79566 Federal Register / Vol

79566 Federal Register / Vol. 85, No. 238 / Thursday, December 10, 2020 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration, 800 e. Safety Element Approval (Part 414) Independence Avenue SW, Washington, f. Vehicle Operator License—Issuance, Federal Aviation Administration DC 20591; telephone (202) 267–8760; Duration, Additional License Terms and email [email protected]. Conditions, Transfer, and Rights Not 14 CFR Parts 401, 404, 413, 414, 415, Conferred (§§ 450.5 Through 450.13) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 3. Part 450 Subpart B—Requirements To 417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, 440, 450, Authority for This Rulemaking Obtain a Vehicle Operator License and 460 a. Incremental Review and Determinations [Docket No.: FAA–2019–0229; Amdt. No(s). The Commercial Space Launch Act of (§ 450.33) 401–9; 404–7, 413–12, 414–4, 415–7, 417– 1984, as amended and codified at 51 b. Means of Compliance (§ 450.35) c. Use of Safety Element Approval 6, 420–9, 431–7, 433–3, 435–5, 437–3, 440– U.S.C. 50901–50923 (the Act), (§ 450.39) 5, 450–2, and 460–3] authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to oversee, license, and d. Policy Review (§ 450.41) RIN 2120–AL17 e. Payload Reviews (§ 450.43) regulate commercial launch and reentry f. Safety Review and Approval (§ 450.45) Streamlined Launch and Reentry activities, and the operation of launch g. Environmental Review (§ 450.47) License Requirements and reentry sites within the United 4. Part 450 Subpart C—Safety States or as carried out by U.S. citizens. Requirements AGENCY: FAA Aviation Administration Section 50905 directs the Secretary to a. Neighboring Operations Personnel (FAA), Department of Transportation exercise this responsibility consistent (§ 450.101(a) and (b)) (DOT). with public health and safety, safety of b. High Consequence Event Protection (§ 450.101(c)) ACTION: Final rule. property, and the national security and c. Critical Asset and Critical Payload foreign policy interests of the United Protection SUMMARY: This rule streamlines and States. In addition, § 50903 requires the d. Other Safety Criteria (§ 450.101(d), (e), increases flexibility in the FAA’s Secretary to encourage, facilitate, and (f), and (g)) commercial space launch and reentry promote commercial space launches e. System Safety Program (§ 450.103) regulations, and removes obsolete and reentries by the private sector. As f. Hazard Control Strategies (§ 450.107) requirements. It consolidates and codified at 49 CFR 1.83(b), the Secretary g. Hazard Control Strategy Determination (§ 450.107(b)) revises multiple regulatory parts and has delegated authority to carry out applies a single set of licensing and h. Flight Abort (§ 450.108) these functions to the FAA i. Flight Hazard Analysis (§ 450.109) safety regulations across several types of Administrator. j. Physical Containment (§ 450.110) operations and vehicles. The rule This rulemaking amends the FAA’s k. Wind Weighting (§ 450.111) describes the requirements to obtain a launch and reentry requirements, l. Flight Safety Analysis (§§ 450.113 to vehicle operator license, the safety consolidating and revising multiple 450.139) requirements, and the terms and regulatory parts to set forth a single set m. Flight Safety Analysis Requirements— conditions of a vehicle operator license. of licensing and safety regulations Scope (§ 450.113) n. Flight Safety Analysis Methods DATES across several types of operations and : (§ 450.115) Effective date: This rule is effective vehicles. It also streamlines the o. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight March 10, 2021, except for amendatory commercial space regulations by, among (§ 450.117) instructions 3, 11, 17, 20, 27, 44 and 54, other things, replacing many p. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction concerning §§ 401.5, 413.1, and 413.23, prescriptive regulations with Flight (§ 450.119) the removal of parts 415, 417, 431, and performance-based rules, and giving q. Debris Analysis (§ 450.121) 435, and instructions 68 and 73 industry greater flexibility to develop r. Population Exposure Analysis amending §§ 440.3 and 460.45, means of compliance that maximize (§ 450.123) their objectives while maintaining s. Probability of Failure Analysis respectively, which are effective March (§ 450.131) 10, 2026. public safety. t. Flight Hazard Area Analysis (§ 450.133) Compliance: Affected parties, List of Abbreviations and Acronyms u. Debris Risk Analysis (§ 450.135) however, are not required to comply Frequently Used in This Document v. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effect with the information collection Analysis, or Distant Focus Overpressure requirements in part 450 until the Office AC—Advisory Circular (DFO) (§ 450.137) of Management and Budget (OMB) CEC—Conditional expected casualty w. Toxic Hazards (§§ 450.139 and 450.187) approves the collection and assigns a EC—Expected casualty x. Computing Systems (§ 450.141) ELOS determination—Equivalent-level-of- control number under the Paperwork y. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, and safety determination Documentation (§ 450.143) Reduction Act of 1995. The FAA will ELV—Expendable launch vehicle z. Flight Safety Systems (§§ 450.143 and publish in the Federal Register a notice FSA—Flight safety analysis 450.145) of the control number assigned by the FSS—Flight safety system aa. Hybrid Vehicles Office of Management and Budget RLV—Reusable launch vehicle bb. Agreements and Airspace (§ 450.147) cc. Safety-Critical Personnel Qualifications (OMB) for these information collection Table of Contents requirements. (§ 450.149) I. Overview dd. Work Shift and Rest Requirements ADDRESSES: For information on where to II. Background (§ 450.151) obtain copies of rulemaking documents III. Discussion of the Rule ee. Radio Frequency (§ 450.153) and other information related to this A. Safety Framework ff. Readiness and Rehearsals (§ 450.155) final rule, see ‘‘How To Obtain B. Detailed Discussion of the Final Rule gg. Communications (§ 450.157) Additional Information’’ in the 1. Prescriptive vs Performance-Based hh. Pre-Flight Procedures (§ 450.159) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of Regulations, ELOS, Safety Case ii. Control of Hazard Areas (§ 450.161) this document. 2. Part 450 Subpart A—General Discussion jj. Lightning Hazard Mitigation (§ 450.163) a. Pre-Application Consultation kk. Flight Commit Criteria (§ 450.165) FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For b. Application Process ll. Tracking (§ 450.167) technical questions concerning this c. Compliance Period for Legacy Licenses mm. Launch and Reentry Collision action, contact Randy Repcheck, Office (§ 450.1(b)) Avoidance Analysis Requirements of Commercial Space Transportation, d. Definition and Scope of Launch (§ 450.3) (§ 450.169)

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nn. Safety at End of Launch (§ 450.171) rule also revises multiple regulatory reference an applicant for either a oo. Mishap (Definition, §§ 450.173 and parts to apply a single set of licensing vehicle operator license, an incremental 450.175) and safety regulations across several approval, a payload determination, a pp. Unique Safety Policies, Requirements and Practices (§ 450.177) types of operations and vehicles. In policy approval, or an environmental qq. Ground Safety (§ 450.179 to § 450.189) addition, this rule replaces many determination. By ‘‘operator,’’ the FAA 5. Part 450 Subpart D—Terms and prescriptive regulations with intends to reference the holder of a Conditions of a Vehicle Operator License performance-based rules, giving license, which is consistent with the a. Public Safety Responsibility, industry greater flexibility to develop definition of ‘‘operator’’ in § 401.7. Compliance With License, Financial means of compliance that meet their This preamble will discuss in detail Responsibility, Human Spaceflight objectives while maintaining public the safety framework encapsulated in Requirements (§§ 450.201 to 450.207) safety. Where possible, the FAA has b. Compliance Monitoring (§ 450.209) part 450, part 450 requirements in c. Continuing Accuracy of License adopted performance standards, and sequential order, followed by Application; Application for considered the prescriptive corresponding and related changes to Modification of License (§ 450.211) requirements for placement in advisory other parts, and cost implications for d. Pre-Flight Reporting (§ 450.213) circulars (AC) that will identify possible this rule. e. Post-Flight Reporting (§ 450.215) means of compliance, but not the only f. Registration of Space Objects (§ 450.217) means of compliance, with this rule. i. Subpart A 6. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, 433, The goal of this approach is to afford the Subpart A includes a general 437, and 440 industry and the FAA the added 7. Miscellaneous Comments discussion on the application process, 8. Responses to Regulatory Impact Analysis flexibility of using new methods to licensing scope and duration, and Comments better enable future innovative concepts compliance dates. Pre-application IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses and operations. While some of the consultation, which may include A. Regulatory Evaluation provisions in this rule may increase the discussion of any applicable flexibilities B. Regulatory Flexibility Act risk to public safety compared to the in the application process, scope of C. International Trade Impact Assessment current regulations, such as the license, and means of compliance, is D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment provisions that apply to neighboring required by part 413. E. Paperwork Reduction Act operations personnel, the FAA has F. International Compatibility Figure 1 illustrates the licensing G. Environmental Analysis ensured that the increased risk is process. The licensing process begins V. Executive Order Determinations minimal and there is a corresponding with pre-application consultation, A. Executive Order 13771, Reducing public interest benefit. which sets the stage for an applicant to Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Part 450 accommodates all vehicle submit a license application. The Costs operators, including hybrid vehicle application evaluation consists of five B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism operators. The revisions include more major components: (1) A policy review, C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations performance-based requirements, That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, (2) a payload review, (3) a safety review, Distribution, or Use alternatives to flight abort and flight (4) a determination of maximum VI. How To Obtain Additional Information safety analysis (FSA) requirements probable loss (MPL) for establishing Rulemaking Documents based on demonstrated reliability, use of financial responsibility requirements, Comments Submitted to the Docket equivalent level of safety (ELOS) for the and (5) an environmental review. The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement measurement of a high consequence license specifies the range of activities Fairness Act event, and allowing application process the licensee may undertake along with I. Overview alternatives as agreed to by the FAA. any limitations. Requirements after a Part 450 is divided into subparts A license is issued encompass the Overview of Final Rule through D. Part 450 is organized by licensee’s responsibility for public This rule amends 14 CFR parts 415, sections that have both safety safety and compliance with its license, 417, 431, and 435 by consolidating, requirements for what an operator must representations in the license updating, and streamlining all launch do to be safe and application application, and FAA regulations. An and reentry regulations into a single part requirements for what must be important component of this 450. After March 10, 2026, parts 415, submitted in an application. By compliance is the FAA’s authority to 417, 431, and 435 will be removed. This ‘‘applicant,’’ the FAA intends to perform safety inspections.

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In the final rule, the FAA does not the regulatory requirements in part 450, and in consultation with an applicant. make any changes to the existing pre- the scope of the license, safety element The final rule does not adopt the application consultation provision, approvals, incremental review, review proposed default that hazardous ground except to update the term ‘‘safety period for license evaluation, pre-flight operations commence when a approval’’ to the newly adopted ‘‘safety compliance expectations, and time launch vehicle or its major components element approval.’’ The FAA makes this frames an operator is required to meet arrive at a U.S. launch site. Instead, the change to delineate between the safety to satisfy part 450. Some of the topics final rule identifies certain activities approval portion of a license application allow for flexibility that can result in a that qualify as hazardous pre-flight and a safety element approval that the more efficient licensing process for both operations, including, but not limited FAA grants under Part 414. This the applicant and the FAA. to, pressurizing or loading of distinction between terms will not affect The rule allows an applicant and the propellants into the vehicle or launch industry. FAA flexibility to establish the scope of system, operations involving a fueled During the pre-application the license. Determining the point at launch vehicle, the transfer of energy consultation stage, an applicant will which launch begins will be discussed necessary to initiate flight, or any work with the FAA to develop an during pre-application consultation. hazardous activity preparing the vehicle application and licensing process that The applicant will describe to the FAA for flight. This rule also clarifies that best fits its proposed operation. This its launch site and its intended concept hazardous pre-flight operations do not stage will focus on compliance planning of operations leading up to a launch, include the period between the end of and positioning the applicant to prepare including any operations that are the previous launch and launch vehicle an acceptable application, which will hazardous to the public. Once the FAA reuse when the vehicle is in a safe and increase the efficiency of the licensing and the applicant have a mutual dormant state. For the end of launch and reentry, the process. The length of pre-application understanding of the applicant’s FAA replaces each use of ‘‘vehicle consultation will vary based on the intended concept of operations, the stage’’ in the proposed rule with proposed operation. For example, pre- FAA will determine what constitutes ‘‘vehicle component’’ in the final rule. application consultations may be hazardous pre-flight operations and thus The FAA adopts this change in lengthy when involving new launch the beginning of launch. The applicant recognition that components other than vehicles that are under development or will then scope its application materials vehicle stages may return to Earth. Also, with operators inexperienced with the based on this starting point. the FAA now includes ‘‘impact or FAA’s regulations. Alternatively, pre- In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking landing’’ in the end of launch and application consultation with (NPRM), the FAA proposed to set the reentry sections in the scope of license experienced operators using proven scope of activity authorized by a vehicle requirements to accommodate vehicles from established sites may be operator license by identifying the increasing efforts to reuse components. considerably shorter. beginning and end of launch and During this stage, the FAA expects to reentry. The final rule provides ii. Subpart B discuss the following topics with an flexibility to scale the beginning of Subpart B contains the requirements applicant: Entrance and exit criteria for launch to the operation. Specifically, to obtain a vehicle operator license. The pre-application consultation, the the FAA will identify the beginning and topics include incremental review and intended means of compliance to meet end of launch on a case-by-case basis determinations, means of compliance,

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policy review, payload review, safety after the effective date of this rule.1 All For five requirements, an applicant review and approval, and operators, including those exercising must use a means of compliance the environmental review. This rule retains this provision, must come into FAA has accepted in advance of the key components of a license compliance with this regulation’s submitting an application. Those application review: The policy review, requirements for critical asset protection requirements for which an applicant payload review, safety review, MPL and collision avoidance (COLA) must use an accepted means of determination, and environmental analysis beginning from the effective compliance in advance are identified in review. This rule continues to allow date of this rule. Any operator may also § 450.35 and include FSA methods, operators to submit the payload, policy, choose to operate under part 450 on the airborne toxic concentration and environmental, and financial effective date of this rule. Operators duration thresholds for any toxic responsibility portions of its application conducting operations under parts 415, hazards for flight, highly reliable flight independently of each other. 417, 431 or 435 may submit requests for safety systems (FSS), lightning commit license renewals such that their license criteria, and airborne toxic The final rule will also allow an remains valid for up to five years after concentration and duration thresholds applicant to submit an application for a the effective date of this rule. A license toxic hazard mitigation for ground safety review in modules using an renewal issued after the effective date of operations. For all other requirements, incremental approach approved by the this rule will be valid for no longer than an applicant may include an accepted FAA. The safety review is typically the five years after the effective date of this means of compliance or a means of most complex part of the license rule.2 All operators will need to comply compliance the FAA has not yet application and usually involves with all parts of this rule five years after accepted as part of its application for submission of numerous documents. In its effective date. Any operator may also the FAA to review during application this rule, the FAA has concluded that a choose to operate under part 450 on the evaluation. The FAA will publish any structured approach agreed to during effective date of this rule. publicly available means of compliance pre-application consultation will reduce For an application for a license that it accepts. In addition, an operator regulatory uncertainty by allowing the modification submitted after this rule may request that the FAA publish the FAA to affirm at an early stage of becomes effective and within five years operator’s unique means of compliance, development that the proposed safety of the effective date, the FAA will once reviewed and accepted. measure or methodology meets the determine the applicability of part 450 The FAA evaluates five major FAA’s requirements. An applicant must on a case-by-case basis. In determining components in an application for a have its incremental review approach whether to apply part 450 in evaluating vehicle operator license. The FAA approved by the FAA prior to a license modification under this adopts the proposed requirements for submitting its application so that the scenario in consultation with the the policy review without modification. FAA can ensure that the modules can be applicant, the FAA will consider the For the FAA to conduct a policy review, reviewed independently and in a extent and complexity of the an applicant must identify the launch or workable order under an agreed time modification, whether the applicant reentry vehicle and its proposed flight frame. proposes to modify multiple parts of the profile, and describe the vehicle by The rule makes it easier for an application, and if the application characteristics that include individual applicant to seek a safety element requires significant reevaluation. stages and their dimensions, the type approval in conjunction with its license The final rule allows most time and amounts of all propellants, and application. A safety element approval frames to be determined during pre- maximum thrust. The final rule clarifies is an FAA document containing the application consultation, or during the that a payload review is not required FAA determination a safety element, application review process. An operator when the proposed launch or reentry when used or employed within a may propose alternative time frames for vehicle will not carry a payload or when defined envelope, parameter, or any of the requirements listed in the the payload is owned or operated by the situation, will not jeopardize public newly created Appendix A to part 404. U.S. Government. The FAA will health and safety or safety of property. Compliance with the performance continue to conduct safety reviews to A safety element includes a launch requirements in this rule may be determine whether an applicant is vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, demonstrated by using a means of capable of conducting a launch or process, service, or any identified compliance that is accepted by the FAA. reentry without jeopardizing public component thereof; and qualified and Means of compliance may be health and safety and safety of property trained personnel, performing a process government standards, industry as specified in §§ 415.103, 431.31(a), or function related to licensed activities consensus standards, or unique means and 435.31. Finally, the FAA adopts or vehicles. An applicant may also of compliance developed by an with revisions the proposed leverage existing safety element individual applicant. During pre- requirements for environmental review. approvals by citing a safety element application consultation, the FAA will The revisions include clarification on approval in another license application, work with applicants on compliance the FAA requirements for an thus streamlining the subsequent planning. The FAA will review the Environmental Assessment (EA) and the submitted means of compliance to licensing process. FAA’s responsibility to determine determine whether they satisfy the whether a Categorical Exemption After the final rule becomes effective regulatory safety standard. (CATEX) applies, in accordance with on March 10, 2021, operators holding an current regulations. The MPL active launch or reentry license, or who 1 The FAA refers to these licenses as ‘‘legacy calculation and financial responsibility licenses’’ throughout this preamble. After that time, have an accepted launch or reentry requirements are discussed under license application within 90 days after all operators must come into compliance with the new regulations. Subpart D. the effective date, may choose to operate 2 Operators holding a part 431 mission operator under parts 415 and 417 for expendable license have a 2-year renewable period, operators iii. Subpart C launch vehicles (ELVs), part 431 for holding a part 435 reentry operator license have a Subpart C addresses safety reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), or part 2-year renewable period, and operators holding a part 415 launch operator license have a 5-year requirements. In the final rule, the FAA 435 for reentry vehicles, until five years renewable period. revises numerous sections under

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subpart C in response to public to ensure (1) mitigations, such as flight consequence event in uncontrolled comments on the proposed rule, so that abort, will be implemented to protect areas for each phase of flight, such as the rule is more performance-based. against high consequence events, and using flight abort in accordance with Subpart C includes regulations for key (2) implementation of mitigations will § 450.108 (Flight Abort) or areas of concern to Federal launch or produce reasonable conditional risks. demonstrating that CEC is below a reentry sites that had not been covered The rule allows for neighboring certain threshold without using flight in previous FAA regulations (e.g., the operations personnel to be protected as abort. treatment of neighboring operations members of the public, but to a less The FAA adopts with revisions the personnel and critical assets, including stringent risk threshold as compared to proposal that an operator must critical payloads). Throughout this other members of the public. In the final implement and document a system document, the terms ‘‘Federal launch or rule, the FAA adopts the proposed safety program throughout the reentry sites’’ and ‘‘Federal sites’’ requirements on neighboring operations operational lifecycle of a launch or replace the NPRM’s use of ‘‘Federal personnel in §§ 401.7, 440.3, 450.101(a) reentry system in § 450.103 (System launch range.’’ and (b), and 450.137 (Far-field Safety Program). The system safety The FAA structured the rule to Overpressure Blast Effect Analysis) program includes a safety organization, facilitate elimination of duplication of paragraph (c)(6), but removes the phase hazard management, configuration the requirements of Federal launch or ‘‘as determined by the Federal or management and control, and post-flight reentry sites by incorporating critical licensed launch or reentry site operator’’ data review. In the final rule, the FAA asset protections, to avoid the need for from the definition of ‘‘neighboring removes the proposed term Federal sites to impose this operations personnel’’ in § 401.7. ‘‘operational’’ to clarify that the requirement. The rule also creates a Instead, the Federal or licensed site regulation applies to hazards throughout path for the FAA to determine that a operator will determine those persons the lifecycle of a launch or reentry Federal launch or reentry site’s ground who are eligible for neighboring system—not just to operational hazards. safety processes, requirements, and operations personnel status in The FAA also does not adopt the oversight are not inconsistent with the coordination with the operators at the proposed requirement in § 450.105 to Secretary’s statutory authority over site and in accordance with definition conduct a preliminary safety commercial space activities. in § 401.7. A site operator at a non- assessment, because that requirement The safety criteria in § 450.101 (Safety Federal site will have the option to has been replaced with a requirement to Criteria) set the public and property designate certain personnel as conduct a functional hazard analysis safety criteria that must be met before an neighboring operations personnel. under the Hazard Control Strategies In the final rule, critical assets include operator may initiate the flight of a section in the final rule. 3 property, facilities, or infrastructure launch or reentry vehicle. The In the NPRM, the FAA proposed quantitative safety criteria continue to necessary to maintain national security, or assured access to space for national under the Hazard Control Strategies be the linchpin requirement for flight section (§§ 450.107 to 450.111) that, for safety, which is fundamental for all priority missions. In the final rule, the FAA does not adopt the proposed each phase of a vehicle’s flight, an operators. There are quantitative risk operator would not need to conduct a criteria for collective risk, individual requirement for operators to calculate the risks to critical assets in preparing flight hazard analysis for that phase of risk, and aircraft risk. The final rule flight if the public safety and safety of applies collective and individual risk a flight hazard analysis, debris analysis, and debris risk analysis. The FAA property hazards identified in the criteria to people on waterborne vessels, preliminary safety assessment could be enabling risk management techniques anticipates that it will perform all critical asset and critical payload risk mitigated adequately to meet the that previously required a waiver. The requirements of proposed § 450.101 rule carves out neighboring operations assessments for commercial space transportation operations involving non- using physical containment, wind personnel on a launch or reentry site as weighting, or flight abort. In the final a separate category of the public subject Federal sites. Under § 450.101(c) of the NPRM, the rule, the FAA concludes that an to different risk criteria. This rule also FAA proposed to require an operator to operator must use one or more of the adds risk criteria for the protection of use flight abort as a hazard control hazard control strategies defined in critical assets essential to the national strategy if the consequence of any §§ 450.108 through 450.111 to meet the interests of the United States, including reasonably foreseeable vehicle response safety criteria. The FAA also adds a new a more stringent requirement for the mode, in any one-second period of paragraph to this section to address how protection of critical payloads. The final ¥3 flight, is greater than 1 × 10 CEC for an operator determines its hazard rule uses conditional risk management uncontrolled areas. The FAA amends control strategy or strategies for any the title of § 450.101(c) from ‘‘Flight phase of flight during a launch or 3 The FAA changes the title of § 450.101 from reentry. ‘‘public safety criteria’’ in the NPRM to ‘‘safety Abort’’ in the NPRM to ‘‘High criteria’’ in the final rule. This is because the FAA Consequence Event Protection’’ in the The FAA adopts proposed § 450.108, changed the definition of ‘‘public’’ in new § 401.7 final rule, because the final rule allows which is a consolidation and revision of of the final rule. In the NPRM, ‘‘public’’ was an operator to use a method other than several proposed sections associated defined to include ‘‘people and property that are not involved in supporting the launch or reentry flight abort in certain situations in with flight abort requirements in the and includes those people and property that may which the operator can show sufficient NPRM. As a result of this consolidation, be located within the launch or reentry site, such protection against high consequence the FAA removes the flight abort related as visitors, individuals providing goods or services events. The FAA retains the CEC requirements in §§ 450.123, 450.125, not related to launch or reentry processing or flight, and any other operator and its personnel.’’ In the requirement as a quantitative criterion 450.127, and 450.129. The requirements final rule, the FAA removed references to property, that an applicant must use to measure in these sections have been revised to be limiting the scope of the term ‘‘public’’ to people. high consequence events, but revises the performance-based standards included This was done to provide better clarity throughout final rule to allow ELOS for the CEC in § 450.108(c), which addresses flight part 450 regarding the protection of people, property, or both. Because § 450.101 includes requirement. The final rule also allows safety limits objectives, and criteria for both people and property, the FAA options for how an applicant may § 450.108(d), which addresses flight removes ‘‘public’’ from the title. protect against a low likelihood, high safety limits constraints.

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Section 450.109 (Flight Hazard safety limits to § 450.108 and condenses In the final rule, the FAA revises the Analysis) details requirements for an the remaining FSA requirements into 11 reference to FSS requirements in operator using a flight hazard analysis performance-based sections that cover § 450.143(a); amends § 450.143(b) to as its hazard control strategy for one or the scope of the analyses, general include other means of compliance and more phases of flight. A flight hazard methodology requirements, and specific broader safe design concepts; and analysis must identify, describe, and sections on normal trajectories, removes the term ‘‘vehicle’’ in analyze all reasonably foreseeable malfunction trajectories, hazardous § 450.143(c) because safety-critical hazards to public safety and safety of debris characterization, population systems can be located off-vehicle. In property resulting from the flight of a exposure, probability of failure, flight addition, the FAA amends the launch or reentry vehicle, mitigate hazard areas, debris risks, and far-field application requirements in § 450.143(f) hazards as appropriate, and validate and overpressure blast effects. The FAA to require that applicants describe the verify the hazard mitigations. The FAA moved some of the proposed FSA method used to validate predicted revises the final rule to reflect that requirements such that an operator operating environments and any performing a flight hazard analysis is could generally perform the analyses in standards used for each safety-critical included as a hazard control strategy to the order that they appear in the final system. derive hazard controls for the flight, or rule, if they choose. Section 450.145 (Highly Reliable phase of flight, of a launch or reentry The FAA revises the FSA sections to Flight Safety System) contains the vehicle. be more performance-based than what requirements for certain FSS. The FAA Regardless of the hazard control was proposed in the NPRM. revises § 450.145 to apply to a highly strategy chosen or mandated an operator Specifically, the FAA revises the FSA reliable FSS, which consists of any must conduct an FSA to demonstrate requirements to identify their onboard portion and if used, any quantitatively that a launch or reentry fundamental purpose, the essential ground-based, space-based, or otherwise meets the safety criteria for debris, far- constraints, and the objectives in each not onboard portion of the system. field overpressure, and toxic hazards. section. The FSA requirements in the Conventional FSS with airborne flight An operator may be required to conduct final rule are consistent with current termination receivers and ground-based additional analyses to use flight abort or practice, but the rule articulates command transmitter systems will have wind weighting hazard control important, often misunderstood, aspects both airborne and ground-based strategies. The FAA anticipates that an of flight analysis such as the creation of subsystems. The final rule provides operator will be required to conduct hazard areas and other operating additional flexibility for operations ¥2 some FSA for at least some phases of constraints necessary to protect public where the CEC is between 1 × 10 and flight, regardless of the hazard control health and safety and safety of property. 1 × 10¥3 and exempts the FSS for such strategy chosen or mandated. For Sections 450.139 (Toxic Hazards for operations from the requirements of example, an FSA must determine flight Flight) and 450.187 (Toxic Hazards § 450.145; however, the FSS for such hazard areas for any vehicle with Mitigation for Ground Operations) operations must still meet the planned debris impacts capable of contain the requirements for toxic requirements of § 450.143. The FAA causing a casualty. release analysis. In the final rule, the makes these changes to scope the FSS The FAA revises the FSA FAA adopts §§ 450.139 and 450.187 design, testing, and analysis more requirements in § 450.113 (Flight Safety with some revisions. The FAA clarifies closely to potential consequence and Analysis Requirements—Scope), which that operators are not required to risk. These changes will reduce burden establish the portions of flight for which perform a toxic release hazard analysis on operators that have a lower potential an operator would be required to for kerosene-based fuels unless directed for causing high consequence events. perform and document an FSA. An by the FAA. Also, the FAA revises the The FAA also removes the reliability operator must perform and document an requirements for performing toxic threshold required of an FSS for FSA for all phases of flight, unless containment. operations where CEC is between 1 × otherwise agreed to by the FAA. The In the NPRM, § 450.111 contained 10¥2 and 1 × 10¥3. The final rule FAA may agree there is no need for an computing systems and software provides that an FSS required for FSA for certain phases of flight based on requirements. In the final rule, the FAA operations for which the CEC is between demonstrated reliability for any launch revises and relocates the requirements 1 × 10¥2 and 1 × 10¥3 must meet the or reentry vehicle, instead of just for for computing systems and software to requirements of § 450.143. hybrid vehicles as proposed in the § 450.141 (Computing Systems and Section 450.147 (Agreements) NPRM. The FAA expands this exception Software). In response to comments, the requires a vehicle operator to have a because, conceivably, an operation FAA revises the requirements of written agreement with any entity that involving a vehicle other than a hybrid § 450.141 to be more performance- provides a service or use of property to could have an extensive and safe based, and levies requirements for meet a requirement in part 450. In the enough flight history to demonstrate computing system safety items in final rule, the FAA requires an operator compliance with the risk criteria in proportion to their criticality instead of to enter into multiple agreements if the § 450.101 based on empirical data in the item’s level of autonomy. The final operator works with multiple entities. lieu of the traditional risk analysis. rule also requires independent Also, operators will continue to be An FSA generally consists of a set of verification and validation for required to enter into agreements with quantitative analyses used to determine computing system safety items that meet the appropriate entities for launches and flight commit criteria, flight abort rules, the definition of ‘‘safety-critical’’ in reentries that cross airspace or impact flight hazard areas, and other mitigation § 401.7. water not under U.S. jurisdiction. measures, and to demonstrate The requirements of § 450.143 (Safety- Section 450.153 contains the compliance with the safety criteria in Critical System Design, Test, and requirements for radio frequency. In the § 450.101. In the NPRM, the FAA Documentation) apply to all safety- NPRM, the FAA proposed that an proposed 15 sections associated with critical systems except highly reliable operator would be required to identify FSA requirements in §§ 450.113 to FSS and safety-critical software items, each frequency, all allowable frequency 450.141. The final rule moves which are regulated by the requirements tolerances, and each frequency’s requirements associated with flight in §§ 450.145 and 450.141 respectively. intended use, operating power, and

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source; and provide for the monitoring cooperate with FAA and NTSB occurs during or immediately after of frequency usage and enforcement of investigations contained in the NPRM. licensed activities. frequency allocations. In the final rule, The FAA finds this requirement II. Background the FAA adopts the proposed duplicative of § 450.13, which states requirements with modifications to the that a vehicle operator license does not This rulemaking arose from work by performance-based objectives central to relieve a licensee of its obligations to the National Space Council that led to radio frequency management. Operators comply with all applicable requirements President Donald J. Trump’s Space will be required to ensure that radio of law or regulation that may apply to Policy Directive-2 (SPD–2) in May 2018, frequency does not adversely affect the its activities. Also, the final rule directing the U.S. Department of performance of FSS or safety-critical standardizes criteria for mishap plans Transportation to streamline the systems, and to coordinate radio across all of 14 CFR Chapter III by regulations governing commercial space frequency with local and Federal making § 450.173 applicable to launch launch and reentry licensing. The goals authorities. and reentry licensees, experimental of this streamlining include creating a Section 450.157 contains the permittees, and site operators. single licensing regime for all types of requirements for communications. In The FAA proposed to give license commercial space flight launch and the NRPM, the FAA proposed that applicants and licensees the option to reentry operations, and replacing personnel that have authority to issue pre-coordinate testing activities with the prescriptive requirements with ‘‘hold/resume,’’ ‘‘go/no go,’’ and abort FAA. In the final rule, the FAA clarifies performance-based criteria. The final commands must monitor each common that § 450.175 (Test-induced Damage) rule is consistent with DOT’s intercom channel during countdown will only apply to licensees or license regulations under 49 CFR 5.5(e), which and flight. The FAA does not adopt the applicants who choose to apply for the instruct that regulations should be proposal because it was overly exception. The final rule also allows an technologically neutral, and, to the prescriptive. operator to coordinate the possibility of extent feasible, should specify Section 450.161 (Control of Hazard test-induced damage prior to an performance objectives, rather than Areas) contains the control of hazard operation and exclude damage meeting prescribing specific conduct that areas. In the final rule, the FAA does not certain requirements from constituting a regulated entities must adopt. remove the requirement for an operator mishap, thereby reducing unnecessary On March 8, 2018, the FAA chartered to verify that warnings have been issued reporting. the Streamlined Launch and Reentry when the operator relies on another Licensing Requirements Aviation party to publicize those warnings. v. Subpart D Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to Instead, the FAA clarifies that the Subpart D addresses the terms and provide a forum for a broad range of requirement may be met by conditions of a vehicle operator license. stakeholders from the aviation and demonstrating due diligence pursuant to space communities to discuss agreements that the operator has with This includes compliance monitoring (§ 450.209), material changes and regulations to set forth procedures and that party and notifying the FAA of any requirements for commercial space deviations from the agreements by any continuing accuracy (§ 450.211), pre- flight reporting (§ 450.213), post-flight transportation launch and reentry party. The FAA also adds an application licensing. The FAA tasked the ARC with requirement for the applicant to give a reporting (§ 450.215), and registration of space objects (§ 450.217). In the final developing recommendations for a description of how the applicant will performance-based regulatory approach provide for any publication of flight rule, the FAA adopts these sections as proposed with the exception of in which the regulations set forth the hazard areas. safety objectives to be achieved while In the final rule, the FAA does not revisions to § 450.213 (Pre-flight providing the applicant flexibility to adopt the four mishap categories Reporting) as described below. produce tailored and innovative means proposed in the NPRM. The FAA agrees The final rule makes few changes to of compliance. with commenters that the regulatory the post-licensing requirements, for On April 30, 2018, the ARC submitted requirements for the proposed mishap which the final rule standardizes requirements for all launches and its final recommendation report to the classes, from most severe (Class 1) to 4 least severe (Class 4), were largely the reentries from Federal sites and FAA. The FAA addressed the same, and concludes that the mishap commercial spaceports or exclusive use recommendations in more detail classes are not needed to achieve the launch sites. In line with the previous throughout the NPRM. This final rule objective of consolidating mishap- requirements, operators will provide incorporates recommendations provided related terms and streamlining the information and comply with reported by the ARC. requirements to report, respond to, and collision avoidance closures. A Federal On March 26, 2019, the FAA posted investigate mishaps. Instead, the FAA agency will continue to provide on its website an NPRM titled ‘‘Launch combines the substantive criteria of operators the appropriate launch or and Reentry Licensing Requirements’’ Mishap Classes 1–4 under the definition reentry closures, but the rule allows the that would revise parts 401, 404, 413, of ‘‘mishap.’’ The revised definition in possibility of some other entity’s 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 433, 435, 437, the final rule describes events that providing this service in the future. The and 440, and create a new part 450. In constitute a mishap. The requirements final rule offers operators flexibility, in the NPRM, the FAA proposed to to report, respond to, and investigate coordination with the FAA, to use streamline and increase flexibility in the mishaps are incumbent upon an different timelines for the submission of FAA’s commercial space launch and operator regardless of a mishap’s pre-flight and post-flight reports. The reentry regulations, remove obsolete severity. FAA revises § 450.213(d) to allow an requirements, consolidate and revise Section 450.173 (Mishap Plan— operator the flexibility to identify an multiple regulatory parts, and apply a Reporting, Response, and Investigation appropriate time frame in coordination single set of licensing and safety Requirements) contains the with the FAA. The FAA also revises 4 Streamlined Launch and Reentry Licensing requirements for the mishap plan. In the § 450.217(c) so that licensees will only Requirements ARC, Recommendations Final Report final rule, the FAA does not adopt the need to notify the FAA that they (April 30, 2008). The ARC Report is available for proposed requirement for a licensee to removed an object from orbit if removal reference in the docket (Docket FAA–2019–0229).

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regulations across several types of commenters’ questions requesting period to the NPRM (84 FR 35051). To operations and vehicles. clarification. Also on July 16, 2019, the provide commenters with sufficient On April 15, 2019, the FAA published FAA posted a statement 7 to the docket time to review the FAA’s clarifications this NPRM in the Federal Register (85 encouraging commenters to post any in response to the commenter’s FR 15296). The initial comment period further requests for clarification in the questions, the FAA extended the was 60-days from the date of docket as soon as possible. That comment period to August 19, 2019.14 publication, ending on June 14, 2019. statement reasserted the FAA’s In the ensuing month, commenters judgment that further engagement with On August 16, 2019, the FAA posted 15 submitted fifty-six requests for an industry through a public meeting to its response to the docket to extension of the comment period to a have clarifying dialogue regarding the commenters’ questions for clarification total of 120 days, or until August 13, NPRM would not be beneficial, but also received by July 12, 2020, and July 29, 2019. offered to entertain meetings in the 2019. In response, on May 31, 2019, the month of July 2019 with members of the On August 19, 2019, the comment FAA published an extension of the public who wished to provide to the period closed, with a total of 155 comment period on the NPRM (84 FR FAA their information bearing on the submissions from 85 commenters, and 25207), for an additional 45-days to July proposed rule. two submissions containing proprietary 30, 2019, to allow commenters more Subsequently, the FAA met with Blue information. Of these comments, 62 time to analyze the proposed rule. 8 Origin, the Coalition for Deep Space requested an extension of the comment On June 14, 2019, the FAA posted to Exploration,9 Space Exploration 5 period, 10 requested to reconvene the the docket a response to MLA Space, Technologies Corp. (SpaceX),10 Virgin LLC, which had requested that the FAA Galactic,11 and Virgin Orbit 12 to receive ARC, 29 requested a public meeting, 18 reconvene the ARC to engage in their clarifying questions and a preview requested a Supplemental Notice of dialogue regarding the NPRM. In the of their comments on the NPRM.13 Proposed Rulemaking (SNPRM), 18 response, the FAA stated its belief that On July 22, 2019, the FAA published contained clarifying questions for parts engagement with industry in the form of a second extension of the comment of the NPRM, and 53 comments an ARC, a public meeting, or through a contained substantive feedback special session of Commercial Space 7 See FAA–2019–0229–0107. regarding the proposed rule. The FAA Transportation Advisory Committee 8 See FAA–2019–0229–0127. discusses the adjudication of these (COMSTAC) would not be beneficial at 9 See FAA–2019–0229–0178. comments in more detail later in the 10 that point in the rulemaking process. See FAA–2019–0229–0129. preamble. The FAA encouraged members of 11 See FAA–2019–0229–0128. 12 industry to submit any questions See FAA–2019–0229–0126. III. Discussion of the Rule 13 Since the information provided at these requesting clarification regarding the meetings is already captured in these commenters’ A. Safety Framework NPRM to the docket. clarifying questions or comments submitted to the On July 16, 2019, the FAA posted to docket, the FAA gave these commenters the option the docket the first of its responses 6 to of not posting to the docket a summary of the meeting, as required by the FAA’s Statement 14 See 84 FR 35051. Regarding Requests for Public Meetings (see FAA– 5 See FAA–2019–0229–0088. 2019–0229–0107), as this would be a duplicative 15 See FAA–2019–0229–0134 and FAA–2019– 6 See FAA–2019–0229–0106. effort. 0229–0135.

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General. The final rule relies on a management and control, and post-flight launch vehicle or its components that safety framework that provides the data review. will ensure compliance with the safety flexibility needed to accommodate Hazard Control Strategies. To address criteria in § 450.101. current and future launch and reentry the wide variety of commercial launch • Flight abort is the traditional safety operations. The safety framework and reentry systems and operations approach for expendable launch encompasses both ground safety and concepts, the final rule includes four vehicles, and is a process to limit or flight safety. Acceptable safety for hazard control strategies. An operator restrict the hazards to public safety and ground operations is achieved primarily can use multiple hazard control the safety of property presented by a through a process-based hazard analysis strategies during flight because different launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, and certain prescribed hazard controls. strategies may be appropriate for including any payload, while in flight Acceptable safety for flight operations is different phases of flight. Different by initiating and accomplishing a achieved through several elements hazard control strategies may also be controlled ending to vehicle flight. With discussed further in this preamble appropriate during any one phase of the exception of phases of flight with section. The FAA identifies specific flight to protect different sets of people demonstrated reliability, flight abort is safety criteria and requirements in and property. The hazard control mandated as a hazard control strategy if § 450.101 that must be met before a strategies are physical containment, the potential for a high consequence launch or reentry can take place, wind weighting, flight abort, and flight event is above a certain threshold. including collective risk, individual hazard analysis. • Flight hazard analysis is the risk, aircraft risk, risk to critical assets, • Physical containment would most traditional safety approach for reusable protection against high consequence likely be used for low energy test flights, launch vehicles, and is the most flexible events, disposal of orbiting stages, risk when a launch vehicle does not have hazard control strategy because an to people and property on orbit, and sufficient energy for any hazards operator derives specific hazard controls notification of planned impacts. associated with its flight to reach the unique to its launch or reentry vehicle System Safety Program. All operators public or critical assets. system and operations concept. Flight are required to have a system safety • Wind weighting is traditionally hazard analysis is mandated as a hazard program that establishes system safety used in the launch of unguided control strategy if the other three hazard management principles for both ground suborbital launch vehicles, otherwise control strategies cannot mitigate the safety and flight safety throughout the known as sounding rockets, where the safety hazards sufficient to meet the operational lifecycle of a launch or operator adjusts launcher azimuth and safety criteria of § 450.101. reentry system. The system safety elevation settings to correct for the An operator determines the program includes a safety organization, effects of wind conditions at the time of appropriate hazard control strategy by hazard management, configuration flight to provide impact locations for the conducting a functional hazard analysis.

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Flight Safety Analyses. Regardless of more performance-based requirements the acceptability of other hazard control the hazard control strategy chosen or that would allow for different means of strategies. Part 450 also builds on the mandated, an operator is required to compliance. The FAA received several precedent set by part 431’s limits on the conduct several FSA. These include comments stating generally that the foreseeable consequences of a failure in trajectory analyses for normal and proposed rule was still too prescriptive. terms of conditional expected casualties malfunction flight, a debris analysis, a The Commercial Spaceflight Federation and establishes a less stringent population exposure analysis, and a (CSF) and SpaceX commented that some threshold.17 Furthermore, the FAA probability of failure analysis. These of the proposed requirements would stated in the NPRM that it would not analyses provide input to a debris risk unnecessarily drive applicants to a specifically address the ARC’s proposed analysis, a far-field overpressure blast burdensome equivalent level of safety regulatory text because that regulatory effects analysis, and a toxic hazard (ELOS) process as a default. Blue Origin text did not receive broad consensus analysis that together demonstrate recommended broadly that the FAA within the ARC. compliance with the safety criteria of remove all prescriptive portions of the One individual commenter noted that § 450.101, and provide input to a flight proposed rule.16 streamlining was long overdue. Another hazard area analysis. The FAA agrees that some of the individual commenter noted that the Derived Hazard Controls. With requirements in proposed part 450 were proposed rule is longer and more respect to flight operations, an operator unnecessarily prescriptive, particularly complicated than the rule it proposes to would derive several hazard controls by those for software and FSA. The FAA replace, and that past FAA approaches conducting the FSA and, if necessary, a has modified those requirements to led to codifying Federal launch and flight hazard analysis. Because hazard remove unnecessary prescriptiveness reentry site requirements, which the controls are derived from these and provide additional flexibility while Federal sites subsequently changed such analyses, they are not specifically still preserving safety and providing that they no longer matched the FAA addressed in part 450. regulatory clarity. For many of the requirements. Prescribed Hazard Controls for requirements amended for this purpose In response, the FAA notes that the Computing Systems and Software and in the final rule, the prescriptive parts proposed regulation combined elements Safety-Critical Hardware. Regardless of of the proposal will be moved to a from parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. Part the hazard controls derived from a flight corresponding AC as guidance on means 450 is shorter than parts 415 and 417 hazard analysis and FSA, the FAA of compliance. Specific changes to the and more performance-based. Although requires many other hazard controls. requirements are discussed later in this it is longer than parts 431 and 435, part The first set of hazard controls includes preamble. 450 is more flexible and encompasses requirements for computing systems Several commenters, including Blue more types of launch and reentry and software, safety-critical systems, Origin, CSF, and SpaceX, also stated operations. This final rule allows and highly reliable FSS. that the FAA should base its new operators to use a means of compliance Other Prescribed Hazard Controls. requirements on parts 431 and 435 and that will accommodate customized The second set of hazard controls have add details on how to comply through operations, changing technologies, and historically been necessary to achieve guidance. CSF also stated that the FAA innovation. acceptable flight safety. These include ignored the draft regulatory text ii. Equivalent Level of Safety (§ 450.37) requirements for (1) written agreements, provided by the ARC, which used parts In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in (2) safety-critical personnel 431 and 435 as a basis for updated rules. qualifications, (3) work shift and rest § 450.37 (Equivalent Level of Safety) The FAA disagrees that parts 431 and that for all requirements in part 450, requirements, (4) radio frequency 435 should be used as the sole basis for management, (5) readiness, (6) except § 450.101, an applicant may part 450. Part 431 depends on an clearly and convincingly demonstrate communications, (7) pre-flight operator to use the system safety process procedures, (8) control of hazard areas, that an alternative approach provides an to derive hazard controls, which as equivalent level of safety (ELOS) to the (9) lightning hazard mitigation, (10) reflected in part 450, is appropriate for flight commit criteria, (11) tracking, (12) requirement. some launch and reentry vehicle In the final rule, the FAA revises collision avoidance, (13) safety at the systems and operations. However, as § 450.37 so that only some portions of end of launch, and (14) mishap plans. also reflected in part 450, not all launch § 450.101—specifically § 450.101(a), (b), Ground Safety. With respect to the and reentry vehicle systems and safety of ground operations, the safety (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g)—are operations require an operator to derive excluded from eligibility for an ELOS framework includes (1) coordination hazard controls through the system with a site operator, (2) explosive siting, approach. This change allows an safety process. Specifically, physical applicant to propose an equivalent level (3) a ground hazard analysis, (4) toxic containment, wind weighting, and, most hazard mitigations, and (5) prescribed of safety to the orbital debris importantly, flight abort are often requirement in § 450.101(e)(2) and the hazard controls addressing visitors, sufficient. Part 450 incorporates the notification of planned impacts countdown aborts, fire suppression, and flexibility of part 431, but acknowledges requirement in § 450.101(f). Most emergency procedures. These together significantly, this change also allows an provide an acceptable set of public 16 Blue Origin submitted to the rulemaking docket applicant to propose an equivalent level safety considerations for ground a letter to Admiral James Ellis, Jr, USN (ret.), of safety to the use of a CE of 1 × 10¥3 operations. Chairman, Users’ Advisory Group, National Space C Council, in which Blue Origin expressed concerns B. Detailed Discussion of the Final Rule with the NPRM. The letter encouraged Adm. Ellis 17 Section 431.43(d) sets a limit for foreseeable to communicate the concerns to the Administration public consequences in terms of CEC, but only for 1. Prescriptive vs Performance-Based and the members of the National Space Council and an unproven RLV. Section 431.43(d) provides an Regulations, ELOS, Safety Case advise the Office of the Secretary of Transportation unproven RLV may only be operated so that during and FAA to engage further with industry through any portion of flight, the expected number of i. Prescriptive a public meeting to address concerns with the casualties does not exceed 1 × 10¥4 given a vehicle NPRM and then to issue a supplemental NPRM that failure will occur at any time the instantaneous The FAA sought in the NPRM to achieves the goals of SPD–2. The FAA is construing impact point is over a populated area. This is in propose changes that would convert the contents of the letter as comments on the greater detail in the high consequence event many of its prescriptive requirements to proposals in the NPRM. protection section of the preamble.

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as the measure of a high consequence add a provision that would allow use of which can be demonstrated through event in § 450.101(c)(2). Section an alternate process for obtaining a ELOS, support the achievement of these 450.101(c) is discussed more fully later license based on the use of a ‘‘safety underlying risk criteria. To use an in this preamble. case’’ methodology. This methodology ELOS, an operator may demonstrate that Virgin Galactic commented that ELOS would consist of voluntary audits of an an alternative approach provides an determinations should be part of the applicant’s safety and risk management equivalent level of safety to a license application process. The FAA program, followed by development of a requirement in accordance with agrees with the comment and safety case showing how the public § 450.37. A petition for waiver must be incorporates ELOS determinations into would be protected during licensed submitted at least 60 days in advance the license application process. To activities. and address why granting the request exercise this option, an applicant must The FAA finds that the proposed for relief is in the public interest and demonstrate, through technical regulation is flexible in allowing an will not jeopardize the public health rationale, that the proposed alternative applicant to propose a means of and safety, safety of property, and provides a level of safety equivalent to compliance. It also affords the national security and foreign policy the requirement it would replace. The possibility of meeting most interests of the United States in FAA will evaluate the proposal during requirements by demonstrating an accordance with § 404.5. 19 the application evaluation. ELOS. An applicant may wish to use Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop CSF stated that, if the FAA adopted a safety case to demonstrate that it is has Grumman, and ULA commented that the parts 431 and 435 framework, ELOS satisfied the ELOS standard; however, the FAA should accept a Federal launch would be unnecessary because the the FAA declines to add prescriptive or reentry site’s safety processes as ELOS process does not exist under those audit requirements for its use. An providing an ELOS to the FAA’s own regulations.18 Blue Origin urged the applicant could, but is not required to, safety standards without any additional FAA to consider the need for an ELOS use a safety case to show that a certain safety requirements. method satisfies an ELOS to a regulatory option in this rule. The FAA disagrees. FAA regulations requirement, excluding the In response to CSF’s comments, the apply to licensed launches and, in requirements of § 450.101(a), (b), (c)(1), FAA acknowledges that, in theory, a accordance with § 450.45(b) (Safety (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g). A safety case performance-based regulation like part Review and Approval), the FAA will is not required to demonstrate ELOS. It 450 could function without an ELOS accept any safety-related launch or is one way to provide rationale for provision, because, in concept, a reentry service provided by a Federal ELOS. An applicant could use a safety performance-based rule allows many launch or reentry site or other Federal case or other justification for ELOS. different means of compliance with the entity by contract, if the FAA required safety standard. The FAA Virgin Galactic recommended that safety cases be counted as an alternative determines that the launch or reentry considered eliminating the ELOS service satisfies part 450. Although it is to CEC in § 450.101(c). The Boeing provision from the final rule, but possible for the FAA to find that a decided that eliminating the ELOS Company (Boeing), Lockheed Martin Corporation (Lockheed Martin), service provided by a Federal launch or provision would remove a useful reentry site does not satisfy a regulatory tool that provides flexibility. Northrop Grumman Corporation (Northrop Grumman), and United requirement in part 450 but does Unlike means of compliance, which provide an ELOS, the FAA needs to demonstrate compliance with the Launch Alliance (ULA) sought clarification as to why § 450.37 would make that determination on a case-by- regulation, ELOS allows an applicant to case basis. propose and demonstrate a method that not apply to § 450.101. Similarly, Blue ensures an ELOS to the requirement, but Origin, CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin iii. ‘‘As agreed to by the Administrator’’ not necessarily compliance with the Galactic commented that ELOS should be allowed for § 450.101(c). Throughout the NPRM, the FAA used requirement itself. The FAA has chosen the clause ‘‘as agreed to by the to retain the option of ELOS to allow The FAA agrees with allowing ELOS for § 450.101(c)(2). This allows an Administrator.’’ The term was used in operators to propose unique processes all time frame requirements, as well as and procedures that this rule may not operator to make a safety case or provide some other justification for an in proposed §§ 450.3(a) and (b)(1), have contemplated. 450.33, 450.101(c), 450.113(a)(5), Blue Origin stated that it supports the ELOS determination for an alternative 450.107(b)(2), 450.107(d), 450.147(c), use of safety cases as a means to method to protect against a high 450.173(g), 450.213(a), and 450.215(b). establish an ELOS under proposed consequence event, such as safeguards As stated in the proposal, this clause is § 450.37. A safety case is a structured other than flight abort, or an alternative used to mean that an operator may argument, supported by a body of to CEC as a measurement of the potential submit an alternative to the proposed evidence that provides a compelling, for a high consequence event, such as a requirement to the FAA for review. The comprehensive, and valid case that a risk profile, both of which are described FAA must agree to the operator’s system is safe, for a given application in more in the preamble section discussing proposal for the operator to use the a particular setting. Regarding process, § 450.101(c). Section 450.101(a), (b), alternative. Blue Origin recommended requiring (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g) contain CSF and SpaceX commented that it only one layer of external-to-applicant the core safety requirements to protect was unclear how the clause ‘‘as agreed audit, and that the audit criteria be people and property on land, at sea, in to by the Administrator’’ differed from transparently developed with industry the air, and in space. Any proposed an ELOS determination. CSF and input to ensure understanding of the non-compliance with these risk SpaceX requested that the FAA describe scope of compliance with the ELOS requirements will require a waiver and its expectations and capture any process proposal process. Another individual are not eligible for a demonstration of associated with this option in guidance. commenter stated that the FAA should ELOS. By contrast, all other flight safety requirements in part 450 subpart C, CSF and SpaceX also recommended 18 The FAA added equivalent level of safety adding ‘‘unless otherwise agreed to by provisions to parts 431 and 435 in a 2018 final rule. 19 ELOS is not applicable to § 450.101(a), (b), the Administrator’’ to the beginning of 83 FR 28528 (June 20, 2018). (c)(1), (c)(3), (d), (e)(1), and (g). proposed § 450.101(c).

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The clause ‘‘as agreed to by the discussed in more detail in the performance-based requirements should Administrator’’ means that an operator preamble section addressing CEC. not apply to launch vehicles with no may submit an alternative to a prior launch history. Performance-based iv. Time frames regulatory requirement. The FAA must requirements provide flexibility to all agree to the operator’s proposal for the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to operators. Means of compliance located operator to use this alternative. Unlike allow an operator to propose different in ACs and other standards that have an ELOS determination, an applicant time frames for certain regulatory been identified as accepted means of need not demonstrate that this sections if ‘‘agreed to by the compliance to part 450 provide detailed alternative satisfies an ELOS to the Administrator’’. Blue Origin, CSF, and guidance to those new operators that requirement. Each use of the term ‘‘as SpaceX disagreed with this approach have not yet established safety processes agreed to by the Administrator’’ and requested that the FAA remove any and procedures. In response to includes criteria or considerations by requirement to submit such a request in SpinLaunch’s comment, the final rule is which the FAA will agree to a different a specific time frame other than as soon structured such that an applicant must approach than the regulatory as the operator understands that a demonstrate to the FAA the necessary requirement. An applicant should look different time frame is necessary. Virgin skills and knowledge to perform safe to these criteria or considerations to Galactic recommended that alternate operations in its launch or reentry determine what the FAA would expect time frames should be spelled out license application. from an applicant when providing an within an operator’s license application 2. Part 450 Subpart A—General alternative proposal. documents and suggested alternative Discussion For most of the requirements in part regulatory text. The FAA disagrees with the approach 450, an applicant may demonstrate an a. Pre-Application Consultation to remove specific time frames because equivalent level of safety if the the time frames are designed to ensure In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to applicant is unable to meet a the FAA has sufficient time to conduct retain the requirement for pre- requirement. In addition, an operator its review and make the requisite public application consultation from § 413.5 may request a waiver to any health and safety, safety of property, (Pre-Application Consultation) because requirement. An ELOS may be and national security and foreign policy the various flexibilities proposed in this submitted in a license application and findings. The FAA notes that the time rule would benefit from pre-application must clearly and convincingly frames proposed in the NPRM and discussions. These include incremental demonstrate that an alternative adopted in the final rule are default time review, timelines, and the performance- approach provides an equivalent level frames. An applicant can propose and based nature of the regulatory of safety to the requirement. A petition the FAA can accept an alternative time requirements. In the final rule, the FAA for waiver must be submitted 60 days in frame. The FAA expects alternative time adopts the proposal with no changes to advance and address why granting the frames to be proposed and accepted the existing pre-application consultation request for relief is in the public interest during pre-application consultation or provision. and will not jeopardize the public during the application process so that As proposed, this rule retains pre- health and safety, safety of property, the agreed to time frames are then application consultation for vehicle and national security and foreign policy reflected in the license once issued. operators seeking a license. The FAA interests of the United States. Time frames can be adjusted after a will also publish a pre-application For some requirements, the FAA license is issued through the license consultation Advisory Circular, which anticipated the need for additional modification process, as opposed to the will provide additional guidance but regulatory flexibility without the burden waiver process under the current will not establish new regulatory of providing an equivalent level of regulations. However, in most cases, the requirements. Pre-application safety or applying for a separate waiver. FAA expects flexible time frames to be consultation will continue to focus on For those requirements, the FAA has negotiated for all the launches or compliance planning and ensuring the incorporated the clause ‘‘as agreed to by reentries under the license prior to the applicant can prepare an acceptable the Administrator’’ to mean that an first licensed activity. application, which will increase the operator may submit an alternative to efficiency of the licensing process. The the proposed requirement to the FAA v. Level of Rigor Based on Experience length of pre-application consultation for review. For each requirement where An individual commenter stated will vary based on the proposed the FAA has provided additional startup launch operators should not operation. For example, pre-application flexibility by including the ‘‘as agreed to operate under the same regimen as consultations may be longer when by the Administrator’’ clause, the FAA experienced operators. This individual involving new launch vehicles that are has also provided criteria that the stated that startup operators should be under development or with operators Administrator will consider in subject to strict and precise regulations. inexperienced with FAA’s regulations. determining whether to approve the Similarly, another individual expressed Alternatively, pre-application alternative approach, including safety concern that the proposed rule would consultations with operators who considerations when appropriate. For apply performance-based requirements demonstrate knowledge of FAA example, an alternative time frame will to launch vehicles with no prior launch regulations and/or use proven vehicles generally be accepted if it provides history. SpinLaunch, Inc. (SpinLaunch) from established sites should be sufficient time for the FAA to review the commented that the correct regulatory considerably shorter. The FAA expects submittal. These alternatives will framework should consist of an to discuss the following topics with an typically be agreed to in pre-application applicant’s demonstrating the necessary applicant during pre-application consultation. skills and knowledge to perform safe consultation, to the extent they are The FAA addresses the and accepted operations. relevant to the applicant’s proposed recommendation from CSF and SpaceX The FAA disagrees that startup operation: Entrance and exit criteria for by including ELOS in § 450.101(c)(2). launch operators should operate under pre-application consultation, the The use of ELOS and ‘‘agreed to by the a different regulatory regime than intended means of compliance to meet Administrator’’ for § 450.101(c) is experienced operators, and that the regulatory requirements in part 450,

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the scope of the license, safety element plan to use for those sections that allow approved independently. In many ways, approvals, incremental review, review alternative means of compliance. While the incremental review process is period for license evaluation, the FAA anticipates that this pre- similar to the independent payload compliance expectations, and time application consultation will expedite review or a safety element approval frames an operator is required to meet license review times and aid both FAA process because it allows the applicant to satisfy part 450. Some of the topics and applicant, it is only required for the to comply with the safety approval allow for flexibility that can result in a sections listed in § 450.35(a). portion of the regulation in modules or more efficient licensing process for both The final rule has built-in flexibilities sections rather than all at once. An the applicant and the FAA. for determining the beginning and end applicant considering the use of the The FAA will continue to consider of launch such that the launch is scoped incremental review process should the following factors to determine if a to an individual operator’s unique indicate to the FAA during pre- prospective applicant is ready to begin circumstances. It is important that the application consultation which portions pre-application consultation: Whether applicant and the FAA come to a of its application will be evaluated the concept of operations is realistic and mutual understanding during pre- under the incremental review process. whether the prospective applicant is application consultation about the See the Incremental Review section of able to provide a program schedule that beginning and end of launch for the this preamble for further discussion. includes definition of significant license. The beginning and end points Finally, part 450 allows an operator to milestones and a funding source or of a launch operation define the extent propose alternative time frames for sources. The regulatory requirements for of a number of requirements, including, certain requirements, which are listed in a launch and reentry license are the but not limited to, indemnification and Appendix A to part 404. If an operator same for all applicants; however, FAA FAA oversight. Therefore, an applicant knows in advance of application expects it will take longer for less should define the beginning and end of submittal that it will propose an experienced operators to meet all of the its operation during pre-application alternative time frame, the applicant requirements. As currently required, to consultation, and should coordinate should raise this proposal during pre- exit pre-application consultation and with the FAA before finalizing and application consultation. The FAA begin the license evaluation period, an submitting its application.21 In this way, would also be able to discuss during application must be complete enough in the applicant can ensure that the FAA pre-application consultation the FAA’s accordance with § 413.11 (Acceptance will evaluate the complete scope of its expected review period to make its of an application). A complete enough proposed operation. determination on the proposed application must include enough If an applicant is planning to seek a alternative time frame. Flexible time information for the FAA to start its safety element approval, the applicant frames are discussed at length later in review. The FAA will screen an must continue to consult with the FAA this preamble. application in its entirety or in modules before submitting its application in The FAA received several comments to determine whether it is complete accordance with § 414.9 (Pre- on the pre-application consultation enough for the FAA to start its review. Application Consultation). Doing so will process. An individual commenter The components of a vehicle operator help ensure that the FAA and the stated that pre-application consultation license application are listed in § 450.31 applicant have a thorough may not provide substantial benefits for (General) and include a policy review, understanding of how the applicant will an existing program and suggested a payload review, a safety review that comply with the regulatory allowing the FAA to request a pre- complies with Subpart C, an requirements surrounding a safety application consultation process with a environmental review, and information element approval before submitting an 30-day completion timeline for any necessary to satisfy the maximum application. During pre-application ‘‘material changes’’ to existing programs probable loss analysis required by part consultation, the FAA would expect an deemed as posing a significant risk to 440. applicant to be able to discuss, at a the safety of the vehicle. The commenter For the five sections listed in minimum, the following information as also suggested the FAA could request § 450.35(a), an applicant must use a outlined in § 414.15: (1) How the this process at least 60 days before the means of compliance that has been applicant will meet the applicable integration of the launch vehicle. The accepted by the Administrator prior to requirements of part 450; (2) the commenter stated that past performance application acceptance. An applicant information required in § 414.13(b)(3), of space flights and aircraft should be may propose another standard or a (c)(2), and (c)(3); and (3) the sections of taken into consideration for the level of unique means of compliance for these the license application that support the rigor for the pre-application process. The FAA will not attach a schedule to five sections before submitting its application for a safety element pre-application consultation but agrees application.20 Furthermore, many approval. requirements throughout the final rule If an applicant is proposing an with the commenter that a material allow an operator to use an alternative incremental review of its application, change can be discussed as part of pre- method if that method has been agreed the applicant must have its approach application consultation. The FAA to by the Administrator. This allowance approved by the FAA prior to acknowledges that pre-application maximizes flexibility and will reduce submitting its application, in consultation should be minimal for the need for the applicant and the FAA accordance with § 450.33 (Incremental experienced operators using proven vehicles from established sites. This to use process waivers. During pre- Review and Determinations). type of abbreviated consultation period application consultation, the FAA Incremental review is intended for experienced operators would be anticipates that applicants will discuss primarily to give additional flexibility to consistent with the pre-application the means of compliance they plan to the applicant, by allowing the applicant process prior to issuance of this final use for the remaining sections of the to separate the safety review into rule. The FAA disagrees with a 30-day rule, and any alternative means they sections so that those sections can be completion timeline for pre-application 20 Further discussion on this topic is in the 21 A discussion on what constitutes beginning consultation for any material change to preamble section for performance-based regulations and end of launch is in the preamble section existing programs. The FAA also and means of compliance. discussing scope of launch. disagrees with the suggestion that the

