From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin?
Nona Mikhelidze
No. 12. April 2021
This publication has been funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 769886. EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 12. April 2021 Turkey andCaspianRegion,RussianforeignpolicyinthePost-Soviet space. (ENP) andconflict resolution in theSouthCaucasus,WiderBlack Sea and regional cooperation, Russia and the post-Soviet space. Her research interests include the European Neighbourhood Policy Relations from the Tbilisi State University. Since 2020 she writes for the newspaper LaStampaon Foundation Scholarship as a Research Fellow. She holds also B.A. and M.A. degrees in International Studies from the Humboldt University Berlin (HU), where shewasawardedwiththeVolkswagen Science from Scuola normale superiore (Pisa), and a M.A. in Regionalism: Central Asia and Caucasian Nona Mikhelidze is Senior Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). She holds a PhD in Political Kremlin. its militaryandenergysectors andfinally improving sanctions mechanismsagainstthe the MinskIIAgreement, strengthening Ukraine’s resilience indeveloping democracy and States–European Union involvement intheNormandy Format aimedatthefulfilmentof Only after, itcould structure atransatlantic strategy along thefollowing lines:active United and democracy and then define how to defend universal values abroad, including in Russia. design clear rules for itsown foreign-policy behaviour basedontheprimacyofhumanrights Moscow’s future aggression. Inorder to face theRussian challenge, theWest shouldfirst wrongdoings already committed by the Kremlin and as a preventative measure to deter governance. Still, theWest needsastrategy inresponse to theinternational anddomestic of international relations isshapedby domestic factors andtheauthoritariannature ofits conflict. Influencing Russia’s foreign policy is notan easy task,asthe country’s conduct these measures failed to impactonRussian decision-making regarding resolution ofthe advance beyond Donbassanddeterred itfrom makingfurtherterritorial gains.However, Western economic sanctions againstMoscow succeeded inlimitingtheKremlin’s military Format inFebruary 2015remains unimplemented despite numerous rounds ofmediation. negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, France andGermany intheframework oftheNormandy the statusquoemergedin2014asa“new normal”cannotlast.The MinskIIAgreement has tried to move towards militaryescalation intheDonbassregion makingclear that Seven years after theannexation ofCrimeaandamidanongoingwarinUkraine, Russia ABSTRACT -2- Nona Mikhelidze . From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin? - - -3- The signs of an imminent military escalation in Ukraine’s Donbass region have been evident for months. for evident been have region Donbass Ukraine’s in escalation military imminent an of signs The do and Germany that if France made it clear Minister Sergey Lavrov In January, 2021, Russian Foreign act “accordingly” implement the Minsk II Agreement, Russia will reserve the right to to Ukraine force not Re- secessionist the by organized Forum” Donbass “Russian the at month, same the In 2021). (Shatrov the time had declared that Margarita Simonyan, Today, Russia of the editor-in-chief public of Donetsk, 2021). (Radio Svoboda Mother Russia” back home to “bring Donbass come to insideand Ukraine with border the to close weapons startedand subsequently Russia troops moving plan of with the training that, in accordance Defence Sergei Shoigu announced Crimea, while Minister of checks had begun in its military command and units (The Minister control armed forces, the country’s a the Kremlin deployed sources, Ukrainian 2021). According to Defence of the Russian Federation of MILITARY ESCALATION IN UKRAINE AND ESCALATION MILITARY CONTEXT DOMESTIC RUSSIA’S Seven years after the annexation of Crimea and amid an ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia is moving to moving is Russia Ukraine, in war ongoing an amid and Crimea of annexation the after years Seven INTRODUCTION wards military escalation in the Donbass region. One can only speculate as to the final goal of this latest this of goal final the to as speculate only can One region. Donbass the in escalation military wards then in order to military operation a localized to attempts at intimidation from varies Conjecture move. andDonetsk Ukraine’s of incorporation the at aimed war large-scale a to “peacekeepers”, Russian deploy the Russian Federation. regions into Lugansk run. long last in the cannot normal” a “new that emerged in 2014 as status quo One thing is clear: the of framework the in Germany and France Russia, Ukraine, between negotiated Agreement II Minsk The media- of rounds numerous despite unimplemented remains 2015 February in Format Normandy the aimedbans visa and freezes asset include which Moscow, against sanctions economic Western tion. at individuals and companies, as well as broader restrictions on specific economic sectors of Russia, fur- making from it deterred and Donbass beyond advance military Kremlin’s the limiting in succeeded important strategically the including – portgains Sea Black theseterritorial ther However, Mariupol. of the conflict. of Russian decision-making regarding resolution on impact measures failed to relations conduct of international