MASTER’S THESIS M-750
TEPPER, EUiot Landis. THE MALAYSIA DISPUTE IN SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE.
The American University, M. A ., 1965 Political Science, international law and relations
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. THE MALAYSIA DISPUTE IN SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE
by
Elliot L. Tapper
Submitted to the
Faculty of The School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF ARTS
Signatures^f Committee:
Chairman: / • J/0~
Date: Dean of th
August 1964
The American University Washington, D. C. FEB 2 1965 WASHINGTON. D.C S||0
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PAGE
PREFACE ...... iv
CHAPTER
SECTION I - STATEMENT OF THEORY ...... 1
I. THEORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD...... 2
II. THEORY AND THE NON-WEST ...... 8
III. THEORY AND THE SUBORDINATE STATE SYSTEM OF
SOUTHERN ASIA ...... 16
Dominant System Pattern ...... 22
Subordinate System Pattern ...... 3Ü
Subregional Pattern ...... 39
SECTION II - THE MALAYSIA DISPUTE .... 42
IV. BACKGROUND ...... 43
V. DOMINANT-SYSTEM PATTERN ...... 50 1 3 VI. THE SUBORDINATE SYSTEM PATTERN...... 59
Anti-Chinese Reaction ...... 59
Anti-Colonialist Reaction .... 65
VII. THE SUBREGIONAL P A T T E R N ...... 78
The Philippines Claim ...... 79
M a p h i l i n d o ...... 88
The Azahari R e v o l t ...... 97
Indonesia...... 108
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CHAPTER PAGE
SECTION III - CONCLUSION...... 128
VIII. C O N C L U S I O N ...... 129
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 137
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE
The study of international relations has become a
discipline since World War II and spawned two lusty off
spring. The catastrophe of global conflict wrought severe
changes on the established order. Old beliefs were brought
into question. Terrifying new weapons were invented; a new
balance of power emerged. Scholars properly sought to com
prehend the world about them and made a profession ôf that
pursuit. Jolted by politics and technology, two distinct
paths of inquiry developed.
Some sought comprehension by burrowing ever deeper
into foreign cultures. The field of geographical area
studies gained new status and new excellence. Emphasis on
language increased; programs expanded to cover greater
portions of the world. No area was assumed too remote or
too uninteresting to specialists. Interest was spurred by
world-wide competition between the rival power blocs, and
by the end of colonialism. It was assumed that by delving
into the minutiae of a culture, day-to-day activities could
be understood, which would lead to the explanation of
specific policies.
Others took the completely opposite tack of moving
ever closer to pure abstraction. International relations
theory underwent spectacular growth in the post-war period.
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Traditional ways of looking at the political events had
proven inadequate and perhaps dangerous. It was felt that a
new perspective might prove valuable. One of the more
fruitful approaches shifted emphasis from the study of a
single nation's policy to the total process of international
relations. Nations' actions vis-à-vis one another were seen
as a segment of an interlocking, overall system that was
more than just the sum of its parts. Attention was focused
on process, action, and interaction; the woods became
visible when attention was shifted from the trees. Careful
study from this point of view was intended to lead to
greater understanding now and to eventual predictability.
There is seldom found a study combining both micro
and macro factors of a situation. The children have gone
separate paths and rarely speak to each other. The area
specialist has been too busy mastering voluminous detail to
be concerned about conceptual methodology. The theorist has
been absorbed in an abstract "billiard-ball" outlook or with
the actions of the most important external forces. Nations
were assumed to be identical quantities acting predictably
the same; or reality was taken into account by positing bloc
relations as the motivating dynamic of the international
relations system. Western egocentrism on the part of
theorists has produced constructions of little interest or
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applicability to the non-West* Conversely, lack of interest
in theory has produced few theoretical works by area spe
cialists.
Michael Brecher has recently attempted to bridge the
gap somewhat. A specialist on Asia, particularly South
Asia, he has taken the concepts and vocabulary of the theo
rist and applied them to Asian international relations. As
he puts it,
Asian studies have long since ventured beyond the traditional limits of Orientalia to embrace history and the social sciences; they have not as yet, however, applied the insights of international relations to an area framework. Similarly, international relations specialists have all but ignored the relevance of their discipline to Asia.l
This study is an attempt to further the line of in
quiry begun by Brecher. Both branches of the discipline
stand to gain by merger. Southern Asia is simply too impor
tant to continue overlooking conceptually. International
phenomena there have both inherent and wide-ranging signifi
cance and, apparently, are undergoing a process of change.
At the same time, theory needs to be concerned with non-
Western political activity and in a direct manner. It
should be possible to develop a theoretical construction
that can be used as a framework for analysis of a situation
Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies; The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, Vol. XV, No. 2 (January, 1963), p. 213.
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and integrate the knowledge gained. Theory needs further
growth; Southern Asia needs study conceptually.
The task is a large one, in keeping with specific
encouragement from academic advisers, and there is a per
ceived gap in the literature to date. To fulfill the task,
this author has chosen the Malaysia dispute for detailed
study, after a statement of theory to give it proper per
spective, If the experiment is successful, it should bear
out the contention that something meaningful can be said
about international relations in Southern Asia by employing
a conceptual analysis of a particular situation. It is
hoped that, at best, a framework for the study on inter
national relations in Southern Asia can be evolved from
these beginnings and, at the least, an understanding of the
Malaysia dispute will be provided.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SECTION I
STATEMENT OF THEORY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I
THEORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
Theory made great strides after World War II. As the
pre-war order collapsed and bipolarity emerged, intellectual
formulation was given to the new political configuration.
Pioneer work was done by Hans J. Morgenthau. Many who fol
lowed since have partially rejected or refined his model,
but most are clearly in his debt. Some approaches have been
in the realm of pure theory or experimentation.^ Most are
in some way related to problems and phenomena of the daily 2 world.
To take into account the post-war world, interna
tional relations theory developed its own lexicon. Rather
than speaking in a traditional way about the world scene,
new terminology was employed. Some have passed easily into
general literature; such as, bipolarity, actor-nation,
political elites, supranational units, and the word "system"
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in Interna tional Politics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957); and Richard C. Snyder, "Game Theory and the Analysis of Political Behavior," International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed, James N. Rosenau (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), p. 381. 2 John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1$58).
4 ReprocJucecJ with permission of the copyright owner. Further reprocJuction prohibitecJ without permission. itself. Others have remained for specialists— step-level 3 4 functions, General Systems Theory, and group responsi- 5 • bility principle. Familiar terms often take on much more
precise meaning when used by a theorist,^ The more esoteric
models would present a strange picture, indeed, to the un
initiated.
The model of most value is not the most complicated or
unintelligible, however; it is the fairly simple view of the
world provided by Morgenthau and developed by those building
from his base. Its real value lies in the perspective it
affords. Lifting attention from individual nations' poli
cies to the total process of international politics gives an
overall view which more than broadens horizons; it adds new
dimensions. By thinking in terms of system, action, and
interaction, inhibiting factors of a single-nation approach
are limited. That is the intention, at least, of the sys
tems approach to international relations.
What, then, is the world of international politics
like when viewed from a system perspective? It is a familiar
3 Kaplan, o£. cit.
^Charles C. McClelland, "The Social Sciences, History, and International Relations," Rosenau, o£. cit., p. 42.
^Felix M. Keesing and Marie M. Keesing, "Opinion Formation and Decision Making," Rosenau, o£. cit., p. 241.
^Ernst B. Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda," Rosenau, o£. cit., p. 318.
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world and can be described in language which now seems quite
ordinary. Basic units are nation-states, or actors. Each
actor determines its own goals internationally to the degree
that it is free from the influence of other actors. Each
pursues these goals to the degree it has the ability to do
so, or until prevented by other actors. Certain goals seem
to be common to nation-states : security from external at
tack, prestige, and as great an independence as possible
from the influence of other nation-states.
Although each independent (sovereign) actor can claim
equality with all others, in actuality great disparities
exist. Classification is usually made by the amount of in
fluence a given nation-state can wield over others. Tradi
tionally, of course, the classifications have been Big,
Medium, and Small Powers. Although there may be doubt, at
times, whether a given nation is Small or Medium, there
usually is little doubt about the Big Powers. This is 7 especially true with the advent of the Super Powers.
Firm underpinnings for certain models were provided
by the emergence of the Super Powers and the Balance of
7 It is impossible at this point to present a full blown theory of international relations. Care has been taken to include only theory that is relevant to the point being made. Many detailed definitions and debates within the discipline had to be avoided here, however tempting their discussion might have been. Chief among these are the notions of power, capability and sovereignty.
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Terr or. Politics and technology, the twin stimulants to
theory after the war also were the cornerstones of theorists'
views. The United States and the Soviet Union replaced the
traditional center of power, Europe. Only two actors were
really essential in international politics. Competition
between them was the key dynamic to the international system;
fear of mutual destruction was the ultimate restraint which
preserved the system. As colonies became nation-states,
they were either added to one of the blocs or consigned to
the roles of mediator and competition source. The bipolar
system was modified slightly to accommodate the additions.
Similar roles were assigned to the United Nations and other
supranational actors. Under conditions of bipolarity, inter
national relations theory developed to its greatest extent
and proved the validity of its approach.
Change is the constant nemesis as well as challenge
to theory. It took the catastrophe of a second global con
flict and the introduction of atomic weapons to produce the
new train of thought. Prior to then, attention was focused
almost exclusively on diplomatic history and the foreign
policy of a given state. Theory never did fully grasp the
whole meaning of the collapse of colonialism, as will be
brought out later. And it has been slow to realize that
major change is occurring within the carefully developed
structure just detailed.
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Bipolarity and the Balance simply do not exist in the
classic form of only five years past. Neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union are leaders of blocs that can be
labeled monolithic. Western Europe now has stable and
wealthy governments and is asserting its former vigor.
Eastern Europe is similarly restive under its untraditional
situation. Mainland China has not let the ideology of
Communism totally replace "the Middle Kingdom" ideology;
Latin America is tossing in the ferment of nationalism and
poverty.
One has only to read a daily newspaper to realize
that major shifts are occurring in world politics. On any
day, reference may be made to the Sino-Soviet split, French
actions upsetting NATO, or Castroism in Latin America. On
rare days, reference may be made to a senior United States
Senator asking that his country begin to "think of the
unthinkable" in foreign policy. It is not even too uncommon
to find acknowledgment of the passing of the old order. A
Washington Post editorial entitled "Challenge of Change"
notes how rapidly and drastically Stalin's empire is alter
ing, and predicts "more and more, bargaining and politics
will be substituted for dominance and command." From this
stems a warning to our own government:
The single discouraging aspect of this process is that the United States is so poorly prepared to deal with it. This is evident to those who would look at
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the primitive belief of many Americans in the mono lithic and permanently evil nature of communism; and the considerable retrogressive power wielded on Capitol Hill over Executive Branch moves towards reasonableness and flexibility; at the backward status of the legislation governing, or rather restricting, trade and other economic relations with the East; at the limited extent and circumscribed terms in which the Administration has tried to publicize its private wiser view of developing events.
Many of our tactics were devised for trench war fare and we seem destined to cling to them in an era when the situation calls for a war of maneuver and not one of fixed defenses , , , . We must alter our tactics and strategy to a new and more fluid— and in some ways even more difficult situation than that which prevailed in an earlier stage of the contest,8
To say that bipolarity is passing is not to say that
it has passed. For some time to come, the weight of the two
largest powers will keep them at the center of the world
political system. Nor is it fair to say that theory has
failed entirely to keep pace. Terms such as polycentrism 9 and alliance disarray have become familiar. The change in
East-West relations is still making itself felt and future
developments are uncertain. But these are being carefully
scrutinized. There is no reason to believe that theory can
not readily cope with a system composed of a multiplicity of
decentralized power units.
^The Washington Post, April 14, 1964, p. 16.
^George F. Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 2 (January, 1964), p. 171.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER II
THEORY AND THE NON-WEST
Before coping with the altered situation, inter
national relations theory must undergo development of its
own. First, full implications of decentralization and
shifting power balances must be realized. Bipolarity of
fered a rigid situation that permitted a detailed model to
be built. Modified bipolarity is a new situation, and con
siderable refinement of the former model is needed. Addi
tional variables have been added. The new system must
account for a number of units with local interests and com
parative power balances. Fear of total destruction is still
the restraint which permits the system to exist; competition
of a different magnitude is the new dynamic.
Secondly, what is needed is an end to the near total
preoccupation by theorists with East-West relations. While
Super Power politics was the basis of the old system, it
will not be sufficient for a thorough model of the system
now emerging. Decentralization has already severely circum
scribed Super Power essentiality. An analysis of relations
between any two actors will no longer serve as an adequate
description of the international political system; probably
it never did.
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Michael Brecher has performed the singular service of
trying to correct both previous defects in international re
lations theory. Rather than constructing a model containing
a single world system, based on bipolarity, he posits a
three level system.^ Level one is the total World System,
comprising the interactions of all other subordinate systems,
Level two is the Dominant System, the pattern of interrela
tions between the Big Powers. This level sets the basic
tone of world politics. Level three is a series of Sub
ordinate State Systems. Relations are regional in nature
and have their own separate calculus of motivation and
capability.
Such a view has more than one advantage. Comprehen
sion or international politics is enhanced when it is
realized that more than one level of interaction exists.
Without such a subdivision, it is easy to assume that the
Dominant System is the only system and make all judgments
accordingly. Acute myopia is a necessary result. While
Cold War dynamics have predominated in the international
political system for some time, they have not been the sole
dynamic. Making such an assumption obscures other patterns.
Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics, Vol. XV, No. 2 (January, 1963), p. 213.
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As bipolarity diminishes, other patterns will come
increasingly to the fore. If theory is to adjust to novel
situations, a two or threefold division will be necessary.
Subordinate systems have probably played a greater role in
international politics than has been realized. As the older
model becomes outmoded, a more sophisticated model becomes
relevant. Regional considerations held in check by over
powering Cold War factors can now come into play. Subsystem
considerations are potent and operate separately from the
Dominant System.
What this means for Asia, and Southern Asia in parti
cular, is that theoretical speculation can accommodate it.
It is ironical that theory should have overlooked Asia for
so long, and now turns to it just as theory and the world
political system are in transition; scholarly study has re
placed neglect in a time of change rather than in a period
of calm. The single level model, based on Cold War reckon
ings barely nodded in the direction of the non-West. When
it did so, the whole area was treated as an adjunct to tha
bloc struggle. Now that the bloc system is undergoing
transformation, attention is directed to the new pattern
emerging within the Dominant System. And it is at this time
that serious theoretical attention has turned toward the
non-West.
For that reason, Brecher*s tri-level theory is
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particularly important. He has presented a model that can
permit treatment of phenomena not directly related to the
Dominant System. At the same time, he has dealt with a non-
Western Subordinate System. By both creating an opportunity
and taking advantage of it, he has opened a new field.
Further modification in the Dominant System and a more de
tailed examination of a Subordinate State System may well
produce an approach somewhat different from his own. But in
combination, emphasis on the non-West and a tri-level frame
work are valuable contributions. Since theory has been
affected by Brecher's additions and a break-down of the old
order, it is necessary to repeat an earlier question: What
is the world of international politics like when viewed from
a system perspective?
At the highest level is the Global System. Still ill-
defined by theorists or political events, the total system
comprises— but is greater than— all existing patterns of
international politics. Until recently the Dominant System
often was implicitly considered to be the Global System. To
the non-West, the bloc conflict must have appeared less
universal. Even under the condition of bipolarity at its
height, the Super Power conflict was the prevailing but not
all-pervading "given" of international politics. It was the
dominant system, not the only one. As Asian governments
took control of their own foreign relations, fierce
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competition between two blocs of power could readily be seen
as the overriding factor to be considered.
Consideration was from a reverse-priority standpoint.
Those countries within the mainstream of Dominant System
politics were quite naturally preoccupied with actions of
the two bloc powers. Bloc actor movements were of most im
portance to the immediate issues concerning their national
interest. Just as naturally, those actors most loosely
connected to the Dominant System based their policies on the
system most likely to affect their own national interest.
Increasingly, that has become the third level, the Sub
ordinate State System. Interaction with other actors could
not be avoided. It is not surprising that it took the form
of regional, hemispheric, and then global pattern. What is
more surprising is that Subordinate Systems did not play a
greater role earlier.
There are oddities in the non-West which theory must
explain. Clearly the Dominant System was not the total
system for the non-West. Theory must account for inter
national political behavior that is largely absent within the
Dominant System. Neutralism is a prime example. If Super
Power relations form the only system, then why are reactions
so variant between the West and non-West? Theory has little
dealt with neutralism, yet it is a marked feature of Asian
international relations.
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Conversely, it cannot be claimed that third level
politics have been the only— or even primary— source of
Asian political relations. Many non-Western nations have
had more diplomatic intercourse with their former métropole
powers than with immediate neighbors. And often more em
bassies have been established in Western nations than within
their own geographic region. Yet such behavior is also
often merely tangential to the Dominant System. Relations
with former colonial powers and international actions con
cerned with anti-colonialism form another oddity with which
theory must come to grips. Introducing a multi-level ap
proach cannot in itself neatly produce an adequate framework
for the study of non-Western international relations.
It can provide the beginnings of an answer and the
analytic tool for further searching. Concrete example and
direct historical comment are needed to fill in the picture
that is beginning to form. In its simplest outline, theory
invokes the image of a large group of non-Western actor
nations that is apart from,but unavoidably concerned with,
the Dominant System. Cold War dynamics could not be avoided,
but were given reverse priority from the point of view of
the Dominant System. At the same time, regional considera
tions, while present, were underdeveloped. Theory cannot,
therefore, delineate a clear-cut pattern of international
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relations, either from a Dominant-to-Subordinate view, or
Subordinate-to-Dominant view.
With further development, contemporary theory can go
a long way toward explaining international phenomena in the
non-West. A logical amplification of the multi-level view
can shed much light. Quite obviously, a major benefit to be
derived from such a perspective is the realization that any
given actor will construct foreign policies appropriate for
each level in which it participates. Nasser's Egypt, for
example, participates in African and Middle-Eastern Sub
systems as well as with the Dominant System. India plays a
role in affairs subcontinental. Southern Asian, Asian, non-
Western, and within the Dominant System.
When abandoning a simple one-level view, then, inter
national relations become instantly more complicated.
Brecher's multi-level view threatens confusion along with
sophistication. Order can be maintained by using each level
as a category for classification. Any given policy can be
examined on the basis of its motivation— Subordinate System
considerations or Dominant System considerations. That is
Brecher's prescription, and it seems a good one.
On closer^ examination, however, the prescription is
difficult to follow. The general path is valid. It is
necessary to be more concrete in following it. A study of a
specific Subsystem is in order. Definitions must become more
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precise. Subjectivity inevitably enters at this point; so
does the danger of losing sight of broader theoretical
aspects in attempting to utilize specific examples. For
these reasons, terminology and concepts must be further
elaborated in discussing the Subordinate State System of
Southern Asia.
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THEORY AND THE SUBORDINATE STATE SYSTEM
OF SOUTHERN ASIA
To begin, it is necessary to define Subordinate State
System. Brecher has listed six necessary conditions;^
1. Its scope is delimited, with primary stress on a geographical region.
2. There are at least three actors.
3. Taken together, they are objectively recognized by other actors as constituting a distinctive community, region or segment of the Global System.
4. The members identify themselves as such.
5. The units of power are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System, using a sliding scale of power in both.
6. Changes in the Dominant System have greater effect on the Subordinate System than the reverse.
There is not room at this juncture for a full critique
of Brecher's presentation. Its strengths have already been
noted. There are areas where further adaptation seems neces
sary, however. One, already indicated, is the fact that the
Dominant System is in flux. At that time of his writing,
perhaps the changes were not clear enough to be taken into
1 Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," World Politics. Vol. XV, No. 2 (January, 1963), p. 220.
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his framework, or even noted. It seems now that the former
Dominant System is on its way toward becoming the most
important of an expanded number of Subsystems. Within the
next few years, theoretical constructions will have to en
compass a revised Dominant System, and perhaps finally
elucidate a Global System.
