UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCE TRN419

SAVING : Comparative American, British, and Canadian Policy Toward Indonesia, 1961-1965

Maria Monica Layarda Supervised by Professor Robert Bothwell & Julie Gilmour

2017 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

*The author is grateful for the guidance, encouragement, and inspiration from her course instructors, Professor Robert Bothwell and Julie Gilmour, throughout the writing of this paper. A special thanks is due to historian David Webster who answered this author’s substantive and research methods queries in writing (on Dec 6-7, 2016) and via Skype interview (on March 21, 2017) and to Dr. Dirks who diligently provided help to navigate various archival databases, especially in requesting documents through the rather complex Canadian national archive. The author is also indebted to Trinity and Robarts librarians who provided general research help and advice.

2 Maria Monica Layarda

The geographical broadening of the academic world and waves of archival opening throughout the

1990s have led to the globalization of Cold War narrative.1 While Cold War historians—orthodox and revisionist alike—were once focused on the American-Soviet rivalry on the European theatre, Cold War narrative has expanded to encompass the periphery. The ensuing growth of Third World historiography has also largely revised the conventional portrayal of the Third World actors from being “victims” into active players who influenced and constrained the principal belligerents. In many cases, these “alleged puppets were less victims than puppeteers”.2 This was especially true in Asia where local agency was responsible for turning the cold hostility into a hot conflict, bringing the lead actors into the Asian theatre.

Along with this broader progression, Cold War scholarship on Southeast Asia has grown correspondingly, albeit with a premium placed on Vietnam. Indonesia, once the largest domino in the region and home to the world’s third largest communist movement after that of and the has curiously escaped much historical scrutiny.3 Despite representing Asia’s most momentous shift in the

Cold War balance of power since China turned communist in 1949, the swift downfall of Indonesia’s communist movement in 1965 was quickly overshadowed by the broadening of Western involvement in

Vietnam. The state of scholarly research on Indonesia has also continued to lag under the shadow of

Vietnam, leaving much room for further inquiry.

This essay aims to bridge the gap within the existing Cold War scholarship on Indonesia by analyzing the evolution of American, British, and Canadian policy towards Indonesia in the turbulent mid-

1960s beginning with John F. Kennedy’s inauguration as the new American president up to the 1965 military coup, which brought a country of a hundred million people into the Western orbit under the staunchly anti-communist military dictatorship of General . A comparative approach to the topic provides a particularly valuable window into the complexities of the Western alliance during the Cold

1 See for instance Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 2 See Pierre Grosser, “Looking for the core of the Cold War, and finding a mirage?” Cold War History, Vol.15, No. 2 (2015), 245-252. 3 Surveys of bibliographical compilations reveals this. See for instance, Robert L Beisner, American Foreign Relations Since 1600: A Guide to the Literature, Vol. 1 (CA: the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 2003).

3 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

War. Despite belonging to the same anti-communist Western alliance and sharing similar Cold War assumptions and objectives, the three countries had prima facie different experiences with Indonesia shaped by their unique international positions, national circumstances, and not least, individual leaders.

The US saw Indonesia mostly through a binary Cold War prism as a key domino whose collapse would jeopardize American containment efforts in the Pacific. To Kennedy and Johnson, preventing the fall of Indonesia into the Soviet or Chinese Communist camps, as would be the case in Vietnam, was necessary to American credibility and security and this priority agenda would not be compromised by any other considerations—including the core interests of its closest allies. This obsessive fear of communism, especially of growingly assertive China, persistently underlay US policies, whether the soft developmental approach or the hard-line subversive strategy. Britain, in contrast, placed Indonesia within the context of decolonization. ’s opposition to (known as Konfrontasi campaign) was seen as a grave threat to Whitehall’s attempt to balance its ambition to maintain its global influence and perpetuate its informal empire in the age of national self-determination. Finally, Canada became involved with Indonesia by virtue of its alliance to Britain and the US despite its relative geographical and political isolation from the Pacific affairs. Throughout the first half of the 1960s, Canada found itself between two quarreling allies as the White House and Downing Street developed divergent Indonesia-policies during the WNG crisis and Konfrontasi. In response, Canada opted for the safest middle path of avoidance and disengagement, rather than Suez-style constructive engagement.

Section I briefly charts the gravitational shift of the East-West struggle into the Third World and situates Indonesia within this context. Section II, III, and IV analyze the evolution of respectively

American, British, and Canadian policy toward Indonesia. Using Waltz’s multi-level analytical framework, these sections analyze the interactions of international environments, national features, and personalities in determining foreign policy. Section V concludes.

4 Maria Monica Layarda

I. COLD WAR IN THE AGE OF DECOLONIZATION

By the 1950s, no longer was there any dispute as to whether the Cold War had begun. The iron curtain had clearly descended and various political, security, and socioeconomic institutions crystallized the separation between the East and West in . Both camps believed in their superiority and vowed to create a world in their self-image. What started as an ideological struggle between the American-led democratic capitalist states and the Soviet-led Eastern communist states soon led to its first bloodbath in

Korea. It was into this bipolar world that the newly-decolonized states across Africa, Asia, and Latin

America were born in 1950s-60s. Given that their political allegiance was yet to be decided, they provided a fertile battleground for the two superpowers to expand their geopolitical flout and “prove the universal

4 applicability of their ideologies”.

The Korean War marked a decisive shift in the focal point of the Cold War outside of the primary

European theatre. While both sides had conceded to the uneasy status quo in vital areas of Europe in the

1960s, the Third World began to be a prominent agenda in American and Soviet foreign policies. In the

USSR, Khruschev’s rise to power in 1953 inaugurated a significant revision of Soviet Cold War strategy.

Khrushchev not only rejected Stalinism and embraced a “peaceful coexistence” with the West, he also revived Soviet commitment to international socialism. With decolonization unraveling in the background,

Khrushchev specifically adopted a revolutionary, anti-imperialist agenda and pledged to support “wars of national liberation”. The Third World, most of whose members were either still fighting for independence or had recently come out of these bitter struggles, became the Soviets’ most logical targets. The USSR

5 subsequently expanded its economic and technical assistance beyond the communist bloc to these states.

To this new Communist challenge, subsequent US presidents from Eisenhower to Johnson pledged a firm

American response though each relied on different means.

4 Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-4. 5 Khrushchev speech in 1961 cited in Lezek Buszynski, “Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia”. (: Routledge, 2013).

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While the Communist powers were especially well-placed to exploit the nationalist, anti-imperial sentiment that ran high across the newly-independent former colonies, the opposite held true for the

Western camp comprised of former colonial masters. The tensions between containment efforts and decolonization dynamics came head-to-head in Indonesia where the two major international crises in the country implicated issues of . The first crisis emerged over West (WNG), the

Netherlands’ most far eastern colony that remained under Dutch sovereignty after the Dutch government formally recognized Indonesian sovereignty in 1949. Since then, Indonesia pursued unsuccessful diplomatic bilateral negotiations to obtain sovereignty over WNG before raising its territorial claims at the

UN. Given its diplomatic lack of success, beginning in 1960, Indonesia pursued a confrontational policy combining diplomatic and political pressures with limited military force to forcefully seize the territory.

In 1962, US-brokered peace oversaw the transfer of WNG to Indonesia. Soon after, the second colonial crisis, greater in magnitude, erupted over the establishment of Malaysia which merged British colonies in the Malay peninsula. This time, Indonesia accused Malaysia as Britain’s neo-colonial creation designed to perpetuate British colonial influence in the region and Indonesian President Sukarno vowed to “crush” it. While preventing Indonesia, a country with immense geopolitical value, from becoming communist was a goal shared equally by members of the Western alliance, subsequent sections will illustrate that national objectives and circumstances uniquely shaped their reactions to the same series of crises in

Indonesia and their approach toward containment.

During this turbulent period, Western relations with Indonesia were further complicated by the personality of the country’s founding father, President Sukarno, a revolutionary, nationalist leader with great charisma, flamboyance and vanity. As the ultimate person in charge of Indonesia’s foreign policy conduct, his mercurial personality and contradictory public statements led to unpredictable swings in the country’s foreign policy and created difficulty for external observers to accurately assess his intentions.6

Most disturbingly for Western governments was Sukarno’s commitment to a non-aligned foreign policy

6 John Subritzky(a), Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-5 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000), 6.

6 Maria Monica Layarda and his personal sympathy for socialism. While these two traits were not uncommon among the Third

World leaders at the time, Sukarno would grow increasingly belligerent in the early 1960s. He began espousing his leftist revolutionary doctrine of continuous struggle by the newly-decolonized states

(NEFOS) against old established imperial powers (OLDEFOS) to voice his antagonism toward colonialism—associated with white western powers—and to advance his personal ambitions to project himself as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement.7 The radicalization of Indonesia’s foreign policy and the country’s growing relations with Moscow and Peking caused great alarm across the Western

8 world.

II. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: SOUTHEAST ASIA’S LARGEST DOMINO

Since President Truman pledged in 1947 “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,”9 containment became the bastion of American

Cold War foreign policy until the final days of the USSR. The US came to adopt a dualistic view of the world in which communism was seen as the evil that threatened American survival. The “falling domino theory” popularized by Eisenhower in 1950s further stretched the fluid definition of national interest.

Within this monolithic understanding of global communism, a fall of one country to communism would trigger subsequent losses in the region resembling a domino effect. This ultimately expanded the scope of

American containment to encompass far-flung areas across the world not least the newly-decolonized

Southeast Asian region where communist threats emanated not just from Kremlin but also Beijing.

It did not take long before Indonesia’s economic, demographic, and geopolitical strategic value turned it into a Cold War battlefield where the Soviets and Americans, soon to be joined by the growingly assertive Chinese, directly and ferociously competed to sway the country into their orbit through aid and diplomatic offensives in the early 1960s. From Eisenhower to Johnson, American Indonesia-policy was

7 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism. (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore, 1994), 21. 8 Franklin B Weinstein, Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto (Itacha: Cornell University Press, 1976), 296-298. 9 Truman Doctrine. Office of the Historians. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine.

7 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 motivated by the same Cold War objective to “[prevent] Communist control of Indonesia” and “[establish] a politically stable, economically viable nation, friendly to the Free World.”10 These objectives, first produced by in 1959 during the Eisenhower era, was to be reiterated verbatim in the NSC report preparing for Kennedy’s inauguration. All the three subsequent US administrations saw Indonesia as the “domino” in Asia they could not afford to lose after the “loss of China”. A communist Indonesia would “isolate

Australia and New Zealand, serve as a communist launching area [to capture Asia], and deny the Free

World countries resources which the seeks to deny the communists.”11 Not only would the loss of Indonesia have grave repercussions for the US’ overall containment efforts in the Pacific, it would almost guarantee an ensuing electoral loss. Indeed, on the eve of American war escalation in Vietnam,

Defense Secretary McNamara still proclaimed Indonesia as “the greatest prize” in the continent.12 Writing in late 1965, during the so-called Vietnam era, while National Security Council (NSC) staff, Robert W.

13 Komer, wrote to Johnson that Indonesia was “a far greater prize than Vietnam.”

Despite this consistent US objective in Indonesia, grounded in the obsessive ideology of anti- communism and the domino principle, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations evidently pursued virtually opposite Indonesia-policies; the former relied on winning the hearts and minds of Indonesia through bilateral relations, massive developmental aid programs, and building personal rapport with

Indonesian President Sukarno while the latter opted for a hard-line approach relying on low-posture covert activities to antagonize Sukarno and weaken his grip on the country.14 This essay proposes three primary factors to account for the policy shift: the change in US leadership and bureaucracy, the radicalization of

10 National Security Council Report, 19 December 1960, FRUS, 1964- 1968, Vol. 23, 293; Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy, 3 December 1960, FRUS, 1964- 1968, Vol. 23, 291. 11 Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 13 October 1961, FRUS, 1964- 1968, Vol. 26, 198. 12 “Text of Secretary McNamara's Address on United States Policy in South Vietnam.” New York Times. 27 March 1964. Accessed 1 March 12017. http://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/27/text-of-secretary-mcnamaras-address-on- united-states-policy-in-south-vietnam.html 13 Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, 19 August 1964, FRUS, 1964- 1968, Vol. 26, 61. 14 Ibid.

8 Maria Monica Layarda

Indonesia’s domestic politics during Konfrontasi against Malaysia, and the limits of US power to engineer change within Indonesia.

It is useful to note the division within the US’ bureaucracy in charge of Indonesia policymaking at the time. This “accommodationist” approach has been most rigorously advocated by US Ambassador in

Jakarta Howard P. Jones (1958-65) and found strong support among Kennedy’s close advisors, including the National Security Council (NSC) staffs and in the Far East Division of the State Department, most notably Assistant Secretary for Eastern Affairs Harriman and his successor Roger Hilsman, as well as

Undersecretary of State George Ball. Hard-liners could mostly be found in the European Division and across US defense bodies, including Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and Secretary of State Dean

15 Rusk.

The Kennedy Administration (1961-3)

The inauguration of the young and charming Harvard-bred John F. Kennedy 1961 brought hopes for a fresh outlook of US Cold War foreign policy. Kennedy was undoubtedly a staunch anti-communist, but as a “torch” representing “a new generation of America”, he offered an alternative strategy to win the

Cold War. In the Third World, the Kennedy’s “New Frontier” developmental platform were to replace

Eisenhower’s hawkish, subversive foreign policy that had largely failed to deliver in the new Cold War competition. 16 The new Administration fulfilled its vow to pursue a fresh agenda by immediately launching a massive expansion of foreign economic and military assistance and establishing lasting developmental institutions including the Peace Corps and Agency for International Development (AID).

The momentum of change that accompanied Kennedy’s inauguration also brought a fresh opportunity to re-start US-Indonesia relations at a critical juncture when the Soviets and Chinese were racing to sway 100 million Indonesians into their orbits. In 1961, US-Indonesia relations remained tense

15 The CIA had long argued that accommodating Sukarno would only encourage him to make further demands. The same logic was advanced by who argued in early 1960s that “if Sukarno starts aggressing against his neighbors he will find us on the other side. We learned our lesson with Hitler.” See Frederick Bunnell, “American “Low Posture” Policy toward Indonesia in the Months Leading up to the 1965 ‘Coup’.” Indonesia, 50 (1990), 31-32; See also Subritzky(a), 24. 16 Kennedy, John F. “Inaugural Address.” 20 January 1961. Accessed 10 February 2017. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8032&.

9 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 after the CIA’s debacle to overthrow Sukarno in 1957-8.17 Unbeknown to Congress and the public,

Eisenhower had then authorized what became the largest covert operation in US history to support the

Outer Island rebels and it proved to be a disaster.18 Imminent communist threats in Indonesia in the early

1960s and Kennedy’s strong personal belief in Indonesia’s strategic importance and the primacy of accommodation strategy led the new Administration to launch a massive aid and diplomatic offensive to win the hearts and minds of Indonesians, despite opposition from US Congress and US’ allies.

US Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones greeted Kennedy into office with a telegram gravely warning the new president that “the US has been seriously challenged in Indonesia by Communist bloc for first time since [1945].” 19 By 1960, the USSR’s $1 billion aid program to the country dwarfed

American aid totaling $372 million.20 Non-aligned Indonesia received one-fifth of all Soviet aid to non- communist countries. Only Castro’s Cuba matched the Soviet military aid to Indonesia. 21 On the diplomatic front, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev also showed great resolve to court Sukarno who “sets store by personal relationships in international relations far beyond any [Western] concept”22 and who

“personalized everything, regarded international relations in the light of personal relations.” 23 While

Eisenhower had turned down Sukarno’s invitation to visit in 1960, Khrushchev spent two weeks touring

17 Audrey Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1997). 18 Since 1957, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruited and trained approximately 42,000 rebels in Indonesia’s outer Sumatran Islands in an attempt to unseat the first Indonesian President Sukarno, accused of having left-wing tendencies. The US role in the rebellion was uncovered when the Indonesian military shot down and captured Allen Pope, an American pilot who was bombing military targets in Ambon in support of the rebels. The debacle, however, was not officially acknowledged by the US government until FRUS published the volume on Indonesia in 1994. The study by Kahin & Kahin remains the most authoritative on US failed intervention in Indonesia in 1950s, see Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policy. 19 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 25 January 1961, FRUS, 1964- 1968, Vol. 23, 143. 20 Baskara Wardaya, "Diplomacy and Cultural Understanding: Learning from US Policy toward Indonesia under Sukarno." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 67, no. 4 (2012), 215 21 Vincent Goessen, “A Far Greater Prize Than Vietnam” (PhD Dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 2015), 28 22 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 26 January 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 23, 144. 23 Memorandum of Conversation, 11 October 1963, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 293.

10 Maria Monica Layarda the country, offered more aid, and, most importantly “paid attention to Sukarno.” Jones concluded that the

24 mere continuation of US status quo inaction would lead to US loss of Southeast Asia’s largest domino.

Jones’ accommodationist proposal to restore personal relations with Sukarno and increase aid to

Indonesia struck a chord with Kennedy’s “New Frontier” spirit and Kennedy swiftly approved and began implementing these suggestions. In April, Kennedy personally invited Sukarno to visit Washington and proposed the initiation of developmental projects to launch Indonesian development, which Sukarno welcomed. 25 Sukarno left Washington impressed with Kennedy and believed he would bring a new approach to US-Indonesia relation.26 The strategy of courting Sukarno did not flow out of personal liking of the egomaniac President, which nobody in the Administration did. Rather there was a rational consensus within the Kennedy Administration that given Sukarno’s strong grip on power in the country, bringing

Sukarno under American influence was key to “assure achievement of US minimum objective of preventing Indonesia from falling under Communist control.”27 As Ambassador Jones stressed, “there is no group in Indonesia except rebels willing directly to oppose Sukarno.”28 Even hawkish Secretary Rusk agreed.29 Without feasible counter-forces to rely on and in the face of Sukarno’s tight grip of power, a rollback approach would only lead to “sterile oppositionism”30—a mistake Eisenhower committed.

WNG Crisis

The urgent agenda Jones urged the new administration to resolve included the decade-long dispute between the Dutch and Indonesians over WNG. There was a consensus in 1961 that the US needed to end its futile decade-long “passive neutrality” on the issue, which translated into de facto support for the status

24 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 25 January 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 143. 25 Indonesia: Sukarno visit, April 1961, JFK Library. Access Date: 13 March 2016. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset- Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-119-003.aspx 26 Jones Howard Palfrey, Indonesia: The Possible Dream. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), 197 27 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, 25 January 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 143. 28 Ibid. 29 Bradley R Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), 39, sn 8. 30 Letter from Komer to Bundy, March 27, 1961, NSF, Box 113, JFKL as quoted by Simpson, 273. The consensus within the NSC and among those with direct access to the President was that the hard-liners lacked promising proposals on Indonesia.

11 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 quo Dutch colonial rule. After the CIA’s debacle, US position on WNG became the thorn that sustained

Indonesian resentment. There were also growing concerns that the USSR, which had given Sukarno strong diplomatic backing on WNG and massive military assistance, could seize the opportunity “to make a double-barreled move” to push Sukarno towards war and deeper into dependency on the Soviets. This

Cold War logic became the driving factor behind the Administration’s subsequent attempts to play a more active role to resolve the dispute initially as a neutral mediator to an overt pro-Indonesia advocate.

In the first half of 1961, despite US officials’ preoccupation with emergency crises in Cuba and

Berlin and impending ones in Laos and Indochina, various departments began to focus on the WNG issue.

The NSC had listed Indonesia and WNG among its “most urgent planning priorities.”31 As officials searched for the appropriate role the US could play to actively facilitate peaceful resolutions, a multiplicity of views developed across the bureaucratic organs. Secretary Rusk, sympathetic to the view of the

Europeanists in the European and UN Divisions of the State Department, pressed for a pro-Dutch stance.32

The NSC and State Department’s Far Eastern Division, in contrast, advocated an active pro-Indonesian position, citing a Cold War concern, that “our principal [strategic] objective is to improve the outlook for a non-Communist Indonesia and only secondarily to satisfy Dutch emotional needs”.33 Indeed, Indonesia’s strategic importance was stressed even within the defense establishment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) joined the discourse by offering their military assessments. Although the JCS was cautious not to make political suggestions regarding the dispute, their assessments strongly supported the pro-Indonesian faction as the JCS recalled “there is no other country in the region which could serve communist military purposes so well, and few that are more vulnerable to communist penetration. The loss of Indonesia to the

31 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 53. 32 Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, 3 April 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 158; Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Hare), 13 February 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 146. 33 Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow), 18 April 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 166.

12 Maria Monica Layarda communists might well start a chain reaction that would culminate in the eventual relinquishment of…the overall US military posture in the Western Pacific.”34 Nonetheless, Rusk continued to resist.

In the Fall 1961, tensions ran high in WNG as Indonesia and the were preparing to table

UNGA resolutions on the issue, and Indonesia’s small-scale incursions into WNG became more frequent.

Meanwhile, the US government’s new position was ambivalent—reflecting the internal debates within the government.35 When Rusk finally made his up his mind, he decided to table a US resolution on WNG, drafted by the Europeanists in the UN Division, which Indonesia strongly opposed for its pro-Dutch bias.

The NSC specialists were outraged that their assessments were ignored by Rusk and eventually as far as going around Rusk to bring up the matter directly with Kennedy who, as they correctly anticipated, would be more open to their strategic Cold War assessment. Reporting to Kennedy on the outcomes of the UN votes, NSC Staff Robert H. Johnson bitterly concluded that “…the net result of our many months of activity was not to produce the solution acceptable to both sides, which we had sought, but to vote against the Indonesians twice…”.36 The report singled out Rusk’s role, writing that “most of the specialists in the area believe that the Secretary’s respect for the Australians and dislike of Sukarno has led him to take a

37 [counter-productive] position in the UN debate which, if continued, can only help the Communists.”

Within a week of receiving the NSC memo, Kennedy intervened personally by writing a letter to

Sukarno asking him to refrain from using force.38 Kennedy’s active role ushered a turning point in US position on the dispute. In the same month, at Kennedy-Macmillan’s first summit in Bermuda on

December 21-22, 1961, Kennedy also reversed British outright pro-Dutch position to bring it closer to

34 “Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara”, 13 October 1961, FRUS 1961- 1963 Vol. 23, 198. 35 As an NSC staff commented, “I continue to be very troubled by our apparent lack of any clear idea of where we are going other than that general notion that what we want is a “mutually acceptable solution”. See “Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)”, 6 November 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 200. 36 Tab B, Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy, 1 December 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 205. 37 “Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy”, 1 December 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 205. 38 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, 9 December 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 210.

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Kennedy’s pro-Indonesian stance. Both eventually agreed that “the right course would be to do everything to prevent the outbreak of hostilities over West Irian and to persuade the Dutch… to extricate themselves from their present position.”39 At the end of the meeting, Kennedy gave an internal instruction that “the

40 Dutch would be made aware of the fact that they could not count on US or UK military support.”

Kennedy’s dramatic shake-up of his foreign policy team in late November—mostly due to the Bay of Pigs fiasco—also had brought into power strong advocates of accommodationist policy who would play a decisive role in bringing the pro-Indonesian position in WNG and the subsequent crises. Among the most consequential changes were the appointments of Averell Harriman’s appointment as Assistant

Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (who would then bring in his own trusted advisors Roger Hilsman and

Michael Forrestal) and George Ball as the Undersecretary of State. Harriman proved to be a strong and effective proponent of pro-Indonesia policy. Ambassador Jones would later call Harriman as his “tower of strength in Washington.”41 Within days of his arrival, Harriman informed the Dutch that they could expect no American support in case of an Indonesian attack. Fortuitously, the State Department completed its long awaited policy review on Indonesia. It concluded that US-Indonesia relations would continue to be strained until Washington removed the WNG dispute “from Communist exploitation” and buried US image as a “protector of colonial interests.”42 Given Soviet’s diplomatic and aid offensive, the US must act fast.

Kennedy’s intervention came a little too late. On 19 December 1961, Sukarno had called for a

“confrontation on all fields” to dismantle the Dutch “” of West New Guinea and vowed to seize the territory by the end of 1962.43 In 1962, tensions between and the Hague reached its peak; the two had previously suspended diplomatic relations in 1960. Small-scale military clashes between the

39 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 122-123. 40 Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 22 December 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 219. 41 Jones quoted in Aandstad, Stig Aga. “Surrendering to Symbols. United States Policy Towards Indonesia 1961- 1965.” (PhD Dissertation), 65-66. dissertation, University of Oslo, 1999 42 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, “US Strategic Interest in Indonesia,” 13 October 1961, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 198. 43 Aanstad, Surrendering to Symbols, 52.

14 Maria Monica Layarda belligerents became more frequent partly because of increased Indonesian incursions into WNG.44 In

January, the Dutch sinking of an Indonesian ship in January 1962 raised the prospects of an all-out war, which alarmed the US government. Kennedy would begin pressuring the Dutch to give up its claim. On

January 18, he declared in front his NSC staff that “The real stake here was not West Irian but the fate of

Indonesia, the most rich and populous country in the area and one which was the target of energetically pursued Soviet ambitions.” 45 Kennedy’s advocacy for a pro-Indonesian stance must be understood within the Cold War context. The President saw the WNG crisis as an integral part of larger anti-communist struggle. Moreover, the dispute also hastened radicalization of domestic politics within the Indonesia as the PKI rode on the widespread anti-colonial sentiment of the public to boost its domestic popularity.46

The WNG dispute, therefore, hastened Indonesia’s leftward drift, the very thing the US was bent on stopping, from the outside and inside. For the subsequent months, US officials, including Kennedy himself, “twisted the Dutch arm.”47 When the Dutch Foreign Minister raised the noble argument of protecting Papuan right to self-determination, Kennedy forcefully told them that the West should not be

“concentrating too much on the future of the Papuan population [while forgetting our other obligations in

Asia and free Europe” and pressed that “if Indonesia goes to war the chances of a Communist takeover in that country are greatly improved. This would be a disaster for the free-world position… [besides] the most important moral obligation we have is to keep Communists from making any further gains.”48 Having lost support from all of its Western allies, the Dutch finally gave up their brief. US-mediated secret negotiation produced the New York Peace Agreement on 15 that ended the dispute by essentially transferring WNG to Jakarta after a temporary UN trusteeship. Dutch Prime Minister de Quay

44 Sukarno lamented to US Ambassador Jones, “Time, time, time,” the President retorted excitedly. “I have run out of patience and we are running out of time. My people are impatient. There will be a mass meeting of one million people this week to demand that I give them the order to march on West Irian. What will I tell them? They already think I am getting soft, getting too old for action.” Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 28, 211. 45 Memorandum of Conversation, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 23, 244. Access Date: 13 March 2017. 46 Djiwandono J. Soedjati, Konfrontasi Revisited: Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Soekarno. (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), 38 47 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball), 15 February 1962, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 234. 48 Memorandum of Conversation, March 2, 1962, FRUS 1961-1963, vol. 23, 244.

15 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 told somberly told the Parliament, “We are ashamed before the world… The Netherlands could not count

49 on the support of its allies, and for that reason we had to sign.”

Launching Indonesian Development

The end of the WNG crisis brought hopes for the Kennedy Administration that the US finally “had an opportunity today we had not had since 1950 to cement relations between the United States and

Indonesia” and the Administration strongly pushed for the implementation of an ambitious developmental package Plan of Action prepared following the signing of the .50 There were hopes that Sukarno would finally end his foreign adventures and turn inwards to build his nation’s shattered economy.51 The plan would include increase of PL 480 aid program to provide food and fiber by $60–70 million, $17 million “emergency assistance” loan to Jakarta to jumpstart its industry, increase in military assistance (to be determined by the Department of Defense) and over $480 million longer-term

52 stabilization loan from the IMF.

The 1962 developmental program was justified by US Cold War political and strategic dimensions.

It made a clear case that “Indonesia’s geo-political position and magnitudes make it important to the United

States. Our commitments on the Indo-China peninsula could be lost if the bottom of Southeast Asia fell out to Communism.” The plan also recalled that “The [Communist] Bloc has given more aid to Indonesia than to any other non-Communist country” and thus it was imperative that the Free World make adequate assistance, otherwise, “Indonesia will be forced to lean more heavily on the Bloc.”53 Here, by fusing modernization economics with anticommunist ideology, Kennedy Administration aimed to turn economic resilience into a safeguard against communism and make Indonesia a showcase of capitalist superiority.

To sweeten the offers, Kennedy had sent a personal letter to Sukarno in late 196254 before dispatching his

49 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, , 127. 50 Memorandum of Conversation, 11 October 1962, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol. 23, 293. 51 Schmitz, The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 39. 52 Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy, 11 October 1962, 292 53 “Background to Plan of Action for Indonesia” attached to “Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President Kennedy”, 10 October 1962, 291 54 “Letter From President Kennedy to President Sukarno”, 2 November 1962, 295

16 Maria Monica Layarda high-level advisors, Hilsman and Forrestal, to sell the plan to Sukarno in . The plan went smoothly for the first few months. Despite the PKI’s efforts to condemn Western programs, Sukarno threw his weight behind the proposed program and authorized his progressive First Minister Djuanda to see the program through.55 Nonetheless, troubling developments within Indonesia and the US were soon to take place concurrent with Kennedy’s developmental efforts.

