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Download (PDF) Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments The Future of the Minsk Agreements WP Press for Implementation and Support Sanctions Susan Stewart S The Minsk agreements are currently the principal instrument for achieving a lasting settlement in the occupied regions of eastern Ukraine. Moscow and Kyiv, however, are showing little enthusiasm for implementing the associated package of measures. Unless this changes by the summer, the European Union would be ill-advised to lift or relax its economic sanctions against Russia. As well as harming the Union’s political credibility, such a step would encourage Russia both to expand its influence in the post-Soviet space and to continue its attempts at dividing the EU. The Minsk agreements consist of a protocol A Tricky EU Context from September 2014 and a package of The European Council Conclusions of 19–20 measures from February 2015. They were March 2015 state: “The European Council prepared under OSCE auspices and signed agreed that the duration of the restrictive by Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE and the sepa- measures against the Russian Federation, ratists in the so-called “people’s republics” adopted on 31 July 2014 and enhanced on of eastern Ukraine. The process is moni- 8 September 2014, should be clearly linked tored by Germany, France, Ukraine and to the complete implementation of the Russia, whose representatives meet regu- Minsk agreements, bearing in mind that larly in the “Normandy format”. this is only foreseen by 31 December 2015.” For over a year now, implementation of After the deadline was missed, the parties the Minsk agreements has failed to progress extended it into 2016. beyond partial fulfilment of individual items. Within the European Union, Germany In the meantime, the European Union’s has taken on the greatest responsibility for unity over sanctions against Russia has achieving a resolution in eastern Ukraine. been gradually eroding, and there is some As well as playing a key role in the Norman- doubt as to whether they will be extended dy format together with France, Germany again in the summer. Given that the EU also assumed the OSCE Chairmanship in has made complete implementation of the January 2016, and is thus now integrated agreements a condition for lifting sanc- even more closely into the existing conflict- tions, it may soon find itself with a cred- resolution mechanisms. The OSCE’s Special ibility problem. Monitoring Mission in Ukraine is keeping Dr. Susan Stewart is a Senior Associate in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 14 March 2016 1 the situation on the ground under per- issues. The Kremlin has also succeeded in manent observation, and the OSCE is also strengthening pro-Russian voices in certain responsible for the contact group in which EU member-states by supporting right-wing talks on implementation of the Minsk deci- forces, which have been gaining additional sions occur. Under this framework it should ground as a result of growing opposition to be possible to stabilise the situation in the the recent influx of migrants. Finally, there occupied parts of the Donbas and improve is widespread disappointment with Ukraine, humanitarian conditions, thereby paving since Kyiv has been slow to conduct impor- the way for implementation of political tant reforms and is experiencing domestic measures such as local elections and ele- political instability. As a result, there are ments of decentralisation. numerous calls emanating from business, To date only one of the thirteen Minsk politics and society in various member- items has been fully implemented: the states (including Germany) for a relaxation work of the contact group has been inten- or lifting of sanctions, despite the clear sified. The ceasefire in eastern Ukraine language of the Council Conclusions. The remains fragile, the withdrawal of heavy French elites are divided on this question, weapons has been only partial and the while Italy, Austria, Greece and Hungary exchange of prisoners has yet to be com- fundamentally question the point of the pleted. Other agreed steps are also still measures. pending: neither has a special status been instituted for parts of the Donbas, nor have elections been held in the occupied areas. Russia: Unyielding And Russia has yet to hand control of the Moscow is plainly seeking to have the sanc- border back to Ukraine. In view of the lack tions relaxed, or better still lifted. But it of progress in the Minsk framework, the EU wishes to achieve this without having to ful- member-states decided in December 2015 fil its Minsk obligations. Instead the Krem- to extend their economic sanctions against lin is pursuing a three-pronged approach. Russia for a further six months. Firstly, it is seeking to present itself as a However, the European Union’s collective constructive actor. At the beginning of 2016 resolve on sanctions seems to be weaken- the Russians made a series of moves that ing. On the one hand, the arguments that many observers interpreted as signs of a