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FAA request pre-application altered. In the final rule, the FAA adopts application submission, including the consultation at least 60 days before these changes as proposed. initial license application, continuing integration of the launch vehicle or that A joint set of comments submitted by accuracy submissions, and modification pre-application consultation be tied to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop submissions. CSF and SpaceX suggested the flight safety risk of the vehicle. Grumman, and ULA expressed support regulatory text changes to § 413.11 to These timelines and criteria may be for the proposal to allow the submission this end. Both commenters also inadequate in some cases to prepare a of an application using physical requested the FAA issue an AC that that complete application properly; in electronic storage. explains how the agency makes the others, they might result in unnecessary In addition, the FAA received complete enough determination, delays in addressing and implementing suggested changes to the generic including a checklist comprising critical safety changes. In addition, the application process. The American regulatory sections that require FAA will not tie pre-application Association of Airport Executives submissions. Virgin Galactic consultation to risk to the vehicle (AAAE) and the Denver International recommended that what constitutes because the FAA does not oversee risk Airport commented on the need for ‘‘complete enough’’ be agreed upon by to the vehicle but rather risk to the further engagement with stakeholders both the applicant and the FAA during public. during an operator’s application the pre-application consultation phase Sierra Nevada noted that operators process. These commenters said the and provided several changes to the could work with the FAA to develop a FAA should provide an opportunity for regulatory text. program schedule and define affected stakeholders to provide input The FAA will continue to use the anticipated data submissions during on an operator’s application regarding complete enough standard to determine pre-application consultation. Sierra issues such as impacts to the National whether a license is sufficiently Airspace System (NAS). Denver Nevada noted that this use of the complete to begin review. The FAA International Airport stated that consultation process was not endeavors to make these determinations stakeholders should be able to submit specifically codified in the proposed within 14 calendar days of receiving an comments on license applications. application. Limiting the FAA to ten regulations and recommended including The FAA does not agree that an it expressly in an AC. days, as suggested by SpaceX, may not application should be open to a public provide adequate time for review. The The FAA agrees and will include input process. The FAA issues a license FAA begins the calculation of the 180- guidance on application scheduling and based on whether the applicant’s day statutory review period on the date data submissions in the pre-application proposal will not jeopardize public that it receives the information needed consultation AC. The FAA considered health and safety, the safety of property, to make the application complete including more robust requirements for and the national security and foreign enough, regardless of how long it takes pre-application consultation in the final policy interests of the United States. to make that determination. The FAA rule, however, the FAA concluded that The FAA coordinates with government does not base this calculation on the the current regulation both prepares the or private entities as necessary to make date it determines that the application is applicant to submit a complete this determination. A broad public complete enough. The complete enough application and the FAA to accept it, input process outside the environmental standard applies to any submission, while also providing flexibility to the review process is unnecessary for the including those for license applicant to approach pre-application FAA to make its licensing modifications for consistency. The FAA consultation in a manner that best fits determination. While commenters may has applied this standard to the proposed operation. seek the opportunity to raise issues such submissions for license modifications b. Application Process as non-safety impacts to the NAS or the and, when necessary, requested economic impact to land adjacent to a additional information and In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to launch, the FAA cannot consider such clarifications to allow it to proceed with clarify in § 413.1 (Scope of this Part) issues in the licensing determination. its evaluation. Section 450.211(c) states that the term ‘‘application’’ means either The NPRM specifically sought that an application to modify a license an application in its entirety or a comments on how the FAA could must be prepared and submitted in portion of an application for standardize and better implement the accordance with part 413. Therefore, incremental review. In § 413.21 (Denial ‘‘complete enough’’ application § 413.11 is applicable to an initial of a License or Permit Application), the standard. Sierra Nevada inquired license application submission and FAA proposed to remove ‘‘license’’ from whether the FAA will still conduct a license modification submissions and paragraph (c) so the regulation applied complete enough review. Sierra Nevada does not need to be modified to apply to both license and permit applications. concurred with the FAA’s approach in to any application submission. The FAA In part 414 (Safety Element Approvals), conducting complete enough reviews will work closely with applicants on a the FAA proposed to change the term but commented that the FAA should case-by-case basis to determine what ‘‘sufficiently complete’’ to ‘‘complete specify a timeline for these reviews. changes may be made without enough,’’ as used in § 413.11 SpaceX commented that the FAA invalidating the license. In accordance (Acceptance of an Application), because should aim to conduct its complete with § 450.211(c), the licensee must the two terms both described the point enough review within ten days of apply to the FAA for modification of the at which the FAA determined it had receipt of submission and apply that license once a license has been issued, sufficient information to accept an standard to submissions for continuing except for the allowable changes application and begin its evaluation. accuracy, renewals, and modifications. identified by the FAA. An operator may Finally, the FAA proposed to amend Furthermore, Sierra Nevada asserted propose an alternate method from part § 413.7 (Application Submission) that the review should be included in 413 to request a license modification. paragraph (a)(3) to allow an applicant the FAA’s statutory 180-day review This alternate method could include an the option to submit its application by period or a new, defined timeline. CSF agreed-upon submittal schedule and email as a link to a secure server and and SpaceX recommended that the FAA review period. remove the requirement that an complete enough standard in current It should be noted that § 450.211 application be in a format that cannot be § 413.11 be expanded to apply to any (Continuing Accuracy of License

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Application; Application for c. Compliance Period for Legacy goes into effect, or an accepted license Modification of License) also covers Licenses (§ 450.1(b)) application within 90 days after the license modification submissions In the NPRM, under proposed effective date of the final rule, to operate related to continuing accuracy. The § 450.1(b) and subject to two exceptions, under parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 for FAA will provide an AC that includes the FAA would permit an operator to up to five years, this rule preserves application checklists that an applicant conduct a launch or reentry pursuant to § 401.5 without change. Section 401.5 can choose to use to help guide a license issued by the FAA under parts will be removed five years after the application submittal. However, 415,22 431, and 435 before the effective effective date of the final rule. additional information may be needed date of the new part 450 or an The FAA adds § 401.7, which depending on the type of operation. application accepted by the FAA before contains the definitions that apply to In response to Virgin Galactic’s the effective date of part 450. Even Chapter III other than parts 415, 417, comments, the FAA agrees that dialogue though the operator could continue to 431, and 435, and which broadly as to what constitutes ‘‘complete conduct operations under the captures those changes proposed in enough’’ can be part of the pre- regulations in effect at the time of § 401.5 in the NPRM. The FAA notes application consultation, but disagrees license or application as referenced that parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 and that any change in the regulatory text is above, the proposed requirements under § 401.5 will be removed five years after required. One of the primary purposes §§ 450.169 for collision avoidance the effective date of the final rule. Part 413 explains how to apply for a of pre-application consultation is to analysis (COLA) and 450.101(a)(4) and license or experimental permit. In the provide the applicant guidance in (b)(4) for critical asset protection would final rule, the FAA amends the table in preparing its license application. apply to all operators subject to the § 413.1(b) to identify that the Although the FAA determines when an FAA’s authority under 51 U.S.C. chapter requirements in parts 415, 417, 431, and application is complete enough to begin 509 conducting launches after the 435 apply only to applicants whose its review, the FAA expects to develop effective date of the new regulations. launch or reentry license has been collaboratively agreed upon criteria The FAA would determine the approved or license application has with an applicant for determining applicability of part 450 to an been accepted by the FAA no later than ‘‘complete enough’’ during pre- application for a license modification 90 days after the effective date of the application consultation. By allowing submitted after the effective date of the final rule. As previously mentioned, applicants and the FAA to negotiate part on a case-by-case basis based on the operators holding an approved launch criteria for ‘‘complete-enough’’ during extent and complexity of the or reentry license, or who have an pre-application, the FAA anticipates modification, whether the applicant accepted launch or reentry license applicants will be able to more proposes to modify multiple parts of the application may choose to continue to predictably track their progress toward application, or if the application operate under parts 415 and 417, part completing the application. requires significant reevaluation. 431, and part 435, until five years after CSF and SpaceX also suggested that The FAA adopts § 450.1 (Applicability) with revisions. The FAA the effective date of this rule. The FAA the FAA provide a substantive response also adds ‘‘Launch and Reentry License to submittals within 30 days of does not adopt § 450.1(b) as proposed in the NPRM. While the FAA adopts the Requirements’’ as a subject in the table receiving the application. CSF also in § 413.1(b). Finally, the FAA adopts suggested the FAA provide status concept as proposed in § 450.1(b) in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, it also the provision that the FAA may grant a updates to an applicant every two request to renew a license issued under weeks. makes corresponding changes to §§ 413.23 and 415.3 to limit the parts 415, 417, 431 or with a non- The FAA already typically provides standard duration in proposed written response to submittals within 30 duration of all licenses issued or renewed to no more than five years after § 450.1(b) and re-designates it as days, often much sooner. In some § 413.23(a)(2) in the final rule. instances, however, the FAA requires the effective date of part 450. The FAA refers to these licenses as ‘‘legacy Specifically, the FAA may grant a more than 30 days to draft a response, request to renew a under parts 415, 431, especially for highly technical analyses. licenses’’ throughout this preamble. After that time, all operators must come and 435 with a non-standard duration The FAA also provides a substantive so as not to exceed five years after the response to an applicant in writing into compliance with the new regulations. In the final rule, the FAA effective date of this rulemaking. The whenever additional information is FAA adds an applicability section to required and, therefore, does not see a makes numerous revisions to certain regulations that apply to operators parts 415, 431, and 435. These parts compelling rationale for a requirement apply to such licenses issued before the to provide status updates on a conducting operations under parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. These revisions effective date of the final rule and predetermined schedule. However, FAA include amending § 401.5 title to read licenses issued on or after the effective recognizes the concerns expressed by ‘‘Definitions as Applied to Parts 415, date of the final rule if the FAA operators regarding extended delays 417, 431, 435,’’ adding new § 401.7 for accepted the application under § 413.11 between communications in certain definitions, updating § 413.1, and no later than 90 days after the effective circumstances. While the FAA does not amending parts 415, 417, 431, 435, 440, date. All operators must comply with believe establishing a specific time the COLA and critical asset protection and 460 to reference compliance with period for communication to applicants requirements in part 450. part 450. is a necessary component of its In the final rule, the FAA adds the The FAA notes that certain regulatory framework, it also recognizes phrase ‘‘pursuant to a license issued definitions in § 401.5 apply to parts 415, the need for applicants to stay informed under part 415 of this chapter’’ to the 417, 431, and 435. Therefore, because and anticipates communicating with scope in § 417.1(a). The FAA also the FAA will allow operators that hold applicants throughout the application removes § 417.1(e), which addresses an approved license at the time this rule process, including procedural changes grandfathering that is no longer used to ensure applicants will be provided a 22 The FAA notes that an operator operating from when part 417 was first status update within 14 days of receipt under a license issued under part 415 would also established. For the same reason, the of an application. be subject to the requirements of part 417. FAA also removes the grandfathering

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reference to paragraph (e) in § 417.1(f). the effective date of this rule may operators with the transition to part 450 As a result of this amendment, the FAA operate under the applicable regulatory so they may take advantage of the re-designates § 417.1(f) and (g) as provisions upon which the licensing significant number of new flexibilities. § 417.1(e) and (f) in the final rule. determination was made. In addition, CSF objected to the lack of clarity on The FAA further revises §§ 417.11 these operators may submit requests for grandfathering and recommended that and 431.73 in the final rule. The FAA license renewals within that five-year the FAA make clear that a licensee adds a paragraph stating that the period and will be required to comply approved under the current licensing Administrator may determine that a with the regulations under which the regime may continue to renew its modification to a license issued under license determination was made.23 The approvals, with no significant changes, these parts must comply with the FAA has revised §§ 413.23 and 415.3 to without having to apply under part 450. requirements in part 450. The reflect that no license issued under parts License renewals without significant Administrator will base the 415, 431 or 435 will be renewed with an changes may continue to be renewed, determination on the extent and expiration date that extends beyond the but not to exceed the five-year complexity of the modification, whether five-year period. As such, applications compliance period. the applicant proposes to modify for renewal submitted near the end of Operators currently holding an active, multiple parts of the application, or if the five-year period will be valid only the application requires significant valid license will have five years after for a short time. All operators will need the effective date of this rule to come evaluation. to comply with this rule in its entirety The FAA revises § 440.3, which into compliance with the entirety of part five years after its effective date. 450. If a license expires before the end addresses definitions. In the final rule, CSF noted that operators under of this period, an applicant may seek a § 440.3 references the definitions current parts 431 and 435 would need renewal under the previous provisions contained in §§ 401.5 and 401.7. The to come into compliance with the in parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, but the reference to § 401.5 will be removed proposed part 450. Similarly, Virgin renewal will only be valid for however from § 440.3 five years after the effective Galactic requested that FAA allow much time remains between the time of date of the final rule. currently licensed operators to be issuance of the renewal and the end of Finally, the FAA revises § 460.45 to grandfathered into part 450 for vehicles the five-year period. identify which mishap definitions an that cannot meet certain part 450 operator should apply in the description requirements as long as the current Virgin Galactic recommended the of the safety record of the vehicle to public safety requirements are met. FAA hold a pre-application phase for all each space flight participant. Virgin Galactic stated that, unlike ELV current license holders to ensure that Specifically, § 460.45(d)(1) addresses operators, RLV operators use their licensees and the FAA are in agreement licenses issued under part 450. For vehicles repeatedly, and the FAA has as to whether the FAA would require these licenses, the operator’s safety not shown why it is necessary for part 450 requirements or parts 415, 417, record must cover events that meet current operators to undergo new 431, and 435 requirements when an paragraphs (1), (4), (5), and (8) of the analyses and possible design changes. operator requests to modify a legacy definition of a ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7 that Virgin Galactic noted that the FAA’s license once part 450 becomes effective. occurred during and after vehicle aviation regulations allow for ‘‘true’’ During the five-year compliance verification performed in accordance grandfathering. Virgin Galactic period, an operator may need to modify with § 460.17. Section 460.45(d)(2) commented that if the FAA chooses not its legacy license. The provisions that addresses licenses issued under parts to allow for ‘‘true’’ grandfathering, it relate to modification are contained in 415, 431, or 435. For these licenses, the should work with each licensee during §§ 417.11 and 431.73. Whether or not operator’s safety record must cover pre-application consultation to new license modifications need to launch and reentry accidents and comply with part 450 is subject to human space flight incidents as defined determine applicability of the new rule Administrator approval on a case-by- by § 401.5. Section 460.45(d)(1) will be to modifications to current licenses. The FAA notes that as the final rule case basis, which can be determined re-designated to §§ 460.45(d) and is more performance-based than the rule during consultation with the FAA 460.45(d)(2) will be removed from as proposed in the NPRM, many of the before the applicant requests the § 460.45 five years after the effective current requirements would serve as a modification. In making the date of the final rule. Several commenters asked for clarity means of compliance to meet the new determination as to whether a license on the FAA’s approach in § 450.1(b) to regulations. The FAA anticipates that modification is necessary to comply legacy licenses issued under the current there would be few, if any, additional with the new requirements, the regulations. CSF objected to requiring requirements that will not be fulfilled Administrator will consider the extent renewals of licenses issued under the by previously submitted information. and complexity of the modification, current regulations to meet the The FAA will not allow operating under whether the licensee would need to requirements of proposed part 450, as parts 415, 417, 431, and 435 indefinitely modify multiple parts of the this would result in significant cost and because the current rule is more application, or if the license requires regulatory burdens for the operator and streamlined, performance-based, and significant reevaluation. The FAA the FAA. up-to-date than the previous encourages licensees to consult with the As previously noted, the FAA does regulations. Therefore, the FAA will FAA on transitioning to part 450 in not adopt § 450.1(b) in the final rule. require all operators to come into advance of the compliance period However, the FAA implements the compliance with the new rule five years deadline. after the effective date. The FAA will concept as proposed in § 450.1(b) in d. Definition and Scope of Launch consult with existing licensees shortly parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. In the final (§ 450.3) rule, the FAA establishes a five-year after the final rule is published to assist period after the effective date of this In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to set 23 rule. Operators holding either an active As noted, all operators are also required to the scope of activity authorized by a comply with the critical assets and COLA vehicle operator license by identifying license or an accepted license provisions of part 450 beginning from the effective application no later than 90 days after date of this rule. the beginning and end of launch in

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§ 450.3 (Scope of Vehicle Operator prescriptive default limit chosen for lends itself to the first module of an License).24 administrative convenience. CSF, incremental review. SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic also The FAA also agrees that the arrival i. Beginning of Launch requested that the FAA limit the of components at the launch site is an In § 450.3(b)(1) and (b)(2), the FAA beginning of hazardous pre-flight unnecessarily prescriptive baseline that proposed that launch begins under a operations only to include potential may not constitute the threshold for license with the start of hazardous threats to the public over which no hazardous pre-flight operations for all activities that pose a threat to the public other Federal regulatory agency has launches. Therefore, the FAA revises at a U.S. launch site. The proposed rule jurisdiction. § 450.3(b)(1) to remove the reference to further stated that, unless agreed to by The FAA agrees that the beginning of arrival of components at a launch site. the Administrator, those hazardous pre- pre-flight ground operations should be Because the beginning of launch is an flight ground operations would determined on a case-by-case basis important designation upon which commence when a launch vehicle or its because each operation is unique. The many licensee responsibilities rely, the major components arrive at a U.S. FAA recognizes that with this flexibility FAA has added to the regulatory text launch site. For a non-U.S. launch site, comes some ambiguity as to when certain activities that constitute the FAA proposed that launch begins at launch will begin for each unique hazardous pre-flight operations. The list ignition or first movement that initiates operation. The designation of when of hazardous pre-flight operations added flight. launch begins is important for both to the final regulatory text is derived In the final rule, the FAA adopts operators and the FAA. Among other from the preamble text in the NPRM 25 proposed § 450.3(b)(1) and (b)(2) with things, the financial responsibility explaining the proposal. Hazardous revisions. First, the FAA does not adopt protections apply from beginning to end pre-flight operations include, but are not the proposed default that hazardous of launch. Therefore, a clear limited to, pressurizing or loading of ground pre-flight operations commence understanding of when launch begins is propellants into the vehicle or launch when a launch vehicle or its major essential for an operator to understand system, operations involving a fueled components arrive at a U.S. launch site. fully its responsibilities under chapter launch vehicle, the transfer of energy The final rule identifies certain III and for the FAA to satisfy its necessary to initiate flight, or any activities that qualify as hazardous pre- obligations, including the calculation of hazardous activity preparing the vehicle flight operations, including but not maximum probable loss (MPL). for flight. This list is not exhaustive, and limited to, pressurizing or loading of during pre-application consultation the Because the proposed default FAA or an applicant may identify an propellants into the vehicle or launch beginning of launch, phrased as ‘‘arrival system, operations involving a fueled activity not included in this list that of major components at a U.S. launch poses a hazard to the public and may launch vehicle, the transfer of energy site,’’ is removed from § 450.3(b)(1) in necessary to initiate flight, or any constitute the beginning of launch. The the final rule, an application FAA retains the ability to determine that hazardous activity preparing the vehicle requirement is added to § 450.3(d) to for flight. Second, this rule also clarifies licensed oversight is unnecessary for require an operator to identify the scope certain activities if the Administrator that hazardous pre-flight operations do of the license being sought in the not include the period between the end determines that they do not jeopardize application, specifically pre- and post- public health and safety, safety of of the previous launch and launch flight ground operations. The final rule vehicle reuse when the vehicle is in a property, and the national security and requires an applicant intending to foreign policy interests of the United safe and dormant state. Finally, this rule launch from a U.S. launch site to adds language in § 450.3(a) that allows States. identify pre- and post-flight ground The FAA further amends § 450.3(b)(1) the Administrator to agree to a scope of operations such that the FAA is able to license different from that laid out in to indicate clearly that activities determine when the launch operation occurring between launches of reusable § 450.3(b), as discussed later in this would begin and end. This requirement document. An applicant wishing to vehicles will not be considered applies only to launches from a U.S. hazardous pre-flight activities if the deviate from the scope of license launch site, as launches from a non-U.S parameters laid out in § 450.3(b) would vehicle is in a safe and dormant state. launch site begin at ignition or first Generally, a launch system is in a safe discuss the deviation during pre- movement that initiates flight. The FAA application consultation. The FAA and dormant state when it is not anticipates that an applicant would undergoing the pressurizing or loading would only allow a deviation for unique identify hazardous pre- and post-flight operations where the scope of license of propellants, a transfer of energy operations that are reasonably expected necessary to initiate flight, operations continued to cover those hazardous to pose a risk to the public. During pre- launch activities identified by statute. involving a fueled launch vehicle, or application consultation, the applicant any other hazardous activity preparing CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic is expected to describe to the FAA its suggested proposed § 450.3(b)(1) be the vehicle for flight. The NPRM launch site and its intended concept of preamble discussed the exemption of revised to remove reference to the operations leading up to a launch, arrival of major components at a U.S. RLVs if a vehicle is in a safe and including any operations that are 26 launch site as beginning of launch. dormant state. potentially hazardous to the public. One commenter suggested the Virgin Galactic noted that the beginning Once the FAA and the applicant have a definition of beginning of flight for of hazardous pre-flight ground clear, mutual understanding of the hybrid vehicles be changed to include operations should be determined only applicant’s concept of operations, the the first forward motion of the vehicle on a case-by-case basis and commented FAA and the applicant will agree on a with the intent for takeoff. that the arrival of components at a starting point for hazardous pre-flight The FAA agrees that the beginning of launch site was an inappropriate operations, and thus, the beginning of flight for a hybrid vehicle is the first launch. The applicant will provide that 24 forward motion of the vehicle with the The FAA proposed to move the beginning and information in its application and scope end of launch and reentry language from the definition of ‘‘launch’’ in § 401.5 to proposed its application materials based on this 25 See 84 FR at 15361. § 450.3. starting point. The scope of the license 26 See 84 FR at 15359.

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intent to takeoff. However, the FAA will makes the following additional changes depending, once again, on whether the continue to use ‘‘first movement that to the end of launch language: The planned trajectory reaches outer space.27 initiates flight’’ to define beginning of addition of ‘‘vehicle component’’ and The NPRM did not propose any the flight phase of launch because it ‘‘impact or landing’’ throughout to change to this framework, and no better accommodates all vehicle types. ensure the definition captures a broader change is made in the final rule. Regarding the FAA’s jurisdiction over variety of operations; and the addition Virgin Galactic commented that the launch activities at a non-U.S. launch of ‘‘deployment’’ in § 450.3(b)(3) to FAA should include specific parameters site, CSF stated that proposed include operations for which a payload for suborbital reentry. Virgin Galactic § 450.3(b)(2) could be problematic for remains on the vehicle. Under also recommended additional regulatory captive carry technologies for which an § 450.3(b)(3) and (c), the FAA replaces language specifying that, for a suborbital operator must comply with the each use of ‘‘vehicle stage’’ in the reentry, reentry ends when each vehicle oversight of foreign aviation authorities. proposed rule in recognition of the fact has returned to Earth and has been CSF suggested removing reference to that components other than vehicle returned to a safe condition as defined ‘‘the first movement that initiates stages may return to Earth. Examples in the operator’s application documents. flight.’’ include a discarded engine or payload As noted earlier, a suborbital reentry The FAA does not adopt CSF’s fairing. In addition, throughout requires flight into outer space. recommendation because the current § 450.3(b)(3) and (c), the FAA includes This distinction does not change regulation is flexible enough to ‘‘impact or landing’’ in the end of when launch ends for a suborbital accommodate all launch vehicle launch and reentry sections in the scope vehicle because, whether a vehicle or technologies at non-U.S. sites, as well as of license requirements where the vehicle component impacts or lands on comprehensive enough to protect public proposal only referred to one or the Earth due to a launch or reentry, the safety. Starting launch at ignition will other or failed to reference either. With launch or reentry would end at the same not capture the full flight of the captive the increasing efforts to reuse point in time; namely, after activities carry hybrid vehicle system. The FAA components, including both impact and necessary to return the vehicle or regulates all of the components of a landing throughout § 450.3(b)(3) and (c) vehicle component to a safe condition hybrid vehicle system, including any encompasses a broader range of on the ground after landing. (See captive carry operations under a license; activities because landing includes a § 450.3(b)(3)(iv) and (c)). however, as discussed earlier, the soft vertical landing or runway landing CSF and SpaceX suggested that orbital flexibility in § 450.3(a) for the of a vehicle or component, whereas launch without a reentry in proposed Administrator to adjust the scope of impact is more accurate to describe a § 450.3(b)(3)(i) did not need to be license applies to § 450.3(b)(2) as well. hard landing of a stage or component. separately defined by the regulation, In the case of a unique operation for Under § 450.3(b)(3)(ii), the FAA adds stating that, regardless of the type of which hazardous activities begin later that, for an orbital launch of a vehicle launch, something always returns: than first movement or ignition, the with a reentry of the vehicle, launch Boosters land or are disposed, upper Administrator may agree to a different may also end ‘‘after vehicle component stages are disposed. CSF and SpaceX beginning of launch for that operation. impact or landing on Earth, after further requested that the FAA not Virgin Galactic recommended that the activities necessary to return the vehicle distinguish between orbital and FAA continue to avoid duplicating or component to a safe condition on the suborbital vehicles for end of launch. The FAA does not agree because the oversight and memorialize that ground after impact or landing.’’ This distinctions in § 450.3(b)(3)(i) and (ii) commitment in its description of the additional language accommodates a are necessary due to the FAA’s limited beginning of launch as starting when carrier vehicle landing after the authority on orbit. For a launch vehicle hazardous pre-flight ground operations completion of the orbital part of the that will eventually return to Earth as a commence at a U.S. launch site that launch. pose a threat to the public and over CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic reentry vehicle, its on-orbit activities which no other Federal regulatory expressed confusion regarding proposed after deployment of its payload or agency has jurisdiction. § 450.3(b)(3), and requested clarity payloads, or completion of the vehicle’s first steady-state orbit if there is no The FAA has amended the regulation regarding proposed § 450.3(b)(3)(iv), payload, are not licensed by the FAA. In to address duplicative oversight at including when reentry applies to addition, the disposal of an upper stage Federal launch or reentry sites in the suborbital vehicles and end of launch. is not a reentry under 51 U.S.C. Chapter final rule. These changes are discussed The FAA introduced suborbital reentry 509, because the upper stage does not in the preamble section addressing in its experimental permit final launch and rentries from a Federal return to Earth substantially intact. rulemaking in 2007. In that rulemaking, The FAA proposed in § 450.3(b)(3)(ii) launch or reentry site. The FAA does the FAA stated that: not agree with the comment that launch that for an orbital launch of a vehicle under this chapter may only begin at a A suborbital rocket may engage in reentry. with a reentry of the vehicle, launch site over which no other Federal agency For most suborbital launches, whether the ends after deployment of all payloads, flight entails a reentry will not matter from upon completion of the vehicle’s first has jurisdiction. In fact, many sites, a regulatory perspective. The FAA will such as Federal sites or launch sites co- authorize the flight under a single license or steady-state orbit if there is no payload, located at airports, may be subject to the permit, implementing safety requirements after vehicle component impact or jurisdiction of multiple Federal agencies suitable to the safety issues involved. landing on Earth, after activities depending on the types of activities that Recognizing suborbital reentry matters for necessary to return the vehicle or are conducted. two reasons. First, if a suborbital rocket is component to a safe condition on the flown from a foreign country by a foreign ground after impact or landing, or after ii. End of Launch entity into the United States, that entity may activities necessary to return the site to In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a reentry license or permit from the a safe condition, whichever occurs later. FAA, depending on whether the planned amend the definition of end of launch trajectory of the rocket includes flight in The final rule changes ‘‘if there is no to remove reference to RLVs and ELVs. outer space. Second, a permanent site that payload’’ to ‘‘if there is no payload Although it did not receive comment on supports the landing of suborbital rockets this proposal specifically, the FAA may now be considered a reentry site 27 See 72 FR 17001, 17002.

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deployment’’ to clarify the FAA’s intent Blue Origin asked how the FAA plans cite 51 U.S.C. 50904(d), which states on how to determine the end of launch to prevent disparate impacts of the that the Secretary of Transportation (the for a vehicle carrying no payload or proposed rule on those operators at ‘‘Secretary’’) shall ensure that only 1 payloads that stay onboard a vehicle. multiuse facilities and at U.S. facilities. license or permit is required from the Both CSF and SpaceX proposed ‘‘end While the meaning of disparate impacts DOT to conduct activities, including of launch’’ should be defined on a case- is unclear, the FAA construes the launch and reentry. The law does not by-case basis in pre-application commenter as asking how the FAA will prohibit the FAA from issuing a license consultation and specified in the distinguish between launch and non- that allows an operator to conduct an license. The FAA disagrees, in part. The launch (e.g., manufacturing or approved operation from various sites. FAA only regulates on a case-by-case refurbishment of pre-flown stages) Rather, section 50904(d) merely basis if the nature of an activity makes activities at a launch site. Because prevents the FAA from requiring it impossible for the FAA to promulgate launch begins with the start of multiple licenses for the same type of rules of general applicability. This need hazardous pre-flight ground operations activity for which a license or permit is has not arisen, as evidenced by decades that prepare a vehicle for flight, an required under title 51 chapter 509. of FAA oversight of end-of-launch operator may manufacture or refurbish e. Safety Element Approval (Part 414) activities. That said, because the launch vehicle components or perform commercial space transportation certain other activities on a launch site In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to industry continues to innovate, without requiring an FAA authorization change the part 414 term from ‘‘safety § 450.3(a) gives the FAA the flexibility during the time after the end of the approval’’ to ‘‘safety element approval’’ to adjust the scope of license, including launch and before hazardous operations to distinguish it from ‘‘safety approval’’ end of launch, based on unique begin for the next launch. This as used in parts 415, 431, 435, and 450. circumstances as agreed to by the treatment is consistent with existing Also, the NPRM proposed to modify Administrator. Unique circumstances practice prior to this rule: a vehicle part 414 to streamline the process by may include, but are not limited to, operator could theoretically perform enabling applicants to request a safety unconventional technologies like non-launch related activities on a element approval in conjunction with a railguns that may use innovative launch launch site without needing a license as license application. The final rule and reentry procedures requiring long as those activities are not in the adopts the changes as proposed. adjustments to a scope of license. scope of the license and do not pose a Several commenters expressed Finally, CSF pointed out that in the risk to public safety. general support for the FAA’s proposed proposed rule, for hybrid vehicles, end The Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) regulations regarding safety element of launch did not mention the recovery suggested the FAA define ‘‘family of approvals in part 414. Blue Origin of carrier aircraft. vehicles.’’ concurred with the FAA’s proposal and Section 450.3(b)(3) distinguishes The FAA does not define ‘‘family of anticipated many benefits to an orbital vehicles with and without a vehicles’’ in this final rule because the applicant’s ability to submit a separate reentry, and suborbital vehicles with industry continues to innovate and it safety element approval. One individual and without a reentry. A separate would be premature to attempt to commented that more extensive use of section for end of launch for hybrid classify all types of vehicle families for these approvals could increase operator vehicles is unnecessary because the the emerging and still-evolving flexibility and significantly simplify the same parameters apply to hybrids as commercial space industry. As licensing process for future launches. apply to non-hybrid vehicles regarding discussed in the NPRM, launch Virgin Galactic recommended an end of launch. The FAA also operators often define ‘‘family of operator that already holds a license be acknowledges that the end-of-launch vehicles’’ themselves. Usually, the able to use previously submitted data to parameters do not mention the recovery vehicles have similar base operational apply for a safety element approval. of a carrier aircraft. Again, it is characteristics, but each member of the Virgin Galactic also noted that the unnecessary to include this distinction family may be capable of different language in the first sentence of because, during launch, a carrier aircraft performance characteristics. proposed § 414.23 should be changed is considered part of the launch AAAE and Denver International from ‘‘safety approval’’ to ‘‘safety vehicle.28 Therefore, to the extent that Airport believed that operating at a element approval’’ to reflect the updated § 450.3(b)(3) refers to activities specific site should necessitate a terminology. necessary to return the vehicle or separate and thorough review from the The FAA agrees that an operator that component to a safe condition on the FAA, and that operators should not be already holds a license may use ground after impact or landing, this able to receive one license covering previously submitted data to apply for reference will include returning the multiple sites. a safety element approval. Just as is the carrier aircraft to a safe condition after The FAA will perform a thorough and case with a license application or impact or landing.29 complete review of all sites where a modification, an applicant can reference vehicle is authorized to operate. An previously submitted data in its safety 28 See Legal Interpretation to Pamela Meredith applicant will not be able to add another element approval application. The from Mark W. Bury, Assistant Chief Counsel for location to its license ‘‘with a lesser applicant will need to specify clearly International Law, Legislation and Regulations (Sept. 26, 2013); available at https://www.faa.gov/ review standard’’ as described by the what it is referencing and indicate the about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_ commenter. A licensee will have to referenced material is still valid. In areas/regulations/interpretations/Data/interps/ meet all applicable regulations for all addition, the FAA has corrected ‘‘safety 2013/Meredith-ZuckertScoutt&Rasenberger%20- sites authorized in a license. Denver approval’’ to ‘‘safety element approval’’ %20(2013)%20Legal%20Interpretation.pdf. International Airport cited 49 U.S.C 29 See Legal Interpretation to Laura Montgomery in §§ 414.23 and 414.3. from Lorelei Peter, Assistant Chief Counsel for 50904(d) to argue the FAA lacked An individual commenter suggested a Regulations (Dec. 10, 2019); available at https:// statutory authority to grant a vehicle new definition for safety element www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_ operator permission to operate from approvals for hybrid vehicles. The offices/agc/practice_areas/regulations/ interpretations/Data/interps/2019/Montgomery- multiple launch and/or reentry sites on commenter suggested the definition Ground%20Based%20Space%20Matters%20- a single license. The FAA believes include a reference to hybrid vehicle %202019%20Legal%20Interpretation.pdf. Denver International Airport meant to components that are critical to avoiding

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or mitigating hazards to the public, proposed requirements describing those frame for any incremental review and including vehicle characteristics. rights that would not be conferred by a determinations would be established The FAA does not agree that it should vehicle operator license in proposed with an applicant on a case-by-case add a separate definition of ‘‘safety § 450.13 (Rights Not Conferred by a basis during pre-application element approvals’’ specifically for Vehicle Operator License). The FAA consultation. As stated in the NPRM, hybrid vehicles. The definition of proposed these rules to consolidate the the FAA did not propose to reduce by ‘‘safety element approval’’ is broad requirements for different types of regulation the statutory review period of enough to encompass approvals for launch and reentry licenses in parts 415, 180 days. hybrid and non-hybrid vehicle systems. 431, and 435 into a single vehicle In the final rule, the FAA provides The definition already includes the operator license. clarification on the basis the phrase ‘‘any identified component AIA and Sierra Nevada commented thereof,’’ which includes a carrier Administrator would consider when that the FAA should not be allowed to approving an incremental approach. vehicle. The FAA agrees that it is make modifications to the terms and possible to craft a safety element conditions of a license except within a In the NPRM, the FAA sought approval for the types of hazard control limited time frame and subject to comment on how a formal incremental strategies employed by hybrid vehicles. specified procedures to ensure review process would account for the The FAA notes that the definition of a reasonable notice and due process to the statutory 180-day review period when ‘‘safety element’’ includes launch vehicle operator. The FAA will not application increments or modules are vehicle, reentry vehicle, safety system, adopt this recommendation and retains likely to be submitted and reviewed at process, service, or any identified the provision in § 450.9 that allows the different times, other useful guidelines component thereof; or qualified and FAA to modify a vehicle operator for applicants crafting incremental trained personnel performing a process license at any time by modifying or approaches, and any safety approval or function related to licensed activities adding license terms and conditions to sections that would be appropriate for or vehicles. This definition would allow ensure compliance with the Act and its incremental review. The FAA did not a hybrid operator to apply for a wide implementing regulations. This receive any comments with feasible range of safety element approvals. provision was introduced in 1999 in 14 solutions on any of these topics. Regarding process, a joint set of CFR 415.11 because the FAA recognized Several commenters expressed comments submitted by Boeing, that a particular licensee’s launch (or Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, support for the FAA’s proposed reentry) may present unique incremental review process, stating that and ULA stated an operator should not circumstances that were not covered by be required to apply to the FAA to it would increase flexibility. Virgin the license terms and conditions in Galactic supported the FAA’s proposed transfer a safety element approval under place. Because such a modification proposed § 414.33 when the transfer is approach to incremental review and would be based on unique commented that it aligned with many due to a corporate transaction, circumstances, the FAA is unable to reorganization, or restructure that does other approval processes in other specify a timeline as requested by the divisions of the FAA. not affect the material content of the commenter. original application. In the final rule, the FAA adopts these Many commenters, including Leo The FAA will apply the same requirements as proposed and adds Aerospace, Microcosm, Sierra Nevada, standard for application, transfer, and specificity to § 450.11 to indicate that SpaceX, and Virgin Orbit asked about issuance of a safety element approval as either the holder of a vehicle operator the duration of incremental review it does for a license. Name changes and license or the prospective transferee periods. Noting the FAA’s statutory internal corporate restructuring do not may request a vehicle operator license mandate to issue a license typically require a license transfer and transfer, both the holder and determination not later than 180 days therefore will not require a safety prospective transferee must agree to the after accepting an application, element approval transfer. transfer, and the FAA will provide commenters inquired whether each Microcosm, Inc. (Microcosm), written notice of its determination to the module would be subject to this 180-day inquired as to how the FAA will issue person requesting the vehicle operator review period. Several commenters, a safety element approval. The FAA will license transfer. These additions mirror including CSF and Sierra Nevada, stated issue a safety element approval applied the language used for the transfer of a they interpret the 180-day statutory for concurrently with a part 450 license safety element approval and reflect requirement to mean that the sum total in accordance with part 414. current practice. of all module reviews must not exceed f. Vehicle Operator License—Issuance, The FAA did not receive any 180 days. Commenters noted that if Duration, Additional License Terms and comments on these proposed every module was subject to a 180-day Conditions, Transfer, and Rights Not requirements. review, the process would be very time- Conferred (§§ 450.5 Through 450.13) intensive. 3. Part 450 Subpart B—Requirements To In the NPRM, the FAA proposed Obtain a Vehicle Operator License Until the FAA has more experience requirements addressing the issuance, with the incremental review process, duration, and transfer of a vehicle a. Incremental Review and the FAA will review each module in operator license in proposed §§ 450.5 Determinations (§ 450.33) accordance with a schedule discussed (Issuance of a Vehicle Operator In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to with the prospective applicant during License), 450.7 (Duration of a Vehicle amend part 413 and to include pre-application consultation. In Operator License), and 450.11 (Transfer provisions in part 450 to allow an developing the incremental review of a Vehicle Operator License), applicant the option for an incremental schedule, the FAA will consider the respectively. The FAA also proposed review of all portions of its application. interdependence of parts of the requirements addressing the addition This proposal was in response to the evaluation and the sequence of their and modification of licensing terms in ARC recommendations. Specifically, the submissions. The FAA makes these proposed § 450.9 (Additional License FAA proposed to amend § 413.15 criteria explicit in this rule in § 450.33 Terms of Conditions). Finally, the FAA (Review Period) to provide that the time (Incremental Review and

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Determinations) paragraphs (b)(1) and associated with the various time frames. experience with incremental reviews. (b)(2).30 To that end, a number of commenters, The FAA will not at this time adopt Review of any modules prior to including Sierra Nevada, Leo maximum time frames, because each submittal of an application in its Aerospace, and SpaceX, requested the evaluation is a unique review that must entirety will not initiate or be bound by FAA provide an outline of acceptance be adjusted to each operation. The the statutory 180-day review period. and review timelines and example FAA’s evaluation of the safety Rather, an agreed upon review period timelines for incremental applications. implications of an application typically will begin once the FAA has a complete CSF and Sierra Nevada agreed with the requires the most effort and time, enough application in its entirety. FAA’s proposal to establish the timeline usually far more than the 60 days During pre-application consultation, an for incremental submissions in the pre- suggested by the commenters. The MPL applicant seeking an incremental review application phase but suggested the is derived from the safety analysis and may negotiate a time frame shorter than FAA include in an AC its goal for cannot be completed independently of the statutory 180-day review period. As maximum review time frames for it. An environmental review must be the FAA gains more experience with the particular modules. CSF and Sierra completed before a license can be incremental review process, it may Nevada recommended the AC include issued. Particularly for new operations, develop guidance concerning expected the following time frames: 60 days for the environmental process can be timelines for various sequences of policy approval; 30 days for payload lengthy, and the FAA advises applicants modular submissions. review; 60 days for safety approval; 5 to begin it early, even before a license Sierra Nevada commented that, if a days for environmental assessment; and application is submitted. For example, module is denied, proposed § 413.21 15 days for financial responsibility an applicant must submit a completed (Denial of a License or Permit assessment. CSF and Sierra Nevada environmental impact statement (EIS) Application) should allow the FAA to noted that the FAA’s review of the prepared by the FAA (or an FAA- extend the review period by up to 60 environmental assessment should only selected and managed consultant days to consider a revised application. take 5 days because the FAA has had contractor), FAA-approved The commenter noted it supports the insight into the contractor used to environmental assessment (EA), FAA’s practice of tolling the review conduct the environmental assessment, categorical exclusion determination, or period in the case of a deficient and the FAA’s review should therefore written re-evaluation as part of its application as long as the applicant simply be a verification that the application materials. The 180-day understands the deficiency and what applicant has submitted the final statutory application review period is must be submitted for the FAA to product. CSF and Sierra Nevada not intended to encompass the time continue its review. Leo Aerospace acknowledged that the financial needed for the applicant to develop the inquired whether an application would responsibility assessment could take necessary application materials, be considered accepted after the longer than 15 days for methods other including environmental incremental process is defined, or after than obtaining insurance, but stated that documentation. Five days may not be the last step of the incremental process this possibility could be mitigated by enough time to evaluate an is completed, and asked how an the FAA’s providing guidance that environmental document, such as a operator would be notified if its safety addresses the type of information that a complex EA. review was accepted. licensee would need to submit to satisfy For conventional operations that do Sierra Nevada’s interpretation of FAA review under § 440.9(f). not pose substantial policy-related incremental review is incorrect because Commenters suggested that time challenges, policy and payload reviews a module cannot be denied under frames for incremental review should be can be conducted in less time than the § 413.21. If the FAA determines a based on the complexity of the review safety review. However, these reviews module does not contain sufficient and that they should be shorter than the are often performed concurrently with information, the FAA and the applicant statutory limit for the review of a the safety review so their completion will discuss amending the agreed upon complete application. Specifically, typically does not reduce the overall incremental review schedule to allow Virgin Galactic commented time frames time required to reach a license time for the applicant to submit a should be based on the complexity of determination. As the FAA gains more revised module. An applicant will be the item being reviewed. Sierra Nevada experience with the incremental review notified in writing when its complete recommended modules be subject to a process, it may elect to update guidance application has been accepted. shorter review time frame than full to reflect timelines that have Sierra Nevada noted the primary application reviews and to define that consistently proven effective. concern with module time frames was time frame in § 413.15. Sierra Nevada Submitting an application the transparency of the FAA’s license stated the FAA should consider a incrementally affords an applicant the application process and the ability for shorter timeline of 90 days for review of approval of various systems and operators to reduce operational risk a license application in order to meet processes earlier than the current non- the direction in Space Policy Directive- incremental review process. The FAA 30 These criteria derived from the discussion in 2 to streamline the review process. expects that the central value of an the preamble to the NPRM on what an applicant The FAA declines to incorporate the incremental approach is regulatory should consider when proposing an incremental approach. In relevant part, the NPRM stated: ‘‘1. suggested time frame changes because certainty for components of the Application increments submitted at different times they will not provide adequate time for application and flexibility for applicants should be not be dependent on other increments to the FAA to assess application materials rather than a reduction in overall review the extent practicable. 2. Application increments for completeness in all situations and time. However, the FAA anticipates that should be submitted in a workable chronological order. In other words, an applicant should not for all potential applications. The FAA a determination of an accepted submit an application increment before a separate agrees that modules will likely be application that utilizes safety element application increment on which it is dependent. reviewed faster than an entire approvals or approved modules will be For example, the FAA would not expect to agree application, and that review times will completed faster than a similar to review a risk analysis before reviewing a debris analysis or probability of failure analysis because depend largely on complexity; however, application that does not use safety the risk analysis is directly dependent on the other at this point it is premature to define element approvals or incremental two analyses.’’ 84 FR at 15366. those time frames until FAA has more review.

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Sierra Nevada recommended that an The five requirements listed in § 450.35 compliance flexibility only to the AC should also address the type of are essential to public safety and regulations cited in the Means of information a licensee would need to involve well-established and complex Compliance Table would be too limited, submit for the FAA’s financial methodologies, thresholds, or practices. and should be expanded. The CSF also responsibility review. The financial Because of the complex nature and requested that the FAA remove or responsibility requirements contained public safety impact of these correct the preamble text to reflect that in part 440 are beyond the scope of this requirements, the FAA would be unable any applicant can seek to add an rulemaking. However, the financial to review unique means of compliance accepted means of compliance to the responsibility requirements are for these five requirements during its Means of Compliance table. The CSF adequately addressed in Appendix A to application evaluation within its review specifically mentioned that the FAA Part 440—Information Requirements for time frame. Rather, an applicant could should allow flexible means of Obtaining a Maximum Probable Loss choose to use an accepted means of compliance to meet the conditional Determination for Licensed or Permitted compliance in its evaluation, or could expected casualty calculation in Activities. Virgin Galactic submit a unique means of compliance proposed § 450.101(c). SpaceX also recommended the FAA take into for review and acceptance prior to commented that the FAA should account FAA AVS 31 Project Specific submitting its application. Unique expand the scope of flexible means of Certification Plans to inform the means of compliance for the compliance and specifically identified incremental review process in proposed requirements identified in § 450.35 may proposed § 450.101(c). part 414. The FAA will discuss project- require evaluation before they are The FAA emphasizes that any specific information, including AVS accepted as demonstrating fidelity and requirement in part 450 can have one or documents, during pre-application safety, however this rule allows unique more means of compliance. The Means consultation. means of compliance for these sections of Compliance Table provides one way, Virgin Galactic also inquired how the to be submitted in advance of a license but not the only way, to meet the operator would be notified when the application in order to provide requirements in part 450. The operator’s safety review has been flexibility and enable innovative conditional expected casualty accepted or rejected. The FAA will concepts. For all other sections of part thresholds in proposed § 450.101(c) inform an applicant in writing as to 450, an applicant may propose in its were intended as safety criteria to whether each module is accepted or application a means of compliance that measure and protect against potential rejected. has not been previously accepted by the high consequence events. In the final rule, the FAA has clarified § 450.101(c) b. Means of Compliance (§ 450.35) Administrator, and the FAA will review the means of compliance as part of its to allow alternative demonstrations of In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that application review process. It is worth high consequence event mitigation. This an applicant would be required to use noting that an applicant who uses change is discussed in detail later in the an accepted means of compliance for means of compliance that have already preamble. The FAA will review the the following requirements: Highly been accepted by the FAA in its license submitted means of compliance to reliable FSS, FSA methods, lightning application will likely experience a determine whether they satisfy the flight commit criteria, and airborne more expeditious license review and regulatory safety standard. These means toxic concentration and duration determination. of compliance may be government thresholds for both flight and ground A means of compliance is one means, standards, industry consensus hazards. For these requirements, the but not the only means, by which a standards, or unique means of means of compliance would need to be requirement can be met and may be compliance developed by an individual accepted by the FAA prior to the used to demonstrate compliance with applicant. For government standards or submission of an application. For all any of the performance-based means of compliance developed by a other performance-based requirements, requirements. For all performance-based consensus standards body, the FAA will an applicant would be able to use a requirements other than those listed in provide public notice of those accepted means of compliance proposed in an § 450.35, an applicant may include a means of compliance that it determines application. unique means of compliance in an satisfy the corresponding regulatory While the final rule maintains that an application for the FAA to review requirement. The FAA will also review applicant must use an accepted means during the application evaluation. In the unique means of compliance developed of compliance in an application for NPRM docket,32 the FAA included a by an individual applicant to determine specified requirements, the FAA has table listing all publicly available means whether they satisfy the regulatory made amendments to the structure of of compliance for each proposed requirement. the regulatory text to identify more performance-based requirement (the Once a means of compliance is clearly that the use of accepted means ‘‘Means of Compliance Table’’) in accepted by the FAA, it may be used to of compliance is an application subpart C that the FAA has accepted to demonstrate compliance with the requirement. This requirement is now date. An applicant need not include the corresponding regulatory requirement. specified in § 450.35(a) of the final rule. entirety of an accepted means of An updated Means of Compliance Table As stated above, for those five compliance standard in an application, will be placed on the docket once the sections now identified in § 450.35, an but may instead reference the accepted final rule publishes. This updated table applicant must use a means of means of compliance using identifying identifies the means of compliance compliance in its application that has features such as title and date or accepted by the FAA at this time for the been reviewed and accepted by the version. corresponding regulation. This table Administrator. The FAA will not accept Several commenters interpreted the will be made available on the FAA an application that uses a means of NPRM as only allowing the means of website and updated as additional compliance that has not already been compliance listed in the Means of means of compliance are accepted by accepted by the Administrator for any of Compliance Table. Conversely, the CSF the FAA. Unique individual operator- the five requirements listed in § 450.35. commented that applying means of developed means of compliance will not be included in the Means of Compliance 31 AVS is the FAA’s Office of Aviation Safety. 32 See FAA–2019–0229–0018. Table to protect proprietary information,

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unless the operator that developed the The part 417 appendices that can be person to request acceptance of a means of compliance requests that its used as an accepted means of proposed means of compliance. This is means of compliance be included. compliance to part 450 requirements are because the FAA anticipates other CSF requested that the FAA clarify listed in the Means of Compliance Table people or entities other than applicants that it would not require compliance in the docket. The FAA agrees that it may wish to submit a proposed means with an untailored RCC 319 33 in order needs to determine and communicate to of compliance, such as operators that to demonstrate reliability. Blue Origin the industry which Federal launch or plan to be applicants in the future, and commented that the preamble does not reentry site analyses and processes voluntary consensus standards bodies. address accepted means of compliance satisfy part 450. As noted earlier, the The FAA wants to enable this. Section as a standalone flexibility measure. CSF FAA will accept any safety-related 450.35(b) is limited to requests for and SpaceX commented that the launch or reentry service provided by a acceptance of a proposed means of proposed rule risks being quickly Federal launch or reentry site or other compliance outside a license outdated and could discourage Federal entity by contract, as long as the application, because the license innovation because it does not allow FAA determines that the launch or application process is already defined in tailoring of the requirements. reentry service satisfies part 450. parts 413 and 450. Lastly, the FAA The New Zealand Space Agency This rule does not require compliance changes the modifier in front of ‘‘means (NZSA) and Virgin Galactic asked what with an untailored RCC 319 in order to of compliance’’ from ‘‘alternative’’ to process and standards the Administrator demonstrate reliability; however, at this ‘‘proposed.’’ The term ‘‘proposed’’ is would employ for accepting means of time, RCC 319 is the only accepted better suited to the types of means of compliance. Virgin Galactic asked what compliance the FAA would expect from means of compliance for flight abort accepted means of compliance would be this provision. with a highly reliable FSS under and whether the Administrator would The process the FAA employs to § 450.145. An applicant may propose a use means of compliance that have not accept a means of compliance will be tailored version of any accepted means been published. Virgin Galactic also set forth in guidance. 34 When of compliance, including RCC 319. If an stated that means of compliance would submitting a unique means of applicant wishes to tailor RCC 319, the need to be published prior to any work compliance, an applicant’s proposal applicant must propose its tailored being performed that would require the should identify the regulation that the means of compliance as a unique means means of compliance. Northrup proposed means of compliance will of compliance in advance of its license Grumman supported the publication of address and provide the rationale as to application. An applicant may include newly accepted means of compliance. why it demonstrates compliance with any unique means of compliance as part The FAA will provide public notice of the applicable regulation. When of its license application, other than each publicly available means of reviewing a unique means of those sections identified in § 450.35(a) compliance that the Administrator has compliance, the FAA will consider past that require a means of compliance to be accepted by posting the acceptance on engineering practices, the technical accepted prior to application submittal. its website. This notification will quality of the proposal to demonstrate An applicant may also propose a unique communicate to the public and the compliance with the part 450 means of compliance to meet these industry that the FAA has accepted a regulations, the safety risk of the requirements in advance of its license means of compliance or any revision to proposal, best practice history, and application. an existing means of compliance. The consultations with technical specialists An individual commenter FAA will not post unique means of for additional guidance. recommended that the FAA allow compliance documents with proprietary NZSA and Virgin Galactic asked how tailoring and include a clause to attend information submitted by applicants, the FAA would protect an operator’s United States Air Force (USAF) tailoring unless specifically authorized by the proprietary information when meetings as part of meeting parts 415 applicant. The applicant may wish to publishing means of compliance. NZSA and 417 requirements. As noted earlier, consider offering its unique means of recommended that the FAA retain the the FAA does allow tailoring. Part 450 compliance to a consensus standards ability to share, with consent of the will not change the FAA’s current body for inclusion as part of an applicant, information about the means practice of attending tailoring meetings. industry-developed consensus standard. of compliance used to issue a license Virgin Galactic also recommended The final rule does not adopt proposed that may include proprietary that the current part 417 appendices and § 450.35(b), which stated that the FAA information. range analyses continue to satisfy the would provide public notice of each As a general matter, the FAA does not requirements in part 450, and that the means of compliance that the share proprietary data with the public. FAA complete its Launch Site Safety Administrator has accepted. The FAA The FAA will treat any proprietary data Assessments (LSSAs) in order for removes this requirement because it is linked to a unique means of compliance operators to know which Federal launch not a licensing requirement. in the same manner as it protects or reentry site’s analyses and processes Proposed § 450.35(c) is amended and proprietary data that an applicant uses the FAA would find acceptable as renumbered as § 450.35(b). The to support a license application. means of compliance. ULA commented provision is renumbered because the An individual commenter suggested that the rule should more clearly allow final rule removes the proposed the development of a Space Safety work performed by another Federal § 450.35(b), as discussed previously. In Institute to develop industry consensus agency to meet FAA requirements. the final rule, § 450.35(b) allows a standards. A consensus standards body, person to submit a means of compliance any individual, or any organization 33 The Range Commanders Council (RCC) to the FAA for review outside the would be able to submit means of addresses the common concerns and needs of licensing process. The means of compliance documentation to the FAA operational ranges within the United States. It compliance must be submitted in a form for consideration and potential works with other government departments and and manner acceptable to the acceptance. The FAA recommends that agencies to establish various technical standards to assist range users. RCC 319 provides for the safety Administrator. The proposed rule in developing standards, a voluntary of people and missions during launch and flight limited this provision to applicants, operations. whereas the final rule would allow any 34 See AC 450.35–1, Means of Compliance.

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consensus standards body consider the other than the National Aeronautics and review independent of a launch license processes outlined in OMB Circular A– Space Administration (NASA). application. The FAA sought comments 119. The FAA disagrees that the additional on the approach of including more language is needed to clarify that the requirements for a payload review in the c. Use of Safety Element Approval FAA may consult Federal agencies other regulation in order to expedite payload (§ 450.39) than NASA pursuant to § 450.41(b)(3). review application processing, but In the NPRM, the FAA proposed The term ‘‘include’’ implies the phrase received none. § 450.39 (Use of Safety Element ‘‘but not limited to.’’ In the final rule, the FAA adopts Approval) to allow an applicant to use The FAA notes, consistent with § 450.43 (Payload Review and any vehicle, safety system, process, current practice, that if a launch or Determination) with revisions. The FAA service, or personnel for which the FAA reentry proposal would potentially adds the term, ‘‘if applicable,’’ to has issued a safety element approval jeopardize U.S. national security or §§ 450.31(a)(3) and 450.43(a) to clarify under part 414 without the FAA’s foreign policy interests, or international that a payload review is not always reevaluation of that safety element obligations of the United States, the required. The FAA notes that all during a license application evaluation FAA may seek additional information payloads include any hosted or to the extent its use is within its from an applicant in support of secondary payloads. approved envelope. The proposed rule interagency consultation to protect U.S. The Commercial Smallsat Spectrum would also change the part 414 term Government interests. Management Association (CSSMA) from ‘‘safety approval’’ to ‘‘safety An individual commenter suggested that the FAA adopt a sixty element approval’’ to distinguish it from recommended the FAA require (60) day timeline for independent ‘‘safety approval’’ as used in parts 415, licensees to comply with the Committee payload review. CSSMA found little 431, and 435, and proposed part 450, on Space Research’s planetary incentive for a payload owner or because these terms have different protection policy (COSPAR PPP) as a operator to use the independent payload meanings. means of ensuring that commercial review process, absent a fixed timeline In the final rule, the FAA replaces the launches comply with the Outer Space for such payload reviews. CSSMA also word ‘‘envelope’’ with the word Treaty and of resolving existing gaps in recommended language that would ‘‘scope.’’ ‘‘Scope’’ more accurately the statutory prohibition on obtrusive render § 413.21(a) (Denial of a License captures ‘‘envelope, parameter, or advertising in outer space. or Permit) applicable to independent situation’’ as used in the definition of The FAA acknowledges the payload reviews. ‘‘safety element approval.’’ For commenter’s concerns, but the scope of The FAA declines to revise consistency, the same change is made in this rulemaking does not encompass § 413.21(a) as suggested because the § 437.21. COSPAR’s PPP or the statutory payload review is a requirement to prohibition on obtrusive advertising. obtain a launch or reentry license under d. Policy Review (§ 450.41) part 450. The FAA notes that a favorable e. Payload Reviews (§ 450.43) In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to payload determination does not itself remove the requirement that In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to constitute a license. As such, the applications include, for the purpose of consolidate payload review procedures set forth in § 413.21(a) do conducting a policy review, information requirements, remove the requirement not apply to payload reviews, whether related to the structural, pneumatic, to identify the method of securing the conducted independently of or in propulsion, electrical, thermal, payload on an RLV, add application conjunction with a license application. guidance, and avionics systems used in requirements to assist the interagency The FAA also declines to incorporate the launch vehicle and all propellants. review, such as the identification of CSSMA’s suggested timeline for review. Instead, in order for the FAA to conduct approximate transit time to final orbit The FAA has not specified a timeline to its policy review, the FAA proposed and any encryption, clarify the FAA’s complete payload reviews independent that an applicant identify the launch or relationship with other Federal agencies of a license application because, reentry vehicle and its proposed flight for payload reviews, and modify the 60- historically, payload owners or profile and describe the vehicle by day notification requirements currently operators have requested such reviews characteristics that include individual found in §§ 415.55 and 431.53. for unique missions that have raised stages, its dimensions, type and The FAA stated in the NPRM novel concerns regarding public health amounts of all propellants, and preamble that, while it would review all and safety, safety of property, or maximum thrust. In the final rule, the payloads to determine their effect on the national security or foreign policy FAA adopts § 450.41 (Policy Review safety of launch, the FAA will not make interests of the United States. Because and Approval) as proposed. a determination on those aspects of independent payload reviews often raise Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop payloads that are subject to regulation complex issues and often require Grumman, Sierra Nevada, and ULA by the Federal Communications extensive interagency consultation, the suggested the FAA change the word Commission (FCC) or the Department of FAA cannot anticipate a standard ‘‘normal’’ in proposed § 450.41(e)(4)(iv) Commerce or on payloads owned or timeline for payload reviews conducted to ‘‘nominal’’ to be consistent with operated by the U.S. Government. In independently from a license industry vernacular. addition, the proposed rule added application. Accordingly, FAA will not The FAA disagrees with this informational requirements that would establish a standard timeline for such suggestion because the FAA seeks a include the composition of the payload reviews in its regulations. Applicants range of possible impact areas in this and any hosted payloads, anticipated are encouraged to discuss timelines to section, not a particular impact point life span of the payload in space, any review their particular proposals during inferred by the use of ‘‘nominal.’’ planned disposal, and any encryption pre-application consultation. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop associated with data storage on the NZSA requested the FAA include in Grumman, and ULA recommended the payload and transmissions to or from the final rule all legislative or regulatory FAA add to § 450.41(b)(3) the phrase the payload. Finally, the NPRM standards by which the FAA will assess ‘‘but not limited to’’ in order to allow proposed to preserve the ability of payloads at the application stage. NZSA the FAA to consult Federal agencies payload operators to request a payload stated that doing so would give owners

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of novel payloads and non-U.S. which seemed to require favorable agencies is important to ensure a operators regulatory certainty on the payload determinations for any launch payload or payload class will not standards they must meet to be or reentry, noting that not all vehicles interfere with agency operations, the launched on a vehicle licensed by the carry payloads. Absent this amendment, FAA disagrees that the recommended FAA. As one example of a rule that Virgin Galactic commented it would addition to § 450.43(a) is necessary. The would affect payload review but did not need to seek a waiver for each non- interagency coordination required for appear in proposed § 450.41, NZSA payload flight, creating an unnecessary both payload and license application cited the prohibition on launching burden. review, coupled with the criteria set payloads for ‘‘Obtrusive Space The FAA agrees that an applicant forth in § 450.43(a)(1) and (a)(2), Advertising.’’ does not need to seek a payload adequately addresses the commenters’ The FAA declines to expand the bases determination if the proposed launch or concerns. Those provisions direct that for issuing an unfavorable payload reentry will not involve a payload. the FAA will issue a favorable payload determination beyond those set forth in Therefore, the FAA revises determination if (1) the applicant, § 450.43(a). It would not be practical to § 450.31(a)(3) by adding the phrase, ‘‘if payload owner, or payload operator has list every law, regulation, and policy applicable.’’ obtained all required licenses, that may possibly affect a proposed Space Logistics, LLC (Space Logistics) authorizations, and permits; and (2) the payload under § 450.43. Rather, urged the FAA to coordinate with other launch or reentry of the payload would applicants are required to complete a Federal agencies before expanding its not jeopardize public health and safety, pre-application consultation during payload review process in order to safety of property, U.S. national security which the FAA can learn about the avoid duplicating activities. Space or foreign policy interests, or proposed action and advise the Logistics noted that the requirements to international obligations of the United applicant on a path forward, including describe encryption associated with a States. The FAA notes, consistent with any U.S. regulations, laws, or policies payload’s data storage and current practice, that if a payload or that may impact its proposal. Payload transmissions and to provide any payload class presents a potential risk to owners and operators may also use the information deemed necessary by the an agency’s asset or other mission, the independent payload review process set FAA under proposed § 450.43(i) were FAA may seek additional information forth in § 450.43(d), which provides open-ended and may duplicate from an applicant on behalf of the greater regulatory certainty for novel requirements of the FCC, NASA, the agency to protect U.S. Government payloads. National Oceanic and Atmospheric interests and assets consistent with Virgin Galactic suggested the FAA Administration (NOAA), or Office of these two objectives. However, in light treat payloads that stay within a vehicle Space Commerce (OSC). of commenters’ concerns, the FAA is as additional equipment on the launch The FAA agrees with Space working with the appropriate agencies vehicle, subject only to the safety Logistics’s comment that Federal to increase transparency and support analysis required of any other piece of agencies must continue to streamline the development of agency guidance on equipment on board a launch vehicle. requirements applicable to commercial the interagency consultation process Virgin Galactic commented that space activities and work closely to during a payload review. The FAA also requiring a payload review for items not eliminate duplicative requirements and plans to publish its own guidance on ejected from a launch vehicle places an minimize review times for policy and payload review, in the form of an unnecessary burden on operators and payload issues. The FAA has engaged Advisory Circular, which will reference the FAA. Virgin Galactic also requested its Federal partners in this rulemaking NASA, DOD, or other agency guidance. clarification on seemingly contradictory process in order to minimize Insight into the interagency process will language in the NPRM preamble duplication. For instance, the FAA help operators anticipate what questions regarding a payload placed in outer proposed to require that applicants and concerns may arise during space versus a payload that remained on provide encryption data (in interagency consultation, which may or within the vehicle. § 450.43(i)(1)(x)) in part to support the vary depending on the operation, and The FAA disagrees with Virgin Department of Defense (DOD) review of will allow operators to be better Galactic’s suggestion. Payloads that (1) payloads for impacts to national prepared to address any potential issues stay within a vehicle, (2) do not contain security. Encryption information allows during payload review. To the extent hazardous materials, or (3) have the DOD to assess impacts on national the commenters intended to address previously been approved may require security due to potential cyber intrusion space traffic management or access-to- less scrutiny but are still being placed or loss of vehicle control. Through its space issues, such matters exceed the in outer space and therefore meet the 14 interagency coordination, the FAA scope of this rulemaking. CFR 401.5 definition of ‘‘payload’’ and endeavors not to request information Boeing suggested the FAA refrain, in require a payload review. Under 51 already provided to other Federal proposed § 450.43(b)(2), from issuing a U.S.C. 50904(c), the FAA must verify agencies. determination on payload components that all licenses, authorizations, and Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop owned, sponsored, or operated by the permits required for a payload have Grumman, and ULA suggested adding to U.S. Government. Similarly, Boeing, been obtained; and that the proposed proposed § 450.43(a) a requirement for Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, launch or reentry will not jeopardize FAA coordination with the applicable and ULA recommended the FAA public health and safety, safety of Federal agency to ensure that the exclude from the review requirement in property, U.S. national security or payload will not interfere with or proposed § 450.31(a)(3) any payloads foreign policy interests, or international impede launch, on-orbit operations, or that have undergone safety review or obligations of the United States. The reentry of other approved missions. The received approval by another Federal FAA therefore declines to exclude from commenters stated this addition would agency. the requirement to obtain a payload avoid adverse impacts to other The FAA declines to exclude from review any payload that remains on the federally-approved missions or review under § 450.43(b) payloads that vehicle. operating systems. are sponsored by the U.S. Government. Virgin Galactic recommended the Although the FAA agrees that Section 450.43(b)(2) excludes payloads FAA amend proposed § 450.31(a)(3), coordination with applicable Federal owned or operated by the U.S.

