Department of History

UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Blitzkrieg under Fire: Gennan Rearmarnent, Total Economic Mobilization, and the Myth of the "Blitzkneg Strategy", 1933-1942 by Brett Thomas Gore A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTiAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY CALGARY, ALBERTA DECEMBER 2000 O Brett Thomas Gore 2000 National Libaiy Bibliothèque nationale 1+1 of,,, du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliogaphic Services se- bibliographiques 395 WMinStreet 395. rue WeDingîm Ottawa ON K1A ON4 ûUawaON K1AW canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence aiiowing the exclisïve permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distri'bute or seil reproduire, prêter, distri'buer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thése sous paper or electronic formats. la fome de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L' auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be prînted or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. The "Blitzkrieg Strategy" as an historid theory has bedthe debate for the last five decades conceming the nature, extent, and purpose of German rearmament during the 1930s, and the performance of the Thini Reich's rnilitary forces and war economy between 1939 and 1941. It argues that Germany deliilyplanned for a series of short, predatory wars requiring only Limited military and economic mobiluation; conversion to fùil-war production came only after the fim Germaa defeats in late-1941. Documentary evidence and the work of revisionkt historians, however, demonstrates that pre-war rearmament and economic mobhtion in wartime were as extensive as possible given the Reich's economic and financiai Iimitations. Furthemore, Gennany planned to fight a large war in the mid-1940s once its major cearmament promand heaw industriai and raw materiai pmjecîs had been compieted .*. Ill It is with pleasure that 1undertake to thank those who conm%uted to the completion of this work. To begin wah, I wouid like to thank Dr. A. Chanady, Dr. B. Zagorin, and Dr. B. PIoufCe of the University of Regina for their letters of reference which enabled me to enter the MA. program. To my supervisor, Dr. Holger Herwig, 1 say thank you for the suggestion of this fascinahg topic, and for the many hours spent editing the working drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to Dr. John Ferris, not ody for senruig as my ïnterim supervisor during the first year of the program, but also for his unhesitahg willingness to sit on the examination cornmittee. His good-mturet humour and support over these past years is greatiy appreciated. Special thanks are due, as weU, to Dr. Rob Huebert for piously agreeing to help a relative stranger, and sit as third examiner at the oral defence. Let me also take this opportun@ to thank Jennifer Feldman of the University of Aberta Library for her assistance with archival materials, and Diana Hossfeld for her help with some of the more complex Gennan documents. 1am ais0 forever gratefui to a feliow Reghm and Graduate Secfetary of the Deparmieut, OIga Leskiw, for her tremendous . moral support and administrative mastery! 1wouid also like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Department of History and Faculty of Graduate Studies, as weil as the support of those at the University of Calgary Parking Services who took my academic schedule into consideration 1 extend my heartfelt appreciation to my famiiy and fiiends, and thank you for your unwavering support and encouragement And a hl thank you to Wendel who kept me Company and remained stead€istLy at my side throughout this entire undertaking. TABLE OF CONTENTS .. Approval Page ....................................................................................................................... u --. Abstract. ............................................................................................................................. .--III Acknowledgements ....................................................... Table of Contenu................................................................................................................... v List of Tables ......................................................................................................................... vi CHAPTER ONE: Introduction: An Historiographical Discussion of the Blitzkrieg Topic ........................................................................... 1 CHAPTER TWO: German MiIitary Reannament, 1 933-1 939 ........................................ 29 CHAPTER THREE: Large-scaie Economic Mobhtion as an Indicator of Tod War Preparations............................................................... 66 CHAPTER FOUR: "BliaIcrieg Smtegy" as an Histoncd Anachronism: Economic Crisis, Diplornatic Biunder, and Total Mobilization....... 89 CONCLUSION.... ................... ............................................................................................ 141 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................ 144 LIST OF TABLES 1. Some Estimates of Rearmament Expenditure 1933- 1939. by Calender Yea r. ............. 118 2. Investment in German Industry 1928-1933 ................................................................... 122 3. German Wage and Consumption Statistics 1928-1938 ................................................ 122 4. indices of Production of Certain Armaments in Germany. 1939- 194 1........................ 133 5 . Expenditure on Selected Weapons in Gennany. 1939-1941 ........................................ 134 6 . The Mobhtion of Net National Product for War Germany. 1938-1945 ..................136 7. Statistics on invernent in German Industry 1938-1944 in Billion RM ....................... 137 8 . Military Expenditure. State Expenditure and National Income in Germany 193 8- 1944.................................................................................................. 138 CHAITER ONE Introduction: An Historiographical Discussion of the Blitzkrieg Topic Much research and discussion has occurred since the end of the Second Wodd War concerning the military and economic motivations of Nazi Germany's Blitzkrieg or lightening-war campaigns between 1939 and 1941. The lively and vigorous historical debate which has resuited has focussed mainly on such key areas as the extent and composition of Germanyts rearmament programmes throughout the 1930s; the evolution of the Gerrnan economy and the nature of German economic policy under Nationai Socialist control: the regime's diplomatic and strategic goais, or lack thereof; the type of war pianned for by the politicai and military leadership; the adequacy of miiitary and economic preparations given the type of war which resuited der 1939: and the performance of the German military and economy during the first two years of war. Al1 these factors must be taken into account when considering the nature and existence of a "Blitzkneg strate&*. The fint attempts to analyse the German economy and German rearmament under National Socialist direction were spearheaded primarily by economists. some of whom were Marxist-Leninists. Econornic and political studies of pre-war Germany were conducted by the American economists Maxine Sweezy, ûtto Nathan. and Milton Fried, as well as by East German Marxists like Jiirgen Kuczynski.' These studies nearly al1 agreed that, beginning in 1933. the National Socialist regime tailored its large public works projects to I See Maxine Sweezy. "Germanicus," Gerrnanv. the Last Four Years (Boston: Eyre and Spomswoode. 1937); idem. The Structure of the Nazi E- (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941); Otto Nathan, Nazi War Finance adBanking (New York: Financiai Research Program, National Bureau of Economic Research. 1944); Otto Nathan and Milton Fried. The Nazi Economic Svstem: Germanv's Mobilizaiion for War (Durham.N. C.: Duke University Press, 1944); Jiirgen Kuczynski, üermay: Economiç and Labur Conditions*. under Fascism (New York: intemational Publishers, 1945); Jiirgen Kuczynski and M. Witt, -ne Economics of Rarbarisrn :Hitler's New EcollpmiE Order in Euroue (Toronto: Progress Books, 1942). Other studies not mentioned include Henri Lichtenberger's The Third Reich (New York: Greystone Press, 1937), and Gustav Stolper's Gennan Economy. 1870-194Q (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940). benefit rearmament. restricted civilian consumption and production. and funneiied al1 available economic resources into massive war preparations. Wleorthodox Marxist research stressed that the NSDAP was merely a tool of organized capital. Manrist and non- Marxist economists alike agreed that the Nazi state had developed into a centralized and efficient war machine. which was prepared for an offensive conflict at such tirne as Adoif Hitler's diplamacy called for one. As Nathan suggests: With the Nazis in power in Germany a unmg principle was brought to bear on the economic system. Tbey had a predetermined purpose: the creation of a war machine. in subordinating the economic system to that objective they substituted conscious over-al1 direction for the autonomy of the

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