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Research Study *. APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE:.( mY 2007 I, Research Study liWOlVEXZ4-1965 neCoup That Batkfired December 1968- i i ! This publication is prepared for tbe w of US. Cavernmeat officials. The formaf coverage urd contents of tbe puti+tim are designed to meet the specific requirements of those u~n.US. Covernment offids may obtain additional copies of this document directly or through liaison hl from the Cend InteIIigencx Agency. Non-US. Government usem myobtain this dong with rimikr CIA publications on a subscription bask by addressing inquiries to: Document Expediting (DOCEX) bject Exchange and Gift Division Library of Con- Washington, D.C ZOSaO Non-US. Gowrrrmmt users not interested in the DOCEX Project subscription service may purchase xeproductio~~of rpecific publications on nn individual hasis from: Photoduplication Servia Libmy of Congress W~hington,D.C. 20540 f ? INDONESIA - 1965 The Coup That Backfired December 1968 BURY& LAOS TMAILANO CAYBODIA SOUTU VICINAY PHILIPPIIEL b. .- .r4.n MALAYSIA INDONESIA . .. .. 4. , 1. AUSTRALIA JAVA Foreword What is commonly referred to as the Indonesian coup is more properly called "The 30 September Movement," the name the conspirators themselves gave their movement. In this paper, the term "Indonesian coup" is used inter- changeably with "The 30 September Movement ," mainly for the sake of variety. It is technically correct to refer to the events in lndonesia as a "coup" in the literal sense of the word, meaning "a sudden, forceful stroke in politics." To the extent that the word has been accepted in common usage to mean "the sudden and forcible overthrow - of the government ," however, it may be misleading. For it now seems clear that the Indonesian coup was not a move to overthrow Sukarno andior the established government of Indonesia. Essentially, it was a purge of the Army lead- ership, which was intended to bring about certain c,banges in the composition.of the cabinet. In this sense, it is more correct to refer to the 30 September Movement as a purge, rather than a coup. A word should also be said about the organization of the paper. It is divided into four main sections. The first one treats the actual events of the coup ow1 October; the second one traces the movements of the key figures in the coup up to the time of their capture or, i:: the case of Sukarno, up to March 1966, when he lost --de -facto control of the government to Gen. Suharto, who assumed full responsibility for restoring law and order; the third one discusses the planning for the coup that VDS done in the one month of September 1965; and the last one, perhaps the most important one, reviews the events leading up to the coup, including the decision to stage the coup. This organization was chosen for several reasons. First of all, there was the consideration of the evidence itself. For the most part, the matters that are discussed in the first two sections are matters of established fact; . in.other words, they are part of the record against which ._we must examine rhe words and testimony of the various -individuals who were involved in the coup. Our knowledge of the conspiracy behind the events, which is the subject of the third section of the paper, comes entirely from .the interrogation of the people involved in the conspiracy. Naturally, this kind of evidence must be considered in a slightly different light than the evidence that is pre- sented in the first two sections. The reader is in a better position to make his own judgment, based on the evidence, if he has a clear understanding of the kind of evidence that is involved. The matters that are discussed in the fovrth section are much more matters of judgment. The coup can only be understood, of course, against the background of Indonesian politics in 1965. Many of the events that form that back- ground 'are open to varying interpretation, however. Again, the reader is in a better position to evaluate those events if he can view them from the vantage point of hindsight, as it were, with the events of the coup clearly drawn in his mind. The one difficulty with the arrangement of the paper, with the events of the coup at the beginning, is the possibility of its creating the false impression that the coup was a distinct occurrence, which can be treated apart from the rest of the Indonesian political scene. , Of course, it can not. It should be viewed as the culmina- tion of many events over the-years. There has been a deliberate effort in telling the story of the coup to present the evidence in as straight- forward a manner as possible, to let the facts speak for themselves. The purpose of this has been to allow the reader to make his own conclusions as he goes along. A final section at the end of the paper summarizes the con- clusions of the author. All the events that are discussed in the paper, including the events of the coup itself and the major events leading up to the coup, are presented in chrono- logical order in the Chronology of Events. Also included in the Appendix is a brief'discussion of the validity of the Army interrogation reports as evidence. INDONESIA .1965 The Coup that Backfired Con tents Page Preface The Coup ............................................ 