More importantly here, Brecher*s list of Subordinate
State Systems does not fully match his definition. No doubt
the five he lists are proper— Middle Eastern, American,
Southern Asian, West European, and West African. But there
are other systems of interaction to be taken into account.
Either a further category of "Sub-subsystems" is needed, or
more than five Subsystems exist. For example, the Southern
Asian Subordinate State System can be cited— the area from
Pakistan through the Philippines. Member nations are
Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Nepal, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos, North and South Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines.
Although little taken into account by theorists pre
occupied with United- States-Soviet Union relations. Southern
Asia has its own separate pattern of politics. India and
Indonesia form the two largest powers within the system;
China is the most important peripheral power. (Australia
and Japan are major peripheral powers also.) Little formal
organization exists to integrate the region, although there
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are repeated signs of interest in such activity. Compared
to the Dominant System, the entire region is weak both
economically and militarily. Moreover, the Dominant System
constantly intrudes into the area, and all members have some
sort of contact with it. India has the most contact within
the region and also plays the most active role within the
Dominant System.
By Brecher's criteria. Southern Asia forms a Sub
ordinate System. There is reason to ask, however, whether
it is possible to stop at this point in constructing a
theoretical structure for Southern Asia. India, for example,
is meaningfully involved in a matrix of political behavior
that is apart from both regional and world-wide affairs. In
addition to Dominant and Subordinate System matters, India
has foreign policies which are concerned with subcontinental
issues. There is a definable configuration of interaction
involving India, Pakistan, Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim
and Ceylon. China and Afganistan are peripheral powers to
this pattern, and an easily identified balance of power
exists within it.
There is an equally identifiable configuration on
mainland Southeast Asia. Stemming back at least to the year
939 A.D. when Vietnam broke away from China and began pushing
South, there has been a three-way struggle among the Viet
namese, Thai and Cambodian peoples. This struggle has
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continued through empires, colonialist occupation, and
modern nation-states. At times, it has surfaced far enough
to involve the World Court and a former United States Secre
tary of State. Most of the time, it is submerged from
outside view by Dominant System politics. Except for recog
nition by outside actors as a distinctive community, main
land Southeast Asia qualifies on all of Brecher's demands for
a_Subsystem. And regardless of outside recognition, there
exists on mainland Southeast Asia a distinguishable set of
interacting political behavior.
Existence of such data cannot go unnoted by those
wishing to construct any sort of theoretical framework for
the study of international relations in Southern Asia.
Doing so complicates a theoretical model by introducing
additional factors but also makes a model conform more to
reality. To prevent complication from degenerating into
confusion, some further refinement is needed. Brecher him
self offers part of the answer, with the maxim "... the
Subordinate System is a political as well as geographic con
cept; the region is a necessary but not sufficient basis for 2 definition." If basic systems approach methodology is kept
in mind, it should be possible to develop a satisfactory
concept from among these ingredients; international political
^ibid.
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behavior limited in geographical area and intent, that has
the characteristics of a clear interaction pattern, identi
fiable from others by its primary motivation. Delimiting
the Subordinate State System, as distinct from the Dominant
System, was a major first step in the direction of accounting
for significant international political behavior; it seems
just as necessary to find a way to account for meaningful
interaction patterns with the Subordinate System. Where
political patterns exist, they should be noted and inte
grated into the total system perspective.
To keep the model broad enough to account for peculi
arities of Southern Asian international relations, and to take
into account primary motivation, one further addition is
needed. For adequate description, it is necessary to make
use of categorizing behavior by types. As suggested, any
given set of foreign policies should be identifiable as per
taining to Dominant or Subordinate System considerations
(using an expanded definition of the latter). While policies
may well serve a dual purpose and selection must be arbitrary
and subjective, such a modification allows treatment of subject
matter theoretically that might otherwise be ignored. Thus,
for example, it becomes possible to speak in broad terms of
neutralism as a response to Dominant System pressures, and
anti-colonialism as a response to Subordinate System pres
sures. When dealing with a specific situation, categorizing
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is even more important for comprehension. Speaking in broad
terms, then, the Subordinate State System of Southern Asia
can be said to contain at least Dominant and Subordinate
System patterns of politics. In less technical terms, there
are area-wide policies relating to cold war and to regional
consideration. Under the heading Dominant System Pattern
would come Alignment and Non-alignment. Both can readily be
seen as reactions to the Dominant System pattern. Both have
distinguishable international political systems of inter
action. Under the heading of Subordinate System Pattern
comes behavior such as anti-colonialist policies, political
and economic regional cooperation, and security policies
aimed at mainland China. These are responses which are im
portant to the Dominant System but which find their initial
motivation in regional politics and imperatives. There are
also lesser series of interactions which form a definable
pattern.
Looking for distinct patterns of political inter
action wherever they may be, and labeling them appropriately
when finding them leads to the following conclusions:
1. Southern Asia is a Subordinate State Bystem.
2. Within Southern Asia there are smaller constella tions of international political behavior. For lack of a better terra these can be called "Subregional."
3. The Dominant System and both the smaller and
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larger Subsystems have distinguishable patterns of interaction.
4. Knowledge of the International Relations of Southern Asia leads to the general identifica tion of Dominant System Patterns of interna tional relations as Neutralism or Alliance reactions. Subordinate System Patterns are Anti-colonialist and Anti-Chinese reactions.
5. More specific motivators of international policy emerge when studying a particular Subregional Pattern.
Meat must be added to this bare skeleton. Historical
background provides the material for filling in the outline.
Based on these observations, a general discussion of Southern
Asia's international relations can take the following form.
Dominant System Pattern ^
Most of what has transpired internationally in Southern
Asia's past two decades has been affected by Dominant System
dynamics. Independence in Southern Asia was coincident with
the emergence of bipolarity in the West. Each nation gaining
control of its own destiny faced the task of constructing
sets of foreign policies. Internationally, the single most
pervasive salient was aggressive competition between the blocs
led by the United States and the Soviet Union. As the cold
war was global in scope, there was no possibility that the
new nations of Southern Asia could totally escape involve
ment. Regardless of domestic considerations, personalities,
ideologies, or geographic remoteness, the cold war was a
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reality to be met. Colonial status partially cloaked this
reality. As nation after nation came from beneath the cloak,
they were drawn into the vortex of Dominant System politics.
With little chance to avoid some sort of intercourse
with the Dominant System, each group of policy-makers had to
determine the nature of their involvement. Where there was
no binding commitment established previously, and freedom of
choice was possible, the alternatives were to join one side
or the other in the bloc dispute, or find some sort of
middleground. In oversimplified form, the choice was between
Alignment and Neutralism. Each alternative forms a distinc
tive set of responses in Southern Asia to the Dominant
System. -
Alignment. One obvious course of action open to
policy-makers was to join actively with one of the two com
peting major powers. As they could not be ignored in any
event, and were both quite ready to force their presence
upon the area, it made good sense to join the side appearing
most to benefit the national interest. At times, pre
existing conditions made such a choice close to inevitable.
Dominant System politics intruded without being asked, and
were often left behind as a final legacy of the departing
colonial power.
Given this situation, and localized external problems
as well, alignment could provide partial answers. Although
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the Sino-Soviet bloc was poor, the United States-led bloc
was not. Alignment could lead to extensive intrusion of
capital, technical assistance, and association with a
"modern" state. It could also lead to the creation and
maintenance of a security force at little or no local ex
pense. Although there were risks in taking sides, there
were good reasons for doing so. Emnity of the Sino-Soviet
bloc could be counterbalanced by money, material, and mili
tary might provided by the United States and her allies. In
addition, cold war pressures pushed toward an alignment
position rather than just making it a possible alternative.
Especially after 1952, both blocs sought allies in Southern
Asia.
Quite naturally, part of the international relations
of Southern Asia conformed to the desire of Dominant System
actors. It would take a detailed examination of each case
to describe fully an alignment set of reactions. Clearly,
differences exist between Vietnam and Pakistan, stemming
from such factors as commitment by choice rather than a
former colonial power, geopolitical considerations, domestic
problems, etc. However, the main elements or characteristics
of Alignment can be outlined. Speaking generally, the
smaller state constructs a set of foreign policies which
centers the pursuit of its own national interest (self-defined)
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upon the material rewards gained by alignment with a larger,
external bloc actor.
Speaking more specifically, Alignment entails forging
of a number of bonds with the Super Power involved. Most
obvious is a military bond. Primary motivation in the past
for a Super Power to seek alliance in Southern Asia has been
the physical blocking • the rival power. This has meant
large-scale military programs. Multilateral agreements in
volving much of the United States-led bloc signed bilateral
military pacts with two nations within the region and three
on the periphery. Aid to Laos and Vietnam assumed even
larger proportions as fighting continued there. Great
Britain maintained extensive positions also. For those na
tions which agreed to alliances, there was no lack of mili
tary supplies.
Economic bonds flowed naturally but a bit behind the
military. Under a variety of titles and agencies, both
public and private ties are a part of alignment. For United
States allies, economic aid in the form of stability assist
ance accompanies military agreements. This is done under
the general rubric of "defense assistance" which includes
both military and stability aid designed to ". . . assist
friendly aligned nations to maintain military forces and
make other provisions for ensuring their internal stability.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 26 3 to help them deter foreign aggression." In the case of the
Philippines, economic ties have been a particularly close
and prominent feature of alignment.
Ideological ties quite expectedly are another common
trait of Alignment. Cold war issues are most often discussed
in terms of basic beliefs. Therefore, foreign policies of
aligned states are couched in appropriate terminology.
Although it would be sufficient to oppose expansion of
Russian or Chinese influence for geopolitical purposes, it
seems necessary to form alliances in order to prevent Com
munism from enslaving freedom.-loving people. Conversely, it
is just as necessary to oppose capitalistic imperialism
instead of gaining control of strategic food-surplus areas,
and consolidating military victories.
Non-alignment. Despite the rewards and pressures of
an alignment policy, only Pakistan, North and South Vietnam,
Thailand, and the Philippines have openly pursued it (Laos
has a facto involvement although officially is neutral
since the Geneva accord of 1962). In facing a bipolar world,
with self-acknowledged military weakness and domestic diffi
culties, the remainder of Southern Asia chose to join neither
bloc. Described popularly as neutralism, the decision did
3 A. A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 196^), p. Vo.
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not reflect an intention of avoiding Dominant System poli
tics by staying neutral. Facing the reality that such a
course would be impossible, a large group of Southern Asian
states found another alternative in a bipolar configuration.
Non-alignment has been attributed to a number of
factors. From a theoretical view, it can be seen as a re
sponse to the Dominant System. Although a full study could
be given to this reaction alone,^ enough value can be gained
by describing its origins and attributes. Much more the-
retical study is needed of this phenomenum. For purposes
here, it can be described in terms of its relevancy as a
category in a model studying Southern Asian international
relations.
Little verification is needed of Non-alignment’s
significance. Except for continued Big Power confrontation
in Indochina, it has been the most marked feature of the
region since World War II. Although adopted since by coun
tries in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East,
modern non-alignment took root and flourished first in
Southern Asia. As the second great response to the Dominant
System, it also is dependent upon the nature of that system.
George Liska, "The 'Third* Party: Rationale of Non- alignment" and "Tripartism: Dilemmas and Strategies," in Laurence W. Martin (ed,). Neutralism and Nonaliqnment (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1 9 6 È ) , Chapters 5 and 11.
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Pressure toward alignment is an inherent but not
irresistible force of cold war dynamics. Resistance is pos
sible under the proper conditions. Actors sufficiently free
from the influence of other actors, and not bound by former
rulers to alignment, could take advantage of bipolarity by
not joining either bloc. This course did not imply absti
nence, as abstinence was impossible; rather it meant sitting
in the middle of a well-balanced teeter-totter. Sliding to
either end of the board provided advantages but entailed
undesirable disadvantages. As long as the board stayed
balanced, benefits could be accrued anyway. If the balance
were lost later, the decision could then be made as to which
way to jump. Meanwhile, the middle ground brought valued
results.
Existence of two opposing groups created the possi
bility and desirability of maintaining an independent posi
tion. If either side gained overweaning superiority, severe
penalty could result from joining with its avowed competitor.
However, as long as both contestants remained within the game
and neither gained decisive advantage, certain clear and
logical gains came from a central position. With sophistica
tion, the contending and countervailing forces of the
Dominant System could make non-alignment a subtle and useful
policy. Despite great disparity in power. Southern Asia's
geographic position, freedom of choice, and the conditions
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of bipolarity allowed leverage in meeting the cold war.
Even without sophistication, Non-alignment could achieve
desired goals, of foreign policy.
Chief among these were recognition of sovereignty,
enhanced political weight when dealing with the Dominant
System, and availability of external financial aid. Newly-
won independence was a cherished commodity, and best pre
served, many thought, by not becoming a minor ally of any
Super Power. Interplay of cold war politics made Southern
Asia a strategic region. Non-alignment allowed utilization
of that fact to gain valued goals through international
diplomacy. One study has nicely summarized the benefits of
such a policy:
1. Non-alignment insures political freedom and inde pendence and contributes to national self- respect and moral integrity.
2. In contrast to alliance membership, which serves as a restraint, non-alignment permits freedom of expression and action.
3. Non-alignment keeps a small nation from getting involved in larger conflicts of no concern to it.
4. Alignment would make local problems more difficult to solve. Nehru, in particular, is convinced that almost any problem can be solved if it is not permitted to become a part of the cold war.
5. Alliances involve military obligations that divert scarce resources from the urgent necessities of economic development.
6. Non-aligned nations are in a position to accept
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and, indeed, to bid for economic aid from both sides in the cold war.5
Non-alignment is known by a variety of titles; posi
tive neutralism, militant neutralism, a bridge policy, etc.
Common to all versions is an insistence that the policy is
morally right, as it contributes to world peace. Also
common is the stated desire to be useful and active, not
classically neutral, in world affairs. Military and eco
nomic ties are accordingly formed with both blocs. Neither
bloc is given consistent ideological support. Mediation
attempts have been made by India, and with some success.
From a theoretical standpoint, the policy can be seen as a
byproduct of bipolarity, created in response to it, and sub
ject to change as the Dominant System alters.
Subordinate System Pattern
Alignment and Non-alignment are region-wide reactions
to the intrusion of Dominant System politics. Primairy moti
vation came from the necessity and opportunity of dealing
with the cold war, and the alternatives depended upon the
dynamics of bipolarity. Bloc actors found, in turn, that
they had to deal with Subordinate System phenomena when
entering Southern Asia. This would be defined as
5 E. W. Lefever, "Nehru, Nasser, and Nkrumah on Neutralism," in Martin, o£. cit., p. 95.
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international political behavior whose primary motivation
stems from regional considerations, and whose form depends
upon regional development historically. Within Southern
Asia, there are several general examples of the Subordinate
System Pattern.
Anti-colonialist reaction. A potent force motivating
international relations in Southern Asia during the past two
decades has been the struggle to gain and maintain independ
ence. Subsuming nationalism and overriding other domestic
passions, anti-colonialism has colored relations between the
Southern Asian nations and the Subordinate and Dominant
Systems, Supranational actors, and each other. Although
this makes it a pervasive backdrop rather than a specific
factor, there are distinguishable manifestations which lead
to an interacting set of foreign policies.
Southern Asia's historical background provides the
context for anti-colonialism. Western colonialism arrived
early and stayed late. Drawn by God, gold, and spices,
Portugal made the first venture into Southern Asia. Diaz
rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1487. Vasco DeGama re
peated the venture in 1498 and was led to Calicut, on India's
Malabar coast, by an Arab-Indian navigator. Goa was estab
lished Portuguese territory soon afterward, and remained so
until the Union of India expelled them just three years ago.
In 1511, a Portuguese expedition gained control of Malacca,
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an entrepôt port dominating the Straits between Sumatra and
Malaya. Probably the richest trading port in the world of
its day, its strategic importance was even greater. Tomé
Pices, a contemporary Portuguese traveler estimated that
"Whoever is lord of Malacca has his hand on the throat of
Venice."^ »
Holland, Spain, England, and France soon followed.
It was no ; until the Eighteenth Century, however, that the
Golden Age of imperialism occurred. Spurred by the opening
of the Suez Canal in 1869, the century of European peace
following Napoleon's final defeat in 1814, and accelerating
competition among industrial nations, physical acquisition
of territory became the vogue. Whereas exploitation and
control of trade had been sufficient earlier, control of the
land and peoples themselves came into being. In all of
Sou'hern Asia, only Thailand remained without a European
overlord, and her independence was sharply circumscribed.
Reaction was inevitable. Earliest stirrings occurred
in British India and the Spanish Philippines. Reform-minded
Indians and English residents founded the Indian National
Congress in 1885. At about the same period, a similar group,
also from the European-educated elite, formed in the
^Brian Harrison, Southeast Asia (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1954), p. 64.
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Philippines. Education was a common goal of early nation
alist movements. Organizations were soon formed in the
other colonies, striving for moderate goals; The Young
Men's Buddhist Association in Burma, the Boedi Oetomo (Noble
Endeavor) in Indonesia, and Vietnamese intellectuals' clubs.
The nationalist virus was nascent in all these groups, and
leadership passed to more radical hands. At one end of the
arc, the Indian National Congress set swarai, freedom, as
its goal in 1906. At the other end of the arc, the Philip
pines had already fought a revolutionary war.
Once infected with nationalism, colonial Southern
Asia was never quiescent again. World War I badly weakened
the métropole powers and spread widely the concepts of self-
determination. World War II wrought decisive changes.
Foremost among thse was the physical expulsion of European
powers by the Japanese from all but India and Ceylon. Inde
pendence was formally granted by them to Indonesia, Indo
china, and Burma. Return of former colonial powers was,
therefore, resented and resisted. Nationalist organizations
demanded freedom, and were willing to fight for it. Local
armies created either by or against the Japanese provided
strength to their determination. In India, non-violence
achieved the same result, and the United States honored its
long-standing promise of independence for the Philippines.
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Over a period of time, and with varying degrees of grace, the
colonial powers withdrew.
In post-independence times, anti-colonialism is the
international manifestation of colonial period nationalism.
It is one of the few experiences truly common to the nations
of the region. One trait of anti-colonialism is thus the
identification with other nations having shared a similar
background. This may be done in spite of relations with the
Dominant System; aligned Pakistan and the Philippines will
join non-aligned India, Burma, and Indonesia at a conference
called to discuss world affairs. A second trait is the
expressed desire to further independence for others, often
leading to concerted actions in supernational organizations.
A third trait is heightened sensitivity to any international
activity involving other powers, particularly former colonial
rulers. This can lead to the questioning— if not disruption—
of the proposed activity.
Being primarily an emotional factor, the form Anti
colonialism takes is less determined by power configurations
than alignment or non-alignment (except for a general sense
of inferiority, and hence apprehension when dealing with
larger powers). Within the region itself, worry about loss
of sovereignty to stronger neighbors and peripheral powers
is abetted by recent colonial experience. As time passes,
it is likely that the historical origin will fade and
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Anti-colonialism as such will play a lessening role in the
international relations of Southern Asia. For the time
being, its potency should not be underestimated. Lack of an
exact parallel in current Dominant System affairs does not
mean it can be discounted as a policy motivator when study
ing the area, either by policy-makers or theorists.
Anti-Chinese reaction. A glance at the map will give
one reason for China's importance to Southern Asia's poli
tics. The sprawling giant borders on Pakistan, India, Burma,
Laos, and Vietnam. Most dividing lines are ill marked.
Clearly an expansionist power, China's ponderous political
weight hangs over every nation in the area to its south.
Much of pre-colonial Southern Asia acknowledged China's
superiority at times of the Empire's strength. Annam and
half of Tonkin, in North Vietnam were Sinified while under a
thousand years of Chinese rule. India found that China
claimed extensive Indian land and was willing to fight to
support her claims. All of "Tibets Five Fingers," the buffer
areas of Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkam, Bhutan, and the North-East
Frontier Agency, have been under Chinese influence in the
past.
Apart from border worries, China's long-range poli
tical intentions seem likely to point toward hegemony of at
least Southern Asia, and dominance of all Asia. Southern
Asia has abundant resources, is relatively underpopulated.