is not an easy task, as the country’s policy foreign Influencing Russia’s Current military tensions its governance. nature of and the authoritarian factors is shaped by domestic the case of oppo inside Russia linked to coincide with political conditions border the Ukraine–Russia on following economy the of state the to as well as issues, human-rights and Navalny Alexei leader sition and foreign Russian between nexus The pressure. social consequent the and pandemic COVID-19 the - drasti way that it was in 2011–12, when internal protests in the same now is evident policy domestic a along West the with relations and posture international Putin’s Vladimir Minister Prime changed cally hisdefend to decided again) once president then (by Putin when 2014 in and pattern, confrontational own strength and credibility at home. affirm his to counterpart, Yanukovych, Ukrainian Viktor be it regarding Na- – many fronts on again “feels” that is “attacked” by the West the regime once Today calling Putin a “killer”. Biden’s US President Joe of say nothing Belarus, to human-rights issues or valny, EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 12. April 2021 of the film the of of murder. of NavalnyThese were followed by demonstrations afterhisarrestandtherelease insupport Khabarovsk, inRussia’s Far East,after itspopular governor wasarrestedonallegedly spurious charges in first out broke which protests, anti-government months-long to response a as come has Repression with total fines approaching $1million(RFE/RL 2021b). upholding about260of theprotocolsto markitsmaterials asoutputsof “foreignagents”,withthecourt agency had issued a total of 390 protocols against Radio Free (RFE/RL) Europe/Radiofor failing Liberty or applying for any government position (RFE/RL 2021a). By 7 April, the Roskomnadzor state monitoring as “foreignagents” whenever they appearinthe media. They are bannedfrom working in public service referred to be must all furthermore, audit; financial scrutinized a undergo then will which activities, their on in the interests of aforeign entity. Such “agents” arerequired topating as election observers report - resultsinanelection andpartici debates, expressingviewsonstatepolicies,campaigningfor certain inpolitical has beencriminalized.Reasonsforbeingrecognizedas“foreignagents”includeparticipating the newlegislation restrictions have beenimposedon publicdemonstrations andblockingthestreets suspected of being engaged“intheinterestsof a foreign state” (The Russian Federation 2021).Under journalists andhuman-rightsactivistsreceivingoverseas grants as“foreignagents”–thatis,individuals panding onearlierlegislation)aimedatlabellingnon-governmental organizations (NGOs), mediaoutlets, and the activities of its citizens. In February 2021, President Putin signed a highly controversial bill (ex- cio-economic context, the Kremlin has already grown anxious and begun to crack down on political life In view of Russia’s upcoming parliamentary elections in September 2021 and the deteriorating so - international anddomestic attention away from domestic issuesandontovert apossible warinUkraine. in resistingRussianaggression. ItseemsmorelikelythattheRussiangovernment issimplytryingto di- attempt to testnewlyinaugurated USPresidentBiden’s readinessto provide assistanceto theUkrainians border areamatterforspeculation. They could beanintimidatingmove againstZelensky, aswellan As stated at the outset, the intentions behind the Kremlin’s military manoeuvres on the Ukraine–Russia (Euobserver 2021). declined theinvitationandrefusedto participate that itsmilitaryexercises on theUkrainian border werenotaimedatfull-scalewar. However, Moscow On April10GermanyandFrance invitedRussiato attendameetingof theOSCEinorderto makeclear The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) reacted promptly to the escalation in Donbass. disseminate messagesabout“Ukraine preparingforwar”. was simply to to take a breath of fresh air, as their weekend jaunt coincided with local media starting The state media showed their pleasant walk in the forest. It was hard to believe that the meeting’s goal pleased. Later, President Putin and Defence Minister Shoigu met in the Siberian Welle 2021a), while a Kremlin’s spokesperson said that Russia was moving troops on its territory as it ful solution to theconflict.Inresponse, Lavrov warned against “thedestructionof Ukraine” (Deutsche Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called on Russia to stop flexing its muscles and seek a peace- zone –includingover 500explosions(OSCE2021). conflict the in violations ceasefire 1,021 of total a Security and Cooperationrecorded in Europe (OSCE) At the beginning of April 2021, the Special Monitoringpassports). Mission (SMM) of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions (who are Ukrainian nationals but to whom the Kremlin handed Russian total of 28 battalion tactical groups. Moscow’s motivations were to “defend” the Russian citizens of the -4- Russia, insomeofthelargest anti-government demonstrations since 2011–12. complex allegedly builtfor theRussian president. Protests were heldin 198 towns andcities across Putin’s Palace Putin’s , which denounces corruption deals associated with an extravagant palatial taiga for a weekend trip. for a weekend trip. Organization for Organization for Nona Mikhelidze . From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin? -5- LOOKING BACK AT THE DETERIORATION DETERIORATION THE AT BACK LOOKING RELATIONS WEST–RUSSIA OF reset to attempts Western of number a been have there 2014 in Crimea of annexation Russia’s Since the by taken measures conciliatory of series a despite failed have them of All Moscow. with relations The US and the and Georgia has been frozen. include Ukraine enlargement to the Kremlin. NATO West to Azerbaijan,and Armenia between conflict eventuallythe in absent, totally not if passive, remained EU coun- EU Some 2020. autumn of war the following forces “peacekeeper” its deploy to Russia allowing and in generally) accommodate Russian interests in Libya (and in Africa, more seemed to tries have Councilthe of Assembly Parliamentary the into back accepted been has Russia 2021). (Popescu Serbia oninfluence limited with personalities, wrong the targeted usually have sanctions Western Europe. of Russialinking Sea Baltic the under pipeline gas the 2, Stream Nord life. economic or political Russia’s to Germany that German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier has defined as “one rationale (Bildt et al. 2021) despite its economic is nearing completion between Russia and Europe” of the last bridges - stra for called case, France (Nixey 2021). Before the Navalny non-existent or even dubious being highly up,Summing cooperation. economic enhanced for appealed Italy and Russia, with engagement tegic the EU has kept at home, authoritarianism and its growing foreign aggression Russia’s in response to According to the World Bank, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought negative economic outcomes in Rus- outcomes negative economic pandemic has brought the COVID-19 Bank, the World to According construction,and manufacturing in jobs of loss the at pressure social in rise eventual an to leading sia 2021). Bank World (The services hospitality povertyand national retail the in increase an as well as rate considered respondents of 43% February, of beginning the at Center Levada the by conducted polls In policy.state with dissatisfaction participating for general is motivation main the that protests these in 2021). expect further 45% said that they About in the future (Levada.ru such protests - Russian govern media, the has been facilitated by social protests pro-Navalny of As the organization - Face Google, for called it Additionally, Twitter. down slowing by “problem” the address to decided ment take part (Euronews to urging young people delete posts protests in banned to Telegram and book 2021). If in April rating. approval in Putin’s their reflection found hardships have economic and political Social, 65% (Statista. 2021 – it had fallen to – February had been 82%, three years later rate 2018 the approval of Crimea, and then in 2015, with the war in Syria, thecom 2021). Back in 2014, with the annexation with eyes. However, Russian in and increase its popularity its legitimacy reinforce Kremlin managed to and evaporated challenges, the “Crimea effect” has socio-political and all the aforementioned COVID-19 divertand problems internal their gaze to from the Russian people distract there is an urgent need to tensions abroad. refuse to 31 as the authorities continue March been on hunger strike since having Meanwhile Navalny, thread.a by hanging is life “His prison. in dying is treatment, medical adequate an with him provide to reportedallies - pro mass for calling while out,” Navalny’s hold can he longer much know how don’t We Navalny for called states member individual as well as EU The 2021). Osborn and (Tétrault-Farber tests powers world declared Macron Emmanuel President French assistance. medical immediate receiving - “conse face would Russia that warned US the while Kremlin, the with (Ibid) lines” red “clear draw should 2021). dies (France24 quences” if Navalny EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 12. April 2021 Skripal case in 2018 (involving the (involving 2018 in case Skripal Foreign Minister Lavrov commented at the time (CNBC 2019). after the The situation worsened further the UnitedStatedisliterally bythedesireto overwhelmed doeverything to destroy US-Russiarelations”, and strengthenthemfrom yearto yearandeventually targetingNordStream2itself.“TheCongress of community all prove the point. In 2014, the US imposed punitive sanctions on Russia, trying to increase indomesticpolitics and,especially intheelections of thecountriesoftransatlantic interference dued abroad. The annexation ofCrimeain2014,theongoing conflictinUkraine, theKremlin’s alleged in LibyaconvincedPutinthattheUSpolicy wasbentto oust himfrom powerandkeepRussiasub - sight, thepoint of no returnwasarguablyin2011-12,wheninternalprotests andNATO’s intervention Relations between the US and Russia have progressively deteriorated since the early 2000s. With hind- dialogue withtheWest. Moscow hassincetimeandagaindemonstrated thatithasno interestinmeaningfulandconstructive constructive dialogue with the EU – a conclusion that could have been reached as far back as 2012. in Moscow. Onhisreturnjourney, Borrell inferredthatMoscowwasnot interestedin engagingina EU diplomats from Germany, Sweden and Poland for allegedly attending pro-Navalny demonstrations the differences between Brussels and Washington (Seskuria 2021). The very same day, Russia expelled journalist with a provocative