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Government. Payloads that are not review process, which often occurs operating from certain Federal sites to owned or operated by the U.S. during the application review process. opt out of demonstrating compliance Government may not have undergone with the FAA’s ground safety f. Safety Review and Approval the same scrutiny, and hence the FAA requirements. (§ 450.45) review is warranted. The FAA also CSF and Space Florida submitted disagrees with the recommended change i. Launch and Reentries From a Federal comments indicating their to § 450.31(a)(3). Although the FAA Launch or Reentry Site (§ 450.45(b)) dissatisfaction with the NPRM’s does not make a determination on those In the NPRM, to address concerns approach to reducing duplication aspects of payloads that are subject to regarding duplicative government regarding launch from a Federal launch regulation by other Federal agencies, the requirements at Federal launch or or reentry site. ULA encouraged the FAA does review all payloads to reentry sites, the FAA proposed largely FAA to reduce duplication between the determine their effect on the safety of performance-based requirements for FAA and Federal sites. Northrop Grumman commented that launch, which may differ from the both ground and flight safety that an the FAA should accept the Federal purpose of another agency’s payload operator could meet using Air Force and launch or reentry site safety processes as review. As such, no change from the NASA practices as means of proposal is made. satisfying FAA requirements because it compliance. The FAA pointed out that was reasonable to presume changes to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop it issues a safety approval to a license Grumman, and ULA recommended launch range regulations would applicant proposing to launch from a continue to provide for safe pre-flight adding to the agencies listed in Federal launch or reentry site if the proposed § 450.43(e)(3) the FCC, NOAA, and flight operations on Federal launch applicant satisfies the requirements of or reentry sites. Similarly, SpaceX stated and the National Telecommunications part 415, Subpart C (Safety Review and that part 450 or its supporting and Information Administration. The Approval for Launch from a Federal documents should reference agreements commenters also proposed adding to the Launch Range), and has contracted with between the FAA and other Federal interagency consultation process set the Federal site for the provision of entities, including the USAF, which forth in proposed § 450.43(e) a safety-related launch services and allow each agency to accept the analyses requirement that the FAA consult with property, as long as an FAA LSSA and technical determinations of the Federal launch or reentry sites to shows that the site’s launch services and other. Blue Origin commented that it coordinate facility information for MPL launch property satisfy part 417. The looks forward to understanding the determination, and to coordinate FAA did not refer to the LSSA process contents of any agreements between the collision avoidance analysis with the in the regulatory text in proposed part ranges and the FAA. cognizant Federal agency, when the 450. The FAA did propose, in § 450.45 Another individual commenter raised launch or reentry activity is not on a (Safety Review and Approval) paragraph similar concerns that the FAA’s Federal launch or reentry site. The (b), that the FAA would accept any proposed licensing regulations do not commenters stated that operators should safety-related launch or reentry service resolve long-standing issues with not have to obtain and provide Federal or property provided by a Federal duplicative and overlapping rules site facility information, which is often launch or reentry site or other Federal burdening commercial launch operators sensitive and not available to entity by contract, as long as the FAA at the KSC and CCAFS. CSF stated that commercial operators. determined that the launch or reentry duplicative or conflicting rules among The FAA disagrees that the services or property provided satisfy overlapping Federal jurisdictions create recommended addition to § 450.43(e)(3) part 450. a barrier to entry for small startups and is necessary. The list of agencies that the The FAA adopts § 450.45(b) as unnecessarily increase the cost of space FAA consults with under § 450.43(e) is proposed, with one revision. The FAA access to all users by forcing all not exhaustive and does not preclude changes the reference to ‘‘Federal range’’ providers either to pass those costs on consultation with any other Federal to ‘‘Federal launch or reentry site’’ to their customers (including the U.S. entity in order to ensure that a payload throughout part 450, to include NASA Government) or to be denied the meets the criteria set forth in § 450.43. and DOD launch and reentry sites. availability of new capabilities due to With respect to the recommendation for As discussed in the NPRM preamble, lack of bandwidth and resources. CSF the FAA to add the interagency the FAA assesses each Federal launch or argued that this burden will drive consultation process to its MPL reentry site and determines if the internationally-competed business to determination, current regulations Federal site meets FAA safety other countries to avoid the cost or address coordination. In addition, requirements. If the FAA assessed a schedule impacts arising from changes to part 440 are outside the Federal launch or reentry site and found duplicative, conflicting, and scope of the rulemaking. In accordance that an applicable safety-related launch overlapping sets of rule. CSF also with 14 CFR 440.7(b), the FAA consults service or property satisfies FAA argued the FAA did not address the with Federal agencies that are involved requirements, then the FAA treats the overlapping jurisdiction of the FAA and in, or whose personnel or property are Federal site’s launch service or property other Federal and State agencies (the exposed to risk of damage or loss as a as that of a launch operator’s, and there Occupational Safety and Health result of, a licensed activity and obtains is no need for further demonstration of Administration (OSHA), the any information needed to determine compliance to the FAA. The FAA Environmental Protection Agency financial responsibility requirements. reassesses a site’s practices only when (EPA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Similarly, collision avoidance analysis the site changes its practice. The final Firearms and Explosives (ATF), and is conducted wholly outside of the rule maintains the position discussed in their State and local equivalents) for payload review. Part 450 provides for the NPRM, namely that these hazardous ground operations. coordination of collision avoidance performance-based regulations allow an The FAA does not agree with the analyses with the cognizant Federal operator to use DOD and NASA comment that the FAA is duplicating agency, though this coordination is practices as a means of compliance. In oversight with other agencies such as primarily conducted on a launch-by- addition, this rule introduces a OSHA, EPA, and ATF. Commercial launch basis, and well after the payload provision that allows operators space activities may be subject to the

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jurisdiction of multiple Federal agencies compliance that involve these Federal Federal agencies for commercial space depending on the types of activities that entities’ practices to ensure those licensing. are being conducted. OSHA, EPA, and practices continue to satisfy the FAA’s In the final rule, an operator need not ATF may regulate or provide oversight part 450 requirements. The FAA expects comply with the ground safety for different aspects of an operation that there will be few, if any, instances requirements contained in §§ 450.181 without duplicating FAA oversight. The in which DOD or NASA practices do not (Coordination with a Site Operator) authority for protecting public health satisfy part 450’s performance-based through 450.189 (Ground Safety and safety, safety of property, and requirements. In addition, part 450 Prescribed Hazard Controls) if the national security and foreign policy should provide enough flexibility to conditions in § 450.179(b) are met. In interests of the United States during accommodate changes in DOD and making this change, the FAA preserves commercial space launches and NASA practices in the future. its statutory jurisdiction over those reentries remains solely with the FAA. In addition to issuing performance- ground safety activities that are part of In the interest of removing duplicative based requirements that an operator launch and reentry, but recognizes authorities, CSF suggested the FAA could meet using DOD and NASA certain Federal processes and should acknowledge when other practices as means of compliance, the procedures as sufficient to meet the agencies have jurisdiction over activities FAA has addressed concerns regarding FAA’s mandate. and not duplicate that oversight. SpaceX duplicative government requirements by For § 450.179(b) to apply, an operator recommended that instead of the FAA’s modifying its approach to ground safety must conduct launch or reentry determining that the launch or reentry at certain Federal sites. For ground activities from a Federal launch or services or property provided by a safety, the Administrator may determine reentry site. The FAA limits the Federal launch or reentry site or other that the Federal launch or reentry site’s applicability of this provision to certain Federal entity satisfy part 450, the FAA ground safety processes, requirements, Federal sites, such as Kennedy Space should just determine that the site and oversight are not inconsistent with Center and Cape Canaveral Air Force operations are in good standing. the Secretary’s statutory authority over Station, because they have a long In the final rule, an operator may meet commercial space activities. Therefore, history of conducting launches and part 450’s performance-based under § 450.179 (Ground Safety— reentries in a manner consistent with requirements using DOD and NASA General) paragraph (b), an operator is FAA regulations. In addition, an practices that have been accepted by the not required to comply with the ground operator must contract with the Federal FAA as a means of compliance. An safety requirements of part 450 if: launch or reentry site for ground safety applicant would reference in its (1) The launch or reentry is being services or oversight. The FAA would application those DOD or NASA conducted from a Federal launch or require that the operator have a written requirements or procedures accepted as reentry site; agreement with the Federal site to use means of compliance. The 2015 (2) The operator has contracted with its ground safety services or oversight Commercial Space Launch the Federal launch or reentry site for and comply with its ground safety Competitiveness Act directed the ground safety services or oversight; and processes and requirements. Finally, the Secretary of Transportation to consult (3) The Administrator has determined Administrator must have determined, with the Secretary of Defense, that the Federal launch or reentry site’s consistent with the considerations in Administrator of NASA, and other ground safety processes, requirements § 450.179(c), that the Federal launch or agencies, as appropriate, to identify and and oversight are not inconsistent with reentry site’s ground safety processes, evaluate requirements imposed on the Secretary’s statutory authority over requirements, and oversight are not commercial space launch and reentry commercial space activities. inconsistent with the Secretary’s operators to protect the public health In making the determination to accept statutory authority over commercial and safety, safety of property, national the Federal site’s processes without space activities. In considering the site’s security interests, and foreign policy specific compliance with ground safety ground safety record, the Administrator interests of the United States. It also regulations, under § 450.179(c), the will consider the extent and directed the Secretary of Transportation Administrator will consider the nature sophistication of both its ground safety to resolve any inconsistencies and and frequency of launch and reentry procedures and the frequency with remove any outmoded or duplicative activities conducted from the Federal which the site uses them during FAA- Federal requirements or approvals launch or reentry site, coordination licensed activities. applicable to any commercial launch of between the FAA and the Federal In making the determination to accept a launch vehicle or commercial reentry launch or reentry site safety personnel, a Federal site’s ground safety of a reentry vehicle.35 The FAA has and the Administrator’s knowledge of procedures, the Administrator generally worked closely with DOD and NASA in the Federal site’s requirements. The will accept only those sites that have a developing part 450 to minimize any FAA will consider the nature and regular cadence of both commercial and need for a DOD or a NASA facility to frequency of the activity in order to government launches and highly impose additional requirements.36 The evaluate a site’s level of experience with developed, well-understood processes FAA will continue to work with DOD different types of launch and reentry and procedures. In considering the and NASA in reviewing means of operations. An example of the ‘‘nature’’ coordination between the FAA and the of the launch and reentry activities Federal site safety personnel, the 35 Public Law 114–90—Nov. 25, 2015 U.S. would be that a site’s experience with Administrator generally will approve Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. non-toxic or non-explosive propellant only those sites with which the FAA has 36 Note that the John S. McCain National Defense might not qualify the site for an a long-term working relationship Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA) includes a provision stating that the Secretary of exemption from FAA ground safety through the Common Standards Defense may not impose any requirement on a requirements involving toxic or Working Group (CSWG). Familiarity licensee or transferee that is duplicative of, or explosive materials. The FAA makes with a Federal site’s ground safety overlaps in intent with, any requirement imposed this change to respond to the direction practices and procedures is the only by the Secretary under 51 U.S.C. chapter 509, unless imposing such a requirement is necessary to of SPD–2, the National Space Council, means by which the FAA can ensure it avoid negative consequences for the national and the recommendation of the ARC to has met its statutory obligation to ensure security space program. address duplicative requirements across public health and safety, safety of

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property, and national security and Launch of Spacecraft Containing Space it is the FAA’s responsibility to foreign policy interests of the United Nuclear Systems 37 directs the Secretary determine whether a CATEX applies States. When the Administrator finds to issue public guidance for applicants rather than an applicant’s responsibility that a site meets the conditions in seeking a license for launch or reentry to request a CATEX. § 450.179(b), the FAA will develop a of a space nuclear system. The FAA is If a CATEX does not apply to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) currently developing this guidance. proposed action, but it is not anticipated with the approved site and publish the to have significant environmental g. Environmental Review (§ 450.47) MOA on the FAA’s website. If these effects, then NEPA requires the conditions are met, then the operator In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to preparation of an EA. When directed by can seek FAA permission during pre- consolidate and clarify environmental the FAA, an applicant must prepare an application consultation to comply only review requirements for launch and EA with FAA oversight. When NEPA with the ground safety regulations reentry operators in a single section, requires an EIS for commercial space imposed by the Federal site. The FAA § 450.47 (Environmental Review). In actions, the FAA uses third-party will publish, maintain, and update the addition, the FAA proposed to revise contracting to prepare the document. Federal launch and reentry site ground §§ 420.15, 433.7, 433.9, and 437.21 to That is, the FAA selects a contractor to safety MOAs on its website. conform to the changes in proposed prepare the EIS, and the license For Federal launch or reentry sites or § 450.47. These revisions codify the applicant pays the contractor. Finally, if other Federal entities that do not satisfy environmental review process as an EA or EIS was previously developed, the conditions in § 450.179(b), the final currently conducted, in accordance with the FAA may require an applicant to rule retains the LSSA-like process in FAA Order 1051.F, in which applicants submit information to support a written accordance with § 450.45(b). As noted for a launch or reentry license provide re-evaluation of the environmental earlier, the FAA believes that because of the FAA with the information needed to document by an FAA-selected the performance-based nature of part comply with the National contractor to ensure the document’s 450, Federal launch or reentry sites will Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and continued adequacy, accuracy, and typically satisfy most or all FAA other applicable environmental laws, validity.38 requirements. regulations, and Executive Orders. This rule will not alter the current ii. Radionuclides (§ 450.45(e)(6)) In the final rule, the FAA adopts environmental review requirements. § 450.47 as proposed with revisions. However, as explained in the NPRM In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in The FAA revises § 450.47(b) to preamble, the consolidation of the § 450.45(e)(6) that the FAA would affirmatively state that an applicant launch and reentry regulations evaluate the launch or reentry of any must prepare an Environmental necessitates a consolidation of the radionuclide on a case-by-case basis, Assessment (EA), assume financial environmental review requirements. and issue an approval if the FAA finds responsibility for preparation of an CSF asked the FAA to explain why it that the launch or reentry is consistent Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), added the requirement that applicants with public health and safety, safety of or provide information to support a prepare EAs with FAA oversight, property, and national security and written re-evaluation of a previously assume financial responsibility for foreign policy interests of the United submitted EA or EIS, when directed by preparation of an EIS, or submit a States. For any radionuclide on a launch the FAA. The FAA revised this section written re-evaluation of a previously or reentry vehicle, an applicant would to clarify that the FAA, not the submitted EA or EIS. CSF requested need to identify the type and quantity, applicant, determines which clarification on the phrase ‘‘under FAA include a reference list of all environmental documentation is oversight’’ in proposed § 450.47, versus documentation addressing the safety of required by NEPA. If the FAA the current language in FAA Order its intended use, and describe all determines that under NEPA an EIS is 1050.1 that requires FAA approval of an approvals by the Nuclear Regulatory required, the FAA will select a applicant-prepared EA. CSF requested Commission for pre-flight ground contractor to prepare the EIS for the further that the FAA clarify when and operations. SpaceX requested that the FAA clarify license applicant who will pay the for what purpose the FAA might require the intent of this regulation, as this topic contractor. The FAA also revised an applicant to prepare a written re- is heavily regulated by other Federal §§ 420.15(b), 433.7(c), 437.21(b)(1)(iii), evaluation of a previously-submitted EA entities. In addition, SpaceX and 450.47(c) to clarify that it is the or EIS, noting that the costs and recommended that the FAA defer to and FAA’s responsibility to determine schedule impacts of this requirement accept results from other Federal whether a Categorical Exemption are unclear. entities when applicable, and stated that (CATEX) applies under NEPA. As noted in the NPRM, the changes to processes for acceptance and deferral An applicant may provide data and the regulatory text on environmental should be provided in an AC. analysis to assist the FAA in review do not represent a substantive As discussed in the NPRM preamble, determining whether a CATEX could change to past regulations or to current § 450.45(e)(6) will address the potential apply (including whether an practice. Section 450.47 reflects the launch or reentry of radionuclides, extraordinary circumstance exists) to a existing environmental review process similar to current § 415.115(b), but with license action. Examples include that §§ 415.201 and 415.203 broadly the addition of reentries. It is the current modifications that are administrative in described, in which applicants must practice of the FAA to address novel nature or involve minor facility siting, provide sufficient information to enable public safety issues on a case-by-case construction, or maintenance actions. In the FAA to comply with NEPA. Section basis because such proposals are so the final rule, the FAA revises 450.47 replaces this general requirement rarely encountered in commercial space §§ 420.15(b), 433.7(c), 437.21(b)(1)(iii), by identifying the specific documents transportation. When applicable, FAA and 450.47(c) to state affirmatively that that the FAA may require applicants to will work closely with other Federal 37 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential- 38 FAA Order 1050.1, Environmental Impacts: entities to avoid duplicative actions/presidential-memorandum-launch- Policies and Procedures, provides a more detailed requirements. Moving forward however, spacecraft-containing-space-nuclear-systems/ description of the FAA’s policies and procedures the Presidential Memorandum on (August, 2019). for NEPA and CEQ compliance.

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provide and the process to prepare those contractor selected by the FAA will use governmental activity, not commercial documents. The language added to the information provided by the civil space operators. § 450.47 reflects current practice and is applicant to prepare the re-evaluation This rule will not affect the consistent with NEPA and FAA policy. document. environmental determination process According to FAA Order 1050.1, unless CSF commented that the FAA should for establishing or altering SUAs. the FAA determines that a categorical adopt, to the greatest extent possible, Environmental review concerns exclusion applies, the FAA may prepare NEPA documentation from other associated with the designation or an EA, EIS, or written re-evaluation, or Federal agencies or licensed site activation of SUAs are not the subject of direct an applicant to provide the operators. this rulemaking. The FAA notes that all information as described in The FAA notes that it may adopt, in environmental impacts associated with §§ 450.47(b)(1), (2), and (3).39 In whole or in part, another Federal a proposed launch or reentry will be response to CSF’s comment, the FAA agency’s draft or final EA, the EA addressed in the NEPA document revises § 450.47(b), as well as portion of another agency’s EA/ prepared for that activity. §§ 420.15(b), 433.7(b), and FONSI, 41 or EIS in accordance with AOPA urged the FAA to ensure that 437.21(b)(1)(ii), from the language applicable regulations and authorities the documentation for commercial proposed in the NPRM to state expressly implementing NEPA.42 Whenever space operations is complete and that an applicant must provide the possible, the FAA will adopt the other transparent so that the public can documents set forth in paragraph (b) Federal agency’s NEPA documents to understand and identify potential ‘‘when directed by the FAA.’’ The support the issuance of launch and impacts. modified text clarifies the applicant’s reentry licenses. Further, the FAA This rule will not alter the current responsibilities in accordance with FAA encourages early coordination with the environmental review process, which Order 1050.1 (Paragraph 2–2–2). These FAA to benefit applicants that are requires documentation of responsibilities are consistent with seeking approvals from other Federal environmental impacts. The FAA current practice and will not increase agencies related to the FAA-issued remains responsible for complying with the cost, impact schedules, or alter the license (e.g., an applicant seeking NEPA and other applicable burden under the previous regulations. approval from a Federal agency to make environmental laws, regulations, and With respect to § 450.47(b)(1), ‘‘with modifications on a Federal launch or Executive Orders prior to issuing a FAA oversight’’ means the FAA will reentry site in anticipation of receiving launch or reentry license. The FAA guide the work of an applicant or an a launch license from the FAA). This ensures transparency of the potential applicant’s contractor. In order to use an coordination will increase the environmental impacts by publishing all applicant or contractor-prepared likelihood of a more efficient draft and final EAs and EISs, and document for compliance with NEPA or environmental review process as the associated Findings of No Significant other environmental requirements, the applicant seeks different but related Impact and Records of Decisions. CSF and Denver International Airport FAA must evaluate and take approvals from multiple Federal requested clarification on how the responsibility for the document. The agencies. The applicant should consult environmental reviews required under FAA’s oversight ensures that: (1) The with the FAA early in the project’s NEPA would apply to multiple sites. In applicant’s potential conflict of interest development phase, prior to the accordance with applicable regulations does not impair the objectivity of the development of the NEPA document, to and authorities implementing NEPA, document; and (2) the EA meets the determine environmental review the FAA’s decision-making process requirements of FAA Order 1050.1. The responsibilities, and the appropriate must consider and disclose the potential FAA may require an applicant to submit level of review, and to foster efficient impacts of a proposed action and its information to support a written re- procedures to develop documentation to alternatives on the quality of the human evaluation of a previously prepared meet the agencies’ legal requirements. environment. This process includes environmental document (i.e., a draft or CSF also encouraged the FAA to considering the impacts of launches final EA or EIS) to determine whether request appropriations to fund regional from multiple sites, which may be the document remains valid or a new or or area EAs. This recommendation is covered in a single NEPA document supplemental environmental document beyond the scope of this rulemaking. is required. Applicants should work The Aircraft Owners and Pilots when appropriate. In some instances, closely with the FAA to determine the Association (AOPA) stated its concern one single NEPA document may not be documentation requirements of NEPA that, under the proposed regulations, possible and individual site-specific and other applicable environmental existing Special Use Airspace approvals NEPA documents could be developed. requirements.40 In response to CSF’s (SUAs) would be activated for purposes The FAA is examining the use of comment, the FAA revises that may not align with the original programmatic NEPA documents to § 450.47(b)(3), as well as §§ 420.15(b), environmental determinations that led analyze the impacts of launches from 433.7(b), and 437.21(b)(1)(ii), to clarify to approval of the SUAs. AOPA noted multiple sites. Under such an approach, that an applicant would submit that the environmental process for applicants could tier their individual, site-specific NEPA analyses from the ‘‘information to support’’ a written re- establishing SUAs includes detailed 43 evaluation of a previously submitted EA studies of the intended activity, its programmatic document. The FAA or EIS, rather than the re-evaluation frequency, and its effect on the public. will conduct programmatic EA analyses document itself, as proposed. The Many of the SUAs activated in support consistent with FAA Order 1050.1 and of commercial space activity originally CEQ regulations. SpinLaunch stated the environmental 39 Currently, the FAA has not established underwent environmental review and review process is lengthy, sometimes categorical exclusions for this program. However, approval on the assumption that they the FAA may propose new categorical exclusions taking as long as 2 years or more. To were supporting military or applicable to the program after the FAA’s facilitate the process, it recommended performance of NEPA reviews of proposed actions (1) including the environmental review finds that the actions, when implemented, do not 41 Finding of No Significant Impact. result in significant individual or cumulative 42 40 CFR 1506.3 of the Council on Environmental within the statutory period, thereby environmental effects. Quality (CEQ) Regulations and FAA Order 1050.1, 40 See FAA Order 1050.1, Section 9–2. as of the publication date of this rule. 43 See Order 1050.1, Section 3–2.

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forcing an expedited process; and (2) Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop location of any member of the public establishing limited environmental Grumman, and ULA recommended the that could be exposed to a probability of approval for proposed activities (e.g., FAA craft an additional section to casualty of 1 × 10¥5 or greater for non-rocket launch systems) that do not proposed § 450.47 to address space neighboring operations personnel, in have the adverse environmental impacts environmental impacts such as debris, response to a comment to clarify of a traditional rocket. collision risk, and interference. representative probability contours. The FAA does not consider the 180- The FAA does not agree with this The FAA sought comment on the day statutory review period to include recommendation. The applicability of proposed approach, as well as on NEPA document preparation. NEPA to space debris is outside the proposals (1) not to require that Specifically, the applicant must submit scope of this rulemaking. neighboring operations personnel be a completed EIS prepared by the FAA One individual commenter expressed specially trained, (2) not to designate (or an FAA-selected and managed concern that the proposed part 450 may ground operations hazard criteria for consultant contractor) or an FAA- cause companies to forgo environmental neighboring operations personnel, and approved EA, categorical exclusion considerations or somehow bypass (3) for the purpose of determining MPL, determination from the FAA, or written compliance requirements. The proposal to align the individual risk threshold for re-evaluation as part of its application does not alter NEPA and will continue neighboring operations personnel with materials. The statutory application to require potential licensees to comply the threshold for losses to government review period is not intended to with all policies and procedures property and involved government encompass the time needed for the implementing NEPA, as well as other personnel. Many commenters agreed applicant to develop the necessary applicable environmental laws, with the FAA’s proposal to change the application materials, including regulations, and Executive Orders risk threshold for neighboring environmental documentation. intended to protect the environment. operations personnel, stating that a Regarding the commenter’s second higher risk threshold is necessary to recommendation, the FAA is bound by 4. Part 450 Subpart C—Safety allow for co-processing of multiple CEQ’s NEPA regulations. There are Requirements operations at a single facility. Despite three levels of NEPA review: CATEX, a. Neighboring Operations Personnel this general agreement, some EA, and EIS. Each of the three levels of (§ 450.101(a) and (b)) commenters disagreed with the specifics review is described in FAA Order of the proposal. Several commenters 1050.1. The required level of review In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to pointed out that the FAA’s approach to depends on the nature of the carve out separate individual and neighboring operations personnel differs commercial space action. Applicants collective risk criteria for neighboring from the ARC recommendation to should coordinate with the FAA early in operations personnel. The proposal was exclude permanently badged personnel the application process to determine the intended to reduce the need to clear or and neighboring launch operations from appropriate level of NEPA review based evacuate other launch operator the definition of ‘‘public’’ but still to on the potential for significant impact. personnel during a commercial launch employ mitigation measures for Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop or reentry operation. Under the current uninvolved neighboring operations Grumman, and ULA jointly regulations, an operator may be required personnel when a hazardous operation recommended adding to proposed to clear anywhere from a handful of or launch is scheduled. § 450.47(a) a statement requiring the employees to over a thousand Several commenters, including Blue FAA to coordinate with other employees from a neighboring site for a Origin, Boeing, CSF, Lockheed Martin, government entities to assist the significant portion of a day. To address Northrop Grumman, Space Florida, applicant in completing EAs, in order to this issue, the NPRM proposed to define SpaceX, ULA, and Virgin Orbit, alleviate the cost impact on operators ‘‘public’’ and ‘‘neighboring operations commented that neighboring operations who currently have to negotiate personnel’’ in § 401.5. Under the personnel should not be included as multiple sets of requirements by proposal, neighboring operations members of the public. CSF stated that Federal, State, and local governments. personnel would still be members of the neighboring operations personnel The joint commenters also public, but would be subject to different should not be considered members of recommended amending individual and collective risk criteria. the public because they have essential, §§ 420.15(b)(ii), 433.7(b)(2), and These proposed regulations were on-going requirements to conduct 450.47(b)(2) to allow EISs to be prepared intended to enable neighboring neighboring space transportation by an FAA-approved consultant operations personnel to remain within activities. CSF further stated that the contractor, in addition to one selected safety clear zones and hazardous launch FAA has the flexibility to exclude and managed by the FAA. The areas during flight as long as their risk neighboring operations personnel from commenters suggested these changes did not exceed the newly designated its definition of ‘‘public.’’ Blue Origin would provide flexibility and allow an thresholds. similarly stated that neighboring operator to use qualified EIS contractors In the final rule, the FAA adopts the operations personnel are more familiar at the State- or local-level as long as the proposal for neighboring operations with the hazardous operations present contractor meets the qualifications for personnel in §§ 401.7, 440.3, 450.101(a) at a launch site and may have a completing an EIS in accordance with and (b), and 450.137(c)(6). The FAA relationship or engagement with their the law. revises the § 401.7 definition of neighboring operators and, therefore, The FAA declines the suggested ‘‘neighboring operations’’ by removing should be treated differently from the regulatory text changes. the phrase ‘‘as determined by the public who are completely uninvolved Section 1506.5(c) of the CEQ Federal or licensed launch or reentry and are not knowledgeable about launch Regulations for Implementing the site operator’’ because the phrase is not and reentry operations. Space Florida Provisions of NEPA and Appendix C of relevant to the definition of neighboring also commented that employees of the FAA Order 1050.1 state that EISs must operations personnel. The FAA also licensee who may be working on a test be prepared by a contractor selected by revises § 450.133 (Flight Hazard Area program or a different launch or reentry the lead agency to avoid a conflict of Analysis) paragraph (e)(2) to require that program are not members of the public interest. an applicant provide the hypothetical and raised the question whether the

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FAA should have statutory authority safety, security, and critical tasks, the § 401.5 and the definition of ‘‘public’’ in over launch essential personnel of a FAA considers neighboring operations § 420.5. Historically, the FAA has neighboring operator for other launch, personnel a separate category of public, considered ‘‘public’’ to include all reentry, or associated operations. Virgin whose collective exposure to risk may people and property that are not Orbit commented that it would be better not exceed 2 × 10¥4 and for whom the involved in supporting a licensed or to include neighboring operations risk to any individual may not exceed permitted launch and in the final rule personnel under launch personnel, 1 × 10¥5. extends the same definition to reentry. rather than requiring a new and possibly The FAA disagrees with Virgin Orbit’s While neighboring operations personnel burdensome expected casualty analysis. comment that neighboring operations or invited guests 45 may accept a higher The FAA agrees that neighboring personnel should be included as launch level of background risk, they are not operations personnel are a unique personnel so as to be exempted from involved in supporting the particular category of people because of their risk calculations and eliminate the licensed operation and this rule essential, ongoing tasks. The FAA burden of the additional risk continues the FAA’s longstanding disagrees, however, with commenters’ calculation. Neighboring operations practice of protecting them as members assertions that neighboring operations personnel are not supporting the of the ‘‘public.’’ While the FAA expects personnel should be excluded from the licensed activity and are members of the that certain members of the public may definition of ‘‘public’’ because of their public; therefore, they must be protected be briefed and aware of hazards, the involvement in launch operations or the under the FAA’s statutory mandate. The FAA does not agree with CSF’s rationale tasks they are expected to perform. The FAA acknowledges that this conclusion that being informed is a sufficient FAA has a statutory obligation to protect requires risk analysis for the condition for such persons to be treated the health and safety of members of the neighboring operations personnel; under the higher risk threshold for public. Prior to this rulemaking, the however, the FAA expects that this neighboring operations personnel. In FAA defined public safety, for a analysis will involve little additional addition to being informed of potential particular licensed launch, as the safety effort because the operator already has hazards, neighboring operations of people and property that are not to perform a similar analysis for the personnel are required to perform involved in supporting the launch, other members of the public and will safety, security, or critical tasks at the including those people and property only need to account for the population neighboring site. The FAA finds that the that may be located within the boundary of neighboring operations personnel, if necessity of these tasks justifies the of a launch site, such as visitors, any. For these reasons, the FAA adopts minimal increase in risk to which individuals providing goods or services the proposal without amendment. neighboring operations personnel are not related to launch processing or In addition to comments exposed. Informed members of the flight, and any other launch operator recommending that neighboring public do not meet this criterion and, and its personnel. The FAA’s definition operations personnel be excluded from therefore, will continue to be protected of ‘‘public’’ is derived from the the definition of ‘‘public,’’ several at the public threshold rather than the definition of ‘‘public safety’’ in § 401.5 commenters had other higher threshold for neighboring and the definition of ‘‘public’’ in recommendations for the proposed operations personnel. § 420.5.44 definition of ‘‘public.’’ CSF commented The FAA considered potential The FAA’s definition of ‘‘public’’ that the proposal does not specify how regulatory mechanisms for allowing encompasses neighboring operations involved in a licensed operation a public stakeholders with a legitimate personnel because they are not involved person needs to be to fall outside public enough interest in the launch or reentry in supporting the specific launch or risk protections. CSF also proposed that activity to be on-site as requested by reentry they are neighboring. The FAA the definition of ‘‘public’’ should allow commenters. However, the FAA agrees that neighboring operations for a risk threshold for those who have identified certain statutory and personnel are more familiar with the been briefed on the risks and hazards regulatory challenges with making these hazardous operations present at a and chosen to participate to the same changes as a part of this final rule. launch site and may have a relationship level as neighboring operations Given the inherent risks associated with or engagement with their neighboring personnel, and that historic NASA commercial space activity, Congress operators, but the FAA does not find operations have followed this model. established a framework for liability that to be sufficient to exclude them CSF further stated that the definition of insurance and financial responsibility from the definition of ‘‘public.’’ It was ‘‘public’’ should not include persons that distinguishes individuals involved a factor, however, in the FAA’s decision who have a passive involvement in the in launch or reentry activities from third to apply a risk requirement to licensed activity, such as invited guests parties. Section 50902 defines third neighboring operations personnel of the operator, customers, families of party as persons other than launch or different from the requirement applied astronauts, and other stakeholders with reentry participants.46 Section 50914 to other members of the public. a legitimate enough interest in the Although this rule includes neighboring launch or reentry activity to be on-site. 45 The FAA is not proposing a higher risk operations personnel in the definition of SpaceX echoed CSF’s comments on this threshold for invited guests or other consenting ‘‘public,’’ the FAA recognizes that issue, and further suggested that the members of the public at this time. 46 Specifically, in accordance with § 50902(26), neighboring operations personnel are definition of ‘‘public’’ should generally include only those people who reside ‘‘third party’’ means a person except— aware of the inherent risks associated (A) the United States Government or the with launch and reentry activities and and work outside the controlled areas of Government’s contractors or subcontractors are likely trained and prepared to a launch or reentry site. Blue Origin, involved in launch services or reentry services; respond to hazards present at these CSF, and SpaceX recommended (B) a licensee or transferee under this chapter; excluding invited guests of the launch (C) a licensee’s or transferee’s contractors, sites. Because of these differences, as subcontractors, or customers involved in launch well as their unique role in performing or reentry operator from the definition of ‘‘public.’’ services or reentry services; (D) the customer’s contractors or subcontractors 44 Both of these definitions are being replaced by As discussed earlier, the FAA’s involved in launch services or reentry services; or the new, consolidated definition of ‘‘public’’ in definition of ‘‘public’’ was derived from (E) crew, government astronauts, or space flight § 401.7. the definition of ‘‘public safety’’ in participants.

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states that a licensee must obtain launch and reentry activities.49 Such Blue Origin requested that the FAA liability insurance to protect launch or requests can serve a purpose of further define the term ‘‘critical tasks’’ reentry participants from third party encouraging, facilitating, or promoting referenced in the new definition to claims, based on maximum probable commercial space launches and include ‘‘tasks that are critical to normal loss calculations.47 Additionally, reentries by the private sector, business operations.’’ section 50914(b) establishes a reciprocal facilitating private sector involvement The FAA does not agree that adding waiver of claims regime for applicable in commercial space transportation Blue Origin’s definition of ‘‘critical parties whereby each party to the waiver activity, and promoting public-private tasks’’ is necessary. In the absence of a agrees to be responsible for personal partnerships. However, the FAA expects regulatory definition, the plain language injury to, death of, or property damage operators to articulate more specifically definition applies and is sufficient here. or loss sustained by it or its own the reasons why allowing particular In addition, the FAA gave context in the employees resulting from an activity individuals to be in areas they otherwise preamble to the NPRM for the types of carried out under the applicable license. would be prohibited from entering is in activity that may qualify as ‘‘safety, This regime includes certain parties the public interest. In considering such security, or critical tasks.’’ The plain waiving claims against the U.S. waiver requests, the FAA would be language definition maintains flexibility Government.48 The FAA has codified mindful of its role in protecting the to include various tasks as industry these requirements in the part 440 public and accounting for any practices evolve over time. These tasks regulations. additional liability such a waiver would include maintaining the security of a While the FAA may waive certain risk impose on the U.S. Government. Some site or facility or performing critical requirements in order to allow members factors that would affect the FAA’s launch processing tasks such as of the public to be present in hazard decision may include the number of monitoring pressure vessels or testing areas during launch or reentry activities, people an operator seeks to have present safety-critical systems of a launch these individuals are third parties under and the strength of association between vehicle for an upcoming mission. These title 51 and will therefore be included those people and the launch or reentry tasks also include business operations in maximum probable loss calculations. activity. Individuals that have an that cannot be reasonably conducted off This would likely increase insurance employment or contractual arrangement site, such as onsite hardware work as costs, which would be borne by the with the licensee, or are otherwise part well as data processing that must be licensee. Additionally, these individuals of the cross-waiver framework of the conducted in a secure facility. are not currently included in title 51’s license, may pose minimal, if any, Neighboring operations personnel do not include individuals conducting cross-waiver framework nor has the liability for the U.S. Government. This normal business operations that need FAA gone beyond the scope of title 51 could include high-level company not be conducted in hazardous areas, in part 440 to expand the cross-waiver officials and U.S. Government officials. individuals in training for any job, or framework to include them. As such, Members of the public for whom a individuals performing routine their presence in hazard areas during waiver is requested should have a strong activities such as administrative, office launch or reentry activities may increase connection to the launch, reentry, or building maintenance, human resource the liability of the United States (and licensee; for example, future customers, major investors, or invited press might functions, or janitorial work. This others involved in the launch who have qualify. flexibility accommodates practices like executed cross-waivers with the The operator bears the burden of those USAF and NASA follow at their operator) because of the increased providing adequate justification for this launch sites and is intended to allow potential for third party claims. Finally, relief through the waiver process. The critical operations to proceed at any regulatory changes would need to operator should include in its waiver neighboring locations without be effectuated in part 440 where the application an assessment of the risks to jeopardizing those operations. As FAA’s financial responsibility the individuals covered by the explained in the NPRM, neighboring requirements for commercial space requested waiver,50 information on how operations personnel are members of the transportation are located; however, the the operator will assume liability and public. The FAA allows a slightly FAA did not contemplate substantial hold the U.S. Government harmless, and increased risk to these personnel over changes to part 440 in this rulemaking. the individuals’ association to the that permissible to other members of the Because of these challenges, the FAA launch, reentry, or licensee. The FAA public. The FAA does not believe that elects to proceed with a waiver regime anticipates using its experience in an increase in risk is justified for rather than a regulatory change at this considering waivers to accommodate reasons other than to facilitate time.The FAA notes that operators may the presence of additional members of performing safety, security, or critical request waivers to allow members of the the public during commercial space tasks at the site. The FAA estimates that public to be present in areas where risk launch and reentry activities to inform the collective risk criteria in the final requirements under part 450 would not potential future rulemaking in this area. rule for neighboring operations otherwise allow them to be during The FAA also received several personnel will enable, on average, comments on the proposed definition of approximately forty additional 47 Specifically, in accordance with § 50914(a)(4), ‘‘neighboring operations personnel.’’ personnel to operatate in this capacity, the insurance must protect the following, to the which the FAA believes will ensure that extent of their potential liability for involvement in 49 launch services or reentry services, at no cost to the Should the FAA grant such a waiver, any neighboring operators can maintain Government: individuals to whom the waiver applied would still operations with minimum disruption. constitute third parties under title 51 U.S.C. 50902, (A) the Government. Virgin Galactic commented that the and operators would continue to be required to (B) executive agencies and personnel, contractors, obtain liability insurance or demonstrate financial definition of ‘‘neighboring operations and subcontractors of the Government. responsibility to cover third party claims as personnel’’ should include all personnel (C) contractors, subcontractors, and customers of required by 51 U.S.C. 50914 and 14 CFR part 440. who have been properly trained to the licensee or transferee. 50 An operator may perform a risk analysis using respond to hazards present at a launch (D) contractors and subcontractors of the its own methods or the risk analyses identified in customer. part 450 in order to demonstrate the individual and or reentry site and who are notified of (E) space flight participants. collective risks imposed on the individuals hazardous operations occurring by other 48 51 U.S.C. 50914(b)(2). identified in the waiver request. licensed operators at that site. Virgin

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Galactic objected to including in the essential to ongoing operations and operations personnel is optional for definition a requirement that what hazard mitigation measures should FAA-licensed or exclusive use site neighboring operations personnel be be observed. operators. The FAA will monitor a notified of the operation, stating that a Other commenters, including ULA launch site operator’s designation and lack of notification should not exclude and Virgin Galactic, commented that the vehicle operator’s implementation of individuals from qualifying as FAA should designate neighboring neighboring operations personnel to neighboring operations personnel. operations personnel. These ensure the appropriateness of these Similarly, ULA commented that the commenters argued that a site operator designations, thereby retaining its requirement appeared to be mostly in should not determine who qualifies as authority to determine which the definition, which ‘‘removes the neighboring operations personnel, individuals are properly characterized definition’s objectivity.’’ because it would be tantamount to the as neighboring operations personnel. FAA disagrees with Virgin Galactic FAA’s reassigning its decision-making Further, site operators are best that training and notification are authority on the matter. Sierra Nevada positioned to adjudicate between sufficient to justify the inclusion of recommended that the FAA collect the tenants, to coordinate acceptable personnel in the neighboring operations neighboring operations personnel numbers of neighboring operations personnel category. Training alone does information and calculate the risk on personnel during licensed operations, not justify placing personnel at a raised behalf of the applicant so that the and to protect their tenants’ proprietary level of risk. Only those personnel proprietary nature of workforce information and furnish the necessary performing safety, security, or critical numbers can be maintained between information to the licensed operator. tasks qualify as neighboring operations competitive companies. The Aerospace The FAA expects that the coordination personnel who may be subjected to a Industry Association (AIA), Blue Origin, of the necessary data transfer will be higher risk threshold because of the Virgin Galactic, and other commenters collaborative between the licensed nature of those tasks, as discussed also raised concerns about how operator, the site operator, and the previously and in the NPRM. proprietary data would be shared after neighboring operators. Neighboring Furthermore, as explained in the NPRM, neighboring operations are designated. operators have the option of removing requiring a licensee to ensure Virgin Galactic commented that those their personnel during the flight of a neighboring operations personnel are best suited to know which employees neighboring flight or reentry. As trained would be burdensome and is not are required for safety, security, or discussed above, neighboring operators necessary to justify the increase in risk critical tasks are the other launch have the option of discussing with the allowed for workers performing safety, operators, not the site operator. site operator which personnel they security, or critical tasks. As previously described, the FAA believe need to remain present in order The FAA does not agree with Virgin maintains that the separate risk to maintain safety, security, or other Galactic and ULA that the definition of thresholds are the appropriate critical tasks. The accommodation of ‘‘neighboring operations personnel’’ protections for neighboring operations neighboring operations personnel imposes a regulatory requirement. personnel, and the FAA does not agree through the risk thresholds benefits the Rather, it enables neighboring with removing its proposed neighboring launch or reentry operator by reducing operations to continue by describing operations personnel risk thresholds the possibility that their presence which individuals qualify as and instead allowing site operators to without evacuation could result in a neighboring operations personnel. designate what mitigations would be violation of the public risk criteria. It Notification of an operation is a necessary to protect neighboring also benefits the neighboring operators precondition to qualify as neighboring operations personnel. The FAA does not to allow safety, security, or critical tasks operations personnel. Personnel cannot agree with ULA and Virgin Galactic that to continue in cases where the site be designated as neighboring operations the FAA or the launch operator should operator might otherwise require personnel and be subject to the higher determine what individuals are evacuation of personnel. Hence, the risk thresholds, if they have not been appropriately classified as neighboring FAA believes that generally, as is notified of the operation. For these operations personnel. Site operators are current practice at Federal sites, reasons, the FAA declines to accept in the best position to know what neighboring operations personnel can be these particular changes to the proposed operations occur on their sites and accommodated with little direct definition. which individuals are appropriately intervention by the FAA. A number of commenters focused on designated as neighboring operations Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX all which authority designates personnel as personnel. The FAA expects that the commented that the neighboring neighboring operations personnel. Many site operator (i.e., an operator of a operations personnel provisions should commenters, including CSF, Space Federal site or FAA-licensed launch or apply to exclusive-use or private sites. Florida, and SpaceX, noted their reentry site) would work with operators Blue Origin asked whether the FAA agreement that the designation of of neighboring sites to identify these intended to exclude such sites from its neighboring operations personnel personnel because the site operator is in proposal because, although these are should be coordinated and determined the best position to identify which sites that the FAA does not license, by the site operator, but urged the FAA personnel are required to perform launch and reentry activities at these to remove its proposed neighboring safety, security, or critical tasks at the sites can cause disruptions to non- operations personnel risk thresholds launch site. The site operator has a licensed neighboring activities, such as and instead allow site operators to formal relationship with all operators on developmental or test programs. designate what mitigations would be its site and has an interest in enabling The FAA does not license exclusive- necessary to protect neighboring continued and unimpeded operations use sites, but it does license launch and operations personnel. CSF urged the amongst its tenants. At Federal sites, the reentry activities that occur at exclusive- FAA generally to defer to Federal, State, site operator already fulfills this use sites. The FAA does not anticipate local, or private site owners and function, and thus enabling neighboring that many exclusive-use sites would operators as the sole decision-makers operations personnel does not impose have personnel within a launch or responsible for determining which any additional costs on the site operator. reentry site, or an adjacent launch or personnel would be considered The designation of neighboring reentry site, that qualify as neighboring

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operations personnel. Nevertheless, the personnel at co-located sites as and personnel of neighboring operators FAA may accept the designation of neighboring operations personnel, the that have a probability of occurrence of neighboring operations personnel at an proposed definition did not preclude no less than one in one hundred exclusive-use site if they are designated the possibility. In response to thousand (1 × 10¥5), instead of the more by the licensed vehicle operator that commenters, the FAA finalizes the stringent requirement of one in ten operates the site. Such designations will definition of ‘‘neighboring operations million (1 × 10¥7) used for other third only apply to members of the public personnel’’ as proposed, and agrees that party losses. This threshold is located within the site or an adjacent the definition may include airport appropriate for neighboring operations launch or reentry site who are not personnel working at a launch site. personnel because, unlike other third associated with the specific hazardous Many commenters expressed parties, except for involved government licensed or permitted operation being concerns about the impact of personnel, the presence of neighboring conducted, but who are required to designating neighboring operations operations personnel at a launch or perform safety, security, or critical tasks personnel on the MPL calculation and reentry site is necessary either for at the site and are notified of the the associated financial responsibility security reasons or to avoid the operation. This approach is requirements. Northrup Grumman, disruption of co-located activities at Sierra Nevada, SpaceX, and ULA all accommodated by the proposed neighboring sites. The MPL commented that the inclusion of regulations without change. methodology captures catastrophic The FAA recognizes that there are neighboring operations personnel would events that, while extremely unlikely, activities that currently take place at likely raise MPL, even at the proposed still fall within the probability launch sites that are not explicitly lower threshold in the NPRM. CSF, associated with launch or reentry Space Florida, and SpaceX requested threshold. operations. For example, payload that neighboring operations personnel The FAA’s examination of past MPL processing typically occurs at launch should be excluded from MPL determinations gives it confidence that sites. The Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein calculations via waivers of liability. these other events will generally drive also has facilities that are essential for Section 50914(c) of title 51 of the U.S. MPL amounts more than the limited tracking objects in space. The U.S. Navy Code states that the Secretary of presence of neighboring operations has a presence at Cape Canaveral Air Transportation shall determine the personnel.52 While additional insurance Force Station (CCAFS). These activities maximum probable losses for which a costs are expected to be minimal, these may sometimes require critical licensee must obtain liability insurance minimal cost burdens are more personnel to remain on site during or demonstrate financial responsibility. appropriately placed on the launch or neighboring launch activities to ensure This amount must include the reentry operator creating the hazards, the continuation of operations. While maximum probable loss from claims by, rather than the neighboring operator the FAA envisioned primarily in relevant part, third parties. 51 U.S.C. who otherwise must halt its operation. facilitating launch operations by 50914(a)(1)(A). Neighboring operations The FAA notes, however, that these proposing a carve out for neighboring personnel are third parties under regulations do not prevent a launch operations personnel, it will allow other chapter 509 of title 51.51 Therefore, the operator from entering into an personnel conducting non-licensed FAA must include neighboring agreement with a neighboring operator activities on a launch or reentry site or operations personnel in its MPL to recover costs as a result of any an adjacent launch or reentry site to calculations. increase in the required amount of third qualify as neighboring operations The FAA agrees with the comments party liability insurance due to the personnel as long as they meet the that MPL calculations could be affected presence of neighboring operations criteria enumerated in the definition. by the designation of neighboring personnel. Should a launch operator ALPA and Space Florida questioned operations personnel because the choose to enter into such an agreement, whether the neighboring operations proposed rule allowed more people to the launch operator would still be × ¥5 personnel provisions would apply at stay inside the 1 10 probability of required to purchase insurance to cover joint spaceport/airport facilities to allow casualty hazard area. While the FAA all third parties, to include any airport staff to stay in the hazard area or must include neighboring operations neighboring operations personnel, and clear zone based on risk assessments personnel in the MPL calculation, it could seek reimbursement as a during licensed space operations. In the does not expect the inclusion to affect secondary measure. Therefore, the FAA NPRM, the FAA took into account that materially the MPL amount. This adopts the proposal without neighboring operations personnel are expectation is based on the adoption in amendment. more likely than the rest of the public the proposed rule, for the purpose of to be specially trained and prepared to determining MPL, of setting the respond to hazards present at a launch 52 For example, the third party MPL for an Atlas threshold for neighboring operations 541 launch from CCAFS is currently $164M, which or reentry site. The USAF and NASA personnel at the same threshold for accounts for an event involving 30 third party definitions specify that these personnel losses to government property and casualties based on the risk profile method. An are either trained in mitigation involved government personnel. The unlicensed government launch of the same vehicle techniques or accompanied by a occurred with 12 people deemed neighboring MPL will determine losses to property operations personnel that were located within the properly trained escort. However, the ¥6 1 × 10 PC contour. If the conditions present FAA did not require that neighboring 51 ‘‘Third party’’ means a person except—(A) the during that unlicensed launch were to occur under operations personnel be trained or United States Government or the Government’s part 450, then those 12 neighboring operations accompanied by a trained escort contractors or subcontractors involved in launch personnel would be accounted for in the third party services or reentry services; (B) a licensee or MPL calculation at the 1 × 10¥5 probability because such a requirement would be transferee under this chapter; (C) a licensee’s or threshold (instead of the current standard 1 × 10¥7 burdensome, and training is not transferee’s contractors, subcontractors, or threshold for third parties as explained in the necessary to justify the slight increase in customers involved in launch services or reentry previous paragraph). The presence of the 12 risk allowed for workers performing services; (D) the customer’s contractors or neighboring operations personnel does not exceed subcontractors involved in launch services or the event involving 30 third party casualties. safety, security, or critical tasks. reentry services; or (E) crew, government Therefore, it is unlikely that those 12 neighboring Although in developing the NPRM, the astronauts, or space flight participants. 51 U.S.C. operations personnel would lead to an increase in FAA did not contemplate airport 50902(26). the MPL for the Atlas 541 under part 450.

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b. High Consequence Event Protection Administrator based on the FAA finds that the use of collective risk (§ 450.101(c)) demonstrated reliability of the launch or through analyses of EC and individual In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to reentry vehicle during that phase of risk through analysis of Probability of expand the FAA’s use of consequence flight. Although not specifically spelled Casualty (PC) is inherently inadequate to criteria to protect the public from an out in the regulatory text, the FAA establish sufficient protection against unlikely but catastrophic event. explained in the preamble that low probability, high consequence Specifically, the FAA proposed to use § 450.101(c) was designed to ensure the events during launch and reentry public was sufficiently protected against conditional expected casualties (CEC) as operations. Whereas PC limits the the quantitative metric for: (1) low probability, high consequence maximum risk to an individual and EC Determining the need for flight abort 53 events using CEC as a measure of the limits the average outcome in terms of as a hazard control strategy in proposed potential for high consequence events. casualties in a group of people, both PC In the final rule, the FAA retains the § 450.101(c); (2) setting reliability and EC are indifferent to the risk of standards for an FSS required by use of CEC as a quantitative criteria that events that involve multiple casualties. § 450.101(c) in proposed § 450.145(a); an applicant may use to measure the This indifference means that, if the risk and (3) determining when to initiate a potential for high consequence events. of a potential event that could result in flight abort in proposed § 450.125(c)(1) However, as explained in the preamble a high number of casualties is low section addressing § 450.101(c)(2), the and (c)(2). The proposed use of CEC enough, the PC and EC criteria would represented the most significant change FAA revises § 450.37(b) (Equivalent not act to prevent that event. As in the NPRM because it introduced a Level of Safety) to allow an applicant to explained in the NPRM, the purpose of propose an alternative way to measure new safety criteria pertaining to low CEC is to protect the public from certain probability, high consequence events high consequence events other than by high consequence events, regardless of and provided a means by which an CEC. The final rule also allows multiple the probability of those events. Thus, ways an applicant may protect against a operator could demonstrate that the final rule includes specific low probability, high consequence event expensive, highly reliable FSS design provisions, such as in §§ 450.101, in uncontrolled areas for each phase of and testing may be unnecessary to 450.108, and 450.145, to ensure flight in § 450.101(c)(1) through (3). As protect public safety. As explained in adequate protection against low discussed in more detail later in this the NPRM, consequence can be probability but high consequence events section, an operator sufficiently protects measured in terms of CEC without during launch and reentry. regard to the probability of failure. against a high consequence event by (1) The FAA received extensive using flight abort in accordance with In addition, a conditional risk comments on this proposal and, as a § 450.108; (2) demonstrating that CEC is assessment ensures adequate mitigation result, has made significant changes in below a certain threshold without any measures are in place to protect against the final rule to allow for additional FSS; or (3) demonstrating sufficient a low probability, high consequence flexibility in measuring and mitigating vehicle reliability and in consideration event in circumstances in which EC and 54 high consequence events. The following of CEC. The FAA changes the heading Pc may not dictate the need for subsections provide an overview of the of § 450.101(c) from ‘‘Flight Abort’’ in mitigation. As explained in the NPRM, finalized CEC requirements in the NPRM to ‘‘High Consequence Event unlike collective risk that determines § 450.101(c), the FAA’s rationale for Protection’’ in the final rule because this the expected casualties factoring in the making the change, and specific section allows an operator in certain probability that a dangerous event will responses to comments. The FAA notes circumstances to use a method other occur, conditional risk determines the that this section of the preamble focuses than flight abort to protect against high expected casualties assuming the 56 on CEC as a means to measure the consequence events. dangerous event will occur. This potential for high consequence events Multiple commenters, including CSF, assumption means that using EC alone under § 450.101(c). CEC will be Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX, stated that may result in a lack of mitigations, such discussed further in the preamble the NPRM requirements in § 450.101(c) as flight abort capability and sections addressing §§ 450.108 (Flight were too prescriptive and objected to preparedness, for certain high Abort) and 450.145 (Highly Reliable the lack of an explicit provision consequence events because the low Flight Safety System). allowing an applicant to propose probability of occurrence would another approach to address a high translate into an E below the 1 × 10¥4 i. § 450.101(c) C consequence event, absent a waiver. The limit. Conversely, using a conditional In the NPRM, proposed § 450.101(c) FAA agrees that the final rule should risk assessment ensures that, if a high would require an operator to use flight provide additional flexibility and consequence event is reasonably abort as a hazard control strategy if the discusses those changes in more detail foreseeable, such as an incorrect consequence of any reasonably later in this section. azimuth at lift-off, then an operator will foreseeable vehicle response mode, in Multiple commenters, including CSF have a mitigation in place to prevent any one-second period of flight, is and Virgin Galactic, indicated that the that event from producing catastrophic × ¥3 greater than 1 10 CEC for EC collective risk criteria alone should results. This result is assured because uncontrolled areas. The FAA further be enough to establish the need for an the decision to activate an FSS is always proposed that the requirement would FSS, the reliability of the FSS, and made in response to a system failure in apply to all phases of flight, unless when an FSS would be required to be the operational environment, as no otherwise agreed to by the activated to ensure public safety.55 The operator plans to implement a flight abort unless the mission objectives 54 53 In the final rule, flight abort is defined as the A CEC value is calculated as the mean number include an intentional test of the FSS. process to limit or restrict the hazards to public of casualties predicted to occur given a specified health and safety, and the safety of property, failure mode in a given time interval with a presented by a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, probability of 1. and activation of FSS. These regulations and the 55 including any payload, while in flight by initiating As proposed, § 450.101(c) simply used CEC to response to commenters’ concern with using CEC and accomplishing a controlled ending to vehicle determine whether flight abort would be required for those purposes are discussed later in the flight. Flight abort is discussed more fully in the as a hazard control strategy. Other proposed preamble. 56 discussion of § 450.108. regulations relied on CEC to establish FSS reliability See 84 FR at 15298.

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Calculating CEC ensures an operator necessitate changes to current practice The FAA does not agree that the cost correctly recognizes certain system for more than a dozen missions of a CEC analysis is prohibitively failures that may have catastrophic involving large, medium, and small expensive. The FAA provides estimates consequences and builds mitigations launch vehicles from a wide variety of in the final Regulatory Impact into the system to account for those sites. The results of this study Assessment of the costs of the CEC failures. As such, an FSS is generally demonstrate that the required reliability analyses as well as estimates of cost activated in the following context: (1) of an FSS for relatively small rockets savings on those launches that will not The vehicle is no longer performing depends greatly on the launch site. need an FSS. nominally; (2) the vehicle is outside the Specifically, the ACTA study found that The ACTA study calculated CEC for a limits of a useful mission; 57 and (3) a small ELV launched from Cape sample of licensed RLVs and the results continued flight would increase public Canaveral or Wallops Island would need indicate that the final rule will not risks in uncontrolled areas. Hence, the a highly reliable FSS compliant with require any changes regarding the FSS risk to the public associated with the proposed § 450.145 to meet the NPRM robustness and FSS activation criteria decision to activate an FSS is inherently requirements, but that a less reliable currently used for the operations at the conditioned on the fact that a system FSS, such as an FSS compliant with Mojave Air and Space Port. The ACTA failure has occurred. An operator would proposed § 450.143, would suffice for study results suggest that launches from only identify a system failure for low the same vehicle launched from more Spaceport America would not need to probability, high consequence events if remote locations, such as the Mahia use flight abort as a hazard control the operator used a CEC-based analysis, Peninsula and Kodiak Island. To the strategy to meet the CEC requirements in rather than an EC calculation, because a extent that commenters suggested the final rule. Thus, the ACTA study CEC analysis assumes that the event will proposed § 450.101(c) would require suggests the final rule could facilitate a occur. Therefore, relying on the currently licensed operators to use an reduction in costs for RLV launches collective risk criteria alone would not FSS, the ACTA study results indicate from non-Federal launch sites for adequately protect against low that no changes would be required current part 431 licenses that include probability, high consequence events under the final rule regarding the need flight abort as a hazard control strategy. that could result in multiple public for an FSS for any currently licensed Ultimately, the ACTA study indicates casualties. launch vehicle launched from a Federal that CEC will not drive a requirement for The FAA received several comments launch or reentry site.59 The ACTA flight abort for currently licensed RLVs regarding the potential for various study also indicates that, for operators operating from non-Federal sites and is launch operations to comply with the who currently employ an FSS to meet therefore not expected to drive costs for proposed CEC thresholds in the NPRM. the FAA’s public risk criteria, their RLV operators. In the final Regulatory Rocket Lab USA, Inc. (‘‘Rocket Lab’’) current practices regarding FSS Impact Analysis, the FAA discusses in commented that it would be ‘‘nearly reliability and activation criteria would detail estimated voluntary costs to impossible’’ for any orbital launch be sufficient to demonstrate compliance perform CEC analyses as well as cost vehicle to meet the CEC thresholds with the requirements in § 450.108. savings that result when an FSS is not defined in the proposal and A number of commenters asserted required. recommended the use of cumulative that the proposed CEC requirements Several commenters, including CSF, risk and individual risk metrics as would increase cost for operators, Rocket Lab, Sierra Nevada, SpaceX, and additional or alternative means of particularly for current RLV operators. an individual commenter, expressed a determining the reliability required for CEC analysis is not mandatory. If an need for clarification of acceptable the flight abort system. Blue Origin also operator chooses to use a § 450.145 methodologies to compute CEC. CSF and stated that most, if not all operators, compliant FSS, it does not need to do Sierra Nevada commented that there are including those operating smaller the CEC analysis to establish if a no publicly available methodologies or suborbital launch vehicles in remote § 450.145 compliant FSS is necessary or background for conducting CEC locations, would be forced to implement if a § 450.143 compliant FSS would analysis. CSF noted that the CEC an FSS that complies with an suffice. A CEC analysis to establish analysis is computationally intensive unmodified set of USAF requirements. compliant Flight Safety Limits is and approved risk analysis tools and SpaceX recommended that the FAA unnecessary if the operator chooses to input data were not readily available. gather more detail on CEC for different demonstrate compliance with SpaceX stated it needed guidance on launch vehicles and trajectory profiles § 450.108(c)(6). several specific technical issues on the to evaluate appropriate lower tiers of computation of CEC. Rocket Lab stated reliability. 59 The ACTA study made four notable that, without standardized methods and The FAA sponsored a series of tasks, conclusions: input data, results would vary widely. 1. For two current launch vehicles launched from performed by ACTA, LLC (ACTA), to ¥3 The FAA notes that CEC is inherent in outside the continential US, the 1 × 10 CEC investigate the potential conditional threshold is not exceeded. Thus, part 450 will not the calculation of EC for launch or risks associated with a wide array of require an FSS for either of these two launches, yet reentry operations. There are extensive past and foreseeable future launch both are designed to employ an FSS (as required by guidance documents available currently part 417). that explain methodologies that can be operations using the best available 2. For ten launch vehicles launched from within 58 used to compute EC and, as a byproduct, information and tools. The study the continential US9, the part 450 CEC requirements 60 provided an independent evaluation of are consistent with current practice, where part 417 CEC as well. The FAA is aware of at requires the highly reliable FSS. the potential for the CEC-related least one operator that has used these requirements in the NPRM to 3. For two piloted launch vehicles, one would guidelines to develop and implement its require no changes, and the other would require no FSS although a flight abort capability is currently own safety analysis tools to demonstrate 57 Limits of a useful mission are defined in the employed under part 431. 60 final rule as the trajectory data or other parameters 4. One current reentry poses CEC well above the See e.g., the FAA Flight Safety Analysis that bound the performance of a useful mission, 1 × 10¥2 threshold. Thus, under part 450 this Handbook v 1.0, 2009 and the Range Commanders including flight azimuth limits. This concept is reentry operation would either need to be modified Council Risk Committee of the Range Safety Group, discussed in greater detail in § 450.119. to reduce the consequence of failure modes that Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges— 58 The report can be found in docket number would result in an intact impact, or be granted a Supplement, RCC 321–20, White Sands Missile FAA–2019–0229. waiver. Range, New Mexico, 2020.

