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European Union European Union Background Guide B CAHSMUN XVII Letter from the Director Dear delegates, My name is Cynthia Gan, and it is my pleasure to welcome you to the European Union committee (EU). I will be serving as your Director, and along with my Chair and Assistant Director, Owen Hawes and Stephanie Hai, I look forward to watching the committee engage in debate over the course of CAHSMUN 2021. Starting my own Model UN journey as a shy—and somewhat terrified—delegate at the beginning of my sophomore year, I have since seen myself and those around me grow in various aspects since that first raised placard and nerve-wracking walk to the podium. On a deeper level than simply a public speaking activity, Model UN challenges you as a global citizen and as a thinker; through Model UN, I have attained some of my most cherished memories, and I whole-heartedly encourage you to strive beyond your comfort zone, whether you are new to the Model UN scene or a seasoned veteran. This year, the committee will be tackling the issue of Asylum Policy Review within the EU and assessing the effectiveness of the Minsk Protocol. With the effects of these issues being intricately interconnected to the global community as well as to each of the member states within the Union, delegates will need to address the various aspects of these multi-faceted topics in order to come to a comprehensive solution. It is expected of delegates in the EU to prepare and research thoroughly on both topics as well as your own country’s stances and policies in order to uphold fruitful and productive committee sessions. The Dais highly recommends that delegates write a position paper, as this will prepare you to navigate debate over the course of three days with success. We encourage you to immerse yourself in in-depth research leading up to CAHSMUN 2021, and assure you that the more you invest in this unique and rewarding experience, the more you will ultimately walk away with. As a Dais team, we look forward to a weekend of exciting debate, leadership, and diplomacy, in the true fashion of Model United Nations. Should you have any questions or concerns about the topics, committee, background guide, or Model UN in general, please feel free to send us an email at [email protected]. I look forward to meeting each of you at CAHSMUN 2021! Welcome to the European Union. Sincerely, Cynthia Gan Director of EU — CAHSMUN 2021 Committee Description The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union officially formed in 1993, consisting of 27 different member states across Europe. Being both the largest political union and the largest trade block in the world, the EU is founded on principles of free trade among its members and is also committed to liberalizing world trade long-term;1 it is based on a single market which aims to enable free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons within the EU.2 The EU functions on a representative democracy and is based on the rule of law. All laws enforced by the EU are founded upon treaties that are negotiated and agreed upon by its member countries. The European Court of Justice, as the supreme court across all member states, holds final jurisdiction in matters of the EU law, as well as its equal application across member states.3 An early-stage form of the EU was created in 1958 shortly after World War II. The main focus was to foster economic cooperation, under the belief that nations would be more likely to maintain peace if they were trade partners and economically interdependent. This idea resulted in the European Economic Community (EEC), initially consisting of six member states (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). Since then, membership has expanded to 22 other countries, prior to the exit of the United Kingdom in 2020, creating and continuously developing a large single market across member states. Although the EU began mainly as an economic union, it has expanded over the years to involve collective policy areas across member states, including areas such as climate change, health, external relations, security, and migration. This growth eventually led to the organization changing its name from the EEC to the EU in 1993. Since then, the EU has focused on a vast number of topics both domestic and international, including the promotion of peace and well-being of its citizens, offering freedom, security, and justice without internal borders, scientific and technological progress, and economic growth and stability established upon the euro currency.4 As the largest trade block and largest donor of humanitarian aid in the world, the EU is committed to helping victims of both man-made and natural disasters internationally, making this union a prominent actor on the global stage. The EU’s significance in past domestic and 1 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu_en 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en international affairs is reflected in accomplishments such as creating the largest programme of environmental legislation in the world, ratifying the Paris Agreement in 2016, and acting as one of the main donors of humanitarian aid in the Syrian refugee crisis.5 Overview of Topic The Minsk Protocol was a peace agreement signed by Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People’s Republic, and the Luhansk People’s Republic in 2014. It was created to provide relief to the ongoing Donbass War in eastern Ukraine which began in the spring of 2014.6 This conflict, largely between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists, has caused immense damage to the daily lives of civilians living in areas surrounding the conflict zone. Past agreements have done little to solve the issue. Escalating from years of Russian forces gradually pushing into Ukrainian borders, the Donbass war is the result of Russian-separatist rebels, backed by government military forces, collectively fighting against Ukraine’s government forces at its borders. Over the past five years, over 10,000 individuals have been killed, including thousands of civilians.7 Previously one of the most densely populated regions of Ukraine, Donbass has seen roughly a million individuals displaced as a result of the ongoing war.8 The Minsk Protocol (also known as Minsk-1), in conjunction with the Minsk Memorandum of September 2014, was the first agreement for ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, followed later by the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, or Minsk-2.9 The specifics of these agreements are often vague and convoluted, especially when it comes to delegating responsibilities to individual countries in order to bring the conflict to a close. Although both Ukrainian and EU politicians have claimed that the Minsk Agreements are the best option to achieve peace, many experts predict that Donbass may simply become a frozen conflict zone, wherein active armed conflict has halted, but no legitimate resolution satisfies both parties involved.10 The EU is a close partner of Ukraine and, along with the United States, has imposed sanctions against Russia in response to the conflict.11 These sanctions were implemented in 2014 and 5 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en 6 http://euromaidanpress.com/minsk-agreements-faq/ 7https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/01/21/assessing_the_failure_of_minsk_ii_in_ukraine_and_the_suc cess_of_the_2008_ceasefire_in_georgia_114118.html 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. continue to be in place, with the overarching purpose of ending Russian military intervention in Ukraine.12 Russia, however, continues to demand for the autonomy of Donbass, as part of its efforts in gradually gaining control of Ukraine.13 Russia’s main goal is to create conditions within the Minsk Agreements that allow for Ukraine to regain Donbass and that leave a potential for Russian interference in Ukraine’s internal government affairs. With mutually exclusive goals on either sides of the conflict, negotiations for a ceasefire repeatedly come to a stalemate. Timeline August 24, 1991 - Ukraine declares itself as an independent state, signifying its separation from the Soviet Union.14 July 2, 1993 - Ukraine passes the document On the Key Directions of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine, which declares the nation’s aspirations for integrating into the EU.15 February 22, 2007 - Ukraine passes the Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which includes directions on beginning negotiations and cooperation with the EU.16 2013 - Ukraine’s pro-Russia president, Victor Yanukovych, is offered a free trade agreement with the EU. He does not accept, instead choosing a deal with Russia; many Ukrainian citizens who wanted closer ties between Europe and Ukraine are upset by this deal.17 February 2014 — March 2014 - Russia annexes Crimea after President Victor Yanukovych flees Kyiv, Ukraine. Yanukovych faces severe public backlash as a result of the Russian trade deal, prompting Russian president Vladmir Putin to hold a ‘private’ referendum, in which he claims 80% of Crimean citizens voted in favour of becoming a part of Russia.18 12 http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/rap_otw_eu/The%20Minsk%20(dis)agreement%20and%20Europe%E2% 80%99s%20security%20order.pdf 13 http://euromaidanpress.com/minsk-agreements-faq/ 14 https://theweek.com/articles/449691/ukraines-fraught-relationship-russia-brief-history 15 https://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-eu/relations 16 Ibid. 17 https://www.heritage.org/europe/heritage-explains/what-you-need-know-about-the-war-ukraine 18
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