Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: V. 1 Free

FREE DIVE BOMBER AND GROUND ATTACK UNITS OF THE LUFTWAFFE 1933-45: V. 1 PDF

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During the interwar period, German pilots Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 trained secretly in violation of the treaty at Lipetsk Air Base in the Soviet Union. With the rise of the Nazi Party and the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty, the Luftwaffe ' s existence was publicly acknowledged on 26 Februaryjust over two weeks before open defiance of the Versailles Treaty through German rearmament and conscription would be announced on 16 March. Partially as a result of this combat experience, the Luftwaffe had become one of the most sophisticated, technologically advanced, and battle- experienced air forces in the world when World War II broke out in The Luftwaffe proved instrumental in the German victories across Poland and Western Europe in and During the Battle of Britainhowever, despite inflicting severe damage to the RAF 's infrastructure and, during the subsequent Blitzdevastating many British cities, the German air force failed to batter the beleaguered British into submission. FromAllied bombing campaigns gradually destroyed the Luftwaffe ' s fighter arm. From latethe Luftwaffe used its surplus ground support and other personnel to raise Luftwaffe Field Divisions. Despite its belated use of advanced turbojet and rocket propelled aircraft for the destruction of Allied bombersthe Luftwaffe was overwhelmed by the Allies' superior numbers and improved tactics, and a lack of trained pilots and aviation fuel. In Januaryduring the closing stages of the Battle of the Bulgethe Luftwaffe made a last-ditch effort to win air superiorityand met with failure. With rapidly dwindling supplies of petroleum, oil, and lubricants after this campaign, and as part of the entire combined Wehrmacht military forces as a whole, the Luftwaffe ceased to be an effective fighting force. After the defeat of Germany, the Luftwaffe was disbanded in During World War II, German pilots claimed roughly 70, aerial victories, while over 75, Luftwaffe aircraft were destroyed or significantly damaged. Of these, nearly 40, were lost entirely. The Luftwaffe was deeply involved in Nazi war crimes. By the end of the war, a significant percentage of aircraft production originated in concentration campsan industry employing tens of thousands of prisoners. The Oberkommando der Luftwaffe organized Nazi human experimentationand Luftwaffe ground troops committed massacres in ItalyGreeceand Poland. After the defeat of Germany, the service was dissolved on 8 May under the conditions of the Treaty of Versailleswhich also mandated the destruction of all German military aircraft. Since the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to have an air force, German pilots trained in secret. To train its pilots on the latest combat aircraft, Germany solicited the help of the Soviet Unionwhich was also isolated in Europe. A secret training airfield was established at Lipetsk in and operated for approximately nine years using mostly Dutch and Soviet, Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 also some German, training aircraft before being closed in This base was officially known as 4th squadron of the 40th wing of the Red Army. Hundreds of Luftwaffe pilots and technical personnel visited, studied and were trained at Soviet air force schools in several locations in Central Russia. The first steps towards the Luftwaffe ' s formation were undertaken just months after Adolf Hitler came to power. The RLM was in charge of development and production of aircraft. On 25 March the German Air Sports Association absorbed all private and national organizations, while retaining its 'sports' title. On 15 Mayall military aviation organizations in the RLM were merged, forming the Luftwaffe ; its official 'birthday'. The Commander-in-Chief left the organisation and building of the Luftwaffeafterto Erhard Milch. Another prominent figure in German air power construction this time was Helmuth Wilberg. Wilberg later played a large role in the development of German air doctrine. Having headed the Reichswehr air staff for eight years in the s, Wilberg had considerable experience and was ideal for a senior staff position. However, it was revealed Wilberg had a Jewish mother. Wilberg remained in the air staff, and under Walther Wever helped draw up the Luftwaffe ' s principle doctrinal texts, "The Conduct of the Aerial War" and "Regulation 16". The German Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 Corps was keen to develop strategic bombing capabilities against its enemies. However, economic and geopolitical considerations had to take priority. The German air power theorists continued to develop strategic theories, but emphasis was given to army support, as Germany was a continental power and expected to face ground operations following any declaration of hostilities. For these reasons, between andthe Luftwaffe ' s leadership was primarily concerned with tactical and operational methods. Untilthe manual "Directives for the Conduct of the Operational Air War" continued to act as the main guide for German air operations. The Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 directed OKL to focus on limited operations not strategic operations : the protection of specific areas and support of the army in combat. With an effective tactical-operational concept, [21] the German air power theorists needed a strategic doctrine and organisation. Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 promoted the Giulio Douhet theory that air power could win wars alone by destroying enemy industry and breaking enemy morale by "terrorizing the population" of major cities. This advocated attacks on civilians. At this time, Wever conducted war games simulated against France in a bid to establish his theory of a strategic bombing force that would, he thought, prove decisive by winning the war through the destruction of enemy industry, even though these exercises also included tactical strikes against enemy ground forces and communications. In the proposal, it concluded, "The mission of the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals. Corum states that under this doctrine, the Luftwaffe leadership rejected the practice of " terror bombing " see Luftwaffe strategic bombing doctrine. Nevertheless, Wever recognised the importance of strategic bombing. In newly introduced doctrine, The Conduct of the Aerial Air War inWever rejected the theory of Douhet [30] and outlined five key points to air strategy: [31]. Wever began planning for a strategic bomber force and sought to incorporate strategic bombing into a war strategy. He believed that tactical aircraft should only be used as a step to developing a strategic air force. In MayWever initiated a seven-year project to develop the so-called " Ural bomber ", which could strike as far as into the heart of the Soviet Union. Inthis design competition led to the Dornier Do 19 and Junkers Ju 89 prototypes, although both were underpowered. However Wever's vision of a "Ural" bomber was never realised, [32] and his emphasis on strategic aerial operations was lost. Following the untimely death of Walther Wever in early June in an aviation-related accidentby the late s the Luftwaffe had no clear purpose. The air force was not subordinated to the army support role, and it was not given any particular strategic mission. German doctrine fell between the two concepts. The Luftwaffe was to be an organization capable of carrying out broad and general support tasks rather than any specific mission. Mainly, this path was chosen to encourage a more flexible use of air power and offer the ground forces the right conditions for a decisive victory. Wever's participation in the construction of the Luftwaffe came to an abrupt end on 3 June when he was killed along with his engineer in a Heinkel He 70 Blitz, ironically on the very day that his "Bomber A" heavy bomber design competition was announced. Despite this Udet helped change the Luftwaffe ' s tactical direction towards fast medium bombers to destroy enemy air power in the battle zone rather than through industrial bombing of its aviation production. Kesselring and Udet did not get on. During Kesselring's time as CS, —, a power struggle developed between the two as Udet attempted to extend his own power within the Luftwaffe. The failure of the Luftwaffe to progress further towards attaining a strategic bombing force was attributable to several reasons. Many in the Luftwaffe command believed medium bombers to be sufficient power to launch strategic bombing operations against Germany's most likely enemies; France, Czechoslovakiaand Poland. General der Flieger Hellmuth Felmycommander of Luftflotte 2 inwas charged with devising a plan for an air war over the British Isles. Felmy was convinced that Britain could be defeated through morale bombing. Felmy noted the alleged panic that had broken out in London during the Munich crisisevidence he believed of British weakness. A second reason was technical. German designers had never solved the issues of the Heinkel He A's design difficulties, brought on by the requirement from its inception on 5 November to have moderate dive bombing capabilities in a meter wingspan aircraft. In addition, OKL had not foreseen the industrial and military effort strategic bombing would require. By the Luftwaffe was not much better prepared than its enemies to conduct a strategic bombing campaign, [39] with fatal results during the Battle of Britain. The German rearmament program faced difficulties acquiring raw materials. Germany imported most of its essential materials for rebuilding the Luftwaffein particular rubber and aluminium. Petroleum imports were particularly vulnerable to blockade. Germany pushed for synthetic fuel plants, but still failed to meet demands. In Germany imported more fuel than it had at the start of the decade. The development of aircraft was now confined to the production of twin- engined medium bombers that required much less material, manpower and aviation production capacity than Wever's "Ural Bomber". German industry Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 