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and militarily inferior. China needs resources badly.
Although a large country with still undeveloped potential,
serious hindrances are presented by vast arid lands, and
mountain ranges. Coupled with an intensive industrializa
tion drive, Western economic embargo, and paucity of certain
key needs (including food), the lush countries on China's
rimland must be attractive.
Population pressures compound the attractiveness.
China needs room. With the world population at about three
billion, China already has close to seven hundred million
people. Sometime in the 1970's, there will be over a bil
lion.citizens in the People's Republic, and 1.2 billion by
the year 2000. Current population alone is already three
times that of all Southern Asia combined, and is growing at
2.3 per cent a year. Southern Asia's rate is about 2.0 per 7 cent. Although there are places of great population
density, such as Java, much of the area could support an
expanded population, and several are food surplus zones.
Without extensive extra-regional aid. Southern Asia
could- scarcely defend itself if China chose to move mili
tarily. Manpower available for China's military purposes is
7 Russell A. Fifield, Southeast Asia in U. Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 6 and 63.
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over 40 per cent of Southern Asia's total population. With
no extra mobilization, China has ready for use in Southern
Asia an estimated 350,000 troops, about six hundred planes
(mostly jets) and several submarines. This figure is only a
small fraction of the standing armies 2.5 million men. Even
without Atomic weapons, the armed forces are thus formidable.
Morale is reported high, officers are well trained and
experienced, and weapons are up-to-date. Before the next
two decades pass, mainland China will possibly have sus- O tained nuclear capability.
For very good cause, then. Southern Asia hes reason
to be preoccupied with its peripheral neighbor. A second
reason, however, is that the Chinese question is also in
ternal. An estimated fifteen million overseas Chinese live
within the Subordinate System. At various times, this has
proved to be an unsettling element in the domestic and for
eign affairs of several countries, particularly Thailand,
Malaya, and Indonesia. Domestically, problems arise because
the local Chinese have gained a stranglehold on the economy.
Chinese traders and merchants willingly stepped into the
middleman role shunned by the local population during the
colonial period. With the advent of independence, the suc
cessor nationalist governments found an unassimilable
®Ibid., pp. 69-73.
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foreign minority largely controlling their nations* econo
mies.
Loyalty, as well as economics, is an issue. This is
a complex matter, expressing itself in several ways. Rela
tions with China are directly complicated. For reasons of
its own (including ancient racial-cultural chauvinism, poli
tical competition with the Koumintang, and desire for I economic aid from their overseas Chinese brethren), the
People's Republic champions the cause of Southern Asia's
resident Chinese. She does so even to the detriment of
friendly diplomatic relations with the government involved.
In turn, this raises the question of massive fifth column
movements in South Asian countries already concerned with
national cohesion. Adding even more sinister undertones is
fear of China's control of Southern Asian Communist parties.
China is a reality of international relations with
which to be reckoned. Inherent political mass, a strong
revolutionary central government, and assertive ideologies
of the Middle Kingdom and Communism make the "awakened giant"
a number one concern of policy-makers. It is possible this
reality was slow in making itself felt. Certainly, it is
still little acknowledged publicly, although tempering ac
tions anyway. New leaders first concentrated on pressing
domestic problems. International affairs were ignored as
much as possible. When dealt with, it often was in terms of
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the Dominant System Pattern or idealistic championing of
Anti-colonialist principles. If this was the case pre
viously, it is likely times passing will alter the situation.
In any event, reaction has not been uniform. No
overall collective defense organization has emerged, and does
not seem in the offing. Indeed, SEATO seems moribund.
Moves toward regional economic and political cooperation
have not ended, and may yet develop into a viable regional
response. This is speculation, and thus beyond the immedi
ate scope. What is important here is recognition that the
international relations of Southern Asia should be studied
with the realization that a major concern of the Subordinate
System is the People's Republic of China. Examination of
particular situations will reveal how policy is thus af
fected.
Subregional Pattern
All that happens internationally in Southern Asia
cannot be explained by the preceding list of factors. There
are sets of foreign policies existing whose primary motiva
tion stems from intraregional, localized issues. For those
accustomed to the Western political tradition, the types of
activity visible from Pakistan to the Philippines must
appear exotic, indeed. Activity of a more familiar nature
also shapes the international relations of the area. Because
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it often does not affect the Dominant System, or is masked
by other patterns, it is less noticeable. Nevertheless, the
potency of immediate problems is such that overlooking them
would lead to a distorted view of what actually is occurring.
The Chinese question is an example of a problem that
is "local" to the whole region. Two examples of even more
local, or subregional problems, were given earlier. Both
the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the countries of former
Indochina contain deep internal fissures that strongly
affect their foreign policies. It would be a handicap to
try fathoming international relations in these two areas
solely in terms of the Cold War Pattern, even if tempered by
knowledge of the Regional Pattern. The Kashmir dispute and
Cambodia's territorial fears do not fit into former theo
retical models, and often are overlooked by current events
analysts. If comprehension of a particular situation is
sought, the Subregional Pattern should be considered as one
of the three main categories for analysis.
By nature, the Subregional Pattern most requires a
concrete situation for adequate discussion. Speaking as
generally as possible, its traits would first include mean
ingful interaction by three or more states in geographical
proximity. Second, primary motivation for the interaction
must come from a subregional source; i.e., a boundary dis
pute, local power balance, irredentism, concern for fellow
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religious or racial companions resident in neighboring ter
ritory— issues which have motivated cooperation and conflict
among neighboring political entities from time immemorial.
Description of techniques and methods of its practice can be
found in Morgenthau, Machiavelli, and the Arthashastra.
It is not without reason that this category has not
made itself more obvious since World War II, In addition to
"meglomania" on the part of outside observers, there has
been simply an absence of phenomena to observe. Nationhood
has only come recently to the area, and much of what has
occurred there internationally has been in the other two
categories. Southern Asia is undeveloped in regional con
tacts, and equally undeveloped in the Subregional Pattern.
Apart from the Columbo Plan, SEATO and ECAFE, there is little
else structurally. Diplomatic contacts have also been
lacking, except in the United Nations. Yet, what does occur
is significant. It is possible that alteration of the Domi
nant System, and simply the passing of time will shift
emphasis to the most local level of political interaction.
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THE MALAYSIA DISPUTE
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BACKGROUND
Section One attempted to construct a framework for
the study of international relations in Southern Asia. This
section is designed to test the relevancy of that framework.
A specific problem has been selected for examination in
detail, following the lines indicated by the previous discus
sion. The issue chosen is the international dispute arising
fran the formation of Malaysia. The creation of a new
federation in Southern Asia led to a diplomatic crisis with
far-reaching implications. Directly involved were four Sub
system states, one peripheral state, two members of the
Dominant System and the leading supranational organization.
Indirectly, most other regional and global powers were also
concerned.
Some understanding of the nature, origins, and issues
of the dispute will be sought. However, it should be em
phasized that what next follows is not a traditional study
of an international crisis; it is not an exhaustive, detailed,
documented presentation of every possible aspect of the
subject,^ Such a project would be worthwhile, but would
Willard Hanna, The Formation of Malaysia (New York: American University Field Staff, 1 9 Ï 4 T 7 No such study has yet appeared concerning Malaysia. The closest approach so far is this collection of articles by Mr, Hanna.
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exceed the limits of this study and accomplish only half of
the intended purpose. Sufficient material will be presented
to discuss the dispute, but the focus is not on its own
intrinsic merits. Beneath the minutiae, the approach re
mains fundamentally conceptual. The aim of the discussion
on Malaysia is to say something meaningful about the study
of international relations in Southern Asia.
To do so, a general background of the dispute is
presented. Following is a discussion of Dominant, Sub
ordinate, and Subregional Patterns found in the dispute,
with a final summary in Conclusion.
Little seems to happen easily in Southern Asia. Even
after the Japanese permanently altered history there, it
still took violent warfare to gain independence. Colonial
wars were fought in Indonesia, Indochina, and Burma after
World War II. In the Crown Colony of Malaya, however, re
organization of the governing structure, into a federation,
seemed all that was desired by local nationalists. Indeed,
they seemed reluctant to have the British depart. Faced with
a dearth of trained Malays to run a government and a serious
Communist insurgency, Malayan nationalism was late developing 2 and moderate. Not until 1954 did nationalist organizations
2 Used here, Malay refers to people of Malay ethnic origin. Malayan refers to the Federation of Malaya.
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combine to demand freedom. And then their goal was to be
obtained only within a four-year time span.
However, England departed in 1957, with great grace.
Singapore, Sarawak, and North Borneo remained British Crown 3 Colonies, and Brunei a Protectorate. An obvious next step
in the Colonialist march to the rear was the relinquishing
of these territories. Little agitation developed for such a
step; but Singapore grew restive, and talks were to begin in
mid-1963 aiming toward revision of her status. As the
United Kingdom gave signs of wanting to liquidate the old
Empire, independence seemed probable.
Certain difficulties stood in the way. Singapore
could scarcely exist as an island city-state with no hinter
land. Totally lacking in resources, it could not claim to
be a viable separate political entity. Lee Kuan Yew, the
resident Chinese Prime Minister of Singapore, indicated in
terest in joining with Malaya. Initially, the interest was
not reciprocated by the Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul
Rahman. Although addition of the Singapore port would
3 Singapore and the Borneo territories became Crown Colonies in 1946. Singapore regained internal self-government in December 1959. Sarawak took the first step in that direc tion in the same year by holding elections for local authori ties. Sabah did not have an election until December 1962. Brunei's Sultan began steps for a constitutional monarchy in 1962 also. Until then all authority rested with the sover eign, who accepted advice from a British Resident on most matters.
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benefit the Malayan economy, the Tunku was unwilling to upset
the Federation's delicate racial balance. British policy
and lack of Malay interest in business, government, or plan
tation farming led to such large-scale immigration that
Chinese residents almost outnumber indigenous Malays. Addi
tion of well over a million Singapore Chinese would have
tipped the balance in their favor.^
Malaysia was the answer to this problem. Britain
apparently wanted to be divested of Sarawak, North Borneo
(Sabah), Brunei, and Singapore. None could stand alone, and
federation of just these states was unlikely. Malaya could
benefit from union with Singapore but would not do so on
racial grounds and fear of the island's Communists. However,
if all these territories joined together, major problems
could be removed mutually. The North Borneo territories are
predominantly populated by peoples of Malay stock. Adding
their numbers to Malaya would dilute the Chinese strength
gained by merger with Singapore. As Singapore's concerns
were economic and defense oriented, there was no disagree
ment. Singapore gained independence, a hinterland, and
4 Figures available at the end of 1963 showed Malaya's Chinese population to be 2,333,756 and Malay population to be 3,084,114. Singapore had only 197,000 Malays at the time and 1,090,545 resident Chinese. Robert Oi Tilman, "Malaysia: The Problems of Federation," The Western Political Quarterly, December 1963, Vol. XVI, No. 4, p. 901.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47
protection from internal Communists; the North Borneo ter
ritories gained independence; Malaya gained a valuable port
and other resources. Colonialism continued to recede.
Once Malaya accepted the idea, it was quickly set in
motion. Tunku Abdul Rahman first made the proposal on May
27, 1961. While addressing a meeting of the Foreign Press
Association in Singapore, he said:
Malaya today as a nation realizes that she cannot stand alone and in isolation .... Sooner or later she should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. It is premature for me to say now how this closer understanding can be brought about, but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to this objec tive and think of a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in political and economic cooperation.5
England agreed in principle in November, 1961. Singapore
agreed. Sarawak and Sabah were polled and also agreed. The
Sultan of Brunei gave tentative approval. Merdeka (Freedom)
Day was set for August 31, 1963, the anniversary of Malaya's g independence.
Although preparations seemed routine and in keeping
with post-war developments in Southern Asia, difficulties
soon arose. Some were minor and did not threaten to disrupt
^R. C. H. McKie, The Emergence of Malaysia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., l96à)7 P» 236.
®For a concise and authoritative statement of con stitutional development see. The Federation of Malaysia, British Information Service (May, 1963).
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the proposed federation— the Sultan of Brunei opted out at
the last stage of negotiations over the questions of oil
royalties and his relationship to the Sultans in the Federa
tion. Others were more serious, but seemed temporary.
Internal opposition came from a socialist party in Singapore
that had Communist connections. It was defeated at the
polls, decisively. An unexpected revolt broke out in Brunei
and soon gained Indonesian verbal support. It was put down
in a week by five thousand British troops. The Philippines
and Indonesia claimed that the residents of Sabah and
Sarawak had not been consulted enough about the merger and
were thus being denied self-determination. Malaya and the
United Kingdom agreed to a poll by the United Nations.
Merkeda Day was postponed until September 16, 1963. On that
day Malaysia came into being.
A new crisis as well as a new nation was born in
Southern Asia. The most serious difficulties, those which
threatened the very existence of the Federation, came from
Malaysia's neighbors. The Philippines asserted an old ter
ritorial claim to parts of Sabah. Indonesia was incensed
rather than mollified by the United Nations poll and in
sisted Malaysia was a plot by the British to maintain
influence in the area. Moreover, formation of Malaysia was
a threat to Indonesian security. A "summit conference" held
in Manila seemed to have produced a sharp policy reversal.
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The leaders of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines
agreed to form a new regional Malay confederation to be
known as Maphilindo. The final settlement of the Malaysia
dispute seemed imminent, but Sukarno again reversed his
stand. His hostility increased, mutual recriminations flew.
He announced that Indonesia was continuing a policy of Con
frontation. Its avowed purpose was to "Crush Malaysia."
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DOMINANT SYSTEM PATTERN
Greatest heat in the dispute has notcome from a
clash of the polar powers. Malaysia is not another Korea,
Taiwan, Laos or Vietnam. However, inextricably mixed among
the strands of controversy are traces of Dominant System.— ^ I
elements. Alignment and Non-alignment, Communism ahd_-Anti-
Communism form part of the dialogue of the dispute. From
the view of outsiders such factors provide cause and colora
tion of their interest in Malaysia. Malaya after independ
ence was anti-Communist and close to the West, but remained
formally non-aligned by refusing to join SEATO. The Crown
Colony of Singapore was the seat of Britain’s defense struc
ture in Southern Asia and a SEATO base. It also contained
an active Communist Party.
Disposition of the Singapore base was a major question
affecting merger plans. Defense of the former Royal posses
sions clearly was going to continue to reside with England
and her allies in the Western bloc. Malaya's ten thousand
man army and thirty vessel navy are inadequate for the task.
This, in turn, means involvement in cold war interplay. The
South Sea basin is interlaced with a web of defense arrange
ments whose origin lies in global politics. Before 1948,
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these were linked to colonial and Western Pacific strategic
policies. The naval complex at Singapore watched over
British interests. The United States retained military,
naval, and air bases in the Philippines by treaty in March,
1947. United States interests were clearly concerned with
Japan and China rather than Southern Asia, where close
allies were engaged in repugnant colonial activities.
Communist insurgency and establishment of the Peoples'
Republic of China altered the situation quite suddenly.
Serious Communist uprisings started in Malaya in 1948. The
following year. New Zealand and Australia joined Great
Britain in defending Malaya, Singapore and the North Borneo
territories, under a defense arrangment known as ANZAM.
After the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States
signed a mutual defense pact with the Philippines. This was
on August 30, 1951. The next day, a "Pacific Security Pact"
was signed between the United States, Australia, and New
Zealand. Known as the ANZUS treaty, it excluded Great
Britain and the Malaysia area while backstopping ANZAM.
Three years later, the United States undertook what
it had refused earlier, the defense of Southern Asia proper.
Communist-led war in Indochina was going against the French,
and the United States Secretary of State desired to extend a
series of anti-Communist defense pacts to the area. The
Manila Treaty thus established, on September 8, 1954, did
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not have the self-operating clause of NATO, its European
counterpart. Article Five of the North Atlantic Treaty
states :
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agreed that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in con cert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.l
By contrast, the operative clause of the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Article IV (1), binds the
members, when faced with aggression, only to meet the common 2 danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
While this may be ambiguous, it did, however, clearly extend
the cold war to Southern Asia. Participation by the United
States in military activity was based upon the stipulation
of Communist aggression. Territory of the signatories was
covered by the treaty. Alignment was automatic for colonial
The North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington, April 4, 1949, Documents On American Foreign Relations. 1949, Vol. XI, Princeton Univer’sTty Press for World Peace Pounda- tion, 1950, p. 612. p _The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed at Manila, September 8, 1954, Documents On American Foreign Relations, 1954 (New York: Harper & Brothers for the Council On Foreign Relations, 1955), p. 319.
^United States, Great Britain, Freuice, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines signed the pact. Other areas were considered "designated states"— covered by the treaty if they wished to be.
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Malaysia, which was considered to be directly blanketed by
SEATO protection.
Independence led to Malaya's opting out of direct
association with SEATO. Subsequently, in 1957, a bilateral
mutual defense pact was signed with Great Britain. As Singa
pore neared independence through merger into the Federation
of Malaysia, the question of Britain's SEATO base arose.
The Prime Minister of the new Federation, Malaya's Tunku
Abdul Rahman, desired a middle ground between alignment and
non-alignment. While staying close to the West and depend
ing on England for major external defense, he wanted to
avoid any charges of being a "puppet." Therefore, he ob
jected to Singapore's use as a SEATO base, but wanted it
maintained for Commonwealth purposes. Despite recent decline
in the Manila Treaty's importance, England could not accede
to the Tunku's wishes in opposition to the United States
wishes.
The Tunku lacked bargaining power, and a compromise
was agreed upon. Obscure wording of the final agreement
allows Great Britain to use the base for SEATO purposes
without directly saying so, but cannot transfer the right to
any other nation. Defense matters are dealt with in Para
graph Six of the London Agreement, signed July 8, 1963. The
Treaty of Defense signed in 195 7 was extended to the terri
tories being added, with the proviso that Malaysia allow
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England to maintain the Singapore ba*Be
. . • and make such use of these . . . facilities as that Government the United Kingdom may consider neces sary for the purpose of assisting in the defense of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defense and for the preservation of peace in Southeast Asia.4
The last clause is-the key phrase permitting the United
Kingdom to fulfill its international commitments as a bloc
actor.
Regardless of the problems raised by the Singapore
base, there is no serious question where Malaysia fits into
the cold war. Prime Minister Rahman has openly stated, "We
are not neutral. We are on the side of the West."^ The
West obviously reciprocates the feeling. England, of course,
maintains close economic, military, and political ties. The
late President Kennedy said at a Press Conference that the
United States is ". . . hopeful that Malaysia will sustain
itself because it is the best hope for security in that part
of the world.In turn, both the Soviet Union and Communist
China have castigated the new nation. Pravda says Malaysia
Daniel Wolfstone, "The Malays Move In," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLII, No. 4 (October 24, 196$), p. 192; and Fecferation of Malaysia, Joint Statement by the Govern ments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaysia, H.M.S.O., (November 22, 1961).
^R. L. Worsnop, Malaysian Federation: Union of Convenience (Washington, D. C. , Editorial Research Reports, March, 196$), p. 552.
^Ibid., p. 553.
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is a way to . • keep control of vast rich territories
where a mighty movement for national independence is gaining 7 with each passing day." In a similar vein, China says,
"The 'Federation of Malaysia' which was knocked together last
September is a neocolonialist invention of the British im
perialists, brought into being with the support of United
Q States imperialism." Malaysia's anti-Communist, pro-
Western stand has thus caused at least verbal hostility from
the Sino-Soviet bloc.
The issue of Communism also had a more immediate
effect in the dispute. Existence of an active and potent
Communist faction in. Singapore made Lee Kuan Yew more anxious
to gain protection by union with Malaya. It was at first a
reason why Malaya did not favor such a move. Having gone
through bitter civil war for fourteen years, the government
did not wish to add new domestic burdens. When it seemed
possible that Singapore would gain independence, Malaya
decided it was better to make the problem a domestic one now
rather than face a Communist-controlled island near its shore
in the future. Referring privately to the "lesson of Cuba,"
^New York Times, September 16, 1963, p. A3.