The high optimism was soon tempered by the separate visits by Soviet Defense Minister Marshal

Malinovsky, followed by Chairman of the CCP Liu Shaoqi and Foreign Minister Chen Yi to Jakarta to compete for Sukarno’s affection by offering material aid and political support for Sukarno’s opposition to the creation of Malaysia. Early signs of Konfrontasi had clearly begun to show.56 Nonetheless, before

Konfrontasi turned into a full-blown crisis in the fall, two other events obstructed Kennedy’s long- anticipated launch of developmental program in the spring.

First, within the US government itself, Congress proved highly hostile to Kennedy’s proposed foreign aid bill. Congress called for cuts in the administration’s proposed $4.9 billion 1963 aid bill and

Indonesia was singled out for attacks during congressional hearings. Congressional leaders accused the

Indonesian government as “Communist” or “Communist-leaning socialist” while Sukarno was personally denounced as “junior grade Hitler”, an international juvenile delinquent”, and a “lower case bum”.57 The amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act proposed by Republican Congressman William Broomfield would prove fateful in the near future. The “Broomfield Amendment” required that no military and additional economic aid to Indonesia would be made without a presidential determination stating that aid was “essential to the national interest of the United States”.58 This would not pose much hindrance for

Kennedy who would sign the determinations without any hesitation and whose officials doggedly fought bureaucratic battles in Capitol Hill to kill the amendment and push forward their economic and military aid programs. Hilsman, who was promoted as the Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East in April

55 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 92. 56 Goossen, A Far Greater Prize Than Vietnam, 70-71. 57 Hilsman, To Move a Nation, 376. 58 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 46.

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1963, gave an impassioned speech before the House Foreign Affairs Committee of the importance of

Indonesia for the US’ overall position in the Pacific. Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command

59 Admiral Harry Felt agreed.

Between May and June, Kennedy Administration again proved its commitment to win the Cold War struggle for Indonesia through accommodation when it promptly and successfully intervened in an oil dispute between the Indonesian government and Western oil giants operating in the country over

Indonesia’s new oil law.60 The Administration saw the crisis as a geopolitical struggle, not simply an investment issue, and the failure to reach settlements could result in foreign capital rush and Indonesian economic collapse which would be a “strategic setback for the US” if Indonesia were to “fall into the hands of the Chinese and Russians.” 61 Kennedy’s strong intervention to save Jakarta did not sit well with

American allies. Indeed, the Kennedy Administration had advised US oil companies, Stanvac and Caltex, to move forward with signing the settlement with Indonesia without giving much thought to the fate of the

British oil company, Shell, which was also implicated in the dispute. This prompted British PM Macmillan himself to write to Kennedy to protest. His evident agitation however fell on deaf ears. Kennedy simply

62 replied that US oil companies should be left to make decisions based on their commercial judgments.

Although the oil crisis was successfully mediated, the Administration soon suffered subsequent blowbacks in its Indonesia-policy. Its aid proposal for Indonesia totaling $125-135 million was quickly dashed when in the last week of July, the IMF rejected the $250 million stabilization package for Indonesia.

Within the same time frame, US Congress passed the Broomfield Amendment. These developments marked the beginning of the end of the stabilization program even before Indonesia’s domestic politics posed further troubles down the road.

Konfrontasi

59 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 97 60 Sukarno had threated to nationalize oil companies that accounted for 90% of all Indonesia’s oil production. Looking back after its resolve, the crisis did not seem to be a major thorn but at the time, Harriman remarked that the dispute was among the most “serious turn since Indonesian independence.” Simpson, Economists with Guns, 105. 61 Harriman-Levy conversation as cited in Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 153. 62 The US government sent an official mission led by Governor of Kentucky Wilson Wyatt to mediate the private oil companies and Jakarta government. Simpson, Economist with Guns, 107-110

18 Maria Monica Layarda

While the Kennedy Administration was fighting hard to find ways to continue with their ambitious economic plan, the transition from the summer into fall became even more difficult when political tensions were rising rapidly in the Malay peninsula over the British plan to establish the Federation of Malaysia. In

January 1963, Indonesian Foreign Minister formally announced Indonesian opposition to the creation of Malaysia. He proclaimed that Indonesia “has no choice but to adopt a policy confrontation against Malaysia that is acting as an accomplice to aid the neo-colonialists and neo-imperialists, which are

63 pursuing hostile policies toward Indonesia.”

Right from the beginning of Konfrontasi, the US under Kennedy’s direction was keen on avoiding involvement in the crisis, preferring to keep its distance to avoid any action that would antagonize Sukarno.

For the Administration, the overriding concern was the successful launch of Indonesia’s economic stabilization, which it considered the best strategy to keep Indonesia from sliding into communism. In early February 1963, Harriman bluntly told the British Ambassador in Washington that the US would not subordinate its regional priorities to Britain’s imperial interests. He added that the US neither wished to become party to Britain’s dispute with Indonesia nor used US aid to Indonesia as leverage since US influence in the country would be solely used to keep Indonesia out of the communist bloc, not to force

64 Sukarno to accept Malaysia.

Nonetheless, there was some realization of the need to maintain Britain’s presence in the region and political support for the US’ increasing efforts in Vietnam. Thus, the Kennedy Administration had to find a balance between catering to the British and the Indonesians who were undergoing painful economic reforms at the time as a result of US-sponsored stabilization program. The resulting stance was to welcome the creation of Malaysia while keeping American interference to the minimum level. Even when

Konfrontasi escalated from verbal, diplomatic wars into small-scale incursions of Indonesian militias into

63 “Kita bangsa Indonesia mau tidak mau harus menjalankan politik konfrontasi dengan Malaya karena Malaya pada waktu sekarang ini merupakan kaki-tangan neo-kolonialisme and neo-imperialisme yang menjalankan sikap permusuhan terhadap bangsa Indonesia”. done by the author. Original text is quoted from Rosihan Anwar, Sukarno, tentara, PKI: segitiga kekuasaan sebelum prahara politik, 1961-1965, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 2006), 217. 64 Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 51; Simpson, Economists with Guns, 118.

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British Borneo in April, the Americans maintained their position at a Canberra meeting with their British,

Australian, and New Zealand counterparts in June. The State Department argued that “the loss of Indonesia to the bloc would be an infinitely more grave threat to our mutual security that any development we now anticipate as likely to arise from Indonesia’s position in the Malaysia dispute.”65 Kennedy’s sympathy for

Malaysia did not go far beyond accepting its formation. In April, Kennedy turned down Malaysia’s request for developmental and military assistance. Over the summer, the American officials maintained hope for a diplomatic solution to the crisis and were encouraged by the conclusion on the Manila Accord, a mediation attempt by the Philippines to bring Indonesia and Malaysia into the negotiating table over

Konfrontasi. At the end of the Manila Conference, both Indonesia and the Philippines agreed they would

“welcome” Malaysia on the condition that the UN could ascertain that the native North Borneo population supported their merger with Malaya.

Unfortunately, the reconciliatory spirit was soon ended when the leaders of Malaya, Singapore, and

North Borneo under British guardianship signed an agreement to establish Malaysia on August 31 regardless of the outcome of UN inspection on July 9. Two days later Sukarno announced the resumption of Konfrontasi. Following the formal establishment of Malaysia on September 16, the situation deteriorated. A large Indonesian mob destructed the Malaysian embassy, stoned British embassy and destroyed British residences in Jakarta. After Malaysia broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia,

Sukarno announced the termination of trade with Malaysia and Singapore (through which half of

Indonesia’s trade passed) and ordered the administrative takeover of all British companies. Overnight,

Konfrontasi turned into a real “hot” war when 200 Indonesian troops attacked a Malaysian outpost in

Borneo fifty miles across the border.66 These subsequent events put an effective end to the stabilization attempts, worsened the country’s economic troubles, and pushed the country closer towards the Bloc that readily offered diplomatic support.

65 Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 61-62. 66 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 200.

20 Maria Monica Layarda

In September, following Jakarta’s declaration to cut trade and economic links with Malaysia, the

Kennedy government was forced to cancel a large-scale developmental loan program to Indonesia. At the

September 23 emergency interagency emergency meeting at the White House, many officials were disillusioned by Sukarno’s actions and began favoring a harder line on Indonesia and pushed for a complete cut off of assistance to Indonesia. However, Kennedy’s “strong, clear stand for restraint” eventually prevented a total cut-off, for he believed that “this was a card that could only be played out

67 68 once.” As Forrestal recalled, “no one person felt strong enough to want to buck” the President.

Nonetheless under great congressional pressures to suspend aid, it was not feasible to proceed with the ambitious Plan of Action and the Administration announced the suspension of all new economic aid to

Jakarta and a temporary delay in military shipments while ensuring that existing non-military food aid and civic action schemes for the army continue.

American officials subsequently focused on finding another diplomatic opportunity to work out some face-saving compromise for Indonesia and Malaysia. The Administration’s greater concern for its relation with Indonesia than the supposedly “special relation” with Britain created bitter feelings among

British officials. 69 Kennedy personally intervened when he wrote a letter to Sukarno urging him to

“prevent matters going from bad to worse.”70 But, on November 7, more trouble came from Congress, which passed an amendment that cut off all remaining aid to Indonesia, during which debate Senator John

Sherman branded Sukarno “the most irresponsible leader of a Government in Asia today”.71 At this desperate time, Ambassador Jones returned to Washington to propose, together with Hilsman and

Harriman, a last “package deal” to Kennedy to salvage US-Indonesian relations. As he always did,

Kennedy approved without any hesitancy. Upon returning to Jakarta, Jones was to ask Sukarno to withdraw the Indonesian forces in Borneo and commit to negotiations to end Konfrontasi in exchange for

67 Memorandum of Conversation, 4 October 1963, FRUS 1961-1963, v. 23, 339 68 Michael Forrestal cited in Simpson, Economists with Guns, 121; Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, September 24, 1963, FRUS 1961-1963, v. 23, 316 69 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 208. 70 Telegram 745 from Djakarta to State, September 27, 1963, FRUS, 1961-1963, v. 23, 336, 71 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 124

21 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 multilateral aid and Kennedy’s visit to Indonesia. In early November, he had told Jones enthusiastically that if the American President ever visited Jakarta he would get “the grandest reception anyone ever received [there].”72 Kennedy accepted the plan without second thought and to further sweeten the offer ratified the sale of 40,000 tons of rice and to welcome Indonesian Army General Nasution to visit

Washington. Unfortunately, three days later Kennedy made his fateful trip to Dallas.

Johnson Administration (1964-1965)

Lyndon B. Johnson’s assumption of office soon hardened American position towards Indonesia and substantially shifted US Indonesia-policy from Kennedy’s accommodationist approach through to low- posture covert policy aimed at antagonizing Sukarno and weakening his grip on power in the country. This shift also brought US position closer to the British who had been advocating fo a tough policy toward

Indonesia—a topic that will be discussed at greater length in Chapter III. Rather than a discontinuity, the policy shift marked continuity with the US’ Cold War objective to prevent a communist takeover. The conjunction of three important factors led toward the American policy reappraisal, namely Johnson’s personal inclinations and the bureaucratic change accompanying the leadership transition, the radicalization of Indonesia’s foreign policy, and the limits of US ability to influence events in Indonesia.

The policy shift, therefore, was already underway even before Johnson’s escalation of the made Vietnam the Administration’s priority. Rather than representing “benign neglect of Indonesia by top officials swallowed up by Vietnam,”73 such a was a calculated, deliberate move.

Having served as Kennedy’s Vice President, Johnson came to office with little faith in the effectiveness of a soft approach in influencing Indonesia. Johnson was highly distrustful of Sukarno, whom he regarded as a “bully”,74 and Johnson wondered “whether the closer we get to Sukarno the more difficult

72 Memorandum of Conversation, November 19, 1963, FRUS 1961-1963, v. 23, 320; Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, November 4, 1963, FRUS1961-1963, v. 23, 319 73 Interviews by Frederick Bunnell with Chester Cooper, Thomson's senior colleague on NSC Asian staff, in June 1970 and May 1981 cited in Frederick Bunnell, “American “Low Posture” Policy toward Indonesia in the Months Leading up to the 1965 ‘Coup,’” Indonesia 50 (October 1990), 31. 74 Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol 26, 1. Access Date: 13 March 2017. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d1

22 Maria Monica Layarda he becomes.”75 Consequently, his deep personal antipathy toward the Indonesian president made Johnson more inclined to instinctively take a less forgiving stance to alarming developments in Indonesia rather than trying to pacify it. While Kennedy had continued to defend aid and gone the extra mile to manipulate personal diplomacy to pacify Sukarno in the face of strong congressional opposition, Johnson asserted from the start of his administration that “any assistance [to Indonesia] just shows weakness on our part.”76

Johnson’s patience for Indonesia—and Sukarno specifically—seemed to be up right from the beginning of his presidency when he asserted on January 10, 1964 that “if we [US-Indonesia] are going to have a break, just let him [Sukarno] break it”. 77 In his first month, Johnson refused to sign a presidential determination to send even limited aid to Indonesia despite the urging of virtually all of his principal foreign policy advisers who pressed that “the stakes [were] very high”.78 Johnson was unmoved. He confessed to Defense Secretary McNamara that “I just feel that I ought to be impeached if I approve it, that’s just how deeply I feel”.79 Instead, he sent the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, to tell Sukarno that aid would be made conditional on Sukarno’s agreement to halt Konfrontasi.

