The Indonesian Coin Strategy: Failures and Alternative Approaches in Overcoming the Papuan Insurgency
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View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2015-12 The Indonesian coin strategy: failures and alternative approaches in overcoming the Papuan insurgency Afriandi, Djon Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/47944 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGY: FAILURES AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN OVERCOMING THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY by Djon Afriandi December 2015 Thesis Advisor: Douglas Borer Second Reader: George Lober Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2015 Master’s thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGY: FAILURES AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN OVERCOMING THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY 6. AUTHOR(S) Djon Afriandi 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis examines some failures of the current Indonesian counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the Indonesian government’s efforts to eliminate the separatist insurgency in Papua. In doing so, this thesis uses the McCormick “Diamond” COIN model to measure and determine the mistakes of the Indonesian approaches from 1965 to 2014. This thesis finds that the Indonesian COIN strategy has no balancing concept in applying its approaches toward the conflict. This thesis proposes alternative options for the Indonesian COIN strategy to completely destroy the insurgents in Papua in the future. In exploring the alternative methods, this thesis also practices the theory of the “Diamond” COIN model as a framework that leads to the conclusion that the Indonesian government must keep using limited coercive and smart political actions in dealing with the Papuan insurgency. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF insurgency, counterinsurgency, and strategy PAGES 109 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE OF ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE INDONESIAN COIN STRATEGY: FAILURES AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES IN OVERCOMING THE PAPUAN INSURGENCY Djon Afriandi Lieutenant Colonel, Indonesian Army Indonesian Military Academy, 1995 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2015 Approved by: Douglas Borer Thesis Advisor George Lober Second Reader John Arquilla Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT This thesis examines some failures of the current Indonesian counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in the Indonesian government’s efforts to eliminate the separatist insurgency in Papua. In doing so, this thesis uses the McCormick “Diamond” COIN model to measure and determine the mistakes of the Indonesian approaches from 1965 to 2014. This thesis finds that the Indonesian COIN strategy has no balancing concept in applying its approaches toward the conflict. This thesis proposes alternative options for the Indonesian COIN strategy to completely destroy the insurgents in Papua in the future. In exploring the alternative methods, this thesis also practices the theory of the “Diamond” COIN model as a framework that leads to the conclusion that the Indonesian government must keep using limited coercive and smart political actions in dealing with the Papuan insurgency. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. THESIS BACKGROUND .........................................................................1 B. PURPOSE ...................................................................................................3 C. THE WARNING OF DISINTEGRATION IN PAPUA .........................3 D. USEFUL CONCEPT .................................................................................4 E. RELEVANT CASES .................................................................................5 F. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHODS ..........................................6 G. CONTENT OF THE THESIS ..................................................................7 II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE ..............................9 A. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................9 B. EARLY PAPUA .......................................................................................11 1. Pre-Dutch Colonization ...............................................................11 2. Papua under Dutch Colonization ...............................................14 C. THE INTEGRATION PROCESS ..........................................................16 1. A Long Way to the Agreement ...................................................16 2. The Emergence of The Free Papua Movement Insurgency .....19 3. The Act of Free Choice and Its Controversy .............................21 D. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................22 III. FLAWS IN THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY..........................................................................................................25 A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................25 B. THE “DIAMOND” COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL ..................26 C. FAILING TO FULFILL LOCAL PEOPLE’S NEEDS .......................28 1. Completing Short-Term Goals, but Discounting Long- Term Effects .................................................................................29 2. Deterrence Led to Human Rights Violations ............................34 3. Unsatisfied State Policy ...............................................................36 D. FAILING TO SECURE EXTERNAL SUPPORT ...............................40 1. Underestimation of the Capability of the OPM Insurgency ....................................................................................42 2. Losing International Supports ....................................................47 E. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................51 IV. IMPROVING THE INDONESIAN COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGY..........................................................................................................55 vii A. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................55 B. ANALYSIS ...............................................................................................55 1. The Indonesian Government COIN Strategy............................55 2. Using the Diamond Model Effectively........................................56 C. ENHANCING GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY AND CONTROL OVER PAPUAN PEOPLE AND TERRITORY .............58 1. Continuing the Implementation of the Special Autonomy Policy .............................................................................................58 2. Papuan People as a Priority in a Policy Regarding the PT Freeport Company .......................................................................61 D. DESTROYING THE OPM’S ABILITIES ............................................63 1. Equipped Soldiers and Effective Deployment ...........................63 2. The Law Enforcement .................................................................64 E. SECURING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT .......66 1. Winning the War of Opinions .....................................................66 2. Playing Good Diplomacy in a Dynamic International Political Change ...........................................................................68 F. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................72 LIST