®"China Supports the North Kalimantan People," Peking Review, No. 14 (Peking: Foreign Language Press, April 3, 1964), p. 28.
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the Tunku said publicly,
It is impossible to grant independence to Singapore because of the danger of its going Communist, and if .. it goes Communist it would, with the help of the Communist powers, try to overrun the whole of Malaya.^
As events showed,following the first steps toward Malaysia,
Communist-influenced unions and front organizations could
exhibit destructive virility.
Domestic problems for Malaysia are external problems
for her neighbors. A Communist cancer in the middle of
Malaysia could some day lead to extension of Communism to
North Borneo and Sarawak. The Philippines would certainly
not welcome such a move, having also fought a long war
against Communist insurgents. It is possible that the
Philippine claim to Sabah stems from strategic security
reasons, although there is little evidence to support such
a conclusion. Indonesia has even more reason to feel se
curity minded, being in greater proximity to Malaysia.
Moreover, the powerful Communist Party in Indonesia— third
largest in the world, with over two million members— would
take aid and comfort from a Communist Malaysia.
It seems doubtful that such considerations are pri
mary motivations for either Indonesia or the Philippines.
Q Gordon P. Means, "Malaysia— A New Federation in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), p. 139, citing Malayan Times (September 25, 1962), pp. 6-7.
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For one reason, both have other visible motives which are
more credible. Regional and Subregional factors are in
volved in their complaints. The Communist issue is an
aspect of Subordinate System regional security considera
tion (although it is a distinct aspect). Secondly, the
threat of Communist control of Malaysia is remote. Malaya
has long and effective experience in dealing with internal
subversion, and Singapore has shown increasing ability and
willingness in that field. The Communist-influenced opposi
tion party, the Barisan Socialis, was badly defeated by Lee
Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party, which gained considerable
strength from the Malaysian issue. Shortly afterward, the
government began a ’’Spring cleaning" campaign to wipe out
Communist elements in the State by wide-spread arrests.
Dominant System politics have made their impact on
the Malaysian dispute. The Attorney General of the United
States was sent by the President to express official concern
over difficulties there. Communist parties of the area all
express hostility to the pro-Western new nation, giving echo
to both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.
However, neither bloc is forcing the Philippines to protest.
Comrad D. N. Aidit, leader of non-aligned Indonesia’s
Communist Party influences but does not control President
Sukarno. General Nosution was the first high-ranking
government official to oppose Malaysia. It is from the
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Philippines and Indonesia that roost of the international
complications arise. If only the Dominant Pattern existed,
there would not be much of a Malaysia dispute.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VI
THE SUBORDINATE SYSTEM PATTERN
Anti-Chinese Reaction
Resident Chinese form a significant percentage of the
population in the units concerned— 43 per cent of Malaya, 80
per cent of Singapore, 2 1/2 per cent of Indonesia, and less
than 2 per cent of the Philippines.^ Part of their signifi
cance stems from strategic economic control in each country,
and from in-group cohesiveness. Assimilation is minimal.
The Chinese maintain a sense of cultural distinctiveness
which borders on chauvinism; with mainland China resurgent,
the border often is crossed. In turn, the Chinese govern
ment takes special interest in their brethren overseas.
Domestic and international complications thus merge.
Each country has had its own internal problems with
local Chinese. Even the Philippines, with only three hundred
fifty thousand Chinese residents, of a total twenty-eight
million population, found fully one-half of the country's
retail trade controlled by them. More than two-thirds of
their copra trade, the world's largest, is Chinese dominated.
In Indonesia there is a similar situation, and it has led.
^Alice Tay Erh Soon, "The Chinese in Southeast Asia," Race, Vol. IV, No. 1, November, 1962 (London), p. 34.
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at times, to outright persecution of the Chinese minority,
including violence. Both countries have passed restrictions
against "alien" ownership of certain retail business enter
prises. Indonesia even used the array, in 1959, against some
rural Chinese shop owners. Despite Indonesia's early recog
nition of the mainland regime, the People's Republic will
ingly risked bad relations by expressing concern. Over forty
thousand Chinese living in Indonesia went to the mainland in 2 ships provided by Mao's government.
Malaya and Singapore quite naturally have the largest
and most long-range problem with resident aliens. British
rule brought peace, prosperity, and Chinese to Malaya.
Large-scale immigration began in the raid-nineteenth century,
as the Malays shunned entrepreneurial and wage labor activi
ties. Singapore became a huge coolie mart. Until 1933, few
females were allowed to enter, and the alien population
2 Ibid., p. 36. Relations between the Indonesian government and the domiciled Chinese minority have been un easy since the foundation of the Indonesian Republic. Nationalist China's alleged complicity in the anti-Djakarta rebellion of 1958 sparked a series of policies by the Indonesian government aimed at weakening the economic posi tion of domestic Chinese businessmen. Rural Chinese retail shopkeepers, faced with massive eviction, and apparently encouraged by members of the mainland regime's embassy in the Capitol, threatened resistance. Troops were employed to put down the resistance, and two lives were lost. See, "Sino-Indonesian Diplomacy: A Study of Revolutionary Inter national Politics," Lea E. Williams, The China Quarterly, July-September 1962, No. 11, p. 184,
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remained transient. Then for a five-year period, male immi
gration was sharply restricted and women admitted freely.
The resulting influx of females led to a more permanent 3 Chinese population. Malaya gained independence only after
an alliance was formed between political parties represent
ing the Malays, Chinese and Indians.^ The Alliance Party
proved harmony was possible, and the British withdrew.
When they did so, the Chinese were left largely in
control of the Malayan and Singapore economies. Chinese
merchants receive over 70 per cent of the national income,
control 72 per cent of road transportation, 40 per cent of
tin mining, and 35 per cent of the rubber plantations. Much
of what is not Chinese is British, Australian or Indian
owned.^ A complicated constitutional arrangement gave pro
tection to the Chinese community in exchange for its accept
ance of what amounted to second-class citizenship. Chinese
3 J. Norman Parmer, "Malaya and Singapore," in George McTurnan Kahin (ed.),"Southeast Asia Program," Government and Politics of Southeast Asia (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1959), pp. 246, 247, and first footnote on page 247.
^Indian immigrants comprise approximately 10 per cent of Malaya's population. Coming mostly from Tamil-speaking areas of Southern India, they arrived at about the same time and for similar reasons as the Chinese. They are less of a problem to the government because of fewer numbers and little fear of India's intentions.
^Soon, op. cit.. pp. 34-36.
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were all but excluded from holding governmental positions.
The question of citizenship was one of the internal stumbling
blocs in the formation of Malaysia, along with other racial
questions already discussed.
Internationally, the resident Chinese would not be
much of a problem were it not for the loyalty question. It
is true that the Chinese could wreak havoc upon the South
Sea economy if they chose to act in unison. Much of the
inter-island traffic is Chinese owned, and docks are usually
dominated by Chinese workmen. South Vietnam's rice exports
came to a halt when Chinese there reacted to discrimination
with economic reprisal, but the action was unusual.^ The
significance of this possibility does not lie in the resident
communities' relationships to each other, but their total
relationship to the New China. If Sukarno expressed private
concern about the ultimate course of Malaysia, he is refer
ring to the danger that the résident Chinese will gain
political control of the new federation, and will then do
the bidding of the revived Middle Kingdom. Such an exten
sion of China's influence would seriously circumscribe
Indonesia's sovereignty.
What appears from a Dominant System perspective to be
clear cases of anti-Communist behavior, appears from a
^Ibid., p. 34.
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Subsystem view to be more complex. The Chinese problem and
the Communist problem blend, China is able to exert influ
ence in Southern Asia through organized Communist parties
and through large Chinese communities stirred by racial
patriotism. Membership often overlaps. Malaya saw that
Communism was growing in Singapore and became more willing
to seek merger; Malaya saw that Singapore’s large Chinese
community was increasingly susceptible to blandishments from
mainland China, and sought merger as a means to reduce ex
ternal influence. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s Prime Minister,
spoke openly of the need for the state government to reach
the non-English speaking Chinese youth of Singapore, as they
were so easily moved by Communist appeals to their heritage.
’’We, the English educated," he said, "went on trying to tap
this oil field of political resources and soon found our 7 pipelines crossing those of the Communist Party."
There is little open evidence that the Chinese ques
tion is a major international factor in the dispute itself,
although it certainly is a latent one. Malaysia does not
^Victor Purcell, "A’Greater Malaysia'? Its Possible effects on Race Relations," Race, Vol. IV., No. 1, November 1962, p. 52. This situation is similar on Sarawak. The Sarawak Report of 1962 says, "The problem of purely Chinese Communist subversion became more and more serious during the year and firm action had to be taken against a number of leaders," including arrests, deportations and closing of three papers. The Report stressed the small numbers of Chinese involved and called them a disservice to the rest of the resident Community.
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have diplomatic relations with either Chinese government.
An official statement says "... neither Communist China
nor Nationalist China can claim to represent China as a
whole. On the basis of this viewpoint the Government
Û recognizes neither." The Philippines recognizes only
Nationalist China, Indonesia only the mainland. China's
opposition to Malaysia might possibly be reflected by
Indonesia's confrontation policy, through the connecting
link of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Malaya has
said so. Certainly, the PKI has strongly backed Sukarno's
stand. However, it is doubtful if the Communists are power
ful enough to originate the confrontation policy, which has
strong military support, or even that the Indonesian party
is totally subservient to Chinese direction.
In the long run, anti-Chinese fears might produce a
new Malaysia dispute. Future developments could well give
political control of the Federation to the urbanized, edu
cated, wealthy Chinese. Whether that will mean obedience to
China (and hence opposition from Malaysia's neighbors) re
mains to be seen; Singapore's experience would suggest not.
For the present, such feelings outwardly seem only a minor
part of the issues disturbing the international scene for
Q Far Eastern Economic Review, No. 43 (October 24, 1963), p. 172T
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Malaysia. What is left unsaid by the participants could
give this factor added importance.
Anti-Colonialist Reaction
At the heart of the Indonesian complaint is the
charge that Malaysia is neocolonialism. Of the several
reasons cited for Konfrontisi, most world attention has cen
tered on Sukarno's anti-British stand. It has been clear
from the outset that the Subordinate System characteristic
of anti-colonialism plays a large share in the dispute.
Terms long familiar in the international relations of
Southern Asia have reappeared, despite the outward dis
similarity to previous circumstances. Great Britain sought
to disband an empire; Indonesia envisages a colonial plot.
The bulk of the Malaysia dispute can be laid to Indo
nesia's violent anti-colonial reaction. Such an explanation
is in keeping with recent history in the area and Indonesian
pronouncements. Former colonies are notoriously sensitive
about their sovereignty, and suspicious of colonial powers.
Indonesia has especially good reason for being so. Sukarno's
credentials as an anti-colonial revolutionary are impeccable.
He founded a nationalist party as early as 1927, and spent
long periods of time afterward in Dutch jails. Two days
after Japan surrendered in 1945, he proclaimed the Republic
of Indonesia independent. Four years of bitter hostilities
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with the Dutch followed before full independence was se
cured, in December, 1949. Indonesia's leaders were bred on
nationalism, revolution, and anti-colonialism.
Indonesian opposition increased and subdivided.
Based on the broad term anti-colonialism, three separate
complaints were lodged. Malaysia was neocolonialist because
Britain remained friendly to its former colonies and vice
versa; no great revolution accompanied its formation.
Malaysia had to be opposed because the peoples of North
Borneo were being denied the right of self-determination;
Great Britain could not be trusted to have taken an impar
tial poll. Malaysia is a colonial threat to Indonesia's
security; British, Australian and United States forces can
surround the revolutionary Republic. Specific complaints
flowed from each subdivision. Britain was the target of
them all. Malaysia itself came increasingly under attack,
both vituperative and physical.
In President Sukarno's view, Malaysia cannot claim to
be part of the anti-colonial revolution. Independence came
late and easily, with many remaining ties to the former
métropole power. Indonesia has emphasized that it is not
opposed to the Malay peoples, nor originally to Malaysia
itself. Their embassy in the United States has said,
But it is the British flavor that pervades the formation of this new nation, the flavor of the
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colonial system, that we find distasteful. It is this that we, who deplore colonialism, consider a threat to our security and our efforts to keep peace in the area. The fact alone that Britain and Australia have pledged military support to Malaysia is indicative of a colonial plot at work.9
In the ideology that is anti-colonialism, Malaysia's
friendly association with Britain marks it automatically as
a status quo state, willingly working with imperialism
against the true forces of independence. As a nation dedi
cated to the cause of opposing colonialism, in all its
forms, Indonesia felt compelled to protest the perpetuation
of the old order under the guise of a new federation.
"Malaysia is against our ideal, against our revolution,
against our State," President Sukarno told his War College.
"... our revolution is a confrontation to destroy the old
order, and build a new order in Indonesia and elsewhere.
In Indonesia, the word "confrontation" has special meaning.
It was first applied to the campaign to wrest West New
Guinea from Dutch control, and then involved graduated steps
of hostility that would have led to an invasion, but for the
Hague's acquiescence. Although ill-defined, the term meant
trouble when applied to Malaysia.
^Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, "Letter to the Editor," Washington Post, October 3, 1963.
^^Straits Times [Singapore], July 12, 1963, p. 1.
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Self-determination, the magic phrase of Wilson's era,
is naturally the prime motivation of anti-colonialism.
Before independence, it was the goal of all nationalists.
After independence, the phrase still is potent; its manifes
tation then can take rather strange turns, as it did in the
Malaysia dispute. First, the respective governments were
concerned lest creation of Malaysia would appear to be a
Malayan succession to British imperial interests. Quite
early in negotiations, it was decided that Sarawak and North
Borneo should be consulted. Prime Minister Rahman flew to
London to meet with Prime Minister MacMillan in November,
1961. As a result, a special commission was established
under Lord Cobbold, charged specifically with ascertaining
the views of the people in the Crown Colonies. Before it
took to the field, wide circulation in simple terminology
was given to Malaysian concept.
For over two months, the Commission sought public
opinion in the two territories. More than four thousand
people were personally interviewed. Nearly twenty-two
hundred documents were solicited from a variety of opinion-
molding groups : town boards, district councils, political
parties, chambers of commerce, trade unions, religious
leaders, members of executive and legislative councils, and
native chiefs. On August 1, 1962, the Cobbold Commission
presented its findings. It was "unanimously agreed that a
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Federation of Malaysia is in the best interests of North
Borneo and Sarawak and that an early decision in principle
should be reached.After finding a substantial majority
in favor of the proposal, Lord Cobbold added in his own
report that it was a necessary condition from the outset
that Malaysia be considered an association of partners.
If any idea were to take root that Malaysia would involve a "take over" of the Borneo territories by the Federation of Melaya . . . Malaysia would not . . . be generally acceptable or successful.12
The idea did take root. Self-determination became an
issue once more, as Indonesia began to be concerned about
the fate of the people in British Borneo^ When the concept
of a greater Malaysia was first broached in 1961, Indonesia
gave an open welcome, coupled with an implicit threat. In
November, the Indonesian Foreign Minister announced in the
General Assembly of the United Nations ". . . w e told Malaya
that we have no objections, and that we wish them success
with this merger so that everyone may live in peace and
freedom." This is the welcome. The threat followed at once:
Dr. Subandrio continued.
Naturally, ethnologically and geographically speaking North Borneo is closer to Indonesia than, let us say.
^^Malaysia; Report of Inter-Governmental Committee, 1962 (London; Her Majesty's Stationery Office), p. 7. 12 The Federation of Malaysia (New York: The British Information Service, May 19ÉÏ),p. 64.
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to Malaya. But we still told Malaya that we have no objections to such a merger based upon the will for freedom of the peoples concerned.13
Exactly this last point became formal basis for a
series of international occurrences. On December 8, 1962, a
revolt broke out in the Sultanate of Brunei. Its aim was to
establish an independent state of North Kalimantan, hopefully
including Sarawak and Sabah as well as Brunei. The Indonesian
press immediately gave editorial support to the revolt. In
dications increased that Indonesia was giving tactical as
well as moral aid. President Sukarno himself remained rela
tively quiet, although voicing support also. At a state
banquet given by the visiting Vice President of Yugoslavia,
he said that Indonesia "sympathizes" with the rebels because
"we are loyal to the principles of the Bandung Conference, 14 and also of the Belgrade Conference." In a much stronger
statement made when the revolt was nearly put down, he denied
any territorial ambition. Support "for the struggle of the
people of North Kalimantan represents the firm attitude of
13 A Survey On the Controversial Problem of the Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia (Washington, D, C., Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia), p. 2.
^^Indonesian Observer [DjakartaJ December 17, 1962, p. 1. At the same time Sukarno emphasized that Indonesia "had obtained independence by her own strength, unlike some other countries which had been granted their freedom by their oppressors."
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the Indonesian people against colonialism, imperialism, and 15 oppressions"
Revolt's end did not mark the end of the crisis* Indo
nesian opposition increased, and tensions remained high.
Incidents took place along the Borneo border, fishing boats
were harassed, mutual insults were exchanged. Then, suddenly,
the mood snapped. President Sukarno took a working-vacation
in Tokyo. The Tunku flew there to meet him and, on June 1,
1963, a quick summit conference was held. A Foreign Mini
ster's Conference was scheduled in Manila, to iron out dif
ferences between Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Among other things, the Manila Accord that resulted aimed at
settling the self-determination question. It was decided
that a further poll of the constituencies be held, this time
under the ~'\spices of the United Nations. When the Heads of
State of the three nations met, this decision was ratified.
All agreed;
. . . The United Nations Secretary General or his representative should ascertain prior to the estab lishment of the Federation of Malaysia, the wishes of the people of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak . . . by a fresh approach which in the opinion of the
Antara Daily New Bulletin (December 28, 1962), p. 1, cited in Justus M. Vander Kroef, "Indonesia, Malaya and the North Borneo Crisis," Asian Survey, Vol. Ill, No. 4 (Berkeley, California; Institute of International Studies, University of California, April, 1963), p. 178.
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Secretary General is necessary to ensure complete com pliance with the principles of determination . . .
The experience was far from a happy one for U Thant.
The result of the United Nations efforts left the self-
determination question still dangling and the participants
still angry. England resented questioning of the Cobbold
Commission's integrity, and scarcely cooperated with United
Nations fact-finders; Indonesia and the Philippines squabbled
with the United Nations and the British over how many ob
servers they would be allowed; Malaya only reluctantly post
poned Merdeka Day. Moreover, in the very middle of the
United Nations poll, the Tunku announced the new Merdeka Day
to be September 16— two days following U Thant's scheduled
report. England's Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys,
apparently was initiator of the move. Indonesia protested.
The Philippines protested. The United Nations team worked 17 diligently at their task.
The Secretary General presented his Borneo report
September 12, 1963:
"Tripartite Summit Meeting - Joint Statement," Malaya/Indonesia Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaya), Appendix XII, 1963, paragraph 4, p. 44.
Laurence Michelmore of the United States represented the Secretary General with a Czechoslovakian as Deputy Rep resentative. Other members were from Brazil, Argentina, Ghana, Ceylon, Pakistan, Jordan, and Japan.
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It is my conclusion that the majority of the peoples in the two territories . . . wish to engage, with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged Federation of Malaysia through which they can strive together to realize the fulfillment of their destiny.
Had there not been intervening factors, this statement might
have laid the matter to rest. U Thant elaborated further :
I have come to the conclusion that the majority of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak have given serious and thoughtful consideration to their future, and to the implications for them of participation in the Federa tion of Malaysia. I believe that the majority of them have concluded that they wish to bring their dependent status to an end and to realize their independence through freely chosen association with other people in their region with whom they feel ties of ethnic asso ciation, heritage, culture, economic relationship and ideals and objectives.18
The United Nations opinion was largely academic by this time.
Indonesia remained opposed to Malaysia. Self-determination
was still in doubt to President Sukarno's mind, still a com
ponent of the dispute.
Even if the self-determination issue had been settled,
anti-Colonialism itself would remain a factor. There is
still the matter of Malaysia's defense arrangements. Al
though the existence of military bases in nearby territories
can be looked at as a Subregional matter, as it will be in
the next section, there is also an element of anti-Colonialism
involved. Malaysia's defenses not only are formidable (from
18 "The Malays Move In," Far Eastern Economic Review (October 24, 1963), p. 193.