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63 compliance with the current public risk compliance. However, the FAA finds a byproduct, CEC as well. The term criteria under part 417. Some tools have that a qualitative approach to determine ‘‘high consequence’’ appears in already been modified to compute CEC the three key CEC-related issues (i.e., the § 417.107(a)(1)(ii), but the FAA chose with only a few hours of effort. Even so, need for flight abort with a reliable FSS not to define this term formally at this the FAA remains dedicated to as a hazard control strategy, the time to allow for operational flexibility. improving the guidance materials reliability standards for any required High consequence events include available to applicants and plans to FSS, and the criteria for activation of an incidents that could involve multiple provide additional advisory materials to FSS) would lack regulatory clarity casualties, massive toxic exposures, explain acceptable safety analysis necessary to ensure a consistent level of extensive property or environmental methods, including those that address public protection, given the wide damage, or events that jeopardize the any unique aspects of CEC variety of launch and reentry national security or foreign policy computations. operations. As noted by Rocket Lab and interests of the United States. Sierra Nevada commented that CEC other commenters, even the results of Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA provided analysis was not a widely accepted quantitative high consequence event regulatory text recommendations for practice, nor had it been subject to assessments can vary significantly from § 450.101(c) including removal of ‘‘flight rigorous testing, and it was not ready to operator to operator without abort,’’ stating that a distinction needed be implemented. In response, the FAA standardized methods and input data. notes that RCC 321 Standard and to be made from flight abort that was not Supplement has included conditional Although quantitative CEC is retained initiated based on threat to public risk standards and guidelines since in the final rule, the FAA adds health and safety because not all abort 2010. Moreover, CEC analysis has been flexibility in both the manner in which systems are considered FSS. used to help inform important decisions a high consequence may be measured The FAA understands that the term regarding the safety of commercial space and the manner in which an operator ‘‘flight abort’’ has been used in other transportation operations since 2016, can sufficiently protect against a high U.S. Government contexts to mean something different, but the FAA finds when the FAA first cited CEC as part of consequence event. First, in the NPRM, a formal waiver evaluation.61 As noted ELOS would not have been allowed for that ‘‘flight abort’’ accurately describes in the NPRM preamble, in granting the requirements in § 450.101. As noted the required hazard mitigations while these waivers, the FAA has adopted the in the discussion of ELOS earlier in the remaining flexible as to implementation. conditional risk management approach, preamble, the FAA has revised § 450.37 For these reasons, the FAA will not noting that the predicted consequence in the final rule to allow operators to amend the rule to remove the term was below a threshold of 1 × 10¥2 use ELOS to measure a high ‘‘flight abort.’’ The final rule adopts the 62 proposed definition of flight abort in CEC. The FAA further stated in the consequence event under preamble that measuring the § 450.101(c)(2). Second, § 450.101(c)(2) § 401.7, which means the process to limit or restrict the hazards to public consequence from reasonably permits an operator whose CEC is foreseeable, albeit unlikely, failures is greater than 1 × 10¥3 to propose health and safety, and the safety of property, presented by a launch vehicle an appropriate metric to assess prudent safeguards other than flight abort to ¥ or reentry vehicle, including any mitigations of risks to public health and reduce the CE below 1 × 10 3. These C payload, while in flight by initiating and safety and the safety of property. In revisions are discussed in greater detail accomplishing a controlled ending to recent years, the USAF has also used later in this section. CE analyses to establish appropriate vehicle flight. The final rule also adopts C Virgin Galactic recommended the in § 401.7 the proposed definition of FSS activation criteria for launch FAA provide a definition of CEC. In ‘‘flight safety system,’’ which means a operations from both CCAFS and VAFB. addition, Virgin Galactic commented system used to implement flight abort, Most recently, the FAA considered the that, in the NPRM preamble, CEC was for which a human can be a part of an results of CE analyses in granting C described using the phrase, ‘‘without FSS. waivers to the debris containment regard to the probability of failure,’’ The FAA finds that the definition of requirements in § 417.213(a) and (d) that ‘‘flight abort’’ is consistent with current enabled the SAOCOM–1B mission to be which appeared to Virgin Galactic to translate to ‘‘assume 100% failure practice for licensed launches and conducted safely. reentries. Most RLVs use some method Several commenters, including CSF, probability.’’ Virgin Galactic to achieve flight abort reliably, either in Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX, recommended the FAA use the terminology ‘‘assuming the failure will the form of a pilot that can safely abort recommended that the proposed CEC- occur’’ and clearly state the probability flight using system controls or an related requirements be moved to a automated system to terminate thrust. guidance document as an accepted of failure would be 1, if that was what was intended. Traditional FSS for ELVs are comprised means of compliance to a more of an onboard flight termination system, performance-based regulation to The FAA does not agree that CEC a ground-based command and control preserve flexibility. CSF stated that, at a should be defined in the final rule. system, and tracking and telemetry minimum, the quantitative criteria Rather, the preamble and associated AC systems. Historically, the flight safety should be moved to a guidance (on High Consequence Event Protection) crew monitoring the course of a vehicle document. discuss in detail what the requirement would send a command to self-destruct, The FAA considered replacing the entails and how to calculate CEC. A CEC

proposed quantitative CEC criteria with 63 value is calculated as the mean number The FAA notes that CEC is inherent in the a qualitative standard and moving the of casualties predicted to occur given a calculation of EC because the total EC for the quantitative criteria to a guidance specified failure mode in a given time operation is the sum of all EC contributions from document as one acceptable means of each failure mode and failure time, and each EC interval with a probability of 1. As contribution for a failure mode and failure time is previously mentioned, there are the probability of failure multiplied by CEC. 61 See Waiver of Debris Containment extensive guidance documents currently Therefore, CEC for a given failure mode and failure Requirements for Launch. 81 FR 1470, 1470–1472 available that explain methodologies time can be found by dividing the EC contribution (January 12, 2016). by the probability of failure for that failure mode 62 84 FR 15312. that can be used to compute EC and, as and failure time.

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thus aborting the flight, if the vehicle preamble) to determine that it has measure high consequence events, such crossed flight safety limits and in doing sufficiently protected against a high as conditional risk profile. If an operator so threatened a protected area. consequence event. Rather, use of flight chooses to propose an alternative means Redundant transceivers in the launch abort consistent with the requirements of measuring a high consequence event, vehicle would receive the destruct in § 450.108 by itself demonstrates the FAA would expect the alternative command from the ground, set off compliance with § 450.101(c). means to account for the potential for charges in the vehicle to destroy the As explained in the next two sections, any event that would be expected to vehicle and disperse the propellants so operators who do not elect to use flight produce multiple casualties,65 using a that an errant vehicle’s hazards would abort consistent with the requirements method that demonstrates equivalent not impact populated areas. While this of § 450.108 must demonstrate they can level of safety to a CEC analysis. The method of flight abort through ordnance protect against a high consequence operator must ensure that the alternative is conventional, the existing definition event by means other than flight abort. means accurately assesses that the in § 417.3 and the definition in the final If an operator cannot demonstrate operation would not exceed an rule do not require an FSS to be compliance with § 450.101(c)(2)— acceptable threshold for high destructive. including through ELOS—or (c)(3), the consequence events. In order to In response to commenters’ concerns, operator would be required to rely on determine whether an alternative the FAA finds that the definitions of § 450.101(c)(1) as the only remaining threshold for high consequence events ‘‘flight abort’’ and ‘‘flight safety system’’ means to protect against a high is acceptable, the FAA will compare the adopted in the final rule remove any consequence event. alternative measurement to the CEC perceived confusion over the use of iii. § 450.101(c)(2) threshold. Alternatively, the applicant these terms for the purpose of FAA would be expected to demonstrate that licensing under part 450. In the final rule, § 450.101(c)(2) states either the consequence of any failure that an operator must protect against a ii. § 450.101(c)(1) during any significant period of flight is high consequence event in uncontrolled at least an order of magnitude less than Section 450.101(c)(1) states that an areas for each phase of flight by the average results from a fixed-wing operator must protect against a high ensuring the consequence of any general aviation aircraft fatal accident.66 consequence event in uncontrolled reasonably foreseeable failure mode, in For example, the Range Commanders areas for each phase of flight by using any significant period of flight, is not Council Document 321–17, ‘‘Common × ¥3 flight abort as a hazard control strategy greater than 1 10 CEC. As noted, Risk Criteria Standards for National Test in accordance with the requirements of proposed § 450.101(c) would have Ranges’’ (RCC 321) includes § 450.108. The FAA has not included required an operator with a CEC greater catastrophic risk protection provisions × ¥3 the reference to the CEC threshold of than 1 10 to use flight abort with that use a ‘‘risk profile.’’ 67 In fact, the ¥ 1 × 10 3 in § 450.101(c)(1) because an an FSS that meets the reliability FAA currently uses a modified risk operator who uses flight abort in requirements of proposed § 450.145 profile method to establish the accordance with § 450.108 has except for a single exception explained insurance requirements for certain demonstrated compliance with in greater detail in the discussion of launch or reentry operations.68 The § 450.101(c)’s requirement to protect § 450.101(c)(3). against a high consequence event The FAA recognizes that flight abort 65 High consequence events include incidents that without further inquiry into CEC beyond is not the only method to protect against could involve multiple casualties, massive toxic the requirements in § 450.108(c). This low probability, high consequence exposures, extensive property or environmental events. Therefore, in the final rule, damage, or events that jeopardize the national change is consistent with the concept security or foreign policy interests of the United proposed in § 450.101(c) of the NPRM § 450.101(c)(2) allows an operator with States. ¥3 that required an operator to use flight CEC greater than 1 × 10 in any 66 The FAA computed this risk profile using 64 abort with a reliable FSS if CEC was significant period of flight to NTSB accident data between 1982 and 2019 for greater than 1 × 10¥3 for any phase of demonstrate protection against a low fixed-wing aircraft operated under FAR parts 91, 135, and 137, excluding aircraft type certificated flight. Under the proposal, if an operator probability, high consequence event under part 25. elected to use flight abort with an FSS through means other than flight abort. 67 RCC 321–17 defines a risk profile as ‘‘a plot that met the reliability requirements in This added flexibility in the final rule that shows the probability of N or more casualties § 450.145, the FAA would not have allows operators to implement other (vertical axis) as a function of the number of safeguards that sufficiently protect casualties, N (horizontal axis),’’ such that the area required the operator to calculate CEC under a risk profile is equal to the EC. Unlike the for the purposes of determining against a high consequence event. For single valued EC, risk profiles illustrate whether the compliance with proposed § 450.101(c) example, one company included a collective risk is from a relatively low probability, because the operator opted into flight design feature in a system so that a high consequence event or from more frequent, abort as a hazard control strategy launch failure during downrange smaller consequence outcomes. 68 See, e.g., the 2016 Report to Congress ‘‘FAA’s irrespective of CEC. overflight would result in break-up and Development of an Updated Maximum Probable As such, in the final rule, there is no demise and thus mitigate the risk from Loss Method’’ in response to Public Law 114–90, need to reference a CEC threshold in the potential for the capsule to survive Section 102. An MPL analysis must model each § 450.101(c)(1) because an operator who intact to impact. accident scenario as a discrete event with discrete results, e.g., no casualties, exactly one casualty, two elects to use flight abort as its hazard In addition, although this provision casualties, etc. Each accident scenario also has a control strategy and complies with retains the quantitative CEC threshold quantitative probability of occurrence. The MPL § 450.108 does not need to calculate CEC proposed in § 450.101(c), the FAA analysis process involves simulation of many (beyond the requirements in provides additional flexibility by thousands of discrete accident scenarios that cover the parameter space of the problem (i.e., all § 450.108(c) discussed later in the modifying § 450.37 to allow applicants foreseeable accident scenarios for each and every to propose alternative approaches that failure time and vehicle failure mode). The 64 Proposed § 450.101(c) required an operator to provide an equivalent level of safety, predicted results of all foreseeable accident use fight abort with an FSS that met the reliability which can be approved by the FAA scenarios are accumulated into a histogram and the requirements set forth in § 450.145. The reference risk profile is computed as the complementary to reliability requirements for FSS has been moved without a waiver. The FAA added this cumulative distribution. For details, see Collins, to § 450.108(b) and will be discussed in that section flexibility because it is aware of Brinkman, and Carbon paper ‘‘Determination of of the preamble. methods other than using CEC to Continued

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FAA understands that risk profiles are consequences materially from any ‘‘VRMs are a combination of debris list currently in use in other industries 69 reasonably foreseeable failure mode. and failure modes’’ and provided a and could be a useful means to quantify The FAA makes this change because it description of typical failure modes for the probability of high consequence recognizes that for some launch and launch and reentry systems, including events associated with a wide variety of reentry concepts, such as relatively loss of thrust, engine explosion, attitude hazardous operations. However, the slow-moving vehicles like balloons, a control failure, structural failure, computation of a risk profile generally ‘‘significant’’ period of flight could separation failure, guidance or entails significantly more effort than the exceed one second. In addition, the navigation failure, etc. Because the final CEC evaluation because a risk profile FAA foresees circumstances in which rule replaces the term ‘‘vehicle response involves more sophisticated an elevated CEC in a single second of mode’’ with ‘‘failure mode,’’ an operator computations and additional input data. flight would not warrant additional is no longer required to evaluate CEC for Specifically, the development of a risk mitigation, such as when no additional each foreseeable combination of failure profile for a launch or reentry operation mitigation would improve public safety mode and debris generation. Instead, an would consist of an evaluation of the meaningfully in terms of the public operator is required to evaluate CEC for absolute probability of each foreseeable risks and consequences. The preamble each reasonably foreseeable failure failure mode and the relative probability discussion of § 450.108 contains further mode in any significant period of of each outcome of each failure mode in explanation of what constitutes a flight.72 terms of the number of public casualties material decrease. Boeing suggested changing the term that could result in uncontrolled areas. Finally, the final rule replaces the ‘‘reasonably foreseeable’’ to ‘‘credible’’ The RCC 321 Supplement describes a phrase ‘‘any reasonably foreseeable vehicle response modes. The FAA does more simplified and conservative vehicle response mode’’ proposed in not agree that the term ‘‘reasonably method to screen for excessive § 450.101(c) with ‘‘any reasonably foreseeable’’ should be replaced by the catastrophic risk, which the FAA finds foreseeable failure mode’’ in term ‘‘credible’’ in this section. As as another acceptable method to § 450.101(c)(2) of the final rule. The previously noted, the term ‘‘reasonably measure high consequence events.70 In NPRM defined ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ foreseeable’’ is used in § 431.35 and contrast, a CEC analysis is independent as a mutually exclusive scenario that commonly used in system safety. In the of the probability of each failure mode characterizes foreseeable combinations absence of a compelling reason to and requires an assessment of only the of vehicle trajectory and debris change, the FAA prefers to continue to average outcome of each failure mode. generation. Thus, the NPRM would have use language consistent with previous regulations instead of introducing a new In addition, the FAA is publishing an required an evaluation of CEC for each AC that describes how an applicant can foreseeable combination of vehicle term at this time. Furthermore, the FAA demonstrate compliance with trajectory and debris generation. By finds that the term ‘‘credible’’ is prone § 450.101(c)(2) by showing that the replacing the term ‘‘vehicle response to errors in judgment whereas the term conditional risk profile for its proposed mode’’ (VRM) with ‘‘failure mode,’’ the ‘‘reasonably foreseeable’’ is more readily launch or reentry mission is comparable final rule is both less prescriptive and discerned by analysis (e.g., fault trees). with the conditional risk profile consistent with the current iv. § 450.101(c)(3) empirically derived from evidence from 71 requirements. In the NPRM, in instances in which a set of past fixed-wing general aviation In the NPRM, the FAA defined a VRM ¥ CE was greater than 1 × 10 3, proposed fatal accidents. Finally, the FAA as a mutually exclusive scenario that C § 450.101(c) provided relief from the use recognizes that industry may develop characterizes foreseeable combinations of flight abort if the Administrator new innovative and less burdensome of vehicle trajectory and debris methods, and therefore the final rule agreed that flight abort was not generation. As stated in the NPRM, necessary based on the demonstrated allows applicants to propose methods proposed § 450.101(c) would have other than CE to measure high reliability of the launch or reentry C required, at a minimum, that an vehicle during a phase of flight. The consequence events. operator compute the effective casualty In § 450.101(c)(2), the FAA replaces NPRM preamble cited the flight of a area and identify the population density certificated aircraft carrying a rocket to the term ‘‘one-second period of flight’’ that would be impacted for each in proposed § 450.101(c) with a drop point as an example of a phase reasonably foreseeable vehicle response of flight when the use of an FSS would ‘‘significant period of flight.’’ A period mode in any one-second period of flight of flight would be significant if it is long likely not be necessary, even though the in terms of CEC. The NPRM further CEC could be above the threshold enough for a mitigation, such as flight explained that the casualty area, abort, to decrease the public risks or because the aircraft would have population density, and predicted demonstrated reliability. consequence for each vehicle response While the final rule retains the Maximum Probable Loss’’ presented at 2nd IAASS mode are intermediate quantities that conference in Chicago, May 2007. ‘‘demonstrated reliability concept’’ 69 For example, Santa Barbara County, California are necessary to demonstrate proposed in the § 450.101(c) of the (where Vandenberg AFB is located) uses risk compliance with the individual and profiles as part of their management of public collective risk criteria currently; thus, 72 As an example of the distinction between casualty risks from activities that involve significant these new requirements would not ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ in the NPRM and quantities of hazardous materials as explained in necessarily impart significant additional ‘‘reasonably foreseeable failure mode,’’ in the final the County of Santa Barbara, Planning and rule consider, a loss of thrust (LoT) failure mode. Development, Environmental Thresholds and burden on operators. Under the NPRM, LoT failure mode would need to Guidelines Manual, October 2008. Several The draft AC 450.115–1 on High be accounted for by three VRMs: A LoT resulting European countries, including the UK and Fidelity Flight Safety Analysis in an intact impact, a LoT resulting in aerodynamic Netherlands, use risk profiles as part of their published for comment in conjunction break-up, and a LoT resulting in explosion due to governance of a wide array of industries that pose with the NPRM further explained that FSS activation. Under the NPRM’s proposal, the public risks. operator would have been required to compute CEC 70 For example, the catastrophic risk averse for three VRMs associated with LoT, but under the 71 pseudo-EC contribution from people in ships may As part of the demonstration required under same circumstances the final rule will require only be computed using a standard EC computation but § 431.35(c), a part 431 applicant is required in one CEC for the LoT. The final rule CEC for LoT will replacing the number of casualties contributed by § 431.35(d)(4) to identify and describe all safety- equal the average CEC for the three VRMs that the type of ship, N, with N raised to an exponent of 1.5. critical failure modes and their consequences. NPRM would have required.

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NPRM, it has been revised and relocated carrier vehicle operated in a more abort capability unless the addition of to § 450.101(c)(3). Section 450.101(c)(3) densely populated area could have a the rocket substantially increased the of the final rule states that an operator CEC near 1 in a given phase of flight and risk from a high consequence event. must protect against a high consequence thus would need to have demonstrated However, aside from some carrier event in uncontrolled areas for each reliability during that phase of flight on aircraft used as a component of a launch phase of flight by establishing the par with commercial transport aircraft vehicle, no launch vehicle, including 75 launch or reentry vehicle has sufficient that empirically produce CEF near 1. U.S. government owned and operated demonstrated reliability based on the This approach is consistent with the vehicles, to date has a significant CEC during that phase of flight. longstanding and often cited principle amount of historical flights to ensure Because demonstrated reliability that launch and reentry should be no sufficient protection against a high provides an alternative to flight abort more hazardous to the public than over- consequence event based on × ¥3 when CEC is greater than 1 10 , it is flight of conventional aircraft, as demonstrated reliability in accordance appropriate to assess it consistent with explained in the NPRM preamble. with § 450.101(c)(3). the approach to flight abort and FSS The FAA received multiple comments c. Critical Asset and Critical Payload reliability, which depends on CEC with seeking clarification of the provision to a 1 × 10¥2 threshold.73 Notably, the use demonstrated reliability as a means Protection ARC recommended that the need for an to ensure a low probability, high Commercial space transportation FSS should be determined by taking consequence event is sufficiently operations occur increasingly in close into account population density, the mitigated. In the NPRM, the FAA noted proximity to critical assets. In order to realm of reasonably foreseeable failures, that ‘‘demonstrated reliability’’ in this maintain the continuing functionality of trajectory, size, and explosive context refers to statistically valid critical assets, the FAA proposed to capabilities of the vehicle. CEC accounts probability of failure estimates based on define ‘‘critical assets’’ in § 401.5 for all those factors. As such, the CEC the outcomes of all previous flights of (§ 401.7 in the final rule) and add a computed for a proposed operation is the vehicle or stage. For example, a quantitative risk criterion (1 × 10¥3) for inherent in determining whether the probability of failure analysis that the protection of critical assets during vehicle has sufficient demonstrated complies with § 450.131 will provide a launch or reentry activity under reliability to protect against a high valid basis to establish the demonstrated § 450.101 in the NPRM. consequence event. This revision reliability of a launch or reentry vehicle In the final rule, the FAA adopts the informs operators on the approach the in a given phase of flight. That concept ‘‘critical asset’’ definition in § 401.7 FAA will take in determining whether is also applicable to § 450.101(c)(3) of with modification, as discussed below. the launch or reentry vehicle has the final rule. Furthermore, the FAA The FAA adopts the risk criterion as sufficient demonstrated reliability to will consider the magnitude of the high proposed but removes the requirement protect against a high consequence consequence event in determining what for operators to assess the risks to event. level of reliability will be sufficient to critical assets in preparing a flight More specifically, the FAA will use ensure that the high consequence event hazard analysis (proposed the demonstrated reliability and average is mitigated. One way to show that a § 450.109(a)(3)(ii)), debris analysis ground consequence results from fatal vehicle has demonstrated reliability (proposed § 450.121(c)(1) and (c)(2)), accidents involving U.S. civil aviation during a phase of flight is to show that debris risk analysis (§ 450.135), and aircraft with standard airworthiness it has demonstrated reliability during ground hazard analysis (§ 450.185(c)). certificates to establish what constitutes that phase of flight equivalent to a Instead, in accordance with sufficient demonstrated reliability to specific aircraft type or an average § 450.101(a)(4)(iii) and (b)(4)(iii), either protect against a high consequence aircraft of similar size and performance the FAA or a Federal launch or reentry event based on CEC. For example, a characteristics with a standard × ¥2 site operator will determine whether the carrier vehicle with a CEC near 1 10 airworthiness certificate.76 The FAA in a given phase of flight would need to proposed activity would expose critical notes an average aircraft of similar size assets to a risk of loss of functionality have demonstrated reliability during would have less uncertainty than a that phase of flight on par with the that exceeds the risk criterion in specific type aircraft because there § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4) and convey any subset of fixed-wing general aviation would be more data collected for an 74 necessary constraints to the operator. aircraft that empirically produce CEF average aircraft, and thus the near 1 × 10¥2. However, the same The operator must receive confirmation demonstrated reliability of an average from the FAA or Federal launch or aircraft could be more readily 73 reentry site operator that the risk to In the proposal and the final rule, the FAA uses characterized with a reasonable level of CEC not only as a basis to determine whether flight critical assets satisfies the risk criterion abort is required but also as a basis to determine confidence. Furthermore, both a specific in § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4) prior to the appropriate FSS requirements. As noted, FSS aircraft type and an average aircraft with launch or reentry. The FAA anticipates requirements are discussed later in the preamble. a standard airworthiness certificate 74 that most critical assets for a given CEF represents conditional expected fatalities generally will not need additional flight and is used to measure the mean number of launch site will be known when an fatalities predicted to occur given an event with a applicant begins pre-application probability of 1. As noted in the NPRM, the FAA 75 As noted in the NPRM, the FAA found that found that about one ground fatality resulted on about one ground fatality resulted on average from consultation. Current practice average from one-hundred fatal accidents involving a fatal accident involving US aircraft operated demonstrates that the critical asset US aircraft operated under part 91 between 1984 under part 121 between 1984 and 2013 based on evaluation can often be completed using and 2013 based on NTSB data. A comparison of CEC NTSB data. preliminary flight safety data (during 76 to CEF is appropriate here because the CEF values As discussed in the preamble section on Hybrid cited here are empirical results from aviation Vehicles, the FAA agreed with a comment that the pre-application or during the license accidents, whereas the CEC values used here are the FAA should not similarly find that an aircraft with evaluation), sufficient to show critical results of physics-based computer simulations for only an experimental airworthiness certificate assets risks are acceptable. Where the launch and reentry operations. In addition, the (EAC) would satisfy the demonstrated reliability prevailing weather conditions are differences between aviation and space operations standard. An aircraft with an EAC may demonstrate justify some margin in the tolerability of the sufficient reliability through the use of a rigorous important to the critical asset risks, an conditional risks predicted for space transportation flight test program or numerous flights without a assessment is performed either close to operations. failure as defined in § 450.131. or on the day-of-launch.

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In the final rule, the FAA also those necessary for high priority civil applicable from ignition or at the first clarified in § 450.101(a)(4)(ii) and space purposes, for clarity. An example movement that initiates flight, (b)(4)(ii) the Federal procedure by of this would be infrastructure whichever occurs earlier, and end when which critical assets will be identified. necessary to support launch and reentry the launch ends. To identify critical assets, the FAA will services to deliver cargo to and from the The FAA received many comments on consult with relevant Federal agencies, International Space Station. the definition of ‘‘critical asset.’’ ULA and each agency will identify, for CSF and SpaceX noted that critical expressed support for the proposed purposes of part 450, any critical assets assets are frequently located on or near definition. A number of commenters, that the agency owns or otherwise Federal launch or reentry sites, and that including CSF and Sierra Nevada, asked depends on. The FAA will accept any the current practice at Federal launch or who will determine whether an asset is identification by the Secretary of reentry sites is to allow a site operator ‘‘critical’’ and how the determination Defense that an asset is critical to or neighboring operator to waive the would be communicated to an national security. For critical assets critical asset requirement for its own applicant. Virgin Galactic commented identified by other relevant Federal facilities. The commenters requested the that the proposed definition is vague agencies, such as NASA, the FAA will regulation provide a similar allowance and did not provide enough information work with the agency to ensure its to reduce the frequency with which to the operator to ensure protection of identification of critical assets aligns operators would need to apply for critical assets because the definition with the requirements of part 450. waivers. SpaceX recommended revising could potentially apply to all property The FAA also adds in § 450.165(a)(5) the regulation to allow for the waiver of at a Federal site. Virgin Orbit (Flight Commit Criteria) a requirement an operator’s own designated critical commented that the lack of clarity could that operators’ flight commit criteria assets, as well as assets that may be result in Federal agencies incorrectly include confirmation from the FAA that shared or used as common concluding their assets were protected. the risk to critical assets satisfies the infrastructure at a range. CSF and SpaceX commented that there requirements of § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4). The FAA acknowledges that critical was no limit on the number or location Lastly, the FAA sought comments in the assets located on a launch site, of assets for which an operator would NPRM on its proposal to add to the final including the launch facility itself, may need to perform a risk analysis. CSF and rule a definition for ‘‘critical payload’’ be exposed to a risk of loss of SpaceX recommended the definition of and a requirement that the probability of functionality that exceeds 1 × 10 ¥3 ‘‘critical asset’’ be limited to U.S. loss of functionality not exceed 1 × 10¥4 during launch activity. The FAA finds Government assets located on Federal for each critical payload. The FAA that it would be burdensome to require property that the Secretary of Defense or adopts the proposed definition and a waiver of the critical asset protection Administrator of NASA determines to requirement in the final rule. requirement when a launch site be essential to the national interests of In the final rule, the FAA adopts the operated by the U.S. Government or the United States. Boeing, Lockheed risk criterion proposed for critical assets licensed by the FAA allows an operator Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA in the NPRM. The property protection to use its facility for launch. Therefore, recommended critical assets be defined criteria in § 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) are the FAA revises § 450.101(b)(4) to not as assets for which incapacitation or consistent with current practice at apply the critical asset risk criteria to destruction would have a very serious, Federal sites. Launch operations from property, facilities, or infrastructure debilitating effect on national defense, NASA-operated ranges are currently supporting the launch that are within or assured access to space for national subject to requirements that limit the the public area distance, as defined in priority missions. The commenters probability of debris impact to less than part 420 Appendix E, Tables E1 and E2 noted this change would be consistent ¥ or equal to 1 × 10 3 for designated or associated formulae, of the vehicle’s with the definition in DCMA–MAN assets. The USAF requirement in AFI launch point.78 Assets that fall within 3401–02, Defense Industrial Base 91–202 and the Guidance Memorandum this exception, located at Critical Asset Identification and to AFSPCI 13–610 match those § 450.101(b)(4)(v), are exempt from the Prioritization. Furthermore, the proposed by the FAA. The FAA also critical asset protection requirements in commenters stated that classification as adopts its proposal to extend the § 450.101(a)(4)(i) and (b)(4)(ii) for a a critical asset should be determined by protection of critical assets to non- licensed launch. minimum criteria (not specified in the Federal launch or reentry sites because Assets excepted from risk criteria are comment) and an assessment by the the protection of critical assets is determined by the required distance to asset owner. necessary irrespective of the location of a public area specified in Table E–1 or The FAA disagrees that the definition the launch. E–2 or associated formulae in Appendix of ‘‘critical asset’’ is vague or overbroad. As proposed in the NPRM, a critical E to part 420, using the quantities of The proposed definition, along with the asset is an asset that is essential to the propellants or other explosives on the examples provided in the NPRM national interests of the United States. vehicle, including any payloads. These preamble, bound the scope of critical The proposed definition noted that distances are equivalent to Inhabited assets appropriately and provide critical assets include property, Building Distances commonly observed sufficient clarity for operators. Only facilities, or infrastructure necessary to on Federal launch or reentry sites to those facilities, property, or maintain national defense, or assured protect critical assets. The exception infrastructure that are necessary for access to space for national priority limits consideration to quantities of national security purposes, high priority missions.77 In the final rule, the FAA propellants on the vehicle, including civil space purposes, or assured access replaces ‘‘necessary to maintain national any payloads. Any critical assets within to space for national priority missions defense’’ with ‘‘necessary for national this area that are not supporting the will be deemed critical assets under security’’ to be more consistent with the activity would be subject to the risk § 401.7. Critical assets will also include rest of 14 CFR Chapter III. The FAA also criteria. This exclusion would be certain military, intelligence, and civil adds that critical assets may include payloads, including essential 78 Part 420 defines public area distance as ‘‘the infrastructure when directly supporting 77 ‘‘Property’’ includes launch vehicles, reentry minimum distance permitted between a public area the payload at the launch site. The FAA vehicles, and payloads. and an explosive hazard facility.’’ provided several examples of critical

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assets in the NPRM. Critical assets criteria would be impractical during a supporting both commercial and include assets that, if incapacitated or launch from the particular launch point. military operations. Similarly, as destroyed, would have a serious, Hence, assets located within the public explained in the NPRM the FAA will debilitating effect on national security area distance required by part 420 deem any commercial property that or assured access to space for national during a licensed launch are exempt meets the definition set forth in § 401.7 security missions, but the FAA from the critical asset protection a critical asset. disagrees that the additional words requirements in § 450.101(a)(4)(i) and Blue Origin asked the FAA to provide proposed by the commenters add clarity (b)(4)(i). As such, the FAA anticipates examples of critical infrastructure. The beyond the proposed definition. that operations exceeding the risk FAA notes that in the past, the launch Virgin Orbit’s concern that Federal criteria for critical assets will continue complexes at CCAFS that support Atlas agency may assume incorrectly that a to be few, resulting in minimal V and Delta IV launches have been critical asset was protected is alleviated restrictions on launch activity. designated as critical assets because by the fact that critical assets will be The FAA maintains that establishing they support missions essential to the identified by Federal agencies that own explicit risk criteria for protecting interests of the United States. or otherwise depend on assets that are critical assets in this final rule provides An individual commenter essential to the national interests of the a level of certainty. Launch and reentry recommended the FAA define United States. The FAA will work with site operators will have a metric to categories of national security interests, operators to identify any measures that determine what activities are including cybersecurity, security operators may need to undertake in appropriate for various locations on controls, and classification level. order to protect critical assets to the their sites. Either the FAA or Federal Although these are important national level required by § 450.101(a)(4) or site will perform any necessary analysis, interests, they are not by themselves (b)(4). and will provide written confirmation to critical assets, and the FAA does not With respect to the concern that the operator that the criteria in find it necessary to add categories of Federal agencies might be inclined to § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4) have been met. national security interests. overestimate their assets as critical, the If the risk to critical assets posed by the Airlines for America (A4A) FAA does not find that experience at proposed activity exceeds the criteria in recommended the FAA extend the Federal launch or reentry sites warrants § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4), then the FAA safety protections of critical assets to such a concern. In fact, discussions with will work with asset owners and include critical aviation infrastructure, safety officials at CCAFS indicate that operators to reach solutions that allow including airports. The FAA notes that the risk to critical assets or critical operations without sacrificing safety to the definition of ‘‘critical asset’’ does payloads has rarely exceeded the risk the critical assets or mission objectives. thresholds adopted by the FAA. Federal The FAA does not adopt the not preclude aviation infrastructure launch or reentry sites have not suggestion by CSF and SpaceX to limit from being a critical asset. More excessively designated assets as critical, critical assets to U.S. Government assets generally, the definition of ‘‘critical nor have they imposed significant located on Federal property that the asset’’ can include non-space associated restrictions on launch activity. When Secretary of Defense or the assets, including those not located at or approving the use of their sites for Administrator of NASA determines to adjacent to a launch or reentry site. launch activity, Federal sites consider be essential to the national interests of However, the criterion for loss of the potential of launch activities the United States. Federal entities other functionality likely limits aviation endangering other facilities. Similarly, than the DOD and NASA might own or infrastructure assets from being subject other users of the site do not knowingly otherwise depend on critical assets, to protection. put their assets at risk. The FAA such as NOAA. Thus, it would be Commenters were divided on the maintains that similar considerations inappropriate to assign the need for critical asset protection. ULA would hold at non-Federal sites. Non- determination of critical assets to only acknowledged the need for protection of Federal launch or reentry site operators these agencies. However, as noted critical assets. Virgin Galactic will consider the siting and scheduling earlier, critical assets will be identified questioned whether the FAA’s proposed of activities to avoid one user’s activity by Federal agencies, such as DOD and critical asset requirements were within threatening the assets of another user. NASA, which own or otherwise depend the FAA’s statutory authority, as title 51 Occasionally, delays in one site user’s on assets that are essential to the did not reference ‘‘national interests’’ or activity may necessitate rescheduling national interests of the United States, ‘‘national priority missions.’’ Blue another user’s activity. Otherwise, a and the FAA will accept any Origin acknowledged the FAA’s new activity that was not anticipated identification by the Secretary of statutory authority to protect property when siting decisions were made, such Defense that an asset is critical to and asked the FAA to explain how it as fly-back of a stage, is most likely to national security. Note also that the will interpret and implement this expose a critical asset to risk exceeding FAA does not limit the definition of authority. An individual commenter the criterion. ‘‘critical assets’’ to assets that are owned stated only assets directly related to Only property, facilities, or or located on property owned by the national security should be given infrastructure located close to the U.S. Government. As stated in the heightened protection. CSF, Spaceport launch point might typically be NPRM, the FAA extended the protection Strategies, LLC (Spaceport Strategies), expected to exceed the criteria, and of critical assets to non-Federal launch and SpaceX commented that critical those assets are generally associated or reentry sites, which previously had assets were already protected by current with the subject launch operation. As no regulatory assurance of protection requirements at Federal launch and discussed in this section, the FAA from loss of functionality of critical reentry sites, rendering the FAA’s revised § 450.101(a)(4) to eliminate the assets. The FAA maintains the same regulations duplicative. SpaceX added need to seek waivers for assets located safety standards for critical assets for that NASA or DOD may not agree with within the immediate vicinity of a launches that take place on a Federal the FAA’s proposed critical asset launch point during the launch. launch or reentry site as those that take requirements, which may lead to further Although many of these assets may be place on a non-Federal launch or duplication of requirements at Federal critical, meeting the critical asset reentry site, some of which are dual use, sites.

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The FAA has the authority to protect critical asset analysis, including asset criteria in § 450.101 are satisfied critical assets. The Commercial Space proprietary or confidential information. except in occasional cases involving Launch Act authorizes the DOT, and the CSF and SpaceX noted the same data critical assets located within the same FAA by delegation, to protect public should be provided to all operators to launch site. Historically, the risk to health and safety, safety of property, ensure the fair and unbiased application critical assets from overflight outside and national security and foreign policy of this regulation. Sierra Nevada the launch site is negligible. interests of the United States. In recommended the FAA provide a Virgin Galactic asked how an operator carrying out its responsibility to protect method of acceptable means of would have input on or dispute the property, the FAA has established a compliance that does not require a determination of a critical asset. The quantitative requirement to protect commercial company to contract with FAA will discuss with operators any assets that are essential to the national DOD to complete this analysis. concerns they may have about ensuring interests of the United States. As noted Alternatively, Sierra Nevada protection of critical assets during their in the NPRM, national interests go recommended the FAA provide the licensed activities, but the FAA is not beyond national security and include analysis instead of the applicant. CSF proposing a formal dispute mechanism infrastructure such as that used to and SpaceX also recommended the FAA to adjudicate its determination that an support high priority NASA missions. publish an AC that would provide an asset is critical or threatened within the As noted earlier, an example of this acceptable means for analyzing critical risk criterion. Often, it might not be would be infrastructure necessary to assets, describe how the FAA would possible to share such information due support launch and reentry services to obtain a definitive list of critical assets, to national security issues and deliver cargo to and from the and how the FAA would provide proprietary interests. The FAA notes, International Space Station. operators the data necessary to conduct however, that if the FAA denies an As CSF, Spaceport Strategies, and the analysis. Blue Origin stated that, by application for a license based on its SpaceX noted, the FAA’s critical asset requiring information that includes data determination that the proposed activity requirements codify current practice at from other entities, the FAA would exceeds the risk threshold for critical Federal launch or reentry sites, but also become responsible for facilitating assets, an applicant may request extend the same regulatory protection acquisition of this data or would risk reconsideration under § 413.21 or a for launch or reentry activity at non- implementing a requirement that would hearing in accordance with part 406 of Federal launch or reentry sites. not be possible to comply with or a this chapter. Although critical assets are primarily requirement that would establish a sole CSF asked how the FAA will manage located on Federal launch or reentry source provider of a service. proprietary and national security sites at this time, the FAA foresees The FAA acknowledges the practical concerns among operators and asset- increased commercial space activity at problems an applicant would likely owners. The FAA does not foresee a non-Federal sites that may result in the encounter in collecting the input data need to share proprietary data with non- presence of critical assets at those sites. necessary to identify and perform a risk Federal entities because the Federal In licensing commercial launch or assessment for critical assets, especially Government will conduct the reentry activities, the FAA safeguards critical payloads. The FAA agrees with assessment of critical asset risk on critical assets—which by definition are Sierra Nevada that it would be better for behalf of the licensee. Based on essential to the national interests of the the U.S. Government to perform all discussions with relevant Federal United States—irrespective of their critical asset and critical payload risk agencies, it is also possible to perform location. assessments necessary to ensure an assessment of critical assets without The FAA does not find the critical operators comply with the risk criteria disclosing the precise location or nature asset requirements to be unnecessarily in part 450. The FAA therefore removes of each asset, thereby eliminating the duplicative of requirements at Federal the requirement for operators to assess need to share proprietary and national launch or reentry sites. As discussed in the risks to critical assets in preparing security information. For example, the the NPRM, the FAA proposed these a flight hazard analysis, debris analysis, USAF 45th Space Wing/Wing Safety requirements to further the goal of and debris risk analysis. The FAA also identifies what facilities are threatened common standards for launches from removes from § 450.185 (Ground Hazard within the thresholds and shares that any U.S. launch or reentry site, Federal Analysis) the requirement that the information with the appropriate or non-Federal. Inclusion of critical ground hazard analysis ensure that the tenants. The tenant can then inform the asset protection in FAA regulations likelihood of any hazardous condition USAF, or another entity performing the aligns FAA licensing with Federal that may cause damage to critical assets analysis, that an asset is threatened launch or reentry site requirements and is remote. The FAA notes that the input without divulging sensitive information removes duplication of effort. The FAA data and analysis tools necessary to to any entity outside the U.S. closely coordinated the critical asset perform a risk assessment for critical Government. The FAA will work with requirements with the CSWG and its assets are often a subset of those the the entities responsible for critical assets interagency partners, including NASA FAA uses to establish the MPL values. to ensure any necessary coordination, and DOD. As a result of this The FAA will perform all critical asset taking into account the need to protect coordination, the FAA anticipates that and critical payload risk assessments for proprietary and confidential data. the methodologies used by the Federal commercial space transportation Several commenters, including CSF, launch or reentry sites will satisfy the operations involving non-Federal sites. SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic requested FAA’s requirements for critical asset Hence, operators should not bear clarification as to the meaning of ‘‘loss protection. additional cost for the analyses of functionality’’ and how the FAA or Many commenters, including AIA, associated with critical assets. other entity would determine what Blue Origin, Boeing, CSF, Lockheed Blue Origin asked how the FAA will could result in the ‘‘loss of Martin, Northrop Grumman, Sierra address overflight of critical assets. The functionality’’ of a critical asset. CSF Nevada, SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, and FAA notes that overflight of a critical sought clarification on whether ULA raised concerns about how an asset is possible if the safety criteria set infrastructure was ‘‘critical’’ if it was applicant would obtain the information forth in § 450.101 are satisfied. Past needed to support full functionality of necessary to perform the proposed experience demonstrates that the critical a critical asset and on the standard for

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determining whether an asset’s function adequate to protect critical assets. The the criterion would apply to payloads had been lost. It inquired whether it FAA is limited by statute to imposing on the vehicle of the operator that might would matter if the function could be no more than $100 million in financial be subject to this new risk threshold. If restored in a timely manner or met with responsibility to compensate for losses so, Virgin Galactic stated this would an alternative asset. to U.S. Government property. The value constitute managing mission success. CSF and SpaceX also recommended of many critical assets easily exceeds Virgin Galactic also inquired whether that ‘‘loss of functionality’’ be defined in that limit, with some critical payloads this risk criterion would apply to § 401.7 as an asset designated critical by reportedly costing over a billion dollars. payloads at neighboring launch sites. If the Secretary of Defense or More importantly, financial so, Virgin Galactic believes the FAA Administrator of NASA that (a) has been compensation for a loss may not address must demonstrate need and a nexus to rendered unable to support a specific the delay before repairs or replacement, statutorily obligated concerns. It further mission or program deemed critical to during which time national security stated that a more stringent criterion for the national interest; (b) for which the might be jeopardized or the opportunity commercial payloads would place loss of function will preclude the to accomplish important national undue burden on operators, potentially assurance of a time-critical mission or interests missed. requiring additional analyses or program unless promptly restored; or (c) The FAA sought comments on its redesign. Virgin Galactic noted that it for which the asset’s function cannot be proposal to require a more stringent did not intend to carry critical payloads, restored by an accelerated recovery criterion for critical assets of utmost so impacts to its operations from this strategy or replaced by an alternate importance to the U.S., to be defined as requirement would be negligible. means of mission/program execution. ‘‘critical payloads’’ in § 401.7. The FAA In the final rule, the FAA defines a SpaceX and Virgin Galactic requested proposed to require that the probability critical payload as a payload and the FAA include this new definition in of loss of functionality for critical essential infrastructure directly an SNPRM, along with a clear rationale payloads, including essential supporting such a payload that is a for the FAA’s proposed requirements for infrastructure when directly supporting critical asset (1) that is so costly or protecting critical assets. the payload, not exceed 1 × 10¥4. In the unique that it cannot be readily Under the final rule, the party past, Federal launch or reentry sites replaced, or (2) for which the time frame responsible for the critical asset would have, on occasion, applied a more for its replacement would adversely determine what constitutes loss of stringent requirement, limiting the affect the national interests of the functionality. The FAA recognizes that probability of debris impact caused by United States. As noted in the NPRM, a the threshold conditions that cause loss launch or reentry hazards to less than or commercial payload that meets this of functionality will be different equal to 1 × 10¥4 for national security definition will be treated as a critical depending on the type of asset and its payloads, including essential payload. The critical payload protection robustness. For example, infrastructure infrastructure when directly supporting requirement does not apply to payloads is typically more robust than a payload the payload at the launch site. The FAA on the vehicle of the operator regulated that may be more fragile. For this asked commenters to identify (1) the under part 450 but will apply to reason, the FAA does not elect to impacts a 1 × 10¥4 risk criterion would payloads on neighboring launch sites. incorporate a specific standard for what have on their operations if applied to The FAA agrees with ULA that the 1 × may constitute loss of functionality into critical payloads; (2) whether a more 10¥3 risk criterion should apply to the final rule. Likewise, the FAA does stringent risk criterion should be essential infrastructure directly not find that it is useful to create a more imposed on any commercial payload; supporting the critical payload, and detailed definition of ‘‘loss of and (3) potential additional costs and notes that it will likely apply to booster functionality’’ but agrees that benefits associated with applying a 1 × hardware in direct support of the launch considerations such as those suggested 10¥4 risk criterion to critical payloads. of a critical payload. After a launch of by CSF and SpaceX (e.g., ability to In the final rule, the FAA adopts the a critical payload, the infrastructure support missions critical to national risk criterion and definition as supporting the launch will be critical interests, or ability to repair or restore discussed in the NPRM preamble, with only if it is essential to the national function through alternative means in a minor clarifications. interests of the United States. The risk ¥ timely manner) would be relevant and ULA supported the 1 × 10 4 risk criterion determines the protection appropriate to determining loss of criterion for critical payloads, stating required for critical assets and payloads. functionality. that given the time and expense It is not necessary to specify in the An individual commenter stated that associated with replacing these assets, it regulation that this requirement does critical asset protection should not was essential they receive the greatest not apply during activities that do not compromise protection of the public protection possible. It further exceed the risk threshold. and neighboring operation personnel. commented that this risk criterion The FAA disagrees with Virgin The commenter stated that an operator’s should also apply to infrastructure and Galactic that there is no benefit in required insurance should already cover booster hardware in direct support of applying a 1 × 10¥4 risk criterion to losses to critical assets. critical payloads, beginning when critical payloads. As explained in the The FAA notes that the critical asset booster hardware for that particular NPRM, during the interagency review protection requirements will not critical payload was received and began process, DOD requested that the FAA compromise the protection of the public processing at the launch site. Under consider specifying a more stringent or neighboring operation personnel. The ULA’s suggestion, at the completion of criterion for certain critical assets of FAA retains stringent requirements for the launch campaign, the risk criterion utmost importance. The FAA considers protecting the public, including should revert to 1 × 10¥4. Virgin a critical payload a type of critical asset. neighboring operations personnel, Galactic, however, commented that it The FAA finds it necessary to protect which are independent of the was not necessary to adopt a heightened payloads such as vital national security requirements protecting critical assets. risk criteria for critical payloads. It saw payloads and high-priority NASA and The FAA also disagrees with the no benefit to the discussed 1 × 10¥4 NOAA payloads. The NPRM noted that commenter that an operator’s financial requirement over the 1 × 10¥4 a payload such as NASA’s Curiosity responsibility requirements are requirement. It also inquired whether rover would likely be afforded this

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protection. In the final rule, the FAA with current practice at Federal launch using physical containment as a hazard adopts this higher protection criterion to and reentry sites and will reduce the control strategy, the FAA or Federal safeguard those payloads of utmost need for a Federal or non-Federal launch or reentry site operator will work importance to the U.S. meriting a greater launch site operator to impose a more with the operator to ensure no critical degree of protection than other critical stringent criterion on operators through assets are within the flight hazard area. assets. While the FAA is providing for contract. The most likely mitigation is shifting heightened protection for critical CSF and SpaceX commented that the the launch point or, if the critical asset payloads, it expects the protection to FAA did not assess the cost burden on is mobile, changing in the launch have minimal effects on commercial industry for compliance with the critical schedule. launch and reentry operations. asset requirements. Virgin Orbit Sierra Nevada requested the FAA Currently there are few commercial commented that critical asset conduct a publicly-available assessment payloads that would rise to the level of calculations would require additional to determine if the proposed critical being considered critical payloads, analysis and resources. asset protection requirements would although the FAA recognizes that might In the final rule, the FAA’s removal of impact an operator’s MPL calculation. change in the future, if for instance, the requirements for operators to assess CSF requested the FAA engage industry DOD were to rely on a commercial impacts to critical assets in flight on the topic of critical assets. service for critical communication hazard, ground hazard, debris or debris The FAA does not find that the support. risk analyses assuages the commenters’ protection of critical assets will increase Virgin Galactic requested the FAA concerns for costs associated with MPL. The designation of an asset as adopt neither 1 × 10¥3 nor a more performing those analyses. As compared critical is unrelated to financial stringent criterion. It argued the to the proposal, there will be much responsibility. In performing its MPL proposed requirement contradicted the reduced administrative burden on the calculation for U.S. Government requirement in 51 U.S.C. § 50901(a)(7) operator. The FAA will coordinate as property, the FAA ascertains the that the FAA regulate only to the extent necessary with critical assets owners, financial responsibility required so that necessary. Virgin Galactic stated the and either the FAA or the Federal site the likelihood of exceeding losses to FAA did not show why these operator will provide written government property involved in a requirements were necessary, given that confirmation to the operator that the licensed activity (taken to mean such Federal launch or reentry sites already criteria in § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4) have property on a Federal launch or reentry protect their own property. been met. If the FAA or Federal site site) that are reasonably expected to Furthermore, Virgin Galactic operator determines that the criteria result from that activity does not exceed commented that the FAA would be have not been met, either the FAA or 1 × 10¥5; or, in the rarer situation in enforcing a more stringent, but Federal site operator will work with the which a critical asset might not be U.S. undisclosed criterion and argued the operator to identify any measures that Government property on a Federal proposed regulation was non- operators may need to undertake in launch or reentry site, 1 × 10¥7. Critical transparent and would deprive the order to protect critical assets to the assets are protected to a less stringent 1 public of the opportunity to comment level required by § 450.101(a)(4) or × 10¥3, or in the case of certain critical on this criterion as required by the (b)(4). payloads, 1 × 10¥4, and financial Administrative Procedure Act. The An individual commenter stated that responsibility and protection are not commenter asserted this undisclosed the proposed regulation would require directly related. If anything, the criterion could prevent operators from companies to perform trade studies to requirement to protect critical assets has planning ahead and would create two determine if additional controls would the potential to lower MPL for U.S. standards that might conflict. be needed to reduce the likelihood of Government property because the As articulated in the NPRM, the FAA critical asset loss of functionality. The mitigation employed may well remove finds it necessary to codify current commenter requested the FAA require a the possibility that the asset can be practice at Federal launch or reentry cost-benefit analysis to ensure that damaged even within the more stringent sites to protect critical assets that are of upfront investment of controls to protect MPL threshold. This would be the case utmost importance to the U.S. and to critical assets would be less than the if, to avoid placing the critical asset at extend the same protections for launch cost of replacing that asset. risk a launch was rescheduled, its or reentry activity conducted at non- When determining whether an asset is trajectory adjusted, or the critical asset Federal sites. For launches from Federal a critical asset, the cost of an asset is a was moved or physically protected. The sites, this rule does not change current factor. However, ultimately an asset is FAA finds that it is unlikely that a practice; rather it incorporates that critical if it is essential to the national mitigation employed to protect critical practice in a regulation. This regulation interests of the United States. If it assets will change the MPL for third- consolidates the FAA’s requirements for cannot be replaced in a time frame that party liability. protection of critical assets and critical satisfies those interests, the cost of the payloads in all commercial launch or asset is irrelevant. Furthermore, the d. Other Safety Criteria (§ 450.101(d), reentry operations, in accordance with FAA does not find that most mitigations (e), (f), and (g)) the FAA’s statutory authority. This rule will impose significant cost. The FAA adopts the criteria in reduces the need for a Federal or non- Virgin Galactic indicated the need for § 450.101(d), (e), (f), and (g) with no Federal site operator to impose critical FAA assistance in planning hazard changes. Section 450.101(d) addresses asset protection requirements on control strategies pursuant to proposed disposal safety criteria, § 450.101(e) is operators as a contractual condition for § 450.107(e)(2)(ii) 79 due to the secrecy the requirement for the protection of the use of its facility. The FAA expects of some critical assets. If an operator is people and property on orbit, that the instances in which a more § 450.101(f) requires the notification of stringent criterion will be necessary will 79 As proposed, an applicant using physical planned impacts, and § 450.101(g) be rare. Preserving the flexibility to containment as a hazard control strategy would addresses the validity of analyses. have been required to describe the methods used to protect particularly vital assets at a more ensure that flight hazard areas are cleared of the The FAA received public comments stringent criterion in a license, as public and critical assets. This requirement has from Virgin Galactic on the notification proposed in the NPRM, is consistent been relocated to § 459.110(c)(2) in the final rule. of planned impacts. Specifically, Virgin

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Galactic advised that a carrier aircraft of all licensed activities and authorized to the FAA only when requested. The operating under an airworthiness to provide final approval to proceed FAA may request the name of the certificate should be exempt from with licensed activities. This position is individual who will act as a safety proposed § 450.101(f). This comment is referred to as the mission director. In official as part of a compliance discussed in further detail in the the final rule, the FAA adopts monitoring action. As is current preamble section on hybrid vehicles. § 450.103(a)(1) as proposed. The FAA practice, the FAA will coordinate in The FAA will not exempt all hybrid did not receive comments on this advance with the operator prior to a vehicle operators from the requirement section. compliance monitoring action. in § 450.101(f). If an operation has no Proposed § 450.103(a)(2) stated that, ALPA concurred with the planned impacts from debris capable of for each launch or reentry, an operator requirement for operators to develop a causing a casualty, then no notification would be required to designate a general system safety program. It also will be necessary to comply with position with direct access to the recommended that that embedding FAA § 450.101(f). The regulation is adopted mission director who would be representatives within commercial as proposed. responsible for communicating potential space companies would assist the safety and noncompliance issues to the commercial space community in e. System Safety Program (§ 450.103) mission director and would be growing robust system safety In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in authorized to examine all aspects of the procedures. The FAA notes that § 450.103 that an operator must operator’s ground and flight safety embedding FAA representatives within implement and document a system operations, and to independently commercial space companies is outside safety program throughout the monitor compliance with the operator’s the scope of this rulemaking. operational lifecycle of a launch or safety policies, safety procedures, and Proposed § 450.103(a)(3) requires the reentry system. The system safety licensing requirements. This position mission director to ensure that all of the program was proposed to include a would be referred to as a safety official. safety official’s concerns are addressed. safety organization (§ 450.103(a)), The FAA noted in the NPRM preamble In the final rule, the FAA adopts procedures to evaluate the operational that the absence of a safety official could § 450.103(a)(3) as proposed. The FAA lifecycle of the launch or reentry system result in a lack of independent safety did not receive any comments on this (§ 450.103(b)), configuration oversight and a potential for a section. management and control (§ 450.103(c)), breakdown in communications of ii. Hazard Management and post-flight data review important safety-related information. (§ 450.103(d)). The FAA also noted that a safety Proposed § 450.103(b) would have In the final rule, the FAA adopts organization that included a safety required an operator to establish proposed § 450.103 with revisions. The official was essential to public safety; procedures to evaluate the operational FAA replaced the term ‘‘operational however, identifying that individual by lifecycle of the launch or reentry lifecycle’’ in the introductory paragraph name was not necessary. In the final system, including methods to review of § 450.103 with simply ‘‘lifecycle’’ to rule, the FAA adopts § 450.103(a)(2) as and assess the validity of the proposed clarify that the regulation applies to proposed. Thus, a safety official will preliminary safety assessment and any hazards throughout the lifecycle of a need to be in place prior to and flight hazard analysis throughout the launch or reentry system, not just throughout any licensed activity. operational lifecycle of the launch or operational changes to the system. This Rocket Lab supported the proposed reentry system, methods for updating change is consistent with the statements safety organization documentation the preliminary safety assessment and in the NPRM indicating that, due to the requirements in proposed § 450.103(a), flight hazard analysis, and methods for complexity and variety of vehicle noting the requirements would provide communicating and implementing the concepts and operations, a system safety improved flexibility for the industry and updates throughout the organization. program would be necessary to ensure support growth in operations, while For operators that would need to that an operator considers and addresses maintaining clear lines of conduct a flight hazard analysis, the all risks to public safety, which include communication and independence in proposed rule would also require an both design and operational changes to safety decision making. Virgin Galactic operator’s system safety program to a system. noted that it agreed with the FAA’s include a process for tracking hazards, approach not to require a specific risks, mitigation and hazard control i. Safety Organization person be listed as the safety official. measures, and verification activities. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that Microcosm inquired if a specific named In the final rule, the FAA adopts the system safety program would safety official would be required for proposed § 450.103(b) with revisions. require an operator to maintain and each launch site for operators with The FAA renames this section ‘‘Hazard document a safety organization that has licensed activity at multiple sites, and management’’ to be more descriptive clearly defined lines of communication how far in advance that information than the proposed name of and approval authority for all public would need to be provided to the FAA. ‘‘Procedures.’’ The FAA also does not safety decisions, and that includes a The FAA notes that a safety official adopt the proposed requirement in mission director and safety official. In must be named and in place prior to the § 450.103(b)(1) to conduct a preliminary the final rule, the FAA adopts the initiation of any licensed activity, and safety assessment because that proposed rule with a revision. The FAA an operator may use the same safety requirement has been replaced with the removes ‘‘and document’’ from the official for multiple launch or reentry requirement to conduct a hazard control proposed requirement because the first sites. It may be difficult for a single strategy determination in § 450.107(b) in sentence in § 450.103 already requires a individual to serve as a safety official for the final rule, as will be discussed later. system safety program to be multiple sites if launch or reentry As noted, proposed § 450.103(b)(1) documented. activities were to occur close in time to would have required the system safety Proposed § 450.103(a)(1) stated that each other. In those instances, an program to include: (i) Methods to for each launch or reentry, an operator operator may choose to have multiple review and assess the validity of the would be required to designate a safety officials. An operator needs to preliminary safety assessment position responsible for the safe conduct provide the name of the safety official throughout the operational lifecycle of

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the launch or reentry system; (ii) Proposed § 450.103(b)(2)(iv) would launch operator’s process for managing methods for updating the preliminary have required the system safety and controlling any change to a safety- safety assessment; and (iii) methods for program, for operators that must critical system to ensure its reliability. communicating and implementing the conduct a flight hazard analysis, to Section 450.103(c) adds necessary updates throughout the organization. include a process for tracking hazards, detail. For those operators required to conduct risks, mitigation and hazard control Blue Origin also stated that proposed a flight hazard analysis, proposed measures, and verification activities. § 450.103(c) is repetitive of the § 450.103(b)(2) would have required the The FAA adopts the language proposed recordkeeping requirements in proposed system safety program to include the in § 450.103(b)(2)(iv) of the NPRM in § 450.219, making it unnecessary. Blue same methods for the flight hazard § 450.103(b)(3) of the final rule with a Origin added that if the FAA were to analysis and a process for tracking revision. The FAA deletes the terms maintain the requirement, it should be hazards, risks, mitigation and hazard ‘‘hazard control,’’ because it is written in the context of safety-critical control measures, and verification duplicative with the existing term systems, which would tie directly to activities. ‘‘mitigation measures.’’ FAA’s responsibility to protect public In the final rule, the FAA consolidates safety. the requirements in proposed iii. Configuration Management and While the FAA considers § 450.103(c) § 450.103(b)(1) and (b)(2) into Control necessary, proposed § 450.103(c)(3) § 450.103(b)(1) of the final rule. Section Proposed § 450.103(c) would have could be perceived as repetitive. 450.103(b)(1) requires a system safety required an operator to (1) employ a Proposed § 450.103(c)(3) would have program to include methods to assess process that tracks configurations of all required an operator to maintain records the system to ensure the validity of the safety-critical systems and of launch or reentry system hazard control strategy determination documentation related to the operation; configurations and document versions and any flight hazard or FSA throughout (2) ensure the use of correct and used for each licensed activity, as the lifecycle of the launch or reentry appropriate versions of systems and required by § 450.219 (Records). Section system.80 The FAA added FSA to this documentation tracked under the 450.219 requires a licensee to maintain requirement because, as proposed in subsection; and (3) maintain records of for 3 years all records, data, and other § 450.101(g) and adopted in the final launch or reentry system configurations material necessary to verify that a rule, any analysis used to demonstrate and document versions used for each launch or reentry is conducted in compliance with § 450.101 must use licensed activity, as required by the accordance with representations accurate data. This is consistent with requirement for records in proposed contained in the licensee’s application, the proposal because proposed § 450.219. the requirements of part 450 subparts C § 450.103(b)(1)(i) would have required In the final rule, the FAA adopts and D, and the terms and conditions methods to review and assess the § 450.103(c)(1) and (c)(2) as proposed contained in the license. The FAA validity of the preliminary safety and revises § 450.103(c)(3) as discussed removes the reference to maintaining assessment, which would have included later. records in § 450.103(c)(3) and revises components of FSA such as vehicle Blue Origin commented that tracking the provision to require an operator to response modes, public safety hazards and maintaining records of individual document the configurations and associated with vehicle response modes, configurations and associated versions identified in paragraph (c)(2) population exposed to hazards, and operations documentation for for each licensed activity. This is a more CEC. As previously noted, the final rule completed operations does not, by itself, focused requirement than § 450.219 and in § 450.103(b)(1) uses the term enhance public safety. Blue Origin limits the documentation requirement ‘‘lifecycle’’ by itself to clarify that the believes that changes should be specifically to safety-critical systems, regulation applies to hazards throughout evaluated for safety impact according to consistent with Blue Origin’s the lifecycle of a launch or reentry a configuration management plan, recommendation. which is a deliverable under the current system, not just operations hazards. iv. Post-Flight Data Review Proposed § 450.103(b)(1)(iii) and regulations. Blue Origin stated that an (b)(2)(iii) would have required the approved configuration management Proposed § 450.103(d) would have system safety program to include plan, coupled with continued accuracy required an operator to employ a methods for communicating and of the application, should suffice process for evaluating post-flight data to implementing the updates throughout without additional requirements for (1) ensure consistency between the the organization. In the final rule, the increased documentation and storage of assumptions used for the preliminary FAA consolidates the requirements in records. safety assessment, any hazard or flight proposed § 450.103(b)(1)(iii) and The FAA agrees that tracking and safety analysis, and associated (b)(2)(iii) into § 450.103(b)(2) of the final maintaining records for completed mitigation and hazard control measures; rule with a revision. The FAA changes operations in isolation does not directly (2) resolve any identified the term ‘‘the updates’’ to ‘‘any updates’’ enhance public safety, but tracking and inconsistencies prior to the next flight of to clarify the intent for maintaining records for completed the vehicle; (3) identify any anomaly comprehensiveness. operations is an important component that may impact any flight hazard of configuration management, which, as analysis, FSA, or safety-critical system, 80 Proposed § 450.103(b)(1)(ii) and (b)(2)(ii) would a whole, does enhance public safety. or would otherwise be material to have required the system safety program to include The FAA agrees with Blue Origin that public health and safety and the safety methods for updating the preliminary safety an approved configuration management of property; and (4) address any assessment and flight hazard analysis. In the final rule, the FAA simplifies the regulatory text of plan coupled with continued accuracy anomaly identified in (3) prior to the § 450.103(b) in the final rule, which requires an of the application should suffice, but next flight, including updates to any operator to implement methods to assess the system does not agree that current requirements flight hazard analysis, FSA, or safety- to ensure the validity of the hazard control strategy are sufficient. Part 431 does not have critical system. The FAA explained in determination and any flight hazard or flight safety analysis throughout the lifecycle of the launch or any requirements for configuration the NPRM that this requirement was reentry system. Updating the safety analyses is a management, and § 417.111(e) is more consistent with industry practice to component of ensuring their validity. general in its requirement to define the review post-flight data to address

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vehicle reliability and mission success of the provision to the hazard control lines of communication and approval and that this requirement imposes no strategy determination, and any hazard authority, both internally and additional burden. The FAA sought or flight safety analyses and associated externally, for all public safety decisions comment on whether proposed mitigation and hazard control measures, and the provision of public safety § 450.103(d) would change an operator’s as opposed to mission success. The FAA services; and (2) a summary of the approach to reviewing post-flight data. does not agree with Virgin Galactic’s processes and products identified in the In the final rule, the FAA adopts suggestion to limit applicable system safety program requirements. proposed § 450.103(d)(1), (d)(2), and inconsistencies to those that have an In the final rule, the FAA adopts (d)(4) with revisions, and adopts effect on the safety criteria of § 450.101. § 450.103(e) as proposed. The FAA did § 450.103(d)(3) as proposed. Section That change would imply that a not receive any comments on this 450.103(d)(1) was modified to replace quantitative analysis is all that is section. ‘‘preliminary safety assessment’’ with required. As discussed earlier in the f. Hazard Control Strategies (§ 450.107) ‘‘hazard control strategy determination’’ hazard management section, the hazard as discussed earlier. The FAA also control strategy determination and the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in added the word ‘‘flight’’ in front hazard and flight safety analyses must § 450.107 that, for each phase of a ‘‘hazard or flight safety analysis’’ to be kept up to date throughout the vehicle’s flight, an operator does not make clear that the requirement lifecycle of the launch and reentry need to conduct a flight hazard analysis addresses any flight hazard analysis or system, so inconsistencies need to be for that phase of flight if the public FSA. addressed. The FAA also does not agree safety hazards identified in the CSF, Rocket Lab, and Sierra Nevada with Virgin Galactic to remove the word preliminary safety assessment (PSA) can commented that proposed § 450.103(d) ‘‘any’’ in front of ‘‘inconsistencies’’ be mitigated adequately to meet the should be deleted because it was overly because it would not change the scope requirements of proposed § 450.101 burdensome and inconsistent with the of the requirement, because using physical containment, wind directive to streamline the regulations. § 450.103(d)(2) explicitly refers to the weighting, or flight abort, in accordance The commenters stated that the analyses in § 450.103(d)(1). with § 450.107(b), (c), and (d). If the requirement would extend the industry Virgin Galactic recommended that public safety hazards identified in the practice beyond the typical analysis for proposed § 450.103(d)(4)—which would PSA could not be adequately mitigated reliability and mission success. Sierra have required an operator to address using these methods, an operator would Nevada suggested that the section could any anomaly identified in paragraph be required to conduct a flight hazard be re-written to address only post-flight (d)(3) prior to the next flight, including analysis in accordance with proposed data of safety-critical systems. updates to any flight hazard analysis, § 450.109 to derive hazard controls for As discussed in the NPRM, operator FSA, or safety-critical system—be that phase of flight. review of post-flight data provides revised to state the FAA should review The FAA has restructured § 450.107 valuable safety information on future and provide a determination on an in the final rule to require an operator operations. The inconsistencies that operator’s post-flight data to approve the to use a functional hazard analysis to need to be resolved in this subsection operator’s ability to launch according to make a hazard control strategy are only those that affect safety analyses schedule, rather than delaying until all determination. This requirement is and associated mitigation and hazard anomalies are resolved. based on the requirements for the PSA control measures, such as greater The FAA notes that proposed that was proposed, but not adopted, in population in the launch area than § 450.103(d)(4) would not have required § 450.105. In addition, the FAA has modeled. The anomalies that need to be FAA approval of the methodology an removed from § 450.107 specific details addressed are only those that may operator uses to address anomalies in for each hazard control strategy impact any flight hazard analysis, FSA, general or a specific anomaly in available to operators and instead or safety-critical system, or are particular. In order to avoid Virgin directs operators to §§ 450.108, 450.109, otherwise material to public health and Galactic’s interpretation that all 450.110, and 450.111, which provide safety and the safety of property, such anomalies must be resolved prior to the requirements for flight abort,81 flight as the momentary drop-out of an FSS. next flight, the FAA revised the final hazard analysis, physical Therefore, while the FAA revises rule to require an operator to address containment,82 and wind weighting, § 450.103(d)(2) to narrow its any anomaly identified in paragraph respectively. applicability, as discussed below, it (d)(3) prior to the next flight as Section 450.107 also characterizes declines to remove proposed necessary to ensure public safety. As flight hazard analysis as a hazard § 450.103(d)(2). proposed, this would include updates to control strategy. Although a flight Blue Origin proposed a revision of any flight hazard analysis, FSA, or hazard analysis is different from the § 450.103(d)(2) to specify ‘‘public safety-critical system. To ensure public other hazard control strategies in that it safety.’’ Virgin Galactic recommended safety, the FAA would expect an does not lay out specific hazard removing the word ‘‘any’’ in front of operator to reassess its safety analyses to controls, it does lay out a process by ‘‘identified inconsistencies,’’ and determine any potentially new public which hazard controls can be derived. recommended limiting applicable safety hazards or increased risks to The hazard controls that are derived inconsistencies to those that have an known public safety hazards due to the from the flight hazard analysis, like effect on the safety criteria of § 450.101. anomaly and, if necessary, determine those defined in the other three hazard The FAA agrees that proposed the need for any additional mitigation § 450.103(d)(2) could be read to reach 81 In the NPRM, the requirements for flight abort strategies or updates to its safety had been scattered throughout proposed §§ 450.107, more broadly than public safety, so the analyses. 450.123, 450.125, 450.127, 450.129, and 450.165. FAA has revised the section to require Section 450.108 is discussed more fully later in the that an operator resolve any v. Application Requirements preamble section titled Flight Abort. inconsistencies ‘‘identified in paragraph An applicant under proposed 82 The NPRM did not include a separate section (d)(1) of this section’’ prior to the next § 450.103(e) would have to submit (1) a for physical containment. In the final rule, as will be discussed later, the requirements from proposed flight of the vehicle. This language description of the applicant’s safety § 450.107(b) are relocated to a new § 450.110 would explicitly limit the applicability organization, identifying the applicant’s (Physical Containment).