1 The Kidnapping of the Generals .................... 1 Suharto Takes Command of the Army ..................7 The Show of Force in Djakarta .................... 10 The Central Command in Djakarta .................. 11 Sukarno Hears the News ........................... 16 The Murder of the Generals ...................... !18 The Coup is Proclaimed ........................... 21 The Central Command Moves to Halim ............... 22 The New Order is Announced ....................... 25 President Sukarno at Halim ....................... 30 Dani Seals His Fate ............................... 41 Suharto: The Making of a Hero ................... 4% The Collapse of the Coup ......................... 53 ................. Reflections of the Coup Throughout Indonesia .....60 The Coup de Grace for the PKI ...................... 66 The Postlude ....................................... 70 The Central Command in Hiding .................... 71 Aidit's Last Days ................................ 77 Dani Under Sukarno's Protection ..................84 Sukarno is a Losing Cause ........................ 87 The Conspiracy ..................................... 97 The Role of the PKI Special Bureau ..............100 PKI Recruitment of the Military Officers ........107 ... .. Page The Planning of the Coup ......................... 110 The First Meeting: The Participants Meet ......112 The Second Meeting: Sjam Takes Charge .........117 The Third Meeting: The Question of Troops 'and the Role of Sukarno...................... 120 The Fourth Meeting: The Question of the Generals and the Choice of a Leader ..........122 The Fifth Meeting: The Question of Arms and an Important Newcomer to the Group ........... 130 The Sixth Meeting. The Training of the Volunteers and a Promise from the Cavalry.... 136 The Seventh hleeting: The Decision on D Day ... -143 The Eighth Meeting: The Order to Go ........... 152 The Last-Minute PKI Preparations ................. 157 The Last-Minute Military Preparations ............ 161 The Prelude ....................................... L 169 PKI Domestic Policy .............................. 169 The PKI's Armed Capability ....................... 173 The PKI's Covert Apparatus....................... 175 PKI Policy Toward Sukarno........................ 182 Background to a Coup . September 1964 - March 1965..................................... 186 The Gilchrist Letter., ........................... f13 .... The Generals' Council ............................ 198 The PKl's 45th Anniversary ....................... 209 Aidit's Last Trip Abroad ......................... 211 In htoscow ...................................... 213 In Peking ...................................... 216 Sukarno's Illness................................ 220 An Urgent Summons to Aidit ....................... 223 The PKI in a State of Panic ...................... 225 Decision in the Politburo ........................ 227 Sukarno Recovered ...and with Aidit ............... 235 Sukarno Against the Generals' Council ............ 237 The hlonth of September- A Flurry of Speeches.... 240 The Evidence Against Sukarno..................... 250 . Conclusions ...................................... 2 66 Appendix I: Chronology of Events ............... 290 11: Some Comments on the Interrogation Reports ........................... 311 i ! .- Preface On 14 September 1965 Indonesian Army Intelligence, of which General Parman was the chief, presented a detailed report on the internal security situation to the Army Chief of Staff, General Yani. The report summarized all informa- tion known about the activities of the Indonesian Communist Party(PK1)as of that date. In particular, it mentioned a report of a plan to assassinate the army's top leadership, giving a list of the Army generals who were to be killed. In conclusion, it stated the Army Intelligence judgment that "something was going to happen." At first, General Parman had been reluctant to accept the judgment of his staff. He was more conserva- tive on the question; in the end, however, he agreed to take the case to General Yani. Yani, in turn, DreSented the report to President Sukarno, laying Darticular stress on the "assassination list ,'I which included the names of three generals--Suharto , Mursjid, and Sukenu: o---in addition to the seven generals who were laxer tu be i18e target
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