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The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim: on the Diplomatic Prelude of World War II Toomas VARRAK* Abstract Introduction

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The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim: on the Diplomatic Prelude of World War II Toomas VARRAK* Abstract Introduction The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim: On the Diplomatic Prelude of World War II Toomas VARRAK* Abstract Introduction In addition to oral tradition, the knowledge The standard historical presentation and understanding of history is based on of WWII can be epitomised as a written sources. Therefore it is highly significant narrative about a clash between when research is able to introduce hitherto good and evil in which victory is unknown material that can shed new light on inveterate truths. This was the case with the rightfully won by the good. That study “Finland at the Epicentre of the Storm” standard was cast into serious doubt by Finnish historian Erkki Hautamäki. The in 2005 by Finnish historian Erkki study dealt with the diplomatic prelude to Hautamäki, whose research was based World War II, and was based on a secret dossier on documents originating from secret by Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim. The dossier was transferred to President J. K. Paasikivi dossier S-32 of Finnish Marshal, 1 after the war, and then disappeared from Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim. The public eye. Fortunately, its main items were documents of the dossier originated either copied or a synopsis was made on the from the two different sources. First, request of the Marshal by his long-time trustee, they represented the documents of Vilho Tahvanaine. On the basis of these copies, Hautamäki was able to propose an entirely new German officials, including a personal view of the diplomatic manoeuvring which led letter by Reichsmarschall Hermann to the outbreak of WW II. Göring and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop to the Commander- Key Words in-Chief of the Finnish armed forces C. G. E. Mannerheim. Enclosed as World War II, Nazi-Soviet relations, Winter well was a photo-copy of a Soviet- War, Eastern Front, Allies’ Diplomacy, the Baltic British secret military agreement Countries, British-Soviet Relations. which was signed by Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill. The agreement * Prof., Euroacademy, Department of was furnished with detailed plans of its International Relations; 11316 Tallinn, implementation. Second, the dossier Estonia. contained information given by Oberst E-mail: [email protected]. Paul Grassmann to Vilho Tahvanainen. 81 PERCEPTIONS, Summer 2016, Volume XXI, Number 2, pp. 81-102. Toomas Varrak Grassmann served as Hitler’s secret occupy Finland, the Baltic countries interpreter and secretary after 1935, and a part of Sweden and Norway.2 and was promoted to the military rank If this statement were proven to be of colonel in 1938. Despite his official true, our current understanding of position he was not a member of the the causes and respective roles of Nazi party. He later fell into disfavour the principal participants of WW II and left Germany for Finland in 1944. would need to be corrected with all the political, legal and moral consequences ensuing from it. Naturally, the text Even well kept secrets like the of the original agreement was not at long denied existence of the Hautamäki’s disposal. The original text of the agreement, if it really exists, has Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’s most likely been hidden in the secret secret protocol or the actual archives of Russia and Great Britain. perpetrators of the Katyn mass Considering the alleged content of such murder tend to become public an agreement, it is no wonder why “the sooner or later. watchdogs are barking and howling around it”,3 making the agreement inaccessible for impartial researchers. However, even well kept secrets like the In the absence of the original long denied existence of the Molotov- documents the question of reliability Ribbentrop Pact’s secret protocol or the of Hautamäki’s sources inevitably actual perpetrators of the Katyn mass rises. All the more because they offer murder tend to become public sooner some pivotally important information or later. for the existing understanding of the diplomatic prelude of WWII. Perhaps The customary narrative of the causes the most startling allegation of his of the WWII goes as follows. With study is that on 15 October 1939 a Hitler’s rise to power in Germany British-Soviet secret agreement was the risk of a new war in Europe was signed about military cooperation becoming more of a reality. The reason against Germany. That was less than for that was the Nazis’ overt intention to two months after the conclusion restore Germany’s former great-power of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact position in Europe. After the failure between Germany and the Soviets, of the Disarmament Conference and which opened the gates for the war departure from the League of Nations in Europe. According to Hautamäki, in