Unpacking Complexity in the Ukraine Peace Process

CSS Analyses in Security Policy CSS ETH Zurich No. 243, April 2019, Editor: Benno Zogg

The conflict in and around Ukraine seems to be immune to political settlement. The lack of political will of the parties and technical challenges have led to a stalemate in the implementation of the Minsk agreements, signed under international pressure. Unpacking the complexity of the Minsk Process allows for a better understanding of the challenges and modest results achieved so far.

By Anna Hess Sargsyan

The armed conflict in and around Ukraine entered its fifth year with ongoing ceasefire violations and with no political resolution in sight. The multi-format peace process dealing with the conflict, known as the Minsk Process, has very modest outcomes to show for it, despite regular meetings within the Trilateral Contact Group format, the mechanism mandated to work out modalities of implementation of the Minsk agreements. In the run-up to presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine, the implementation of the security and political provisions of the Minsk agreements, signed under international pressure, remain elusive.

When a peace process lasts for four years without tangible outcomes, it becomes an easy target for criticism as being ineffective and irrelevant, and runs the risk of discred- The dilapidated pedestrian bridge of Stanytsia Luhanska is the only crossing point between government and non-government-controlled areas in the Luhansk region. ICRC iting conflict resolution efforts. Some schol- ars pondered whether the conflict in Ukraine would become yet another pro- tracted conflict that Russia would use to se- cure its stronghold in the post-Soviet space. litical and technical realities around it. An litical will to do so. Unpacking this com- What seemed to be only a speculation back analysis of the rationale and positions of plexity not only sheds light on the chal- then, has turned into bitter reality. the parties sheds light on the influence of lenges of the Minsk Process, but also helps these factors on the process dynamics and identify openings for potentially revitaliz- This growing critique of the Minsk Process outcomes. This context and process analysis ing a deadlocked peace process. needs to be assessed by unpacking its com- in its turn raises the underlying question as plexity. A close look at the conflict back- to how effective the implementation of The conflict in and around Ukraine ground, the issues of contention and the agreements can be if they were signed un- In November 2013, then Ukrainian presi- key elements of the existing peace process der pressure and how any process can move dent Viktor Yanukovych backed out of the allows for a better understanding of the po- ahead if the parties involved lack the po- signature of the Association Agreement