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control strategies, are then used as part Proposed § 450.107(e) would have g. Hazard Control Strategy of the input to the FSA that is used to required an applicant in its application Determination (§ 450.107(b)) show compliance with § 450.101(a), (b), to describe its hazard control strategy In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in and (c). Therefore, because a flight for each phase of flight. The application § 450.105 to require that every operator hazard analysis is a means by which an requirements in the final rule, in conduct and document a PSA for the operator derives the appropriate hazard § 450.107(d), similarly require an flight of a launch or reentry vehicle to controls, the FAA has characterized it as applicant to provide a description of its identify potential public safety impacts a hazard control strategy in this final hazard control strategy or strategies for early in the design process. The FAA rule. As such, throughout the final rule, each phase of flight. The FAA added the intended the PSA to be a top-level a flight hazard analysis is listed with phrase ‘‘or strategies’’ to reflect the fact assessment of the potential public safety physical containment, wind-weighting, that an operator may use one or more impacts identifiable early in the design and flight abort as a hazard control hazard control strategies for any given process and broad enough that minor strategy.83 Further, § 450.107(c) retains phase of flight. In addition, because the changes in vehicle design or operations the proposed requirement that an requirements for physical containment would not have a significant impact on, operator must conduct a flight hazard have been relocated to § 450.110, the or invalidate the products produced by, analysis if the public safety hazards for FAA has likewise relocated the the PSA. As proposed, the PSA would that phase of flight cannot be mitigated application requirements for physical have required the operator to identify a adequately to meet the requirements of containment proposed in § 450.107(e) to number of items, including: A 85 § 450.101 through physical § 450.110(c). These requirements have preliminary hazard list that documents containment, wind weighting, or flight been adopted as proposed. all hardware, operational, and design abort.84 Lastly, § 450.107(d) in the final rule causes of vehicle response modes that, Lastly, the final rule fixes an error in requires an applicant to submit in its excluding mitigation, have the proposed § 450.107, which referenced application the results of its hazard capability to create a hazard to the § 450.101 in its entirety as being control strategy determination, public; safety-critical systems; and a relevant to the hazard control strategies, including all functional failures timeline of all safety-critical events.87 even though certain requirements in identified under § 450.107(b)(1), the An applicant would have been required § 450.101 regarding the disposal of identification systems, and a timeline of to submit the PSA result, including the upper stages, protection of people and all safety-critical events. These relate to items identified above, in its application property on orbit, and notification of the hazard control strategy for a license. determination, which is discussed in planned impacts, are not relevant to the The final rule removes proposed the next section of this preamble. hazard control strategies defined in § 450.105 in its entirety but relocates The FAA received a few comments for certain items from the PSA section into § 450.107. Section 450.107 refers instead proposed § 450.107. One individual to § 450.101(a), (b), or (c). § 450.107(b) as part of the hazard commenter supported the additional control strategy determination. The final The FAA adds paragraph (b) to flexibility inherent in allowing an § 450.107 to address how an operator rule replaces the requirement for a PSA operator to select its hazard control with a functional hazard analysis and determines its hazard control strategy or strategy and noted that this flexibility strategies for any phase of flight during replaces the term ‘‘vehicle response would help to reduce overall design mode’’ with ‘‘reasonably foreseeable a launch or reentry. This paragraph is costs for the private enterprise. Virgin based on and replaces a portion of the hazardous events.’’ The FAA finds these Galactic requested that the FAA define changes are less prescriptive and preliminary safety assessment in ‘‘traditional hazard controls’’ and proposed § 450.105 of the NPRM. burdensome on an operator, while provide opportunity for public comment preserving the intended benefits and Because an operator determines a through the issuance of an SNPRM. Blue hazard control strategy or strategies level of safety of the proposed Origin proposed that the FAA amend requirements. based on an assessment of potential proposed § 450.107(e)(2)(ii) to require hazards, the requirements for such an Blue Origin and Microcosm that an applicant describe the methods commented that requiring operators to assessment are better suited for this used to ensure that risk to the public develop a preliminary hazard list that section. The next preamble section and critical assets in flight hazard areas identifies all causes of hazards and discusses the revision to § 450.107(b) meet allowable criteria. This latter vehicle response modes for a PSA, prior more fully. comment is discussed later in the to analysis or testing of their vehicle preamble section titled Physical systems, was unreasonable. Blue Origin 83 The FAA notes that, throughout the preamble, Containment. stated it would be infeasible to it uses the phrase ‘‘as a hazard control strategy’’ to To the extent that Virgin Galactic document in a preliminary hazard list modify physical containment, wind-weighting, commented that the term ‘‘traditional flight abort, and flight hazard analysis. For example, all hardware, operational, and design in the preamble, the FAA refers to operators who hazard controls’’ should be defined and causes of vehicle response modes use ‘‘flight abort as a hazard control strategy.’’ In comment allowed through publication capable of causing a hazard to the such instances, the FAA means that flight abort is of an SNPRM, the FAA notes that the public at the preliminary design phase. being used as a hazard control strategy consistent NPRM stated that traditional hazard with the requirements in § 450.108. Likewise, when an operator uses flight hazard analysis as a hazard controls included physical containment, 87 The operator would also have needed to 86 control strategy, the operator is conducting a flight wind weighting, and flight abort. identify (1) vehicle response modes; (2) public hazard analysis consistent with the requirements safety hazards associated with vehicle response set forth in § 450.109. 85 The proposed rule also required an applicant modes, including impacting inert and explosive 84 Although proposed § 450.107 was written in using physical containment as a hazard control debris, toxic release, and far field blast the negative, stating that an operator was not strategy to demonstrate that the launch vehicle does overpressure; (3) geographical areas where vehicle required to conduct a flight hazard analysis if the not have sufficient energy for any hazards response modes could jeopardize public safety; (4) public safety hazards identified in the preliminary associated with its flight to reach outside the flight any population exposed to public safety hazards in safety assessment for that phase of flight could be hazard area developed in accordance with or near the identified geographical areas; and (5) the mitigated adequately to meet the requirements of § 450.133, and to describe the methods used to CEC, unless otherwise agreed to by the § 450.101 through physical containment, wind ensure that flight hazard areas are cleared of the Administrator based on the demonstrated reliability weighting, or flight abort, the final rule has revised public and critical assets. of the launch or reentry vehicle during any phase this language to be more easily understood. 86 See 84 FR 15316 (footnote 62). of flight.

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The commenters noted that operators a hazard to the public, (2) safety-critical identify the effect of design and identify potential hazards, but not all systems, and (3) a timeline of all safety- operational decisions on public safety, causes of vehicle response modes, prior critical events. and provide the operator with an to the detailed design phase. Blue In the NPRM, proposed appropriate hazard control strategy for Origin added that identification of § 450.105(a)(6) would have required a its proposed operation. causes was a continuous process that preliminary hazard list documenting all Section 450.107(b)(1) in the final rule evolves as hardware and operations hardware, operational, and design requires an operator to use a functional design matures, and recommended the causes of vehicle response modes that, hazard analysis to determine a hazard PSA be limited to analyzing and excluding mitigation, have the control strategy accounting for all identifying all functional failures that capability to create a hazard to the functional failures associated with could have the capability to create a public. The final rule requires an reasonably foreseeable hazardous events hazard to the public, rather than operator to use a functional hazard that, excluding mitigation, have the analyzing the detailed design, which analysis that accounts for, among other capability to create a hazard to the may still be maturing. Blue Origin also things, all functional failures associated public. As noted earlier, a functional noted that early engagement with the with reasonably foreseeable hazardous failure is a condition of a system, FAA through the pre-application events that, excluding mitigation, have subsystem, or component function process, before a design is mature, was the capability to create a hazard to the derived by assessing each function beneficial to both parties. public. A functional failure is a against multiple potential failure modes The FAA concurs that the detailed condition of a system, subsystem, or during each phase of the system’s design may not be mature enough at a component function derived by mission. The failure end-effect is the preliminary stage such that an operator assessing each function against multiple resulting system behavior from each could define all hardware, operational, potential failure modes during each functional failure. Failure end-effects and design causes of vehicle response phase of the system’s mission. This that result in impacts to public safety modes with minimal changes addresses Blue Origin’s concerns about should in turn identify the safety- downstream in the development process the preliminary hazard list because critical systems and can be grouped to in a preliminary hazard list. Although identifying functional failures does not identify the system hazards to the the preliminary hazard list would not require detailed design information that public. Thus, the inability of a safety- have been provided to the FAA until an may not be finalized at the stage of critical system, subsystem, or applicant submitted an application, the design when a hazard control strategy is component to function as designed, or FAA agrees with the commenters that being considered. to function erroneously, may potentially the proposed rule would have required A functional hazard analysis is a result in a hazard to the public. It is a launch or reentry operator to complete common system safety tool that, as important to note that public exposure the preliminary hazard list early in the articulated in DOD’s MIL–STD–882E, is to a hazard should only be accounted design process, to enable the operator to used to identify and classify the system for after determining the potential then carry out its hazard control strategy functions and the safety consequences hazards to the public. That is, limits to or strategies. This, as noted by Blue of functional failure or malfunction.88 A public exposure can be a mitigation Origin, would not have been practicable functional hazard analysis is a when considering hazards at the overall as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA does foundational tool useful throughout the system or mission level, and thus not not adopt the proposed requirement for lifecycle of the launch or reentry system considered when determining what an operator to identify a preliminary that helps drive the design and constitutes a hazard to the public (i.e., hazard list. Instead, the FAA requires an development process at a preliminary functional sources of the hazard) for the operator, in § 450.107(b), to determine stage by identifying safety-critical purposes of § 450.107(b)(1). its hazard control strategy or strategies functions of which launch and reentry The FAA does not retain in for any phase of flight during a launch vehicle developers should be cognizant § 450.107(b) the items in proposed or reentry, based on a functional hazard throughout the process to ensure public § 450.105(a)(1) through (a)(5) for an analysis accounting for all functional safety. The requirement to perform a operator to identify (1) vehicle response failures associated with reasonably functional hazard analysis instead of a modes, (2) public safety hazards foreseeable hazardous events, safety- preliminary hazard list, as proposed in associated with vehicle response modes, critical systems, and safety-critical § 450.105, should reduce the burden on (3) geographical areas where vehicle events. Even with this change, the FAA operators, for the reasons cited by Blue response modes could jeopardize public also agrees with Blue Origin that this Origin. safety, (4) any population exposed to approach will encourage operators to The FAA finds that a functional public safety hazards in or near the engage early with the FAA, prior to the hazard analysis will preserve the identified geographical areas, and (5) design becoming mature. benefits of the preliminary safety the CEC. These are addressed in the four In the final rule, the FAA eliminates assessment proposed in the NPRM, but hazard control strategies and in FSA. proposed § 450.105, but moves, with reduce the burden on applicants by not Finally, the FAA replaces the term some revision, the requirements in requiring detailed design information ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ in the NPRM proposed §§ 450.105(a)(6) through (a)(8) that may not be finalized at the stage of with ‘‘reasonably foreseeable hazardous into § 450.107(b). Section 450.107(b), design when a hazard control strategy is events’’ in § 450.107(b)(1) in the final titled ‘‘Hazard Control Strategy being considered. Like the PSA, a rule. As explained in the preamble Determination,’’ requires that for any functional hazard analysis should help section discussing § 450.101(c), the phase of flight during a launch or an operator identify specific information NPRM defined ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ reentry, an operator must use a relevant to public safety, scope the as a mutually-exclusive scenario that functional hazard analysis to determine analyses that must be conducted to characterizes foreseeable combinations a hazard control strategy or strategies ensure that the launch or reentry of vehicle trajectory and debris accounting for (1) all functional failures operation satisfies safety criteria, generation. The final rule is less associated with reasonably foreseeable prescriptive by requiring that an hazardous events that, excluding 88 Department of Defense, Standard Practice for operator account for reasonably mitigation, have the capability to create System Safety, MIL–STD–882E, May 11, 2012. foreseeable hazardous events, instead of

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each foreseeable combination of vehicle abort 89 that it has sufficiently protected consequence events are possible but trajectory and debris generation. against a high consequence event (as would not be effectively mitigated by an Accounting for reasonably foreseeable measured by CEC), the only remaining FSS. In addition, the flight abort rule hazardous events in a functional hazard way to satisfy § 450.101(c) is to use requirements proposed in § 450.165(c) analysis is consistent with common flight abort consistent with the have been revised and relocated to industry standards. This change also requirements in § 450.108. § 450.108(f) to reflect the revisions to means the FAA does not adopt the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to the flight safety limits requirements. proposed definition of ‘‘vehicle address flight abort in several sections. The FAA also moves the reference to response mode’’ in § 401.7. As proposed, to implement flight abort FSS reliability from proposed Blue Origin also requested as a hazard control strategy, an operator § 450.101(c) to § 450.108(b). clarification from the FAA on its would have been required to: The FAA will provide guidance to interpretation of the requirement (1) Establish flight safety limits and gates illustrate how operators may proposed in § 450.105(a)(8) to provide in accordance with proposed §§ 450.123 demonstrate compliance with these ‘‘a timeline of all safety-critical events.’’ (Flight Safety Limits Analysis) and 450.125 requirements. The guidance will Blue Origin noted that it interprets (Gate Analysis); (2) establish when an operator must abort encompass many of the traditional ‘‘safety’’ to mean meeting the collective a flight following the loss of vehicle tracking means of developing flight safety limits, and individual risk requirements for information with proposed § 450.127 (Data but operators can develop other means launch and reentry and, in essence, Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe Flight of demonstrating compliance with the suggested that the PSA should be State Analyses); performance-based objectives and limited in scope based on the collective (3) establish the mean elapsed time constraints. As discussed in more detail risk criteria resulting from the FSA. between the violation of a flight abort rule throughout this section of the preamble, and the time when the FSS is capable of the revisions in the final rule allow for The FAA does not agree with Blue aborting flight for use in establishing flight Origin’s interpretation nor with its safety limits in accordance with proposed greater flexibility for operators while suggestion that this requirement, now in § 450.129 (Time Delay Analysis); maintaining the same level of safety as § 450.107(b)(3) in the final rule, be (4) establish flight abort rules in proposed in the NPRM. limited by the results of FSA. The FAA accordance with § 450.165(c) (Flight Abort i. FSS Thresholds Using CEC will consider any event that occurs Rules); and during a phase of flight of a launch or (5) employ an FSS in accordance with § 450.145 and software in accordance with In the NPRM, an operator required to reentry vehicle that meets the definition § 450.111. use flight abort under proposed of ‘‘safety critical’’ in § 401.7 to be a § 450.101(c) was referred to proposed ‘‘safety-critical event.’’ Many of these requirements were § 450.145 to determine the required derived from existing requirements in As noted earlier, proposed § 450.105 reliability of its FSS based on CEC. part 417 and retained a more Section 450.145(a)(1) proposed to would have required that every operator prescriptive approach to flight abort conduct and document a PSA for the require an operator to employ an FSS than the final rule adopts. with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 flight of a launch or reentry vehicle and Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX percent confidence and commensurate submit its results. Virgin Galactic commented that the FSA requirements design, analysis, and testing if the inquired as to when the PSA would be in proposed §§ 450.117 through 450.141 consequence of any vehicle response due to the FAA, as well as the timeline were too prescriptive and should be ¥ mode is 1 × 10 2 CE or greater. This for the review. The final rule replaces replaced with a performance standard. C is the reliability standard for a highly the requirement to conduct a PSA with The commenters cited a lack of reliable FSS under part 417. Section the requirement to conduct a functional flexibility and the use of an approach 450.145(a)(2) proposed to require that, if hazard analysis in § 450.107(b). The directed at large orbital launches from the consequence of any vehicle response application requirements for Federal launch or reentry sites. ¥ ¥ mode is between 1 × 10 2 and 1 × 10 3 § 450.107(b) are in § 450.107(d) and are In the final rule, the FAA consolidates CE for uncontrolled areas, an operator due with the application, even though a the requirements for flight abort in C must employ an FSS with a design launch or reentry operator will conduct § 450.108 and revises the more reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent the functional hazard analysis early in prescriptive requirements from the confidence and commensurate design, the design phase, well before it applies proposal into a single performance- analysis, and testing. The FAA for a license. This approach is based regulation. As a result of this explained that, for operations for which consistent with Blue Origin’s consolidation, proposed §§ 450.123, the consequence of a flight failure is recommendation that the analysis be 450.125, 450.127, and 450.129 are not less, an FSS—while still being reliable— limited to analyzing and identifying all included in the final rule. The may not need to be as highly reliable as functional failures that could have the requirements in these sections have an FSS for a vehicle operating in an area capability to create a hazard to the been revised to reflect the performance- where the consequence of a flight failure public, rather than analyzing the based standards in § 450.108(c), which is higher.90 detailed design, which may still be establishes flight safety limits maturing. As such, in the final rule an objectives, and § 450.108(d), which In the final rule, the CEC thresholds applicant is required to provide the establishes flight safety limits for establishing the reliability or other results of the functional hazard analysis, constraints. The FAA adds § 450.108(e) requirements for an FSS proposed in including all functional failures, the in the final rule to relieve the operator § 450.145(a) have been moved to identification of all safety-critical from the requirement to use flight abort § 450.108(b). The requirements for a systems, and a timeline of all safety- in certain situations in which high highly reliable FSS proposed in critical events. h. Flight Abort (§ 450.108) 89 As discussed, § 450.101(c)(2) and (c)(3) allow 90 The FAA anticipated that this proposed an operator to demonstrate it can sufficiently relaxation of the FSS reliability requirements would protect against a high consequence event through be applicable to operations launching or reentering As discussed, if an operator cannot ¥3 other means that reduce CEC below 1 × 10 or in remote locations or for stages that do not overfly ensure by means other than flight through demonstrated reliability. population centers. 84 FR 15328.

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§ 450.145(a)(1) remain in § 450.145.91 FSS that meets the requirements of which this requirement applies. The However, the requirements for an FSS § 450.143 if the consequence of any FAA makes this change in the final rule proposed in § 450.145(a)(2) have been reasonably foreseeable failure mode in because the requirement in revised and relocated to § 450.143.92 any significant period of flight is § 450.101(c)(1) is met through use of × ¥2 × ¥3 Rocket Lab agreed with the concept of between 1 10 and 1 10 CEC for flight abort as a hazard control strategy, quantifying consequence as a key metric uncontrolled areas. and § 450.101(d), (e), and (f) are not in determining the reliability of a flight The requirements for the two types of relevant to flight abort. abort system. Other commenters were FSS, as well as the removal of the critical of the proposed use of CEC proposed requirements, are discussed in Section 450.108(c)(2) thresholds to set reliability standards for more detail later in this preamble in the any required FSS, particularly in discussion of §§ 450.143 and 450.145. In the NPRM, proposed situations in which a lower reliability § 450.123(a)(2) required the operator to FSS may be sufficient to protect the ii. Flight Safety Limits Objectives prevent debris capable of causing a public. For example, SpaceX Proposed § 450.123(a) stated an FSA casualty from impacting in uncontrolled commented that the requirement in RCC must identify the location of areas if the vehicle is outside the limits 319 for an FSS with 0.999 at 95 percent uncontrolled areas and establish flight of a useful mission. In the final rule, confidence reliability was overly safety limits that define when an § 450.108(c)(2) requires that an operator prescriptive for low-risk mission operator must initiate flight abort to: (1) initiate flight abort to prevent continued profiles. CSF noted that, by ‘‘binning’’ Ensure compliance with the safety flight from increasing risk in the CEC of a vehicle and then criteria of § 450.101; and (2) prevent uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is prescribing a fixed reliability debris capable of causing a casualty unable to achieve a useful mission. requirement for the FSS, risk of an from impacting in uncontrolled areas if Although proposed § 450.123(a)(2) unmitigated (by FSS) CEC event was not the vehicle is outside the limits of a focused on debris impacts in consistent. CSF commented that such an useful mission. uncontrolled areas to define when an approach requires the same FSS even The introductory language of though the risk varies by an order of § 450.108(c) is a revision of proposed operator must initiate flight abort, magnitude between the extreme values. § 450.123(a).93 In the final rule, § 450.108(c)(2), as finalized, Several other commenters, including § 450.108(c), titled ‘‘Flight Safety Limits acknowledges that debris impact is not CSF and Sierra Nevada commented that Objectives,’’ requires an operator to the only risk contributor that must be the FAA should not preclude applicants determine and use flight safety limits accounted for in determining flight from making a ‘‘safety case’’ to justify a that define when an operator must safety limits. For example, a release of certain level of rigor for their FSS. initiate flight abort if the conditions toxic propellant following a debris As noted in the discussion of enumerated in § 450.108(c)(1) through impact may also contribute to risk. § 450.101(c), the FAA has retained CEC (c)(5) are met. Alternatively, an operator Therefore, in § 450.108(c)(2), an as the appropriate regulatory standard could meet § 450.108(c)(6) to satisfy the operator must determine and use flight for measuring high consequence events. requirements of § 450.108(c)(2) and safety limits to prevent continued flight Likewise, for the reasons set forth in (c)(4). from increasing risk once a vehicle can that section of the preamble, the FAA The following sections provide no longer achieve a useful mission. The has retained the use of CEC in additional detail on the performance- FAA recognizes that a vehicle may § 450.108(b) to determine the level of based flight safety limits objectives deviate from the limits of a useful reliability required for an FSS. However, derived from the more prescriptive mission during a period when hazard in response to comments, the FAA has requirements proposed in the NPRM added flexibility for FSS that do not containment through flight abort is not and respond to public comments on the possible. In this case, the requirement is need to meet the standard for highly proposals in the NPRM to the extent reliable FSS in proposed § 450.145(a)(1) not to allow continued flight to increase they are relevant to compliance with the risk, though some risk from either flight based on the CEC. The FAA notes that final rule. an operator does not need to calculate abort or continued flight may be CEC for the purposes of determining Section 450.108(c)(1) unavoidable. reliability under § 450.108(b) if it elects Section 450.108(c)(1) requires that an For example, a vehicle may begin an to use a highly reliable FSS that meets operator initiate flight abort to ensure unplanned turn away from a nominal the requirements of § 450.145. compliance with the safety criteria of trajectory while overflying an island. In the final rule, the FAA removes the § 450.101(a) and (b). The FAA proposed Once the vehicle leaves the limits of a prescribed reliability threshold a related requirement in § 450.123(a)(1), useful mission, the operator should proposed in § 450.145(a)(2) of the NPRM which stated that an FSA must identify initiate flight abort if continued flight

for operations with a maximum CEC the location of uncontrolled areas and would result in an increase in risk. value between 1 × 10¥2 and 1 × 10¥3. establish flight safety limits that define Pursuant to § 450.108(c)(2), depending Accordingly, an operator does not need when an operator must initiate flight on the risk to the public, it may be better to employ an FSS with a design abort to ensure compliance with the to withhold flight abort until the reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent safety criteria of § 450.101. In the final confidence and commensurate design, hazards resulting from the abort would rule, § 450.108(c)(1) specifies the not affect the island. However, if the analysis, and testing. Rather, under relevant subparagraphs in § 450.101 to § 450.108(b)(2), an operator must use an turn is towards a major population center on the island, it may pose less of 93 The FAA has not included in the final rule the 91 The reliability requirements for a highly language in § 450.123(a) that would have required a risk to the public to abort the flight as reliable FSS will be discussed later in the preamble the operator to identify the location of uncontrolled soon as it leaves the limits of a useful in the section pertaining to § 450.145. areas. The FAA finds it is unnecessary to specify mission, even if it might result in a 92 The reliability requirements for an FSS that is this language in the introductory paragraph of not required to meet the standard for highly reliable § 450.108(c) because an operator must identify the hazard posed to less-dense populated FSS will be discussed later in the preamble in the location of uncontrolled areas to meet the objectives areas. section pertaining to § 450.143. of § 450.108(c)(2) through (6).

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The concepts of ‘‘useful mission’’ and In the final rule, the concept of gate upcoming phase of flight for which ‘‘limits of a useful mission’’ 94 are analysis in proposed § 450.125 is population is exposed to hazardous discussed in greater detail in the captured in a more performance-based debris effects from reasonably preamble section on FSA methods manner in § 450.108(c)(3).96 Section foreseeable failure modes. An example (specifically, in § 450.119 (Trajectory 450.108(c)(3) requires that an operator of a critical vehicle parameter outside Analysis for Malfunction Flight)). initiate flight abort to prevent the its pre-established expected range is a The FAA also notes that the vehicle from entering a period of tank pressure that is higher than the maximum extents of a gate,95 materially increased public exposure in normal operating range and could lead determined by the limits of a useful uncontrolled areas, including before to a rupture. An example of a critical mission in proposed § 450.125(c)(2), are orbital insertion, if a critical vehicle vehicle parameter that indicates an addressed by § 450.108(c)(2) in the final parameter is outside its pre-established inability to complete flight within the rule, which requires flight abort to expected range or indicates an inability limits of a useful mission is an prevent continued flight from increasing to complete flight within the limits of a acceleration that is too low and would risk in uncontrolled areas if the vehicle useful mission. The FAA removes the result in a vehicle failing to reach orbit. is unable to achieve a useful mission. term ‘‘gate’’ in the final rule to allow The operator must select parameters and Therefore, trajectories outside the limits operators to use another method to their acceptable ranges that are of a useful mission that intersect flight comply with the requirements. appropriate for the vehicle and mission, safety limits that prevent increased risk Furthermore, the term ‘‘gate’’ can have with consideration of the ability to in uncontrolled areas must trigger flight different meanings within the industry, measure and act on the parameters, and abort. which can cause confusion. However, describe in the application the Virgin Galactic recommended that the although the term ‘‘gate’’ is not used in parameters that will be used and how term ‘‘prevent’’ in proposed the final rule, the FAA expects a similar their ranges were determined, pursuant § 450.123(a)(2) be qualified, as it could approach to a gate analysis will be used to the application requirement in be taken to mean many probabilistic by many operators and by Federal § 450.108(g)(3). values. Although proposed launch or reentry sites. With the The intent of the gate analysis in § 450.123(a)(2) has been removed from removal of explicit gate requirements, proposed § 450.125 was to prevent the final rule, § 450.108(c) uses the term the term ‘‘tracking icon’’ is no longer unnecessarily exposing the public to ‘‘prevent’’ in five places including required, and the FAA therefore hazards from a mission that can no § 450.108(c)(2). In § 450.108 (c)(2), (3), removes the term from the final rule. longer be useful. Proposed § 450.125(a) (5), and (6), prevention is dependent on The FAA notes that a period of required that an FSA include a gate the proper functioning of the FSS. There materially increased public exposure analysis for an orbital launch or any is no expectation that these objectives would include the beginning of a period launch or reentry where one or more when the vehicle will overfly a major will be met if the FSS fails to function trajectories that represent a useful landmass prior to orbital insertion (e.g., properly. In § 450.108(c)(4), when the mission intersect a flight safety limit Europe, Africa, or South America). reliability of the FSS is accounted for that provides containment of debris Overflight of large islands with pursuant to § 450.108(d)(5), prevention capable of causing a casualty. Gate substantial population may also is considered to be achieved. analysis was necessary if a vehicle on a constitute a period of materially useful mission needed to fly in an area Section 450.108(c)(3) increased public exposure, while where population could be exposed to overflight of islands with small As noted earlier, the FAA proposed in hazards in the event of a vehicle failure. populations or other areas of sparse § 450.125 to establish the requirements As long as a trajectory met the population will not constitute a period for a gate analysis. The FAA explained individual and collective risk criteria of of materially increased public exposure. that the primary purpose of gates is to § 450.101(a)(1) and (a)(2) for a launch, or Consequence may be used to determine establish safe locations and conditions if an exposed area should be considered (b)(1) and (b)(2) for a reentry, when to abort the flight prior to the vehicle an area of materially increased public treated like a nominal trajectory with entering a region or condition where it exposure. Orbital insertion also results normal trajectory dispersions, the flight may endanger populated or other in a material increase in public safety limit with which it intersected protected areas if flight were to would be removed (or ‘‘relaxed,’’ as exposure due to the possibility of a 98 continue. A gate should be placed random reentry from a vehicle that described in the NPRM), so flight of where a trajectory within the limits of cannot achieve a minimum safe orbit. A the vehicle would not be aborted. a useful mission intersects a flight safety vehicle intended for orbit that cannot Alternatively, under proposed limit as long as that trajectory meets the achieve a minimum safe orbit would § 450.125(b)(1), the flight safety limit risk criteria in § 450.101. In response to require flight abort under could be replaced with a gate that comments that the proposed gate § 450.108(c)(3). The FAA will provide allowed continued flight as long as a analysis requirements created confusion guidance on what constitutes materially real-time measure of performance and should be more performance-based, increased public exposure.97 indicated that the vehicle was able to § 450.125 is not included in the final The FAA notes that, for purposes of complete a useful mission. rule. § 450.108(c)(3), a ‘‘critical vehicle Section 450.108(c)(3) achieves the parameter’’ is a parameter that intent in proposed § 450.125(a) because 94 A useful mission means a mission that can demonstrates the vehicle is capable of it codifies the goals achieved by gate attain one or more objectives. Limits of a useful analysis but allows for alternative mission means the trajectory data or other completing safe flight through the parameters that bound the performance of a useful approaches to achieve the same mission, including flight azimuth limits. 96 The performance-based requirement in objective. Similar to the gate analysis in 95 A gate is an opening in a flight safety limit § 450.108(c)(3) incorporates elements of proposed proposed § 450.125(a), the analysis in through which a vehicle may fly, provided the § 450.125(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(4). § 450.108(c)(3) is required when a vehicle meets certain pre-defined conditions such 97 For example, a period of materially increased trajectory that represents a useful that the vehicle performance indicates an ability to public exposure would include any area where the continue safe flight. Gate analysis has been removed CEC from any on-trajectory failure mode is greater from the final rule. than 1 × 10¥2. 98 See 84 FR 15386.

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mission approaches an uncontrolled with those sections. The FAA finds that § 450.108(c)(3) that the critical vehicle area. the intent of the proposed gate analysis parameter check is required prior to Proposed § 450.125(b)(1) required that requirements would be clearer if these entering a period of materially increased a gate analysis establish a relaxation of requirements are included as separate public exposure in uncontrolled areas, the flight safety limits that allows flight safety limits objectives and including before orbital insertion. The continued flight or a gate where a constraints because they can also be meaning of ‘‘materially increased public decision will be made to abort the applied outside of a traditional gate exposure’’ is discussed earlier in this launch or reentry or allow continued analysis. section. flight. This proposed requirement is The FAA received several comments Rocket Lab inquired whether a gate addressed in § 450.108(c)(3) because it on proposed § 450.125 focused on the analysis is required for when a also either allows continued flight proposed definition of the term ‘‘gate,’’ trajectory intersects a flight safety limit, without a check of critical vehicle the prescriptive nature of the if an operator was using flight abort only parameters if the upcoming population requirements for a gate analysis, and the as a hazard control strategy. exposure is not materially increased, or manner in which gates would be In the final rule, pursuant to requires a check of critical vehicle applied. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, § 450.108(c)(3), this performance check parameters before continued flight if the Northrop Grumman, and ULA is not necessary if the vehicle is not upcoming population exposure is commented that the gate analysis must approaching an area of materially materially increased. In this respect, the establish a relaxation of the flight safety increased public exposure regardless of final rule provides clarity on the point limits that allows continued flight or a how the operator develops flight safety at which the check of critical vehicle gate where a decision will be made to limits, as long as it meets requirements parameters is required, whereas the abort the launch or reentry or allow in § 450.108(c) and (d). The FAA also proposal was ambiguous on when a gate continued flight. The commenters notes that if flight abort is not required would be required. asserted that flight rules and placards as a hazard control strategy to meet the Proposed § 450.125(b)(2) stated that, if can constrain allowable trajectories, and safety criteria of § 450.101, an operator a gate is established, a gate analysis that it is appropriate to disapprove a may still choose to use flight abort at its must include a measure of performance trajectory if the nominal trajectory is discretion. Compliance with at the gate that enables the flight abort beyond the flight safety limits. The FAA § 450.108(c)(3) is only required for an crew or autonomous FSS to determine declined to make the recommended operator required to use flight abort as whether the vehicle is able to complete change because § 450.108(c)(3) allows a a hazard control strategy to meet the a useful mission or abort the flight if it nominal vehicle to overfly a populated safety criteria of § 450.101. is not. In the final rule, this requirement area, which is current practice. A flight Section 450.108(c)(4) is addressed in § 450.108(c)(3), which safety limit that intersects the nominal states, ‘‘if a critical vehicle parameter is trajectory trace can only be enforced if As noted earlier, proposed outside its pre-established expected the vehicle has experienced a § 450.125(c) would have required the range or indicates an inability to malfunction before reaching the limit. extent of any gate or relaxation of the complete flight within the limits of a These limits are common, such as gates flight safety limits to be based on useful mission.’’ The pre-established protecting downrange landmasses normal trajectories, trajectories that may expected range of the critical vehicle before overflight. achieve a useful mission, collective risk, parameters are those values that do not Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop and consequence criteria. Section predict the vehicle will fail or exit the Grumman, and ULA recommended 450.108(c)(4) in the final rule is related limits of a useful mission, or simply replacing ‘‘flight abort’’ with ‘‘flight to proposed § 450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) in those that indicate the vehicle is termination’’ to distinguish between a that it describes the consequence performing as intended. Accordingly, as flight abort for a reason unrelated to requirements for flight safety limits; with gate analysis under the proposal, public safety. The FAA did not adopt however, it contains differences as the operator will establish the measure this change because the term ‘‘flight explained in this section of the of performance—referred to as the abort’’ is meant to encompass hazard preamble. critical vehicle parameter(s) and pre- control strategies that may not include In the final rule, § 450.108(c)(4) established expected range(s) in the destruction of a vehicle or termination requires that an operator initiate flight final rule—that will determine whether of thrust. For example, flight abort for a abort to prevent conditional expected ¥ flight abort must be initiated. captive carry mission may entail casualties greater than 1 × 10 2 in Proposed § 450.125(b)(4) stated that a aborting the mission and returning to uncontrolled areas due to flight abort or gate analysis must establish, for an base or landing at a contingency site. due to flight outside the limits of a orbital launch, a gate at the last The FAA finds that the term ‘‘flight useful mission from any reasonably opportunity to determine whether the termination’’ has connotations that are foreseeable off-trajectory failure mode vehicle’s flight is in compliance with inconsistent with the FAA’s intent. initiating in any significant period of the flight abort rules and can make a Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop flight. The purpose of § 450.108(c)(4) is useful mission, and to abort the flight if Grumman, and ULA requested to ensure that, when an operator cannot it is not. This requirement is addressed clarification on the term ‘‘relaxation of develop flight safety limits that prevent by the § 450.108(c)(3) requirement that a flight safety limit’’ in the NPRM and hazards from affecting uncontrolled critical vehicle parameters must be questioned whether it is appropriate for areas, the failure modes that result in checked before orbital insertion. an operator to relax a flight safety limit. deviations from the planned trajectory Therefore, § 450.108(c)(3) is a more The FAA agrees that the proposed will not result in a high consequence performance-based requirement that is language ‘‘relaxation of a flight safety event if the vehicle is unable to achieve consistent with the proposed limit’’ lacked clarity and that the a useful mission. This scenario can arise § 450.125(b)(4). regulation should be clear about when when some public exposure must be The FAA notes that certain concepts a vehicle may overfly population accepted to allow useful vehicles to in proposed § 450.125 are also captured without a performance check. The final continue during a phase of flight when in § 450.108(c)(2), (c)(4), and (d)(7), as rule removes terms related to relaxed flight abort is still used as a hazard discussed in the preamble associated flight safety limits and states in control strategy.

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This situation frequently occurs, for was within the limits of a useful initiating in any significant period of example, on northeasterly missions mission when the outcome of the failure flight from exceeding 1 × 10¥2 launched from the Eastern Range that occurred. Collective risk requirements casualties, even though the public in are permitted to overfly some portions still apply in these scenarios and ensure uncontrolled areas might be exposed to of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland on that the risk is met for any trajectory debris from a flight abort. trajectories within the limits of a useful that the operator declares as SpaceX asked if there were mission. If the vehicle fails after the representing a useful mission, pursuant restrictions to using flight safety limits overflight has begun and reaches flight to § 450.108(d)(7). that met the risk requirements of safety limits protecting more westerly Third, whereas proposed proposed § 450.101 but did not meet the ¥2 portions of the uncontrolled areas from § 450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) concerned the 1 × 10 CEC requirement. flight outside the limits of a useful consequence from flight abort ‘‘resulting Under § 450.108(c)(4), flight safety from any reasonable vehicle response limits must not allow CEC greater than mission, the consequence from flight ¥ abort must meet the criteria in mode,’’ § 450.108(c)(4) concerns the 1 × 10 2 unless the consequence § 450.108(c)(4). consequence from any ‘‘reasonably resulted from a vehicle within the limits Proposed § 450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) foreseeable off-trajectory failure mode.’’ of a useful mission and therefore could included the consequence requirements The replacement of ‘‘vehicle response not be mitigated by flight abort without as a part of gate analysis. In the final mode’’ with ‘‘failure mode’’ is discussed aborting a vehicle on a useful mission, rule, the consequence requirements are in the preamble section on or the consequence resulted from an on- a standalone flight safety limits § 450.101(c)(2).99 The term ‘‘off- trajectory failure mode. objective in § 450.108(c)(4). The final trajectory’’ was added to explain further An example of when the consequence rule also makes several revisions. First, which types of failures must result in requirement would not apply is when a the final rule expressly states flight the consequence criteria being met. Off- vehicle on a normal trajectory suffers a safety limits are required only to trajectory failures are those for which spontaneous breakup. This on-trajectory prevent high consequence events in the vehicle deviates from its intended event cannot be mitigated by flight abort uncontrolled areas. This concept was flight path—for example due to failures without terminating a useful vehicle implied in the NPRM because, per of the guidance, navigation, or control before it overflies uncontrolled areas. proposed § 450.123(a)(2), flight safety systems. Outcomes from on-trajectory An operator would not be required to limits must prevent debris capable of failures, such as an explosion or loss of initiate flight abort under the final rule causing a casualty from impacting in thrust along the intended flight path, are for this scenario. An example of when uncontrolled areas if the vehicle is not able to be fully mitigated by an FSS the consequence requirement would outside the limits of a useful mission. because once the failure occurs the apply is if a malfunction causes the The consequence criteria in proposed hazard cannot be prevented from vehicle to depart from the limits of a § 450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) were affecting uncontrolled areas if the useful mission. If CEC is used to applicable to flight safety limits that did failure occurred during a period in measure high consequence events, the not prevent debris from impacting in which the uncontrolled areas were flight safety limits must prevent the uncontrolled areas following a gate or exposed. At best, the hazard can be consequence from such a failure mode relaxation in a flight safety limit reduced for some failure modes such as (i.e., a malfunction that causes the developed per § 450.123(a)(2). a loss of thrust that may result in an vehicle to depart from the limits of a ¥ Therefore, the proposed consequence intact impact unless a destructive abort useful mission) from exceeding 1 × 10 2 criteria only applied to uncontrolled that disperses propellants is CEC, whether produced by flight abort areas. implemented. In this case, flight abort or other reasonably foreseeable Second, the requirement in the final may still be required to reduce risk per outcomes (such as aerodynamic/ rule applies in cases of flight abort and § 450.108(c)(2) since the vehicle is structural breakup, intact impact, etc.). in cases where the vehicle is outside the unable to achieve a useful mission, but SpaceX requested guidance on how limits of a useful mission. The the consequence criteria would not an operator should balance EC and CEC consequence criteria in proposed apply. when designing flight safety limits and § 450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) were only Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop expressed concern that EC may increase applicable in cases of flight abort. If Grumman, and ULA requested as an operator attempts to reduce CEC. only flight abort action were considered, clarification on the intent of the CEC SpaceX also recommended removing all a high consequence event resulting from limits in proposed § 450.125(c)(1) and numerical values associated with CEC other outcomes (intact impacts, (c)(2). In the final rule, the FAA retained and requiring the consequence of flight structural breakup, etc.) outside the the CEC limits related to flight abort. abort at the flight safety limits to be limits of a useful mission might not be The intent of these limits is to ensure minimized. identified. that, when flight abort or a flight outside Regarding the balance of EC and CEC, Vehicle failures within the limits of a the limits of a useful mission resulting the FAA notes that flight safety limits useful mission are excluded from the from an off-trajectory failure mode must be designed to meet the EC and consequence criteria in § 450.108(c)(4) produces debris capable of causing a CEC requirements as described in in the final rule because flight abort casualty, it nonetheless protects against § 450.108(c)(1) and (c)(4), respectively. cannot prevent a failure from affecting a high consequence event. In other If the flight safety limits must be uncontrolled areas that must be exposed words, flight abort provides sufficient modified to reduce the CEC to to allow a vehicle on a useful mission protection against a high consequence acceptable levels, EC must still be kept to continue flight. For example, if a event when flight abort is implemented within acceptable levels. The FAA does vehicle begins an unplanned turn from to prevent the CEC from any reasonably not agree with the recommendation to the nominal trajectory while overflying foreseeable off-trajectory failure mode remove the numerical value associated uncontrolled areas and breaks up with the CEC requirement because this aerodynamically before exiting the 99 The FAA also notes that the term ‘‘in any one- could allow flight safety limits that limits of a useful mission, this failure second period of flight’’ has been changed result in a high consequence through throughout the final rule to the term ‘‘in any would not count against the significant period of flight,’’ as described in the flight abort or through flight abort consequence criteria because the vehicle preamble section discussing § 450.101(c). inaction. However, the final rule does

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allow for methods of measuring In developing the NPRM, the FAA the public risk criteria, as flight safety consequence other than CEC that considered alternatives to a conditional limits analysis amounts to an additional provide an equivalent level of safety risk limit, including the current layer of regulation that Virgin Galactic under § 450.37. approach employed in § 417.213.100 The believed was redundant and unneeded. FAA rejected using the approach in The FAA determined that a Section 450.108(c)(5) § 417.213 as a requirement in part 450 clarification is required in response to Section 450.108(c)(5) requires that an because it is unnecessarily restrictive to this recommendation. Pursuant to operator initiate flight abort to prevent require designated impact limit lines to § 450.108(a), flight safety limits are only the vehicle state from reaching bound the area where debris with a required in phases of flight in which identified conditions that are ballistic coefficient of three pounds per flight abort is used as a hazard control anticipated to compromise the square foot or more is allowed to impact strategy to meet the safety criteria of capability of the FSS if further flight has if the FSS functions properly, as § 450.101. The FAA does not agree that the potential to violate a flight safety evidenced by the need for the FAA to meeting public risk criteria, or just limit. For example, if a roll rate of a grant waivers to allow innovative collective and individual risk, are the particular magnitude would preclude missions to proceed safely, such as only objectives of flight abort, as ground-based flight abort commands return of boosters to the launch site.101 explained in the preamble section on from being received by the vehicle, a However, if an operator satisfies the CEC. The FAA finds it necessary to flight safety limit should be developed current requirements in § 417.213, it include additional objectives for flight that triggers flight abort before the roll would meet the requirement in abort in § 450.108(c) to protect public rate reaches this value. § 450.108(c)(6). This strategy is not an safety adequately. Lastly, the preamble Section 450.108(c)(5) is related to the option when hazard containment is not section on CEC describes why a flight abort rule in proposed possible during a phase of flight when conditional risk assessment is appropriate to provide the public § 450.165(c)(3)(ii), which required that flight abort must be used as a hazard protection from unlikely but flight abort rules include that the FSS control strategy. For example, if an area catastrophic events in the context of must abort flight when the vehicle state of overflight occurs on the nominal launch and reentry operations. approaches conditions that are trajectory during a phase of flight when anticipated to compromise the flight abort is still used as a hazard iii. Flight Safety Limits Constraints control strategy, an operator cannot capability of the FSS and further flight Section 450.108(d) in the final rule has the potential to violate the FSS. In claim containment during this phase and must meet § 450.108(c)(2) and describes flight safety limits constraints. the NPRM, the FAA did not include a (c)(4). The FAA notes that its approach This subsection consolidates the flight flight safety limit objective that in § 450.108(c) to employing conditional safety limits constraints in proposed corresponded with the flight abort rule risk limits is consistent with a §§ 450.123 through 450.129. in proposed § 450.165(c)(3)(ii). The FAA recommendation made by the National adds this flight safety limit objective in Section 450.108(d)(1) Academy of Sciences.102 § 450.108(c)(5). The flight abort rule in Virgin Galactic recommended adding Proposed § 450.123(b)(1) required proposed § 450.165(c)(3)(ii) is in an exclusion to the requirement for flight safety limits to account for § 450.108(f)(2)(ii) and is discussed flight safety limits in proposed temporal and geometric extents on the further under Flight Abort Rules in the § 450.123 for vehicles that already meet Earth’s surface of any vehicle hazards following paragraphs. resulting from any planned or Section 450.108(c)(6) 100 The FAA currently requires in § 417.213 that unplanned event for all times during ‘‘a flight safety analysis must identify the location flight. Section § 450.108(c)(6) states that, in of populated or other protected areas, and establish In the final rule, § 450.108(d)(1) lieu of meeting § 450.108(c)(2) and flight safety limits that define when an FSS must requires that flight safety limits account terminate a launch vehicle’s flight to prevent the § 450.108(c)(4), an operator may initiate hazardous effects of the resulting debris impacts for temporal and geometric extents on flight abort to prevent debris capable of from reaching any populated or other protected area the Earth’s surface of any reasonably causing a casualty due to any hazard and ensure that the launch satisfies the public risk foreseeable vehicle hazards under all from affecting uncontrolled areas using criteria.’’ reasonably foreseeable conditions 101 See Waiver of Debris Containment an FSS that complies with § 450.145. Requirements for Launch. 81 FR 1470, 1470–1472 during normal and malfunctioning The FAA adds this regulation to clarify (January 12, 2016). flight. The FAA adds ‘‘reasonably 102 that a CEC analysis is not required if an In 2001, the National Research Council foreseeable’’ before ‘‘vehicle hazards’’ to FSS that complies with § 450.145 published a report on ‘‘Streamlining Space Launch be consistent with language elsewhere Range Safety,’’ which included a recommendation provides hazard containment. Hazard that ‘‘destruct lines and flight termination system in the regulation. As noted earlier, containment is a means of achieving the requirements should be defined and implemented ‘‘reasonably foreseeable’’ is a term goals of § 450.108(c)(2) and (c)(4) in a way that is directly traceable to accepted risk commonly used in system safety. The standards.’’ See p. 44 of IBSN 0–309–51648–X because, if an operator provides for available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9790.html. FAA also replaces ‘‘from any planned or hazard containment, continued flight The flight safety limit requirements currently in unplanned event for all times during will not increase risk in uncontrolled § 417.213(d) are not directly traceable to accepted flight’’ in proposed § 450.123(b)(1) with areas and hazard containment would risk standards in that they require the analysis to ‘‘under all reasonably foreseeable prevent conditional expected casualties ‘‘establish designated impact limit lines to bound conditions during normal and ¥ the area where debris with a ballistic coefficient of greater than 1 × 10 2 in uncontrolled three or more is allowed to impact if the flight malfunctioning flight’’ in areas. This requirement is consistent safety system functions properly.’’ As noted earlier, § 450.108(d)(1). This revision does not with the NPRM because if an operator the approach in § 417.213 has been rejected because result in a substantive change from the it is unnecessarily restrictive, as evidenced by the is able to contain hazards throughout need for the FAA to grant waivers to allow proposal, but the FAA finds the revised the period when flight abort is used, the innovative missions to proceed safely, such as language to be clearer and consistent proposed consequence requirements in return of boosters to the launch site. The FAA with language elsewhere in the § 450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2) would not found that those waivers did not jeopardize public regulation through use of the term safety based on conditional risk analyses that are apply since a gate analysis would not be inherent in methods the NAS referred to as ‘‘reasonably foreseeable conditions’’ in necessary. accepted risk standards. place of the proposed ‘‘planned or

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unplanned event.’’ This standard does In the NPRM, the FAA explained that site parlance, data loss flight times are not hold the operator responsible for data loss flight time would be the known as ‘‘green numbers.’’ unforeseeable events. shortest elapsed thrusting or gliding In the NPRM, data loss flight times time during which a vehicle flown with would not be used if a vehicle’s tracking Section 450.108(d)(2) an FSS can move from its trajectory to icon has potentially passed a final gate Section 450.108(d)(2) requires that a condition in which it is possible for when the countdown reaches zero flight safety limits account for the the vehicle to violate a flight safety because this could result in introducing physics of hazard generation and limit. Data loss flight times would have hazards in uncontrolled areas that the transport including uncertainty. This been required from the initiation of gate protects. As described in proposed articulation represents a revision of flight until the minimum elapsed § 450.127(b)(1), there are no data loss proposed § 450.123(b)(2), which stated thrusting or gliding time was no greater flight times when the minimum elapsed flight safety limits must account for than the time it would take for a normal thrusting or gliding time is greater than potential contributions to debris impact vehicle to reach the final gate crossing the time it would take for a normal dispersions. The FAA finds the NPRM or the planned safe flight state. vehicle to reach the final gate crossing, language was unclear as to the scope of Section 450.108(d)(3) revises the to preclude abort from occurring after a the requirement. The NPRM would have prescriptive requirements in § 450.127 gate crossing. required an operator to consider how to require that flight safety limits Proposed § 450.127(c)(1) through factors like winds, imparted velocities, account for the potential to lose valid (c)(3) described other phases of flight and uncertainty in mass properties data necessary to evaluate the flight when data loss flight times would be affect where debris from a failed vehicle abort rules. Data is valid when it is of unnecessary. If a vehicle cannot reach a may impact. However, direct debris sufficient quality to be used to make flight safety limit, then a data loss flight impacts are not the only hazards posed flight abort decisions. Data used to make time cannot be computed and would be by vehicle failures. For example, an flight abort decisions can be missing or unnecessary. It may seem futile to have intact impact of a vehicle may lead to invalid for a number of reasons, but a flight safety limit that cannot be a blast wave or release of toxic reached, but for purposes of data loss resulting from an unplanned event, such propellant, both of which must be flight times a flight safety limit is as disruption or loss of communication considered when developing flight considered unreachable if the vehicle pathways with ground-based or onboard safety limits. Hazard generation and cannot reach it starting from within tracking sensors. Despite an operator’s transport are factors that apply to all normal trajectory limits when track data or launch site’s best efforts, the potential hazards, unlike factors that only apply is lost. The flight safety limit may still to lose track data is a contingency for to determining debris impact be reachable if the vehicle was outside which operators must plan. dispersions. Hazard generation refers to of normal trajectory limits at the time the process by which a vehicle becomes Section 450.108(d)(3) requires an data was lost. Therefore, these flight a hazard, and transport is how the operator to account for the potential to safety limits may still have value. hazard moves from the source to an lose valid data necessary to evaluate the Finally, in the NPRM, data loss flight exposed person or asset. Simply flight abort rules because the loss of times would not be necessary in phases accounting for potential contributions to valid data does not absolve the operator of flight when an FSS is not required. debris impact dispersions would not from attempting to meet the flight safety There may still be flight safety limits encompass all hazards, though debris limits requirements in § 450.108(c) and during such phases if an operator impact dispersions also need to be (d). Section 450.108(d)(3) captures the retains an FSS and active flight abort accounted for under § 450.108(d)(2). performance-based intent of proposed rules even though they are not required. Blue Origin requested clarification of § 450.127 (Data Loss Flight Time and Loss of track data would not require the term ‘‘potential contributions’’ in Planned Safe Flight State Analyses). The flight abort since the flight safety limits proposed § 450.123(b)(2). The FAA FAA finds that this revision allows for themselves are unnecessary. This notes the term ‘‘potential contributions’’ the use of data loss flight times as a approach would allow operators to be to debris impact dispersions are those means of satisfying § 450.108(d)(3), but conservative in the use of flight safety that influence the propagation of debris also allows operators to propose other limits in phases of flight when they are following a vehicle breakup, such as methods of meeting the requirement. unnecessary, with no threat of flight explosion-induced velocities, winds, Microcosm and SpaceX requested abort from loss of track data. uncertainty in aerodynamic properties, clarification of the intent for proposed Proposed § 450.127(b)(3) would have etc. The FAA further notes the term § 450.127. The FAA notes that the permitted the real-time computation ‘‘potential contributions’’ does not purpose of proposed § 450.127 was to and application of data loss flight times appear in the final rule. The FAA will determine when flight abort is required during vehicle flight, in which case the address development of debris impact if track data used to evaluate the flight state vector just prior to loss of data dispersions in guidance, similar to the abort rules is lost. If a vehicle is able to should be used as the nominal state existing Flight Safety Analysis reach a flight safety limit when track vector. The FAA finds that Handbook. data is lost, then a countdown begins § 450.108(d)(3) provides the same level that would indicate, upon reaching zero, of safety as the proposed requirement in Section 450.108(d)(3) that a flight safety limit may have been § 450.127 and provides additional In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to reached. Under proposed flexibility. The FAA will provide consolidate and update data loss flight § 450.165(c)(3)(iii), flight abort would guidance on compliance with times and planned safe flight states have to occur no later than when the § 450.108(d)(3). The proposed requirements in proposed § 450.127 countdown reaches zero. Throughout requirement in § 450.127 can be part of (Data Loss Flight Time and Planned Safe flight, the time for the countdown to a viable means of compliance with Flight State Analyses). As explained in reach zero is the data loss flight time. If § 450.108(d)(3). An operator may the proposal, data loss flight time reliable tracking sources are regained propose other means of compliance analysis is necessary to establish when before the countdown reaches zero, then with § 450.108(d)(3). Microcosm and an operator must abort a flight following flight abort rule evaluation resumes and SpaceX requested clarification of the the loss of vehicle tracking information. the countdown resets. In Federal launch intent for proposed § 450.127. The FAA

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notes that the purpose of proposed for the reliability of the FSS under two areas, compared to continued flight. In § 450.127 was to determine when flight scenarios when determining whether the NPRM, the FAA explained that the abort is required if track data used to individual, collective, or conditional proposed requirement is equivalent to evaluate the flight abort rules is lost. risk requirements are met with the flight the U.S. Government consensus safety limits objectives. The applicable standard that a conditional risk Section 450.108(d)(4) flight safety limits objectives are located management process should be Proposed § 450.129 (Time Delay in § 450.108(c)(1), which addresses implemented to ensure that mission Analysis) would have required an individual and collective risk, and rules do not induce unacceptable operator to perform a time delay § 450.108(c)(4), which addresses consequences when they are analysis to establish the mean elapsed conditional risk. Although implemented. time between the violation of a flight § 450.108(c)(2) is also associated with Section 450.108(d)(6) requires that abort rule and the time when the FSS is risk, it is independent of the FSS flight safety limits be designed to avoid capable of aborting flight for the reliability because it is a comparison flight abort that results in increased purpose of establishing flight safety between the risk if the FSS is activated collective risk to the public in limits. The time delay analysis would and the risk if it is not activated. uncontrolled areas, compared to have been required to determine a time To comply with § 450.108(d)(5), first, continued flight. This language is very delay distribution that accounts for all the FSS must be assumed to have a similar to proposed § 450.123(b)(3), with foreseeable sources of delay. reliability of one, meaning it is one change. The FAA changes the term While proposed § 450.129 does not presumed to function without error. The ‘‘people’’ in the proposed rule to ‘‘the appear in the final rule, the objective of risk evaluations using an FSS reliability public’’ in the final rule because the proposed § 450.129 is captured by of one ensure that the criteria are met if FAA regulates the safety of the public. § 450.108(d)(4). Section 450.108(d)(4) the FSS functions as intended. This The term ‘‘people’’ could be construed requires that flight safety limits account requirement is important because an as meaning something broader than for the time delay, including FSS failure should not be relied upon to ‘‘public,’’ such as mission essential uncertainties, between the violation of a make flight safety limits compliant with personnel who may be in uncontrolled flight abort rule and the time when the risk requirements. The decision to areas. FSS is expected to activate. The term in implement a flight abort is a deliberate Blue Origin stated that proposed the final rule ‘‘time delay including safety intervention. The FAA wants to §§ 450.123(d), 450.125(b)(2), 450.125(c), uncertainties’’ is consistent in intent be sure that the public is safe given any and 450.125(c)(3) were in conflict and with the NPRM language ‘‘mean elapsed deliberate safety intervention. This commented on the definition of a time’’ and ‘‘determine a time delay objective is consistent with proposed ‘‘useful mission.’’ Blue Origin explained distribution.’’ § 450.125(c)(1) and (c)(2), which contain that, even though the intent was to meet The time delay distribution in requirements for consequence from the public safety requirements in proposed § 450.129 is distribution in a flight abort, implying that the flight proposed § 450.101, terminating a statistical sense. The uncertainties abort action occurs, and is also vehicle that may not meet the definition referred to in § 450.108(d)(4) are the consistent with current practice for all of a ‘‘useful mission’’ may result in an same as the time delay distribution risk evaluations. increase in risk to the public, including referred to in proposed § 450.129. To Second, the risk evaluations must those on ships and aircraft, compared to meet § 450.108(d)(4), the operator must consider the predicted reliability of the continued flight that may result in consider the range of values that the FSS. Predicted reliability of the FSS is reaching orbit. Blue Origin commented actual time delay could fall between. important because even low that, if the limits were defined only with While proposed § 450.129 stated that probabilities of FSS failures can have respect to the risk criteria in proposed the time delay analysis would be used significant impacts on risk. This § 450.101, allowing the vehicle to in establishing flight safety limits, the consideration is consistent with the continue flight may result in a safer risk final rule specifies that the time delay NPRM because FSS reliabilities are a profile. is a constraint in developing flight fundamental component of the viability The FAA agrees that the risk to the safety limits. Time delays are important of flight abort as a hazard control public must not be increased by flight in a flight safety limits analysis because strategy, and it is expressly stated in the abort. However, if a vehicle intended for the decision to abort flight must be final rule for clarity. Consideration of orbit is outside the limits of a useful made in time to achieve the flight safety the FSS reliability in risk evaluations is mission and approaching populated limits objectives. This is not possible also consistent with current practice. uncontrolled areas, there is likely an unless the time delay between the The final rule allows an operator optimum location to abort the flight violation of a flight abort rule and the flexibility to establish the design, without increasing risk. For launches time when the FSS is expected to analysis, and testing of its FSS and the where the instantaneous impact point activate is known. The FAA finds that conditions that require initiation of (IIP) 103 approaches a landmass from the including this requirement in the flight flight abort as long as the CEC is no ocean, aborting flight before the safety limits constraints provides more greater than 1 × 10¥2 for any reasonably resulting debris would encroach on the clarity regarding the relation between foreseeable failure mode in any landmass and dense coastal shipping this requirement and the flight safety significant period of flight that could traffic would be compliant with limits. require the operator to initiate flight § 450.108(d)(6). Current practice for abort, accounting for the reliability of orbital launches from Federal launch Section 450.108(d)(5) the FSS pursuant to § 450.108(d)(5). sites is to allow the vehicle to continue Section 450.108(d)(5) requires an to orbit if it can achieve a minimum safe operator to determine flight safety limits Section 450.108(d)(6) orbit and is within the limits of a useful that account for individual, collective, Proposed § 450.123(b)(3) would have and conditional risk evaluations both added a requirement to design flight 103 Section 401.5 has a long-standing definition of for proper functioning of the FSS and safety limits to avoid flight abort under IIP: ‘‘instantaneous impact point means an impact point, following thrust termination of a launch failure of the FSS. To satisfy this conditions that result in increased vehicle, calculated in the absence of atmospheric requirement, an operator must account collective risk to people in uncontrolled drag effects.’’

