthen the EU’s ability to discourage transatlantic partners from the ongoing military escalations by Russia, thereby sig- OSCE operation, which emerged as a frame- nalling resolve and commitment. This type work that unintentionally results in greatly

SWP Comment 27 April 2021

7 facilitating Russia’s existing interest to con- trol the negotiations format over the war in Donbas. Because Russia favours the OSCE’s participation to any other organisation, due to its veto right at regular stages of the pro- cess, an EU–Ukraine conditional agreement on replacing the OSCE operation due to an armed escalation triggered by Russia could in itself serve as a powerful deterrent against such undesired military developments. © Stiftung Wissenschaft Although many risk-averse EU member und Politik, 2021 states may be reluctant to discuss the poten- All rights reserved tial and conditional replacement of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine This Comment reflects with an EU mission, they need consider the the author’s views. alternatives, which are worse than what The online version of used to be the status quo. Only the concern this publication contains of losing its current level of control over functioning links to other the negotiations process related to the SWP texts and other relevant armed conflict in Donbas could force Russia sources. to check its temptation to conduct military SWP Comments are subject escalations. to internal peer review, fact- The above suggestions are examples of checking and copy-editing. creating real costs in response to Russia’s For further information on attempts to change the status quo via mili- our quality control pro- tary means. It is only by enacting clear cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- mechanisms that would bind the EU to .org/en/about-swp/ respond to Russia’s military actions – by quality-management-for- tying its hands politically – that the Euro- swp-publications/ pean Union can credibly discourage mili- tary escalation against Ukraine or other SWP countries in the ex-Soviet space. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik The logic of hard power implies that an German Institute for effective response would require a credible International and commitment by the EU to create costs, Security Affairs which would be possible by deploying its own hard power. And the emerging crisis Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin around Ukraine’s Donbas region provides Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 the EU with both challenges and opportu- Fax +49 30 880 07-100 nities in this regard. www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 doi: 10.18449/2021C27

Dr Dumitru Minzarari is Associate in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division at SWP.

SWP Comment 27 April 2021

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