Throughout 1964, Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy grew increasingly radical and belligerent. Within the country, the PKI became more assertive and used the tensions generated by

Konfrontasi to mobilize public opinion against Western neo-colonialism and push for domestic land reforms. Sukarno himself began to resort to leftist, anti-imperialist rhetoric in his public speeches targeting

Western powers and he no longer bothered to make distinction between the imperial powers (e.g. Britain) and non-imperial ones (e.g. the US and later Canada). Months of public denunciation of Indonesian aggression by American press and officials, especially within Congress, further infuriated Sukarno. In

March 1964, Sukarno, known for his great oratorical skills, delivered a furious speech at a large ceremony chastising countries which offered conditional aid and suddenly reverted to English as he yelled “go to

75 Memorandum of Conversation, FRUS, 1961-1963, vol 23, 326. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d326 76 Ibid 77 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 242. 78 Komer memorandum for Bundy, 9 December 1963, FRUS, XXIII, 760-1 79 Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara, FRUS XXVI, 1

23 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 hell with your aid!” while reportedly looking at Ambassador Jones.80 The following month, Sukarno stepped up Konfrontasi military efforts and Johnson responded by refusing to sign presidential determination to send aid to Indonesia and instead he invited Sukarno’s political arch-enemy, the

81 Malaysian leader Tunku, to Washington, and offered political and military assistance to Malaysia.

By the end of 1964, there was a radical shift in US Konfrontasi policy from Kennedy’s cautious non-intervention to Johnson’s over support for Malaysia. The US was still concerned of communist threats in Indonesia, only this time, it was Indonesian communism that posed the largest threat. The US National

Intelligence affirmed that Konfrontasi substantially “helped accelerate the drift toward the radical left and… [further] domestic deterioration, external aggression, [would only result in] overall Communist profit.”82 Having given up on soft diplomacy, Johnson sought an alternative high-risk strategy of “join[ing] the UK in all-out support for Malaysia” with the hope to “dare [and] scare off the Bung [Karno].”83

Johnson’s overt hostility proved futile in tempering Sukarno. At the Independence Day celebration on August 17, Sukarno retaliated by openly criticizing US mingling in Vietnam and Korea.84 This sent the bilateral relation to a historic low and unleashed anti-Americanism sentiment, which the PKI swiftly manipulated to begin small-scale targeting of US properties. As Sukarno increased Konfrontasi effort, he further relied on the PKI to mobilize domestic support and in exchange offered presidential protection to allow PKI land reforms. Against this alarming developments, the Johnson Administration officially adopted a low-posture rollback strategy in November.85 The primary objective of this “covert action program” was to “[c]reate an image of the PKI as an increasingly ambitious, dangerous opponent of

80 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 263-4. 81 National Security Action Memorandum No. 309, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, 53. Access Date: 13 March 2017. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d53 82 National Intelligence Estimate, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, 56. Access Date: 13 March 2017. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d56 83 Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson, FRUS, 1964- 1968, Vol. 26, 56. Access Date: 13 March 2017. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d55 84 A subset of the original script of Sukarno’s speech as follows, “Dan serangan Amerika atas Vietnam Utara sekarang inipun, kami kutuk dengan sekeras-kerasnya. Dan akupun mendoakan Korea lekas bersatu kembali dalam kemerdekaan” taken from https://strez.wordpress.com/buku-blog-gratis-anticopyright/dibawah-bendera-revolusi- 2/dibawah-bendera-revolusi/rahasia/tahun-vivere-pericoloso/ 85 Political Action Paper, November 19, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, 86. Access Date: 13 March 2017. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d86

24 Maria Monica Layarda

Sukarno and legitimate nationalism” while providing “covert assistance” to anti-communist elements for the “obstructive action against the PKI” and to prepare for an “non-Communist succession upon Sukarno’s death or removal from office.”86 While the declassified document erases the considered “means” it would not be surprising if it had contained “coup” scenarios.

Why turn to underground operations? Sukarno’s recent behavior seemed to have convinced the

Administration that he was “well on his way to becoming a captive of the Communists.”87 When aid was so limited to no longer be effective as a leverage (or even a threat) and diplomatic pressures only sparked anti-Americanism, the remaining options to contain the PKI were direct (military) interventions and clandestine activities. The choice was clear. Even before US became tied down in Vietnam, the first option was simply unthinkable given the economic and human costs that would be involved in going to war against a large and rather powerful country. A clandestine operation offered the most economical strategy with the lowest risk to continue to exert some some influence, however minimal, over domestic politics while maintaining crucial links with the Indonesian Army. While the US had confidence in the Army’s staunch anti-communist stance, the problem was the Army’s reluctance to take any action to suppress the growing PKI influence. The Army leaders continued to insist that it “would always react, not act.”88 All the US could do was to wait and see.

The change in the tone of the Indonesia-policy, from courting Sukarno to antagonizing him, was also driven by the change in the bureaucratic make-up of the new administration. Kennedy’s departure ushered in a drastic decline in influence of strong pro-Indonesian lobbyists Hilsman and Harriman influence within the State Department. Johnson came to rely on Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy who frequently advocated for a hard-line approach, while Johnson openly displayed his disdain for

Hilsman. Soon, after Hilsman lost his position on McNamara’s recommendation, he left foreign service

86 Political Action Paper, November 19, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, 86. Access Date: 13 March 2017. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d86. 87 Current Intelligence Memorandum, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. 26, 62. Access Date: 13 March 2017. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v26/d62. 88 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 141

25 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 altogether. Similarly, Michael Forrestal was moved to the Vietnam Task Force, and he too left foreign service after a year.89 Harriman stayed but lost his influence on the executive’s decision making. In a later interview, Hilsman recalled that Johnson “was just not going to listen to the Harriman-Forrestal-Hilsman-

90 Ball” group.

Throughout 1965, Sukarno grew increasingly anti-American and the PKI militant while Konfrontasi showed no signs of abatting and the US became increasingly involved in Vietnam. Jakarta would go on to ban all foreign investment and it seemed to be preparing for a final diplomatic break with the US while drifting closer to Beijing. 91 By Summer 1965, continuous government-and-PKI-backed public demonstrations and physical attacks against US properties forced the US to slim down its presence to minimize damage. What left were a dozen staffs to continue black propaganda, intelligence reporting, and maintaining contacts with the Army. As long as the Army still insisted to react, the Administration’s hands were tied, despite concluding in late August 1965 that “Indonesia was at least as important as all of

Indochina.”92 Starting an open conflict in Indonesia would be the last thing Johnson wanted on his plate given US involvement in the broadening war in Vietnam. In July, Johnson had just ordered an increase in the number of US troops in Indochina to 125,000 and an increase in the draft of young Americans into the military. The arrival of the new US Ambassador, Marshall Green, in June foreshadowed Indonesia’s fate.

Green had been Ambassador to when General Park Chung Hee came to power in a military

th 93 coup. Before Green marked his 4 month in Indonesia, the real showdown began.

The Army’s Reichstag Fire and US Complicity

In early morning of 1 October 1965, a group calling itself the September 30th Movement launched an abortive coup, which was swiftly defeated in less than 24 hours by the Indonesian Army led by General

Suharto. The Army immediately accused the PKI for masterminding the Movement and turned the

89 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 238-9 90 Roger Hilsman Oral History 91 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 163-5 92 as cited in Green, Marshall. Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation, 1965-1968. (Washington, D.C.: Compass Press, 1990), xi 93 Simpson, Economists with Guns, 145-165.

26 Maria Monica Layarda

Movement into a pretext to remove Sukarno and install Suharto as the new ruler. What then followed was a three-month purge during which between half and a million of accused PKI sympathizers were killed almost indiscriminately without any prosecution.94 The coup brevity, its utter defeat and the subsequent anti-communist myths under Suharto mean that October 1 remains an enigma in Indonesia’s modern history. Suffice to note that while US direct involvement in planning the coup has not been substantiated, existing evidence suggests that the US as well as Britain were at the very least guilty for being willing and eager accomplices in what the CIA deemed “one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century.”95

Through its embassy in Jakarta, the US government aided the mass killings by providing name list of PKI cadres,96 intensifying black propaganda,97 and diplomatically defending the Army and assuring it of US support to ease the power takeover. Indeed some have concluded that the killings were part of US tactics to erode the Sukarno’s domestic support.98 Given the US enduring objectives in Indonesia, its complicity was a logical extension of its past policies. The coup fulfilled the best possible scenario Jones had outlined in March 1965: “an unsuccessful coup attempt by the PKI might be the most effective development [to reverse leftwards] political trends in Indonesia.”99 What is certain is in Indonesia, the US exhausted all of its arsenals—soft and hard—stopping short of direct invasion to prevent the domino from crumbling down.

94 Wardaya, Diplomacy and Cultural Understanding, 1060-1. 95 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Report: Indonesia-1965, The Coup that Backfired (Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1968), 71. 96 An Embassy official admitted to handing in target list to the military. He was quoted as saying "I know we had a lot more information [about the Communists] than the Indonesians themselves... The US-supplied information was superior to anything they had." As cited in Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, Chapter 6, 176-201 Certainly, one must approach first-hand account with a high degree of critical evaluation since many would like to overstate their contribution towards the success of the mission. Yet, given that US intelligence had been present in the country and intensified their work over the years leading to the coup, it did not come as a surprise if US with its modern technology and intelligence experience did have more extensive data than a newly decolonized Third World country. 97 David Easter (2005) ‘Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling’: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia, October 1965– , Cold War History, 5:1, 58 98 Peter Dale Scott, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967," Pacific Affairs 58, 2 (summer 1985): 239-64. 99 Ambassador Jones as quoted in Nathaniel Mehr, Constructive Bloodbath' in Indonesia: The United States, Britain and the Mass Killings of 1965-66 (Nottingham: Spokesman, 2009), 72

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III. BRITAIN: POLITICS OF DECOLONIZATION

Addressing an audience at West Point on December 5, 1962, former US Secretary of State Dean

Acheson famously observed, “Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role. The attempt to play a separate power role; that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a ‘special relationship’ with the US, a role based on being the head of a ‘Commonwealth’… is about to be played out”.100 In the 1960s, challenges stemming from decolonization and Britain’s reduced status in the international system were fully illuminated in Britain’s relations with Indonesia. The relations between an imperial power and a former colony were bound to be uneasy. Britain-Indonesia relations were further marred by resentment and suspicion due to Britain’s active role in assisting the Dutch reoccupation of Indonesia in 1945 and more recently, Macmillan’s support for Eisenhower’s disastrous attempt to oust Sukarno in 1958 and

Britain’s support for the Dutch in WNG. At the height of Konfrontasi, the two came close to breaking diplomatic relations.

Throughout the period examined, Britain steadfastly promoted a hard-line stance toward Indonesia under both the Conservative and Labour parties. Nonetheless, Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) showed a willingness to defer to the American view and withdraw its support for its Dutch ally’s claims over WNG.

This, however, was not the case during Konfrontasi. Britain stood firm by Malaysia despite Britain’s economic troubles and the reluctance of its allies to assist. British Konfrontasi policy lay at the heart of the Anglo-American rift under Kennedy until the Vietnam War hardened US attitude towards Indonesia and Johnson brought US policy closer to the British position in the mid-1964. Ironically, it was after the

Anglo-American rift over Konfrontasi was resolved that the British government began to consider reductions in its Konfrontasi efforts under domestic economic pressures.

Despite various shifts in Britain’s Indonesia-policy, three primary factors were consistently present in Britain’s Indonesia-policy calculation. Balancing these factors proved to be a demanding task as they

100 Dean Acheson as quoted from Gerald Prenderghast, Britain and the Wars in Vietnam: The Supply of Troops, Arms and Intelligence, 1945-1975 (Jefferson: McFarland, 2015), 101.

28 Maria Monica Layarda demanded different policy responses. The resulting shifts reflected the different degree of priority assigned by British policymakers to these factors at different points in time. The first important factor was Britain’s postwar aspiration to perpetuate British informal influence over its former colonies through the establishment and defense of Malaysia. 101 Second, the new postwar dynamics of Anglo-American relations imposed substantial constraints on British policymaking as Britain strove to be the second-in- command within the Western alliance by contributing to American containment strategy in the region to maintain good relations and some degree of influence over American policies. During the WNG crisis, the

British showed readiness to defer to the American appeasement policy, but American policy was much harder to swallow during Konfrontasi when British national interests were at stake. Finally, Britain’s domestic economic troubles also created a difficult dilemma for the policymakers. Domestic economy required large-scale British retrenchment east of Suez while the leaders still maintained an aspiration for

Britain to maintain a global role, not only to preserve British status but also to secure Britain’s role as the special and trusted advisor of the US.

Given the importance attached to Malaysia and the Anglo-American “special relationship” within

British foreign policy in the 1960s, British policy towards Indonesia, by extension, was decided by the highest ranks of British foreign policymakers. The most influential figures include Harold Macmillan

(Conservative PM, 1958-63), Alec Douglas-Home (SSEA, 1960-3; PM, 1963-4), Harold Wilson (Labour

PM, 1964-70), and Duncan Sandys (Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1960-64). What they all shared in common was a strong anti-appeasement view which shaped Britain’s attitude toward

Indonesia. Sandys, in particular, had great discretion over Konfrontasi policy. His Commonwealth

Relations Office (CRO) became one of the most powerful departments within the Foreign Office (FO) and

102 the most vocal advocate of a hard-line approach toward Indonesia.

WNG Crisis

101 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post-war World (London, 1988); JA Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1982); Subritzky, 3. 102 Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 7-8

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Britain had watched the brewing colonial crisis between Indonesia with the Netherlands with a degree of apprehension. The FO’s primary concern was that WNG might trigger regional instability which might disrupt British plan for establishing Malaysia.103 Long before Konfrontasi, the British had perceived

Indonesia as a potential threat to the British position in the region. As a British diplomat summarized in

1952, Indonesia “lies across our imperial air connextions, she is wrapped around Malaya in such a way that she could be a dangerous thorn in Malaya’s flesh and accordingly, through indirect means, in the tenability of our position in Southeast Asia.”104 Since the election of the Conservatives in 1951, Britain’s official position was supportive of the Dutch and Britain’s voting patter at the UN reflected this when

Indonesia put the issue on the UN agenda in 1957. Alliance politics made a pro-Dutch stance a rather natural option. WNG itself meant little to Britain while it mattered greatly to Britain’s Dutch partners in continental Europe. Maintaining good relations with the Hague was particularly crucial when London was trying to gain entry into the European Economic Community. More importantly was the strong opposition of Australia, a close Commonwealth ally, to Indonesia’s WNG takeover for reasons “partly strategic,

105 partly emotional, and… partly electoral.”

In 1960, the Macmillan government voiced their strong opposition to the Malayan Tunku’s initiative to introduce trusteeship over WNG leading to eventual transfer to Indonesia. Head of the Southeast Asia

Department of the FO Frederick Warner prepared a comprehensive explanation to justify the British position: “We can see no grounds of history, ethnography or equity which would justify handing over

West New Guinea to Indonesia in this way. Nor would it be to our interests, as the next stage would almost certainly be Indonesian agitation for Australian New Guinea and the British Borneo territories.

Furthermore, such a proposal is a waste of everyone’s time as it would be quite unacceptable to the

Dutch.”106 The Colonial Office concurred. It added that the British government would “not want its

103 Simpson, Conflict and Confrontation, 56. 104 Ambassador Derwent Kermode, National Archives, as quoted from Nicholas Tarling, “Britain, the Tunku and West New Guinea, 1957-1963”, Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 83, No. 298 (2010), 78. 105 Ibid., 78. 106 Ibid., 83.

30 Maria Monica Layarda freedom of action restricted” by its actions over WNG if Indonesia made a future claim over British

Borneo.107 There was a real concern among British policymakers that Indonesia’s territorial takeover of a former colony based on political prestige and geographical proximity with self-determination justification would set a very dangerous precedent for future territorial changes. The same consideration led to British reluctance to support a multilateral solution pressed by Indonesia at the UN. An establishment of a UN commission could put Britain “in particularly weak position to resist similar proposal for Commission to

108 visit a dependency of ours… e.g. Borneo territories.”

