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Luftwaffe Maritime Operations in World War Ii AU/ACSC/6456/2004-2005 AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY LUFTWAFFE MARITIME OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II: THOUGHT, ORGANIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY by Winston A. Gould, Major, USAF A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements Instructor: Dr Richard R. Muller Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 2005 Distribution A: Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited Ú±®³ ß°°®±ª»¼ λ°±®¬ ܱ½«³»²¬¿¬·±² п¹» ÑÓÞ Ò±ò ðéðìóðïèè Ы¾´·½ ®»°±®¬·²¹ ¾«®¼»² º±® ¬¸» ½±´´»½¬·±² ±º ·²º±®³¿¬·±² ·• »•¬·³¿¬»¼ ¬± ¿ª»®¿¹» ï ¸±«® °»® ®»•°±²•»ô ·²½´«¼·²¹ ¬¸» ¬·³» º±® ®»ª·»©·²¹ ·²•¬®«½¬·±²•ô •»¿®½¸·²¹ »¨·•¬·²¹ ¼¿¬¿ •±«®½»•ô ¹¿¬¸»®·²¹ ¿²¼ ³¿·²¬¿·²·²¹ ¬¸» ¼¿¬¿ ²»»¼»¼ô ¿²¼ ½±³°´»¬·²¹ ¿²¼ ®»ª·»©·²¹ ¬¸» ½±´´»½¬·±² ±º ·²º±®³¿¬·±²ò Í»²¼ ½±³³»²¬• ®»¹¿®¼·²¹ ¬¸·• ¾«®¼»² »•¬·³¿¬» ±® ¿²§ ±¬¸»® ¿•°»½¬ ±º ¬¸·• ½±´´»½¬·±² ±º ·²º±®³¿¬·±²ô ·²½´«¼·²¹ •«¹¹»•¬·±²• º±® ®»¼«½·²¹ ¬¸·• ¾«®¼»²ô ¬± É¿•¸·²¹¬±² Ø»¿¼¯«¿®¬»®• Í»®ª·½»•ô Ü·®»½¬±®¿¬» º±® ײº±®³¿¬·±² Ñ°»®¿¬·±²• ¿²¼ λ°±®¬•ô ïîïë Ö»ºº»®•±² Ü¿ª·• Ø·¹¸©¿§ô Í«·¬» ïîðìô ß®´·²¹¬±² Êß îîîðîóìíðîò λ•°±²¼»²¬• •¸±«´¼ ¾» ¿©¿®» ¬¸¿¬ ²±¬©·¬¸•¬¿²¼·²¹ ¿²§ ±¬¸»® °®±ª·•·±² ±º ´¿©ô ²± °»®•±² •¸¿´´ ¾» •«¾¶»½¬ ¬± ¿ °»²¿´¬§ º±® º¿·´·²¹ ¬± ½±³°´§ ©·¬¸ ¿ ½±´´»½¬·±² ±º ·²º±®³¿¬·±² ·º ·¬ ¼±»• ²±¬ ¼·•°´¿§ ¿ ½«®®»²¬´§ ª¿´·¼ ÑÓÞ ½±²¬®±´ ²«³¾»®ò ïò ÎÛÐÑÎÌ ÜßÌÛ íò ÜßÌÛÍ ÝÑÊÛÎÛÜ ßÐÎ îððë îò ÎÛÐÑÎÌ ÌÇÐÛ ððóððóîððë ¬± ððóððóîððë ìò Ì×ÌÔÛ ßÒÜ ÍËÞÌ×ÌÔÛ ë¿ò ÝÑÒÌÎßÝÌ ÒËÓÞÛÎ ÔËÚÌÉßÚÚÛ ÓßÎ×Ì×ÓÛ ÑÐÛÎßÌ×ÑÒÍ ×Ò ÉÑÎÔÜ ÉßÎ ××æ ë¾ò ÙÎßÒÌ ÒËÓÞÛÎ ÌØÑËÙØÌô ÑÎÙßÒ×ÆßÌ×ÑÒ ßÒÜ ÌÛÝØÒÑÔÑÙÇ ë½ò ÐÎÑÙÎßÓ ÛÔÛÓÛÒÌ ÒËÓÞÛÎ êò ßËÌØÑÎøÍ÷ ë¼ò ÐÎÑÖÛÝÌ ÒËÓÞÛÎ ë»ò ÌßÍÕ ÒËÓÞÛÎ ëºò ÉÑÎÕ ËÒ×Ì ÒËÓÞÛÎ éò ÐÛÎÚÑÎÓ×ÒÙ ÑÎÙßÒ×ÆßÌ×ÑÒ ÒßÓÛøÍ÷ ßÒÜ ßÜÜÎÛÍÍøÛÍ÷ èò ÐÛÎÚÑÎÓ×ÒÙ ÑÎÙßÒ×ÆßÌ×ÑÒ ß·® ˲·ª»®•·¬§ Ю»•• øßËÔñÔÐ÷ôïíï É Í¸«³¿½¸»® ߪ»²«»ôÓ¿¨©»´´ ÎÛÐÑÎÌ ÒËÓÞÛÎ ßÚÞôßÔôíêïïîóêêïë çò ÍÐÑÒÍÑÎ×ÒÙñÓÑÒ×ÌÑÎ×ÒÙ ßÙÛÒÝÇ ÒßÓÛøÍ÷ ßÒÜ ßÜÜÎÛÍÍøÛÍ÷ ïðò ÍÐÑÒÍÑÎñÓÑÒ×ÌÑÎÍ ßÝÎÑÒÇÓøÍ÷ ïïò ÍÐÑÒÍÑÎñÓÑÒ×ÌÑÎÍ ÎÛÐÑÎÌ ÒËÓÞÛÎøÍ÷ ïîò Ü×ÍÌÎ×ÞËÌ×ÑÒñßÊß×ÔßÞ×Ô×ÌÇ ÍÌßÌÛÓÛÒÌ ß°°®±ª»¼ º±® °«¾´·½ ®»´»¿•»å ¼·•¬®·¾«¬·±² «²´·³·¬»¼ ïíò ÍËÐÐÔÛÓÛÒÌßÎÇ ÒÑÌÛÍ ïìò ßÞÍÌÎßÝÌ Ì¸» ¼»ª»´±°³»²¬ ±º ¿·®°±©»® ½¿² ¾» ¬®¿½»¼ ¬± ¬¸®»» µ»§ »´»³»²¬•æ ¬¸±«¹¸¬ô ±®¹¿²·¦¿¬·±² ¿²¼ ¬»½¸²±´±¹§ò ̸» Ô«º¬©¿ºº» ±º