question forced Borrell to condemn US policy towards Cuba and to highlight tempted to manipulatethe2020USpresidentialelection withaviewto keepingDonald Trump inpower. at- had Russia that March in stated report intelligence US declassified a while government, federal US hackers backedbytheRussianintelligenceagencySVRhadcarriedoutaserious cyberattack on the agentNovichok andhissubsequentarrest.Inlate2020,Washingtonthe nerve claimedthatagroup of daughter intheUnitedKingdom (UK))and,similarly,inrecentmonthsafterNavalny’s poisoning with the EUwasusingmethodsfrom thecolonial past. The lowestpoint ofthevisitcamewhena to in Russia’s interfere domestic policy. He slammed Brussels for its sanctions policy and argued that common ground, theKremlin usedhisvisitto humiliatetheEU.Lavrov trying calledtheEUanunreliablepartner some find to hoped had Borrell While Russia. towards policy accommodating Brussels’ of and Vice-PresidentoftheEuropean Commission(HR/VP),to Moscow wasapractical demonstration The last visit of Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy actions inthepost-Soviet space(Bildtetal.2021). seeking aselectiveengagement,which,however, hasgenerally resultedinacquiescenceto theKremlin’s -6- border. who is the aggressor and who is the victim: it was Russia,not Ukraine, that moved its troops to the to show restraint and work towards a peaceful solution (Deutsche Welle 2021b). Yet, it is all too clear statement expressing concern over growing ceasefire violations in which they called on both parties the recent military tensions on the Ukraine–Russia border, Germany and France issued a joint bland power structureand (Rumer Weiss 2021). In response to erned by President Putin and his vertical still seems hesitantto accept thatits relations with theKremlin will not improve whileRussiais gov- in WashingtonAll observers are awarethat the Russian challenge is here to stay, whereas theEU RUSSIA? WITH UKRAINE,BUT MAINLY WITH LOOKING FORWARD: HOW TODEAL poisoning of poisoning a former Russian military officer/double agent and his his and agent officer/double military Russian former a Sputnik
Nona Mikhelidze . From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin? - - - -7- Defence Lloyd Austin told his Ukrainian counterpart his Ukrainian that told Austin Defence Lloyd Defining rules for Westernworking is the EU globally, rights human law and of the rule democracy, on mounting is pressure “As foreign-policy “strategic the EU’s in is it and the world” supportand inspire around protect, democracies to actively behaviour:of champion a be] [to … democracy and human rights on leadership global its advancing in interests Putting democracy December in published Plan Action Democracy the Union’s says order”, multilateral based the rules back2020 (European Commission 2021). Backsliding on democracy is evident in ontoa number of countries; the globalfurther,emphasizes the document therefore, geopolitical “a new deliver to for the EU high time is it agenda (Ibid). agenda on human rights and democracy” human of defence in and values democratic of name the in externally and internally acting Indeed, and – policy foreign when practising respect and credibility strength, build to be a way would rights par- in Credibility, neighbourhood. shared its of countries the and Russia with engaging in especially hand pledge the one who on member states, EU some of by the leaders has been undermined ticular, flirt their supportto continued have hand the other with auto on and human rights of the defence for crats. This was the case, for example, with President Macron courting Macron President with example, Fattah for Abdel case, was the leader This Egyptian crats. Action Plan. Democracy al-Sisi at the same time as the EU published its European EU–US challenge, the Russian addressing and neighbours European Eastern with the EU’s dealing In of the determination and promotion democracy on position proactive Biden’s crucial. is coordination opportunityan represent abroad activities malign the Russian for address to Administration US the on these issues. coordination increase transatlantic EU to revitaliza the needs West the 2021, Guidance Strategy Security National interim US the to According Leading 2021b). (The White House challenges global all meet to as an instrument democracy of tion American the of self-interest” “undeniable the in is democracy of promotion the through world the be challenged to continues democracy Yet (Ibid). abroad violence and instability reduces it as people, and disinformation through of governance their own model promote to trying states by authoritarian In contrast, US President Biden first called President Putin a killer and then declared that the days Unit “the he promised Zelensky, President to a call on While were over. aggression” “Russian of ed States’ unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (The White House integrity” and territorial sovereignty support unwavering ed States’ Ukraine’s for of US Secretary the Additionally, 2021a). - aggres Russian of escalation of event the [the] in alone Ukraine leave not [would] States United “the 2021). of Ukraine sion” (Ministry of Defence partiesthe Borrell, HR/VP and Blinken Antony State of Secretary between US meeting a During ongoing its including behaviour, challenging Russia’s manner a coordinated in “address to pledged the to commitment their declared the allies Moreover, Georgia”. and Ukraine against aggression on engage with Moscow to ready being Russia while at the same time in human rights of defence interest (U.S. Departmentissues of common of State 2021). - transat new a for need a is there as however, steps, concrete by followed be to have These words Moscow, to trip last his of light the In Russia. towards mainly but Ukraine, towards strategy lantic to order In engage the Kremlin. and push back, contain will that Brussels has said HR/VP Borrell EU transform these words into policy, the EU should first design clear rules for its own foreign-policy behaviour based on the primacy of human rights and democracy and then define how including in Russia. to abroad, universal values defend EU-LISTCO Policy Paper Series. 