with the European Union. Full of disap- aratist entities, both the Ukrainian govern- agreements. The multi-layered Ukraine pointment, hundreds of thousands of ment and civil society alike see Ukraine as peace process is a reflection of these com- Ukrainians went out into the streets of bearing the brunt of the conflict. Feeling plexities and provides the parties with di- Kyiv. The rapidly unfolding instability attacked by its neighbor and one-time ally, verse formats for negotiation mechanisms spread to the rest of the country and caused Ukraine sees the conflict as orchestrated to tackle issues of contention on multiple Yanukovych’s ousting. The power vacuum from outside and a blatant meddling in its levels. in Kyiv was followed by the annexation of internal affairs. Crimea by Russia and unrest in eastern The Minsk Matrix: Multiple Formats Ukraine, ultimately leading to the break- Russia on the other hand sees the conflict An amalgam of third party efforts ranging away of some parts of the Donetsk and Lu- as being between Kyiv and the breakaway from diplomacy, high-powered mediation areas, justifying its annexation to technical talks were underway to settle Despite all the low points, all key of Crimea as a means of pro- the conflict already in its early stages in actors remain committed to the tecting Russian-speaking pop- 2014. As the conflict was still flaring up, the ulations abroad, while provid- Organisation for Security and Cooperation settlement of the conflict in and ing support to the separatist in Europe (OSCE) under the Swiss presi- around Ukraine through the entities without openly ac- dency managed to set up a Special Monitor- knowledging it. Russia saw the ing Mission (SMM) with an agility and Minsk Process. Maidan protests as a regime speed unprecedented for the organization. change orchestrated by the Deployed in March 2014, after the annexa- hansk regions. Full-blown hostilities broke West and hence a direct threat to its geo- tion of Crimea and before the breakout of out between Russia-backed separatist forc- political interests. Losing Ukraine to the violence in the East, the SMM has been es in the two regions and the fledgling EU is a major blow to the Eurasian Eco- continuously facilitating local ceasefires. It Ukrainian army, which left Donbas divided nomic Union, Russia’s grand economic has a mandate to “ensure effective monitor- with a contact line between government scheme in the post-Soviet space. ing and reporting of the situation on the controlled areas (GCAs) and non-govern- ground, and towards reducing tensions and ment controlled areas (NGCAs). The loss The West, in particular the US, Germany fostering peace, stability and security in of Crimea, the NGCAs and the control and France perceived the Maidan protests Ukraine.” over its border with Russia undermined as homegrown and genuine demonstra- Ukraine’s sovereignty and further destabi- tions against a corrupt and oligarchic re- On 6 June 2014, on the fringes of the Nor- lized the country. gime, in their own right. There is a wide- mandy commemoration, German Chan- spread perception that Ukraine’s strive to cellor Angela Merkel together with then Over the past five years, the highly esca- become part of the European family of French president François Hollande bro- lated conflict has turned into a low sim- countries and to pursue its independent se- kered the first meeting between Russian mering conflict, with regular ceasefire vio- curity and foreign policy got hijacked by President Vladimir Putin and the newly lations and alarming human, economic and the conflict instigated by Russia. elected Ukrainian President Petro Porosh- political costs. It has claimed around enko. The concerted diplomatic effort -re 13,000 lives on all sides and caused massive When it comes to the breakaway areas of sulted in the creation of Normandy format displacement of hundreds of thousands of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, (N4) on the level of heads of states and people. It has left a whole region with a little space is given to their narratives. Un- governments, and/or foreign ministers. On devastated economy and aging population recognized by anyone internationally, in- the same day, the N4 decided to set up the in dire humanitarian conditions. All these cluding Russia, who is their political and Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), to be factors led to the erosion of trust on many military guarantor, these de facto authori- comprised of one representative from levels, causing an ongoing political and se- ties are seen as marionettes from all sides Ukraine and Russia respectively, with a curity standoff between Ukraine and Rus- – the West, Kyiv and Moscow alike. Special Representative to be designated by sia, a political and economic standoff be- the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office as its tween Russia and the West, antagonism These diametrically differing perspectives third member. and deteriorated relationships between so- on the conflict are reflected on the parties’ cieties in Ukraine and Russia, and severed positions on issues at the heart of the con- Despite the high-level diplomatic initia- ties between Ukraine and its NGCAs. De- flict and their perceptions of who the direct tives, military logic on the ground pre- spite all the low points in the relationships conflict parties are. The most salient ques- vailed. The Ukrainian army was losing of key actors of the conflict, however, they tion for Ukraine is full restoration of its ground to the Russia-backed forces in the all remain committed to the settlement of territorial integrity accompanied by a de- East incurring major territorial losses. The the conflict in and around Ukraine through militarization of the NGCAs from foreign Minsk agreements – the Minsk Protocol the Minsk Process. troops, whereas for Russia the political res- and Memorandum of September 2014 and olution of the conflict and the status of the the Package of Measures for the Imple- To understand the conflict resolution ini- self-proclaimed breakaway entities are cen- mentation of the Minsk Agreements of tiatives and the content of the Minsk tral. This presents a considerable challenge February 2015 – followed major military agreements at their basis, there is a need to for any third party and matters for key as- losses for the Ukrainian army. They were outline the issues of contention and to un- pects of peace process design, in particular both negotiated within the N4 format and derstand the competing narratives on the for the format and the agenda of talks, the serve as the basis of talks today within the causes and the consequences of the conflict participation of all relevant actors, their Minsk Process. The circumstances under in eastern Ukraine. Having lost Crimea to mandates and decision making power, as which the Minsk agreements were signed, Russia and NGCAs to Russia-backed sep- well as their commitment to potential the public perception that Ukraine is forced

to make too many unilateral concessions The Conflict in and around Ukraine and the fact that Russia is not mentioned as a conflict party, combined with the ex- clusion of the Crimea question have led to the reluctance of both the Ukrainian society and the political elite to support the Minsk Process.

