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Analytical Digest Russian No. 242 3 December 2019 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html www.laender-analysen.de RUSSIA–UKRAINE ■■ANALYSIS A New Momentum for Settling the Donbas Conflict? 2 By André Härtel, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” ■■OPINION POLL Ukrainian and Russian Popular Opinion on the Conflict in the Donbas 5 ■■MAP Disengagement of Troops in the Donbas 12 ■■ANALYSIS The Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia on Gas Transit: A Progress Report 12 By Julia Kusznir, Jacobs University Bremen ■■STATISTICS Imports and Consumption of Natural Gas in Ukraine 16 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies Security Studies Eastern European Studies East European Studies The George Washington University University of Bremen ETH Zurich University of Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 242, 3 December 2019 2 ANALYSIS A New Momentum for Settling the Donbas Conflict? By André Härtel, National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000382152 Abstract: Despite some early signs of movement in resolving the Donbas conflict between Ukraine and Russia, there is no clear path forward yet. Ukraine’s young President Volodymyr Zelensky is still working to construct a set of policies that will be acceptable to his divided population. The Russians seem to benefit from the status quo. Similarly, numerous questions remain about how to implement Minsk 2 at a time when the West seems to be tiring of sanctions and more focused on other issues. Zelensky’s Surprise Election Brings New and the public mood then was that any further losses or Hope concessions would upend the Ukrainian state. Already The war in Donbass is in its sixth year and has so far in late summer 2015 Ukrainian legislation on decen- left approximately 13,000 people dead. The fighting in tralization and more autonomy for the occupied terri- both the occupied territories consisting of the so-called tories (to say nothing of a Minsk-style “special status”) “Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)” and the “Luhansk was accompanied by violent and deadly clashes between People’s Republic (LNR)” and the Ukrainian-held parts nationalist protestors and the police. As a result, Presi- of the respective oblasts has taken a serious toll and dire dent Poroshenko began to understand both his lack of humanitarian and economic conditions prevail, espe- negotiating leverage due to a growing patriotic-nation- cially at the contact line. The Minsk Agreements of alist sentiment in his country (one of the main results of February 2015 (Minsk II) have so far ensured a fragile the Revolution of Dignity and the war) and the domes- ceasefire, but were never fully implemented by either tic political calculations that he would need to make. the Ukrainian or Russian sides as would be necessary That the Ukrainian president made the war with to end this conflict. With the unexpected rise of Volo- Russian and separatist forces the main theme of his dymyr Zelensky to the Ukrainian presidency in Spring term was, however, as much his choice as a consequence 2019, and the absolute majority he won in parliamen- of Russia’s behavior. The Kremlin from 2015 onwards tary elections shortly afterwards, the overall atmosphere never showed much interest in conflict resolution and has changed. Zelensky’s election platform, promising despite Western sanctions applied a consistent tactic of to speed up negotiations in the Normandy Format and confrontation vis-à-vis Ukraine. Moscow continued to end the war, a high-level prisoner exchange in early Sep- fortify the so-called “DNR” and “LNR” militarily and tember, and the general agreement of the Ukrainian instructed them to demonstrate as much bellicosity and side to the so-called “Steinmeier Formula” at the begin- intransigence possible under a working cease-fire agree- ning of October, have brought hope for new momen- ment. At the same time, Russian Donbas-policy was tum and the beginning of a genuine settlement process. curated mostly by the infamous Vladislav Surkov, who This article analyses the current situation and asks if we engineered a more Kremlin-convenient elite set-up in can really expect significant progress in the near future. both entities and drew them ever closer into a Moscow- dominated security, economic, and media space. The 2015–2019: Poroshenko—the “War Russian portrayal of Poroshenko as a “war president” and President”? his political allies in Kyiv as the “party of war” therefore In order to assess what has changed recently it makes first of all served Russian interests in a perpetuation of sense to take a brief look first at the conflict’s dynamics the post-Minsk II status quo in Donbas. and the related policies of the Ukrainians, Russians The international community, and especially the and other participants in recent years. After the Minsk Normandy format participants Germany and France, Agreements of February 2015 were able to stop large- for various reasons seemed to have