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a neighbors view); they are evil. They compromise Malaysia’s
independence; they threaten Indonesia’s hard won existence.
The first solid and official indication of the Indonesian
government’s hostile attitude came from Defense Minister
Nasution. This staunch anti-Communist did not speak in
terms of logistics, but in language used by the PKI. "Im
perialism and neo-colonialism are not yet dead," he warned
in October of 1962, "but are still active all around
Indonesia.
At issue is the Singapore base. Great Britain used
it as a Commonwealth link and to fulfill SEATO obligations.
Abdul Rahman's government also has a separate defense treaty
with England, and no objection to the Commonwealth. Objec
tions to SEATO and the concurrent desire for federation led
to a papering-over of the differences, as noted above.
(Singapore also gained, after bargaining, servicelands
formerly owned by England, including a plush golf course
coveted by Lee Kuan Yew.) The last phrase of Article VI—
allowing the base to be used "for the preservation of peace
in Southeast Asia"— clearly does not prevent Singapore from
remaining a SEATO port, and the Tunku was not unaware of it.
Nor is he at all unaware that his nation's defenses rest
19 Antara News Bulletin, Vander Kroef, o£. cit., p. 178 (October 'S'J Ï9é2 ).
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with Great Britain. He told the Malayan Parliament,
. . . we need them while danger threatens us from without; we need the bases because we cannot man the bases ourselves for lack of money, for lack of equip ment, for lack of men and for lack of so many things .... Until the day comes when we are assured that we can live in peace and sleep in our beds without any disturbance, then, perhaps, we may get together with the British and say that we need no more of their help— and that has been agreed to by our partners.20
Malaysia may consider themslves partners, but to
Indonesia the Tunku is a British puppet, helping to preserve
a colonial life line. With Egypt, India and Pakistan inde--
pendent, Britain created a subservient neocolonialist federa
tion to retain control of the remnants of the old empire.
That is also why Malaysia, with only ten million people can
be an attempt at encircling Indonesia, with over one hundred
million population. Moreover, Indonesia views Article VI
with particular suspicion. For what reason and right can
the colonial power arrogate to itself military overlordship
of all Southeast Asia, including areas beyond the territories
of the contracting parties? To Indonesia that provision
"cannot be interpreted but as having ulterior motives towards 21 the immediate neighbors of . . . Malaysia."
20 "The Malays Move In," op. cit., p. .193. Lee Kuan Yew was even more candid. He saTd some military power was going to dominate in Singapore and "better the teeth-drawn British whom we know than some contender whom we don't," ibid., p. 191. 21 Asian Survey, Vander Kroef, jO£. cit., p. 173.
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Doubt can be cast on the Sukarno, Nasution anti
colonialist position. The British bases were on Singapore
long before Indonesia gained independence, yet no complaint
was raised. Issue was piled on issue as the debate in
creased. No mention was made at the outset about British
military presence in Malaysia, yet later it was found objec
tionable'. Moreover the Philippine Islands contain a far
greater "alien" military complex, again with no complaint
from Indonesia. Indonesia has said that if Malaysia estab
lishes a military base in the Borneo territories, the Soviets
will be invited to establish a base in Indonesian Kaliman- 22 tan. The United States has a large striking force in the
neighboring.Philippine Islands, yet no Soviet base has
appeared on Borneo. Such inconsistencies raise serious
questions about motivation. So does the policy sequence of
hostility-peace-hostility. War has seemed imminent on
several occasions; so has complete cooperation.
There can be no question of President Sukarno's fervor:
We are a nation that is really engaged in Revolu tion because this, the law of Revolution affects us; that is we have friends and face foes. If we were a satellite nation, if we had the spirit of slaves, if we had the spirit of sheep, if we had the spirit of ducks, . . . then certainly we would not have opponents, certainly we would not be undermined, certainly there
^^Indonesian Observer [Djakarta], September 28, 1962, p. 1.
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would be no subversion against us, but on the other hand we would be trampled on as we formerly were, our noses would be pierced by a lead, we would be dic tated to, order to trail behind. But once again, I say, we are not nations of such a type! This is why we are undermined, subverted, spied upon and white- anted in all sorts of ways.23
Anti-colonial speech is heady and omni-present; there is
cause to wonder if it is entirely relevant.
23 "Malays Move In," o£. cit., p. 190. Speech made August 17, 1963.
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THE SUBREGIONAL PATTERN
The tri-level system perspective being attempted in
this analysis should be kept clearly in mind. At this point
in other analyses, there would be little left to discuss.
The war in Vietnam and Laos, for example, could be largely
explained in terms of the previous two categories. There
would remain such items as the historic subjection of South
Vietnam by their Northern brethren, the religious split, and
causes of Ho Chi Minh's domestic appeal; but, by and large,
the key elements would already have been dissected. The
Dominant System Pattern is plainly evident in the dispute.
Contrarily, in other situations, the bulk would still
remain ahead. Such would be the case in Cambodia’s difficul
ties with her neighbors. Not even the Subordinate System
Pattern would have deeply scratched the complexities in
volved. Subregional factors predominate. Territorial
claims, ancient ethnic emnities, and limited expansionism
create apolitical pattern revealing immediate, local motiva
tion.
Malaysia forms a middleground. The categories so far
examined have provided answers, particularly the Subordinate
System Pattern. Much remains, however. The Philippines in
volvement has yet to be discussed; Maphilindo is unexamined;
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the Azahari revolt barely mentioned. More can be said about
Indonesia. Having focused attention increasingly-downward,
it is now proper to ask whether there are Subregional con
siderations involved in the Malaysia dispute. Disparate
activities fall under this classification. The criteria for
their inclusion should be kept in mind; international
political behavior, limited in scope and intent whose pri
mary motivation stems from local imperatives.
The Philippines Claim
Most of the Philippines interjection fits this last
category. The Dominant System intrudes minimally. Sincere
anti-Communism often forms a reflex for Philippine foreign
policy, but opposition to Malaysia is manifested despite
alignment with the Western bloc, rather than because of it.
The Subordinate System Pattern is better represented. Anti-
Colonialism received frequent mention as a factor, especially
after Indonesia raised the issue. The Philippines supported
demands for the United Nations poll. (The opposition party,
Nacionalista, in the Philippines was quick to bring the
government to task for claiming Malaya's pretentions to
North Borneo "colonialism," yet asserting rights over the
same area.) Anti-Chinese fear also forms a part, although
more in the press than from the government. Here the issue
is again the potential influence of Singapore's Chinese
Communists. As in the case with anti-colonial statements.
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this objection is usually made in passing. In the long run,
anti-Chinese sentiments may well assume greater importance.
They seem to be only a minor factor in the current Filipino
argument. Even when mentioned, it is a Subregional consid
eration: anti-Communism is anti-Chinese Communism, which is
fear of extension of Singapore's Chinese Communist influence
to the Philippine's Southern doorstep, Sabah.
Subregional motivation is even clearer in the main
argument put forth. The Philippine leaders are pressing a
long-standing legal claim to North Borneo, its nearest
neighbor. Historical and legal background is complex, to
say the least. The government is pursuing its territorial
claim as successor to the Sultanate of Sulu, which is now
part of the Republic of the Philippines. The Sultan of Sulu
gained Sabah from the Sultan of Brunei in 1704, and his heir
either ceded or leased the territory to a group of free
booters in 1877. Eventually, the British wound up with the
area. Crux of the Philippine case is whether sovereignty
was lost, and that depends on a single-disputed word in the
original treaty. Filipino conviction is sufficiently strong
to warrant major policy decisions.
Relevant facts of the tangled history can be given in 1 brief. The Sultan of Brunei was faced with serious
^Martin Meadows, "The Philippine Claim to North
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insurrection in 1704, and called upon the Sultan of Sulu for
aid. With the successful quelling of the revolt. North
Borneo was ceded as a gift, in gratitude. The nineteenth
century brought European powers more actively to the scene;
with them came the heyday of rugged individualists and adven
turers. Sarawak was gained by an Englishman named Brooke,
who also was ceded it by the Sultan of Brunei. The Sultan
later granted trading rights in Sabah to three Americans,
despite the fact he no longer controlled the area. They, in
turn, brought a key figure into the picture, Baron de
Overbeck, the Austrian consul in Hong Kong. He hoped to
gain trading rights from the American company and sell them
to his own government.
Soon, running short of funds. Overbeck went to his
former employers. The Dent Brothers, an English firm in Hong
Kong. Alfred Dent provided financial support in exchange
for sole control of any resulting concession. Overbeck
gained the concession, England later gained a colony, and
Malaysia ultimately gained the emnity of the Philippines.
Austria lost an entry point to Southeast Asia, Brunei lost
for good her Northern territory; more importantly, the
Sultan's son mysteriously lost the original signed treaty
Borneo," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. LXXVII, No. 3 (September, 1962).
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while in Singapore. The British have a copy but will not
show it to anyone. Spain has a copy, translated into Spanish
from the Malay-script Arabic used by the Sultan of Sulu. It
is this copy that was found by Philippine lawyers, and which
]3d to active espousal of the North Borneo cause.
Specifically, the Philippine lawyers claim that the
Sultan leased, but did not cede, the territory to Overbeck.
The Malayan word "pajak" is used to describe the territory's
disposition. They translate the treaty as reading, "We have
decided to conclude a contract of lease of Sandakan as pro- 2 posed to us by Baron Overbeck." The British version reads,
"We . . . herby grant and cede of our own free and sovereign
will to Gustavus Baron de Overbeck . . . ," and mentions
"forever and in perpetuity." The Philippines have re
peatedly stressed their willingness to submit to arbitration,
and their basic friendliness to England. There have also
been hints that a monetary settlement is possible. These
have come primarily from the lawyer hired by heirs of the 4 last Sultan of Sulu.
^Napoleon G. Rama, "North Borneo - It's Ours!," Philippines Free Press, January 20, 1962, p. 67.
^Ibid.
^Gordon P. Means, "Malaysia - A New Federation in Southeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), p. 157. Nicosia Osmena, son of the former President of the Philippines, reportedly approached the British and
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It seems doubtful that the government entertains
serious hopes of regaining Sabah. While the claim has some
legal weight, the Sultan of Brunei could probably make an
equally good one, as Azahari did during the revolt. More
over, England has been internationally recognized as sover
eign since 1882, when the British North Borneo (Chartered)
Company was formed. Malaysia has succeeded the British and
Sabah is firmly imbedded as a constituent part of the new
Federation— as their legislature so voted and the United
Nations poll indicated the people wished. Indeed, the small
initial opposition to Malaysia in Sabah disappeared after
the Philippines presented their claim. With so little chance
of success and with years of silence preceding, why did the
Philippines choose to create an international issue?
One answer is domestic Filipino politics, and a
series of coincidences. President Diosdado Macapagal first
came to national attention by successfully regaining land
from the British. In 1947, he was a member of the Foreign
Affairs office, and negotiated the return of Turtle Island
to the Philippines. It had been leased to the North Borneo
Malayan governments in 1962 and asked for a settlement of ten million British pounds sterling. In exchange, Philippine diplomatic pressure would be abandoned. It was further rumored that a similar price was quoted later to the Indo nesian government, to buy out the claim. Several major corporations have bought shares in the heir's company, in the hopes of gaining exclusive concessions.
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Company in 1903 by the Sultanate. Using this as a spring
board, he entered politics and was elected to Congress.
There, in 1950, he authored a resolution calling for the
return of North Borneo. Although passed unanimously by the
House and Senate, no action was taken by the government.
Macapagal ran for President in 1961 and was elected, but
little mention was made of North Borneo, On his inaugura
tion day, however, an influential weekly newspaper in Manila
began a campaign to revive the issue. Shortly afterward the
plan for Malaysia was announced.
By April, 1962, the campaign had succeeded enough to
once again move a resolution through Congress. The approach
throughout was unpolemical and businesslike. Finally on
June 22, 1962, the government made its position formal, in a
letter to the British ambassador:
It is clear . . . that there is a dispute between the Sultanate of Sulu and the Philippine Government on the one side and Her Majesty's Government on the other regarding the ownership and sovereignty over North Borneo.^
Support for the government's position grew. Over eight
thousand students gathered at a peaceful rally, the press
continued its agitation, an influential section of business
Embassy of the Philippines, Division of Cultural Affairs, Larawan, Series VII, No. 10 [Washington]. Original emphasis.
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and industry backed the stand.^ Even the opposition party
decided to make the issue bipartisan. Macapagal*s previous
activity suited him for the role, Malaysia's formation
forced the issue, and Filipino nationalism responded readily
when called upon.
More than these "matters-of-the minute" are behind the
Philippines participation in the Malaysia dispute. For some
centuries, the Philippines have been "in Asia but not of
Asia." Meaningful cultural and political ties ended when
Islam confronted Spanish Catholicism and guns in Mindanao,
during the sixteenth century. Spain faced the Philippines
toward Europe. Occupation by the United States reinforced
the stance. In a very real sense, the Philippines current
diplomatic activities mark an attempt to return to Asia.
Macapagal has thrust the Republic into intimate continuing
contact with its nearest neighbors. There is good reason to
believe the gesture is a conscious one, that the Philippines
is deliberately trying to be "of Asia."
A post-colonial generation of Filipinos is ready for
a new tack in foreign policy; economic and security factors
may demand it. Relations with the United States undoubtedly
will remain paramount for some time, but there is growing
g "Manila on Malaysia," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXIX, No. 9 (February 28, 1963), p.
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realization of a divergence on matters other than security.
The Philippines shares the same problems as other commodity
producers in the area, and cooperation is seen as a solu- 7 tion. The working alliance with Indonesia has already
brought tangible results, as Confrontation has shifted some
of Indonesia's intrepôt trade— two hundred million dollars
per year— from Singapore to Manila. Moreover, the Philip
pines is industrializing and looks to Southeast Asia for its
markets. "There are many things we can produce here and
sell in Indonesia and other countries of that area,"
Macapagal told a press conference. "We are determined to 8 become industrialized and are well underway."
Evidence is not lacking that the Philippines now is
seeking regional contacts. Macapagal has stated openly that
"We are especially partial towards the regional groupings of g Asian states . . . ." His Foreign Affairs Secretary told
the United Nations, "I trust I may be permitted to report
with pardonable pride that Manila during the past year has
7 Frances L. Starner, "Macapagal and Borneo," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XL, No. 2 (Hongkong, April 11, 1963),p. 69.
®W. J. Pomeroy, "Reorientation For the Philippines," Eastern World, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (March, 1964), p. 8.
8"The Philippines In World Affairs," Larawan, op. cit., Series VII, No. 12. Speech before Manila Overseas Press Club on September 24, l962.
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served as a busy center of regional diplomatic activity.
This same gentleman, Salvador P. Lopez, gave another address
to a home audience. It was long and thoughtful. Seldom
does a single document so clearly illustrate the influence
of regional needs on foreign policy. First he stated some
basic historical background:
As the Philippines achieved its independence at the end of the war in which it fought loyally side by side with the United States, it was inevitable that its foreign policy should be strongly oriented towards the United States and the West .... Our principle diplo matic posts were Washington, the United Nations, London, Paris, and Madrid.11
He then stated the Philippines new orientation specifically:
Over the years, a shift has taken place, at first, imperceptibly, later noticeably, today dramatically, resulting in a clear orientation towards Asia, in particular. Southeast Asia .... From the vantage- point of my present position which enables me to view the operations of our entire foreign service, I can testify that our diplomatic activities towards Asia might be likened to a 90-degree turn in the direction of a moving ship.12
Activity will not diminish in the West, nor with the United
Nations, and ties with Latin America will be strengthened.
He concludes.
^^"Philippine Policy Statement," Larawan, op. cit., (October 8, 1963).
"Foreign Policy Transformations and Reconsidera tions," Larawan, op. cit., Series IX, no. 8 (August 29, 1963). Address before the Manila Rotary Club. l^ibid.
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But in the end the powerful affinities of race cul ture and geography and the imperatives of regional security and common destiny will inevitably push us towards our racial kin and next-door neighbors in Southeast A s i a . 13
Maphilindo
Cold war came to Southern Asia. Not a clash of Big
Powers, but hostility between Indonesia, Malaya, and the
Philippines marred the international waters. Tensions grew
sharply, and armed clash seemed imminent. President Sukarno
told his army to "hold on to your rifles." Malaya's defense
allowance topped 10 per cent of the yearly budget for the
first time. At the eleventh hour, a summit conference was
arranged. The Philippines hosted a meeting of all three
Heads of State. The leaders huddled; twice the conference
was extended to keep it from collapsing. When the men
emerged, they astounded the world.
All agreements were settled, amicably. Malaya consented
to let U Thant handle the question of self-determination, and
to postpone Merdeka Day. Malaya further joined the other
two nations in asking Great Britain to agree to "seek a just
and expeditious solution" to the North Borneo claim "by
means of negotiation, conciliation, and arbitration, judicial
l^ibid.
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settlement, or other peaceful means.Most surprising of
all, relations improved so much that the three participating
nations agreed to join together in a new political confedera
tion, Maphilindo. (MAlaya, PHILippines, INDOnesia.) The
Filipino desire for regional cooperation was apparently
shared so strongly by its neighbors that even the bitterness
surrounding Malaysia’s formation can be surmounted.
Obviously, Maphilindo, so hopefully launched, never
became a reality. President Sukarno soon was calling the
Tunku, boneka, "puppet"; the United Nations unsatisfying role
has been recounted. The Borneo claim remains unsettled.
There was an unreal air about the Conference results and
"normality" reasserted itself at once. But the attempt was
notable, and the idea is far from dead. As an example of
regionalist attempts, it stands out as unique in origin; a
war parley turning into peaceful union. It also illustrates
the forces growing in Southern Asia's international relations.
As part of the Malaysia dispute, Maphilindo deserves closer
scrutiny.
Initiative came from the Philippines, Maphilindo
seemed sudden to the outside world, but had actually grown
"A Survey On the Controversial Problem of the Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia," Malaya/Indonesia Relations (Government of Malaya, Appendix XII, 1963) para. 8.
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from a seed planted by Macapagal a year earlier. As noted,
the Philippines laid formal claim to North Borneo on June
22, 1962. No serious reply was given by England. Three
days later, the Cobbold Commission reported that a majority
of political leaders in Borneo favored Malaysia. Steps were
continued to bring the enlarged Federation into actuality.
Meanwhile, Macapagal paid a state visit to Pakistan, and
while there made vague references to pan-Asian unity. When
he returned home, he found little response still from the
British, but continuing evidence of domestic support for the
North Borneo claim. He also found that foreign opinion,
particularly from the United States, condemned the Philip
pines "obstructionism."
These were some of the elements in Maphilindo’s birth.
On July 28, 1962, President Macapagal held a press conference,
"Asians should not accept a European project as a substitute
for an Asian project," he said, "planned and carried out by
Asians themselves in the true and enduring interests of the
Asian world." The lecture continued, "The unity of the
Malay peoples is the business of the Malay peoples. We must
forge it ourselves, by our own efforts, out of our sense of
history and our recognized community of interests." He then
put forth his own proposal: a Confederation of Greater
Malaya. Included would be Malaya, Singapore, the three
Borneo Territories, and the Philippines. The confederation
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would supersede the proposed Malaysia. He added, "My state
ment is a step to accelerate a British reply.
The immediate reply was that Malaysia would proceed.
After a time, however. Great Britain did consent to discuss
the Philippine claim. On January 20, 1963, Vice President
Pelaez was dispatched to London for discussions— coinci
dentally, the very day that President Sukarno announced
Confrontation. When returning to Manila, Pelaez proposed
that Presidents Sukarno and Macapagal and Prime Minister
Rahman meet together to settle their differences. Malaya
accepted at once; Indonesia was non-committal. Little was
being said by anyone about Malay unity. Relations between
Indonesia and Malaya seemed near the flash point.