ɱ®´¼ É¿® ×× ·­ ²± ¼·ºº»®»²¬ò ̸·­ °¿°»® ©·´´ »¨¿³·²» ¬¸» Ô«º¬©¿ºº»­ ¬¸±«¹¸¬ô ±®¹¿²·¦¿¬·±² ¿²¼ ¬»½¸²±´±¹§ ¿• ·¬ °»®¬¿·²• ¬± ³¿®·¬·³» ±°»®¿¬·±²•ô ±® ¿• ¬¸» ³±¼»®² ˲·¬»¼ ͬ¿¬»• ß·® Ú±®½» øËÍßÚ÷ ½¿´´• ·¬ô ݱ«²¬»®•»¿ Ñ°»®¿¬·±²•ò ̸»•» ³¿®·¬·³» ±°»®¿¬·±²• ©·´´ ·²½´«¼» ¼·®»½¬ •«°°±®¬ ±º ¬¸» Õ®·»¹•³¿®·²» ¿²¼ ·²¼»°»²¼»²¬ Ô«º¬©¿ºº» ±°»®¿¬·±²• ¿¹¿·²•¬ ¬¸» ß´´·»•ò Ô«º¬©¿ºº» ¬¸±«¹¸¬ ©·´´ •¸±© ¬¸¿¬ ¼±½¬®·²¿´´§ ¬¸» Ô«º¬©¿ºº» ©¿• ²±¬ ¿• °®»°¿®»¼ º±® ¬¸» ³¿®·¬·³» ®±´» ·¬• ´»¿¼»®• ¬¸®«•¬ «°±² ·¬ô ¾«¬ º´»¨·¾·´·¬§ ¿²¼ ¬¸» ¿°°´·½¿¬·±² ±º ¬¸» ¬»²»¬• ±º ¿·®°±©»® °®±ª·¼»¼ ¬¸» ¾¿•·• º±® ¿¼¿°¬¿¬·±²ò ß´•± ·²½´«¼»¼ ©·´´ ¾» ¿² »¨¿³·²¿¬·±² ±º ¬¸» º·»®½» ®·ª¿´®§ ¾»¬©»»² ¬¸» Ô«º¬©¿ºº» ¿²¼ Õ®»·¹•³¿®·²» •»²·±® ´»¿¼»®•¸·° ¿²¼ ¸±© ¬¸·• ·²¬»®º»®»¼ ©·¬¸ ¬¸» ½±²¼«½¬ ±º ½±«²¬»®•»¿ ±°»®¿¬·±²•ò Ô«º¬©¿ºº» ±®¹¿²·¦¿¬·±² ¼«®·²¹ ɱ®´¼ É¿® ×× °®±ª·¼»¼ ¿ ³±®» ¬¸¿² ¿¼»¯«¿¬» ¾¿•·• º±® ½±²¼«½¬·²¹ ¬¸» ½±«²¬»®•»¿ ½¿³°¿·¹²ò ̸» ¿¼¿°¬¿¾·´·¬§ ±º ¬¸» ±°»®¿¬·±²¿´ ¿²¼ •«°°±®¬ •¬®«½¬«®» ¿´´±©»¼ ¬¸» Ô«º¬©¿ºº» ¬± ¿½½±³°´·•¸ ¿ ª¿®·»¬§ ±º ³·••·±²•ô »ª»² ¿• ¬¸»·® ¿·®½®¿º¬ ¿²¼ ©»¿°±²• ©»®» °®±ª·²¹ ¼»º·½·»²¬ò Ú·²¿´´§ô ¬¸» Ô«º¬©¿ºº» ©¿• ¿¬ ¬¸» º±®»º®±²¬ ±º ·²²±ª¿¬·±² ·² ¬¸» º·»´¼ ±º ¿ª·¿¬·±² ¬»½¸²±´±¹§ô ·²½´«¼·²¹ ¿·®º®¿³» ¿²¼ ©»¿°±² ¼»ª»´±°³»²¬ò Ѳ½» ¿¹¿·²ô ·²¬»®º»®»²½» ¾§ •»²·±® ´»¿¼»®•¸·° ¿²¼ »¯«·°³»²¬ ¬»»¬¸·²¹ °®±¾´»³• ½±³¾·²»¼ ©·¬¸ ·²½®»¿•·²¹ ß´´·»¼ ¿¬¬¿½µ• ½±•¬ ¬¸» Ô«º¬©¿ºº» °®»½·±«• ¬·³»ò ïëò ÍËÞÖÛÝÌ ÌÛÎÓÍ ïêò ÍÛÝËÎ×ÌÇ ÝÔßÍÍ×Ú×ÝßÌ×ÑÒ ÑÚæ ïéò Ô×Ó×ÌßÌ×ÑÒ ÑÚ ïèò ÒËÓÞÛÎ ïç¿ò ÒßÓÛ ÑÚ ßÞÍÌÎßÝÌ ÑÚ ÐßÙÛÍ ÎÛÍÐÑÒÍ×ÞÔÛ ÐÛÎÍÑÒ ¿ò ÎÛÐÑÎÌ ¾ò ßÞÍÌÎßÝÌ ½ò ÌØ×Í ÐßÙÛ Í¿³» ¿• ëç «²½´¿••·º·»¼ «²½´¿••·º·»¼ «²½´¿••·º·»¼ λ°±®¬ øÍßÎ÷ Ü·•½´¿·³»® The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government. ii Preface The German Luftwaffe maritime forces were colloquially known as "Der See Adlers", or "The Sea Eagles." This particular breed of the Luftwaffe developed its own doctrine and tactics to accomplish the many unique roles it was assigned. Units were created to meet unique requirements, often in response to a pressing need and learning from expensive and painful lessons. German ingenuity and creativity once again came to the forefront in the adaptation of current technology and the development of special weapons to support maritime operations. The German Luftwaffe of World War II is well known for its role in supporting the "Blitzkrieg" tactics of the Wehrmacht