The beginning of Kennedy presidency in 1961 proved critical to British position on WNG. Kennedy reversed the brought US policy into pro-Indonesia camp. Following the alarming developments in the region when Indonesia threatened WNG annexation by force in early December 1961, Kennedy was convinced of the eventual need to transfer the WNG territory to Indonesia upon Ambassador Jones’ urging.

During Kennedy-Macmillan’s first in Bermuda on December 21-22, the British were brought into the new

American pro-Indonesia policy on WNG. The President made clear that the US would not offer any assistance to the Dutch in case of Indonesian attacks. Despite a British promise to provide logistical assistance to the Dutch in the event of an Indonesian attack in 1959, Macmillan showed no hesitation to reverse this position and concurred with Kennedy that “Western Powers should refrain from offering to support the Dutch in resisting any Indonesian attack”.109 Given that Britain had little stake at WNG, there seemed to be no reason for putting Anglo-American relation on a strain especially since Macmillan had come to power pledging, among other priorities, to mend the trans-Atlantic relation that hit a low point during the Suez crisis. At Bermuda, Britain and the US also agreed that “the United States and United

Kingdom Governments should each impress on the Australian Government the desirability of avoiding military operations in West Irian and… for the purpose of avoiding this, it would be preferable that the

Western Powers should refrain from offering to support the Dutch in resisting any Indonesian attack on

107 Tarling, Britain, the Tunku and West New Guinea, 86. 108 Ibid. 109 Record of Meeting at Government House, Bermuda, 22 December 1961, PREM11/3782 cited from Jones, 101.

31 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 this territory… [reminding Australia that’ retaliatory action… would be even more damaging to Australia than Indonesian occupation of West Irian.”110 Subsequent to the Bermuda meeting, Macmillan wrote a personal letter to his Australian counterpart explicitly stating that Kennedy and him personally thought that “the discouragement of Communist influence in Indonesia are more important to the West than the maintenance of the Dutch position in Dutch New Guinea.” Despite the display of empathy to Menzies noting “of course that Indonesian ambitions in New Guinea present special problems for you”, Macmillan presented the WNG transfer as a fait accompli—the better of “a choice of evils”.111 The Anglo-American accord over the WNG question effectively ended any Western support for the Dutch position.

By early 1962, London was content to welcome American efforts to defuse tension over WNG.

Britain’s foreign policy establishment pulled its weight behind the American appeasement policy. In

March 1962, amidst small-scale armed clashes between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the Conservative cabinet re-emphasized their desire to stay out of the conflict. It reverted to realpolitik to justify its stance asserting that “In view of the large British investments in Indonesia… it would be preferable that in present circumstances any Dutch request for assistance should be turned aside with the suggestion that their requirements could be more expeditiously met by the US Government”112 knowing well the US would turn down such request. Alliance ties to the Dutch, a fellow European and NATO member, were secondary to British national interests and Anglo-American relations.

Within the British FO, the American appeasement policy won support from Warner of the

Southeast Asia Department and Deputy Under-Secretary Edward Peck. They saw no inconsistency in US appeasing Indonesia while sending 8,000 military personnel to South Vietnam and 10,000 to Thailand to respond to renewed fighting in Laos. For them, “forces of nationalism,” as was the case in WNG, “can still be tactfully harnessed by the West but if spurned will succumb to the Communists.” 113 This

110 Doran, Stuart. “Toeing the Line: Australia's abandonment of 'traditional' West New Guinea Policy.” Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001), 13. 111 Ibid, 14. 112 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 101, sn 7. 113 Ibid., 102, sn 8.

32 Maria Monica Layarda appeasement logic however would be completely overturned when the same forces of nationalism threatened core British interests.

Konfrontasi: Between Ambitions & Retrenchment

As the WNG settlement was finalized under the American watch, Menzies warned his British counterparts that Indonesia’s insatiable territorial ambitions would likely “look to the north” toward British

Borneo.114 His prophecy was fulfilled when Indonesian foreign minister Subandrio formally announced the beginning of Konfrontasi in January 1963 in response to the creation of the Federation of Malaysia, which merged former British possessions of Borneo, Sarawak, and Singapore into the Federation of

Malaya—also a British creation established half a decade earlier. In 1957, Britain had committed itself to the defence of Malaya when the two states signed the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement. In 1961, this treaty was extended to Malaya’s successor state Malaysia. Following Subandrio’s declaration, Konfrontasi soon escalated into an undeclared low-level guerilla war between Indonesians and Malaysians, and the

British, which would later be supported by the Australasian Commonwealth countries. For Sukarno,

Malaysia was the prototype of neo-colonialism through which old established imperial powers perpetuated their dominance over emerging forces. This undeclared war between Indonesia and Britain Konfrontasi essentially dictated the substance of Britain’s policy toward Indonesia.

From the beginning of Konfrontasi in January 1963 up to the signing of the Bangkok Agreement in

June 1966, Britain proved its commitment to support Malaysian defense. Nonetheless, British policy objectives underwent a major shift in mid-1964 although Konfrontasi was ended prematurely before the

British government enacted their deliberated policy changes. During the first stage of Konfrontasi from

1963 until about mid-1964, Britain was fully committed to the defense and survival of Malaysia. However, the generally unanticipated resolve of Indonesia to oppose Malaysia and the high costs incurred by

Konfrontasi combined with Britain’s worsening balance of payments conditions forced the government to re-appraise its overall position in Southeast Asia and ultimately settle on planning a gradual withdrawal

114 Tarling, Britain, the Tunku and West New Guinea, 88.

33 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 from the region. Consequently, Britain’s objective shifted from winning Konfrontasi to focus on finding an immediate (and honourable) exit from the conflict. Nonetheless, the British withdrawal plan from the region was delayed temporarily by alliance politics, in particular the need to maintain strategic partnership with the US and secondarily, with Australia and New Zealand. In regard to Konfrontasi, the Wilson government was greatly helped by the army coup in Indonesia in October 1965 that brought into power a new, pro-Western military government which would soon undermine Indonesia’s Konfrontasi efforts and sign the Bangkok peace treaty in May 1966 to end the conflict. Britain eventually declared its withdrawal east of Suez in 1968.

A detailed genealogy of Malaysia is beyond the scope of this paper. The turbulence created by the

Brunei revolt in 1962 and communist threats in Singapore in late 1950s to early 1960s were undoubtedly important factors behind the Greater Malaysia concept. It suffices to examine how the establishment of

Malaysia fit into Britain’s overall regional plan and why Britain attached such great importance to it as displayed by its prompt response to defend Malaysia in 1963 against Indonesian aggression. There is a lively scholarly debate regarding Britain’s intention to establish Malaysia. Some scholars regard Malaysia as a step towards British retrenchment in the region while others see it as a means to perpetuate British influence in the region and maintain links to its former Australasian dominions in the era of decolonization when “wind of change” was unstoppable.115 Examining the greater debates behind Britain’s postwar defense policy “east of Suez”—an area encompassing the Arab peninsula stretching over the Pacific Rim and Asia—appears to confirm that latter view. By 1950s, the importance of Southeast Asia to British “core” interest was unclear. The region’s economic value was diminishing given the consistent decline in the level of trade and investment over the preceding decades. Indeed, Macmillan argued that “Economic arguments alone would not justify, and have not for many years justified, our heavy expenditure on the maintenance of defence forces in the Far East, wider political and military interests are at stake.”116 Since

115 See summary in Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 8 . 116 Minute by W. I. McIndoe, Cabinet Office, to T. J. Bligh, Principal Private Secretary to Macmillan, 24 Sept. 1963, PREM 11/4183 cited in Subritzky, Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, 215.

34 Maria Monica Layarda the late 1950s, British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia Lord Selkirk had become a vocal of

British retrenchment east of Suez. He, however, represented the minority view. Most policymakers within the Macmillan cabinet, not least the Prime Minister himself, and officers within the FO and the Chiefs of

Staff still had the belief that Britain remained, and should strive to remain, a global power despite knowing full well of Britain’s strained economy. British presence in Southeast Asia and its continued “use of

Singapore” was necessary “if [Britain] want to maintain our influence with Australia and New Zealand on the one hand, and the United States on the other… without it, our influence in the area could sink to the level of France.117 France, of course, had just lost its last colony, Indochina, in the region just years prior.

Indeed, despite Indonesia’s announcement of its Konfrontasi policy in January, Britain forcefully pushed for the formation of Malaysia. During the Manila Summit over the summer of1963, in which

Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines resorted to a final diplomatic attempt to peacefully resolve

Konfrontasi, reconcile their differences and find a mutually acceptable arrangement for the establishment of Malaysia, British policy was to obstruct push the Malayan Tunku to take a hard-line approach in the

Manila Summit and resist delaying the establishment of Malaysia.118 When the Tunku was judged to show too much flexibility in negotiating with his Asian counterparts, Sukarno and Macapagal, British officials put pressures on him to take a more unforgiving stance. CRO Secretary Duncan Sandys relayed a message to the Tunku, who acted as Malaya’s principal negotiator at the conference, that “no amount of plebiscites will alter Sukarno’s basic hostility to Malaysia” and assured him of British support in any conflict with

Indonesia. 119 Notwithstanding the tripartite Manila agreement among the three Asian states that the establishment of Malaysia would await the results of UN observers to ensure the rights to self- determination of the Borneo population, Britain was in no mood to delay the Malaysian establishment.

117 Note by Amery, 4 Oct. 1961, D(61)66, CAB 131/2 cited in Subritzky(b), 212. 118 They did so by inviting a Philippine delegation to London to discuss issues of mutual interest. But the British efforts failed as President Macapagal would later denounce Malaysia as a neo-colonial child cited in Jones, 29. 119 FO (Sandys) to Manila, no. 1003, 2 August 1963, PREM 11/ 4349 cited in Jones, 211.

35 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

Indeed, Sandys had actually drafted a text to reject the UN report if it were to report negatively on its

Borneo survey.120 On September 16, Malaysia was formally established.

The establishment of Malaysia was welcomed by an angry mob on Jakarta by attacking and looting the British embassy. Such strong reactions were largely unanticipated by Whitehall. Despite warnings from Chief of the Defence Staff Lord Mountbatten that Britain would be hard-pressed to meet military requirements in the case of Konfrontasi escalation, the Conservative government remained firm in its commitment to defend Malaysia. Various departments within the FO were particularly enthusiastic to rally behind Britain’s hard-line approach toward Sukarno. The Head of the Southeast Asia Department, Fred

Warner, emphasized the importance of Malaysia defense to fulfill “our obligations to Australia, New

Zealand and Malaysia, and more remotely India and Pakistan”121 As a former FO officer later recalled,

“the Tories were always committed to imperial responsibilities and the world role” and they instinctively

122 would “hang one and not give up until they were convinced it was the only option.”

Jakarta’s attack on British embassy on September 15th and 18th convinced Britain, already suspicious of Sukarno, that the attacks were stage managed by Sukarno despite Sukarno’s public statement of disapproval and regret on September 19th. The Americans, nonetheless, remained convinced that Sukarno could still be won through persuasion and rewards. The Kennedy Administration officials’ “surprisingly lenient [attitude] towards Sukarno’s political faults” of the Americans caused grave concerns and bitterness within British foreign policy establishments.123 The months following the formal establishment of Malaysia and Indonesia’s escalation of Konfrontasi efforts largely showed the cracks between the

British and their American counterparts in regards to Indonesia and Malaysia. The lack of US support for

Britain would prove fatal given Washington’s strong clout over Australian and New Zealand policies.

President Kennedy and his key advisors’ approach to Konfrontasi was similar to its prior approach to the

120 Sandys to CRO, SOSLON, No. 136, 11 September 1963, PREM 11/4350. 121 Memo, by Warner, 'Four Years in South 1960-1963', 28 Nov. 1963, FO 371/169688/D 1051/41 cited in Subritzky, Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, 215. 122 Subritzky’s interview with Sir James Cable cited in Subritzky, Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, 212. 123 Greenhill to Warner, 16 August 1962, DH103145/9, FO 371/169888 cited in Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 202.

36 Maria Monica Layarda

WNG crisis. Their overriding goal was to prevent the open outbreak of conflict which would likely radicalize Indonesian politics and hasten its leftward drift. For Washington, squabbles over colonial remnants should not be allowed to disrupt the Americans’ larger goal for the region—this applied equally

124125 on the Dutch and the British.

On the other hand, Macmillan and his cabinet members’ anti-appeasement stance was greatly shaped by the prevalent belief of Britain’s failure of appeasement in WWII, which remained fresh in the memories of these seasoned statesmen—many of which had served in the government in the lead up to WWII. Indeed, right from the beginning of Konfrontasi there were frequent comparisons of Sukarno to Hitler and

Mussolini within the British government. 126 In his writing to Prime Minister Macmillan, Selkirk characterized Sukarno as “a man with much of the instability and lust for power of Hitler” and argued against appeasement asserting that “the longer we appease him the more extensive the war will be which will ensue.”127 In other occasions, British officers compared Sukarno to Mussolini who “had no cut-and- dried-plan, but seized each opportunity” to turn the Mediterranean in the “Mare Nostrum” similar to the former’s ambition in the Malay peninsula.128 The British, thus, believed that only strong military response would deter Sukarno from his foreign adventures. Furthermore, it is also worthwhile to note that the

Macmillan government was the same government that had supported Eisenhower in deposing Sukarno in

1957-8. Indeed, Warner from the FO made this personal antipathy clear to his American counterparts when he compared Sukarno to Castro: “it was difficult for the British to take moderate attitude towards Sukarno

129 whom they looked upon as a special enemy in the same way the US regards Castro.”

124 Harriman-Hislman telephone conversation, 17 September 1963, box 581, Harriman papers cited in Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 203. 125 See Jones, Conflict and Confrontation Chapter 9. 126 British Commissioner General Selkirk was alarmed by Sukarno’s purported support for Brunei’s revolt and in his writing to Prime Minister Macmillan, he characterized Sukarno as “a man with much of the instability and lust for power of Hitler”. 127 Selkirk to FO, no. 374, 19 December 1962; Selkirk to Macmillan, 20 December 1962 cited from Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 115. 128 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 133. 129 London to DOS, np. 778, 15 August 1963 POL 3 Malaysia, RG 59 cited in Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 172.

37 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

Notwithstanding the escalation of Konfrontasi into a full-scale military conflict, the Kennedy

Administration showed little sympathy for problems facing its closest ally. As much as expected, strong

Indonesian supporters within the Kennedy Administration, such as Harriman and Hilsman, tended to shift the blame for Konfrontasi escalation to Britain’s forceful and reckless attempt to establish Malaysia.