The Philipppines tried again. In March, 1963, an
ECAFE meeting was held in Manila. President Macapagal used
the occasion to hold informal conversations with the delega
tion leaders from Malaya and Indonesia. Then he formally
proposed that Ministerial talks be held, leading to a Summit
Conference. Malaya agreed, but suggested Subministerial
talks be held first. To this, Indonesia gave consent.
Manila hosted the meeting. Eight sessions in early April,
1963, led to a friendlier turn of events. The representatives
l^New York Times, July 28, 1962, p. 1.
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agreed that a Foreign Ministers conference should be held,
leading to a meeting of Heads of Government. Also on the
agenda was "consideration of arrangements by which the three
countries can achieve closer cooperation" on the solution of
their common problems.At about the same time, Manila
hosted a meeting of ASA (Association of Southeast Asian
States) and President Macapagal conferred privately with his
houseguest, Tunku Abdul Rahman. They agreed closer coopera
tion among Malay nations was needed and that Tripartite
talks should be held on Malaysia.
Southern Asia's cold war seemed on its way to solu
tion. President Sukarno planned a visit to Japan and stopped
in Manila on his way. Several decisions were reached over
breakfast at Malacanang, the Presidential Palace. In addi
tion to expressing satisfaction at Philippine-Indonesian
relations, both Presidents favored the forthcoming Minis
terial talks, and a Summit Conference to follow. Both also
"expressed complete agreement on the goal of understanding
and harmony between Malay peoples as the genuine foundation 17 for the peace and stability of their region." President
"Joint Final Communique," Malaya/Philippine Rela tions' (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaya), Appendix II, paragraph 4. 1 7 Joint Communique issued by President Macapagal and President Sukarno on May'23, 1963, after a two hour meeting in Manila. Ibid., Appendix VI, p. 25.
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Sukarno proceeded on to Tokyo and was soon joined there by
an unexpected visitor. With almost no warning, Tunku Abdul
Rahman flew in for a quick conference, completing the tri
angular discussions. There the two antagonists reached the
same decisions as the two ^ facto allies a week earlier in
Manila. The Foreign Ministers Conference would be held, a
Summit Meeting should follow. In addition, "they would
strive towards the achievement of a closer understanding
between the three countries in matters of common concern and
1 ft mutual interest."
With this, the path was cleared for the Ministers
Conference and Maphilindo. Manila again was host. The
meetings lasted from June 7 to 11, 1963. Indonesia's Foreign
Minister expressed confidence as he arrived; "I hope to
celebrate Philippine Independence Day (June 12i with the full 19 cohesion and unity of the three Malay nations." President
Macapagal treated the plenipotentiaries to a state dinner
and there reintroduced his concept of a union of Malay
states. He predicted
This date will be recorded in annuals of Asian history as the day 140 million peoples of Malay
18 "Joint Statement Issued After Tokyo Meeting," Malaya/Indonesian Relations, op. cit., Appendix XII (1963), p. 44.
^^Manila Daily Bulletin, June 7, 196.3-, p. 2.
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origin in Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines started upon the road . . . back to their common ancestral home.
Over a toast he called the plan
. . . a joyous reunion of brothers . . . triplets who became separated at birth, who were placed under the care of three foster parents but who have now come of age and are trying to rediscover their common origin and destiny.20
The Filipino delegate. Vice President Pelaez, opened
the Conference with a formal proposal for confederation.
Security was stressed as a main reason for such a move.
Singapore and British Borneo were to be included separately,
as a means of solving Philippine-Malayan friction. Both 21 Indonesia and Malaya at first called the plan "premature."
Word soon leaked from the secret sessions, however, that the
idea had gained acceptance "in principle." The Indonesians
gave priority to the question of the Chinese in Borneo, said 22 the rumors. Then came word of a defense pact, as first
step toward confederation. A consultative committee was to
be established. A day later, a Secretariat was announced,
Manila Daily Bulletin, June 8, 1963, p. 1.
^^New York Times, June 10, 1963, p. 8.
^^Manila Daily Bulletin, June 10, 1963, p. 1. Sarawak contains 229,154 resident Chinese out of a total population of 744,529. Resident Chinese in Sabah number 104,542, in a total population of 454,421. Robert 0. Tilman, "Malaysia, The Problems of Federation," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. 4, December 1963, p% 901.
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to handle problems between the three countries. Midway
through the Ministers Conference, Maphilindo seemed nearly
assured. The decision to call upon the United Nations was
the final link needed to remove major obstacles.
At meeting's end, the Ministers themselves were a
little more subdued, and so were their recommendations.
President Macapagal's suggestion of Tripartite union was
endorsed, but defined more precisely by adding the words
"without surrendering any portion of their sovereignty." A
central Secretariat was to be established, but pending its
creation, National Secretariats were to be created. The
projected defense pact received no concrete mention beyond
the recommendation that "heads of State and Foreign Minis
ters meet at least once a year for the purpose of consulta is tions on matters of importance and common concern." Still,
the margin of agreement was large, and the steps advocated
quite momentous, especially in view of the hostility exist
ing shortly before the meetings. Maphilindo lacked only
endorsement and a name.
Both came when the Heads of State met. Manila re
mained the gracious host. It took the leaders from July 30
to August 5, 1963, to ratify what their Foreign Ministers
23 "Joint Final Communique," Malaya/Philippine Rela tions , op. cit.. p. 26.
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accomplished a month and a half earlier. In the interim,
Confrontation had been renewed, almost scuttling the Summit
Conference. President Sukarno understood at Tokyo that no
further action would be taken on Malaysia until the Tripar
tite talks had been held. The Tunku flew to London July 9
and signed the London Agreement, setting Merdeka Day for
August 31. President Sukarno called Abdul Rahman a liar and
renewed his hostile attitude. "We, the Republic of Indo
nesia and the Indonesian people," he said in front of the
Malayan Ambassador, "not only disagree with Malaysia but we
shall oppose it to the end."^^ The Tunku said he had told
Sukarno of the London trip and its purpose when in Tokyo.
At the final hour, talks went ahead as scheduled.
As a major first step, the Heads of State adopted
their Ministers’ recommendations in toto, and dignified the 25 title "The Manila Accord." The basic idea of a confedera
tion was thus confirmed. As a second step, a statement of 26 common principles was agreed upon. Known as the Manila
Declaration, its final article commits the three signatories
"to take initial steps towards the establishment of Maphil
indo by holding frequent and regular consultations at all
9 A Straits Times, July 12, 1963, p. 1.
Z^ibid., July 31, 1963. ^^Ibid., August 3, 1963.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 27 levels, to be known as Mushawara Maphilindo." In the
final announcement, the Manila Joint Statement, the previous
decisions were confirmed; consultations were to be held at
all levels, each nation is to establish a National Secre
tariat for Maphilindo Affairs, and these are to work
together to set up the machinery for Maphilindo itself.
. Maphilindo soon floundered on the rock of self-
determination. Much of the Summit Meeting was devoted to
the role of the United Nations. Failure of the United
Nations poll to satisfy the Philippines and Indonesia led to
renewed recriminations and the halting of expressions of
brotherly love. Details of Maphilindo's origins have been
presented anyway because of the conscious recognition by all
the parties of their mutual geographic and diplomatic
proximity. Maphilindo, as part of the Malaysia dispute,
clearly demonstrates the Subregional Pattern.
The Azahari Revolt
In a sense, the whole dispute involving North Borneo
stems from the decline and fall of a middle-sized empire.
The Sultanate of Brunei once covered much of the South China
sea; how much is uncertain. It was in its glory at the
27 Manila Declaration (Washington, D. C.: Embassy of the Philippines, n.d.). Mushawara is an Indonesian concept meaning "brotherly consultations."
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beginning of the sixteenth century. Every river sent trib
ute, all the lessor lords of Borneo paid homage. Few previ
ous Malay states in all known history surpassed it.
Magellan's fleet stopped by in 1521, the first Europeans to
arrive in Borneo. Pigafctta, official fleet chronicler left
this description;
.... We went to the house of the Governor where we were given a supper of many kinds of food .... Then we went to the King's palace upon elephants. All the streets, from the Governor's to the King's house were full of men with swords, spears, shields, for such were the King's orders. We entered the courtyard of the palace mounted on elephants .... There were three hundred foot-soldiers with naked rapiers at their thighs in that hall to guard the King .... Then a chief told us that we could not speak with the King and that if we wished anything we were to tell it to him, so that he could communicate it to a brother of the Governor who was stationed in the small hall, and this man would communicate it by means of a speaking-tube through a hole in the wall to one who was inside with the King. The chief taught us the manner of making three obeisances to the King with our hands clasped above our heads, raising first one foot then the other and then kissing the hand towards him, and we did so that being the method of royal obéis sance. 28 [sicj
Although the current Sultan is twenty-eighth of his
line, Brunei's splendor has never been the same. Deteriora
tion has set in. Sulu grew to power in the North, internal
government decayed. Each traveler following Pigafetta
po R. C. Tregonning, North Borneo (London; Her Maj esty's Stationery Office, I960), pp. 252-253, quoting John Crawford, A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Ad1acent Countries (1856).
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reported worse conditions. Sulu gained Sabah in 1704, as
noted earlier. James Brooke arrived in 1839 and started
gaining territory. He brought stability to Sarawak after
buying it from Brunei's Sultan, but the cession almost ended
the Sultanate itself. Brooke's son, the second Rajah, moved
North and claimed territory bordering on Sabah. The Sultan
was helpless; except for a small seacoast, Sarawak com
pletely surrounded Brunei. Extinction certainly would have
followed had not the British government intervened. In
1888, all three Borneo states were made protectorates,
saving the two small enclaves in Brooke's domain known as 29 Brunei.
Time's progression brought the discovery of oil and
nationalism to Brunei. The oil made the Sultan rich, and he
created one of the most unusual states in the world: a
Welfare Sultanate. Per capita income is the highest in
Southern Asia besides Malaya; education is free to all who
desire it; development plans were laid for gradual growth
into a constitutional monarchy. With the British as an
example and prod, modern institutions of governments have
29 Actually, Charles Brooke did not give up so easily. He steamed up the Limbang River and annexed it, in 1890. Britain kept away outside powers, but refused to rule. In 1902, the end seemed in sight. London's Colonial Secretary recommended the land be partitioned, and the Sultanate be allowed to expire. Only a policy reversal in 1905 and ap pointment of a British Resident saved Brunei.
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been created. The first constitution was promised in 1956,
promulgated from the throne in 1959. Brunei's first elec
tion in history was held in August 1962, after being post
poned the previous year.
Only one political party existed until 1961, the
Party Ra'ayat (People's Party). It registered in 1956 and
no others seriously competed with it. The throne was con
tent until elections neared; then the Sultan realized the
party might oppose his wishes. He mildly favored merger
with Malaysia, Party Ra'ayat did not. Inche (Mr.) A. M.
Azahari, founder and mentor of the party, posed a serious
counterpoise to the Sultan's power. Party Ra'ayat's program
crystalized as election time approached. Two key planks
were (1) opposition to Malaysia, and (2) demand for creation
in 1963 of a three-state Borneo Federation under the Sultan
of Brunei.Dreams of glory past die hard..
The appeal was successful and revolt was soon sparked.
Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifudden tried at the last minute to
form a second party to contest in the election held in
August, 1962. He failed miserably; in one constituency his
supporter received not a single vote. Party Ra'ayat swept
Willard A. Hanna, Malaysia, A Federation in Pros pect, Part XIV, "Brunei - How To Emerge," Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XI, No. 2 (American University's Field Staff, Reports Service), p. 8.
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thirty-two uncontested seats by default, twenty-two by elec
tion. The Sultan was undeterred; he still appointed a
majority of the Council. Besides, traditional Malay respect
for established authority could guarantee him popular sup
port, and even Azahari assiduously proclaimed loyalty.
Nevertheless, Party Ra'ayat was entrenched and consolidated.
At the first Council meeting, they announced, resolutions
would be introduced calling for a three-state Borneo Federa
tion under the Sultan, and also the right for the Council
minority to carry foreign policy matters to the United 31 Nations. Absurd? Perhaps, but the party's next move
after defeat was widely discussed. Brunei's irregular bor
ders, and previous control of all North Borneo, were power
ful issues on the side of Azahari's revolutionary political
organization. Rumors circulated that some of the Sultan's
appointive members might even bolt, and pass the resolution.
The Sultan postponed opening the Legislative Council from
December 5 to December 19.
At two o'clock in the morning, December 8, 1963,
armed attacks occurred in several population centers
throughout Brunei, and several border towns in Sarawak and
Sabah. The attacks were coordinated, well executed, and
generally successful. Approximately thirty-five hundred
^^Ibid., p. 11.
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troops were involved, from a total population in Brunei of
eighty-four thousand. Azahari was in Manila at the time.
From that sanctuary, he announced that the revolution was
intended to set up a Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara
(Northern Borneo), and declared himself Prime Minister of
the new state. "The Sultan is in our hands and supports the
revolution," he announced further. "We have half a battalion
protecting him. If we have to retreat we have arranged a 32 hideout for him." Later he said that the capitals of
Sarawak and Sabah were under siege.
Azahari was wrong. A telephone tip to the palace led
to posting twenty extra men at the gates. They frightened
off the insurgents, whose leaders arrived by taxi and de
manded to see the Sultan. Sultan Saifudden fled to Brunei
Town’s police station. Two hundred attackers failed to storm
the station, whose British commissioner had deployed his own
forces. All two hundred surrendered when challenged. The
Sultan then took to the radio and declared a state of
emergency, banned the Party Ra'ayat and declared the rebels
to be traitors. He also called upon the British to honor
their treaty obligations. The British did so, dispatching
from Singapore several hundred British Commandos and Gurkas.
32 Gordon P. Means, "Malaysia— A New Federation In Southeast Asia," o£. cit., p. 153. No further source given for the quote.
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Several thousand more troops followed. The British lost two
officers and five enlisted men, the revolt collapsed.
Kalimantan Utara never materialized.
Tinder for the revolt abounded. Although all factc
may never be known, irredentism and intrigues abroad played
their part. Considering Brunei's diminutive size and popu
lation, Azahari went far on meager resources. He and his
companions started organizing as early as 1952. Emphasis on
Greater Brunei gained him a following, although the Sultan
himself never endorsed the project. When constitutional
development was too slow and too conservative for Azahari,
revolt was made possible by his established political base,
and the willingness of a few thousand men to die for a re
constituted empire. Moreover, Brunei Malays living in
Sabah and Sarawak joined in the revolt; they formed as much
as a third of the rebel force. Dissolution of the old
Brunei Sultanate did not follow neat ethnic or tribal lines.
Some members of the once-ruling tribe living in the "break
away" territories were susceptible to the call for Kalimantan 33 Utara. (For understandable reasons, former subordinates
0 0 The North Borneo Annual Report of 1962 lists Brunei Malays and Kedayans as a separate group, comprising 17.5 per cent of the population, roughly 80,000 out of a total popu lation of half a million. (Information Office, Jessleton, 1963). Sarawak does not have a separate listing.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104
to the imperial court were not at all sympathetic to the
idea of resubmission to rule by Brunei Malays.) Capricious
ness of territorial expansion left Brunei with border griev
ances, natural irredenta impulses, and lingering memories of
greatness. A skillful politician took advantage of the
situation.
Irredentism alone could not let a spark turn into a
blaze. Azahari looked further. Nationalism was sending
ripples through Britain's other Borneo possessions. In 1949,
two fanatical Malay-nationalist organizations in Sarawak
arranged the murder of Sir Duncan Stewart, the second
colonial governor. They also tried to persuade the Sultan
of Brunei to reclaim Sarawak. Azahari arranged alliances
with their remnants. As fear of domination by resident
Chinese is strong in Sarawak, he promised Malay domination
of united North Borneo, and it was effective.A "non
political" Malay nationalist society, Barison Pemuda, also
became an ally. These three groups could become the nucleus
for revolution.
As mark of his skill, Azahari then gained support of
the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), even though it is
left-wing and led by resident Chinese. To them, he excused
^^For statistics on resident Chinese, see supra, p. 94, footnote No. 20.
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his pro-Malay statements by displaying anti-capitalist sen
timents, and branding Brunei's Chinese as capitalist
businessmen. His efforts bore fruit when these disparate
political groups joined together to form an anti-Malaysia
united front. In North Borneo, he encouraged the founding
of two Malay nationalist organizations modeled after the
Party Ra'ayat. Their registration was pending as the revo
lution broke out, and they were promptly declared illegal.
The web spun finer yet. Contact was established in
Singapore and Malaya. Right and left again joined in sup
port of Azahari, or against Malaysia; it amounted to the
same thing. The Tunku Abdul Rahman's party has little oppo
sition on the mainland. One of the few to gain a seat was
the Pan-Malay Islamic Party (PMIP), which espouses narrow
communal Malay nationalism. The PMIP supported Brunei's in
surgents. So did a left-wing grouping in Malaya, the
Socialist Front. Nine of its leaders were subsequently
arrested, including its president, Akmad Boestamen. Re
portedly, he was to have been named "Prime Minister of 35 Malaya and Singapore" by Azahari in some distant future.
On Singapore, the left-wing opposition parties similarly
gave support. The most important one, the Barisan Socialis,
immediately proclaimed sympathy for the revolt. Many of its
35 Means, jO£. cit., p. 153, footnote 43.
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leaders were soon arrested. Several members of the Singa
pore Party Rakjat were also arrested, for putting up pro-
Azahari posters.
More substantial aid came from the two neighbors
embroiled in the Malaysia dispute. Azahari made frequent
visits to both Manila and Djakarta before the rebellion (and
to Cairo as well). In Manila he soon made close contact
with Nicasio Osmena, legal adviser to the Sultan of Sulu's
heirs, and a man with connections high in government and
business circles. Osmena was an early and powerful moti
vator of the move to reclaim Sabah for the Philippines. He
became legal adviser and spokesman for Azahari also. His
interest in Greater Brunei can only be speculated upon, but
trade rights for his clients would be a good guess. In any
event, the Philippines government allowed Azahari to remain
until after the revolt was well underway. Then he moved on
to Djakarta.
Indonesia's reactions have been discussed. There is
no doubt that President Sukarno gave more than verbal sup
port to the revolt. Defense Minister Nasution openly ad
mitted that Indonesia helped train "more than 6,000 anti-
British, anti-Malaysia rebels in the Northern Borneo 36 Territories." Azahari cut his political teeth by fighting
36 New York Times, September 3, 1963, p. 5.
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in the Indonesian army, against the Dutch. His politics
reflect his background. Relations with Indonesia remained
close; even some of his advisers feel that he favors Brunei's
merger with Indonesia. For months before December 8, 1963,
reports circulated about bands of young men going from all
three British territories into Indonesian Kalimantan.
British troops found that a hard core of the rebels were
well trained in guerrilla warfare, and that these men fought
their way back to Indonesian territory. For reasons of his
own, Sukarno apparently supplied Azahari with a training
camp, military supplies, money, political support, and
sanctuary._
What was the revolt about? An Indonesian newspaper
carried an article during the revolt giving the rationale
and future development of Kalimantan Utara. Signed "A con
tributor" it was possibly written by Azahari himself.
Malaysia was seen as a bloc to Brunei's independence, and
the revolution as the only means of ending colonialism. To
be effective, it had to come before merger into Malaysia.
The goal was a federated Borneo state, with the Sultan as
head of the union. The author saw the federation as remain
ing in the Commonwealth, and even entering into a confedera cy tion with Malaya, Singapore and the Philippines. One
37 Indonesian Herald, December 3, 1962, p. 2.
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study sums up the, situation this way-: "The revolution was
not so much anti-British, anti-Sultan or anti-court clique;
rather it was against anyone opposing Brunei's recovery of 38 Sarawak and North Borneo."
Resolute action by Great Britain prevented Kalimantan
Utara from coniing near fruition. Brunei remains a Protec
torate, Azahari is now in exile. Skillfully fishing in the
diplomatic waters stirred up by the Malaysia dispute, he
went far toward an unlikely goal. Without the Malaysia pro
posal, he could have done little. Recovery of Sarawak and
Sabah has no appeal to anyone but tiny Brunei; yet Malaya,
Singapore, the Philippines, and above all, Indonesia got
drawn to his cause.