exhausted their polit- scale hostilities and establish a more or less stable con- ical will to invest much into conflict regulation after tact line between the occupied territories and the rest the Minsk Agreements. Especially the Germans, who of Ukraine, it soon became clear that the framework took the lead in the management of the EU sanctions agreed to in the Belarusian capital was a challenge first regime against Moscow and in negotiating the cease- of all to the Ukrainian side. The country’s sovereignty fire in Minsk, where unable from late 2015 onwards to had been compromised by annexation and intervention exert much leadership. With anti-Russian sanctions still RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 242, 3 December 2019 3 unpopular among the German public and the migra- tired of both the war and the former president’s rigid tion crisis both constraining foreign policy resources and Ukrainization campaign. Still, even many Ukrainian significantly hurting Angela Merkel’s standing, Berlin observers were irritated by how much Zelensky priori- slowly lost its earlier courage. At the same time, calls for tized conflict regulation from his first day in office and a more progressive engagement of the United States in how soon he implemented, at first unilaterally, moves the Normandy Format fell on deaf ears in Washington, such as the withdrawal of Ukraine’s armed forces near where conflict resolution in Donbas is still perceived as Stanytsia Luhanska already in June this year. Zelensky’s a European matter. reasoning, aside from the population’s war fatigue, is however easily explained: the ongoing confrontation is The Minsk Agreements—Still the Way to an unbearable burden to Ukraine’s economic recovery Go? (the government’s “anti-terrorist operation”/“operation Over the years the Minsk Agreements have come under united forces” comes at a cost of approximately 4 mil- heavy criticism especially from the Ukrainian side and lion Euros a day) and a significant distraction from the neutral observers. Indeed, the technical flaws, such as the new president’s ambitious reform agenda. uncertainty about the sequencing of the steps towards However understandable in general, Zelensky’s regulation and the lack of detail regarding even the most policy approach is not without risks and might ulti- crucial points (elections, border management, special mately be ill-fated. First, one of the main concerns is that status), are more than obvious. the hasty approach applied now might come at the cost of Yet, any peace agreement first of all reflects the de- quality decisions. Zelensky, as demonstrated by his now facto situation on the ground at the time of its signing. public telephone call with U.S. President Donald Trump, In early 2015 Ukrainian regular and volunteer forces had is a foreign policy novice and so far lacks the support of been badly hit and driven out of Debaltsevo by the com- a professional foreign policy machinery. Many Ukrain- bined thrust of regular Russian and separatist fighters, ian experts see his actions as guided by intuition rather who threatened to advance even further into Ukrainian than strategy, which seems to be confirmed by a presi- territory and take a then fragile post-revolutionary state dential administration and foreign ministry who seem and economy to the brink. In many ways therefore the to be in competition with each other to issue superficial Minsk Agreements, with their insistence on changing statements announcing different “plans” for peace in the the Ukrainian constitution in favor of foreign-backed Donbas. Second, Ukrainian public opinion on the Don- insurgents, bore an anti-Ukrainian bias and could be bas conflict is much more contradictory than commonly interpreted as a confirmation of Russian strategic success. assumed, which might develop into a source of domes- The Minsk-ensured “low-key” cease fire, on the other tic contention that Zelensky will still need to address hand, also provided the foundation of Ukraine’s slow and manage. While indeed a large majority of Ukrain- restoration as a functioning state and economy ever ians wanted the new president to prioritize peace in the since. Although it is understandable that Ukrainians, Donbas (in summer 2019, almost 70% opted for a nego- with their now reformed and modernized army, and tiated peace, 20.1% “without any conditions”), and even a stable contact line in place, are more than uncomfort- to negotiate directly with the DNR/LNR-authorities able with the spirit and letter of Minsk, their critique (41.5%), and re-integrate Donbas into Ukraine (56%), is somehow ahistorical. Arguably, the visible success of only a minority of 26% are willing to accept a “special the Agreements in securing at least a “negative peace” status” for the so called “DNR” and “LNR” entities in and Ukraine’s Western partners’ continuous reference Ukraine’s constitution or to changes in Ukraine’s now to them as the sole basis for further progress make any clearly Western-oriented foreign policy (24.7%).
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