The Minsk agreements entail key political, security, economic and humanitarian provisions. They call on all conflict parties in eastern Ukraine to observe immediate full- scale ceasefire, guarantee the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and for the Ukrainian con- stitution to allow for decentralization of power. The Minsk agreements further stip- ulate the release and exchange of hostages, restoration of socioeconomic ties between NGCAs and the rest of Ukraine, amnesty for persons directly involved in the events leading up to the breakup of the NGCAs, and full restoration of Ukraine’s sovereignty, including the control of its border with Russia. To come up with concrete implementation measures on the four key clus- ters, the Minsk Package of Measures also stipulated for the creation of four Sub- tant to understand the bigger picture with The currentdeadlock in the political and secu- Working Groups (WGs) under the TCG. all the formats but disaggregate it when rity working groups in the Minsk Process is looking at the results. Eventually, this dif- by and large due to timing and sequencing In essence, the N4 acts as a political guar- ferentiated viewpoint helps us understand of the key political and security related is- antor of the Minsk Process, namely the whether results serve the ultimate resolu- sues in the Minsk agreements. Moscow TCG, which in turn offers a platform to tion of the conflict, dealing with its causes, blames Kyiv for the lack of progress on the the four WGs, mandated to tackle security, or its management, dealing with its conse- political provisions to allow for decentral- political, humanitarian and economic is- quences. ization and local elections in the NGCAs, sues respectively. While the Normandy while Kyiv insists on full demilitarization format tackles high-level political issues, Conflict Resolution and Management of the conflict zone and restoration of con- the TCG is a trilateral convening body A friend and foe for any third party, control over the state border before imple- bringing together the two lead negotiators structive ambiguity allows room for ma- menting the political provisions fully. from Russia and Ukraine accompanied by neuver to bring conflict parties together for the OSCE Special Representative and talks in the short run, like setting up the However, incremental steps remain in overseeing the work of the WGs. The WG Minsk Process formats, but it might be- place, such as the law on special status for discussion rounds are the only format come a liability in the long-run. The fuzzy certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk where representatives of Kyiv and the NG- formulations of the Minsk agreements regions of Ukraine with a proviso that elec- CAs communicate with each other directly. seem to generate space for multiple inter- tions can take place in the NGCAs only in pretations by the parties, hence making the case of full demilitarization. On the secu- This unique setup lacks an institutional co- chances for an agreement to implement rity front, there has been marginal progress ordination mechanism among all the dif- specific measures very thin. This is further and withdrawal of weapons further away ferent formats, which can cause procedural complicated by procedural questions. Pro- from the contact line. Seasonal ceasefires challenges and hinder efficient have contributed to a significant decrease linkages. However, the fluidity The fluidity and multi-faceted of casualties in 2018. There have also been and multi-faceted nature of the nature of the Minsk Process recent efforts to break the current political Minsk Process allows for prog- deadlock by introducing elements of a pos- ress in one format even when allows for progress in one format sible UN peacekeeping mission in the con- work in the others is not mov- even when work in the others is flict zone, without much success so far. ing ahead. While the political contexts in Ukraine, Russia and not moving ahead. While the sequencing of implementation the West have not been condu- of the political and security issues hinders cive to enabling N4 meetings since 2016, ceedings are usually not recorded, which substantial progress towards the resolution the TCG and WG meetings have taken has direct implications for the roles and re- of the conflict, work has been progressing place almost every two weeks in Minsk and sponsibilities of the parties present at the due to the dynamics within the humanitari- the SMM work on the ground has contin- discussions. Furthermore, the parties’ lack an and economic working groups. Tangible ued uninterrupted. To analyze the efficien- of decision-making power at the table ren- efforts have been underway to alleviate cy of the Minsk Process, it is hence impor- ders commitments very weak. livelihoods of the affected populations