Malaysia, in their view, was a “self-fulfilling prophecy—[the British] have been prophesying that the

Indonesians would not come around” and then made it impossible for Sukarno to find a face-saving exit to the dispute. Subsequently, they pushed hard for a negotiated settlement to end Konfrontasi. The

American sensitivity to the colonial history of Britain was again displayed when the Administration specifically pushed for an “Asia solution” in late 1963. Harriman specifically warned that too much British involvement in the dispute would create an image of “white” power ganging up against Jakarta as they did

130 during the Manila Summit.

By the end of 1963, Konfrontasi had reached a stalemate with neither side having enough capability to make a breakthrough. Amidst the worsening of the British economy, the pressures on the sterling, and

US refusal to support the British efforts, Minister of Defence Peter Throneycroft warned that Britain’s status quo defensive posture could not continue indefinitely given that “the Indonesians can readily increase their pressure” while Britain would be hard-pressed to “make further calls on [their] strained military resources”.131 In his visit to Malaysia, he again impressed upon the Malaysian Deputy PM Abdul

Razak the need “to seek a political solution was paramount [in light of Britain’s military constraints]”.132

Macmillan’s retirement and Home’s assumption of the premiership did little to shift the British course.

Home himself had been a strong supporter of Malaysia and too much British credibility was at stake in

Malaysia for it to pull out. Home did however show some qualifications. The lack of American support for British Konfrontasi efforts did prompt the new government to re-evaluate its stance. Home wrote to his new SSEA Butler that “We must defend Malaysia of course but it will help neither Malaysia nor

130 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 301-2. 131 Memcon, FO, 16 Oct. 1963, FO 371/169909/DH 1071/31/G cited in Subrtizky, 216. 132 Note fa meeting between Thorneycroft and Razak, 6 January 1964, PREM11/4905 cited in Jones, 244.

38 Maria Monica Layarda ourselves… if in the course of defending Malaysia we drive Indonesia into the arms of communist Russia or China. It is probably considerations of this sort that make our friends and allies less than wholehearted in our support.”133 While not disagreeing, Butler emphasized that Britain had few alternatives to its defensive posture.

In a comprehensive report distributed to the cabinet in January 1964, Butler suggested neither military escalation nor negotiation would do any good to Britain. The former was discouraged out of the realization that Britain alone could not undermine Sukarno’s Konfrontasi resolve in the face of the

“ambivalent attitude of our major [American] ally”, while the latter would also be unproductive to the

British goal since the US “would only be too glad” to seize the opportunity to force “a reluctant Tunku… from concession to concession”. In the same report, Butler also reported that Britain had thus far failed to secure substantial support for Malaysia from its Commonwealth allies in the Pacific, Australia and New

Zealand, because their attitude was largely “influenced by the United States attitude”.134 The US, therefore, was key to the success of Konfrontasi.

Fortunately for Home, the leadership change in the US at the end of the year provided new opportunity for Britain to lobby for American support against Sukarno given that the new president showed great antipathy toward Sukarno. In February 1964, Home and Johnson managed to reach a higher degree of unity over their countries objectives in Southeast Asia by pledging informal support for each other’s interest in Malaysia and Vietnam. For the following months, British officials concentrated its effort to win greater US support for Malaysia by tying it directly to Vietnam. The message was a simple one: “what

South Vietnam is to you, Malaysia is to us… and Indonesia’s strident nationalism is… unwittingly abetting the communists. This is why British support in Malaysia has to be regarded indivisible from US support

135 for Vietnam.”

133 Minute by Home to R. A. Butler, Foreign Secretary, 19 Dec. 1963, FO 371/169894/DH1051/102/G cited in Subrtizky(b), 216. 134 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, GB CP(64) 5, Cabinet Policy Towards Indonesia, 6 January 1964, p. 1. 135 Peck minute, 29 January 1964, FO 371; cited from Jones(b), 273.

39 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

Nonetheless, despite winning some political support at Washington, Britain’s balance of payment deficit continued to worsened throughout 1964 and the Treasury made further calls for cuts in defense spending. In mid-1964, the FO conducted a major review of British policy in Southeast Asia. It grimly concluded that over the last 25 years, British had lost more than gained economically from trade. No longer did Britain rely on raw material imports from the region and Malaysia had worsened Britain’s balance of payment deficits—thus further weakening the sterling. Despite the negative economic assessment, the report emphasized that there was vital political value in maintaining presence: Britain’s role as the principal ally in Western alliance to contain communism which went beyond Asia. Communist triumph in

Asia would break American resolve with grave and wide repercussions. Thus Britain presence “to the global Anglo-American partnership” which also gave British some leverage to harness American policy direction and by this point alone Britain’s SE Asia presence was “worth retaining for this reason alone.”

Secondary importance was given to the defense of Australia and New Zealand on the grounds of history,

136 race, and emotional attachments which required the maintenance of British presence east of Suez.

In October, the Conservatives were voted out of of office after 13 years in power and a new Labour government came into office under Harold Wilson. Soon, the new government faced a difficult dilemma.

Sukarno had despatched more army regulars into Borneo as part of his attempt to escalate the conflict.

Meanwhile, Johnson’s support for Britain had not turned into any material support, given that the

Americans themselves were tied down in Vietnam and Britain’s balance of payment crisis worsened to the point that the Treasury published a forceful warning to the government, “We are bound to state our opinion that we cannot see a satisfactory solution for the economic problems of this country in the next decade unless an immediate halt is called to the increases in the defence budget, and a steady reduction takes place in the proportion of the nation's resources devoted to defence.”137 Domestic factors and Konfrontasi therefore demanded polar policy actions. The government internally decided to prioritize the former and

136 FO memo., 'British Policy Towards South-East Asia', 22 Sept. 1964, CAB 148/7 cited in Subritzky, Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, 213. 137 Treasury memo., 11 Nov. 1964, CAB 148/40 cited in Subritzky, Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, 220.

40 Maria Monica Layarda agreed that “The basis of our policy should be to lessen our commitments [to Malaysia] as quickly as we

138 can… [and seek a political solution to Konfrontasi] to avoid bankruptcy.”

In August 1965, Malaysia’s expulsion of Singapore provided a window of opportunity to implement British plan of withdrawal. Nonetheless, having just escalated their presence in Vietnam,

Britain’s plan of making peace with Sukarno and retreating from Southeast Asia was utterly rejected by the Americans. Amidst Britain’s sterling crisis, the Americans used financial assistance as the carrot and stick to keep Britain in the region. The US eventually agreed to support sterling through ‘aggressive intervention’ in world markets provided that Britain postponed its withdrawal east of Suez. As

Undersecretary Ball bluntly told Wilson in a private conversation, ‘it would be a great mistake if the UK

Government failed to understand that the American effort to relieve sterling was inextricably related to the commitment of the UK Government to maintain its commitments around the world.”139 In mid-1965 therefore Britain had no option but to remain in Konfrontasi. Amidst increasing pressures from the US for

British military support in Vietnam, Britain’s Konfrontasi efforts had also become the excuse to turn down

American requests. As Wilson stated, “we could not insist on making an early move to end Confrontation without causing grave offence to our allies and prejudicing the prospect of their future collaboration.”140

So Britain hung on to its low-intensity Konfrontasi conflicts until the Army coup in October 1965 provided

Britain with its greatly welcomed, awaited exit. While conventional scholarship has referred to the 1956

Suez crisis as marking the end of Britain’s global role, it was the exhausting and nearly-bankrupting experience of battling Indonesians in Borneo jungles that dashed Britain’s ambitions to play a global role in the postwar era and paved way for Wilson’s eventual announcement of British withdrawal east of Suez in 1968.

138 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, 223. 139 Ibid., 289. 140 Subritzky, Britain, Konfrontasi, and the end of empire in Southeast Asia, 223.

41 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

III. CANADA: ALLIANCE & AVOIDANCE

While the Americans and British saw their strategic interests sprawling across the world, Canada, had neither the former’s rising superpower role and ambitions nor the former’s colonial power status.

Despite its geography stretching across the Atlantic, Arctic, and Pacific, Canada’s foreign policy had traditionally prioritized the foremost. Until Prime Minister Trudeau called for a westward reorientation of

Canadian foreign policy, Canada had little interest in the Pacific. In the immediate postwar decades, where

Canada was present in the region, it was part of larger Western efforts through the Commonwealth, the

UN, or NATO. In 1954, Canada sent its largest diplomatic mission to Southeast Asia when it participated at the ICC in Indochina on behalf of the “free world”. In the region’s lower arc, Canada found natural partnership with Malaya, a Western-oriented, Commonwealth cousin.141 Canada’s relations with newly independent Indonesia, on the other hand, was lukewarm at best. Bilateral relations were first forged at the multilateral level when Canada successfully mediated the final arrangement of Indonesia’s independence from the Netherlands in 1949.142 For the subsequent decade, Indonesia occupied a low priority in Canadian foreign policy. Bilateral relations were limited; trade and migration were negligible. Canada only began a granting modest amount of wheat flour aid to Indonesia under the Colombo Plan in 1959.

Although Indonesia largely lay outside of Canada’s core interest, examining Canada’s Indonesia- policy in the turbulent decade of the 1960s has its own merits: it portrays a contrast in the conduct of Cold

War policy between great and middle powers, and provides insights into Canadian policymaking on issues peripheral to Canada yet central to its allies. The literature on Canada-Indonesia relation is currently in its infancy. Canadian historian David Webster deserves a distinct mention for undertaking a historian’s most challenging task of writing the first historical narrative of Canada-Indonesia foreign relations in Fire and the Full Moon. The following section will examine closely Canada’s Indonesia-policy during the WNG

141 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 75-78. 142 Ibid., Chapter 1.

42 Maria Monica Layarda crisis and Konfontasi. I rely on Webster’s work as the primary point of reference and comparison while

143 attempting to further the literature by flagging unresolved puzzles and offering preliminary analyses.

Throughout the period examined, Canada’s approach toward Indonesia was primarily characterized by its reactive and passive nature. Rather than pursuing a clearly-defined strategic plan, Canada’s

Indonesia-policy was a culmination of crisis-driven responses. Within Canada’s long history of multilateral activism, its diplomatic self-image as a mediator and strategic exercise of “policy of constraints”144 , Canada’s deliberate efforts to minimize its engagement in Indonesia, to the point of rejecting direct requests for Canadian mediation, might first appear unnatural. The following identifies three primary factors behind Canada’s Indonesia-policy. At the structural level, as Webster has argued, alliance politics led to Canadian involvement in Indonesia, not dissimilar to Canada’s involvement in

Vietnam over the same period. Commonwealth solidarity and Canada’s strategic Cold War alliance with the US made it impossible for Canada to remain completely detached from Indonesian affairs which became an increasingly important preoccupation of its allies. Nonetheless, alliance ties are insufficient to explain Canada’s avoidance and passivity in Indonesia which resulted from the lack of Canadian national interests in Indonesia. Conservative and Liberal policymakers alike tried to avoid political and military entanglements in Indonesia, while balancing Canada’s commitment to its allies. Finally, given the executive discretion within foreign policymaking especially in the absence of predetermined objectives, the personality and convictions of PM Diefenbaker (1957-63) and Secretary of State for External Affairs

(SSEA) Howard Green (1959-63) and his successor Paul Martin (1963-68) were particularly crucial in shaping Canada’s response toward the crises in the archipelago.

WNG Crisis

Right from the outset of the WNG crisis and throughout the ordeal, Canada showed great reluctance to assume an active role. In 1957, Indonesian Ambassador to Canada L. N. Palar appealed directly to

143 Due to lack of access to archives, the author relies on Webster’s primary research for the period between 1957 and mid-1963. The author has obtained the documents from late-1963 to 1967 directly from LAC. 144 The phrase is often used by Canadian scholars to characterize Canada’s foreign policy strategy to steer its allies’ policy directions. See for instance, Hillmer and Granatstein, From Empire to Umpire, Chapter 7.

43 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

Ottawa for Canadian mediation over WNG, but Canada squarely refused.145 Canada’s internal policy assessment, shared by Green and the Department of External Affairs (DEA), was sympathetic to the Dutch proposal for the self-determination of WNG. Given the Canadian gradual assertion of self-determination from Britain, Canada had a natural sympathy for the Dutch proposal for tutelage. Moreover, as Green observed, “the Indonesian claim [over WNG] is not based on sound arguments of racial affinity or historical rights.”146 Far Eastern Division Chief Arthur Menzies concurred, adding that the Dutch had

147 greater capability in preparing the natives for self-determination.

For Canada, however, the merits of the WNG crisis—implicating peoples in a faraway land—were to be assessed within the broader context of Canada’s Euro-centric post-war political and security priorities, which in real terms meant Canadian “concern for the continued safety and well-being of one of Europe’s oldest and most stable democracies… [and] common membership in NATO.”148 Canada’s pro-Dutch bias was a direct manifestation of its alliance solidarity. Indeed, throughout the 1950s, prior to Kennedy’s reorientation of American policy toward Indonesia, Canada’s major allies all fell in the same camp although they occupied different positions along the spectrum: Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, took a staunch pro-Dutch position while US support for the status quo translated into a soft support for the

Dutch position while cautiously avoiding to antagonize Indonesia. Given its slight interest in the dispute,

Canada had initially followed the Americans’ low-risk position and abstained from Indonesia-sponsored

WNG resolution at the UN. Beginning in 1954, as the crisis escalated and Canada came under pressures from its allies, especially the Netherlands and Australia, to take a stronger stance against Indonesia Canada

149 began voting “no” alongside the Commonwealth.

While both the Prime Minister and his SSEA were known as staunch anglophiles,150 the Australian position seemed to be a more prominent factor in shaping Canada’s attitude towards the WNG issue given

145 Memorandum by John Holmes cited in Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 101, sn 1. 146 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 106 147 Such view point is explicitly expressed by Canadian Far Eastern Division chief Arthur Menzies, Webster p. 106 148 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 104, sn 7 149 Ibid., 105. 150 Bothwell, Robert. The New Penguin History of Canada. (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2006), 393.

44 Maria Monica Layarda that Australia had the most at stake over issues in its own backyard. Canada did not only share a close bilateral relation with its Commonwealth cousin, Diefenbaker had also enjoyed close relations with

Australian Prime Minister Menzies. The two, after all, shared similar conservative views and were united in opposing Britain’s entry into the EEC—an economic issue that had significant emotional impacts on these two passionate Commonwealth supporters.151 In 1957, Australia had evidently voiced its opposition to Canadian meddling in the WNG. The Australian government would be displeased if Western countries

“such as Canada” took over WNG trusteeship.152 At the same time, the Canadian Ambassador to the

Netherlands, C. P. Hébert, had suggested that Canadian mediation would be a “thankless and frustrating task.”153 Passivity and non-intervention, therefore, emerged as the safest and most pragmatic option for

Canada. Canada had too little at stake for the government to interfere and risk good relations with its allies.