made certain countries sceptical from the new willingness to make progress on im- outset continue to be advanced. The EU’s plementing Minsk. These included the sanctions and Moscow’s counter-measures appointment of Boris Gryzlov – former are causing trade and investment losses speaker of the Duma and today a member to firms and certain economic sectors in of the Russian Security Council – to repre- a number of member-states. And Ukraine sent Russia in the OSCE-led contact group. aside, even if many European actors are At the same time Moscow responded posi- quite dissatisfied with Russia’s role in Syria, tively to a meeting between Victoria Nuland, most continue to regard the Russian Federa- US Assistant Secretary of State, and Putin tion as an important international partner. adviser Vladislav Surkov in Kaliningrad on Generally, many EU states find the poten- 15 January, where possible next steps in tial consequences of stricter isolation of the Minsk process were discussed in detail. Russia unpredictable and alarming. There is, however, no reason to believe New factors also play a part. With east- that Russia has altered its objectives in the ern Ukraine remaining relatively calm in Ukraine conflict. There has in fact been no recent months, Russia’s destabilising role positive shift in Moscow’s behaviour (or there has slipped out of the focus of Euro- that of the Russian-controlled separatists) pean attention, especially as the refugee with respect to Minsk. Furthermore, Russia crisis has come to overshadow most other has taken military measures which would SWP Comments 14 March 2016 2 allow the fighting in the Donbas to resume Ukraine: Foot-dragging at any time. Germany and the EU must For several months Ukrainian politicians therefore assume that Russia is still seeking created the impression that realising two to destabilise Ukraine and remains unwill- points of the Minsk agreements lay within ing to relinquish control of the occupied reach: a constitutional amendment to allow areas in the east. decentralisation and a law on local elections Secondly, the Russians never tire of in the occupied areas. But since the begin- repeating that Ukraine is not fulfilling its ning of 2016 the Ukrainians have been in- own Minsk obligations. The Kremlin con- sisting that Russia and the separatists must centrates particularly on the requirement do more to observe the first part of the to grant the occupied territories in the Don- agreements: ceasefire, withdrawal of heavy bas a special status in the Ukrainian con- weapons and exchange of prisoners. Until stitution, presenting Ukraine as the main these points have been fulfilled, they argue, obstacle to implementation of the Minsk Ukraine cannot meet its ensuing obliga- package. Thirdly, Moscow is seeking to tions. It is indeed hard to imagine how a deepen fault lines within the EU to a point special status could be introduced or an where consensus on extending the sanc- election held according to OSCE standards tions can no longer be achieved in July. in the unstable context of the so-called Germany is currently one of the targets people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. of this policy. The Russian international Credible steps to improve security in these media campaign claiming (falsely) that a areas could boost Ukrainian confidence girl possessing both German and Russian that Russia is genuinely committed to the citizenship had been raped by refugees in Minsk framework. Berlin is just one example of Moscow’s Currently, however, a climate of mistrust attempts to discredit Germany and depict of Moscow prevails in Ukraine, with the it as a dangerous country with incompetent measures needed to implement Minsk con- security organs. One of Russia’s goals here sequently rejected by large segments of the is to make life difficult for the German political elite and the society. This applies government by sowing discord in society. most of all to the question of a special status Ultimately, Moscow would like to under- for the Donbas. Some fear that a loosely for- mine Germany’s dominant role within the mulated constitutional amendment would European Union, in order to increase the leave Ukraine powerless to control how influence of more strongly pro-Russian that status was concretely implemented. member-states. The situation is exacerbated by severe ten- Moscow is thus attempting to provide sions within the government coalition, the European Union with arguments for which has essentially collapsed. It is cor- relaxing or lifting sanctions, even though respondingly difficult to achieve a broad Minsk is still far from full implementation. consensus on sensitive legislative proposals. One outcome of such a course would be a In relation to local elections in the scenario in which the situation in eastern occupied areas, there are growing fears in Ukraine remains unresolved, while Russia Kyiv that the OSCE could water down its no longer has any incentive to agree to standards in order to obtain a recognised compromises within the Minsk framework.
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