Indonesia
All roads lead back to President Sukarno. Militarily,
economically, politically, and ideologically, Indonesia has
opposed Malaysia. Political leaders of all persuasions
within the country support Confrontation. Labor unions and
youth groups offered to send volunteers to Brunei. Military
leaders share PKI charges of neo-colonialism. Two sources
of this opposition have been discussed: anti-Chinese and
anti-colonialist sentiments; both are part of the Subordinate
38 Means, o£. cit., p. 154.
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State System Pattern, It is appropriate at this point to
search for even more parochial motivations. Are there Sub
regional factors shaping Indonesia's foreign policy toward
Malaysia? Three possibilities come to the fore.
1. Territorial gain: Nusantara. Irredentism and
expansionism are two sides of the same coin. Indonesia can
invoke the concept of nusantara, "empire of the islands,"
and lay claim to most of the area between Madagascar and
the Southern Philippines. Pre-European Javanese empires
spread their influence and culture over wide areas. Wher
ever Islamic Malays live, and that includes the Malay
Peninsula to the Kra Isthmus and beyond, can be considered
historically Indonesian. Nusantara evokes a strong emo
tional response for return of the lost peoples to the Mother- 39 land. These "lost peoples" now live under other govern
ments, whose leaders view Indonesian pretensions in less
romantic terms. To them, any such claim to their territory
is expansionism, and their expense.
Indonesia denies having any pretensions. "Indonesia's
top leaders have always emphasized that Indonesia never
claimed areas beyond those that were colonized by the Dutch
O Q Bernard H. M. Vlekka, Nusantara, A History of the East Indian Archipelago (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, Ltd., 1959).
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in the past," points out a Djakarta editorial.Statements
by the leaders themselves bear out the editorials Terri
torial ambitions have been disclaimed at every step, from
Dr. Subandrio’s welcoming speech before the United Nations,
to Nasution*s admission that Brunei's rebels trained in
Kalimantan. Even Portugal does not seem concerned about
losing her half of the island of Timor.
Malaysia is less secure. Subandrio's guarded threat
before the United Nations that North Kalimantan is closer to
Indonesia than Kuala Lumpur has not been forgotten. All the
subsequent hostile actions have reinforced suspicion. Indo
nesia clearly did not want Malaysia to come into being;
territorial gain is a logical reason. Struggle for control
of the Malacca Straits and the archipelago antedates the
European era by centuries. With the withdrawal of outside
powers, the old struggle may have begun anew.
There is clear evidence that the present rulers of
Indonesia do covet far more than the former Dutch East
Indies. President Sukarno himself is on record favoring a
"Greater Indonesia," meaning not only all of Borneo, but
Singapore, Malaya, four provinces in Thailand, and all of
New Guinea. The suggestion was made almost twenty years
ago, in 1945, but the concept is still current. At the very
40 ■ Indonesian Observer, January 28, 1963, p. 2,
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foundation of the Republic of Indonesia, the issue of
boundaries was raised, Sukarno was supported by a majority
of those present in opting for Nusantara.
Japan’s role was crucial, if temporary in the ques
tion of territorial definition. Although Europeans colonized
Southeast Asia, and indigenous people now run the governments
there, it was the Japanese who first routed the outsiders.
Their New Order of Greater East Asia swept aside old colo
nial regimes, and then dissolved in turn. For Indonesia in
particular, Japan seemed a deus ex machina solution. Nip
ponese troops defeated, then humiliated the Dutch. Sukarno,
Hatta, and others were released from detention and allowed
to establish a government. Armed forces and a national ad
ministration developed. Then the war turned against Japan,
and plans were set in motion for full Indonesian Independ- 41 ence.
The Japanese Military Administrator had Sukarno and
his colleagues form a committee to make final preparations.
Membership was announced on the auspicious occasion of the
Emperor's Birthday, April 29, 1945. The war was nearly over.
A special subcommittee was created to define the full extent
Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics Under the Japanese Occupation; 1944-1945 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, Modern Indonesian Project, 1961).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112
of Indonesian territory. Members included Sukarno, Hatta,
and Mohammad Yamin. Yamin later compiled a book on this
time period, which the Malaysian Government has partially 42 translated and circulated. A distinguished professor and
early nationalist, Yamin was influential at the delibera
tions. He felt two principles should be followed in
deciding Indonesia's boundaries. In inverse order, he said
Indonesia should not encroach on any one else's land, not 43 wish "for even the size of a palm of other territories."
Firstly, however, the state should include all the territory
which gave birth to Indonesian peoples, and "without any
enclaves.Japan had united again the areas partitioned
by European Powers; Indonesia should rightfully secede to
them; Yamin held.
President Sukarno heartily concurred. "I am not an
imperialist,"^^ he started out, and pointed to twenty-five
years as a revolutionary. But "at no time during the 25
years that I have been connected with our struggle have I
42 "The Territory of the Indonesian State, Discussion in the Meeting of the Investigating Committee for Preparation of Indonesia's Independence," Background to Indonesia's Policy Toward Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Federal Department of Information, 1964). 43 44 P* 1' Ibid., p. 2. ^^Ibid., these and the following quotes from Sukarno's speech are from pp. 20-22.
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declared that my struggle was confined to the claim to the
former Dutch-held territory." (The Malaysian government
printed this whole address in bold-face type.) On the con
trary, as a youth he dreamed of Pan-Indonesia, including the
Philippines. Respect for the Philippines independence means
that idea must be abandoned, but Malaya, Singapore, Borneo,
and Papua (New Guinea) were in Japanese hands. All had been
Indonesian under the Madjapahit Kingdom, and he knew per
sonally that the peoples there wished to join independent
Indonesia. Moreover, Indonesian security demanded control
of these territories;
. . . I still say, despite the danger of my being accused as an imperialist, that Indonesia will not become strong and secure unless the whole Straits of Malacca is in our hands. If only the west coast of the Straits of Malacca, it will mean a threat to our security. 46 Of the major figures present, only Dr. Hatta demurred.
He raised the question of the practicability of administering
too large a territory, and the political realism of seeking
more area than the Dutch had ruled. He warned that strategy
also depends on "political groupings within the international
sphere," and cautioned against becoming imperialists or fol
lowing "Kultur und Boden" theories which had caused Germany
so many problems. He strongly favored seeking only the areas
4Gibid., pp. 16-18.
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ruled by the Dutch. The matter was brought to a vote, and
the Hatta position was soundly defeated. Two alternative
claims were possible:
1. The former Dutch East Indies.
2. The former Dutch East Indies plus Malaka (Malaya), North Borneo, Papua, Timor, and the adjacent islands.
Nineteen voted for present-day Indonesia, thirty-nine for 47 Nusantara.
The decision was irrelevant even at the time of voting.
The Japanese made territorial decisions. On July 27, 1945,
representatives of the various occupation jurisdictions met
hurriedly in Singapore. The war definitely was going badly
and many issues needed settlement at once. There "it was
finally decided not to include Malaya along with the former 48 Dutch colonial territory in the new Indonesian nation."
Sukarno, Hatta, and others were told of the decision two
weeks later, as well as the projected date of independence.
The issue was closed. However, Dr. Yamin continued to make
public claim to further areas, along with some press and
radio agitation. He also retained a government position
until his recent death, and his ideas were in wide circula
tion. It is notable that only Hatta voluntarily agreed at
^\nderson, 0 £. cit., p. 29.
48ibid., p. 34.
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the outset to restrict Indonesia to the boundaries of the 49 Dutch East Indies.
2. Hegemony. What Indonesia cannot own, it can
dominate. Indonesia's opposition to Malaysia can be seen to
have the extreme possible consequence of "the survival of
Malaysia as a strong, responsible, and independent actor in
Southeast Asian politics.Half of the population of
Southeast Asia is Indonesian, the strongest army in South
east Asia is Indonesian. Indonesia's President sees himself
as leader of the area, and the Indonesian revolution as the
prototype of the new emerging forces. Expansion of Malaya
to North Borneo not only precludes Indonesian acquisition of
that territory, but is an affront to Indonesian leadership.
The Tunku could not be allowed to disregard Indonesia with
out Challenge.
This picture is somewhat overdrawn, but based on life,
In combination with other factors, Indonesian desire for
hegemony undoubtedly does play its part in the dispute.
President Sukarno makes no secret of his wish to be
49 Bernard K. Jordan, "The Potential For Indonesian Expansionism,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4, Winter 1963-1964, p. 384. This article is a useful background for all phases of this discussion of the Subregional imperatives of Indonesia's policy toward Malaysia.
^^Donald E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontation In Southeast Asia," Orbis, Vol. VII (Summer, 1963), p. 348.
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recognized as a leader of great international stature.
Frequent trips abroad, visits from major leaders, a bloated
military budget and exultant oratory support this aim. So
does Confrontation with Malaya. If Malaysia could be
destroyed or intimidated by Indonesia, it would be a step in
the direction of Djakarta's pre-eminence. Natural weight
and geographic position make Indonesia the likely dominant
power in Southeast Asia. Forceful diplomacy enhances that
probability. Prime Minister Rahman had to deal with Presi
dent Sukarno before proceeding with his plans. The
t- Philippines found themselves in league with Indonesian
policy in their first major entry into regional politics.
Hegemony is impeded by Western military presence in
Southeast Asia. The West must leave before the full impact
of Indonesia's position comes into play. Alignment gives
Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines significant
military leverage. If these nations did not have external
ties, Indonesia would already be the most powerful nation in
the region, on paper at least. Therefore, the Western mili
tary presence is a logical source of irritation. The
Singapore base was used to thwart Indonesian interests in
North Borneo, and the Philippines base quite clearly was a
source of support for the anti-government rebels during the
Indonesian civil war in 1958. These bases must go. Indo
nesia has drummed hard on the anti-British theme during the
Vv
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Malaysia dispute, perhaps with an eye to pressuring complete
English withdrawal. The United States base in the Philip
pines is more difficult to attack, because of ^ facto
alliance of Indonesia with Manila, and large-scale monetary
aid to Indonesia from the United States itself. An indirect
approach is called for.
Thus, Maphilindo was possibly part of an anti-West
campaign. To some Western eyes, a contrary view was seen.
President Sukarno left his neutralist position to join with
two Western-oriented nations, and might even be trying to
creep quietly under the United States nuclear umbrella.
However, the opposite view can be held: Maphilindo was a
triumph for Indonesian diplomacy as two Western-oriented 52 nations joined with non-aligned Indonesia. When the Heads
of State met and announced plans for Maphilindo, only one
phrase was added to the report prepared previously by their
respective foreign ministers. Article eleven states:
The three Heads of Government further agreed that foreign bases— temporary in nature— should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three coun tries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the "Bandung Declaration," the three countries , will abstain from the use of arrangements of
^^Robert Trumbell, New York Times, June 12, 1963, p. 1.
^^Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 2, February 1964, p. 689. See also Pomeroy, loc. cit.
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collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the Big P o w e r s . 53
Undoubtedly, this marked a concession to Indonesia by the
other two parties. Neither had spoken openly before of the
"temporary" nature of their allies' bases. Without those
bases, Indonesia could assert clear military superiority.
Article eleven indicates that Indonesia will push and bar
gain to gain that end.
Hegemony cuts two ways. Indonesia not only wishes to
assert dominance over Malaysia; she quite likely fears the
consequences of failing to do so. Paper advantages notwith
standing, there is serious reason for President Sukarno to
view the Prime Minister Rahman as a major counterpoise to
his own position. Indonesia outnumbers Malaysia ten to one
in both population and military capability, and is four
times larger in territory. Malaysia has a stable democratic
government, booming economy, and able leadership. In an
area where these three elements are often lacking, they are
precious resources. Malaysia is equipped to compete with
Indonesia.
Competition takes more than one form. Economically,
Malaysia already leads Indonesia in two vital areas. Rubber
is the major export commodity for both countries, and
53 "Tripartite Summit Meeting - Joint Statement," op. cit., p. 50.
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Malaysia dispute, perhaps with an eye to pressuring complete
English withdrawal. The United States base in the Philip
pines is more difficult to attack, because of ^ facto
alliance of Indonesia with Manila, and large-scale monetary
aid to Indonesia from the United States itself. An indirect
approach is called for.
Thus, Maphilindo was possibly part of an anti-West
campaign. To some Western eyes, a contrary view was seen.
President Sukarno left his neutralist position to join with
two Western-oriented nations, and might even be trying to
creep quietly under the United States nuclear umbrella.
However, the opposite view can be held: Maphilindo was a
triumph for Indonesian diplomacy as two Western-oriented 52 nations joined with non-aligned Indonesia. When the Heads
of State met and announced plans for Maphilindo, only one
phrase was added to the report prepared previously by their
respective foreign ministers. Article eleven states:
The three Heads of Government further agreed that foreign bases— temporary in nature— should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three coun tries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the "Bandung Declaration," the three countries , will abstain from the use of arrangements of
^^Robert Trumbell, New York Times, June 12, 1963, p. 1.
^^Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 2, February 1964, p. 689. See also Pomeroy, loc. cit.
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collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the Big P o w e r s . 53
Undoubtedly, this marked a concession to Indonesia by the
other two parties. Neither had spoken openly before of the
"temporary" nature of their allies' bases. Without those
bases, Indonesia could assert clear military superiority.
Article eleven indicates that Indonesia will push and bar
gain to gain that end.
Hegemony cuts two ways. Indonesia not only wishes to
assert dominance over Malaysia; she quite likely fears the
consequences of failing to do so. Paper advantages notwith
standing, there is serious reason for President Sukarno to
view the Prime Minister Rahman as a major counterpoise to
his own position. Indonesia outnumbers Malaysia ten to one
in both population and military capability, and is four
times larger in territory. Malaysia has a stable democratic
government, booming economy, and able leadership. In an
area where these three elements are often lacking, they are
precious resources. Malaysia is equipped to compete with
Indonesia.
Competition takes more than one form. Economically,
Malaysia already leads Indonesia in two vital areas. Rubber
is the major export commodity for both countries, and
53 "Tripartite Summit Meeting - Joint Statement," op. cit., p. 50.
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Malaysia has captured the larger share of the international
market. Per capita income is also higher, and shows signs
of increasing its lead. The Malaysian economy is expanding
and diversifying, while Indonesia's economy seems near the
point of collapse. Politically, the threat to Indonesia may
be even more significant. Both ancient and recent history
shows evidence of tension between mainland and insular
powers, and between the islands of Sumatra and Java. Indo
nesia is beset with extensive domestic instability and
strong centrifugal forces. If the situation worsens, and
Malaysia succeeds, the Kuala Lumpur magnet might prove irre
sistible.
There have already been signs of Sumatran disaffec
tion and Malaya's pulling power. Dissatisfaction with
Djakarta's rule led to Indonesian civil war in 1958. Strong
regionalist sentiment resulted in army-led councils in many
of the outer islands and the creation of an insurgent govern
ment, the Federal Republic of Indonesia. A number of once-
prominent Sumatran political leaders joined the rebels. The
main army remained loyal and put down the rebellion. Mean
while, many political refugees appeared in Malaya, and some
minor Malayan politicians called openly for merger with
Sumatra. Indonesia asked to sign an extradition treaty with
Malaya. The treaty was refused on the grounds that political
persons were to be included, contrary to common practice in
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international law, Malaya officially maintained a policy of
non-involvement and non-interference throughout the rebel
lion.
Both involvement and interference are possible in the
future. Sumutra remains disaffected. Political parties such
as the Masjumi, which received support there, have been banned.
The PKI remains legal, potent, and almost entirely Javanese.
In some post-Sukarno power struggles, the PKI may well come
to power in parts of Java. The military, led by Sumatran-
born Nasution, could not tolerate a Communist government,
and civil war might break out again. Nearby Malaysia,
staunchly anti-Communist, Muslim, and Malay, could scarcely
remain unaffected. Continued economic and political chaos
in Indonesia makes Malaysia look inviting even without this
eventuality. Indonesian leaders must be aware of this
reality.
In any event, Indonesia continues to follow a forward
policy. The army not only is the largest in the region, but
the air force and navy are developing rapidly. For reasons
of its own, the Soviet Union has supplied Indonesia with a
quantity of modern weapons. The Indonesian economy has had
to bear the burden of surface-to-surface missiles, five
thousand mile range jet bombers, supersonic fighters, and an
expanding surface and submarine navy. In addition, the
standing army was never reduced after being inflated to
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three hundred fifty thousand men for the West Irian dispute.
President Sukarno has the might and will to interject Indo
nesia into regional disputes, and has done so. Hegemony in
Southeast Asia seems a clear objective, a factor in Con
frontation with Malaysia,
3. Irian Baru. Indonesia is a new nation, strug
gling to create bonds of national cohesion. Strong regional
and traditional loyalties persist within its sprawling ter
ritory. Moreover, severe domestic problems pose difficulties
for the government. Inflation is soaring, there are food
shortages, and widespread dissatisfaction exists due to cor
ruption and ineptitude in the administration. The time-
honored solution to internal problems is to export them.
One way to forge national unity is through intense nation
alism. Confrontation can thus be seen as an exercise in
diversion and unity building.
Immediate and long-range Indonesian history lends
weight to this thesis. Malaysia emerged into national
prominence just as the West Irian issue subsided. The
coincidence in timing is significant. The dispute with
Holland over control of West New Guinea— Irian Barat— had
dragged on for thirteen years. By mid-1962. President
Sukarno had stepped up the tempo to near fever pitch. No
other single issue more dominated national attention.
Defense preparations accounted for 70 per cent of the
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nation budget. Routine business activity halted as men
drilled and trained for volunteer duty. The economy was
upset in favor of the "war effort" and economic planning
became irrelevant. Control of Irian Barat was made a
national obsession, far more a national goal than would seem
warranted by objective political or economic gains.
With tension screwed to the sticking point, Indonesia
attained her goal. Infiltrators and "volunteer" para
troopers already were conducting guerrilla operations when
the United States and the United Nations intervened. The
Dutch were enabled to withdraw and save face, and Indonesia
to gain West Irian. Formal agreement was signed August 15,
1962. Transfer of administration was to take place May 1,
1963. Confrontation succeeded, leaving behind a serious
question. "After Irian Barat, what next? Another crusade,
grievance, distraction? Eastern New Guinea? North Borneo?
Or even the more difficult and perhaps even more frustrating 54 labor of self-appraisal and national construction."
The question is well posed and pertinent. If Irian
Barat signaled the end of radical nationalism and return to
internal development, the peace of Southeast Asia would not
be disturbed by Indonesia. If not, then Indonesia's
Willard Hanna, "The Irian Barat Settlement," Southeast Asia Series, Vol. X, No. 18 (New York: American Universities Field Staff, October 15, 1962), p. 8.
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neighbors could anticipate trouble again in the near future.
Perhaps Indonesia had purged itself, or perhaps only a
suitable new target was lacking. First indications were in
the direction of internal reconstruction. President Sukarno
announced a new Confrontation— within the Indonesian Revolu
tion, "within ourselves, a confrontation with._the problems
of development, with the question whether we can build
socialism.Plans were made for the development of Irian
Barat also, and on a scale that showed signs of a new style
domestic crusade.
The older-type crusade and confrontation proved more
popular. As headlines on West Irian faded, headlines about
Malaysia took their place. Familiar signs of the West Irian
Confrontation reappeared: well-organized riots, military
speeches, patriotic slogans. Irian Barat had not been
formally transferred to Indonesia when the government offi
cially declared Confrontation against Malaysia. In the same
speech on economics just noted. President Sukarno added that
no matter what happened in North Kalimantan, two things had
been established:
First, Indonesia is no longer treated like a dummy "togog" [one of the clowns in Indonesian "wayang"
55 Embassy of Indonesia, "Indonesia Now Faces Problems of Development, President States, August 17," Press Release (Washington, D. C., August 21, 1963).
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puppet shows], allowed just to view changes in the status quo, especially when such changes concern its safety, and second, Indonesia is recognized as having the right and responsibility to guard security and peace in the region with its neighbors. The Philip pines and M a l a y a . 56
The projected new federation had become an "Irian Baru"— a
New Irian.