build two Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 bombers for one heavy bomber and the RLM would not gamble on developing a heavy bomber which would also take time. The lack of strategic capability should have been apparent much earlier. The Sudeten Crisis highlighted German unpreparedness to Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 a strategic air war although the British and French were in a much weaker positionand Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe be expanded to five times its earlier size. Felmy concluded it was not possible until bases in Belgium and the Netherlands were obtained and the Luftwaffe had heavy bombers. It mattered little, as war was avoided by the Munich Agreement, Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 the need for long- range aircraft did not arise. These failures were not exposed until wartime. All first saw active service in the Condor Legion against Soviet-supplied aircraft. The Luftwaffe also quickly realized the days of the biplane fighter were finished, the Heinkel He 51 being switched to service as a trainer. Particularly impressive were the Heinkel and Dornier, which fulfilled the Luftwaffe ' s requirements for bombers that were faster than s-era fighters, many of which were biplanes or strut-braced monoplanes. Despite the participation of these aircraft mainly from onwardit was the venerable Junkers Ju 52 which soon became the backbone of the Transportgruppen that made the main contribution. It is the aircraft which the Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory. Poor accuracy from level bombers in led the Luftwaffe to grasp the benefits of dive-bombing. The latter could achieve far better accuracy against tactical ground targets than heavier conventional bombers. Range was not a key criterion for this mission. It was not always feasible for the army to move heavy artillery over recently captured territory to bombard fortifications or support ground forces, and dive bombers could do the job faster. Dive bombers, often single-engine two-man machines, could achieve better results than larger six or seven-man aircraft, at a tenth of the cost and four times the accuracy. This led to Udet championing the dive bomber, particularly the Junkers Ju Udet's "love affair" with dive bombing seriously affected the long-term development of the Luftwaffeespecially after General Wever's death. The tactical strike aircraft programs were meant to serve as interim solutions until the next generation of aircraft arrived. In the Junkers Ju 52 was the backbone of the German bomber fleet. The Ju 86 was poor while the He showed most promise. The Spanish Civil War convinced Udet along with limited output from the German munitions industry that wastage was not acceptable in munition terms. Udet sought to build dive bombing into the Junkers Ju 88 and conveyed the same idea, initiated specifically by OKL for the Heinkel Heapproved in early November In the case of the Ju 88, 50, modifications had to be made. Luftwaffe - Wikipedia

By Henry L. Subtitled 'Units, formations and redesignation, commanders, Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 operations, codes, emblems'. Published by Classic inpages. Hardback with Dust Jacket - c. Brand New Book. From the inside front fly leaf: Initial operations by the Luftwaffe in Poland, France and the Low Countries during and were to demonstrate the concept of the dive-bomber. During these first years of the war, the Ju 87 'Stuka' was able to roam unchallenged over the battlefronts, striking terror into enemy troops and contributing mightily to the success of the German Blitzkrieg concept of warfare. But when the aircraft came up against effective fighter opposition during the Battle of Britain, those units operating the type suffered devastating losses, resulting in the Stuka's withdrawal from operations. Turning to the East, the Ju 87 was able once more to contribute to Germany's initial incursion into the Soviet Union. Again, however, the Luftwaffe gradually lost its air superiority and the type again became vulnerable as a dive-bomber. The result was that Germany was forced to switch to ground-attack operations mainly with the Fw This is the first of two volumes providing highly detailed information on the organisation of the Luftwaffe's Dive Bomber and Ground Attack Units of the Luftwaffe 1933-45: v. 1 units during World War 2. This volume covers sixteen dive-bomber and the first two ground-attack Geschwader together with their component Staff flights and Gruppen. It includes details of their formation and reorganisation through to the end of the war, with locations, bases and transfers together with an exhaustive breakdown of theatres of operations, key battles and aircraft types that were flown by each unit. This volume also includes listings of senior field officers together with brief biographies of the more important commanders. Volume 2 covers the remaining day and night ground-attack units and both contain many photographs of aircraft in unit markings with colour renditions of unit emblems. Cart 0 0 item s in your cart. View cart.