February 2020

STATEMENT BY THE EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY LEADERSHIP GROUP (EASLG) Twelve Steps Toward Greater Security in Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Region

he conflict in and around Ukraine is a tragedy for all affected by the violence. It is a flashpoint for catastrophic miscalculation and is a continuing threat to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. A political resolution is fundamental to ending the armed conflict in the Donbas region, Tto improving prospects for constructive Ukraine-Russia dialogue more broadly including on Crimea, and to improving Euro-Atlantic security. Action to help those in harm’s way and to establish a foundation that resolves the conflict must be taken now to address urgent security, humanitarian, economic, and political concerns. Such action also will help reduce tensions between Russia and the West and help build a sustainable architecture of mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic region, including enhanced cooperation on nuclear threat reduction.

Recent developments have opened the way for progress. Those from their homes. This opening must not be missed. The changes include in 2019 the following: (1) the mutual release following 12 practical, concrete steps can be taken now of prisoners and an agreement to define additional areas to address urgent security, humanitarian, economic, and for disengagement of forces; (2) the October agreement on political concerns. a process for elections in Donetsk and Luhansk and special status for these regions once the elections are certified as free and fair by the Organization for Security and Cooperation SECURITY STEPS in Europe (OSCE); and (3) the December Paris Summit in In March 2014, following a request by Ukraine’s government the Normandy format between France, Germany, Russia and and a consensus decision by all 57 OSCE participating Ukraine. In Paris, the leaders underscored their common states, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) was commitment to a sustainable architecture of trust and security deployed within Ukraine to foster peace, security, and in Europe, for which resolving the conflict in Ukraine— stability. In September 2014, the SMM began to support the including creating political and security conditions to implementation of the Minsk agreements. In the same month, organize local elections—is one of several important steps. the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) was In 2020, a further meeting in the Normandy format, ongoing established by Ukraine and Russia to focus on a ceasefire and work of the Trilateral Contact Group, and other diplomatic stabilization of the contact line, as well as implementation exchanges provide opportunities to move forward on ending a of the Minsk agreements. On December 18, 2017, Russia war that, over the past six years, has killed more than 13,000, announced that Russian representatives of the JCCC would wounded more than 25,000 and forced 2.5 million people leave Ukraine the next day.

Des Browne, Wolfgang Ischinger, Igor Ivanov, Ernest J. Moniz, Sam Nunn, and their respective organizations—the European Leadership Network (ELN), the Munich Security Conference (MSC), the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)—work with former and current officials and experts from a group of Euro-Atlantic states and the European Union to test ideas and develop proposals for improving security in areas of existential common interest. The EASLG operates as an independent and informal initiative, with participants who reflect the diversity of the Euro-Atlantic region from the United States, Canada, Russia, and 15 European countries. STEP 1: Restore the JCCC. particularly around “disengagement areas” and crossing Restoring the JCCC would provide (1) an added capability points—is vital to reducing casualties. That support can also for implementation of the Minsk agreements; (2) assistance in encourage military-to-military dialogue within the JCCC, ensuring a prompt response to violations of the agreements, can energize confidence building, and can enable economic including response to impediments to the SMM’s monitoring revitalization. and verification; and (3) support for the restoration of critical STEP 4: Address the problem of missing persons. infrastructure and demining. Resolving missing persons cases will require all relevant STEP 2: Establish a Normandy-format, military-to- stakeholders, including human rights organizations and military crisis management dialogue. family groups, to cooperate in locating and identifying the missing due to all circumstances across the country. The Leaders of the Normandy-format countries (France, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Germany, Russia, and Ukraine—the “N4”) should direct the International Commission on Missing Persons could the establishment of an “N4” military-to-military crisis facilitate the process while working with relevant authorities, management dialogue that could serve, inter-alia, as a civil society groups, and stakeholders. The process would be mechanism for regular exchanges with respect to Minsk consistent with the Paris N4 Summit and would support the implementation, including as a follow-up and remedy full and unconditional access of international organizations, mechanism for Minsk violations, as reported by the SMM. including the ICRC, to all detained persons. In addition, a new N4 dialogue could support the JCCC and could proceed separately or in parallel with efforts to renew STEP 5: Plan for and implement humanitarian crisis management dialogue at the expert level—both bilateral demining initiatives. and multilateral—within the NATO-Russia Council or as a It is essential that all children and adults in eastern Ukraine separate working group.1 immediately be taught to understand the risks posed by STEP 3: Improve unrestricted access and landmines and explosive remnants of war and to avoid or minimize such risks. Meanwhile, Ukrainian authorities freedom of movement. and the international community could establish a special Although the security situation in eastern Ukraine has “Donbas demining” program. A comprehensive survey improved, there remains a need to improve the freedom of of the nature and extent of the problem would add to the movement for all civilians, including the SMM. This effort effectiveness of those efforts. Such humanitarian demining includes more and safer entry-exit checkpoints to build trust initiatives are consistent with, and would logically build on, and to enable effective monitoring. All parties should work the agreed conclusions of the Paris N4 Summit that support toward this goal to build on security improvements and to the development and implementation of an updated mine support an irreversible cease-fire, which is consistent with clearance plan for Ukraine. The work of governmental and the Minsk agreements and the conclusions of the Paris N4 non-governmental organizations engaged in demining would Summit supporting the SMM’s ability to have unrestricted, be aided by permission to use high explosives in this effort. safe, and secure access throughout Ukraine for the full implementation of its mandate. Denial of access and the undermining of night time patrols should end. ECONOMIC STEPS The armed conflict has led to an economic collapse on both HUMANITARIAN STEPS sides of the line of contact. Poverty and underdevelopment are entrenched in eastern Ukraine, taking a heavy toll on Since 2014, hundreds of people have gone missing as a result pensioners in particular. of refugee flight, fighting, reprisals, and abductions. Locating missing persons is crucial to creating a long-term settlement STEP 6: Advance reconstruction in the Donbas. of the conflict, reinstating the rule of law, and securing Building on the October 2019 Investment Forum in Mariupol, the rights of surviving families. Landmines and explosive the Delphi Economic Forum meeting in March 2020 should remnants of war continue to threaten civilians, restrict advance the concept of establishing—with the support of freedom of movement, and deter access to infrastructure the European Union (EU)—an appropriate international and jobs. Support for governmental bodies and international framework for the reconstruction of Donbas, as well as organizations working to map and mark dangerous areas and an associated international donor’s conference that could to remove mines in the buffer zone and the line of conflict— include Russia. Such a framework and initiative could