Heer, or German Army. Another important role was the use of the Luftwaffe in maritime operations in support of the Kriegsmarine. This research paper will examine the role of the Luftwaffe in maritime operations, specifically in the Atlantic area of operations. First, this paper will examine the thought and doctrine of the Luftwaffe in maritime operations. Secondly, this paper will examine the organization of the Luftwaffe, specifically the units employed in maritime operations. Finally, this paper will examine the technology employed by the Luftwaffe in maritime operations. I would like to acknowledge the guidance received from my research advisor, Dr Richard R. Muller. His expertise and vast knowledge of the Luftwaffe in World War II assisted in “zeroing in” on the subject. I would also like to acknowledge the wonderful assistance of Miss Terry Kiss of the Air University Library. Her tireless efforts searching for reference material were invaluable. Finally, I would like to thank the Toni Petito of the Air Force Historical Research Agency. The AFHRA’s vast repository of translated German documents provided immeasurable information for this paper. iii AU/ACSC/6456/2004-2005 Abstract The development of airpower can be traced to three key elements: thought, organization and technology. The Luftwaffe of World War II is no different. This paper will examine the Luftwaffe’s thought, organization and technology as it pertains to maritime operations, or as the modern United States Air Force (USAF) calls it, Countersea Operations. These maritime operations will include direct support of the Kriegsmarine and independent Luftwaffe operations against the Allies. Luftwaffe thought will show that doctrinally the Luftwaffe was not as prepared for the maritime role its leaders thrust upon it, but flexibility and the application of the tenets of airpower provided the basis for adaptation. Also included will be an examination of the fierce rivalry between the Luftwaffe and Kreigsmarine senior leadership and how this interfered with the conduct of countersea operations. Luftwaffe organization during World War II provided a more than adequate basis for conducting the countersea campaign. The adaptability of the operational and support structure allowed the Luftwaffe to accomplish a variety of missions, even as their aircraft and weapons were proving deficient. Finally, the Luftwaffe was at the forefront of innovation in the field of aviation technology, including airframe and weapon development. Once again, interference by senior leadership and equipment teething problems combined with increasing Allied attacks cost the Luftwaffe precious time. iv Contents п¹» DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................................ ii ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................... iv LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS........................................................................................................ vii INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 LUFTWAFFE THOUGHT AND DOCTRINE...............................................................................3 Doctrine: Evolution or Dogma ..................................................................................................3 The influence of Douhet and the Spirit of the Offense..............................................................5 Luftwaffe Regulation 16............................................................................................................6 Grossadmiral Erich Raeder........................................................................................................6 German military leadership and their impact on thought and doctrine .....................................8 Summary..................................................................................................................................12 LUFTWAFFE ORGANIZATION.................................................................................................13 The See-Luftstreitkrafte...........................................................................................................13 The organization of the Luftwaffe...........................................................................................15 Operationalizing the war in the Atlantic..................................................................................19 Summary..................................................................................................................................21
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