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mission in the IIP projection. This The relocation of requirements in iv. End of Flight Abort practice is consistent with the proposed § 450.125 to § 450.108(c)(2) The FAA adds § 450.108(e) in the requirements in § 450.108. If an operator through (c)(4) and § 450.108(d)(7) final rule, which states that a flight does proposes to allow a vehicle outside the necessitated a revision to the language not need to be aborted to protect against IIP limits of a useful mission to overfly in § 450.108(d)(7). Section 450.108(d)(7) high consequence events in population to proceed to orbit, it must requires only that any trajectory within uncontrolled areas beginning demonstrate that this option presents the limits of a useful mission that is immediately after critical vehicle lower risk than aborting the flight before permitted to be flown without abort parameters are validated, if the vehicle the overflight begins. would meet the collective risk criteria of is able to achieve a useful mission and The FAA agrees that a discrepancy § 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1) when analyzed certain conditions are met for the existed in the NPRM in proposed as if it were the planned mission remainder of flight. Specifically, the § 450.123(d) but is uncertain if this is pursuant to § 450.213(b)(2). As stated in conditions which must be present are: the conflict to which Blue Origin the NPRM, the philosophy behind (1) Flight abort would not materially referred. The proposed § 450.123(d) proposed § 450.125(c)(2) was to allow a decrease the risk from a high referred to risk criteria in § 450.101, but non-normal flight to continue as long as consequence event, and (2) there are no mistakenly omitted the requirement to the mission does not pose an key flight safety events. Section prevent debris capable of causing a unacceptable conditional risk given the 450.108(e) relieves the operator from the casualty from impacting in uncontrolled present trajectory. The intent of requirement to use flight abort in certain areas if the vehicle is outside the limits § 450.108(d)(7) is similar but is stated in situations in which high consequence of a useful mission. The option to a different context than in the NPRM events are possible but would not be determine the need for flight abort in and also revised for clarity. In the final effectively mitigated by an FSS. This real time as described in proposed rule, the FAA removes the individual change responds to comments and § 450.123(d) does not appear in the final risk criterion from the requirement addresses a common occurrence during rule because it is just one means of because the intent of the requirement a period of planned overflight of an meeting the requirements for flight was not to potentially create flight uncontrolled area before orbital safety limits. However, this does not hazard areas along every azimuth within insertion. preclude an operator from determining the limits of a useful mission wherever Section 450.108(e) applies to a flight the need for flight abort entirely in real- × an individual risk contour exceeds 1 beginning immediately after critical time, as long as requirements in ¥6 10 . vehicle parameters are validated, if the § 450.108 are met. The FAA found that the phrase vehicle is able to achieve a useful Section 450.108(d)(7) ‘‘when analyzed as if it were the mission. As discussed in the section on As noted in the section on flight planned mission pursuant to flight safety limits objectives, ‘‘critical safety limits objectives, proposed § 450.213(b)(2)’’ was more precise than vehicle parameters’’ are those § 450.125(c)(1) stated that flight safety ‘‘when treated like a nominal trajectory parameters that demonstrate the vehicle limits would be required to be gated or with normal trajectory dispersions.’’ A is capable of completing safe flight relaxed where they intersect with a planned mission must be characterized through the upcoming phase of flight normal trajectory if that trajectory with uncertainties and assessed for risk where population is exposed to would meet the individual and from planned events and reasonably hazardous debris effects from collective risk criteria of proposed foreseeable failure modes; therefore, reasonably foreseeable failure modes. § 450.101(a)(1) and (a)(2) or (b)(1) and trajectories must be within the limits of Due to the wide variety of launch and (b)(2) when treated like a nominal a useful mission that are permitted to be reentry vehicles that could be licensed, trajectory with normal trajectory flown without abort, pursuant to there is a wide variety of vehicle dispersions. Proposed § 450.125(c)(2) § 450.108(d)(6). parameters that could be considered stated that flight safety limits may be Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop critical in this context. For example, gated or relaxed where they intersect Grumman, and ULA recommended recent state vector history data, as well with a trajectory within the limits of a replacing the terms ‘‘normal as vehicle health indicators such as useful mission if that trajectory would trajectories’’ and ‘‘limits of a useful motor chamber pressure, generally will meet the individual and collective risk mission trajectories’’ in proposed qualify as critical vehicle parameters. criteria of proposed § 450.101(a)(1) and § 450.123(c) and § 450.125(c) with Section 450.108(e) only applies when (a)(2) or (b)(1) and (b)(2) when treated ‘‘nominal trajectories.’’ The FAA finds the following conditions are met. The like a nominal trajectory with normal that such a change would restrict first condition is that flight abort would trajectory dispersions. severely the allowable flight corridor of not decrease the risk from a high In the final rule, § 450.108(d)(7) vehicles that could achieve a potentially consequence event materially as requires an operator to determine flight useful mission by requiring that a measured by CEC or other means safety limits that ensure that any vehicle be on a nominal trajectory to identified through ELOS. The FAA trajectory within the limits of a useful enter a period of materially increased expects that the requirement in mission that is permitted to be flown public exposure in uncontrolled areas. § 450.108(e)(1) can be met by without abort would meet the collective As such, §§ 450.108(c)(3) and implementation of the current practices risk criteria of § 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1) 450.108(d)(7) in the final rule allow at the 45th SW, specifically, performing when analyzed as if it were the planned vehicles within the limits of a useful a comparison of the CEC and EC in mission pursuant to § 450.213(b)(2).104 mission to enter a period of materially uncontrolled areas with and without increased public exposure in flight abort from each reasonably 104 As part of pre-flight planning, an operator uncontrolled areas, provided the foreseeable failure mode in any must submit to the FAA planned mission trajectory meets the collective risk significant period of flight during the information, including the vehicle, launch site, requirement. subject phase of flight. If flight abort planned flight path, staging and impact locations, each payload delivery point, intended reentry or would not reduce the CEC and EC landing sites including any contingency abort or reentry vehicle stage or component that is associated with each failure mode location, and the location of any disposed launch deorbited. materially, then this condition is met.

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A material decrease would exclude ’’overflight’’ phase of flight. SpaceX also operator would be required to abort a any best estimate of the mean value that recommended that the CEC requirement flight if a flight safety limit is violated is already two orders of magnitude or apply only to vehicle response modes or if some condition exists that could more below the criteria in § 450.101(a) that are mitigated by the FSS. lead to a violation, such as a and (b). As the best estimate approaches The FAA acknowledges that some compromised FSS or loss of data. the established limits in § 450.101(a) launches that overfly major landmasses In the final rule, the FAA revised and and (b) on the mean predicted values, a prior to orbital insertion produce CEC relocated the flight abort rules to material decrease would be smaller, levels in excess of the 1 × 10¥2 § 450.108 consistent with the objective including: (1) Any reduction that brings threshold and that flight abort will not of consolidating relevant flight abort the operation into compliance with mitigate the consequences associated requirements into a single section in the § 450.101(a) and (b) limits, (2) any half- with those failure modes. The FAA final rule. In § 450.108(f), an operator order of magnitude reduction in the best modifies the final rule to address such must establish and observe flight abort estimate of the mean value of EC, or (3) circumstances by adopting requirements rules that govern the conduct of launch a reduction by an amount at least as proposed in the NPRM, such as and reentry. large as the coefficient of variation due § 450.125(c). Specifically, § 450.108(e) Section 450.108(f)(1) requires that to uncertainty in the population identifies conditions that, if met, vehicle data required to evaluate flight distribution. Section 450.108(e)(1) uses demonstrate a high consequence event abort rules must be available to the FSS the phrase ‘‘risk from a high is sufficiently mitigated. These under all reasonably foreseeable consequence event’’ deliberately so that conditions are met generally by U.S. conditions during normal and other measures of collective risk and launches that overfly downrange malfunctioning flight. A similar consequences, not just CEC and EC, can landmasses prior to orbital insertion. requirement appeared in proposed be considered in evaluating compliance Thus, the final rule includes specific § 450.165(c)(2), which required vehicle with this requirement, absent a waiver. provisions designed to allow the current data necessary to evaluate flight abort The FAA will provide guidance on what practice where some launches proceed rules to be available to the FSS across constitutes material decrease. through a phase of flight, such as the the range of normal and malfunctioning The second condition in § 450.108(e) downrange overflight of a major flight. The FAA adds ‘‘under all requires that there are no key flight landmass just prior to orbital insertion, reasonably foreseeable conditions’’ to safety events for the remainder of flight. without additional protections against § 450.108(f)(1) to acknowledge that The FAA currently has a formal low probability, high consequence some conditions that prevent vehicle definition of the term ‘‘key flight-safety events. data from being available to evaluate event’’ in part 437 (Experimental The FAA finds that meeting the flight abort rules might be unforeseeable Permits). Section 437.3 states that key requirements in § 450.108(e) and therefore unpreventable through flight-safety event means a permitted demonstrates sufficient protection planning and design. flight activity that has an increased against the probability of high Section 450.108(f)(2) describes when probability of causing a launch accident consequence events, even though the the FSS must abort flight, similar to ¥3 compared with other portions of flight. CEC may exceed the 1 × 10 or 1 × proposed § 450.165(c)(3). Section In addition, § 437.59(a) states that, at a 10¥2 thresholds during the subject 450.108(f)(2)(i) requires that the FSS minimum, a key flight-safety event phase of flight. The use of collective risk must abort flight when valid, real-time includes: (1) Ignition of any primary to determine acceptability of downrange data indicate the vehicle has violated rocket engine, (2) any staging event, or overflight is consistent with current any flight safety limit developed (3) any envelope expansion. The current practice. pursuant to this section. In the final description of key flight safety events in Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX rule, the FAA revised the language from the permit regulation conveys what the commented that flight abort may proposed § 450.165(c)(3)(i) to add FAA may consider a key flight safety actually increase risk during overflight ‘‘developed pursuant to this section’’ event in the context of part 450. where vehicle hazards cannot be because the flight safety limits Section 401.7 of the final rule has contained. Even for vehicles that requirements now appear in the same added a definition of ‘‘key flight safety implement an FSS with a reliability of section as this flight abort rule. events’’ and states that a key flight 0.999 at 95 percent, it would still be As proposed in § 450.165(c)(3)(ii), the safety event means a flight activity that possible to fall into the highest risk bin flight abort rules would have required has an increased probability of causing and not improve a risk posture the FSS to abort flight when the vehicle a failure compared with other portions measured by CEC. state approaches conditions that are of flight. The term key flight safety event The FAA agrees with the commenters. anticipated to compromise the in the context of part 450 includes In the final rule in § 450.108(e), the FAA capability of the FSS and further flight events that could compromise any sets conditions that demonstrate that a has the potential to violate a flight safety safety-critical system, or otherwise high consequence event is sufficiently limit. increase the risk from high consequence mitigated, including if flight abort in Blue Origin commented that, while it events, such as events that subject a that phase of flight would not materially is possible to write flight abort rules to safety-critical system to environments at decrease the risk from a high account for specific cases, there was not or near the maximum predicted consequence event. currently a practical means of writing environment. general rules that would abort flight SpaceX commented that launches that vi. Flight Abort Rules when the vehicle state approaches overfly major landmasses (e.g., Europe, Proposed § 450.165(c) (Flight Commit conditions that could result in a Africa, or South America) prior to Criteria) contained the requirements for compromise of the FSS for every orbital insertion would violate the CEC flight abort rules. As explained in the circumstance proposed in requirement in proposed § 450.101(c) NPRM, an operator would identify the § 450.165(c)(3)(ii). It also commented during overflight. SpaceX urged the conditions under which an FSS, that the potential to violate a flight FAA to update the regulation to clarify including the functions of any flight safety limit is vague and outside the that an operator would not have to abort crew, must abort the flight to capability of current generation perform a CEC analysis for the ensure compliance with § 450.101. An autonomous FSS. Blue Origin

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recommended the rule be reworded as If the ability to reach a flight safety limit under which the FSS, including the ‘‘the flight safety system must abort via a particular failure mode is functions of any flight abort crew, must flight when the vehicle state approaches uncertain, the assumption should be abort the flight. These included identified conditions from the system made that it is possible during any proposed § 450.165(c)(1)(i), to ensure safety analysis that are anticipated to phase of flight where flight abort is used compliance with proposed § 450.101, compromise the capability of the flight as a hazard control strategy. This and proposed § 450.165(c)(1)(ii), to safety system and the flight safety approach is consistent with acceptable prevent debris capable of causing a system is required to contain the risk to methods of compliance with proposed casualty from impacting in uncontrolled an acceptable level (as analyzed in the § 450.165(c)(3)(ii). areas if the vehicle is outside the limits flight safety analysis).’’ Section 450.108(f)(2)(iii) requires that of a useful mission. The FAA finds this In the final rule, the revised the FSS must abort flight in accordance requirement to be unnecessary, as flight requirement in § 450.108(f)(2)(ii) adopts with methods used to satisfy safety limits requirements and flight Blue Origin’s recommendation to add § 450.108(d)(3) if tracking data is invalid abort rules requirements are clearly ‘‘identified’’ before ‘‘conditions that are and further flight has the potential to stated in § 450.108(c) through (f). In anticipated to compromise the violate a flight safety limit. This addition, in the final rule the FAA does capability of the flight safety system.’’ requirement is similar to proposed not adopt the proposed definition for The FAA finds this addition reasonable § 450.165(c)(3)(iii), which stated that the ‘‘flight abort crew’’ in § 401.7 because because it avoids requiring protections FSS must incorporate data loss flight the term is no longer used in the final against unknown conditions. As times to abort flight at the first possible rule. revised, § 450.108(f)(2)(ii) requires that violation of a flight safety limit, or Virgin Galactic commented that the FSS must abort flight when the earlier, if valid tracking data is proposed § 450.165(c)(ii) seems vehicle state approaches identified insufficient for evaluating a minimum unachievable for an operator with a conditions that are anticipated to set of flight abort rules required to nominal trajectory that meets EC compromise the capability of the FSS maintain compliance with proposed requirements but can result in debris and further flight has the potential to § 450.101. outside of the controlled area. Virgin violate a flight safety limit. This As noted in the discussion of flight Galactic recommended deleting the requirement is used in conjunction with abort constraints, the FAA has replaced requirement or excluding the the flight safety limits objective in proposed § 450.127, which contained requirement if EC was met. § 450.108(c)(5). requirements for a data loss flight time The FAA finds, based on the context The FAA declines to adopt Blue analysis, with the more performance- of the comment, that Virgin Galactic Origin’s recommendation to limit this based approach in § 450.108(d)(3). meant to refer to proposed requirement to the system safety Consistent with that change, the FAA § 450.165(c)(1)(ii). The FAA analysis because a system safety revises the language in proposed acknowledges that a mission that flies analysis is not the only means to § 450.165(c)(3)(iii) in final over uncontrolled areas on the nominal identify these conditions. For example, § 450.108(f)(2)(iii). Data loss flight times trajectory cannot always prevent debris an FSS survivability analysis or a link are not the only means of compliance impacts on the uncontrolled area, but analysis for a command destruct with the performance-based the requirement only applies to vehicles architecture may identify conditions requirement in § 450.108(d)(3) to outside the limits of a useful mission. A anticipated to compromise the account for the potential to lose valid nominal vehicle is on a useful mission; capability of the FSS. The FAA also data necessary to evaluate the flight therefore, this requirement would not does not adopt Blue Origin’s abort rules. The FAA also removes the apply to the scenario in Virgin recommendation to change requirement to abort flight at the first Galactic’s comment. In the final rule, § 450.165(c)(3)(ii) by replacing ‘‘and possible violation of a flight safety limit, the intent of proposed § 450.165(c)(1)(ii) further flight has the potential to violate or earlier, if valid tracking data is is covered in § 450.108(f)(2)(i). a flight safety limit’’ with ‘‘and the flight insufficient for evaluating a minimum The FAA removes the requirement safety system is required to contain the set of flight abort rules required to proposed in § 450.165(c)(3)(iv) that a risk to an acceptable level (as analyzed maintain compliance with proposed flight may continue past any gate in the flight safety analysis).’’ § 450.101. This statement was established under proposed § 450.125 The FAA finds an acceptable level of associated with implementation of data only if the parameters used to establish risk might be interpreted as only loss flight times, but the performance- the ability of the vehicle to complete a meeting collective and individual risk based requirement in § 450.108(d)(3) useful mission are within limits. The requirements, while flight safety limits will allow other methods of compliance replacement of proposed § 450.125 with must meet other requirements as that may not be consistent in all cases performance-based requirements in described in § 450.108 in the final rule. with the NPRM language in § 450.108(c) and (d) makes this The FAA recognizes that a real-time § 450.165(c)(3)(iii). The FAA will requirement unnecessary. determination of whether a particular provide guidance on compliance with SpinLaunch commented that the FAA failure may evolve to reach a flight §§ 450.108(d)(3) and 450.108(f)(2)(iii). should simplify the proposed flight safety limit is not possible. The operator The FAA also does not adopt the safety limits analysis (§ 450.123), gate must determine in pre-flight analyses proposed definition for ‘‘data loss flight analysis (§ 450.125), and time delay (system safety analysis, link analysis, time’’ in § 401.7 in the final rule. The analysis (§ 450.129) regulations by etc.) which failure modes can relation between §§ 450.108(d)(3) and stating that the safety analyses must compromise the capability of the FSS. 450.108(f)(2)(iii) in the final rule is address certain goals and relying on a The operator must then use FSA to substantively the same as that between training and evaluation structure to determine if those failure modes can proposed §§ 450.127 and assure applicants are knowledgeable potentially violate a flight safety limit. 450.165(c)(3)(iii). and capable of performing the analyses If it finds a failure mode that can The FAA removes proposed in a manner that sufficiently addresses potentially violate a flight safety limit, § 450.165(c)(1), which required that for those goals. The FAA revises the the operator must develop flight abort a vehicle that uses an FSS, the flight requirements in proposed §§ 450.123, rules that protect against those modes. abort rules must identify the conditions 450.125, and 450.129 to be more

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performance-based. However, the FAA than would have been possible under burden on the operator from the does not agree that training applicants the flight safety limits analysis and application requirement proposed in the to be capable of performing the subject traditional gate analysis proposed in the NPRM. analyses is sufficient to ensure NPRM. Accordingly, the application Microcosm requested clarification of compliance with the regulations. requirements associated with those proposed § 450.165(d)(2)(i) and (iii), sections have been combined in which would require that the applicant v. Application Requirements § 450.108(g)(2) in the final rule. This submit, for flight abort rules, a Section 450.108(g) contains approach improves organization and description of each rule, and the application requirements for flight increases flexibility with regard to how parameters that would be used to abort. Section 450.108(g)(1) requires an an operator demonstrates compliance evaluate each rule; and a description of applicant to submit a description of the with § 450.108. the vehicle data that would be available methods used to demonstrate Section 450.108(g)(3) requires an to evaluate flight abort rules across the compliance with § 450.108(c), including applicant to submit a graphic depiction range of normal and malfunctioning descriptions of how each analysis or series of depictions of flight safety flight. constraint in § 450.108(d) is satisfied in limits for a representative mission, The FAA provides the following accordance with § 450.115 (Flight Safety together with the launch or landing examples in response to Microcosm’s Analysis Methods). This rule is similar point, all uncontrolled area boundaries, comment. An example of a flight abort to proposed § 450.123(e)(1), which the nominal trajectory, extents of rule would be a line on the Earth’s required that an applicant submit in its normal flight, and limits of a useful surface that, when crossed by an IIP (the application a description of how each mission trajectories, with all trajectories parameter), would trigger flight abort. In flight safety limit would be computed, in the same projection as each of the this example, the vehicle data would be including references to the safety flight safety limits. This rule is similar position and velocity data necessary to criteria of proposed § 450.101.105 The to proposed § 450.123(e)(4), which compute the IIP, as provided by external intent of the requirement in the final required that an applicant submit a (such as ground-based) or onboard rule is similar to the proposal. However, graphic depiction or series of depictions sensors. The operator should consider the reference to § 450.101 is excluded in of representative flight safety limits, the the availability of this data during the final rule because not all flight launch or landing point, all normal and malfunctioning flight and safety limits objectives in § 450.108(c) uncontrolled area boundaries, and the effect on the operator’s ability to refer directly to § 450.101. vacuum IIP traces for the nominal evaluate the applicable flight abort Section 450.108(g)(2) requires that an trajectory, extents of normal flight, and rule—which in this example is that applicant must submit in its application limits of a useful mission trajectories. flight abort be initiated if the IIP crosses a description of how each flight safety The final rule clarifies that an the line on the Earth’s surface. limit and flight abort rule is evaluated applicant will need only to submit flight Another example would be an and implemented during vehicle flight, safety limits for a representative altitude versus downrange distance including the quantitative criteria that mission. Also, the FAA finds that the constraint. If the vehicle is outside of a will be used, a description of any requirement for depictions of vacuum range of altitudes as a function of the critical parameters, and how the values IIP trajectories would not be appropriate downrange distance, flight abort would required in § 450.108(c)(3) and for flight safety limits in different be triggered. The ranges of altitudes and 450.108(e) are identified. This provision projections (such as present position) downrange distances are the parameters is derived from three requirements in and revises the final rule to require all in this example. In this example, the the NPRM. First, proposed trajectories in the same projection as vehicle data would be position data, each of the flight safety limits. This § 450.123(e)(2) would have required an similarly reported by external or change will not result in an increased applicant to submit representative flight onboard sensors. burden compared to the NPRM because Other examples of parameters used in safety limits and associated parameters. the applicant would have to depict the flight abort rules could be chamber Second, proposed § 450.125(d)(2) would trajectories in either case; the final rule pressure, body rates, health and status have required an applicant to submit a simply states explicitly that the of critical systems, etc. In the final rule, description of the measure of trajectories must be depicted in the the requirements in proposed performance used to determine whether appropriate projection. § 450.165(d)(2)(i) and (d)(2)(iii) are a vehicle would be allowed to cross a Section 450.108(g)(4) requires an addressed by § 450.108(g)(2) and gate without flight abort, the acceptable applicant to submit a description of the § 450.108(g)(4), respectively. ranges of the measure of performance, vehicle data that will be available to and how these ranges were determined. evaluate flight abort rules under all i. Flight Hazard Analysis (§ 450.109) Third, proposed § 450.165(d)(2)(i) reasonably foreseeable conditions In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in would have required an applicant to during normal and malfunctioning § 450.109 that, unless an operator uses submit, for flight abort rules, a flight. This section is similar to physical containment, wind weighting, description of each rule and the proposed § 450.165(d)(2)(iii), which or flight abort as a hazard control parameters that would be used to required an applicant to submit a strategy, an operator would be required evaluate each rule. description of the vehicle data that to perform and document a flight hazard As discussed earlier, the FAA has would be available to evaluate flight analysis and continue to maintain it removed §§ 450.123 and 450.125 from abort rules across the range of normal throughout the lifecycle of the launch or the final rule and relocated the flight and malfunctioning flight. In the final reentry system. As explained in the abort rules from § 450.165 to reflect a rule, the FAA replaces ‘‘across the range NPRM, the use of a flight hazard more performance-based approach to of normal and malfunctioning flight’’ analysis to derive hazard controls would flight abort and allow greater flexibility with ‘‘under all reasonably foreseeable provide flexibility that does not conditions during normal and currently exist under the prescriptive 105 Section 450.115 addresses the scope and level of fidelity required for FSA methods. The level of malfunctioning flight’’ to be consistent requirements in part 417 and is broadly fidelity must demonstrate that any risk to the public with language elsewhere in the consistent with the practice in parts 431 satisfies the safety criteria of § 450.101. regulation. It results in no increased and 435.

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As proposed in § 450.109(a), the flight Blue Origin acknowledged the FAA’s Critical RLV guide. Virgin Galactic hazard analysis would need to identify, statutory authority to protect property noted that the wording differed slightly describe, and analyze all reasonably but noted that FAA regulations do not from one source to another and foreseeable hazards to public safety and define property nor the criteria for the recommended that the FAA harmonize safety of property resulting from the safety of property. Blue Origin also the various lists. The FAA notes this flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. expressed concern that the requirements comment is outside the scope of this Each flight hazard analysis would need in § 450.109 extended to critical assets rulemaking. to: (1) Identify all reasonably foreseeable and property located in controlled areas. Proposed § 450.109(a)(3) stated that a hazards, and the corresponding vehicle Blue Origin requested clarity on these flight hazard analysis must ensure that response mode for each hazard, issues. Virgin Galactic commented that the risk associated with each hazard associated with the launch or reentry the protection of property was a new would meet the following criteria: (1) system relevant to public safety and requirement and also expressed The likelihood of any hazardous safety of property; (2) assess each concerns about the criteria requiring an condition that may cause death or hazard’s likelihood and severity; (3) operator to mitigate the likelihood of serious injury to the public must be ensure that the risk associated with each any hazardous condition that can cause extremely remote; and (2) the likelihood hazard would meet certain defined a major property damage to ‘‘remote.’’ of any hazardous condition that may criteria; (4) identify and describe the In response, the FAA has not adopted cause major damage to public property risk elimination and mitigation the requirement to identify, describe, or critical assets must be remote. measures required to satisfy the criteria; and analyze all reasonably foreseeable In the final rule, the FAA revises this and (5) demonstrate that the risk hazards to property resulting from the requirement to remove the property elimination and mitigation measures flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. protection requirement in proposed would achieve the necessary risk levels Although property protection is codified § 450.109(a)(3)(ii), as discussed earlier. through validation and verification. in current licensing requirements for Section 450.109(b)(3) states that a flight In the final rule, the FAA revises reusable launch vehicles in § 431.35(c), hazard analysis must ensure that the § 450.109 by adding a new applicability launch and reentry operators have not likelihood of any hazardous condition paragraph (a) and by re-designating in the past been required to account for that may cause death or serious injury proposed § 450.109(a) through (e) as hazards to property due to flight. to the public is extremely remote. § 450.109(b) through (f).106 The FAA However, the FAA retains in the final Proposed § 450.109(a)(5) stated a adds an applicability paragraph in rule specific requirements for critical flight hazard analysis must demonstrate § 450.109(a) that applies to the use of a assets and property on orbit, which have that the risk elimination and mitigation flight hazard analysis as a hazard specific safety criteria in § 450.101 and measures would achieve the risk levels control strategy to derive hazard § 450.169, respectively. The FAA notes of proposed § 450.109(a)(3) through controls for the flight, or phase of flight, that the emergency response validation and verification. Verification of a launch or reentry vehicle. Hazards requirements in § 450.173(d), which includes analysis, test, demonstration, associated with computing systems and address fire hazards, may also mitigate or inspection. The FAA adopts and re- software are further addressed in hazards to property. The FAA may designates proposed § 450.109(a)(5) as § 450.141. This revised language reflects address other property and property § 450.109(b)(5) in the final rule, with that performing a flight hazard analysis hazards in a future rulemaking if launch one revision. In § 450.109(b)(5), the FAA is included as one of the hazard control and reentry flight operations dictate changes the term ‘‘demonstrate’’ in the strategies in § 450.107(c) of the final such a need. introductory paragraph to ‘‘document.’’ rule. Blue Origin also recommended Virgin Galactic noted that the NPRM Proposed § 450.109 included several proposed § 450.109(a) be revised to used the term ‘‘demonstrate’’ as both provisions that required the flight require that a flight hazard analysis part of the introductory paragraph in hazard analysis to address hazards to identify, describe, and analyze all proposed § 450.109(a)(5) and as a property. For instance, the FAA reasonably foreseeable hazards to public verification method in proposed proposed in the introductory language safety and safety of critical assets and § 450.109(a)(5)(iii). Virgin Galactic to § 450.109(a) that operators identify, safety of property resulting from the commented that demonstration is a describe, and analyze all reasonably flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. standard verification method, and use of foreseeable hazards to public safety and The FAA declines to adopt this the word in both places could drive safety of property. The FAA proposed in recommended language because, as confusion. Virgin Galactic § 450.109(a)(1) that an operator identify discussed in the preamble section recommended changing the term all reasonably foreseeable hazards, and dedicated to critical assets, the FAA will ‘‘demonstrate’’ in § 450.109(a)(5) to the corresponding vehicle response determine whether an asset is critical in ‘‘verify and validate’’ to clarify that mode for each hazard, associated with consultation with the entity responsible demonstration is not the only method of the launch or reentry system relevant to for the asset, and either the FAA or a completing validation and verification. public safety and safety of property. The Federal launch or reentry site will The FAA agrees that the proposed FAA also proposed in § 450.109(a)(3)(ii) determine whether the proposed language could cause confusion, and that the likelihood of any hazardous activity would expose critical assets to that demonstration is not the only condition that may cause major damage a risk of loss of functionality that method of completing validation and to public property or critical assets must exceeds the risk criterion in verification. The FAA changes be remote. § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4), and convey any ‘‘demonstrate’’ to ‘‘document’’ to avoid Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic necessary constraints to the operator. that confusion. The FAA does not adopt commented on the property protection Virgin Galactic commented on Virgin Galactic’s specific suggestion requirements in proposed § 450.109. proposed § 450.109(a)(1)(i) through because ‘‘verification’’ and ‘‘validation’’ (a)(1)(x) and noted the list of error are terms used later in the sentence, and 106 The FAA changes the term ‘‘vehicle response sources, or very similar, shows up in are defined in § 401.7. mode’’ in proposed § 450.109(a)(1) to ‘‘failure four other locations: (1) § 437.55, (2) AC Virgin Galactic commented on mode,’’ consistent with similar changes throughout the final rule as discussed in the conditional 431.35–2A, (3) FAA Flight Safety proposed § 450.109(c) and expected casualty section of the preamble. Handbook, and (4) the AIAA Safety recommended that there be an exclusion

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for vehicles that follow the same SpinLaunch recommended that an As noted earlier in the discussion of standard trajectory each flight. applicant just demonstrate knowledge § 450.107, Blue Origin commented that The FAA disagrees with Virgin and skills to perform safe and accepted the FAA amend proposed Galactic’s recommendation. Even if an operations. § 450.107(e)(2)(ii), which proposed to operator follows a stable trajectory, Operators have a responsibility to require an applicant to describe the vehicle design changes or other ensure that public safety analyses are methods used to ensure that flight operational changes may introduce new consistent with their proposed hazard areas are cleared of the public hazards. An operator must confirm that operations and that all hazards are and critical assets, and to require that an the flight hazard analysis is valid for mitigated to an acceptable level. This applicant describe the methods used to each mission in order to ensure that all practice is consistent with system safety ensure that risk to the public and hazards are identified and mitigated to practices and current commercial space critical assets in flight hazard areas meet an acceptable level. That said, the FAA regulations. The framework allowable criteria. Blue Origin pointed expects that operators with stable recommended by SpinLaunch would out that critical assets cannot be cleared vehicle designs and operations will not achieve these public safety from a flight hazard area. In addition, typically not have major updates to their outcomes because it is too broad and Blue Origin stated that the proposed flight hazard analyses. lacks performance metrics. definition of ‘‘flight hazard area’’ in The FAA re-designates proposed In the final rule, the FAA re- § 401.5 already captured that the area § 450.109(d) as § 450.109(e) in the final designates proposed § 450.109(e) as would be controlled to risk limits and rule, and removes the term § 450.109(f), (Application requirements). that can be achieved through methods ‘‘operational’’ to reflect that an operator Except for number re-designations, the other than clearing the area. must continually update the flight FAA adopts the requirements as The FAA disagrees with Blue Origin hazard analysis throughout the lifecycle proposed. that proposed § 450.107(e)(2)(ii), now of the launch or reentry system, rather j. Physical Containment (§ 450.110) § 450.110(c)(2), should be amended to than just address operational changes. require an applicant to describe the As discussed in the preamble discussion As discussed earlier, unlike other methods used to ensure that risk to the on the system safety program hazard control strategies, the FAA did public and critical assets in flight (§ 450.103), design and operational not propose a separate section for the hazard areas meet allowable criteria, as changes to a system can have an impact physical containment hazard control opposed to ensuring that the area is on public safety. strategy in the NPRM. Rather, proposed cleared of the public and critical assets. Virgin Galactic commented that the § 450.107(b) simply contained the Although Blue Origin is correct in term ‘‘continually’’ in § 450.109(d) is requirements for physical containment noting that the definition of ‘‘flight not defined and is vague. In addition, as a hazard control strategy. The FAA hazard area’’ is not limited to clearing Virgin Galactic noted that the proposed that, to use physical the area,107 the physical containment requirement appears to duplicate the containment as a hazard control hazard control strategy is designed to be current continuing accuracy strategy, an operator would be required a simple method of protecting public requirements in part 413 and the to ensure that the launch vehicle does safety by launching within an area that proposed continuing accuracy not have sufficient energy for any is cleared of the public and critical requirements in proposed § 450.211. hazards associated with its flight to assets, and within an area that contains Virgin Galactic recommends this reach outside the flight hazard area hazards based on the potential energy of requirement be removed. developed in accordance with proposed the vehicle. The FAA modifies what The FAA notes that, for the purposes § 450.133 (Flight Hazard Area Analysis), was proposed in § 450.107(b)(1) and of the flight hazard analysis, and would be required to apply other (b)(2), now § 450.110(b)(1) and (b)(2), ‘‘continually’’ means that the operator mitigation measures to ensure no public from what was proposed in the NPRM, must update the flight hazard analysis exposure to hazards as agreed to by the to clarify that the hazard area must be as aspects of the mission change or as Administrator on a case-by-case basis. clear of the public and critical assets. new information is learned about an In addition, proposed § 450.107(e) The FAA also modifies the definition operation, if potential impacts to the included specific application of ‘‘flight hazard area’’ in § 401.7 to analysis are identified. Although requirements for an operator using change the language from ‘‘in order to somewhat redundant with the physical containment as a hazard protect public health and safety and the requirement in § 450.211 for a licensee control strategy; namely, that it must (1) safety of property’’ to ‘‘in order to to maintain the continuing accuracy of demonstrate that the launch vehicle ensure compliance with the safety representations in its application, does not have sufficient energy for any criteria in § 450.101.’’ The FAA makes proposed § 450.109(d) (re-designated hazards associated with its flight to this change to tie flight hazard areas to § 450.109(e) in the final rule) provides reach outside the flight hazard area the safety criteria in § 450.101. the specific expectation that the flight developed in accordance with k. Wind Weighting (§ 450.111) hazard analysis must be complete and § 450.133, and (2) describe the methods all hazards must be mitigated to an used to ensure that flight hazard areas In the NPRM, the FAA proposed wind acceptable level for every launch or are cleared of the public and critical weighting requirements in § 450.141. As reentry. assets. discussed earlier, the wind weighting SpinLaunch commented that the In the final rule, the FAA places the requirements have been moved to requirements in proposed § 450.109(c) requirements for the physical § 450.111 in order to group all hazard and (d) were an onerous burden, and containment hazard control strategy in a control strategies together. Although the that to achieve a regulatory framework separate section, § 450.110. With one FAA did not receive any comments on that can effectively and efficiently exception, the proposed requirements this hazard control strategy, the FAA oversee multi-site, multi-vehicle are unchanged in the final rule. The one operations, a shift away from the exception, as discussed next in response 107 The proposed definition of ‘‘flight hazard area’’ in the NPRM was ‘‘any region of land, sea, traditional regulatory verification of to a comment, is that the FAA clarifies or air that must be surveyed, publicized, controlled, each component to a more practical that the hazard area must be clear of the or evacuated in order to protect public health and method would be necessary. public and critical assets. safety and the safety of property.’’

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has made a few changes in the final requirement was redundant with through all component impacts or rule. § 450.45(e)(7)(ii). landings. Section 450.115 specifies that In the applicability section, the FAA the operator’s analysis methods must l. Flight Safety Analysis (§§ 450.113 to specifies that an operator may use wind account for all reasonably foreseeable 450.139) weighting as a hazard control strategy to events and failures of safety-critical meet the safety criteria of § 450.101 to Regardless of the hazard control systems during nominal and non- § 450.101(a), (b), and (c), which address strategy chosen or mandated, the FAA nominal launch or reentry that could launch risk criteria, reentry risk criteria, anticipates that an operator will be jeopardize public health and safety, and and high consequence event protection. required to conduct an FSA for at least the safety of property. Section 450.115 The FAA makes this change because the some phases of flight. For example, an also specifies that the operator’s criteria in § 450.101(d), (e), (f), and (g)— FSA must determine flight hazard areas methods must have a level of fidelity addressing disposal safety criteria, the for any vehicle with planned debris sufficient (1) to demonstrate compliance protection of people and property on impacts capable of causing a casualty. with the safety criteria of § 450.101, orbit, the notification of planned Also, an FSA must quantitatively accounting for all known sources of impacts, and the validity of analyses, demonstrate that a launch or reentry uncertainty, using means of compliance respectively—are not relevant to wind meets the safety criteria for debris, far- accepted by the Administrator; and (2) weighting. Therefore, an operator does field overpressure, and toxic hazards. to identify the dominant source of each not need to demonstrate that wind An operator may be required to conduct type of public risk with a criterion in weighting satisfies these requirements. additional analyses to use flight abort or § 450.101(a) or (b) in terms of phase of In the NPRM, proposed § 450.141(b) wind weighting hazard control flight, source of hazard (such as toxic would require that for the flight of an strategies. exposure, inert, or explosive debris), unguided suborbital launch vehicle that Generally, an FSA consists of a set of and failure mode. An operator must uses a wind weighting safety system, the quantitative analyses used to determine comply with these foundational sections launcher azimuth and elevation settings flight commit criteria, flight abort rules, when performing any of the separate must be wind weighted to correct for the flight hazard areas, and other mitigation analyses that together comprise the effects of wind conditions at the time of measures and to demonstrate FSA. flight to provide a safe impact location. compliance with the safety criteria in Sections 450.117 and 450.119 specify The FAA has replaced ‘‘to provide a safe § 450.101. In the NPRM, the FAA the constraints and objectives of impact location’’ with ‘‘to provide proposed 15 sections associated with analyses sufficient to characterize the impact locations that will ensure FSA requirements in §§ 450.113 through trajectory of the vehicle during normal compliance with the safety criteria in 450.141. The final rule moves and malfunction flight. Section 450.121 § 450.101.’’ This change removes any requirements associated with flight specifies the constraints and objectives ambiguity as to the meaning of ‘‘safe safety limits to § 450.108, such that 11 of an analysis sufficient to quantify the impact location.’’ interrelated sections remain component physical, aerodynamic, and harmful Also in the NPRM, proposed parts of an FSA. characteristics of hazardous debris, § 450.141(b) would require that for the There are 11 performance-based including impact probability flight of an unguided suborbital launch sections with FSA requirements that fall distributions generated from normal and vehicle that uses a wind weighting into three groups. The first group, malfunction flight. Section 450.123 safety system, an operator must use §§ 450.113 and 450.115, provides specifies requirements to characterize launcher azimuth and elevation angle requirements on the scope and fidelity the population exposed to a significant settings that ensures the rocket will not of the analyses required by the probability of impact by hazardous fly in an unintended direction given remaining nine sections. The second debris, including the vulnerability of wind uncertainties. The FAA has group, which consists of five sections people in various structure types. replaced ‘‘given wind uncertainties’’ from § 450.117 through § 450.131, Section 450.131 specifies requirements with ‘‘accounting for uncertainties in specifies the requirements for analyses for statistically valid estimates of the vehicle and launcher design and necessary to develop quantitative input probability of reasonably foreseeable manufacturing, and atmospheric data used by the last four sections. The failures based on the outcomes of uncertainties.’’ This change last group consists of four sections that previous flights. Depending on the type acknowledges that the uncertainties that specify quantitative risk analyses with of operation or the hazard control affect an unguided suborbital launch products necessary to evaluate strategy used, an operator may be vehicle’s ability to fly in an unintended compliance with the safety criteria in required to perform some or all of these direction are broader than just wind § 450.101. All of the FSA sections must analyses in developing its FSA. uncertainties—they include use methods that comply with Finally, §§ 450.133, 450.135, 450.137, uncertainties in vehicle and launcher § 450.101(g) because they are essential and 450.139 specify the requirements design and manufacturing, and other to demonstrating compliance with the for quantitative risk analyses to atmospheric uncertainties. The FAA safety criteria in § 450.101. demonstrate that the risks to the public makes two grammatical changes to the To aid in holistically understanding from debris, far-field overpressure, and application requirements, which in the the substance of, and relationships toxic hazards are consistent with the final rule are in § 450.111(e). First, in between, the FSA sections, the safety criteria in § 450.101. Generally, § 450.111(e)(2), the FAA replaces ‘‘and following provides a brief overview, the analyses conducted under identify’’ with ‘‘including.’’ In before a more detailed discussion of §§ 450.117 through 450.131 are used to § 450.111(e)(3), the FAA removes the each FSA section. Section 450.113 inform the analyses for these final word ‘‘provide.’’ specifies the overall scope of the portions of the FSA. Flight commit Lastly, similar to other sections in this subsequent analyses in terms of the criteria, flight hazard areas, flight abort rule, the FAA removes the proposed period of flight for which the public rules, and other mitigation measures are requirement for an applicant to provide risks must be quantified. For example, typically derived as necessary to additional products that allow an for an orbital launch, an FSA must demonstrate compliance with the safety independent analysis as requested by account for all phases of flight from criteria in § 450.101, and thus are the Administrator because the liftoff through orbital insertion and typical byproducts of the risk analyses

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performed to satisfy the requirements in data in lieu of the traditional risk comments on this proposal unique to §§ 450.133, 450.135, 450.137, and analysis. this section. 450.139. The requirements for each of In the final rule, the FAA modifies In the final rule, the FAA adopts the FSA sections are described in more § 450.113(a)(1), which addresses orbital § 450.115 as proposed with one change. detail in the following sections. launches, to clarify that an FSA covers The term ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ is from liftoff through orbital insertion and changed to ‘‘failure mode’’ to be m. Flight Safety Analysis consistent with the changes to this term Requirements—Scope (§ 450.113) through ‘‘all component impacts or landings’’ instead of proposed ‘‘any made elsewhere in the final rule. In the NPRM, proposed § 450.113 component or stage landings or final Consistent with the NPRM, stated the scope and applicability of impacts.’’ Likewise, for the scope of an § 450.115(c)(4) requires that an FSA FSA requirements. Proposed FSA for suborbital launches, the FAA methodology must identify the evidence § 450.113(a), which covered scope, changes § 450.113(a)(2) to ‘‘through all for validation and verification required stated an operator would be required to component impacts or landings’’ instead by § 450.101(g), which addresses the perform and document an FSA: (1) For of proposed ‘‘through final impact.’’ required accuracy and validity of data orbital launch, from liftoff through These changes reflect the reality that and scientific principles. For example, orbital insertion, and any component or orbital and suborbital launch vehicles the ‘‘accounting for all known sources of stage landings; (2) for suborbital launch, often have multiple components that uncertainty’’ requirement specified in from liftoff through final impact; (3) for can either impact the Earth or land § 450.115(b)(1) must produce results disposal, from the beginning of the intact. An FSA should address all such consistent with or more conservative deorbit burn through final impact; (4) impacts or landings. than the results available from previous for reentry, from the beginning of the The FAA modifies § 450.113(a)(4) for mishaps, tests, or other valid deorbit burn through landing; and (5) a similar reason. For the scope of a benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity for hybrid vehicles, for all phases of reentry analysis, the FAA changes methods. flight, unless the Administrator § 450.113(a)(4) to include ‘‘through all o. Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight determines otherwise based on component impacts or landings’’ instead (§ 450.117) demonstrated reliability. Proposed of proposed ‘‘through landing.’’ This In the NPRM, proposed § 450.117 § 450.113(b), which covered change reflects the reality that reentry (Trajectory Analysis for Normal Flight) applicability, identified what sections vehicles often have multiple set requirements for an FSA for normal needed to be included in an FSA components that can either impact the trajectories. The proposed provision was depending on the type of operation or Earth or land intact. meant to distinguish between variability hazard control strategy being used. The FAA modifies § 450.113(a)(3) and in the intended trajectory and In the final rule, the FAA has (4) by replacing the term ‘‘the beginning uncertainties due to random sources of removed the proposed applicability of the deorbit burn’’ with ‘‘the initiation dispersion such as winds and vehicle provision and adopted the scope of the deorbit.’’ The FAA notes not all performance. The FAA explained that provisions with some changes and deorbit operations will include a all FSAs depend on some form of reorganization. The FAA revised ‘‘burn.’’ The FAA notes that, for a analysis of the trajectory under normal § 450.113(a) to state that an operator disposal, an operator could discontinue conditions, otherwise known as a must perform and document an FSA for the analysis prior to final impact and normal trajectory. That is, a vehicle’s all phases of flight, except as specified demonstrate an equivalent level of trajectory when it performs as intended in § 450.113(b). The FAA also revised safety by presenting evidence of and under normal conditions must be § 450.113 to add in paragraph (b) an complete demise due to aerothermal understood to determine the effects of operator is not required to perform and heating. The scope of the FSA is malfunctions along its flight path. document an FSA for a phase of flight consistent with the risk criteria in Proposed § 450.117(a)(1) required an if agreed to by the Administrator based § 450.101 and the long-standing FSA to include a trajectory analysis that on demonstrated reliability. An operator definition of ‘‘reentry’’ in § 401.7. The established, for any phase of flight demonstrates reliability by using FAA clarifies here that, for the purposes within the scope of proposed operational and flight history to show of the FSA and risk criteria, the § 450.113(a), the limits of a launch or compliance with the risk criteria in initiation of the deorbit for a reentry or reentry vehicle’s normal flight as § 450.101(a) and (b). Operational history disposal from orbit generally coincides defined by the nominal trajectory, and includes the flight time and/or cycles of with the final health check prior to the sets of trajectories sufficient to an aircraft, which may have an final command to commit the vehicle to characterize variability and uncertainty airworthiness certificate, operating a perigee below 70 nautical miles. during normal flight. First, proposed under part 91, part 135 or part 121 as The final rule removes the language § 450.117(a)(1)(i) required a set of an example. Flight history could be proposed in § 450.113(b) covering trajectories to characterize vulnerability. represented by flight time accumulated applicability, because the reorganization This set would be required to describe through a period of developmental and of the flight abort related sections means how the intended trajectory could vary flight tests of a vehicle that does not that all FSA sections are applicable, due to the conditions known prior to have an airworthiness certificate. unless otherwise agreed to by the initiation of flight. Second, proposed Although the demonstrated reliability Administrator based on demonstrated § 450.117(a)(1)(ii) required a set of language was limited to hybrid vehicles reliability. Instead, § 450.113(b) in the trajectories to characterize uncertainty. in the proposed rule, the FAA is final rule addresses how an operator This set would be required to describe providing additional flexibility by demonstrates reliability, as discussed. how the actual trajectory could differ expanding it to all vehicles. Some from the intended trajectory due to n. Flight Safety Analysis Methods vehicles other than hybrids could random uncertainties. The FAA also (§ 450.115) conceivably have an extensive and safe proposed to require an FSA to include enough flight history to demonstrate In the NPRM, proposed § 450.115 a trajectory analysis establishing a fuel compliance with the risk criteria in outlined the methods for conducting exhaustion trajectory in proposed § 450.101(a) and (b) based on empirical FSA. The FAA did not receive § 450.117(a)(2) and, for vehicles with an

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FSS, trajectory data or parameters that significant influence on the vehicle’s requirements of § 450.117(a). The FAA describe the limits of a useful mission behavior through normal flight’’ in did not receive comments on this in proposed § 450.117(a)(3). § 450.117(a)(2). Generally, the FAA proposal. In the final rule, the FAA adopts considers ‘‘a significant influence’’ to Proposed § 450.117(c) would have proposed § 450.117 with revisions. The include any parametric uncertainties required a trajectory analysis to account FAA makes clarifying changes for a within three-sigma that affect the for all wind effects including profiles of number of requirements regarding crossrange IIP location or downrange IIP winds that are not less severe than the trajectory analysis; removes and rate by at least one percent because the worst wind conditions under which relocates the fuel exhaustion trajectory IIP location and rate is often a flight might be attempted and for requirement to § 450.119; and removes convenient surrogate for the potential uncertainty of the wind conditions. In and relocates references to ‘‘limits of a impact locations of hazardous debris. the final rule, the FAA revises the useful mission’’ to § 450.119. The FAA One percent is a typical threshold value requirement to state that a trajectory also makes changes to remove used in RCC 321–20 Standard and analysis must account for ‘‘atmospheric prescriptiveness in favor of more Supplement. Thus, the final rule does conditions that have an effect on the performance-based language. not intend for applicants to characterize trajectory’’ rather than ‘‘all wind Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop the influence of all random effects.’’ The FAA notes that the Grumman, Sierra Nevada, and ULA uncertainties or variability, but only revision captures the intent of (1) the recommended changing the term those with a significant influence on the proposed requirement to account ‘‘normal’’ flight to ‘‘nominal’’ flight in potential impact locations for hazardous specifically for wind effects under all numerous parts of proposed § 450.117. debris. foreseeable conditions within the flight The FAA does not agree with this The FAA removes the NPRM commit criteria and consistent with the recommendation because both of these requirements for a fuel exhaustion flight abort rules, and (2) the proposed terms are defined by the FAA and are trajectory in proposed § 450.117(a)(2) requirement in § 450.117(a) to establish distinct. Section 401.7 defines and its associated application sets of trajectories sufficient to ‘‘nominal’’ to mean, in reference to requirement in proposed characterize variability and uncertainty launch vehicle performance, trajectory, § 450.117(d)(3)(ii). The requirements for during normal flight. or stage impact point, a launch vehicle this analysis are more appropriately The FAA recognizes that wind is the flight for which all vehicle aerodynamic located in the malfunction flight section primary atmospheric consideration for parameters are as expected, all vehicle because a fuel exhaustion trajectory is a most vehicles, but, for some (non- internal and external systems perform as malfunction trajectory that results when traditional) vehicles, other atmospheric planned, and there are no external thrust termination does not occur as parameters such as density, humidity, perturbing influences other than planned. A fuel exhaustion trajectory is or temperature may affect trajectory and atmospheric drag and gravity. Section not always required; however, such an be part of the flight commit criteria. 401.7 defines ‘‘normal flight’’ to mean analysis could be necessary for certain Although these other conditions would the flight of a properly performing operations. For example, a fuel have necessarily been accounted for in vehicle whose real-time vacuum IIP exhaustion trajectory will be necessary the trajectory analysis for normal flight does not deviate from the nominal under the final rule § 450.119(a)(2) for a as ‘‘uncertainties’’ in the introductory vacuum instantaneous impact point by return to launch site scenario. As a language to § 450.117(a), the final rule more than the sum of the wind effects result of this removal, the FAA expressly refers to all atmospheric and the three-sigma guidance and combines proposed § 450.117 paragraph conditions in § 450.117(c). The FAA performance deviations in the uprange, (a) with paragraph (a)(1) as a new also notes that flight in the context of downrange, left-crossrange, or right- paragraph (a), and re-designates this section refers to the period of crossrange directions. Thus, in simple proposed § 450.117(a)(1)(i) and (a)(1)(ii) launch or reentry within the scope of terms, a nominal trajectory is a single as § 450.117(a)(1) and (a)(2), § 450.113. trajectory that the vehicle would fly in respectively. Boeing commented that it is the absence of wind effects and The NPRM referenced the limits of a impossible to account for all wind guidance and performance variability. useful mission in proposed effects, as wind models were local and Section 401.7 defines ‘‘normal § 450.117(a)(3). In the final rule, the limited in altitude. Boeing trajectory’’ to mean ‘‘a trajectory that FAA moves all references to the limits recommended incorporating an altitude describes normal flight.’’ The FAA of a useful mission from § 450.117, limit of 60,000 feet, and modifying the retains the definitions of these terms. It including proposed § 450.117(a)(3), to requirement to state, ‘‘a trajectory is virtually impossible for flights to be § 450.119 (Trajectory Analysis for analysis must account for launch and, if nominal such that all aerodynamic Malfunction Flight). The FAA finds that different, reentry site wind effects, as parameters and systems are as expected the requirements associated with the applicable, including profiles of winds without the influence of any limits of a useful mission belong in the that are no less severe than the worst uncertainties. To replace ‘‘normal’’ with malfunction flight section because wind conditions under which flight ‘‘nominal’’ would substantively change limits of a useful mission can exceed the might be attempted, and for uncertainty the meaning of the rule, as uncertainty bounds of normal flight. in the wind conditions.’’ does not apply to a nominal trajectory. The FAA received several comments The FAA notes that the proposed Requiring normal flight trajectories is a on the proposed use of the term ‘‘limits requirement concerning wind effects, more permissive range of trajectories of a useful mission.’’ A summary of the revised to ‘‘atmospheric effects’’ in the than nominal flight and allows the rule comments and FAA’s responses can be final rule, specifies profiles under to be performance based within safe found in the preamble section on which flight may be attempted based on parameters. The FAA retains the use of Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction the launch commit criteria and flight the terms as proposed. Flight. abort rules. The NPRM and the final In the final rule, the FAA narrows the The FAA adopts § 450.117(b) as rule set performance level requirements scope of the set of trajectories to proposed. A final trajectory analysis that avoid placing an arbitrary altitude characterize uncertainty due to random must use a six-degree of freedom limit that may not encompass all the uncertainties ‘‘in all parameters with a trajectory model to satisfy the conditions that may have an effect on a

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normal trajectory. Accordingly, the final characterize the vehicle’s flight behavior significant parameter rule requires a trajectory analysis to throughout normal flight. (§ 450.117(d)(2)(iv)). account not for all wind effects, but The FAA proposed application Commenters asserted these proposed instead for atmospheric conditions that requirements for trajectory analysis for requirements were too prescriptive, and have an effect on the trajectory, normal flight in § 450.117(d). In the the FAA agrees. The FAA revises including any uncertainty. Accounting final rule, the FAA adopts proposed § 450.117(d)(2) to require an applicant for atmospheric effects on the trajectory § 450.117(d) with revisions. to submit the quantitative input data, will be addressed in guidance. Specifically, the FAA removes the including uncertainties, used to model Blue Origin stated the requirements in proposed requirement to describe the the vehicle’s normal flight in six degrees proposed § 450.117(b) through (d)(2) methodology used to determine the of freedom. This revision in the final amount to translating complex vehicle limits of a useful mission in rule captures the parameters of the trajectory models into verbiage for § 450.117(d)(1). Instead, an equivalent proposed requirements in delivery to FAA for licensing. Blue requirement appears in § 450.119(c)(2) § 450.117(d)(2)(ii) through (d)(2)(iv), Origin proposed revising the language to of the final rule. The FAA also removes while allowing for more flexibility in specify vehicle state vector parameters the items proposed in § 450.117(d)(1)(i) the application of the regulatory in terms of position, attitude, velocity, through (d)(1)(iv) because they were requirements. Quantitative input data thrust, and mass. In terms of a statistical redundant with the performance-based used to model the vehicle’s normal distribution of each parameter, Blue requirements that apply to all FSA in flight in six degrees of freedom includes Origin recommends providing a accordance with § 450.115(c).110 The comprehensive sets of aerodynamic and covariance matrix describing vehicle FAA removes the prescriptive mass properties. Explanation and details guidance and performance uncertainty requirements in § 450.117(d)(2)(ii) on how to comply with these as meeting the intent of the requirement. through (d)(2)(iv) proposed in the requirements will be included in The FAA notes Blue Origin’s NPRM because these requirements are Advisory Circular 450.117–1, recommendation to specify the vehicle’s ‘‘Trajectory Analysis.’’ captured with the final rule requirement position and velocity during normal The FAA retains the requirement in § 450.117(d)(2), as explained later in flight using covariance matrices would proposed in § 450.117(d)(2)(i) and re- this preamble section. In addition, the satisfy the requirement in designates it as § 450.117(d)(3) in the § 450.117(a)(2) because that approach FAA re-designates proposed final rule. In addition, the FAA changes was identified in Appendix A to part § 450.117(d)(2)(i) as (d)(3), and the term ‘‘wind effects’’ to ‘‘atmospheric 417 under A417.7(g)(7)(xiii). The 450.117(d)(3) as (d)(4) with a minor effects’’ to be consistent with approach in Appendix A to part 417 revision. The FAA removed proposed § 450.117(c) of the final rule. under A417.7(g)(7)(xiii) meets the § 450.117(d)(4), which required an The FAA revises proposed requirement in § 450.117(a)(2) because a applicant to submit additional products § 450.117(d)(3) as discussed in this set of covariance matrices for the that allow an independent analysis, as paragraph and re-designates it as vehicle position coordinates and requested by the Administrator, because § 450.117(d)(4) in the final rule. The velocity component magnitudes are an the requirement was redundant with proposal required an applicant to acceptable means to describe how the § 450.45(e)(7)(ii). submit representative normal flight actual trajectory could differ from the In the NPRM, proposed trajectory analysis outputs, including intended trajectory due to random § 450.117(d)(2) required an applicant to the position, velocity, and vacuum IIP, uncertainties in all parameters with a submit a description of the input data for each second of flight. Blue Origin significant influence on the vehicle’s used to characterize the vehicle’s flight commented that this requirement behavior throughout normal flight. behavior throughout normal flight and created an unnecessary burden to However, the FAA recognizes that other limits of a useful mission. The proposal calculate vacuum IIP for potentially approaches, including a sufficiently would have required a description of hundreds or thousands of normal and large 108 set of Monte Carlo sample the wind input data, including malfunction vehicle trajectories. Blue trajectories,109 may also satisfy the uncertainties (§ 450.117(d)(2)(ii)); a Origin stated that vacuum IIP was not requirement. The FAA does not intend description of the parameters with a representative of where vehicle hazards to prescribe a specific method to significant influence on the vehicle’s may impact the Earth and believed this characterize normal flight. Therefore, behavior throughout normal flight, requirement should only apply to the the FAA declines Blue Origin’s including a quantitative description of nominal trajectory. recommendation to revise the the nominal value for each significant The FAA disagrees that the IIP requirement to specify vehicle state parameter throughout normal flight application requirement would have vector and covariance parameters. (§ 450.117(d)(2)(iii)); and a description created an unnecessary burden; Instead, the final rule implements of the random uncertainties with a however, the final rule removes the performance-based trajectory analysis significant influence on the vehicle’s application requirement because requirements as proposed, such that an behavior throughout normal flight, vacuum IIP can be readily computed if applicant must submit a description of including a quantitative description of necessary from the position and velocity the methods and input data used to the statistical distribution for each vectors, which are a part of the application materials. In the final rule, 108 The FAA will determine what constitutes a 110 Section 450.115(c) requires an applicant to § 450.117(d)(4) specifies that the sufficiently large set of Monte Carlo trajectories submit a description of the FSA methodology, representative normal flight trajectory pursuant to the level fidelity of analysis including identification of: (1) The scientific analysis outputs include orientation of requirements in § 450.115(b). principles and statistical methods used; (2) all 109 Monte Carlo methods include computational assumptions and their justifications; (3) the the vehicle in addition to the position algorithms that, for example, repeatedly sample rationale for the level of fidelity; (4) the evidence and velocity data specified in the from probability distributions that characterize for validation and verification required by proposal. The FAA notes that input parameters (such as the weight, thrust, and § 450.101(g); (5) the extent that the benchmark orientation is inherent in any six-degree drag of a vehicle) and perform physics-based (such conditions are comparable to the foreseeable as Newton’s laws) simulations to obtain numerical conditions of the intended operations; and (6) the of freedom trajectory model, as required results (such as a set of trajectories that characterize extent that risk mitigations were accounted for in by both the proposed and final flight under normal or malfunction conditions). the analyses. § 450.117(b). Orientation is important to