October 1933, Germany conclusively the agreement entitled the Soviets to took the course to rearmament. Hitler’s 82 The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim: On the Diplomatic Prelude of World War II policy abruptly surfaced in 1935 with Soviet Union had concluded a Treaty the introduction of compulsory military of Friendship, Non-Aggression and service and conclusion of the Anglo– Neutrality with the formally fascist German Naval Agreement. From then Italy already in autumn 1926. The on the policy of Western democracies official manual of Soviet foreign towards Germany did not go much policy, the “Diplomatic Dictionary” beyond reactions to Hitler’s leverage of (Moscow 1973, 1986),4 does not also German military and economic might reveal anything that would support the and, of course, to start to prepare for theoretical axioms of the Soviet foreign the worst. policy. The often repeated Soviet thesis of their miscarried policy of collective The Soviet version of the story looks at security against the Nazis remains in the developments in Germany through practice without corroboration. Even the prism of Marxism-Leninism. From an attempt to forge such an alliance the Bolshevik perspective, war was the in 1939 ended up with a deal with the essence of fascism from the outset and Nazis. thus needed to be contested both in the internal and international arenas. However, in the turbulent German National socialism or, in politics of the late 1920s and early customary terms, fascism, due 1930s, up to the decisive victory of the to its relative standing in the Nazis in the Reichstag elections of 1932, political balance of Germany in Communists (with the benign support the early 1930s, did not pose a of the Soviets) and Nazis repeatedly united forces against the democratically bigger menace or challenge to pitched parties in Germany. the Soviet political and security interests in Europe than social National socialism or, in customary democracy or any bourgeois terms, fascism, due to its relative political force from liberals to standing in the political balance of conservatives. Germany in the early 1930s, did not pose a bigger menace or challenge to the Soviet political and security interests in Europe than social A more customary approach to democracy or any bourgeois political international politics, however, looks at force from liberals to conservatives. it through the prism of national interests. Notwithstanding its theoretical The national interests of Germany in position with respect to fascism, the the 1920s and 1930s were determined 83 Toomas Varrak by what was set out in the Treaty of support to such a conception. Even Versailles. The treaty summarized when the trilateral negotiations the political and economic results of started between the Soviet Union, World War I (WWI), condemned Britain and France in the summer of Germany as the sole culprit of the 1939, their failure was caused by the war, and declared Emperor Wilhelm Soviet demand to recognise her right II a war criminal. The treaty deprived to take her armies into the territories Germany of 70.6 thousand square of neighbouring neutral countries to kilometres of her former territory, as counter the Wehrmacht. If recognition well as 7.3 million people living on the of this right had been secondary for lost territories, including a considerable the Soviet Union, the difficulties part of her economic potential. A which thwarted the agreement would number of German speaking citizens not have arisen. The representatives found themselves living in new nation of the Western Allies were evidently states. They had lost their former ready to conclude an agreement in position and experienced all the usual which the problems of the potential inconveniences of being national battle contact of the Soviets with the minorities. The peace treaty reduced Wehrmacht were left open or settled in the pre-war European great power into some other and less costly way for the a second-rate international actor that Soviet Union. Otherwise they would was not allowed to muster an army over not have sent their representatives to 100,000 men or hold heavy weaponry. Moscow at all. So the primary motive The most burdensome obligation was of the Soviets’ foreign policy in the undoubtedly the liability to pay huge 1930s was not the fight against fascism reparations: the initial magnitude of but rather the recovery of the territories the indemnity was 223 billion gold lost during the revolution and civil marks. war to the new-born national states, The national interests of the Soviet i.e. a raison d’État. The real content Union in that period, on the other of the Soviet national interests was hand, were officially manifested as revealed by the territorial clauses of a building up of socialism in the the secret protocol of the Molotov- country. For that purpose it was vital Ribbentrop pact. The conclusion of a to maintain a peaceful international non-aggression pact with Germany environment and, if necessary, to prop revealed that the Soviets’ position it up with the system of collective was not ideologically determined but security in Europe.
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