1 For more information on renewing and deepening crisis management dialogue, see the EASLG statement released at the 2019 Munich Security Conference, available at: https://media.nti.org/documents/EASLG_Statement_Crisis_Management_FINAL.pdf A political resolution is fundamental to ending the armed conflict in the Donbas region, to improving prospects for constructive Ukraine-Russia dialogue more broadly including on Crimea, and to improving Euro-Atlantic security.

leverage crucial assistance in rebuilding critical infrastructure, the context of its five “guiding principles” about relations with health, and education. An essential first step is to conduct a Russia, the EU committed to “selective engagement” in 2016, credible needs assessment for the Donbas region to inform yet a positive agenda for this engagement also remains elusive. a strategy for its social-economic recovery. Within Ukraine and between Ukrainians and their neighbors, social shifts are affecting the politics of historical memory STEP 7: Explore free trade areas. and national identity and are raising difficult issues for Free trade areas have been used to revitalize war-torn regions. governments regarding citizenship and language rights—with Relevant stake-holders should explore on the expert level real effects on politics, economics, and security. measures to establish a Ukraine free trade area with both the EU (implementing the Deep and Comprehensive Free STEP 10: Direct a new dialogue among Euro-Atlantic Trade Agreement between the EU and Ukraine) and Russia, states about building mutual security. as well as focused measures in support of exports. This new dialogue must be mandated by political leaders and must address core security issues through a dynamic STEP 8: Support for a roadmap on sanctions. process that directly deals with key divides. Such a dialogue A process must be identified for better defining how specific could help deepen cooperation and mutual understanding actions in implementation of the Minsk agreements could and could prevent future conflicts. The EASLG can provide a lead to corresponding changes in sanctions. Track II work in foundation for this work, which should involve the planning this area could be an appropriate place to start. and strategy departments of foreign affairs ministries from across the region. STEP 9: Address radiological hazards. Approximately 1,200 radioactive sources—used for medical, STEP 11: Support and define areas of selective industrial, or scientific purposes—are in locations in and engagement between the EU and Russia. around the Donetsk region; some have reached the end of The EU and Russia should prioritize selective engagement their useful lives, thus posing unique health, safety, and in 2020, including through support of the implementation ecological risks. Ecological challenges, such as this one, have of the Minsk agreements. They should also take steps in been addressed in the Economic Working Group of the areas where there is a strong common interest (e.g., science Trilateral Contact Group. Removing radiological hazards in and research, cross border and regional cooperation, and the Donbas region would provide important economic (and cooperation on climate change and the environment). humanitarian, security, and ecological) benefits and would be Thus they could recognize that progress can be mutually a valuable step in confidence-building. reinforcing. Existing human and economic ties should be further developed. Working with the OSCE, Trilateral Contact Group, and Normandy-format countries, relevant stakeholders should STEP 12: Launch a new national dialogue agree on measures to secure and safely transport high- about identity. activity disused radioactive sources (cesium, strontium, A new, inclusive national dialogue across Ukraine is etc.) out of the Donbas region. Furthermore, measures desirable and could be launched as soon as possible. This should be agreed to monitor the safety and security of high- dialogue should include opinion-makers, top scholars, and activity radioactive sources currently used for medical or internationally recognized experts. Efforts should be made to industrial purposes in the Donbas region. engage with perspectives from Ukraine’s neighbors, especially Poland, Hungary, and Russia. This dialogue should address POLITICAL STEPS themes of history and national memory, language, identity, and minority experiences. It should include tolerance and The states of the Euro-Atlantic region have yet to define, agree, respect for ethnic and religious minorities—in both domestic or implement an approach to security that can ensure peace, and international contexts—in order to increase engagement, independence, and freedom from fear of violence for all. In inclusiveness, and social cohesion. Signatories