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public safety when the induced establish the vehicle’s capability to and when flight abort was necessary, velocities have a preferred direction. depart from normal flight would have and to establish the width of a gate. The FAA also removes the required the analysis to account for the Microcosm requested that the FAA requirement proposed in IIP in modeling of a malfunction define ‘‘a useful mission.’’ Boeing, § 450.117(d)(3)(ii) that applies to fuel trajectory because normal flight is Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, exhaustion trajectory under otherwise defined in terms of IIP. Thus, the and ULA recommended changing the nominal conditions, because a fuel proposed requirement in § 450.119(a)(1) definition of ‘‘limits of a useful exhaustion trajectory is merely one would have foreclosed a valid medium- mission’’ to mean the trajectory or other specific type of malfunction trajectory fidelity FSA approach. In the final rule, parameters that bound performance of a and is not necessarily required for all § 450.119(a)(1) and § 450.119(a)(2) mission that can attain its primary applicants. For example, a fuel provide flexibility and permit at least objective. Blue Origin disagreed with exhaustion trajectory would be one approach that allows a simpler the addition of ‘‘limits of a useful necessary under the final rule for a computation of risk but still preserves mission’’ to the regulation and stated return to launch site scenario but not for safety. Not all operations are eligible for that regulating what is considered a a typical unguided suborbital rocket. this corridor method, but it is valid useful mission was outside of the FAA’s The requirement in § 450.119(a)(2) of when the vehicle debris risks are due to jurisdiction. the final rule is used to determine flight phases where the IIP is moving In the final rule, the FAA adopts a whether an applicant must include a steadily downrange, and when the new definition of a ‘‘useful mission’’ in fuel exhaustion trajectory. failure modes do not involve distorted § 401.7 and amends the proposed 112 definition of ‘‘limits of a useful p. Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction impact distributions. In the final rule, mission’’ to mean the trajectory data or Flight (§ 450.119) the FAA amended the requirement to allow this and other simplified methods other parameters that bound the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed for those operations for which they may performance of a useful mission, requirements associated with trajectory be valid. including flight azimuth limits. A analysis for malfunction flight in The FAA adds § 450.119(a)(3) in the ‘‘useful mission’’ means a mission that § 450.119. As stated in the NPRM, a final rule. Section 450.119(a)(3) states can attain one or more objectives and is malfunction trajectory analysis is that an FSA must include a trajectory based on the definition of ‘‘limits of a necessary to determine how far a analysis that establishes, for vehicles useful mission’’ proposed in the NPRM. vehicle can deviate from normal flight. using flight abort as a hazard control The definition of ‘‘limits of a useful This analysis helps determine potential strategy under § 450.108, trajectory data mission’’ adopted in the final rule impact points in the case of a or parameters that describe the limits of removes the language ‘‘describe the malfunction and is therefore a vital a useful mission. This requirement was limits of a mission that can attain the input for the analyses needed to found in § 450.117(a)(3) of the NPRM. primary objective’’ and replaces it with demonstrate compliance with risk The FAA finds that trajectory analysis ‘‘bound the performance of a useful criteria. requirements associated with the limits mission,’’ consistent with the In the final rule, the FAA adopts of a useful mission belong in the commenters’ recommendation. In this proposed § 450.119 with revisions. The malfunction flight section because context, bounding the performance will FAA removes, as unnecessary, proposed presumably normal flight can attain the include flight azimuth limits and could § 450.119(a)(1), which required that an one or more objectives within the flight include limits on the altitude versus FSA include a trajectory analysis that azimuth limits. distance downrange or other physics- establishes the vehicle’s capability to The requirement in § 450.119(a)(3) is based limits depending on the nature of depart from normal flight, formally related to the requirement proposed in the operation. The FAA makes these defined in terms of IIP in § 401.7. § 450.119(a)(1) because trajectories that changes because it recognizes that Proposed § 450.119(a)(2) is re- are outside of the normal envelope can pursuit of objectives other than the designated (a)(1) and requires that a still be ‘‘useful,’’ even though they primary objective may be considered a trajectory analysis establish the involve a malfunction.113 The FAA useful mission. However, when all other vehicle’s deviation capability in the notes that an operator can elect to objectives can no longer be achieved the event of a malfunction during flight. designate the normal mission FAA does not consider the collection of The FAA adds a new requirement, trajectories as the limits of a useful data related to a failure in and of itself designated as § 450.119(a)(2), which mission and meet the application to be a useful mission. This is because requires that an FSA must include a requirement to submit data that mere failure data collection alone does trajectory analysis that establishes the describes the limits of a useful mission, not justify continued risk to the public. trajectory dispersion resulting from but this may result in the termination of Therefore, the final rule states in reasonably foreseeable malfunctions. a flight that could still achieve a mission § 450.119(a)(3) that the FAA does not This language retains the concept of objective. consider the collection of data related to proposed § 450.119(a)(1), but revises the The FAA received several comments a failure to be a useful mission. regulatory language to allow for a on the NPRM’s proposal to use the The FAA finds the requirements medium-fidelity FSA approach (e.g., ‘‘limits of a useful mission’’ to inform associated with ‘‘useful mission’’ and corridor method) for which the vehicle the development of flight safety limits ‘‘limits of a useful mission’’ are central vacuum IIP during a malfunction is not to the hazard control strategies. The specified, as explained in the FAA’s 112 Distorted impact distributions are often caused FAA is not attempting to regulate what Flight Safety Analysis Handbook.111 by actions taken in response to abort criteria. the operator or its customer considers a More specifically, the proposed 113 Publicly available information indicates that the flight of the Ariane 5 VA241 that occurred from useful mission. The FAA instead is requirement in § 450.119(a)(1) to the Guiana Space Centre on January 25, 2018 may simply requiring that the applicant be a potential empirical example. There the flight identify which missions are useful so 111 See Flight Safety Analysis Handbook, V1.0, path anomaly was evident from the beginning of that vehicles that fly outside of these August 2009 (available at https://www.faa.gov/ flight and the payloads were deployed into an about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/ orbital inclination that was approximately 18 parameters erroneously are not Flight_Safety_Analysis_Handbook_final_9_ degrees from the intended orbit, yet the payloads permitted to threaten the public. The 2011v1.pdf). were still able to deliver useful data. FAA finds it necessary to include a

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requirement that would prevent a objective. As an example, during an characterize the foreseeable trajectories launch or reentry vehicle from operation for which a gate width was resulting from a malfunction. continued flight that would increase determined using only a vehicle’s The FAA partially agrees with Blue risk to the public if that vehicle can no normal trajectory envelope, a failure Origin’s recommendations. The FAA longer achieve an objective of the before the gate resulted in the flight deletes the proposed language in operator, outside of the collection of nearly being terminated at the gate, even § 450.119(b), ‘‘for each cause of a data related to a failure. though it went on to achieve the malfunction trajectory, the analysis Blue Origin recommended replacing mission’s primary objective. In that must characterize the foreseeable ‘‘limits of a useful mission’’ with ‘‘limits instance, if the limits of a useful mission trajectories resulting from a to meet public risk criteria.’’ The FAA data included flight azimuth limits, this malfunction,’’ but retains the phrase does not agree with this vehicle would have had more margin in ‘‘for each cause of a malfunction flight’’ recommendation. As described in the the form of a wider gate. Under the final in the first sentence of § 450.119(b). The section on CEC, public risk criteria alone rule, if an operator decides that placing FAA notes the analysis must account for are inadequate to establish the need for a payload in any orbit or withholding the probability of each set of trajectories an FSS, the reliability of the FSS, or the abort for crewed flights is more useful that characterize a type of malfunction timing of an FSS activation to ensure than terminating a flight, it may declare flight, and that probability must account public safety. Similarly, while some that flight is useful at any azimuth or for each cause of a malfunction flight, might consider risk-based flight safety altitude and may fly the vehicle on any including software and hardware limits as a reasonable approach to risk trajectory that meets § 450.108(d)(7). failures, for every period of normal management when a vehicle is on a However, flight safety limits that flight. potentially useful mission, once a terminate flights that are no longer The FAA notes that use of the phrase malfunction results in a mission that useful should be placed so that they do ‘‘for each type of malfunction’’ in can no longer achieve an objective, then not increase risk compared to continued § 450.119(b) of the final rule addresses hazard containment should be the goal flight, pursuant to § 450.108(d)(6). Blue Origin’s comment that it is not and flight abort must be used to protect The FAA found it necessary to move feasible to model a malfunction turn the public against high consequence all references to the limits of a useful trajectory for each cause, but only for events. Application of the limits of a mission from § 450.117 to § 450.119 vehicle responses to the cause. The term useful mission benefits the operator (Trajectory Analysis for Malfunction ‘‘each type of malfunction’’ refers to the because flights with trajectories that are Flight), including proposed vehicle response to the cause and outside of the normal envelope, but still § 450.117(a)(3). The FAA finds that the multiple causes could result in a similar useful according to the operator, will be requirements associated with the limits vehicle response. For example, under permitted to continue without flight of a useful mission belong in the part 417 a malfunction turn analysis abort as long as they comply with malfunction flight section because would account for a series of ‘‘tumble § 450.108(d)(7), including trajectories limits of a useful mission can exceed the turns,’’ as enumerated in Appendix A to that overfly the public. This was the bounds of normal flight. part 417 under A417.9(d)(5), which intent of proposed § 450.123(b)(6) in the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in result in the launch vehicle rotating due NPRM, and remains the intent of § 450.119(b) that a malfunction to a constant thrust vector offset angle. § 450.108(d)(7) in the final rule. trajectory analysis must account for The FAA recognizes that there could be Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop each cause of a malfunction flight, multiple causes for a constant thrust Grumman, and ULA commented that including software and hardware vector offset, such as a jammed limits of a useful mission were already failures. For each cause of a malfunction mechanism, loss of electrical power, or addressed in flight termination triggers, trajectory, the analysis would have been loss of hydraulic fluid pressure. Thus, and that proposed § 450.117(a)(3) required to characterize the foreseeable the probability of a tumble turn must requiring trajectory data or parameters trajectories resulting from a account for ‘‘each cause of a that describe the limits of a useful malfunction. The proposal included six malfunction flight, including software mission should be replaced with limits items in § 450.119(b)(1) through (b)(6) and hardware failures,’’ in accordance that trigger flight termination. that would be required to be included with § 450.119(b). Furthermore, the The FAA declines to adopt this in the analysis. FAA recognizes that multiple sets of recommendation because of the In the final rule, the FAA adopts trajectories are necessary to characterize relationship between the limits of a proposed § 450.119(b) with revisions. the vehicle behavior in response to a useful mission and flight safety limits. The FAA removes proposed malfunction. An example is a Pursuant to § 450.108(c)(2) in the final § 450.119(b)(1) through (b)(3) because malfunction that results in a constant rule (similar to proposed § 450.123(a)(2) they are no longer needed due to the thrust vector offset, because a range of of the NPRM), flight safety limits define adoption of performance-based thrust vector offsets is reasonably when an operator must initiate flight standards and re-designates proposed foreseeable (from very small angles that abort to prevent continued flight from § 450.119(b)(4) through (b)(6) as (b)(1) would cause a slow departure from increasing public risk in uncontrolled through (b)(3). Also, the FAA revises the normal flight up to the maximum areas if the vehicle is unable to achieve introductory language in § 450.119(b) to feasible thrust offset that would a useful mission. Under the final rule, improve clarity and remove prescriptive typically result in a rapid tumble of the flight safety limits will be developed language. vehicle). Thus, there is a natural after the limits of a useful mission are Blue Origin commented that it was question regarding the appropriate identified. An operator can elect to not feasible to model a malfunction turn resolution of the malfunction trajectory designate the normal mission trajectory for each software or hardware analysis. The intent of the requirements trajectories as the limits of a useful cause, only for vehicle responses to the in § 450.119 is to produce sets of mission and meet the application cause as proposed in § 450.119(b). Blue trajectories that are sufficient to requirement to submit data describing Origin recommended striking the characterize the public risks posed by the limits of a useful mission, but this phrase, ‘‘for each cause of a malfunction each type of malfunction. Thus, the may result in the termination of a flight trajectory,’’ and instead indicate that a final rule sets a performance standard in that could still achieve a mission malfunction trajectory analysis must § 450.119(b) that the analysis for each

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type of malfunction must have sufficient dispersion resulting from reasonably final rule and revises the requirements. temporal and spatial resolution to foreseeable malfunctions. Section 450.119(b)(3) requires that a establish flight safety limits, if any, and Virgin Galactic also recommended a malfunction trajectory analysis account individual risk contours that are smooth wording change to § 450.119(b)(2) to for the parameters with a significant and continuous. define the duration as, ‘‘starting when a influence on a vehicle’s flight behavior In order to be less prescriptive, the malfunction begins . . . until such time from the time when a malfunction FAA further amends § 450.119(b) in the effects of the malfunction are begins to cause a flight deviation until response to Blue Origin’s comment. The mitigated.’’ As previously discussed, the each malfunction trajectory will NPRM proposed in § 450.119(b)(1) FAA does not adopt proposed terminate due to vehicle breakup, through (b)(3) that the malfunction § 450.119(b)(2) in the final rule. ground impact, or orbital insertion. The trajectory analysis must account for (1) However, the FAA notes in the final FAA adds the phrase ‘‘parameters with all trajectory times during the thrusting rule, the combination of the requirement a significant influence on vehicle’s phases, or when the lift vector is for sufficient temporal resolution to flight behavior’’ because the analysis controlled, during flight; (2) the establish smooth and continuous must account for these parameters to duration, starting when a malfunction individual risk contours, along with the characterize sufficiently the vehicle’s begins to cause each flight deviation requirement to account for the timing of flight behavior. This language was throughout the thrusting phases of each malfunction trajectory’s proposed in the application flight; and (3) trajectory time intervals termination due to means other than requirements in § 450.119(c)(2)(iii) and between malfunction turn start times flight abort, including vehicle breakup, has been added to paragraph (b)(3) in that are sufficient to establish flight ground impact, or orbital insertion, the final rule. The FAA received no safety limits, if any, and individual risk provide a sufficient performance-based comments on this language. The FAA contours that are smooth and specification to establish the duration of also clarifies that a malfunction continuous. The FAA removes proposed the malfunction trajectory analysis. In trajectory can terminate due to orbital § 450.119(b)(1) through (b)(3) and addition, the FAA finds that the insertion, not just ground impact or consolidates these requirements into commenter’s suggestion that the predicted structural failure (vehicle § 450.119(b). This revision sets more duration of the analysis continue only breakup), as specified in the NPRM, for performance-based requirements for the ‘‘until such time the effects of the the same reason that those outcomes scope and resolution of the malfunction malfunction are mitigated’’ would not were added to § 450.119(b)(2). Finally, trajectory analysis to create flexibility in analyze both the success and the failure the FAA replaces the proposed term demonstrating the trajectory dispersion of the mitigation necessary to quantify ‘‘predicted structural failure’’ with the resulting from reasonably foreseeable the risk and consequence in the event term ‘‘vehicle break-up’’ in the final that the FSS fails. malfunctions. In the final rule, rule. This change is consistent with the As a result of removing proposed § 450.119(b) will require the analysis for terminology used in § 450.121 (Debris § 450.119(b)(1) through (b)(3), the FAA each type of malfunction to have Analysis). re-designates proposed § 450.119(b)(4) Blue Origin commented that smooth sufficient temporal and spatial as § 450.119(b)(1) in the final rule. and continuous contours were not resolution to establish flight safety Proposed § 450.119(b)(4) required that a typically feasible unless flight limits limits, if any, and individual risk trajectory analysis for malfunction flight were also included in the malfunction contours that are smooth and account for the relative probability of turn analysis. Blue Origin also continuous. occurrence of each malfunction turn for recommended adding flight abort to the In the NPRM, proposed which the vehicle is capable. In the final list of vehicle end state conditions. § 450.119(b)(2) required that a rule, the FAA revises § 450.119(b)(1) to The FAA did not add flight abort to malfunction trajectory analysis account reflect that the analysis must account for the list of vehicle end state conditions for the duration, starting when a the relative probability of occurrence of based on Blue Origin’s comment malfunction begins to cause each flight each malfunction, and not specifically a because of the relationship between deviation throughout the thrusting malfunction turn. The FAA views the trajectory analysis for malfunction flight phases of flight. Virgin Galactic term ‘‘malfunction turn’’ as outdated. and risk analyses that produce risk commented that a malfunction turn The requirement in the final rule is contours. Risk analyses must consider analysis would not apply to operations consistent with the proposal. outcomes of flight abort and FSS for which a pilot is in control of a The FAA re-designates proposed inaction, whether through failure of the winged vehicle because the pilots act as § 450.119(b)(5) as § 450.119(b)(2) in the FSS or because no flight abort rules an FSS. final rule. The FAA also revises were violated, which could result in The FAA is aware that having pilots § 450.119(b)(2) to correct an omission of vehicle breakup, ground impact, or onboard and in control of a vehicle the word ‘‘trajectory.’’ Furthermore, the orbital insertion. If the trajectories for during flight may mitigate the need for FAA adds ground impact and orbital malfunction flight were terminated certain malfunction analyses; however, insertion as potential termination states. when flight abort was predicted, no there may still be instances when pilots The FAA found the exclusion of these trajectory data would exist for cases may become incapacitated during flight. states in the NPRM to be a deficiency when the FSS failed. The rule ensures In any such instances, a trajectory that would have resulted in an that complete trajectory data exists to analysis for malfunction flight would operator’s inability to meet regulatory account for flight abort action and still potentially be necessary to identify requirements for quantifying the risk inaction in risk analyses. More impact points as an essential input for because malfunctions can result in specifically, ending the malfunction risk analyses to demonstrate compliance trajectories that result in ground impact trajectories at the flight safety limits with risk criteria in § 450.101. The FAA or orbital insertion, as well as vehicle conflicts with the requirement in notes that flight simulators can facilitate break-up, and those additional § 450.108(d)(5) to account for proper the development of representative outcomes can pose significant public functioning of the FSS and failure of the malfunction trajectory analysis outputs risks as well. FSS in individual, collective, and in cases in which pilot responses have The FAA re-designates proposed conditional risk evaluations. It was not a significant influence on the trajectory § 450.119(b)(6) as § 450.119(b)(3) in the necessary to amend the rule according

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to Blue Origin’s comment because flight § 450.117(d)(1) in the NPRM. Moving in § 450.119(c)(4)(ii) as proposed in abort is already a necessary end case to this application requirement to § 450.119(c)(3)(ii) in the NPRM. be analyzed when producing risk § 450.119 is consistent with the Proposed § 450.119(c)(3)(ii) required contours in accordance with relocation of its associated analysis submission of the probability of each § 450.133(e)(2)(iii), which is a separate requirement to § 450.119(a)(3). The FAA trajectory that characterizes a type of analysis from producing trajectories for re-designates proposed § 450.119(c)(2) malfunction flight. Blue Origin malfunction flight. as § 450.119(c)(3) in the final rule. The commented that delivering probabilities Section 450.119(b)(4) explicitly FAA captures the requirements of for each trajectory modelled was not requires a malfunction trajectory proposed § 450.119(c)(2)(i) and (c)(2)(ii) practical or useful for independent analysis to account for potential FSS and relocates them in § 450.119(c)(3)(i) assessment. Instead, Blue Origin failure, if an FSS is used, because that and (c)(3)(ii). proposed revising the regulatory can also influence the termination The FAA re-designates proposed language to require the applicant to condition of a malfunction trajectory. § 450.119(c)(2)(iii) as § 450.119(c)(3)(iii) submit the probability of each set of For example, if a malfunction trajectory in the final rule and revises the final malfunction trajectories. The FAA triggers a flight abort rule, potential § 450.119(c)(3)(iii) to specify the need agrees with this comment and revises outcomes of the trajectory are abort for an applicant to submit a quantitative § 450.119(c)(4)(ii) in the final rule to (through destruct, thrust termination, or description of the parameters, including reflect Blue Origin’s recommendation. other method) or continued flight uncertainties, with significant influence In the final rule, § 450.119(c)(4)(iii) resulting in aerodynamic breakup, intact on the vehicle’s malfunction behavior requires an applicant to submit a impact, or orbital insertion if the FSS for each type of malfunction flight representative malfunction flight fails. The requirement in § 450.119(b)(4) characterized. Proposed trajectory analysis output, including the is consistent with the proposal because § 450.119(c)(2)(iii) required an applicant position and velocity as a function of both the proposed and final § 450.115(a) to submit a description of the input data flight time for a set of trajectories that explicitly require that an operator’s FSA used to characterize the vehicle’s characterize the limits of a useful method must account for all failures of malfunction flight behavior, including a mission as described in § 450.119(a)(3) safety-critical systems during nominal description of the parameters with a of this section. This requirement was and non-nominal launch or reentry that significant influence on the vehicle’s proposed as § 450.117(d)(3)(v) in the could jeopardize public health and behavior throughout malfunction flight NPRM. As discussed earlier, the FAA safety and the safety of property. for each type of malfunction flight moves the limits of a useful mission Furthermore, any FSS required to characterized. Proposed requirement from proposed § 450.117 to comply with § 450.143 or § 450.145 § 450.119(c)(2)(iii) also required a § 450.119 in the final rule. necessarily will meet the definition of a quantitative description of the nominal Lastly, similar to other sections in this safety-critical system. Therefore, the value for each significant parameter rule, the FAA removes the requirement proposed requirement § 450.123(a) throughout normal flight. The FAA for an applicant to provide additional would have necessitated that the specifically replaces the proposed products that allow an independent malfunction trajectory analysis account requirements in § 450.119(c)(2)(iii) and analysis, as requested by the for the potential failure of the FSS. (c)(2)(iv) 114 with the requirement in Administrator. The FAA finds the In the NPRM, § 450.119(c) addressed § 450.119(c)(3)(iii) in the final rule. This requirement redundant with the application requirements associated revision retains the intent of the § 450.45(e)(7)(ii). Blue Origin and the with trajectory analysis for malfunction requirements proposed in the NPRM but CSF objected to proposed flight. In the final rule, the FAA adopts is more flexible in its application § 450.119(c)(4). Blue Origin strongly the application requirements in because, although it still requires a disagreed that the FAA should be in the proposed § 450.119(c) with revisions. quantitative description, the regulation business of recreating analysis The revisions include adding a new permits something other than the completed by operators. It submitted § 450.119(c)(2), re-designating proposed statistical distribution that would have that the FAA should vet the process § 450.119(c)(2) through (c)(4), and been required by the proposal. used by the operator to conduct the removing proposed § 450.119(c)(1)(i) The FAA re-designates proposed analysis, along with the products of the through (c)(1)(iv). § 450.119(c)(3) as § 450.119(c)(4) in the analysis, to determine whether approval Proposed § 450.119(c)(1) required an final rule. The FAA also removes the was warranted. Blue Origin further applicant to submit a description of the need for the vacuum IIP for each second stated that such independent recreation methodology used to characterize the of flight. The FAA makes this change in of the analysis could lead to protracted vehicle’s flight behavior throughout response to Blue Origin’s comment on back and forth between an operator and malfunction flight. In the final rule, the computing vacuum IIP for a large the FAA that was unnecessary if the FAA adopts the proposal and adds a number of trajectories, as addressed in FAA had vetted the process used by the reference to the requirements in the preamble section on § 450.117. operator to conduct the analysis. Blue § 450.115(c), which sets the standards The FAA adopts the requirements in Origin proposed to delete this for the methodologies used in the FSA. § 450.119(c)(4)(i) as proposed in requirement in order to limit the scope Also, the FAA removes the items § 450.119(c)(3)(i) in the NPRM. The to what was required to establish proposed in § 450.119(c)(1)(i) through FAA received no comments on confidence in the validity of an (c)(1)(iv) because they were redundant proposed § 450.119(c)(3)(i). The FAA operator’s analysis. CSF stated that the with the performance-based adopts, with revisions, the requirements FAA’s practice of recreating an requirements that apply to all FSA in applicant’s analysis should be ended, as accordance with § 450.115(c). 114 Proposed § 450.119(c)(2)(iv) required an it was expensive and burdensome. CSF In the final rule, a new § 450.119(c)(2) applicant to submit a description of the random recommended that an AC should guide requires an applicant to submit a uncertainties with a significant influence on the and inform this analysis. description of the methodology used to vehicle’s behavior throughout malfunction flight for Virgin Galactic noted that numerous each type of malfunction flight characterized, determine the limits of a useful mission, including a quantitative description of the regulations under part 450, including in accordance with § 450.115(c). This statistical distribution for each significant proposed § 450.119(c)(4), call for requirement was proposed as parameter. additional products that allow an

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independent analysis, as requested by design or flight safety critical systems. from ‘‘each foreseeable vehicle response the Administrator. Virgin Galactic stated Thus, the FAA foresees continuing to mode’’ with ‘‘debris generated from that ‘‘additional products’’ was neither perform independent analyses in certain normal and malfunctioning vehicle defined nor constrained, permitting the circumstances to assure that it has met flight,’’ (2) relying upon a new FAA to request any information from its statutory obligation to ensure public definition for ‘‘hazardous debris,’’ (3) operators at any time. This would create health and safety and safety of property. replacing ‘‘flight time’’ with ‘‘flight uncertainty regarding the kind of Although the FAA declines to remove sequence,’’ and (4) removing products an applicant or operator would the ‘‘additional products’’ reference in prescriptive thresholds for various need to prepare for the FAA. Virgin § 450.45(e)(7)(ii) of the final rule, the debris hazards in favor of a Galactic recommended striking the FAA does not include the redundant performance-based standard of ‘‘capable above references in their entirety. Virgin references proposed in other sections. of causing a casualty or loss of Galactic commented that, based on prior ‘‘Additional products’’ refers to data functionality to a critical asset.’’ Each of experience under part 431 with the FAA that will allow the FAA to conduct an these changes is discussed in the requesting additional information, these independent safety analysis in support following paragraphs. regulations may have a significant time of its application assessment and Proposed § 450.121(a) required that an and monetary impact on an operator, if licensing determination. It would be FSA include a debris analysis that implemented. impractical to list everything needed for characterizes the debris generated for The FAA does not agree with the every independent analysis. As each foreseeable vehicle response mode commenters’ recommendation to delete explained in the NPRM, the FAA’s as a function of vehicle flight time, this requirement in its entirety from the decision to conduct an independent accounting for the effects of fuel burn final rule. The goal is for the FAA to analysis is usually reserved for new and any configuration changes. The evaluate, in an efficient and thorough vehicle concepts, new analysis methods, NPRM noted that an operator’s debris manner, the validity of an analysis, or proposals involving unique public list generally changes over time with along with the products of the analysis safety cases. In all instances, the request variations in the amount of available submitted by an operator. The FAA for information is bounded by the propellant and the jettisoning of finds that at times it may be necessary regulatory requirements for obtaining a hardware. to conduct an independent analysis of license and the FAA’s need to ensure In the final rule, the FAA adopts the process used by the operator in compliance with the safety criteria. The proposed § 450.121(a) with revisions. order to ensure safety. Additional FAA adopts the requirement that an The FAA replaces the proposed product requests under part 431 may applicant submit additional products to requirement to characterize ‘‘the debris have been more frequent due to a lack facilitate an independent analysis, as generated for each foreseeable vehicle of well-defined application requested by the Administrator in response mode as a function of vehicle requirements. However, under part 450, § 450.45(e)(7)(ii). flight time, accounting for the effects of the FAA expects the application fuel burn and any configuration q. Debris Analysis (§ 450.121) requirements are sufficient and will changes’’ with a more flexible and generally not request additional The NPRM proposed in § 450.121 to performance-based requirement to products beyond those that are require a debris analysis that characterize ‘‘the hazardous debris necessary to protect public safety. characterized the debris generated for generated from normal and Furthermore, as noted in the NPRM, the each foreseeable vehicle response mode malfunctioning vehicle flight as a FAA has evaluated the validity of an as a function of vehicle flight time, function of vehicle flight sequence.’’ applicant’s proposed methods by accounting for the effects of fuel burn Several commenters suggested comparing the results to valid and any configuration changes. The changing the term ‘‘foreseeable’’ vehicle benchmarks such as data from mishaps, proposal required that the debris response modes in § 450.121(a) of the tests, or validated high-fidelity methods. analysis account for each foreseeable NPRM to ‘‘credible’’ vehicle response Once that has occurred, the FAA can cause of vehicle breakup, including any modes. The commenters stated that issue an operator’s license for a breakup caused by an FSS activation or credibility was determined during the repeatable operation at a specific site for by impact of an intact vehicle. As noted system safety analysis, and that the a specified range of trajectory azimuths. in the NPRM, this would include debris debris analysis should not have to Using published benchmarks, the from a vehicle’s jettisoned components include extremely improbable, non- FAA intends to facilitate the validation and payloads because such debris could credible failure modes. and verification of FSA methods to cause a casualty due to impact with an The FAA does not agree that the term alleviate some of the needs for the FAA aircraft or waterborne vessel or could ‘‘foreseeable’’ should be replaced by the to perform independent analyses. pose a toxic or fire hazard.115 Under term ‘‘credible’’ in this section or However, the FAA finds that relying on proposed § 450.121(c), the debris throughout the final rule. The term an approved process alone is analysis would include inert, explosive, ‘‘foreseeable’’ is used in § 431.35 and insufficient when certain critical and other hazardous vehicle debris from also commonly used in system safety; variables may change that affect flight both normal and malfunctioning flight therefore, the FAA is not changing these safety or the MPL determination, or in during launch or reentry. references. The FAA finds that the term cases in which the operator proposes In the final rule, the FAA adopts ‘‘credible’’ is unacceptably prone to launch or reentry operations that are so proposed § 450.121 with revisions. errors in judgment whereas the term unique that relevant benchmarks are Specifically, the FAA preserves the ‘‘foreseeable’’ is more readily discerned unavailable. Also, the FAA will scope of the debris analysis from the by analysis (e.g., fault trees). With continue to verify flight operations for NPRM but consolidates, clarifies, and regard to § 450.121(a) of the final rule, new vehicles, for existing vehicles increases the flexibility of the the FAA adopts the more flexible and conducting operations at new sites, for regulations in this section. The final performance-based requirement vehicles flying a trajectory outside the rule’s revisions include (1) replacing the recommended by the commenters to accepted range of trajectory azimuths, requirement to characterize the debris characterize the hazardous debris and vehicles that have undergone generated from normal and significant modifications to vehicle 115 84 FR 15383. malfunctioning vehicle flight as a

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function of vehicle flight sequence. materials used in their licensed Also, imparted velocities due to break- With the removal of the reference to operations. up typically correlate with propellant ‘‘each foreseeable vehicle response For example, recent research and load better than flight time does. mode’’ in § 450.121(a), the final rule development sponsored by the FAA Therefore, the final rule uses ‘‘flight standard for the scope is set by the demonstrates that the threshold kinetic sequence’’ as a less prescriptive and language in § 450.115(a), specifically by energy capable of causing a casualty more accurate independent variable. the reference to reasonably foreseeable from a collision with a rigid object is The FAA notes that the term events. In addition, the resolution of the substantially lower than for a collision ‘‘sequence’’ is used in the common failure modes accounted for in the with an object made of certain meaning of the word, which is a series debris analysis is set by the level of composite materials.117 The FAA will of related things or events, or the order fidelity necessary to comply with provide an AC with valid debris impact in which things or events follow each § 450.115(b). The FAA also notes that, thresholds, such as those proposed in other. The phrase ‘‘as a function of in the context of § 450.121, reasonably § 450.121(c)(1)(i) and (ii). Thus, in the vehicle flight sequence’’ would foreseeable events that can generate final rule, § 450.121(a) uses the naturally include ‘‘accounting for the hazardous debris during malfunctioning definition of ‘‘hazardous debris’’ in a effects of fuel burn and any vehicle flight generally include engine/ way that will enable those debris impact configuration changes,’’ so the final rule motor explosion, exceeding structural thresholds to be updated as appropriate deletes those elements of the proposed limits due to aerodynamic loads, inertial based on future research and requirement as redundant. loads, aerothermal heating, and development. In addition, the definition In § 450.121(b) of the NPRM, the FAA activation of a flight termination system. of ‘‘hazardous debris’’ is used in proposed to require that the debris § 450.121(a) in a way that replaces the analysis account for each foreseeable In reference to the use of the term relatively verbose requirement in cause of vehicle breakup, including any ‘‘hazardous debris’’ in § 450.121(a), the proposed § 450.121(c) that ‘‘a debris breakup caused by FSS activation, and final rule in § 401.7 includes a analysis must account for all inert, for impact of an intact vehicle. definition of this term. Hazardous debris explosive, and other hazardous vehicle, Consistent with § 450.133(a)(4), this means any object or substance capable vehicle component, and payload debris proposal included debris from a of causing a casualty or loss of foreseeable from normal and vehicle’s jettisoned components and functionality to a critical asset. malfunctioning vehicle flight.’’ payloads because such debris could Hazardous debris includes inert debris In summary, the final rule uses the cause a casualty due to impact with an and explosive debris such as an intact performance-based definition of aircraft or waterborne vessel or could vehicle, vehicle fragments, any detached ‘‘hazardous debris’’ that currently pose a toxic or fire hazard.118 vehicle component, whether intact or in equates to the same debris thresholds as Section 450.121(b) retains the fragments, payload, and any planned proposed in the NPRM because requirement that a debris analysis jettisoned bodies. This definition is ‘‘hazardous debris’’ means any object or account for each reasonably foreseeable based on proposed § 450.121(c)(1), substance capable of causing a casualty, cause of vehicle breakup and intact which required a debris analysis to including people in aircraft or impact. As explained in the NPRM, this identify all inert debris that could cause waterborne vessels or loss of would include ‘‘engine or motor a casualty or loss of functionality of a functionality to a critical asset. Thus, by explosion, or exceeding structural limits critical asset. The FAA clarifies that the relying on the definition of ‘‘hazardous due to aerodynamic loads, inertial clause ‘‘whether intact or in fragments’’ debris,’’ the final rule retains the loads, or aerothermal heating.’’ 119 applies to the payload and jettisoned standard in proposed § 450.121(c) of In addition, the final rule requires an bodies as well. debris capable of causing a casualty or operator to account for vehicle The final rule’s definition of loss of functionality to a critical asset structural characteristics and materials ‘‘hazardous debris’’ facilitated and allows operators to propose impact and energetic effects during break-up or streamlining in proposed §§ 450.113 vulnerability models appropriate for the at impact. Although these items would through 450.139. For example, the term materials used in their vehicle. be necessary considerations in any hazardous debris in § 450.121(a) In the final rule, the FAA replaces the debris analysis, the FAA has added establishes a performance-based term ‘‘flight time’’ in § 450.121(a) with them expressly in § 450.121(b). The threshold, which resulted in the the more flexible term ‘‘flight sequence’’ requirement to account for energetic elimination of the prescriptive debris because it is a better independent effects in § 450.121(b)(3) is consistent thresholds proposed in § 450.121(c)(1)(i) variable. For example, during a reentry with the requirement in proposed through (v).116 Section 450.121(a) operation, the transitions between § 450.135(d)(3)(iii) which addresses retains the essential performance phases of flight, which generally ‘‘indirect or secondary effects such as bounce, splatter, skip, slide, or standards in proposed § 450.121(c)(1) produce substantially different 120 and (c)(2) (i.e., that the analysis must hazardous debris, such as prior to and ricochet.’’ Moreover, accounting for the fundamental physical phenomena identify all inert and explosive debris after peak aero-thermal heating, can identified in § 450.121(b)(2) of the final capable of causing a casualty or loss of occur at widely variable flight times. rule would logically be necessary to functionality to a critical asset), and comply with the requirement in allows operators to propose impact 117 ‘‘The crash test results and subsequent vulnerability models appropriate for the analysis strongly suggest that RCC-based thresholds are overly conservative because they do not 118 The preamble to the NPRM stated that ‘‘this accurately represent the collision dynamics of proposal would include debris from a vehicle’s 116 As proposed, an operator would have been elastically-deformable sUAS with larger contact jettisoned components and payloads because such required to include all debris that could impact a areas in comparison to the metallic debris analysis debris could cause a casualty due to impact with human being with a mean expected kinetic energy methods for high speed missiles on the national test an aircraft or waterborne vessel or could pose a at impact greater than or equal to 11 ft-lbs; impact ranges.’’ Final Report for the FAA UAS Center of toxic or fire hazard,’’ but the proposed regulatory a human being with a mean impact kinetic energy Excellence Task A4; UAS Ground Collision Severity text did not include that specific language. per unit area at impact greater than or equal to 34 Evaluation Revision 2, Arterburn et al, 2017. http:// 119 84 FR 15383. ft-lb/in2; cause a casualty due to impact with an www.assureuas.org/projects/deliverables/a4/ 120 This language in proposed § 450.135(d)(3)(iii) aircraft; cause a casualty due to impact with a ASSURE_A4_Final_Report_UAS_Ground_ is removed in the final rule, as discussed in the waterborne vessel; or pose a toxic or fire hazard. Collision_Severity_Evaluation.pdf. preamble associated with that section.

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proposed § 450.135(d) to ‘‘model the analysis products from §§ 450.117 and or fragment class quantitatively. Section casualty area, and compute the 450.119. Similarly, the final rule 450.121(d)(5) of the final rule requires a predicted consequences of each requirements in § 450.121(c) are nearly quantitative description of the physical, reasonably foreseeable vehicle response identical to those in proposed aerodynamic, and harmful mode.’’ As explained in the NPRM, ‘‘the § 450.135(b), except that the final rule characteristics of hazardous debris. The casualty area and consequence analysis removes the term ‘‘including FAA finds that ‘‘quantitative would be required to account for all uncertainties’’ from the regulation. The description’’ will allow alternative relevant debris fragment FAA finds inclusion of this term to be approaches for the applicant to characteristics.’’ The characteristics of superfluous, as accounting for demonstrate compliance with this all relevant debris fragments, such as foreseeable sources of impact dispersion section. the size and kinetic energy at impact, naturally includes the uncertainties in Virgin Galactic stated the proposal depend on the three fundamental the debris aerodynamic parameters, pre- would introduce additional workload to physical phenomena identified in the breakup state vectors, and breakup- the company. Virgin Galactic raised final rule. imparted velocities. The FAA notes that concern that proposed § 450.121 As noted earlier, the NPRM proposed the debris analysis must compute introduced requirements for waterborne to require in § 450.121(c) that a debris statistically valid debris impact vessels that were not referenced in other analysis account for all inert, explosive, probability distributions of all parts of the rule. The NPRM proposed, and other hazardous vehicle, vehicle hazardous debris to be consistent with and the final rule requires in component, and payload debris the scope identified in § 450.121(a). § 450.133(b), that a flight hazard area foreseeable from normal and Virgin Galactic recommended that the analysis must determine waterborne malfunctioning vehicle flight. The FAA allow operators to provide their vessel hazard areas. Also, the NPRM NPRM also specified a set of items for own assessments of casualty causing preamble explained that the which a debris analysis would be debris. The FAA agrees that the specific requirement includes people on ships in required to account, at a minimum. impact vulnerability thresholds the collective risk computation (see These items included highly specific specified in the NPRM were overly proposed § 450.101(a)(1) and (b)(1)), and and prescriptive debris thresholds prescriptive and potentially overly thus explicitly allows the application of requirements. With the addition of the conservative for some non-rigid debris risk management principles to protect hazardous debris definition, § 450.121 impacts. Thus, the final rule removes people on waterborne vessels. The FAA no longer requires a specific subsection these proposed requirements in finds that the scope of the FSA establishing debris thresholds. § 450.121(c) entirely. requirements in the final rule are In the final rule, new § 450.121(c) In the NPRM, § 450.121(d) provided consistent with current practice and contains requirements associated with the debris analysis application will not introduce additional workload. the propagation of debris that are requirements. In the final rule, the FAA Virgin Galactic stated that the FAA relocated from the proposed debris risk relocates and revises proposed should quantify the debris that could analysis requirements in § 450.135(b). § 450.121(d)(1), which was a cause a casualty on a waterborne vessel. Specifically, a debris analysis must requirement to submit a description of The FAA notes that it provided compute statistically valid debris the debris analysis methodology, to guidance on debris thresholds for impact probability distributions. The § 450.121(d)(2). The FAA re-designates waterborne vessels in Table 10 of the propagation of debris from each and revises proposed § 450.121(d)(2) as draft AC on High-Fidelity FSA predicted breakup location to impact § 450.121(d)(1) in the final rule. In the published with the NPRM. must account for all foreseeable forces NPRM, proposed § 450.121(d)(2) r. Population Exposure Analysis that can influence any debris impact required an operator submit a (§ 450.123) location, and all foreseeable sources of description of all vehicle breakup impact dispersion, including, at a modes and the development of debris In the NPRM, the exposure model minimum: The uncertainties in lists. In the final rule, the re-designated requirements were addressed in the atmospheric conditions; debris § 450.121(d)(1) makes use of the formal debris risk analysis section in proposed aerodynamic parameters, including definition of ‘‘hazardous debris,’’ § 450.135(c) and (d) because a complete uncertainties; pre-breakup position and requiring a description of all scenarios risk analysis must account for the velocity, including uncertainties; and that can lead to hazardous debris. distribution of people and how those breakup-imparted velocities, including In the final rule, § 450.121(d)(2) and people may be sheltered. The FAA uncertainties. The FAA notes that a (d)(3) require an operator to submit a received numerous comments stating quantitative description of the physical, description of the methods used to the proposed requirements were too aerodynamic, and harmful perform the vehicle impact and breakup prescriptive. The FAA agrees and has characteristics of hazardous debris is a analysis in accordance with revised the requirements to be more prerequisite to compute statistically § 450.115(c), which is consistent with performance-based. valid debris impact probability similar changes in other FSA sections. In the final rule, the FAA revises the distributions and to quantify the risks to The final rule also moves the exposure model requirements and the public. requirements relevant to the debris moves them from proposed § 450.135(c) The propagation of debris is a propagation analysis from proposed and (d) to § 450.123 (Population physics-based analysis that predicts § 450.135(e)(2) and (e)(5) to Exposure Analysis). The FAA moves the where debris impacts will occur given a § 450.121(d)(3) and (d)(4). population exposure analysis debris event while the vehicle is in The FAA re-designates and revises requirements out of the proposed debris flight, such as jettison of a vehicle stage proposed § 450.121(d)(3) as risk analysis section because this or an explosion. The FAA moves the § 450.121(d)(5). In the NPRM, proposed analysis informs other sections of the requirements in proposed § 450.135(b) § 450.121(d)(3) required an applicant to FSA. A population exposure analysis to § 450.121(c) because the computation submit all debris fragment lists must also be used to provide input to of statistically-valid debris impact necessary to describe the physical, other public risk analyses to address distributions naturally depends on the aerodynamic, and harmful toxic hazards and far-field overpressure nature of the debris and the trajectory characteristics of each debris fragment blast effects, if any. This change does

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not an expand the scope of the final rule use reliable, accurate, and timely source final rule. The FAA revises the final beyond what was proposed in the data. § 450.123(c)(1), which requires an NPRM because the NPRM identified the Section 450.123(b)(1) relocates the applicant to submit a description of the need for population exposure input to requirements in proposed FSA methodology, to reference address toxic hazards for flight and far- § 450.135(c)(2), but removes the term § 450.115(c). As previously noted, the field overpressure blast effects.121 The ‘‘vulnerability’’ and the reference to population exposure analysis must also rationale for the final rule requirements critical assets, as discussed earlier.122 be used to provide input to other public remains the same as proposed in the The final rule removes proposed risk analyses to address toxic hazards NPRM: An exposure model provides § 450.135(c)(4), which would have and far-field overpressure blast effects, critical input data on the geographical required the exposure model to have if any. Section 450.123(c)(2) requires an location of people and critical assets at sufficient temporal and spatial applicant to submit complete various times when the launch or resolution that a uniform distribution of population exposure data, in tabular reentry operation could occur. While people within each defined region can form, which is a more concise statement the rationale remains the same, the FAA be treated as a single average set of equivalent to proposed § 450.135(e)(4). makes two changes in § 450.123. characteristics without degrading the In the final rule, the FAA specifies that Consistent with the change discussed in accuracy of any debris analysis output. the complete population exposure data the critical assets section of the By removing this requirement, an must be in tabular form and deletes the preamble, the FAA removes the operator may demonstrate compliance requirement that the description of the requirement for an operator to with § 450.123(b) in the manner set exposure input data include, for each characterize the distribution and forth in proposed § 450.135(c)(4), but population center, a geographic vulnerability of critical assets. The FAA also has flexibility to demonstrate definition and the distribution of also revises the population exposure compliance through other means. population among shelter types as a analysis to require that input data must Section 450.123(b)(2) replaces the function of time of day, week, month, or account for the vulnerability of people more prescriptive requirements in year. The population exposure data to hazardous debris effects. The FAA proposed § 450.135(c)(3) by removing provided under § 450.123(c)(2) may will issue a Population Exposure the requirement that, in accounting for reflect some or all of the information Assessment AC to describe a possible the distribution of people among described in proposed § 450.135(e)(4). structures and vehicle types, an means of compliance. s. Probability of Failure Analysis exposure analysis includes ‘‘a resolution Section 450.123(a) requires that an (§ 450.131) FSA must account for the distribution of consistent with the characteristic size of In the NPRM, proposed § 450.131 people for the entire region where there the impact probability distributions for covered probability of failure analysis is a significant probability of impact of relevant fragment groups.’’ The language requirements for all launch and reentry hazardous debris. This final rule is removed from the final rule remains a vehicles. In the final rule, the FAA consistent with the requirement in valid means for an operator to adopts proposed § 450.131 with minor proposed § 450.135(c)(1) that the demonstrate compliance with revisions codifying current practices population exposure data would be § 450.123(b)(2) in the final rule. and eliminating the proposed classes of required to include the entire region Section 450.123(b)(3) replaces the mishaps referenced in § 450.131. where there is a significant probability more prescriptive requirements in proposed § 450.135(c)(5) and (c)(6) so Section 450.131(a) proposed that for of impact of hazardous debris. The each hazard and phase of flight, an FSA definition of ‘‘hazardous debris’’ in that an exposure analysis must use reliable, accurate, and timely source for a launch or reentry would be § 401.7 informs the scope of this required to account for vehicle failure requirement. In § 450.123(a), the data. Section 450.123(b)(4) consolidates probability. The probability of failure standard of ‘‘significant’’ means that the and replaces the requirements to would be required to be consistent for scope of the population exposure account for the vulnerability of people all hazards and phases of flight. For a analysis is bounded by what is to hazardous debris effects that were vehicle stage with fewer than two necessary to demonstrate compliance proposed in § 450.135(d)(3)(i) and (ii), flights, the failure probability estimate with the risk criteria in § 450.101(a) and as well as proposed in § 450.137(b)(4). would be required to account for the (b), consistent with the scope In the final rule, the FAA removes the outcome of all previous flights of requirements set in §§ 450.113 and requirement in proposed § 450.135(c)(7) vehicles developed and launched or 450.115. altogether. Proposed § 450.135(c)(7) is reentered in similar circumstances. For Section 450.123(b) sets constraints on redundant in conjunction with the a vehicle or vehicle stage with two or the population exposure analysis requirements in § 450.115(b), which more flights, vehicle failure probability consistent with proposed § 450.135(c)(2) specify the necessary fidelity of any estimates would be required to account through (c)(7). Specifically, § 450.123(b) FSA, and the requirement in for the outcomes of all previous flights requires that the exposure analysis must § 450.101(g) that an operator must use of the vehicle or vehicle stage in a characterize the distribution of people accurate data and scientific principles statistically valid manner. The outcomes both geographically and temporally; and the analysis must be statistically of all previous flights of the vehicle or account for the distribution of people valid. vehicle stage would be required to among structures and vehicle types; and The FAA moves and revises the account for data on any partial failure application requirements in proposed and anomalies, including Class 3 and 121 Specifically, in § 450.139(f) the FAA proposed Class 4 mishaps, as defined in proposed to require an applicant submit (ii) the population § 450.135(e)(3) as § 450.123(c)(1) in the density in receptor locations that are identified by § 401.5. The FAA adopts § 450.131(a) as toxic dispersion modeling as toxic hazard areas; 122 However, the proposed requirement in proposed with a minor change to the and (iv) the identity of the population database § 450.135(c)(4) to characterize the vulnerability of language pertaining to mishaps to reflect used. Also, in § 450.137(c)(1) the FAA proposed to people both geographically and temporally is revisions to the definition of ‘‘mishap’’ require an applicant submit a description of the effectively preserved in the final rule requirement population centers, terrain, building types, and in § 450.123(b)(4) to account for vulnerability of in § 401.7. The FAA notes that the final window characteristics used as input to the far-field people to hazardous debris effects in the population rule replaced the term ‘‘partial failures’’ overpressure analysis. exposure analysis. with ‘‘mishap’’ in § 450.131(a)(2)

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because the proposed language from both CCAFS and Vandenberg Air In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that, referenced both anomalies and mishaps, Force Base (VAFB). In this case, the for FSA purposes, a failure occurs when and ‘‘partial failure’’ is redundant since best-available data indicates the mean a vehicle does not complete any phase any partial failure could qualify as an conditional probability of a failure of normal flight or when any anomalous anomaly or a mishap under § 401.7, during first stage and second stages of condition exhibits the potential for a depending on the nature of the failure. flight are both 50 percent, with plus or stage or its debris to impact the Earth or Virgin Galactic commented that the minus 10 percent uncertainty at a reenter the atmosphere outside the proposed requirements to gather and minimal level of confidence (e.g., 60 normal trajectory envelope during the account for anomaly data in the percent lower and upper bound mission or any future mission of similar probability of failure analysis confidence limits at 40 percent and 60 vehicle capability. It further stated that introduced additional workload percent based on the binomial Class 1 or Class 2 mishaps would compared to the current regulation. It distribution). constitute failures. recommended the FAA adopt a Given the fact that the public Blue Origin commented that defining performance-based standard in an exposure to hazardous debris effects for failure as not completing any phase of SNPRM. launches from VAFB is relatively high normal flight is ‘‘overly punitive’’ as The FAA does not agree that this during stage one, and the opposite is proposed in § 450.131(b). Operators may requirement results in additional true for launches from CCAFS, a define secondary mission objectives for workload from current regulations. The consistent and reasonably conservative research and development purposes FAA notes that the final rule probability of failure analysis would use that, if not achieved, do impact mission requirement in § 450.101(g) is relevant a 60–40 split in the conditional success but do not impact safety. Blue here because it requires that a method probability of failure during stage one Origin proposed deleting the language must produce results consistent with, or and stage two flight for launches from ‘‘when a vehicle does not complete any more conservative than, the results VAFB, but a 40–60 split in the phase of normal flight or’’ and anchor available from previous mishaps, tests, conditional probability of failure during the definition in impacts outside the or other valid benchmarks, such as stage one and stage two flight for normal envelope. Virgin Galactic 123 higher-fidelity methods. Hence, an launches from CCAFS. Furthermore, the recommended that the FAA should only operator has the option to use a more conditional probability of a failure account for failures, partial failures, and conservative approach to avoid any applied to different hazards, such as anomalies that affect public safety. Blue unnecessary additional workload. For debris and toxics, must be consistent Origin also commented that including example, an operator can assume one with each other. More details on means anomalies that might impact a future more failure than the actual outcomes of of compliance are provided in the High mission conflicts with the causal logic all previous flights of the vehicle or Fidelity FSA Methods AC published that an anomaly experienced on a given vehicle stage. Therefore, the FAA does with this rule, and a future AC on mission will be subject to corrective not find that the requirements in the probability of failure. actions prior to the next mission. The FAA understands the concerns final rule constitute additional workload Leo Aerospace asked if the FAA raised by the commenters but finds it compared to current regulations. would consider a balloon platform to be unnecessary to change the regulatory Boeing requested clarification on a stage. what is meant by a ‘‘consistent’’ text to address these concerns. An The FAA will discuss project-specific operator may adjust its final failure probability of failure in this section. The information, including whether a FAA clarifies that the vehicle or vehicle probability estimates to account for balloon platform is part of a launch various extenuating circumstances, as stage probability of failure must be vehicle stage, during pre-application consistent internally with outcomes of will be described in a future Probability consultation. of Failure Analysis AC. For example, previous flights, as described in Boeing, Blue Origin, and Sierra § 450.131(a)(1) and (a)(2). Furthermore, the probability of failure may be Nevada commented on the lack of adjusted based on extenuating the probability of failure input data availability of previous flight must be consistent for all phases of circumstances with justification (e.g., if information for vehicles not operated or the failure is not public safety related or flight and hazards. In this context, owned by the applicant. ‘‘consistent’’ does not mean identical if corrective actions implemented after a The FAA responded to this comment and does not preclude an operator from failure were demonstrated to be in the FAA’s ‘‘Responses to the Public’s varying the probability of failure within successful). If an operator makes any Clarifying Questions Received by July statistical confidence limits for the same adjustments to the final failure 12, 2019,’’ 125 which is posted in the event in different contexts, in order to probability estimates to account for docket. An operator should use the best- bias an analysis towards a conservative various extenuating circumstances, it available data, which in many cases outcome.124 The probability of failure can update its FSA in accordance with would be limited to publicly available input data should be reasonably § 450.103(d). data. The FAA will also provide data conservative and consistent across The FAA notes that, for FSA and guidance on failure mode and phase phases of flight and for various hazards purposes, the vehicle failure probability of flight allocations in the High Fidelity given the uncertainty in each accounts for any failure of the launch or FSA Methods AC, which will be probability of failure. reentry system because of the way finalized with this rule. A hypothetical example is a proposed failure is defined in § 450.131(b). In the final rule, the FAA replaces all launch of a two-stage launch vehicle Specifically, for FSA purposes, a failure references to Class 3 and Class 4 occurs when a vehicle does not 123 Because the FSA is necessary to demonstrate mishaps in § 450.131 with the term complete any phase of normal flight or compliance with the risk criteria in § 450.101, the ‘‘mishap.’’ As previously noted, the when any anomalous condition exhibits requirements set forth in that section regarding the FAA eliminates the proposed classes of the potential for a stage or its debris to validity of analysis apply to all parts of the FSA. mishaps in the revised definition of impact the Earth or reenter the 124 Section 450.115(b)(1) requires an operator to mishap in § 401.7 of the final rule. demonstrate that any risk to the public satisfies the atmosphere outside the normal safety criteria of § 450.101 accounting for all known trajectory envelope during the mission sources of uncertainty. 125 See FAA–2019–02290–0134. or any future mission of similar vehicle

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capability. Therefore, in the context of changes the word ‘‘deorbit’’ to ‘‘reentry’’ first and second phases of flight. FSA, any failure of the launch or reentry to accommodate a reentry that starts on Therefore, because the required input system, including pilot error, that a suborbital trajectory. data may involve a similar level of produced vehicle failure as defined in In the NPRM, § 450.131(d) proposed experience of the vehicle operation and § 450.131(b) must be taken into to require that a vehicle probability of development team members, the final account.126 failure be distributed across flight times rule in § 450.131(d)(2)(iii) retains that Proposed § 450.131(c) defined and vehicle response modes. The consideration. ‘‘previous flight’’ by stating that the distribution would be consistent with The FAA adopts the observed and flight of a launch vehicle begins at a the data available from all previous conditional failure rate requirements in time when a launch vehicle normally or flights of vehicles developed and § 450.131(e) as proposed and the inadvertently lifts off from a launch launched or reentered in similar application requirements in § 450.131(f) platform and the flight of a reentry circumstances and data from previous with revisions. Section 450.131(f)(1) to vehicle or deorbiting upper stage begins flights of vehicles, stages, or require methods used in probability of at a time when a vehicle attempts to components developed and launched or failure analysis be in accordance with initiate a deorbit. The FAA adopts reentered by the subject vehicle § 450.115(c) because that section sets § 450.131(c)(1) as proposed with a developer or operator. As proposed, the out the requirements for FSA minor change. The FAA strikes the data could include previous experience methodologies. In § 450.131(f)(2), the words ‘‘normally or inadvertently’’ as involving, among other things, a similar FAA changes the term ‘‘vehicle redundant, since any lift off, whether level of experience of the vehicle response mode’’ to ‘‘failure mode,’’ normal or inadvertent, would count as operation and development team which is consistent with similar a flight under the proposed and final members. changes throughout this final rule. The FAA adopts § 450.131(d) with rule requirements in § 450.131(c)(1). t. Flight Hazard Area Analysis Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop revisions. Specifically, the FAA changes (§ 450.133) Grumman, ULA, and Virgin Galactic ‘‘flight time’’ to ‘‘flight phase.’’ ‘‘Flight requested explanation on whether the phase’’ gives applicants more flexibility In § 450.133, the NPRM proposed proposed requirement in § 450.131(c) in their analysis because it is less general requirements for the flight would apply to hybrid vehicles. specific than ‘‘flight time.’’ The FAA hazard area analysis as well as In the final rule, the FAA revises the also changes ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ requirements specific to waterborne regulatory text in response to these to ‘‘failure mode,’’ consistent with vessel hazard areas, land hazard areas, comments. The FAA changes ‘‘launch similar changes throughout the final airspace hazard volumes, and the platform’’ to ‘‘surface of the Earth’’ as rule. Finally, the FAA replaces the license application. In the final rule, the the point at which flight begins for a phrase ‘‘launched or reentered’’ in FAA adopts § 450.133 with revisions. probability of failure analysis. This § 450.131(d)(2) to ‘‘launched, reentered, The revisions include changing terms change reflects the fact that various flown, or tested.’’ This change will proposed in the NPRM and removing types of vehicles, such as hybrids, do enable the probability of failure redundant requirements. not lift off from launch platforms. The allocation across flight phases and Proposed § 450.133(a) stated that an probability of failure analysis must failure modes to account for data from FSA would be required to include a account for the probability of failure previous flights of vehicles, stages, or flight hazard area analysis that identifies during all phases of flight to ensure components by the subject vehicle any region of land, sea, or air that would public safety, including captive carry, developer or operator that did not be required to be surveyed, publicized, unless the exception in § 450.113(b) qualify as launch or reentry operations, controlled, or evacuated in order to applies to that phase of flight. For such as drop tests or glide flights. The control the risk to the public. A flight example, an aircraft crash with a rocket FAA also revises ‘‘flight phases’’ and hazard area analysis would be required attached can present much higher risks ‘‘failure modes’’ to be plural in the final to account for all reasonably foreseeable to the public from an explosion, toxic rule. This amended language is a minor vehicle response modes during nominal release, or inert impact, than the risks grammatical change and is consistent and non-nominal flight that could result posed by an aircraft crash without a with the intent of the proposed in a casualty. The NPRM specified six rocket attached. requirement. items that would be required to be For the purposes of § 450.131(c)(1) Virgin Galactic commented that the included in a flight hazard area analysis, and (c)(2), a previous flight may include FAA should not employ a subjective at a minimum. flights conducted outside FAA licensed measure of ‘‘level of experience’’ and The FAA adopts § 450.133(a) with activity, such as amateur, permitted, requested this language be stricken. revisions. The FAA moves the U.S. government, or foreign launches, The FAA asserts that this measure is requirement in § 450.133(a) that a flight reentries, or flights. For the purposes of not subjective. The High Fidelity FSA hazard area analysis must account for § 450.131(c)(1) and (c)(2), a previous Methods draft AC contained specific all reasonably foreseeable vehicle flight may include FAA-licensed quantitative thresholds that have been response modes during nominal and activity, such as the Falcon 9 launch used for many years as guidelines to non-nominal flight that could result in vehicle anomaly which destroyed the distinguish new versus experienced a casualty to § 450.133(a)(1). This text is vehicle and its AMOS–6 payload,127 if developers for the purposes of also revised, as discussed below. The the outcome exhibited the potential for probability of failure analyses. Because replacement of ‘‘vehicle response a stage or its debris to impact the Earth the quantitative thresholds are in modes’’ with ‘‘failure modes’’ was or reenter the atmosphere outside the guidance, the FAA may consider other discussed in the preamble section on normal trajectory envelope during the quantitative thresholds as appropriate. § 450.101(c)(2). mission or any future mission of similar Furthermore, the data available from In § 450.133(a)(1), the FAA proposed vehicle capability. The FAA also previous flights of ELVs developed by that the flight hazard analysis must experienced and inexperienced account for the regions of land, sea, and 126 The SpaceShipTwo accident on October 31, operators demonstrates a statistically air potentially exposed to debris impact 2014, is an example of this situation. significant difference between the resulting from normal flight events and 127 On September 1, 2016. relative frequency of failures during the from debris hazards resulting from any

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potential malfunction. The FAA revises conditions’’ to ‘‘atmospheric the issue raised by AOPA is best proposed § 450.133(a)(1) by adding the conditions’’ because in some cases, such addressed by the NOTAM/AIS term ‘‘hazardous debris’’ as discussed in as far-field overpressure blast and toxics Modernization effort rather than this the preamble section for § 450.121 analyses, the temperature profile is an rulemaking. Industry can provide input (Debris Analysis). As defined, atmospheric condition that may also be on this effort through the Aeronautical hazardous debris includes any object or stipulated as part of the flight commit Information Systems Coalition. substance capable of causing a casualty criteria (in addition to the wind profile). Information regarding temporary flight or loss of functionality to a critical asset, This change does not create any restrictions (TFR) can be found at: such as an intact vehicle, vehicle additional burden to the operator https://tfr.faa.gov/tfr2/list.html and is fragments, any detached vehicle because the proposed and final searchable by the type of TFR being component, whether intact or in requirements in § 450.135(e)(1) and implemented. The FAA plans to fragments, payload, and any planned § 450.165(b)(2) already require an complete the NOTAM/AIS jettison bodies. The FAA also replaces operator to account for and identify the Modernization effort by late 2022. In ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ with ‘‘failure conditions immediately prior to addition, an acceptable flight hazard modes’’ for consistency throughout the enabling the flight of a launch vehicle area analysis methodology is addressed final rule. or the reentry of a reentry vehicle that in the High Fidelity FSA AC. In § 401.7, the FAA modifies the are necessary to demonstrate Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop definition of ‘‘flight hazard area’’ as compliance with the safety criteria in Grumman, and ULA also provided applied to part 450. The NPRM § 450.101, such as the atmospheric suggested regulatory text that stated the proposed that flight hazard area means conditions and any meteorological airspace hazard volume was only any region of land, sea, or air that must conditions. The final rule in necessary for airspace up to 60,000 feet be surveyed, publicized, controlled, or § 450.133(a)(3) clarifies that all mean sea level. The FAA agrees that the evacuated in order to ‘‘protect public atmospheric conditions are analysis only needs to account for health and safety and the safety of considerations when the operator reasonably expected air traffic in a given property.’’ This language was establishes the worst conditions under region, but, in order to account for inconsistent with the language in which flight might be attempted. operations in different regions, does not § 450.133. As such, in the final rule, the In § 450.133(a)(4), the FAA proposed change the text to a specific altitude. definition has been revised in § 401.7 that the analysis account for the debris The FAA adopts § 450.133(b), (c), and for consistency to state that a flight identified for each foreseeable cause of (d) as proposed. Section § 450.133(b)(1), hazard area is any region of land, sea, breakup, and any planned jettison of (c)(1), and (d)(1) state that flight hazard or air that must be surveyed, publicized, debris, launch or reentry vehicle areas must be determined as necessary controlled, or evacuated in order to components, or payload. The FAA to contain, with 97 percent probability ‘‘ensure compliance with the safety adopts § 450.133(a)(4) with a revision. of containment, all debris resulting from criteria in § 450.101.’’ For reasons previously discussed, the normal flight events capable of causing Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop FAA replaces this section with ‘‘all a casualty to any person located on Grumman, and ULA suggested replacing hazardous debris,’’ which uses the term land, sea, or air. In the NPRM, the FAA ‘‘all reasonably foreseeable’’ with defined in § 401.7 of the final rule. This explained that proposed § 450.133(b)(1), ‘‘credible’’ because credibility is revision does not change the intent of (c)(1), and (d)(1) would align FAA established in the system safety the requirement. regulations with practices at the Federal analysis. As discussed previously, the In § 450.133(a)(5), the FAA proposed launch or reentry sites by allowing FAA does not agree with the that the analysis account for all operators to reduce or otherwise recommendation because the term foreseeable sources of debris dispersion optimize the size of the regions for credible is prone to errors in judgment during freefall, including wind effects, warnings of potential hazardous debris whereas the term foreseeable is more guidance and control, velocity imparted resulting from normal flight events. readily discerned by analysis (e.g., fault by breakup or jettison, lift, and drag Virgin Galactic stated that, given the trees). The final rule moves the term forces. The FAA adopts § 450.133(a)(5) currently available information and ‘‘reasonably foreseeable’’ from proposed with revisions. In the final rule, the tools regarding debris, the 97 percent § 450.133(a) to § 450.133(a)(1), where it analysis must account for sources of probability of containment requirement more appropriately modifies the debris dispersion in accordance with in proposed § 450.133(b)(1), (c)(1), and language in § 450.133(a)(1) that specifies § 450.121(c). The FAA makes this (d)(1) would result in inflated hazard the analysis must account for the revision to avoid replication of area determinations. Boeing, Lockheed regions of land, sea, and air potentially requirements between §§ 450.133(a)(5) Martin, Northrop Grumman, and ULA exposed to hazardous debris generated and 450.121(c) and to ensure commented on proposed § 450.133(b)(1) during normal flight events and all consistency in the FSA. and suggested it reference current 3- reasonably foreseeable failure modes. AOPA commented that the FAA sigma standards. Boeing stated that, The FAA adopts § 450.133(a)(2) with should provide the public an given the new limitation on debris, a minor correction. The FAA replaces authoritative source of flight hazard area changing from 99.7 percent to 97 ‘‘control risk to any hazard’’ in the information as well as guidance on percent containment appeared less safe. NPRM with ‘‘control risk from any various flight hazard area analysis The final rule retains the 97 percent hazard’’ in the final rule. methodology. The FAA is working on containment requirement proposed in In § 450.133(a)(3), the FAA proposed the NOTAM/Aeronautical Information the NPRM. The FAA notes that the that the analysis account for the limits Service (AIS) Modernization effort, comments demonstrate a difference of of a launch or reentry vehicle’s normal which will redesign the current opinion in the industry regarding the flight, including winds that were no less NOTAM management information appropriate probability of containment severe than the worst wind conditions system with a single technology gateway requirement for flight hazard areas, with under which flight might be attempted for entering, processing, and retrieving Virgin Galactic claiming the proposal and uncertainty in the wind conditions. all NOTAM data, making it easier for all would result in inflated hazard area The FAA adopts § 450.133(a)(3) with users of the airspace to access safety- determinations, as opposed to the other revisions. The FAA changes ‘‘wind critical information. The FAA finds that commenters calling for more stringent

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hazard area requirements to maintain contours or probability of casualty requirements and ensure consistency public safety. The FAA finds the 97 contours to meet the risk requirements throughout subpart C of part 450. percent containment requirement strikes in § 450.101 for sea, land, and air. In § 450.133(e)(1)(i), the FAA an appropriate balance, particularly Blue Origin commented that the proposed that an applicant provide when coupled with the requirement to intent of these requirements seems to be input wind data and justification in the include the collective risk contribution to establish hazard areas for normal application. The FAA did not adopt this from people in waterborne vessels in the operations and mishaps, but the proposal in the final rule. Rather, the public risk criteria in § 450.101. As requirements do not explicitly state that FAA deletes proposed § 450.133(e)(1)(i) noted in the NPRM, the FAA adopts the risk criteria applies to malfunction because this application requirement is flight hazard area regulations for trajectories. Blue Origin proposed that covered in § 450.117(c). Section waterborne vessels consistent with past the FAA should specify that risk 450.117(c) accounts for all atmospheric waivers that the FAA granted to ensure contours should be conducted for conditions that have an effect on the they align with current practices at the malfunction trajectories. trajectory, including worst case Federal launch ranges, where most The FAA notes the proposed atmospheric profile conditions under commercial launches take place requirement in § 450.133(a) that a flight which flight might be attempted. currently. Recent experience from hazard area analysis must account for In § 450.133(e)(2), the FAA proposed commercial and U.S. Government all reasonably foreseeable vehicle that an applicant submit tabular data launch and reentry operations response modes during nominal and and graphs of the results of the flight demonstrates that the requirements non-nominal flight that could result in hazard area analysis, including in adopted eliminate unnecessary launch a casualty also specified that the risk § 450.133(e)(2)(iv) and (v) the following: ¥ delays while ensuring that the overall contours required in proposed if applicable, representative 1 × 10 5 ¥ level of safety provided to the public § 450.133(e)(2)(iii) through (v) must and 1 × 10 6 probability of impact remains consistent with the public risk account for malfunction trajectories. contours for all debris capable of criteria in § 450.101. The FAA notes that However, the FAA revises the causing a casualty to persons on a the application of a risk management requirement to state in § 450.133(a)(1) waterborne vessel regardless of location; that the flight hazard area analysis must and representative 1 × 10¥6 and 1 × approach to ensure the safety of people ¥ in waterborne vessels is consistent with account for the regions of land, sea, and 10 7 probability of impact contours for recommendations made by the National air potentially exposed to hazardous all debris capable of causing a casualty Academy of Sciences.128 The FAA finds debris generated during normal flight to persons on an aircraft regardless of that public safety is not compromised events and ‘‘all reasonably foreseeable location.129 by changing 99.7 percent containment failure modes,’’ which includes Blue Origin commented that, by × ¥6 × ¥7 to 97 percent containment because the malfunction trajectories. In addition, the requiring 1 10 and 1 10 risk overall public risk criteria must also be FAA revises the risk contour contours for waterborne vessels and met, irrespective of the size of the requirement in § 450.133(e)(2)(iii), aircraft, respectively, the FAA was hazard areas. From a policy perspective, which is explained below in the extending application requirements the final rule approach to protect people discussion on that requirement. The beyond those either currently codified in waterborne vessels achieves the goal FAA notes that the High-Fidelity FSA in part 400 or proposed in part 450. The FAA notes that, as stated in the of common standards for launches from Methods AC describes one acceptable NPRM preamble, these contours are any U.S. launch site, Federal or non- methodology for flight hazard areas, necessary for the applicant to Federal. Both industry and the National which accounts for malfunction demonstrate to the FAA sufficient Space Council have urged government trajectories. computational resolution and analysis agencies involved in the launch and Virgin Galactic commented that fidelity for the results that are critical to reentry of vehicles by commercial requirements for waterborne vessels should also be in § 450.101. The FAA public safety. Thus, the FAA declines to operators to work towards common notes that the operator must meet adopt the recommended change. For standards. these reasons, the FAA adopts Boeing also requested clarification on individual and collective risk § 450.133(e)(2)(iv) and (e)(2)(v) as how containment boxes for nominal requirements, as stated in § 450.101. People on waterborne vessels are proposed. impacts can use the same standard as In § 450.133(e)(2)(iii), the FAA hazard areas intended to contain debris included in the collective and individual risk calculations. However, proposed that an applicant would be in the much less likely event of a required to submit representative failure. The FAA notes that planned as explained in the NPRM, operators have the option to use the current individual probability of casualty hazardous debris impacts must use a approach in part 417 as a means of contours regardless of location. probability of 1 in the analysis in compliance, which requires surveillance Virgin Galactic requested clarification accordance with § 450.133(a)(6), while to ensure no ship is exposed to more on the meaning of the term ‘‘regardless hazardous debris impacts due to a than 1 × 10¥5 probability of impact, of location.’’ Based on the context in failure will have a probability applied as proposed § 450.133(a), which required determined from the § 450.131 because that will be generally sufficient to ensure compliance with § 450.101. the flight hazard area analysis to probability of failure analysis. identify any region of land, sea, or air The FAA adopts § 450.133(b)(2), In § 450.133(e)(1), the FAA proposed that the applicant submit a description that must be surveyed, publicized, (c)(2), and (d)(2) as proposed. These controlled, or evacuated in order to sections use probability of impact of the methodology to be used in the flight hazard area analysis including all control the risk to the public, the term ‘‘regardless of location’’ referred to 128 In 2001, the NRC published a report on assumptions and justifications for the ‘‘Streamlining Space Launch Range Safety,’’ which assumptions, vulnerability models, whether the contours are on land, sea, included a recommendation that ‘‘safety procedures analysis methods, and input data. In the based on risk avoidance should be replaced with final rule, the FAA revises this 129 The FAA received no comments on procedures consistent with the risk management § 450.133(e)(2)(i) and (ii) and adopts philosophy specified by EWR 127–1.’’ See p. 44 of requirement by adding that the analysis § 450.133(e)(2)(i) as proposed and § 450.133(e)(2)(ii) IBSN 0–309–51648–X available at http:// must be done in accordance with a revision include a cross-reference to the hazard www.nap.edu/catalog/9790.html. § 450.115(c) to avoid replication of area publication requirement in § 450.161.