The USSR’s aid offensive in the last few years of the 1950s, however, alarmed Canada’s major allies, namely the US, Britain, and Australia. Between 1958 and 1961, a looming Communist threat in the archipelago created an uncomfortable balancing act between the West’s greater containment effort and catering to the Dutch interest in WNG. As the US, Britain, and Australia moved towards a greater accommodation toward Indonesia, Canada also followed. Canada joined its three allies in making moderate military sales to Indonesia when it sold … otter aircrafts and gave .. additional ones as gifts in

1959. The Australian factor remained a key consideration on the minds of Canadian policymakers. The

Diefenbaker government had first secured Australian approval before signing any sales deal to

154 Indonesia.

Immediately following his assumption of office in early 1961, Kennedy reoriented US policy toward

Indonesia and marked the beginning of a rift in the Western camp’s position toward WNG. As was made clear in While Kennedy began supporting the Indonesian claim, Britain and Australia continued to oppose

151 McKenzie, Francine. “Trade Dominance, Dependence, and the End of the Settlement Era in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, 1920-1973” in Settler Economies in World History edited by Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzer, and Richard Sutch, 463. 152 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 107, sn 18. 153 Ibid., 107, sn 17. 154 Ibid., 111.

45 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

Indonesia’s takeover of WNG—made clear in the 1960 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference.

Caught in the middle of this rift, Canada sought the middle path, not to close the gap, but rather to avoid offending any of its allies. This rebalancing act also translated into Canada’s return abstention on

Indonesian-backed resolution on WNG.155 Nonetheless, the Canadian government quietly had greater sympathy for the Dutch, backed by Britain and Australia. Green instructed the Canadian UN delegation to

“avoid taking the initiative and oppose any attempt to involve the ”156 as any UN solution

“was unlikely to have useful result”157 given that Indonesia would likely win at UN negotiations, especially with US support and Canada would not want to facilitate this adverse outcome for the Dutch and

Commonwealth allies.

The Kennedy-Macmillan Bermuda summit on December 21-22, 1961 forced Britain to abandon its support for the Dutch. Observing Anglo-American unity, Australian Secretary for External Affairs

Barwick concluded that “we have been obliged to conclude [from US recent actions]… that Dutch withdrawal largely on Indonesian terms is inevitable.”158 Soon, under US pressure, Australia also yielded and followed Britain’s lead. The Menzies government’s sharp U-turn on the position Australia had staunchly and passionately advocated had been deemed “the most profound shift in Australian foreign policy since the war.”159 It was unsurprising that Canada would follow along the stream. Assistant Under-

Secretary George Glazebrook subsequently recommended that Canada withdrew its support for WNG self-

160 determination.

Nonetheless, the Commonwealth did not convert into becoming keen supporters of Indonesia. Their new stance was at best non-opposition to US efforts by distancing themselves from the Dutch. When the crisis escalated into military skirmishes, Indonesia once again appealed to Canada for mediation but met

155 “West New Guinea” in “The Month in the United Nations: Sixteenth Session of the General Assembly,” External Affairs Review (New Zealand) XI, no. II (November 1961), 49-50. 156 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 113. 157 Ibid., 113. 158 Barwick to Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador in Washington, 15 January 1962, Tange Papers, DFAT as cited in David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain's Empire (Melbourne: University Press, 2002), 48. 159 Marr, Barwick, 175 160 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 125.

46 Maria Monica Layarda with a resounding no. The DEA telegram to the Hague puts it bluntly, “We do not wish to take any soundings or to discuss with any other government the possibility of Cdn participation in the [WNG] talks.”161 The Canadian chilly attitude was perhaps also a reflection of the cold personal relations between the two North American leaders. Diefenbaker had “spectacularly bad relations with Kennedy”162 and it was no surprise that the Chief had been unenthusiastic about getting involved in the mediation efforts which had been initiated by his political nemesis. The dispute was eventually ended with the US-sponsored mediation in 1962, which forced the Dutch government to give up its sovereign claim over WNG and the

UN subsequently took on its first direct administration of a former colony before handing it to Indonesia.

Between 1962-4, Canada provided logistical support to the UN, but it did so cautiously after Green secured

163 the Hague’s approval.

Konfrontasi

Not dissimilar to the Diefenbaker government’s non-intervention in WNG, the Liberal policy under

Pearson also stayed on the spectator’s side when the Anglo-American rift deepened over the best policy to arrest Sukarno’s leftward drift and Canada was reluctant to become involved when Indonesia’s

Konfrontasi policy brought Britain as well as Australia and New Zealand to the brink of war with the

Republic over the formation of Malaysia in late 1963. Commonwealth solidarity would eventually lead

Canada to actively support Malaysia but this explicit commitment only came after the US and Britain resolved their own disagreement and notwithstanding Canadian support to Malaysia, Canada remained extremely cautious, anxious not to antagonize Indonesia. Consequently, throughout the second half of

1964, the Pearson government supported both sides of the belligerents: it sent military aid to Malaysia while continuing Colombo aid to Indonesia. Canada’s “wishy washy” 164 policy remains largely unexplained and this section pays a particular attention to explaining this seeming contradiction.

161 Ibid., 125, sn 87. 162 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984. (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2007), 177. 163 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 127. 164 Conservative opposition attacked the Pearson government for “sitting on a fence” and having a “wishy washy foreign policy in Southeast Asia” cited in P. J. Boyce and R. K. Davis, “Malaysia Tests the Commonwealth”, The Australian Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1965), 60.

47 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

Canada had been one of the first states to establish full diplomatic relations with the British

Federation of Malaya when it was established in 1953. Soon after, bilateral relation flourished under

Diefenbaker who, despite his notoriously bad relations with Macmillan and Kennedy, had enjoyed a warm personal relation with the Tunku.165 The latter managed to impress the Chief when he visited Malaya in

1958 with a lavish state dinner and an assembly of luxurious local gifts. 166 Diefenbaker returned the favor and displayed his wit as he acclaimed, “Canada and Malaya will be friends until the snow falls in Malaya and the rubber trees grow in Canada.”167 The sympathy for Malaya continued after the 1963 election brought to power the Liberal government under Pearson.

This sympathy, first for Malaya and soon for the British hard-liner policy on Indonesia, did not promptly, however, translate into a concrete change in Canadian policy toward Indonesia. Pearson’s coming into office came when Indonesia’s infiltrations into the Malaysian territory were posing a serious challenge to Malaysia, and when Kennedy and Macmillan’s disagreement over the Indonesia policy deepening. For the next year and a half, until Canada decided to aid Malaysia in mid-1964, the Liberal government watched the crisis boiling from afar even as British military commitment to Malaysia rapidly escalated. American reluctance to confront Sukarno appears to be the determining factor of Canada’s restraint just as it as the primary factor behind Australian and New Zealand reluctance to respond to

Britain’s repeated calls for military reinforcements throughout 1963-4. Despite their close relation to

Malaysia and great stake in the dispute by virtue of their geographic location, the two Pacific

Commonwealth nations decided that it was paramount to secure American military guarantees before committing to Malaysia’s defense. In the words of New Zealand Secretary of Foreign Affairs Sir Alister

McIntosh, Canberra and Wellington would not “[put] ourselves out on a limb if it appears the United States

165 Richard Stubbs, “Canada’s Relations With Malaysia: Picking Partners in ASEAN.” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 3 (1990), 354. 166 David Reece, A Rich Broth: Memoirs of a Canadian Diplomat. (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 56-8. 167 Ibid.

48 Maria Monica Layarda might be indifferent to an attempt to see it off.”168 Unsurprisingly, with even less at stake, Canada followed this cautious path.

The first crisis that the new Liberal government had to respond to in 1963 came when an Indonesian mob attacked British and Malayan embassies after the inauguration of the Federation of Malaysia on

September 16. The news received highly negative reporting in Canada. The fresh outbreak of violence swayed the government into the Britain’s hard-line camp, away from the American perspective. In Jakarta,

Ambassador Sigvaldason grimly concluded that Sukarno’s revolutionary ambition to upset “the present balance of power” between the developed and less developed nations will inevitably lead him into alignment with the Communist bloc and “we believe that under Sukarno’s Indonesia is already a lost cause as far as the free world is concerned.”169. In January 1964, before he ended his appointment, Sigvaldason wrote a detailed analysis of the Indonesia situation:

“… Our reading of Indonesian history and our personal knowledge of Indonesian leaders lead

inevitably to the conclusion that attempts to conciliate will not be very effective and that willingness

to compromise will be misunderstood as weakness to be met by increased demands and truculence.

It follows that efforts to persuade, to reason, and to exercise diplomatic influence will at best be

170 marginally effective [in guiding Indonesia] into a free world orbit.”

A similar conclusion was reached within the DEA in Ottawa. An internal document “Assessment of

Present and Future Indonesian Foreign Policy” from April 1964 signed by … shows that Canadian policymakers concurred with their British counterparts that Jonesian appeasement could not end Sukarno’s pursuit of “endless succession of foreign adventures” and his “personal and national megalomania”; only

171 an economic collapse could.

As Indonesia escalated its military incursions into Malaysia over the summer, the Tunku pressed for greater assistance at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in July 1964. Sympathy and moral

168 NZDEA, 27 Feb 1963, brief, ABHS, 950, NZNA cited in Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, 50. 169 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 137, sn 24. 170 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 275-6 171 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 141, sn 38.

49 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 support was abundant but material assistance less so. In the Communique, Commonwealth leaders

“assured the Prime Minister of Malaysia of their sympathy and support in his efforts to preserve the sovereign independence and integrity of his country and to promote a peaceful [resolution of

Konfrontasi].”172 Canada’s domestic political mood was receptive to the Malaysian plea. Parliamentary members were, on the whole, pro-Malaysia but the extent of their commitment differed. Following the

Conference, the Tories attacked the Liberal government for “sitting on a fence” and having a “wishy washy foreign policy in Southeast Asia” as they pressed for a greater military support for Malaysia. 173 Leader of the New Democratic Party T. C. Douglas, on the other hand, defended the government’s policy and preferred even more restraint: “while we are all anxious to protect Malaysia, or any part of the

Commonwealth or any other nation in the world, against aggression, such action must be taken within the framework of the United Nations if it is to be effective.”174 In attesting to parliament regarding the

Commonwealth Conference, Pearson had emphasized that Canada would extend “support” not just mere

“sympathy” to Malaysia but insisted that “the question of sending men to Malaysia is not involved.”175

Tunku’s subsequent visit to Ottawa in late July following the Commonwealth Conference managed to turn

Canadian political support into a concrete assistance. The Pearson government increased the amount of

Malaysian developmental aid under the Colombo plan to CAD$2 million, while offering promises to train

Malaysian air force pilots, arrange concessional credit for aircraft sales to Malaysia, and dispatch a military survey team to Kuala Lumpur to assess Malaysia’s military need.176 Canada, thus, made its first military aid to an Asian country and in so doing inaugurated itself as a participant in Konfrontasi.

Nonetheless, although Canada finally took side in Konfrontasi, the government was cautious not to cut the limited Colombo Plan aid to Indonesia earmarked at $350,000. There was some truth to the

Conservatives’ repeated criticism that the government was aiding both sides of the conflict. As Konfrontasi

172 The Commonwealth at the Summit: communiqués of Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings, 1944-1986. (London : Commonwealth Secretariat, 1987) 173 Stubbs, Canada’s Relations With Malaysia, 60. 174 Ibid., 60. 175 Ibid., 62. 176 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 142; Stubbs, Canada’s Relations With Malaysia, 60-62.

50 Maria Monica Layarda continued to escalate, so did parliamentary pressures to take a stronger stance against Indonesia.177 In

November, the Conservatives once again pressed for a greater assistance to Malaysia and campaigned for the termination of Canadian aid to Indonesia in the House of Commons arguing that Canadian aid helped free up Jakarta’s foreign exchange that could be used for military purposes against Malaysia.178 During the Supply Debate on November 28, Tory back-bencher Mr. Barnett explicitly questioned whether the government would “send equipment or troops, or both, to help our partners in the Commonwealth.” Paul

Martin responded cautiously by framing Malaysia as a matter “that engages the interests of the commonwealth as a whole, particularly those of the , Australia and New Zealand.”179 He too defended the aid to Indonesia on the grounds the Colombo Plan was non-political.

Canadian restraint and seemingly contradictory Indonesia-policy has not been sufficiently addressed in the current literature. The Pearson government’s firm stance not to even the possibility of sending

Canadian troops to the Malay peninsula right appears to have stemmed primarily from the lack of Canadian direct interest in the area. A comprehensive internal memorandum assessing Canada-Indonesia relations produced by the Far Eastern Department in April 1964 made clear that “Because of distance and lack of direct interests in the area, Canada has not been prominently involved in the current Indonesian-Malaysian dispute.” The document highlights that “[f]rom the first… we have supported the idea of Malaysia as the most suitable arrangement for ending the colonial status of former British colonies in the area…

180 Consequently we would not favour any weakening in Malaysia’s position vis-à-vis Indonesia”

Canadians undoubtedly had their misgivings, but the careful choice of the word “favour” also draws a subtle yet important distance between Canada and the conflict; Malaysian survival would be the optimal, preferred outcome but there was a clear limit to which Canada would go to ensure its realization in the absence of direct interests. Moreover, the Canadian military also faced substantial constraints due to

Canada’s declining defense spending throughout the 1960s while it expanded its peacekeeping

177 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 196. 178 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 142. 179 Italics added. House of Commons debate as cited in Stubbs, Canada’s Relations With Malaysia, 61. 180 Italics added. Internal Memorandum DEA, April 1964, Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 247.

51 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 commitments, such as the formation of the Cyprus peacekeeping in 1964, initiated and almost exclusively conducted by Canada. With limited resources the armed forces had preferred to focus on Europe which it saw as the primary Cold War battleground.

The seemingly contradictory policy toward Konfrontasi reveals the polar tendencies of alliance pressures on Canada, especially that from the Commonwealth. Aiding Malaysia was a domestically favored policy, but also one that would have otherwise been unescapable given the pressures Canada received from Malaysia, not least its long-standing allies, Britain and Australia which called for greater

Canadian role in the conflict as the old, Western Commonwealth partner that was most removed from the conflict. Canadian continued aid to Indonesia, arguably, also flows from similar alliance thinking. Indeed, within the broader development of Canadian Cold War policy, this period saw Canada re-orienting its role within the Western alliance to act as a bridge between the West and the third world. While the St. Laurent government had firmly refrained from extending Canadian military aid outside of Europe in the 1950s, the

Diefenbaker government reversed this policy when it provided military aid to in 1961 amidst Cold

War escalation. As a middle power and a Western country uniquely deprived of colonial “sins”, Canada was strategically placed to offer military assistance to recently-decolonized developing countries which, due to their sensitivity to colonialism, would likely reject similar offers from Britain or the US181 Under

Pearson, Canada sent military officers to train the new Commonwealth, including Barbados, Jamaica,

Nigeria, Trinidad, Zambia, and finally Malaysia—the first in the region to receive Canadian military aid.182

In Indonesia, the bridging role manifested in a slightly different form. As the old Commonwealth

country least involved in the stand-off, Canada saw its role not as the primary backer of Malaysia—a role

assumed by Britain, Australia, and New Zealand—but as the “Plan B” these Commonwealth countries

could fall back on in case they were forced to break diplomatic relations with Indonesia. As early as June

1964, Martin had agreed “to assume duties as protecting power of Brit interests in Indonesia immediately

181 Greg Donaghy, “The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952-1971,” 77. 182 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 148.

