Security Council Provisional Asdf Sixty-Ninth Year 7311Th Meeting Wednesday, 12 November 2014, 2.30 P.M

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Security Council Provisional Asdf Sixty-Ninth Year 7311Th Meeting Wednesday, 12 November 2014, 2.30 P.M United Nations S/ PV.7311 Security Council Provisional asdf Sixty-ninth year 7311th meeting Wednesday, 12 November 2014, 2.30 p.m. New York President: Mr. Quinlan . .................................... (Australia) Members: Argentina . ...................................... Mr. Oyarzábal Chad .......................................... Mr. Mangaral Chile .......................................... Mr. Olguín Cigarroa China .......................................... Mr. Wang Min France ......................................... Mr. Delattre Jordan ......................................... Mr. Omaish Lithuania ....................................... Ms. Murmokaitė Luxembourg .................................... Ms. Lucas Nigeria . ........................................ Mr. Laro Republic of Korea ................................ Mr. Oh Joon Russian Federation ............................... Mr. Pankin Rwanda ........................................ Mr. Nduhungirehe United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ... Sir Mark Lyall Grant United States of America ........................... Ms. Power Agenda Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136) This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506. Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org). 14-62253 (E) *1462253* S/PV.7311 Ukraine 12/11/2014 The meeting was called to order at 2.30 p.m. reforms to which the Ukrainian authorities have committed themselves. Clearly, the ability of the Adoption of the agenda leading coalition to work constructively alongside the opposition bloc will also be key for the unity and The agenda was adopted. stability of Ukraine. We also hope to see an urgent start of a comprehensive national dialogue to rebuild Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the cohesion and address all outstanding critical national Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the issues. United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2014/136) On 2 November, rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk held their own elections, in defiance of the Ukrainian The President: In accordance with rule 37 of the Government, which were deplored by many in the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite the international community, including the Secretary- representative of Ukraine to participate in this meeting. General. These elections have been condemned by the In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s Ukrainian authorities as being outside the framework provisional rules of procedure, I invite the following of the Ukrainian Constitution and law. Following the briefers to participate in this meeting: Mr. Jens Anders elections, the rebels have engaged in inflammatory Toyberg-Frandzen, Assistant Secretary-General ad rhetoric, declaring themselves as de facto independent interim for Political Affairs; Ambassador Ertuğrul from Ukraine and threatening to expand the territory Apakan, Chief Monitor of the Organization for Security under their control. A full mobilization, including the and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring creation of local armies and security forces, was also Mission to Ukraine; and Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, announced. In response, President Poroshenko has representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. proposed that Parliament revoke the law providing for three years of greater autonomy or special status On behalf of the Council, I welcome Ambassadors for the rebel-controlled areas that had been offered as Apakan and Tagliavini, who are joining today’s meeting fulfilment of a key tenet of the Minsk protocol. Also, on by video teleconference from Kyiv. 5 November, Prime Minister Yatsenyuk announced that The Security Council will now begin its pensions and subsidies would be halted to areas under consideration of the item on its agenda. rebel control. I give the floor to Mr. Toyberg-Frandzen. On 3 November, hostilities in the east reignited, with the potential to further undermine the Minsk Mr. Toyberg-Frandzen: My briefing today will agreement. Currently, the security situation in Donetsk focus on two specific issues: political developments and Luhansk almost rivals the period immediately in Ukraine and the latest developments related to the preceding the ceasefire agreement of 5 September. conflict in the east of the country. I will also provide a Citing credible threats from the rebel leadership that brief update on the United Nations activities in relation it would launch a new offensive, on 4 November, to Ukraine. President Poroshenko ordered army reinforcements to On 26 October, Ukraine held its early parliamentary key cities in southern and eastern Ukraine. Reaffirming elections. Although there was no voting in Crimea and that Kyiv sees no military solution to the conflict and the parts of Donbas under rebel control, elections were that it would not attempt to retake rebel areas held by held throughout the rest of Ukraine in a manner that rebel force, the President’s stated objective is to protect Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Ukraine’s territory from any further incursions. (OSCE) observers welcomed as largely upholding This past weekend, particularly on the night of democratic commitments. Yesterday, 11 November, the 9 November, hostilities were reported to be at their Central Electoral Commission announced the official worst in months, with a heavy exchange of artillery results of the elections. and shelling in and around Donetsk. A similar level of Discussions are under way for the formation of fighting was reported today. Lives continue to be lost a Government, and we are hopeful that the leading daily, including those of two schoolchildren as a result coalition will be committed to the rapid implementation of shelling in Donetsk on 5 November. of the comprehensive political, legal and economic 2/24 14-62253 12/11/2014 Ukraine S/PV.7311 The upsurge in fighting comes amidst regular With nearly 1 million people now displaced by reports from the OSCE of an influx of large convoys of this conflict, both within Ukraine and to neighbouring heavy weapons, tanks and troops flowing into rebel-held countries, humanitarian agencies continue to scale areas. In that connection, there is no doubt that a failure up their presence and respond to the growing needs. to secure the Russian-Ukrainian border is a factor that The United Nations is also leading a comprehensive continues to impede the path to peace. Meanwhile, the recovery and peacebuilding assessment to conflict- humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate in parts affected, Government-held areas in eastern Ukraine of Donbas. With the onset of harsh winter conditions, that also includes participation by the European Union the number of internally displaced persons is expected and the World Bank. Finally, in continuation of the to increase. If there is a return to full-scale fighting, the Secretary-General’s good offices, Under-Secretary- numbers could grow exponentially. General Feltman is slated to travel to Ukraine again in the near future, pending the formation of the new While Ambassador Apakan will brief members Government. in more detail as to the situation on the ground, one thing is clear — the ceasefire of 5 September is In conclusion, the promise of renewal and of renewed under continuous and serious strain. If the prevailing energy towards solving Ukraine’s problems embodied hostilities continue, the Minsk agreements could in the recent parliamentary elections threatens to be undoubtedly be in jeopardy. Further consultations of overshadowed by the worsening security situation in the Trilateral Contact Group with rebel representatives the east of the country. Nonetheless, the prospect that have not been scheduled, while the self-proclaimed a new, reform-oriented ruling coalition will be formed, leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics empowering it to move the country closer to a path have reportedly signalled that they would not participate of peace and stability, provides the avenue for all to in future consultations, appointing persons of lesser support Ukraine out of this debilitating conflict. authority in their place. Ambassador Tagliavini will be With the Minsk agreements in question and providing further details on that issue. uncertainty over how much strain the ceasefire can Yet, while these agreements have been breached in withstand, we are deeply concerned by the possibility various respects and are fragile, it is critical to note that of a return to full-scale fighting. Alternatively, the no side has unilaterally abrogated them. In recent days, conflict may simmer this way for months, with sporadic, there have been some small, albeit positive steps toward low-level battles marked by periods of increased implementation, such as a meeting between the general hostilities and further casualties. While either scenario staff of the Russian and Ukrainian military on a line would be a catastrophe for Ukraine, a third prospect of of delimitation.
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