Peace on Ukraine's Terms
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Peace on Ukraine’s Terms: Partition not Autonomy Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jacob Richard Coakwell Graduate Program in Slavic and East European Studies The Ohio State University 2018 Thesis Committee John B. Quigley, Advisor Dr. Richard Herrmann Copyrighted by Jacob Richard Coakwell 2018 Abstract Since conflict broke out in 2014, Ukraine has not had control over the entirety of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Two self-proclaimed People’s Republics have formed in the non-government-controlled region in the east. With over 10,300 lives lost and 1.5 million persons internally displaced, the closest this conflict has come to resolution was with the signing of the Minsk Agreements of February 2015. The crux of the Minsk Agreements is the granting of autonomy to the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Three years have passed with no progress on the implementation of the Minsk Agreements from either side. This work argues that Ukraine should not maintain the stalemate and should not implement the Minsk Agreements. Ukraine in fact should pursue the partition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. Ukraine should neither maintain the status quo nor implement the Minsk Agreements because these options will lead to indefinite internal Russian influence in Ukraine. Partition is Ukraine’s only hope to pursue a future as a sovereign state. ii Dedication To Sergey and Natalya who deserve better iii Acknowledgments I am indebted to Professor John Quigley for his guidance, encouragement, and thoughtful feedback. I appreciate Professor Quigley’s unmatched attentiveness to his students and their ideas. I graciously thank Dr. Richard Herrmann for supporting me and for his participation in my committee. I thank my wife, Lena, and my two daughters, Valerie and Anastasia, who supported me throughout this process and without whom I would have little purpose in life. iv Vita Personal Information Previous Education: Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Russian, cum laude, Global Development Track Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; April 2016 Fields of Study Major Field: Slavic and East European Studies Professional Specialization: Public Administration v Table of Contents Abstract ...........................................................................................................................ii Dedication ..................................................................................................................... iii Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................... iv Vita ................................................................................................................................. v List of Figures ..............................................................................................................viii Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 Chapter 2. Ukraine’s Current State of Affairs .................................................................. 7 The Minsk Accords ..................................................................................................... 7 Ukraine’s Options...................................................................................................... 12 Chapter 3. A Freezing Conflict ...................................................................................... 18 Quintessential Frozen Conflicts: Moldova and Georgia ............................................. 18 Ukraine’s Status Quo ................................................................................................. 25 Alternative Status Quos ............................................................................................. 30 Chapter 4. A Government-sanctioned Frozen Conflict ................................................... 33 The Tajik Civil War................................................................................................... 34 Russia’s Intervention and the Peace Agreement ......................................................... 36 Post-Conflict Tajikistan ............................................................................................. 40 Russia’s Influence in Freezing the Conflict ................................................................ 43 Another Frozen Conflict ............................................................................................ 45 Tajikistan and Ukraine ............................................................................................... 48 Chapter 5. Autonomy According to Minsk .................................................................... 50 The Variety of Autonomy Schemes ........................................................................... 50 No to Autonomy in the Donbas ................................................................................. 53 Chapter 6. The Case in Favor of Partition ...................................................................... 59 Territorial Integrity .................................................................................................... 59 vi The Benefits of Partition ............................................................................................ 64 Chapter 7. The Case Against Partition ........................................................................... 67 Slippery Slope ........................................................................................................... 68 State Security ............................................................................................................ 74 From Civil to International War ................................................................................. 77 Viability After Partition ............................................................................................. 79 Humanitarian Crisis ................................................................................................... 80 Minsk Agreements Anyway ...................................................................................... 82 Partition is No Solution ............................................................................................. 82 Russian Appeasement or Ukrainian Sovereignty? ...................................................... 83 Chapter 8. Ukraine’s Cession of the Donbas .................................................................. 86 Ukrainian Law on Territory Changes ......................................................................... 86 Public Opinion on Partition ....................................................................................... 89 Chapter 9. Peace on Ukraine’s Terms ............................................................................ 93 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 98 vii List of Figures Figure 1 The Situation in Eastern Ukraine ..................................................................... 13 Figure 2 Russian and Ukrainian Armies Compared........................................................ 16 Figure 3 Frozen Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union ................................................... 20 Figure 4 Frozen Conflict Progression ............................................................................ 28 Figure 5 Tajikistan's Government-sanctioned Frozen Conflict ....................................... 47 Figure 6 Ukraine's Government-sanctioned Frozen Conflict .......................................... 56 Figure 7 Russia has Checkmated Ukraine ...................................................................... 60 Figure 8 Ukraine Ceding the Donbas ............................................................................. 88 viii Chapter 1. Introduction In late 2013 and early 2014, antigovernment protests wracked Ukraine after President Yanukovych rejected a trade agreement with the European Union (EU) in favor of a financial package from Russia. This was perceived as yet another example of Russia’s indisputable influence on Ukraine. In February 2014, President Yanukovych fled to Russia under the pressure of the Maidan protests, and the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, instituted an interim government to rule until after nation-wide elections in May 2014. Shortly after Yanukovych fled, Russian troops took control of the Crimean Peninsula where an illegitimate referendum on accession to the Russian Federation was held and reportedly overwhelmingly supported. On March 18, 2014, Russia signed a treaty with the Republic of Crimea integrating the Crimea as two federal subjects: The Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (2014c). During the same period, disagreement over Ukraine’s political trajectory turned into armed opposition and soon full-blown warfare in the eastern regions of Ukraine, the Donbas. Two regional governments in the Donbas held questionable referendums on autonomy and soon declared independence from Ukraine and became the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. These republics were subsequently deemed terrorist organizations by President Poroshenko (Luhn and Walker 1 2014, Mosendz 2014). Violent conflict erupted as Ukrainian forces and separatist forces began the struggle of claiming, securing, and reclaiming territory in eastern Ukraine. On September