52 Maria Monica Layarda in event of break in [diplomatic] interests between Brit and Indonesia”.183 As Australia and New Zealand became militarily involved in the conflict, Canada also assumed responsibility on their behalf. The government therefore refrained from any extreme measures, including ending Canadian aid, which might jeopardize Canada-Indonesia relations and compromise Canada’s ability to represent Commonwealth interests.

When Malaysia was elected into the UNSC on January 1, 1965, Indonesia responded by formally withdrawing from the UN and UN-related agencies. Immediately after Jakarta’s UN walk out, the Head of Far Eastern Division, Louis Rogers, urged the government “against any precipitate action which would exacerbate Canada’s relations with Indonesia” recalling that “Canada has agreed to protect the interests of

British, Australian and New Zealand citizens in the event that those three must sever diplomatic relations with Indonesia… [and] have to step into the breach.” This policy recommendation, nonetheless, came with a caveat that “preservation of Indonesian-Canadian relations” should be prioritized “as long as this policy is consistent with the maintenance of security in South East Asia and of our good relations with

184 Malaysia”.

Soon, however, Indonesia clearly turned into a rogue state after Sukarno declared his alignment with the Communist bloc and frequently spoke of an anti-imperialist Asian bloc comprising of Indonesia,

China, Cambodia, and North Korea. He came to be perceived as a security threat across the West, not limited to the Commonwealth. Aid to Indonesia was soon dropped quietly given that the “food aid vote

[was conducted] on a lapsing basis” and “the Minister [Paul Martin] will not find it possible to approve any flour shipment to Indonesia”185 given Indonesia’s foreign policy radicalization. At the same time, on

January 22, following Martin’s recommendations, the Cabinet substantially doubled Canadian military aid to Malaysia from $1.5 million agreed in July during Tunku’s visit to $4 million over the following two years to provide four Caribou aircrafts, training for Malaysian air force and army, and 250 light

183 Memorandum from SSEA Paul Martin to Canadian Ambassador in London, Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc 227. 184 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc 172. 185 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc 154.

53 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 motorcycles for the Malaysian police.186 The decision, as Canada declared at a NATO meeting, was

187 designed to assist “Malaysia, a fellow Commonwealth member … to develop its ability to defend itself.”

The Indonesians responded with outrage. The Indonesian Herald, an English speaking newspaper owned by Indonesian foreign minister Dr. Subandrio delivered a stinging criticism, “this [the aircraft delivery] should be a lesson to every Indonesian that a Canadian is not a Canadian but that a Canadian is

British… After all, Canadians do not even have an independence day.”188 It regretted that the earlier expectation of “today’s government of Mr. Lester Pearson would be more progressive than previous governments has proven wrong.”189 From the Indonesian point of view, from this point onwards, Canada was to be lumped along with the other imperialists, not least Britain, Australia, New Zealand, as well as the US190 But Canadian officials were keen on distinguishing themselves still from their Commonwealth counterparts with direct military roles in the conflict. In fact, what the Indonesians overlooked was the fact that Canadian military assistance to Malaysia was also relatively mild. The Cabinet rejected Malaysia air defence’s request for military jets to be included in the aid package on the grounds that they were “unduly warlike”.191 While the Cabinet finally authorized the sale of the jets it emphasized that the sale must be justified on “trade and industrial considerations, not political or military ones” and they “should be

192 exported without armament.”

After making this aid, Canada sought to refrain from further involvement in the conflict. In February,

Undersecretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux instructed the Canadian delegation to NATO meeting to emphasize that “[i]n view of our reluctance to become more deeply involved, we would not wish to pose as experts when confrontation is discussed… nor be considered to have an intimate interest in the question.” 193 The same set of instructions were submitted to Martin in preparation for the

186 Military assistance for Malaysia, Cabinet Conclusions, 22 January 1965, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 6271, Unit 25987, LAC. 187 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 131. 188 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 158. 189 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 158. 190 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 191, 147. 191 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 150, sn 71. 192 Sale of Canadair CL-41 aircraft to Malaysia, RG2, Privy Council Office, Series A-5-a, Volume 6271, Unit 26296. 193 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 130-131

54 Maria Monica Layarda

Commonwealth Conference in June 1965. Indeed, although Canada was forced to take some extreme measures, such as cutting aid to Indonesia, it was cautious not to go beyond the necessary. Head of the

Commonwealth Division A. G. Campbell suggested that the SSEA should emphasize to Commonwealth that “Canada is anxious to maintain good relations with Indonesia and this is demonstrated not only by the non-interruption of normal trade between the two countries but also by the continuance of educational aid to the republic.”194 Both values were minimal in magnitude but symbolically represented the continuing bilateral relations. Indeed, the government also waited until June 1965 before cutting off another string of attachment to Indonesia by cancelling the Otter aircraft order with potential military use. In 1963, at the end of the WNG crisis, Jakarta had signed a contract with Canadian aircraft company DeHavilland to buy fifteen Otter aircrafts to support the UN operations in the WNG and the Indonesian government made a

$240,000 down payment. By mid 1965, it became clear that UN operations would cease and Canada, taking a legal rather than a political argument ended the sales on the grounds that the conditions in the

195 original contract ceased to apply.

Before another crisis dawned, Konfrontasi was ended when Sukarno was toppled in the October 1 army coup. Currently there is little evidence suggesting Canadian complicity in the affairs—a charge often laid on the other Western powers. Even less was the suggestion of Canada’s direct involvement in engineering the coup. In his narrative, historian Webster focuses more on Canada’s positive response to the consolidation of the new military government in 1966 but skips the discussion on Canada’s involvement in 1965. Official documents suggest that Canada had no role in the conflict and indeed did not foresee the coming of the coup. Indeed, Canada did not have much intelligence on the ground as the

Commonwealth Division only submitted a proposal to the Defence Liaison Division to “send a Military

Attaché to Indonesia… [who] might be able to make some contribution to intelligence”196 one week prior to the coup. Immediate reports from the Canadian Embassy in Jakarta following the coup were relatively

194 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 130-131 195 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 148 196 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 124

55 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965 calm and Ambassador Macdonnell reported that the embassy would be focused on “preparing a series of letters, of possible historical interest, reporting the facts as far as we were able to ascertain them” and ended the report on a positive note that “all Embassy staff, Canadian and locally engaged, are working hard and cheerfully”. 197 Canada remained largely a passive bystander until the year 1966 saw a normalization of Western relations with Indonesia and Canada joined its Western allies in making economic relief aid to the country and the long-run modernization program.

This narrative proposes that Canada’s attitude was most primarily a result of a compromise between

Canada’s peripheral national interest in the region, which led to its reluctance to become involved in the conflict, and its solidarity with the Commonwealth. Canada was reluctant to become involved in WNG, but was moved increase its engagement when its closest allies were going into deep troubles in Borneo jungles. The Konfrontasi episode, in particular, uniquely shows how alliance loyalty manifested in two seemingly contradictory forms: it compelled Canada to make its first military assistance to the region to aid Malaysia while also striving to maintain a normal relation with Indonesia as much as possible since the old Commonwealth decided that Canada was the only member that Indonesia might still find acceptable to bridge the country and the old Commonwealth. Canada, in other words, was the emergency

“Plan B” that was expected to intervene in the worst scenario in which Britain and Australia were forced to break diplomatic relations with Indonesia.

Given that the literature on Canada-Indonesia remains at its early stage, there is ample room for future research, including how the Vietnam factor played out in the case of Canada’s Indonesia-policy. As many Canadian historians have noted, the broadening Vietnam war in 1964-5 was a major preoccupation for Ottawa. “For Ottawa, as for Washington, the war in Vietnam overshadowed all else.”198 Nonetheless,

Webster’s subsequent analysis falls short of integrating the Vietnam factor into Canada’s policy toward

Indonesia, largely because Canadian policymakers often treated the two separately in the available

197 Indonesia file, 20-1-2-Indon, Vol. 1, LAC, Doc. 119. 198 Webster, Fire and the Full Moon, 131.

56 Maria Monica Layarda archives.199 Nonetheless, in absence of archival evidence, it doesn’t take a far stretch of imagination to believe that Vietnam was important in the minds of policymakers at the time and caused serious constraints on Canadian diplomatic resources. How this affected alliance is an important question worth investigation especially as this came on the eve of Trudeau’s wholesale reorientation of Canadian foreign policy.

V. CONCLUSION

The coup of 1965 provides an appropriate ending for this analysis provided that it marks the rise of a new government that will bring 100 million Indonesians into the Western orbit and radically change the relationship between the West and Indonesia. General Suharto’s consolidation of power in 1966 finally secured the “largest prize in Southeast Asia”200 into the Free World. Sukarno’s radical nationalism no longer threatened Western interests and the mass killings that accompanied his rise completely wiped off the largest communist movement outside the Communist Bloc in a matter of months, representing the most fundamental geopolitical shift in the region since the “loss of China”. In retrospect, Indonesia rendered the

American subsequent bloodbath in Indochina unnecessary.

In a comparative perspective, American, British and Canadian policies toward Indonesia in the

1960s provide a useful contrast into the dynamics of Western containment efforts and the Western alliance—all of which have so often been treated monolithically by Cold War students. A number of important trends can be drawn from the Indonesian episode. First, while “containment” was broadly accepted as the strategic objective of the Western alliance, “containment” offered few concrete policy prescriptions. In Indonesia, although the Americans, British, and Canadians agreed on the importance of

Indonesia to their containment efforts, they disagreed over the best way to pursue this objective. National interests and personal convictions mattered tremendously. Kennedy’s and his officials’ genuine belief in appeasement, Britain’s colonial history and recent memory of appeasement failure and Canada’s isolation from Pacific affairs shaped their attitudes toward the crises in Indonesia. Indeed, British comparison of

199 This author discussed this in her interview with David Webster on 24 April 2017. Webster concurred with this point. Webster said that it is difficult to extrapolate on Vietnam’s impact on Canada’s attitude toward Indonesia. 200 Richard M. Nixon, “Asia after Viet Nam,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1967), 111.

57 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

Sukarno to European fascists was more than just an exaggerated rhetoric; more than any of its allies,

Britain showed greater concerns for the expansionist tendencies of Indonesian nationalism than communist threats. For London, therefore, Communist containment was the overriding concern to the extent that it served the security of Malaysia. It is fair to say that only US officials had a consistent global outlook on

Indonesia and situated its Indonesia-policy within the classic Cold War containment calculus which balanced US’ relative geopolitical position vis-à-vis the Soviets and Chinese communist. Britain’s

Indonesia-policy calculus was fixated on its decolonization attempt and Canada’s on its allies. These differing national objectives eventually led to a different prioritization of their Indonesia-policy.

Western Indonesia-policies also illuminate clearly the distinction between great and middle power foreign policy, their motivations, and their policy constraints. By virtue of being the current and former global hegemons, the US and Britain had an established presence in the Pacific and thus had clear objectives in Indonesia. Canada, on the other hand, lacked any substantive goal in the area so peripheral to its interest and subsequent Canadian governments pursued a reactive policy toward Indonesia and shifted Canada’s position along with her allies. Subsequent crises in Indonesia also drew into sharp focus the tensions between American global interest and its allies’ regional concerns. US new hegemony in the postwar era came into full display in its handling of the WNG dispute and Konfrontasi. Even in a place where US had no military bases or historical links, its words and actions mattered more than its allies, whether the Dutch or the British, with more direct interests. Although it was Commonwealth loyalty that was prominent on Canadian leaders’ mind, Canada’s eventual policy in Indonesia frequently resembled

US policy, not least because Washington also had great influence on the British and Australian policymakers whom Ottawa closely consulted in its Indonesia-policy.

The dynamics of Anglo-American relations also deserves distinct attention. The Indonesian episode came during the uneasy transition of Britain into a role of a junior partner in the “special relationship” with the US. Britain gradually came to a realization and acceptance that it could no longer pursue its foreign policy independent of the US. Its initial resolve to defend Malaysia without American support soon wavered and London began focusing on finding ways to get Washington to support its Konfrontasi efforts.

58 Maria Monica Layarda

Assuming the inferior role in the alliance did not mean that HMG relinquished its autonomy over its foreign policy conduct; it simply meant that “US position” had become a crucial independent variable in

Britain’s foreign policy calculus, just as “British position” was a traditionally influential variable in

Canada’s classic middle-power calculus.

This essay undeniably reflects some degree of Western bias; the focus was on Western relations with Indonesia (rather than the opposite) and events were interpreted based on Western perspectives and primarily Western sources. It is important, nonetheless, to highlight the role of the Indonesians. The

Indonesian episodes also demonstrate clear limits to the power of even the most powerful to engineer change and shape events in Indonesia. At many junctures, especially during Sukarno’s final year, domestic situations in Indonesia had gone out of hands that the West had to fall back on a “wait and see” approach.

The former Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, William Bundy, later reflected that the US’

Indonesia-policy in the 1960s was “no more than a sum of decisions to act or not in the face of unpredictable development.” 201 This applied equally to Britain and Canada. The final “Indonesian solution” to the Indonesian crisis that ended Cold War struggle in the 1960s evidently shows that local agents in the Third World were far from being just “victims” of superpower competition during the Cold

War; they were active players with direct influence on the course of their own history. Nonetheless, the

Western powers should not be absolved from their responsibility in influencing local developments.

In Indonesia, the West exhausted nearly available strategies to save the Indonesian nation from the

Soviets, the Chinese, and eventually from the Indonesians themselves. The US and Britain were eager to lend their support to the atrocious butchery that followed the 1965 army coup. The American, British, and

Canadian quick embrace of the new developmental military regime under Suharto proved indispensable to the survival of the regime’s authoritarian rule for the next three decades. In retrospect, the 1960s was undoubtedly among the most crucial historical episodes shaping modern Indonesia. Whether Western intervention had done more good than damage, it is up to the Indonesians to cast the final judgment.

201 Bundy as quoted in Simpson, Economists with Guns, 4.

59 TRN419|Saving Indonesia, 1961-1965

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