Co-Conveners Philip Mark Breedlove Dr. Sabine Fischer Joan Rohlfing General (Ret), United States Air Senior Fellow, German Institute President and Chief Operating Des Browne Force; former Commander, U.S. for International and Security Officer, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Vice Chair, Nuclear Threat European Command, and 17th Affairs/SWP, Berlin, Germany United States Initiative; Chair of the Board Supreme Allied Commander of Trustees and Directors of the Europe at NATO, United States Air Marshal Sir Chris Harper Matthew Rojansky European Leadership Network; KBE Director of the Wilson Center’s and former Secretary of State for William J. Burns United Kingdom Kennan Institute, United States Defence, United Kingdom President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Alexander Hug Lynn Rusten Ambassador (Botschafter) States Former Principal Deputy Chief Vice President, Global Nuclear Professor Wolfgang Ischinger Monitor of the OSCE Special Policy Program, Nuclear Threat Chairman (Vorsitzender), Munich E. Buzhinskiy Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Initiative, United States Security Conference Foundation, Chairman of PIR Center Executive Switzerland Germany Board; Vice-President of the Sir John Scarlett Russian International Affairs Ian Kearns Former Chief of the British Secret Igor Ivanov Council; and Lt-General (Ret), CEO, The Oracle Partnership, Intelligence Service & Vice- Former Minister of Foreign Russia United Kingdom Chairman Royal United Services Affairs, Russia Institute, United Kingdom General (Ret) Vincenzo Bert Koenders Ernest J. Moniz Camporini Former Minister of Foreign Oleksiy Semeniy Co-Chair and CEO, Nuclear Vice President, Istituto Affari Affairs, Netherlands National Security and Defense Threat Initiative; and former U.S. Internazionali, Italy Council, Ukraine Secretary of Energy, United States Andrey Kortunov Hikmet Cetin Director General of the Russian James Stavridis Sam Nunn Former Minister of Foreign International Affairs Council, Admiral (Ret), United States Co-Chair, Nuclear Threat Affairs, Turkey Russia Navy; former Supreme Allied Initiative; and former U.S. Commander Europe at NATO Senator, United States Oleksandr Chalyi Mark Melamed (2009–2013); and Dean, The Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Senior Director, Global Nuclear Fletcher School of Law and Participants Ambassador of Ukraine; and Policy Program, Nuclear Threat Diplomacy, Tufts University Initiative, United States Ambassador Brooke President Grant Thornton (2013–2018), United States Ukraine, Ukraine Anderson Tom Meredith Stefano Stefanini Former Chief of Staff, National James F. Collins Advisor, HALO Trust, United Former Italian Permanent Security Council, United States Ambassador (Ret), Senior Fellow, Kingdom Representative to NATO; Steve Andreasen Russia and Eurasia Program, Ferdinando Nelli Feroci European Leadership Network National Security Consultant, Carnegie Endowment for President, Istituto Affari Executive Board; Atlantic Council Nuclear Threat Initiative; and International Peace, United States Internazionali, Italy Nonresident Senior Fellow; former Director for Defense Policy and Project Associates Brussels James Cowan Professor Roland Paris Director, Italy and Arms Control, National CEO, HALO Trust, United Security Council, United States University Research Chair in Kingdom International Security and Adam Thomson Oksana Antonenko Governance, University of Ottawa, Director, European Leadership Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola Network, United Kingdom Member of European Leadership Former Chief of Defence; former Canada Network Contact Group on Chairman of NATO’s Military Paul Quilès Ivan Timofeev Russia-West Relations, United Committee; former Minister of Director of Programs at the Kingdom Former Defence Minister; and Defence, Italy Chairman of IDN (Initiatives for Russian International Affairs Council, Russia Robert Berls Ambassador Rolf Ekéus Nuclear Disarmament), France Senior Advisor for Russia and Diplomat and Chairman Emeritus Bruno Racine Nathalie Tocci Eurasia, Nuclear Threat Initiative; of the Stockholm International Director, Istituto Affari and former Special Assistant Chairman, Fondation pour la Peace Research Institute, Sweden recherche stratégique, France Internazionali; and Special for Russia/NIS Programs to the Advisor, HR/VP, Italy Secretary of Energy, United States Vasyl Filipchuk Leon Ratz Ukrainian Diplomat; former Senior Program Officer, Materials General (Ret) Dr. Erich Vad Kathryne Bomberger Political and EU Director of the Lecturer at the Universities of Director-General, International Risk Management, Nuclear Threat Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Initiative, United States Munich and Salzburg, Germany Commission on Missing Persons, Ukraine; and Senior Adviser at United States the International Center for Policy Marcin Zaborowski Studies in Kiev, Ukraine Former Executive Director, Polish Institute of International Affairs (2010–2015), Poland

For more information on the EASLG, go to www.nti.org/EASLG