12. April 2021 new Russiansovereign-debt issuance (O’Toole andFried 2021). or tradingthe UK, could consider by limiting US/UK orpersons fully in restricting anyparticipation to consultthelistwhenselectingpersonalities to besanctioned. Moreover, theUS,together with volved inpoliticalpersecution,human-rightsabusesandcorruption. This letteraskedWashington Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation including a list of oligarchs and state authorities allegedly in- no sense and only undermine Western credibility. Recently President Biden received a letter from sion. Visa bans and asset freezes on state officials who will never travel to Europe or the US make Additionally, sanctions should beappliedto thejudgesresponsibleforNavalny-related repres- and thesuspension oftheNordStream2pipeline. provement of thesanctionsmechanismagainstRussiathrough theinclusion of Russian oligarchs im- – point tofinal us sectors,the brings energy which and developingdemocracy military its and and France replaced by a strong EU. A second priority would be to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience in weight; therefore, there is a need for active US involvement. The ideal solution would see Germany German ChancellorAngela Merkelleaves herpost laterin2021,theformat willlose itspolitical current When Agreement. II Minsk the of fulfilment the at aimed Format Normandy the in ment A transatlantic strategy could bestructuredalongthefollowinglines.Firstly, activeUS–EUinvolve - ted andasapreventative measureto detertheKremlin’s futureaggression. strategy as a response to will serve the international and domestic wrongdoings already commit- society – require an urgent review of the EU’s guiding principles for engaging the Kremlin. Such a ment ofNavalny anditsharshrepressionofprotesters – and, more generally, itshandlingof civil to facethechallengesthathehasalreadyposed to thetransatlantic community. Russia’s treat- Ukraine in of fundamental freedoms in his country, is a useless exercise. The West needs a strategy in order aggression Trying to repression predict what President Putin will or willnot do in Ukraine, or regarding further Russia’s deter to steps Concrete this approach effective,coherenceandcoordination isneededbetweentheUS,EUandUK. tization and,atthesametime,atool to addresstheRussianchallenge.However, inorderto make EasternEuropeanway to countries(inthiscase,Ukraine) support on theirpathtowards democra- Thus, in the US/UK’s understanding, promoting democracy and defending human rights would be a armed forces (Ibid). Easternneighbourhood countries, especially Ukraine, instrengtheningthecapacityoftheirport Moscow accountable for breaches of these. In this context, the UK declares its readiness to sup- calls for deterrence. Therefore, itpromises to upholdinternational rulesandnorms andto hold London perceives Russiaasthe“mostacutethreat”to thesecurityof theNATO members,and to protecting human rights and upholding global norms worldwide (European Commission 2021). view of Security,Defence,Development andForeign Policy”, declaringthattheUKiscommitted In March 2021 the UK also published its “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Re- democratic processes ofWesterncountries(Ibid). tion infrastructure and energy coercion. Real costs in will the be imposed on anyone who interferes disinforma cybersecurity, of field the in policies aggressive their and regimes authoritarian deter to global stage. In the samedocument, the USrecommits itself to in order the transatlantic partnership the weaponizing ofcorruption. In this sense, Russiaremains an actor playing a disruptive role on the -8- - Nona Mikhelidze . From the Ukraine–Russia War to the Navalny Case: How to Deal with the Kremlin? -
-9- Policy
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EU-LISTCO POLICY PAPER SERIES © 2021 EU-LISTCO
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ISSN: 2604-6237 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4730103
Edited by the Project: Europe’s External Action and the Dual Challenges of Limited Statehood and Contested Orders (EU-LISTCO) EU-LISTCO Policy Papers are available on the EU-LISTCO website: https://www.eu-listco.net/ EU-LISTCO Policy Papers are also available at https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/24657
Editorial coordination: Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)
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This publication has been funded by the European Union under the Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement no. 769886.