If true, then the decision supports the well-documented
conclusion that Indonesia's leadership today prefers unity 58 building projects over national construction. During the
early years of the Republic, serious attempts were made to
follow rational economic plans and to construct a parlia
mentary democracy. Before 1953, problem solvers, such as
Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, were in the ascendancy. Along
with Hatta, they believed:
. . . a revolution should not last too long, not more than a few weeks or a few months. It then should be checked; the time will then have arrived for a consolidation which will realize the results produced by the Revolution. What is left unfinished is not the revolution itself, but the efforts to carry its ideals
Willard Hanna, "Malaysia, A Federation Prospect Part XV: Brunei, How To Merge," Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XI, No. 3 (New York: American Universities Field Staff, January 10, 1963), p. 6. Hanna answers here the question he posed in October, 1962.
^ ?ibid.
^^See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University Press, 1962), particularly pp. 556-608.
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into effect over a period of time after the founda tions have been laid.59
Hatta once again lost out, along with his ideals. After the
watershed years of 1956-1957, those interested in solving
administrative and economic problems lost power to leaders
concerned with preserving national unity. Concern for
legality, maximum production and fiscal stability were down
graded. Emphasis switched to mystique, nationalism and the
romance of the Revolution.
President Sukarno led the shift in goals. Political
unrest baffled control-oriented leaders such as the Wilopo
cabinet in 1953. Long electioneering split the leadership
consensus maintained through the pre-independence.era.
Manipulation of the unrest replaced solving its causes, and
President Sukarno stepped in to prevent total disintergra-
tion. Nationalism is his chosen tool. Symbols and gestures
are more important than effectiveness of economic and politi
cal performance; they increase the legitimacy of the govern
ment. Unfortunately, further unrest results. Hence, the
legitimacy of the government is again called into question,
and even more nationalism is required.
Mohammad Hatta, Past and Future (Ithaca, New York; Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Translation Series, Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 15 in Feith, ibid., p. 608.
^^Herbert Feith, "Indonesia's Political Symbols and Their Wielders," World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (October 1963), pp. 79-97.
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The vicious circle thus created augers ill for Indo
nesia's neighbors. "The activities of the Revolution go
on . . . 'For a fighting nation there is no end'," President
Sukarno has declared. _
I am one of the people who is in love with the Romanticism of Revolution. I am inspired by it, I am fascinated by it . . . the Logic of Revolution is that, having once sparked off the revolution we must go through with it until all of its ideals have been realized .... There are people who ask "Do we have to keep stirring up the spirit of Revolution? .... Can't we work a bit more patiently, slowly, but surely?" Heavens! Slowly but surely is impossible. Impossible unless we want to be crushed by the People .... The People's Awareness demands that every unjust situation or relationship be torn down and changed . . . changed fast and in a revolutionary way. If it is not the new Awareness will produce an explosion . . . the world of today is a tinderbox of Revolution.61
Sports stadia, distinguished visitors, new medals, a giant
hotel help pacify the Peoples Awareness. So did Irian
Barat; and if this analysis is correct, so did Confrontation
with Malaysia.
Territorial gain, hegemony, and nation-building
politics are not mutually exclusive categories. In combina
tion, it seems that the Subregional Pattern provided the
most motivation for Indonesian policy toward Malaysia. Sub
ordinate System characteristics are found also: anti
colonialism offered manner of expression, anti-Chinese fears
"The Course of the State in Politics and Upbuilding; Djakarta Department Penerangan, 1961," pp. 98-99 in Feith, op. cit., p. 607.
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a possible future bond with present antagonists. Indonesia
expressed willingness to join a regional grouping for the
first time. Significantly, the Dominant System Pattern
apparently played no appreciable role.
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CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
In light of the Malaysia dispute, what now can be
said of international relations in Southern Asia? Questions
such as who is to "blame" for the difficulties, and how
problems could have been avoided are not at issue. They
would be in order if the dispute itself were the prime ob
ject of this inquiry. Perhaps some answers to traditional
questions have been indicated during the course of the
discussion. But it is not enough to show why Azahari re
volted or the Indonesian's objected. What is important is
to see if the dispute had any deeper implications, and if
the approach outlined in Section One revealed them.
To recapitulate, it has been suggested that inter
national relations theory has undergone great development,
but overlooked the non-West. Moreover, preoccupation with
Super Power relations produced inadequate theoretical con
structions which could not account for the more than one
level of international politics, nor account for phenomena
not found in current relations between the bloc powers. At
the same time, geographical area studies also developed
greatly, but lacked any underlying conceptual approach to
give it perspective. To attempt partially to remedy these
defects, Michael Brecher's suggestions for a tri-level
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framework’ with a non-Western emphasis has been adapted, and
applied to a particular problem. The resulting model is
frankly experimental and admittedly only a beginning. It
does seem to yield suggestive conclusions.
If the analytic device utilized has any validity, the
Malaysia dispute marks a significant point in the develop
ment of international relations in Southern Asia. Maintain
ing the terminology used throughout the study, it can be
said in conclusion that the dispute is a mixture of old and
new political patterns. The familiar Dominant System Pattern
was present. Cold war factors, the interplay of power poli
tics between the two bloc actors, are involved in the dis
pute, centering around the Singapore military base and Tunku
Rahman's pro-Western orientation. However, Subordinate
State System factors,nearly as,familiar, play a greater role.
The prominent place given volubly to anti-colonialism, and
quietly to anti-Chinese reactions, is rationale enough to
warrant a multi-level theoretical approach. Dominant System
factors alone could not explain the dispute adequately.
Third level politics play the greatest role of all.
Motivation for the Philippine involvement stems primarily,
and consciously, from Subregional factors. The government
seems to have almost deliberately sought out a local issue
in which to get involved. The Malaysia dispute is thus the
re-entry point of the Philippines to Southeast Asia, a
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dramatic departure in foreign policy. Indonesia's mixed
motives similarly show Subregional origin. Irredentism,
hegemonical interests, and demonstrative nation-building
politics blend together to illustrate clearly that Indonesia
will not stay aloof or uninterested in what occurs in her
immediate vicinity. Malaysia, of course, finds its foreign
intercourse deals, of necessity, with Subregional matters.
A matrix of political interaction has formed, shaping the
foreign policies of its participants.
If so, then something new has appeared under the sun
of the South China Sea. For the first time since the crea
tion of nation-states. Southeast Asia has become truly a
region. Predominance of the Subordinate and Subregional
Patterns means the issue is Southeast Asian; Southeast Asia
qua system has molded the development of international
relations. This has not been true since the isolation of
units caused by European colonization. Major policy deci
sions affecting international relations in Southeast Asia
were made in London, Paris, Lisbon, Madrid, and the Hague,
and more recently in Washington, Moscow, and Peking. The
Dominant System of eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth
century politics determined the bulk of the areas' inter
national relations. An Englishman, Lord Mountbatten, created
the term Southeast Asia as a wartime and geographic con
venience in 1942. The Malaysia dispute has given substance
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to the title by re-initiating regional politics. Geographic
proximity has been joined by interacting political activity
to create it least the beginnings of a Subregional System.
What does this mean for the theorist? Advent of a
new system makes revision of contemporary models more
definitely imperative. International relations cannot be
sufficiently explained by former models. Bloc-power con
flict barely entered the Malaysia dispute. Vigorous politi
cal activity is occurring which must be taken into account.
Quite clearly, a multi-level construction is indicated. As
the blocs themselves become increasingly unstable, they will
be correspondingly less able to set the tone for world
politics. Smaller systems of interaction are appearing and
will probably continue to do so. One of these is peninsular
and insular Southeast Asia.
What does this mean for the area specialist? Speak
ing in specific terms, several things can be said. The
Philippines can be expected t-O continue seeking political
and economic ties in Southeast Asia. Their new interest
will continue to be put in policy form. Indonesia should be
watched with considerable care to see which way her atti
tudes will be next expressed. Malaysia will likely seek to
re-establish normal relations with the Philippines and
Indonesia, and be receptive to regional economic arrange
ments. Indeed, further activity towards regional
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organizations can be anticipated. Peripheral powers, such
as Japan and Australia, can be expected to seek increased
contact within the region. Australia in particular was
impressed by the evidence of new political growth to its
North. It is as if a physical barrier had been crossed.
Southeast Asia has become a political as well as geographi
cal entity. Long-severed connections are receiving new
sustenance.
Speaking in general terms, it can be said that
Southeast Asia has come of age. The post-colonial period is
passing in Asia, as the post-war period is passing in the
West. The Malaysia dispute, unless it is a false harbinger,
marks a new stage of development in the international rela
tions of Southern Asia. The concept of nationhood has taken
hold, and the consequences- of nationhood are beginning to
flow. A Southeast Asian leader has phrased the process well.
President Diosado Macapagal pointed out, after he signed the
Manila Declaration, that the new nations go through three
stages of development. Stage one is the gaining of inde
pendence; stage two is setting up domestic programs; "the
third stage of our development follows logically from the
other two" he said, and continued:
As sovereign nation's conscious of their duties to themselves and to the world, the peoples of Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines . . . have now agreed jointly to assume their rightful share
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of responsibility for the stability and welfare of the region in which they live. In this sense, the , Manila Declaration is a declaration of independence.
The West has left its imprint and withdrawn. If there was a
time lag before full reality set in, the Malaysia dispute .
illustrates the waning of unreality.
To the policy maker, whether theorist or specialist,
there is also a message. If the international politics of
Southern Asia are to be understood, it must be realized that
the nations there have their own perspective, their own
problems, their own imperatives. While "South and Southeast
Asia" may as yet be a more proper designation than "Southern
Asia," from the standpoint of meaningful systems of inter
action, the area is far from a political vacuum any longer.
Emphasis here has been on the emergence of a new interaction
pattern, but it should be remembered that South Asia and
Mainland Southeast Asia already have had their own pattern
for some time. Dominant System myopia must recede. Dominant
System influence becomes increasingly the least important
dynamic to the international relations in the Subordinate
System of Southern Asia.
Rupert Emerson has pointed out:
The nation has been taken as the measure of the /state, in Asia and Africa as in the West. Once that
^Manila Daily Bulletin, August 6, 1963, p. 12.
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premise has been established the goal of policy in evitably becomes the promotion of the national interest, however that uncertain concept may come to be defined.2
Stage Three has been reached, the premise has been estab
lished, Southeast Asia has come of age politically. That is
the conclusion of major import to be gained if the preceding
experiment bore fruit.
Perhaps the two offspring of the international rela
tions discipline, theory and area studies, are incompatible,
and no attempt should be made to put the siblings in a single
harness. Undoubtedly, more could have been said about the
Malaysia dispute itself if the total effort herein had been
devoted to its study. Very likely a traditional analysis
would have followed different organization and have, there
fore, been more complete. One complaint to be made about
combining theory and practice is the increased difficulty of
chronological construction. On the other hand, the feeling
persists that there is value in discussing a particular
problem on the basis of a theoretical construction. It is
possible the construction offered here would not be suitable
for other studies, or is just plain unsuitable. If so, the
effort should not be abandoned, but pursued more competently.
2 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 418. Also see Donald E. Weatherbee, "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confrontation in South east Asia," Orbis, Vol. VII (Summer, 1963), p. 337.
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Theory needs to be honed by subjection to concrete reality;
area studies need tempering by additon of conceptual
methodology. That is the beginning and concluding convic
tion of this experiment.
/ /
/ /
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. PRIMARY SOURCES
_1. Government Publications
British Information Service, The Federation of Malaysia» London: Cox & Sharland, Ltd., 1963,
Embassy of Indonesia, Information Division. "Dr. S;ubandrio's Latest Statement on Observers in Sabah and Se^awak," Press Release, August 29, 1963.
"Indonesian Government Deplores Damage Suffered by British and Malayan Embassies," News Release, September 18, 1963.
"Indonesia Now Faces Problems of Development President States August 17," News Release, August 21, 1963.
"Kuala Lumpur Feels Effects of Indonesian Economic Confrontation," News Release, No. 3, November 8, 1963.
.• Letter to the Editor of the Washington Post, October 3, 1963.
______• Memorandum of the Indonesian Delegation on the Report of the U.N. Malaysian Mission, September 13, 1963.
______. A Survey on the Controversial Problem of the Establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, n.d.
Malaysia, Department of Information. Background to Indo nesia's Policy Towards Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, 1964.
Malaya/Indonesia Relations 31 August 1957 to 15 September 1963. Kuala Lumper, 1964.
Malaya/Philippine Relations, 31 August 1957 to 15 September 1963. Kuala Lumper, 1964.
Embassy of Malaysia, Information Service. News Bulletin, No. NB 2, December 1, 1963.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 139
Press Release No. M 113, January 17, 1964, White Paper on Indonesia/Malaya and Philippine/Malaya Relations up to Malaysia Day, September 16, 1963.
Embassy of the Philippines, Division of Cultural Affairs, Larawan, Series VII, Nos. 10, 11, and 12; Series VIII, Nos. 3, 7, and 10; Series IX, Nos. 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, and 12. ______, "Philippine Embassy Replies to Monitor Article, ’ ‘Malaysia Beset,' March 2d," Press Release, March 4, 1963.
______, "Malaya and Indonesia Accept Philippines' Proposal for Confederation of Malay States," Press Release, June 13, 1963.
Lopez, Salvador P. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of the Philippines, Division of Cultural Affairs, "Philip pine Policy Statement," Larawan, October 10, 1953.
B. SECONDARY SOURCES
_1, Books
Bone, Robert C., Jr. Contemporary Southeast Asia. New York: Random House, 1962.
Brecher, Michael. The New States of Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
Butwell, Richard. Southeast Asia Today and Tomorrow. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
Cady, John F. Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1964.
Feith, Herbert. Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca, New York: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University Press.
Fifield, Russell H. Southeast Asia in United States Policy. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 196'3.
The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958,
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Harrison, Brian. South-East Asia. London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954.
Henderson, William. Southeast Asia: Problems of U.^. Policy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1963.
Jordan, Amos A. Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
Kahin, George McTubnan. Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1959.
London, Kurt. New Nations In A Divided World. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 196?.
Martin, L. W. (ed.). Neutralism and Nonalignment. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.
McKie, R. C. H. The Emergence of Malaysia. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1963.
Robequain, Charles. Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1961.
Rose, Saul. Politics In Southern Asia. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963.
Royal Institute of International Affairs. Collective Defence in South East Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.
Vlekka, Bernard H. M. Nusantara, A History of the East Indian Archipelago. The Hague: W, van Hoeve, 1959.
Talbot, Phillips (ed,). South Asia in The World Today. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.
Tregonning, K. G. Malaysian Historical Sources. Singapore: Department of History, University of Singapore, 1962.
_2. Periodicals
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish. "The Troubled Birth of Malaysia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 4 (July, 1963), pp. 673- 693.
Dale, Martin. "Malaya (Defense Expense to Increase," Far Eastern Economic Review (February 28, 1963), p. 432.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 141 Fisher, Charles A. "The Malaysian Federation, Indonesia, and the Philippines; A Study in Political Geography," The Geographical Journal, Vol. 129, Part 3 (September T9^3), pp. 311-328.
Gordon, Bernard K. "The Potential for Indonesian Expan sionism," Public Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter, 1963-1964), pp. 378-393.
Hanna, Willard A, "Malaysia, A Federation in Prospect." New York, American University's Field Staff Reports Service, 1963, 13 pp.; Southeast Asia Services, Vol. XI, No. 2 (Brunei, Malaya, North Bornpo, Sarawak, Singapore), February 1963.
"Malaysia, A Federation in Prospect." New York, American Universities Field Staff, Reports Service, 1963, 9 pp.; Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Brunei, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore), March, 1953.
"Malaysia, A Federation in Prospect." New York, American Universities Field Staff, Reports Service, 1963, 5 pp.; Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XI, No. 5 (Brunei, Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak, Singapore), May 1963.
"The Irian Borat Settlement," New York, American Universities Field Staff, Reports Service, 1963, 10 pp.; Southeast Asia Series, Vol. X, No. 18 (Indonesia).
Hindiey, Donald. "Foreign Aid to Indonesia and Its Political Implications," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), pp. 107-119.
"Imperial Defence, Communist Challenge and the Grand Design," India Quarterly (April/June, 1962), pp. 134-153.
'.'Interview with Diosdado Macapagal," Far Eastern Economics Review (July 25, 1963), pp. 216-217.
"Interview with Lee Kuan Yew," Far Eastern Economics Review (June 7, 1962), pp. 506-507.
Johari, Mr. "Malaysia: A 24 Page Survey," Far Eastern Economics Review (November 8, 1962), p. 319.
Kroef, Justus M. van der. "Indonesia, Malaya, and the North Borneo Crisis," Asian Survey, Vol. Ill, No. 4 (April, 1963), pp. 173-181. Lev, Daniel S. "The Political Role of the Array in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs. Vol. XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter, 1963-1964), pp. 349-364.
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"Malaysia, Crucial Phase," Far Eastern Economics Review (July 19, 1962), p. 117.
"Malaysia (The London Pact), Far Eastern Economics Review (July 25, 1963), pp. 206-208.
"Malaysian Attitudes," Far Eastern Economics Review (April 18, 1963), pp. 162-164.
Means, Gordon P. "Malaysia— A New Federation in Southeast Asia, Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 (Summer 1963), p. 138.
Milne, R. S. "Malaysia," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 2 (February, 1964), pp. 695-701.
Pauker, Guy J. "Indonesia in 1963: The Year of Wasted Opportunities," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 2 (February, 1964), pp. 687-694.
Pomeroy, W. J. "Reorientation for the Philippines, Eastern World, Vol. XVIII, No. 3 (London, March, 1964), p. 7.
Purcell, Victor, "A Greater Malaysia," Race, Vol. IV, No. 1 (November, 1962), pp. 49-62.
Ronquillo, D. "The Borneo Claim," Far Eastern Economics Review (May 23, 1963), pp. 418-420.
Smith, T. E. "Progress Toward Malaysia and The Brunei Revolt," The World Today, January 1963, p. 6.
_. "Proposals For Malaysia," World Today (May, 1962), pp. 192-200.
e "The Brunei Revolt: Background and Consequences," The World Today (April, 1963), p. 135.
Soon, Alice Tay Ehr. "The Chinese in South-East Asia," Race, — - Vol. IV, No. 1 (November, 1962), pp. 34-48.
Starner, Frances L. "Macapagal and Borneo," Far Eastern Economics Review (April 11, 1963), pp. 6^71.
Taylor, Carl. "Indonesian Views of Chian," Asian Survey, Vol. Ill, No. 3 (March, 1963), pp. 165-172.
"The Economic Basis for Malaysia," Asian Revue (April, 1962), pp. 132-135.
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"The Economics of Malaysia," Far Eastern Economic Revue (February 22, 1962), pp. 400-402.
Tilman, Robert 0, "Malaysia: The Problems of Federation," The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (December, 1963), pp. 897-911.
Tregonning, N. "Malaysian Prospects," Far Eastern Economics Review (November 29, 1962), pp. 78-79.
Weatherbee, Donald E. "Indonesia and Malaysia: Confronta tion in Southeast Asia," Orbis: A Quarterly Journal of World Affairs, Vol. VII, No. 2 (Summer, 1963), pp. 335-351.
Werfel, David. "A Changing Philippines," Asian Survey, Vol. IV. No. 2 (February, 1964), pp. 702-710.
Williams, Lea E. "Sino Indonesian Diplomacy: A Study of Revolutionary International Politics," The China Quarterly (July-September, 1962), No. 11, pp. 184-199.
Wolfstone, Daniel. "Carefree Like Children," Far Eastern Economic Review (January 17, 1963), p. 105.
"The Malays Move In," Far Eastern Economics Review (October 24, 1963) , pp. 187-195.
_3. Newspapers
Indonesian Herald. June, 1963-July, 1964.
Manila Daily Bulletin. June, 1963-July, 1964.
Philippines Free Press. July, 1963-rJuly, 1964,
The Indonesian Observer. July, 1963-July, 1964.
The Malayan Times. June, 1963-July, 1964.
The New York Times. June, 1963-August, 1964.
The Straits Times [SingaporeJ. June, 1963-July-1964.
The Washington Post. June, 1963-July, 1964.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.