Switzerland and the Peace Process basic services for a dignified life. However, their feet and delay implementation, mak- the political settlement of the conflict re- ing the premise of a success for the overall In June 2014, during its OSCE Presidency, mains elusive, ceasefire violations by armed Minsk Process rather shaky. Over time, a Switzerland appointed Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini as the OSCE Special Representative actors occur regularly and socio-economic lack of tangible progress has further eroded for Ukraine. She served in this capacity ties between Ukraine and its NGCAs re- trust between parties, positions have hard- within the Trilateral Contact Group from the main severed. ened, and societal perceptions of the utility summer of 2014 until June 2015. Since then, and relevance of the Minsk Process have Switzerland has supported the Trilateral The lack of tangible progress in the Minsk become even more unfavorable than they Contact Group and its four working groups through Ambassador Toni Frisch, OSCE Process can be attributed to a constellation were before. Co-ordinator of the Working Group on of factors, most conspicuously, to the lack Humanitarian Affairs. Furthermore, of political will from key actors. The cir- Whether it is possible to ripen parties’ po- Switzerland deployed up to 16 monitors to cumstances under which the Minsk agree- litical will and reinvigorate efforts to un- and, until October 2018, Alexander Hug as ments were signed illustrate the limitations block the political impasse remains an deputy head of the OSCE’s Special Monitor- ing Mission in Ukraine of the use of pressure to bring parties to an open question. In the current year of both agreement. With the Ukrainian army presidential and parliamentary elections in quickly losing ground to the Russia-backed Ukraine, it is hard to imagine any progress. forces in the East, the agreements were The larger political climate among Western necessary to stop the violence on the actors and Russia is not conducive either ground and force the parties to talks. How- for bringing in renewed energy into the across the line of contact. Parties have been ever, the agreement signed in a military political echelons of the Minsk Process. able to agree on a detainee exchange in logic of the unfolding events comes with its While so far all parties easily dismiss the 2017, to undertake joint efforts for water limitations and poses challenges for imple- Minsk Process as ineffective, they seem to provision from GCAs to NGCAs and mentation. Ukraine had very little choice tacitly agree that there is no alternative at guarantee respective payments. Repairs of but to sign an agreement largely deemed by present. With all its challenges, the Minsk water infrastructure along the line of con- its public, the government and the parlia- Process has served as a communications tact take place due to the regular discus- ment as being unfavorable. From the Rus- and conflict management platform, with sions in the Minsk meetings. Also, the par- sian perspective, the Minsk agreements very modest but tangible results on the ties have managed to agree on the need to be implemented both by Ukraine ground that improve the lives of those restoration of the Vodafone network in the and the unrecognized breakaway entities. most affected by the conflict. It is in this NGCAs, the only mobile phone service Neither political elites nor the domestic sense that it should continue its work, be- across the line of contact. constituencies in Russia are in a position to cause every life matters and as the classics oppose the Minsk agreements, and even say “jaw jaw is better, than war, war.” Matter of Political Will or Formats? though implementation of these provisions The brief summary of the challenges and are closely linked to a lifting of the West- successes of the Minsk Process highlights ern sanctions against Russia, this does not the nature of its work as that of conflict give them enough incentives to settle the management, rather than conflict resolu- conflict. tion. By serving as a regular communica- Anna Hess Sargsyan is a Senior Programme Officer tion platform, it allows for progress on hu- Given lack of political will from all parties at the CSS. Her work in Ukraine ranges from manitarian issues from saving civilian lives combined with procedural and technical educational management to expert support to to enabling communication and access to challenges, conflict parties can easily drag dialogue processes on different levels.

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