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or air. In the final rule, the FAA changes applicable ‘‘flight commit criteria and risk analyses to address toxic hazards the term ‘‘regardless of location’’ to ‘‘for flight abort rules’’ if such controls are and far-field overpressure blast effects, all locations specified in paragraph (a)’’ necessary to ensure compliance with the if any. As discussed earlier, this is not for more specificity. The FAA further public risks as required in proposed and an expansion of the scope because the specifies that ‘‘representative final § 450.165(b). NPRM identified the need for probability of casualty contours’’ must There is no additional burden on the population exposure input to address account for both neighboring operations operator due to the updated language in toxic hazards for flight and far-field personnel (at the 1 × 10¥5 probability of § 450.135(a)(2), because this overpressure blast effects. casualty level) and other members of the requirement is consistent with the In proposed § 450.135(d), the FAA set public (at the 1 × 10¥6 probability of proposed requirements in forth the features of a valid casualty area casualty level). Hence, the requirement §§ 450.135(e)(1) and 450.165(b)(2). An and consequence analysis. Proposed in § 450.133(e)(2)(iii) of the final rule operator is required to account for and § 450.135(d) stated that a debris risk specifies that representative individual identify the conditions immediately analysis would be required to model the probability of casualty contours include prior to enabling the flight of a launch casualty area and compute the predicted tabular data and graphs showing the vehicle or the reentry of a reentry consequences of each reasonably hypothetical location of any member of vehicle that are necessary to foreseeable vehicle response mode in the public that could be exposed to a demonstrate compliance with the safety any one-second period of flight in terms ¥ probability of casualty of 1 × 10 5 or criteria in § 450.101, such as the of CEC. The NPRM also specified that greater for neighboring operations atmospheric conditions and any other the contents of a casualty area and personnel, and 1 × 10¥6 or greater for commit criteria. The final rule in consequence analysis must account for, other members of the public, given all § 450.135(a)(2) now explicitly at a minimum, the items proposed in foreseeable conditions within the flight acknowledges that a valid debris risk § 450.135(d)(1) through (d)(3).130 commit criteria. analysis must account for any In the final rule, the FAA revises and The FAA adds this explicit language applicable flight commit criteria and re-designates the requirements proposed to the application requirement to reflect flight abort rules when the operator in § 450.135(d) to § 450.135(b). In what is necessary to demonstrate establishes if the present conditions addition, the FAA replaces the term compliance with the substantive produce public risks consistent with the ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ with ‘‘failure requirements for flight hazard area safety criteria in § 450.101. mode,’’ consistent with similar changes analysis as proposed in the NPRM and In § 450.135(b), the FAA proposed made throughout the final rule and as set forth in the final rule. performance-based requirements to discussed further in § 450.101(c)(2) of Specifically, the substantive address the physical phenomena that this preamble. The FAA also replaces requirements proposed in influence the propagation of debris, the term ‘‘one-second period of flight’’ § 450.133(b)(2) and (c)(2), which which the analysis would be required to with ‘‘significant period of flight,’’ as required an operator to determine the account for to compute the probability discussed in the preamble section areas of water and land where the of impact of debris on people and associated with high consequence event individual probability of casualty for critical assets. In the final rule, the FAA protection. any person on a vessel or on land would adopts and moves these requirements In the NPRM, the FAA included a exceed the criterion in § 450.101(a)(2) or with revisions to § 450.121(c), as definition of ‘‘casualty area’’ in § 401.5, (b)(2), would necessarily have required discussed in the section of this defined as the area surrounding each a demonstration consistent with the preamble on Debris Analysis. There potential debris or vehicle impact point revised application requirements. were two reasons for moving the where serious injuries, or worse, can proposed propagation of debris u. Debris Risk Analysis (§ 450.135) occur. The FAA adopts this definition requirements in § 450.135(b) to as proposed. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to § 450.121(c). First, the computation of SpaceX commented the FAA should require that a debris risk analysis be valid impact probability distributions is modify proposed § 450.135(d) to require performed to determine whether the relevant to more than the debris risk that the casualty area and consequence individual and collective risk of public analyses; for example, valid impact analysis not only account for the items casualties meet the safety criteria in probability distributions are necessary in proposed § 450.135(d)(1) through § 450.101. The debris risk analysis for the development of flight hazard (d)(3) but also model them would be required to compute areas and the yield-probability pairs conservatively. The FAA notes that the statistically-valid debris impact used as input to the far-field term ‘‘account for’’ already includes probability distributions using the input overpressure analysis. Second, although using conservative data or assumptions data produced by FSAs required in the relationships between the FSA for all inputs and results of an analysis, proposed §§ 450.117 through 450.133. sections are complex and pursuant to § 450.101(g). Thus, this In the final rule, the FAA adopts interdependencies exist, the FAA change would be redundant. § 450.135 with revisions. sought to lay out the FSA requirements As previously discussed, the Proposed § 450.135(a) stated that a in a sequential order. requirements for debris propagation in debris risk analysis would be required In § 450.135(c), the FAA proposed the § 450.135(b) have been relocated in the to demonstrate compliance with safety features of a valid population exposure final rule to § 450.121(c). As a result, the criteria in proposed § 450.101, either analysis. In the final rule, the FAA FAA adds a requirement in prior to the day of the operation, by adopts and moves these requirements § 450.135(b)(2) that a casualty area and accounting for all foreseeable conditions with revisions to § 450.123, as discussed consequence analysis must account for within the flight commit criteria or in the preamble associated with that during the countdown using the best section. As noted, the FAA moved the 130 The FAA received no comments on available input data. The FAA adopts population exposure analysis § 450.135(d)(1), which requires the casualty and § 450.135(a) with revisions. Specifically, requirements out of the proposed debris consequence analysis to account for all relevant debris fragment characteristics and the the FAA adds in § 450.135(a)(2) that the risk analysis section because a characteristics of a representative person exposed to ‘‘best available input data’’ used during population exposure analysis must also any potential hazard. The FAA adopts this the countdown must include any be used to provide input to other public requirement without change.

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statistically-valid debris impact the proposed requirements because the have contemplated the need to account probability distributions. This definition includes the concept of all for the effect of atmospheric conditions requirement is derived from the hazard sources and the direct impacts of on debris impact effects now explicitly requirements in proposed § 450.135(b). debris fragments, intact impact, or required under § 450.135(b)(4)(ii). The FAA notes that without indirect impact effects. In the NPRM, proposed statistically-valid impact probability In the NPRM, the FAA required in § 450.135(d)(3)(vi) specified that the distributions it would be impossible to proposed § 450.135(d)(3) that the analysis account for uncertainty in compute the predicted consequences of analysis account for the vulnerability of fragment impact parameters. In the final each reasonably foreseeable failure people and critical assets to debris rule, the FAA re-designates proposed mode in any significant period of flight impacts. In the final rule, the FAA § 450.135(d)(3)(vi) as § 450.135(b)(4)(iv). in terms of conditional expected moves proposed § 450.135(d)(3) as The FAA also requires in the final rule casualties, as required in proposed § 450.135(b)(4) and strikes the reference that the analysis account for uncertainty § 450.135(d) and § 450.135(b) of the to critical assets, as explained in the in the input data, such as fragment final rule, because the consequence of preamble section on critical assets. The impact parameters. Although the any failure depends on the FAA also re-designates and adopts uncertainty in fragment impact characteristics of the debris (such as the proposed § 450.135(d)(3)(i) as parameters typically has a pronounced casualty area) predicted to impact § 450.135(b)(4)(i) in the final rule. As effect, it is conceivable that exposed populations. Thus, the FAA discussed, the proposed requirements in uncertainties in the input data more finds the final rule is consistent with the § 450.135(d)(3)(ii) and (d)(3)(iii) are generally could affect the vulnerability NPRM in requiring this information as captured in § 450.135(b)(3) in the final of people to hazardous debris effects. part of a debris risk analysis. rule. The FAA finds these changes consistent In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in with the proposed and final require that the casualty area and § 450.135(d)(3)(iv) that the analysis requirements in § 450.115(b)(1) that an consequence analysis account for any must account for the effect of wind on operator’s FSA method must have a direct impacts of debris fragments, debris impact vector and toxic releases. level of fidelity sufficient to account for intact impact, or indirect impact effects, In the final rule, the FAA re-designates all known sources of uncertainty.132 in proposed § 450.135(d)(2). It also proposed § 450.135(d)(3)(iv) as In the NPRM, proposed § 450.135(e) proposed that the analysis account for § 450.135(b)(4)(ii). The FAA also revises listed the application requirements the vulnerability of people and critical the requirement so that the analysis associated with the debris risk analysis, assets to debris impacts including all must account for the effect of including the casualty area and hazard sources, such as the potential for atmospheric conditions on debris consequence analysis. Proposed impact and effects known to influence any toxic or explosive energy releases, § 450.135(e)(1) required an applicant to the vulnerability of people to hazardous in proposed § 450.135(d)(3)(ii) and submit a description of the methods debris impacts. For example, wind can indirect or secondary effects such as used to compute the parameters typically have a pronounced effect on bounce, splatter, skip, slide or ricochet, required to demonstrate compliance the debris impact vector as illustrated in including accounting for terrain, in with the safety criteria in proposed the FAA FSA Handbook. In addition, proposed § 450.135(d)(3)(iii). § 450.101, including a description of In the final rule, the FAA consolidates other atmospheric conditions, such as how the operator would account for the the three proposed requirements into the presence of a temperature inversion conditions immediately prior to § 450.135(b)(3). Section 450.135(b)(3) can have a significant effect on the enabling the flight of a launch vehicle more simply states that the analysis vulnerability of people to toxic or the reentry of a reentry vehicle, such must account for ‘‘any impact or effects releases.131 of hazardous debris,’’ because the new The change from the proposed as the final trajectory, atmospheric definition of ‘‘hazardous debris’’ in § 450.135(d)(3)(iv) implemented in the conditions, and the exposure of people § 401.7 reflects the scope of the NPRM final rule in § 450.135(b)(4)(ii) does not and critical assets. requirements. In the final rule, the use create any additional burden to the In the final rule, the FAA re- of the defined term ‘‘hazardous debris’’ operator because this requirement is designates and adopts proposed in § 450.135(b)(3) replaces the consistent with the proposed § 450.135(e)(1) as § 450.135(c)(1) with requirement in proposed requirements in §§ 450.135(e)(1) and revisions. The FAA removes the § 450.135(d)(3)(ii) to account for all 450.165(b)(2). An operator is required to proposed requirement to submit a hazard sources, such as the potential for account for and identify the conditions description of the methods ‘‘used to any toxic or explosive energy releases. immediately prior to enabling the flight compute the parameters’’ required to It also replaces the requirement in of a launch vehicle or the reentry of a demonstrate compliance with the safety proposed § 450.135(d)(2) to account for reentry vehicle that are necessary to criteria in § 450.101. Instead, the FAA any direct impacts of debris fragments, demonstrate compliance with the safety replaces this requirement with a intact impact, or indirect impact effects. criteria in § 450.101, such as the requirement to submit a description of Also, the final rule uses the phrase ‘‘any atmospheric conditions and any the methods used to demonstrate impact or effects’’ of hazardous debris to meteorological conditions. Furthermore, compliance with the safety criteria in replace the proposed requirements to given the proposed requirement in § 450.101, in accordance with account for any direct or indirect effects, § 450.135(d)(vi) to account for the § 450.115(c). This change is consistent including indirect or secondary effects uncertainty in fragment impact with other FSA sections. Also, the FAA such as bounce, splatter, skip, slide, or parameters in assessing the strikes the reference to critical assets as ricochet, including accounting for vulnerability of people to debris explained in the preamble section terrain. The FAA’s use of the defined impacts, an operator already would associated with critical assets. term hazardous debris, discussed previously, allows for consistency 131 The FAA re-designates and adopts proposed 132 The FAA re-designates and adopts proposed throughout the final rule with regard to § 450.135(d)(3)(v) as § 450.135(b)(4)(iii) without § 450.135(d)(3)(vii) as § 450.135(b)(4)(v) without substantive changes in the final rule. The FAA substantive change in the final rule. The FAA the scope of the FSA requirements. This received no specific comments on the proposed received no specific comments on the proposed revision does not change the scope of requirement. requirement.

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In the NPRM, the application analysis using input data for present an environment conducive to requirements in § 450.135(e)(2) atmospheric conditions that lead to far-field overpressure. addressed the methods used to compute risks just below the limits set in Section 450.137(a)(1) does not require debris impact distributions. In the final § 450.101 (i.e., worst foreseeable a full FSA the day before launch. rule, the FAA moves proposed conditions) and running the debris risk Instead, § 450.137(a) requires the far- § 450.135(e)(2) to § 450.121(d)(3). analysis using more typical atmospheric field overpressure blast effect analysis Proposed § 450.135(e)(3) and (e)(4) conditions that produce risks clearly be performed either as a ‘‘screening’’ addressed population exposure data. In below the limits. Under the worst analysis prior to the day of the the final rule, those requirements are foreseeable conditions, the collective operation, accounting for all foreseeable moved to § 450.123(c). These changes risk results for people on land could be conditions within the flight commit are described in the preamble sections such that the operator would need to criteria, or during the countdown using associated with those sections.133 perform additional surveillance of areas the best available input data. The The FAA moves the application to ensure the absence of waterborne requirement in § 450.137(a)(1) does not requirements in proposed vessels, whereas under representative have a time constraint for when the § 450.135(e)(8)(i) through (iii) regarding conditions such surveillance would not ‘‘screening analysis’’ must be the collective and individual debris risk be necessary to ensure compliance with completed. In response to Microcosm’s outputs to § 450.135(c)(5)(i) through (iii) collective risk limits in § 450.101(a)(1) comment, the FAA notes that, in order and removes the proposed requirement and (b)(1). The FAA does not anticipate to determine that local meteorological to report critical asset results in that there will be significant additional conditions do not present an § 450.135(e)(8)(iv), as discussed further burden in providing the analysis for environment conducive to far-field in the critical asset section of this representative conditions. overpressure, an operator would preamble. necessarily be required to perform an The FAA revises and re-designates the v. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effect analysis under § 450.137(a)(1). As such, application requirements in proposed Analysis, or Distant Focus Overpressure § 450.137(a)(1), as proposed and § 450.135(e)(9) on the collective and (DFO) (§ 450.137) adopted without change, allows an individual debris risk outputs as In the NPRM, § 450.137 proposed operator to demonstrate that a far-field § 450.135(c)(6). The FAA replaces the requirements for far-field overpressure overpressure analysis need not be term ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ with blast effects analysis. Proposed performed during the countdown if the ‘‘failure mode.’’ This revision is § 450.137(a) required that a far-field flight commit criteria are sufficient to consistent with changes throughout the overpressure blast effect analysis ensure compliance with § 450.101. final rule. The FAA also changes the demonstrate compliance with safety In the NPRM, the FAA proposed term ‘‘one-second interval’’ to criteria in proposed § 450.101 either requirements associated with analysis ‘‘significant period,’’ as explained in the prior to the day of the operation, constraints in § 450.137(b) that set preamble section on CEC. accounting for all foreseeable conditions required performance outcomes and the SpaceX commented that it was not within the flight commit criteria, or specific factors that a far-field clear why proposed § 450.135(e)(8) and during the countdown using the best overpressure blast effect analysis must (9) would require debris risk analysis to available input data. In the final rule, consider. Blue Origin commented that include both representative conditions the FAA adopts § 450.137(a) with one the proposed requirements in and the worst foreseeable conditions, revision. § 450.137(b) were prescriptive. The FAA arguing that if the worst foreseeable The final rule in § 450.137(a)(2) agrees that the proposal was conditions meet requirements, then specifies that far-field overpressure unnecessarily specific in § 450.137(b)(3) representative conditions are of no analysis performed during the through (5) and revises these consequence. The FAA responds that, countdown using the best available requirements. for the purposes of § 450.135(c)(5) and input data must also include flight In the NPRM, § 450.137(b)(3) (c)(6), worst foreseeable conditions commit criteria and flight abort rules. proposed that the analysis account for means those conditions that produce the The FAA notes that the best available the explosive capability of the vehicle at highest individual, collective, and input data specified in proposed impact and at altitude, and potential conditional risks under which the § 450.137(a)(2) would naturally include explosions resulting from debris operator would initiate the launch or flight commit criteria and flight abort impacts, including the potential for reentry. An operator can submit the rules because those would generally mixing of liquid propellants. In the final same debris risk analysis results for have a significant influence on the rule, the FAA revises the language in representative conditions and the worst public risks posed by hazardous debris proposed § 450.137(b)(3) and relocates it foreseeable conditions in cases where effects. Hence, the phrase ‘‘including to § 450.137(b)(1) to reflect the order in there is no difference between flight commit criteria and flight abort which the FAA expects the analysis will representative conditions and the worst rules’’ is consistent with the be conducted. As rewritten, foreseeable conditions that are requirement for a debris risk analysis in § 450.137(b)(1) in the final rule requires significant to public safety. § 450.135(a)(2). the analysis to account for the explosive However, the FAA foresees the Virgin Galactic commented that capability of the vehicle and hazardous potential for situations where the § 450.137(a)(1) appeared to require an debris at impact and at altitude. As differences between the representative FSA the day before launch for the discussed previously, the FAA uses the conditions and the worst foreseeable portion of its launches involving its definition for ‘‘hazardous debris’’ to conditions would require additional carrier aircraft’s captive carriage of the reflect the scope of the NPRM operational mitigations. An example spaceship. Virgin Galactic expressed a requirements. The final rule also would be running the debris risk concern about the operational impact removes the phrase ‘‘potential for and additional workload of a day of mixing of liquid propellant’’ because it 133 The FAA adopts without change and re- launch analysis. Microcosm requested is redundant with ‘‘explosive designates proposed § 450.135(e)(5) through (e)(7) clarification on whether the regulations capability,’’ which is already included as § 450.135(c)(2) through (c)(4) in the final rule. The FAA received no specific comments on these required a day of launch analysis if in the requirement. The FAA has also proposals. meteorological conditions did not removed reference to solid propellant

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impacts because they are part of the approach.134 Furthermore, the FAA from FAA, as these aircraft most explosive capability. confirms that the analysis tool in use by commonly carry jet fuel. Virgin Galactic In the NPRM, proposed the U.S. government has been used by commented that, although jet fuel may § 450.137(b)(1) required that the the U.S. commercial space be considered a toxic substance, it is analysis account for the potential for transportation industry at non-Federal carried by thousands of aircraft every distant focus overpressure or sites as well. day and thus performing a toxic release overpressure enhancement given The FAA adopts § 450.137(c) with hazard analysis for jet fuel would not current meteorological conditions and only two minor modifications. In the have a material effect on public safety. terrain characteristics. In the final rule, NPRM, § 450.137(c)(6) explicitly The FAA acknowledges that, the FAA re-designates proposed identified that an applicant would be historically, no toxic release hazard § 450.137(b)(1) as § 450.137(b)(2). The required to submit the analysis results analysis has been required for kerosene- FAA also requires in § 450.137(b)(2) that given foreseeable meteorological based fuels, such as jet fuel, and agrees the analysis must account for the conditions, yields, and population that such an analysis would be unnecessary in most instances. influence of meteorological conditions exposures. In the final rule, § 450.137(c)(6) Therefore, in the final rule, the FAA and terrain characteristics. The FAA requires that the application include the revises the applicability language in notes meteorological conditions are individual risk data given foreseeable §§ 450.139(a) and 450.187(a) to create an known to have a potentially substantial conditions. The FAA also revises exception from the toxic release hazard influence on the propagation and § 450.137(c)(7) in this manner. The FAA analysis for kerosene-based fuels unless attenuation of blast waves with peak notes generally that the same elements the Administrator determines that an incident overpressures at or below 1.0 of the foreseeable conditions listed in analysis is necessary to protect the psi. In the final rule, the FAA removes the NPRM influence the results of the public safety. The FAA anticipates that the reference to current meteorological far-field overpressure blast effects such an analysis will be required for conditions in proposed § 450.137(b)(1) analysis. Thus, the reworded final rule uses of kerosene-based fuels that are to reflect that an applicant may use a maintains the same scope and intent of novel or inconsistent with standard screening analysis pursuant to the NPRM application requirements. industry practices. The FAA will work § 450.137(a)(1) to demonstrate The FAA adds this language because the with operators during pre-application additional analysis is not required by proposal was unnecessarily limited. consultation to identify any kerosene- accounting for all foreseeable conditions based propellants requiring a toxic within the flight commit criteria. w. Toxic Hazards (§§ 450.139 and 450.187) release hazard analysis under In the NPRM, proposed §§ 450.139 or 450.187. § 450.137(b)(2) required that the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to Proposed § 450.139(b) required an analysis account for the potential for consolidate requirements for toxic operator to conduct a toxic release broken windows due to peak incident release analysis into two performance- hazard analysis and manage the risk of overpressures below 1.0 psi and related based regulations: §§ 450.139 (Toxic casualties from exposure to toxic release casualties. In the final rule, the FAA re- Hazards for Flight) and 450.187 (Toxic either through containing hazards in designates proposed § 450.137(b)(2) as Hazards Mitigation for Ground accordance with proposed § 450.139(d) § 450.137(b)(3) and adds the essential Operations). Although the two proposed or by performing a toxic risk elements from proposed § 450.137(b)(4) sections contained a number of assessment, under proposed through (b)(6). Those sections contained similarities, the FAA divided them into § 450.139(e), that protects the public unnecessary details regarding shelter two sections because ground operations consistent with the safety criteria types, time of day, characteristics of and flight operations had different proposed in § 450.101. Furthermore, potentially affected windows including proposed criteria to establish an proposed § 450.139(b)(3) required an size, location, glazing material, and acceptable level of public safety. operator to establish flight commit characteristics of potential glass shards. Proposed §§ 450.139(a) and 450.187(a) criteria based on the results of its toxic made the sections applicable to any Section 450.137(b)(3) removes these release hazard analysis, containment launch or reentry vehicle, including all analysis, or toxic risk assessment for any details and captures the concept of the vehicle components and payloads, that requirements proposed in necessary evacuation of the public from use toxic propellants or other toxic any toxic hazard area. The FAA adopts § 450.137(b)(4) through (b)(6) by adding chemicals. language to reflect that the potential for § 450.139(b) as proposed. Virgin Galactic requested that the In the NPRM, paragraph (b) was broken windows due to peak incident FAA create an exception to §§ 450.139 inadvertently omitted from the overpressures below 1.0 psi and related and 450.187 for carrier aircraft on regulatory text to § 450.187; however, casualties must ‘‘be based on the hybrid systems that already possess a the preamble discussed that proposed characteristics of exposed windows and standard airworthiness certificate or § 450.187(b) would, like proposed the population’s susceptibility to injury, experimental airworthiness certificate § 450.139(b), require an operator to with considerations including, at a manage the risk of casualties from minimum, shelter types, window types, 134 A valid approach is described in ‘‘Safety exposure to toxic release by either and the time of day of the proposed Design for Space Operations,’’ Allahdadi, Firooz A., containing the hazards or performing a operation.’’ Isabelle Rongier, Tommaso Sgobba, Paul D. Wilde (Eds.), ‘‘Safety Design for Space Operations,’’ toxic risk assessment. The preamble Blue Origin commented that the Sponsored by The International Association for the stated that for ground operations, an constraints could be accomplished by Advancement of Space Safety, published by operator using a toxic risk assessment an analysis tool available only to the Elsevier, Watham, MA, 2013. The only three topics not addressed in that reference (updated explosive must demonstrate compliance with government. The FAA disagrees that the impact yield models, launch availability analyses proposed § 450.109(a)(3), rather than far-field overpressure analyses can only based on past measurements of meteorological § 450.185(c).135 The FAA adds be accomplished using a tool available conditions, and satisfaction of license application paragraph (b) to § 450.187 in the final to the U.S. government. Currently requirements) are addressed in AC 450.137 ‘‘Distant Focusing Overpressure Risk Analysis Supplemental rule. As discussed later in this section, available materials contain a detailed Topics,’’ which is planned to be published after this technical description of a valid final rule. 135 84 FR 15395.

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the FAA revises the toxic risk regarding the ‘‘a worst-case toxic or §§ 450.139(f) and 450.187(e). Although assessment criteria for ground maximum credible release scenario.’’ proposed §§ 450.139(d) and 450.187(c) operations by replacing the reference to Thus, in the final rule, a ‘‘toxic hazard detailed the two ways in which an proposed § 450.109(b)(3) with a area’’ means ‘‘a region on the Earth’s operator could perform toxic reference to § 450.185(c). The FAA also surface where toxic concentrations and containment, the NPRM did not specify revises § 450.139(b)(3) to refer to ‘‘toxic durations may be greater than accepted how an operator would demonstrate containment,’’ rather than a ‘‘toxic toxic thresholds for acute casualty in the compliance with the toxic containment containment analysis,’’ as this term does event of a worst-case toxic or maximum requirements in their application. In the not appear in the regulation. credible release scenario during launch final rule, the FAA adds an application Proposed §§ 450.139(c) and or reentry.’’ The FAA revises this requirement for toxic containment, in 450.187(b) set forth the requirements for definition to ensure that the toxic §§ 450.139(f)(8)(i) and 450.187(f)(8), toxic release hazard analysis. The FAA hazard area is consistent whether the which reflects the substantive adopts the substance of those provisions operator performs a toxic risk requirements for performing toxic in the final rule, but re-designates assessment or toxic containment. The containment. That is, if toxic proposed § 450.187(b) as § 450.187(c), to revised definition of ‘‘toxic hazard area’’ containment is selected, the applicant account for the addition of new is consistent with the approach taken in must identify the evacuation plans or § 450.187(b). current regulation in Appendix I to part meteorological constraints and As noted, §§ 450.139(b) and 417 under I417.5(c), which directly associated launch commit criteria or 450.187(b) in the final rule require an links the toxic concentration thresholds ground hazard controls that it will operator to manage the risk of casualties to the size of the toxic hazard area. The employ to ensure that the public will that could arise from the exposure to FAA anticipates that the toxic not be within a toxic area in the event toxic release through toxic containment concentration thresholds used in an of a worst-case or maximum credible or by using a toxic risk assessment. accepted means of compliance for release scenario. The FAA notes that an Toxic containment, as proposed in §§ 450.139 and 450.187 will generally applicant will need to submit the §§ 450.139(d) and 450.187(c), required be consistent with those in Appendix I information required by this subsection an operator to manage the risk of to part 417 under I417.5(c). in order to demonstrate compliance casualty from the exposure to toxic The final rule’s requirements for a with the substantive requirements for release either by evacuating, or being toxic risk assessment under § 450.139(e) toxic containment in §§ 450.139(d) and prepared to evacuate, the public from a are unchanged from the proposal. A 450.187(c). toxic hazard area, or by employing toxic risk assessment must meet the The FAA revises the application meteorological constraints. In either safety criteria of § 450.101 and account requirements, in §§ 450.139(f)(8)(ii) and scenario—evacuation or employment of for: Airborne concentration and 450.187(f)(9), to reflect the substantive meteorological constraints—the operator duration thresholds of toxic propellants requirements of toxic risk assessment. If would be required to demonstrate that or other chemicals; physical phenomena a toxic risk assessment is performed, an average member of the public would expected to influence any toxic then the applicant must account for the not be exposed to greater than one concentration and duration; the toxic public that may be exposed to airborne percent conditional individual hazard area and the meteorological concentrations above the toxic probability of casualty in the event of a conditions involved; and all members of concentration and duration thresholds, worst-case release or maximum credible the public that may be exposed to the release scenario. The FAA received a toxic release. describe any risk mitigations applied in formal comment from NASA during the In the final rule, § 450.187(e), which the toxic risk assessment, describe the interagency review on proposed contains the requirements for a toxic population exposure input data used in § 450.139(d) and § 450.187(c). The FAA risk assessment for ground operations, accordance with § 450.123 (Population revised these provisions in the final rule includes one revision from the proposal. Exposure Analysis), and demonstrate consistent with the updated definition As mentioned, proposed § 450.187(d) compliance with the applicable public of toxic hazard area described below. required an operator using toxic risk risk criteria (for flight, the risk criteria Specifically, § 450.139(d)(1) and assessment to manage the risk from any in § 450.101; for ground operations, the § 450.187(c)(1) require an operator using toxic release hazard and demonstrate risk criteria in § 450.185(c)). Lastly, the toxic containment to manage the risk of compliance with the criteria in FAA replaced the term ‘‘population casualty from the exposure to toxic § 450.109(a)(3). The FAA replaces the density’’ with ‘‘population release either by evacuating, or being reference to proposed § 450.109(a)(3) characteristics’’ in § 450.139(f)(8)(ii)(2) prepared to evacuate, the public from with a reference to § 450.185(c) because and § 450.187(f)(9)(ii) because any toxic hazard area. These revisions the flight hazard analysis risk criteria characteristics other than density (e.g., are consistent with current practice. The were removed from § 450.109. The vulnerability of population) would be FAA also re-designates proposed standard in § 450.185(c) is the same as relevant to assessing potential effects of § 450.187(c) as § 450.187(d) to account in proposed § 450.109(a)(3); therefore, toxic release, as indicated by the for the addition of new § 450.187(b). there is no substantive change in the Population Exposure Analysis criteria in The FAA proposed to define ‘‘toxic criteria. As a result, an operator § 450.123. hazard area’’ in § 401.5 (§ 401.7 in the complies with the requirements for a Blue Origin commented that toxic risk final rule) as ‘‘a region on the Earth’s toxic risk assessment by demonstrating analysis tools were not currently surface where toxic concentrations and no more than an extremely remote available to operators, and that, unless durations may be greater than approved likelihood of toxic exposure causing the FAA facilitated access to these tools, toxic thresholds for acute casualty, in death or serious injury to the public, a sole-source provider of this service the event of a release during launch or using toxic concentration and duration may arise. One individual commenter reentry.’’ thresholds accepted by the asked what dispersion models were In the final rule, the FAA revises the Administrator as a means of acceptable to the FAA and commented proposed definition of ‘‘toxic hazard compliance. that the FAA should provide specific area’’ to include the language from In the final rule, the FAA amends the examples of allowable and acceptable proposed §§ 450.139(d) and 450.187(c) application requirements proposed in toxic release and dispersion mitigations.

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The FAA disagrees that the tools rigor with reductions in the software’s mitigations. Virgin Galactic stated that needed to analyze risks associated with degree of autonomy. software need not be categorized by a potential release of toxic substances In the final rule, the FAA revises levels of consequence and degrees of during launch or reentry are not proposed § 450.111 and re-designates it control if the software development currently available to operators. as § 450.141 (Computing Systems). process was linked to a system safety However, the FAA will issue an AC Although the scope of the requirements program. entitled, ‘‘Toxic Hazards for Flight,’’ for operators under § 450.141 does not The FAA agrees that some of the that will provide guidance and differ substantially from the proposed requirements proposed in § 450.111 examples of publicly available tools for version, the FAA replaces prescriptive were too prescriptive, potentially overly conducting the required toxic release requirements with performance-based burdensome, and could have the effect hazard analyses, as well as a toxic risk standards and provides increased of discouraging technological assessment and toxic containment. This flexibility for operators to demonstrate innovation to improve safety.137 The guidance will include information on: compliance with § 450.141. The final FAA also agrees with the commenters’ • Determining the airborne toxic rule levies requirements for computing discussion of the limitations of concentration threshold or level of system safety items in proportion to autonomy as a criterion for level of concern (LOC) for each toxic propellant their criticality rather than their rigor. In the final rule, the FAA revises or toxic combustion by-product; autonomy; requires independent the requirements for computing • Determining the worst-case quantity verification and validation for safety- systems, which are now located in of any toxic release that might occur critical computing system safety items; § 450.141 to address the commenters’ during the proposed flight of a launch and retains the NPRM’s focus on concerns. Section 450.141 scales level of vehicle, or that might occur in the event development and testing processes rigor for computing system of a flight mishap; instead of direct inspection of software requirements based on system-level • Determining the worst-case quantity by the FAA. The FAA removed the criticality rather than on degree of of any toxic release that might occur term, ‘‘software,’’ from the section autonomy, and is designed to parallel during normal launch processing, and heading since ‘‘computing systems’’ the requirements of computing system that might occur in the event of a would include software. The FAA also safety responses to the existing mishap during launch processing; removes the definition of ‘‘control regulations. The existing regulations • Characterizing the terrain, as a entity’’ proposed in § 401.5 because the require plans for software development precursor for modeling the atmospheric term is no longer used in the final rule. and validation and verification plans transport of a toxic release from its A number of commenters stated the but remain silent on the acceptable source to downwind receptor locations; requirements proposed in § 450.111 content of those plans. The final rule • Determining the meteorological were overly prescriptive or difficult to requirements are designed to align with conditions for the atmospheric transport meet. SpaceX stated that the proposed current software safety submissions. of any toxic release from its source to software process would be more The FAA also removes prescriptive downwind receptor locations; burdensome and costly for applicants requirements from § 450.141, as detailed • Performing air quality dispersion than it had been under current in the following paragraphs, to increase modeling to predict concentrations at regulations and would prevent flexibility in application to current and selected downwind receptor locations applicants from utilizing safer methods future computing system designs. (by characterizing the atmospheric to construct a safety case. Blue Origin Section 450.141 requires the processes that disperse a toxic substance and SpaceX argued the proposed identification and assessment of the emitted by a source); and requirement would hinder technological public safety-related computing system • Determining the population density advances that could improve safety. requirements, functions, and data items, in receptor locations that could Blue Origin stated the proposal in order to streamline the evaluation of potentially be identified by air quality threatened innovation towards lower computing system safety. The final rule dispersion modeling as toxic hazard cost, higher quality, and safer software retains the requirement proposed in areas.136 approaches, but did not specify the § 450.111 to identify and assess the approaches that would be impeded by public safety implications of computing x. Computing Systems (§ 450.141) the NPRM. Rocket Lab similarly systems, which derives from the current In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in asserted that the proposal would hinder requirements in §§ 417.123(a) and § 450.111 (Computing Systems and the development of software for FSS, 431.35(c) to perform this assessment as Software) to require operators to the automation of which is currently a part of a system safety process. The develop a process that identifies and major area for innovation. Rocket Lab explicit identification of the public assesses hazards to public safety and the commented that the proposal did not safety related aspects of computing safety of property arising from allow flexibility to use other means of systems enables a reduction in the scope computing systems and software. functional system safety from equivalent of FAA’s evaluation compared to the Operators would have needed to industries or government standards, and current regulations. identify all safety-critical functions that the requirements would become In the final rule, § 450.141(a) requires associated with its computing systems quickly outdated as software an operator to identify computing and software and to classify software technologies and best practices evolve. system safety items, meaning any based on degree of autonomy. In the CSF also viewed the proposal as highly software or data that implements a NPRM, software safety requirements prescriptive and uneconomical for the capability that could present a hazard to would have increased in rigor with the FAA or for industry. CSF and SpaceX specifically rejected rise in the degree of autonomy of the 137 As an example, the FAA acknowledges the the degree of autonomy approach software. Conversely, software safety commenter’s concerns in particular with regard to proposed in § 450.111, noting that the requirements to document a process for requirements would have decreased in human involvement did not always identifying hazards arising from software; to meet software testing standards and hazard analyses 136 SpaceX made a comment referencing an produce a safer system. CSF suggested based on levels of autonomy; and to detail the agreements subsection of § 450.139(b), but no such the FAA scale the levels of rigor based functionality of all software having no safety subsection existed in the NPRM. on hazard effects and architectural impact.

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the public, and the criticality of each between the two safety analyses.138 For identified for items that did not computing system safety item, some systems, system-level criticality previously have known safety commensurate with its degree of control and degree of autonomy will produce requirements. over hazards to the public and the the same or similar allocations of rigor Section 450.141(b)(2) requires an severity of those hazards. For purposes in computing system development. An operator to ensure the safety of this section, a computing system applicant can propose to use degree of requirements are complete and correct. safety item is any item that is a autonomy as a proxy for system-level A computing system requirement set is computing system or software that has criticality based on that similarity, as it complete if it contains all of the some degree of control over hazards to is an industry standard method of requirements necessary to specify all of the public; a computing system that is determining level of rigor allocation. the functions and attributes needed for either a cause of or a mitigation for a This revision achieves the objective the computing system to perform its hazard that can affect the public. stated in the NPRM of tailoring safety required tasks. A computing system Computing system safety items include requirements based on criticality but requirement is correct if it specifies the not only software, but also software eliminates the prescriptive criticality correct functionality or attributes for the elements, including data, and interfaces levels proposed in the NPRM. The item to perform its intended system- that present or control risks to the criticality of each computing system or level functions. This can be public (e.g., software/hardware function must be assessed at the system accomplished as part of an applicant’s interfaces, and software/human level so the applicant can clearly normal software and computing system interfaces). The FAA uses the term demonstrate to the FAA how the system requirement review process. The FAA ‘‘computing system safety item’’ in uses computing systems and the does not require the applicant to order to provide a clean interface influence of each computing system conduct a separate public safety-specific between software safety, which controls safety item on public safety. review, provided the applicant’s Section 450.141(b) requires an risks due to flaws in logic, and system computing system requirement review operator to develop safety requirements safety, which controls risk. Software process accomplishes the intent of for each computing system safety item. runs on hardware in response to § 450.141(b)(2). A safety requirement specifies the commands and inputs, so a computing Section 450.141(b)(3) requires an implementation of one or more public operator to implement each safety system safety item is often more than safety-related functions, capabilities, or just software. ‘‘Level of criticality’’ here requirement. That is, the safety attributes in a computing system safety requirements reviewed in accordance means the combination of a computing item. The FAA notes that it uses the system safety item’s importance in the with § 450.141(b)(2) must be built into phrase ‘‘safety requirements’’ in the the system for verification in causal chain for a given hazard, which final rule differently than it did in the is commensurate to its degree of control, § 450.141(b)(4). Requirements are NPRM. In the NPRM, ‘‘software safety normally implemented by operators, and the severity of that hazard. requirements’’ referred to regulatory Computing system safety items that are and no special implementation process requirements for software. In § 450.141 is required for safety requirements. more influential on a causal chain for a of the final rule, ‘‘safety requirements’’ Section 450.141(b)(4) requires that the hazard of a given severity would be means computing system requirements applicant verify and validate the subject to a proportionally higher level that specify computing system attributes implementation of each safety of rigor in development and testing. The or functionality that have public safety requirement using a method appropriate degree of control may be evident in (1) significance. Identification of this subset for the level of criticality of the a system’s tolerance to a given of computing system requirements computing system safety item. computing system fault, (2) the related to public safety is essential to Computing system requirements are computing system’s autonomy in focus an operator’s safety efforts on normally verified and validated by a causing or preventing a hazard, (3) the those parts of the computing system combination of testing, analysis, and number and characteristics of other safety item that have public safety inspection. The NPRM proposed to system faults or failures required for the consequences. It will also streamline the require specific testing and verification hazard to manifest itself, or (4) some scope and depth of data required of methods that have not been retained in other measure devised by the applicant. applicants and the FAA’s evaluation the final rule due to the removal of process relative to current requirements, The requirement proposed in specific criticality levels for software. to the same extent as proposed § 450.111(c) to allocate development The final rule allows sufficient § 450.111. process rigor according to degree of flexibility for operators to implement Section 450.141(b)(1) requires an autonomy has been replaced with the methods and levels of rigor appropriate operator to identify and evaluate safety requirement in § 450.141(a)(2) to use for their operations. For example, a requirements for each computing system system-level criticality to set the development process that traces from safety item. Safety requirements are the minimum level of rigor in developing computing system requirements to subset of requirements that define and testing each computing system verification and validation evidence is features, capabilities, or behaviors that safety item. The FAA agrees with the necessary but may not be the only have public safety implications. This comments received on the shortcomings process for adequate verification and identification and evaluation process of allocation by degree of autonomy and validation; a process that traces from may identify new computing system the recommendation to use a system verification and validation tests to the safety items if safety requirements are safety approach to computing system intended computing system safety. System safety allocates level of functionality may be more appropriate rigor according to the criticality of each 138 Since the approach in proposed § 450.111 of using degrees of autonomy was largely informed by for third-party products. Operators may item in the system, and the revised MIL–STD–882E, this revised approach in § 450.141 use many different processes that regulation aligns software and of the final rule will reduce confusion and error accomplish traceability as long as the computing system level of rigor caused by translating between different allocation process demonstrates that the allocation with system safety’s level of schemes already adopted by other industry standards. This will also improve the rule’s verification and validation evidence is rigor allocation, erasing a difference resilience to future changes to standards. sufficient to verify and validate all of

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the computing system safety requirements, and verify and validate computing system safety items are requirements. their implementation including carried out by defined personnel in the Section 450.141(b)(4) further specifies independent verification and validation organization, though not necessarily that, for each computing system safety for safety-critical computing system individuals by name. item that meets the definition of ‘‘safety safety items. These regulatory Under § 450.141(c)(2), a development critical’’ in § 401.7, verification and requirements have the net effect of process must include processes for validation must include testing by a test identifying all safety-critical functions internal review and approval, including team independent of the development involving computing systems, since review that evaluates the division or organization. As defined in safety requirements necessarily include implementation of all safety § 401.7, a safety-critical item means a all safety-critical functions, capabilities, requirements, such that no person system, subsystem, component, and attributes of computing systems. approves their own work. This is condition, event, operation, process, or Section 450.141(c) requires operators consistent with proposed item, whose proper recognition, control, to implement and document a § 450.111(d)(4), which required performance, or tolerance, is essential to development process for computing independent verification and validation, ensuring public safety. A safety-critical system safety items identified in and proposed § 450.111(d)(5)(i), which computing system safety item is a § 450.141(a) appropriate for the level of required coding standards. Neither of computing system safety item of which criticality of the computing system those requirements could be met in proper recognition, control, safety item. The requirement to absence of a review and approval performance, or tolerance is essential to implement and document such a process that meets § 450.141(c)(2) of the ensuring public safety. As described in development process for all computing final rule, since acceptable performance the NPRM, the FAA uses the term system safety items is substantially of those tasks inherently includes ‘‘independent’’ to designate a similar to both existing rules and the review and approval by a person verification and validation group that requirements proposed in § 450.111, independent of those who did the work. has substantial and credible except in the final rule the requirement Software and computing system independence from the development is no longer contained in separate development is a complex set of actions, team. This independent group has a subsections for each level of autonomy and some subsets of those actions are separate personnel structure through at (proposed § 450.111(d) through (g)). As milestones that require review and least senior leadership, operates under explained in the NPRM preamble, the approval. This requirement means that distinct performance, technical, FAA needs to understand the those reviews and approvals must have schedule, and incentive pressures, and computing system development some degree of independence such that has the latitude to develop and test processes used for each computing no person approves their own work, and requirements independently. This system safety item, relative to its effect requires that the minimum set of independent verification and validation on public safety, in order to assess reviews and approvals contains reviews group can be a third party or an in- computing system safety. The final rule of the implementation of safety house group but in either case must calls for a development ‘‘process,’’ requirements. This association is have the technical, managerial, rather than a ‘‘plan,’’ that achieves the defined by generation, such as code schedule, and incentive same objectives key to a development written to implement a safety independence 139 to carry out its plan but affords applicants greater requirement, or by interaction, such as functions without undue pressure from flexibility to structure their processes as code that must function in order for a the development team. The requirement needed to satisfy § 450.141(c). Operators safety requirement to be met. Code for independent verification and need not employ a separate reviews conducted to meet this validation of safety-critical computing development process for each requirement need not be single events system safety items is broadly aligned computing system item. However, the but may be modularized in a manner with current practices for verification development process must be similar to the code itself as long as and validation. Specifically, the appropriate to the level of criticality of comprehensive understanding is minimum expectation is that safety- each computing system safety item to communicated between modular critical computing systems, such as which it is applied, and must satisfy the reviews. Computing system autonomous FSS, are subjected to a criteria listed in § 450.141(c), at a development efforts that use pre-commit level of verification and validation rigor minimum. and post-commit reviews to conduct a that can only be achieved by verification In order to demonstrate that a modularized code review process could and validation staff that are development process is appropriate to meet § 450.141(c)(2). The intent is that independent of the development the level of criticality of each computing code developed to implement safety organization. system safety item, an operator would requirements should be checked by at The requirement in proposed need to identify the tasks associated least one independent technical § 450.111(b) to identify all safety-critical with each safety item, along with its reviewer prior to its release. functions involving software is revised processes for reviewing, verifying, and Section 450.141(c)(3) requires the and included in § 450.141(b) of the final validating computing system safety operator to ensure that development rule. Section 450.141(b) requires the requirements. Section 450.141(c)(1) personnel are trained, qualified, and applicant to identify all safety requires a development process to capable of performing their roles. This requirements performed by computing define responsibilities for each task is consistent with § 450.111(d)(5)(i) of system safety items, check that the associated with a computing system the NPRM, which required coding safety requirements are complete and safety item. This requirement derives standards, which are an implicit part of correct, implement the safety from the requirement proposed in the training of development personnel. § 450.111(d)(5) for a software The final rule makes this implicit 139 Incentive independence means that the development plan; in order to be requirement in the NPRM explicit. independent verification and validation group is acceptable, the development process Personnel responsible for public safety rewarded based on some metric other than schedule or throughput, so that the schedule or throughput must assign responsibilities for its tasks must have training and experience demands that drive error rates upward do not also execution. This requirement intends to that enables them to discharge their drive testing thoroughness downward. ensure that development tasks for responsibilities effectively. In its

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application review, the FAA does not that is appropriate for the level of Section 450.141(d) contains the intend to verify the qualifications of criticality of the computing system application requirements for this individual development personnel, but safety item, and allows the operator to section. Each of the first five rather to verify that the operator has a define the levels of criticality that are requirements in paragraph (d) mirrors a process in place to put appropriately- appropriate for its operations. The key aspect of computing system safety, trained and experienced personnel in operator must determine, and the FAA allowing the applicant and FAA to public safety roles. will verify, which of the operator’s understand the rigor of development in Section 450.141(c)(4) requires a levels of criticality affect public safety terms of public safety. This structure is development process to define and which of the computing systems meant to reflect the typical formats of processes that trace requirements to described in the proposed operation are computing system safety data verification and validation evidence. in each of those public safety levels. submissions received by the FAA to This requirement is a performance Operators must then define verification date. The regulation requires an criterion that was implicit in the and validation procedures to test applicant to describe the computing proposed § 450.111(d)(5) software computing system safety items in system safety items, identify the safety development plan; FAA is making this appropriately representative requirements implemented by each criterion explicit and performance- environments. computing system safety item, provide based in the final rule to address Section 450.141(c)(7) requires a the development processes that commenters’ concerns. Traceability development process to define reuse generated them, provide evidence that from computing system requirement to policies that verify and validate the the development process was followed, verification and validation evidence safety requirements for reused and provide data verifying the correct significantly streamlines computing computing system safety items. This implementation of the safety system safety evaluations by connecting requirement was retained from requirements. These application the requirements that define a proposed § 450.111(d)(5)(v), which requirements need not be met in computing system’s capabilities to similarly required an operator to separate documents. evidence of their implementation. develop and implement software The application requirements of Importantly, this requirement applies to development plans, to include § 450.141(d) essentially replicate those all requirements for computing system descriptions of a policy on software proposed in § 450.111(h), except that safety items, as a lack of rigor reuse. In essence, the applicant is the revised regulation allows greater latitude to implement development inmanaging requirements on any required to have processes in place to computing system safety item is an processes that achieve the same goals by understand the safety implications of opportunity for undocumented or different means. An example of such an any computing system safety item unintended computing system safety alternative process would be a formal developed for a different project or requirements to be introduced into the mathematical proof that the code will purpose. system. function only as designed and that the Section 450.141(c)(5) requires a Section 450.141(c)(8) requires a design meets all of its requirements. A development process to define development process to define third- formal proof is preferable to an iterative processes for configuration management party product use policies that verify development and testing process, that specify the content of each released and validate the safety requirements for whenever practical, because a formal version of a computing system safety any third-party product. This proof demonstrates that every possible item. This requirement is a requirement was retained from action that a computing system system performance-based version of proposed proposed § 450.111(d)(5)(iv), which can take is safe whereas iterative § 450.111(d)(5)(ii), which required required an operator to develop and development can only approximate that configuration control. Configuration implement software development plans, demonstration. A formal proof would management at this level of performance to include a description of a policy on have required waivers under proposed is the baseline expectation for any use of any commercial-off-the-shelf § 450.111 but will not under § 450.141. computing system safety item because a software. The FAA replaces the term Several commenters recommended known configuration with a known ‘‘commercial-off-the-shelf software’’ in that hazards associated with computing history is required to provide the proposal with ‘‘third-party product’’ systems and software be addressed adequately for safety. The revised because commercial software is not the through other sections in part 450, requirement contains the performance only kind of third-party computing rather than in a dedicated section on criteria that were implicit in the NPRM. system that an applicant could use; computing systems and software. CSF, Section 450.141(c)(6) requires a government-off-the-shelf and free, open SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, and Virgin development process to define source products need strategies for safe Orbit stated that hazards associated with processes for testing that verify and use, and the policy does not need to computing systems and software should validate all safety requirements to the vary based on the nature of the third be addressed through the system safety extent required by § 450.141(b)(4). This party. The important characteristic is requirements for flight hazard analyses, means that safety requirements must be that the computing system was not proposed § 450.109. CSF commented tested in a manner consistent with their developed by the applicant, so FAA that a computing system was just one of level of criticality. The FAA removed a now uses ‘‘third-party’’ to describe it. many critical subsystems integrated into prescriptive requirement proposed in The final rule sets performance criteria a larger complex system, that all the NPRM for testing on flight-like for this requirement with the addition of systems and subsystems should be hardware 140 to increase flexibility. The the phrase ‘‘that verify and validate the analyzed and controlled for hazards, FAA requires verification and validation safety requirements in any third-party and that the fact that a particular system product.’’ This means that the safety may contain software should be 140 For each level of criticality in proposed requirements implemented by third- irrelevant to top level performance- 450.111(d) through (g), the FAA proposed that the party products must be subjected to based safety requirements. Blue Origin software component’s safety-critical functions must be tested on flight-like hardware, which must verification and validation just like and CSF recommended that the include nominal operation and fault responses for applicant-developed computing system requirements for safety-critical systems all safety-critical functions. safety items. in § 450.143 be used for software

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systems. SpaceX recommended that beyond nominal safety-critical system The FAA revises the regulation in a hazard analyses be limited to operation. Fault tolerance is not way that aligns better with the system demonstrating one fault tolerance for achievable for many software faults. safety process and replaces the safety-critical functions, including Similarly, the predicted environments prescriptive requirements identified by tolerance to faults in any inputs to the are defined and evaluated very commenters with performance-based functions (e.g., data loss, data differently for software than for other metrics. The final rule also aligns better corruption) and any downstream safety-critical systems under § 450.143. with industry standards, including ISO hardware or software effects required for The predicted operating environment 26262 and DO–178C. Virgin Galactic public safety (e.g., effecting thrust for computing systems is defined in noted similarities between proposed termination). computing system requirements, but § 450.111 and existing standards, and The FAA will retain a separate section those requirements are derived from the this similarity is intentional as the FAA for computing system requirements in mathematical relationships that the was attempting to codify those parts of the final rule. As stated in the NPRM software must embody, so the industry standards that were well suited preamble, the FAA consolidated the requirement to provide predicted to standardization. The final rule bears computing system safety requirements environments for computing systems is less similarity to existing standards, applicable to launch or reentry indistinguishable from providing the instead specifying the goals of those operations under a single section in computing system requirements and standards as requirements in § 450.141. § 450.141 of the final rule to address design documentation for computing The FAA has revised the computing software, firmware, and data, and the systems. systems and software safety way they operate in computing systems. Blue Origin, CSF, Sierra Nevada, requirements to contain the minimum The FAA based this approach on a Virgin Galactic, and Virgin Orbit set of performance requirements determination that software safety commented that any prescription in the necessary to address the public safety cannot be evaluated outside of the regulation should be moved to an AC as implications of a given operation. The computing system in which it operates. a means of compliance. Virgin Galactic FAA also removed many prescriptive Software and computing systems are commented that guidance material requirements from the regulation. This decision engines that, like humans, should be based on industry standard revision allows for more flexibility and control other vehicle systems that can development assurance processes. CSF thus consistency with industry present hazards to the public and suggested that ACs reference industry standards. therefore merit analysis of their control standards and to refer to new or existing CSF, SpaceX, and Virgin Galactic logic. Although computing systems and FAA ACs, such as AC 20–115C, AC 20– commented that the proposed rule was software must be factored into an 152, AC 20–153, AC 20–170, and AC not comprehensive enough and was operator’s system safety process and 20–174, to provide a detailed means of missing items such as aeronautical hazard control strategies, the FAA has compliance to performance-based databases, integrated modular avionics, determined that computing systems regulations for computing systems. regression testing, and other details. warrant separate consideration due to As discussed, the FAA has revised the Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX stated distinct characteristics that make them proposed requirements to be less that the proposal failed to address uniquely ill-suited to most traditional prescriptive in the final rule. The FAA object-oriented technology, model-based system safety methods. regulates software assurance only to the development, machine learning, tool Software assurance is often a more extent that it is used as a mitigation qualification, load control, formal appropriate mitigation strategy than strategy for computing system hazards. methods, robust protection and fault tolerance for software faults. The The FAA plans to issue guidance that partitioning, integrated modular FAA anticipates that any emergent avionics, and integration with the method for system safety analysis that will provide further clarity on the requirements in § 450.141, including the system process. handles software and computing As discussed, the final rule has been integration of existing software systems well will meet § 450.141 revised to remove prescriptiveness and assurance standards, such as the because such a method would increase flexibility. Therefore, because referenced ACs, with computing system necessarily produce the essential such prescription was removed from the safety processes. The FAA considers elements of computing system safety final rule, the FAA does not find the these changes in the final rule to be embodied in the regulation. That is, changes recommended by these consistent with the comments received. § 450.141 applies equally well to comments to be necessary. The FAA Blue Origin, CSF, Rocket Lab, SpaceX, dedicated computing system safety will address items like aeronautical and Virgin Galactic commented that the analyses and to system safety analyses databases, integrated modular avionics, requirements in proposed § 450.111 did that handle computing systems in an regression testing, and other details in not integrate well with most industry integrated manner. guidance documents. These items will applications and best practices. CSF and Furthermore, although computing be addressed by § 450.141(c), which SpaceX commented that the methods systems can be ‘‘safety critical,’’ as implements safety requirements for prescribed by the proposal were defined in § 401.7, the FAA declines to these and all other computing system incompatible with proven industry apply the requirements set forth in safety items. § 450.143 regarding safety-critical standards such as ISO 26262 141 and 142 An individual commenter suggested system design, test, and documentation DO–178C. that all hardware dependent on software to computing systems because those be vertically integrated and signal proof requirements do not adequately address 141 ISO 26262 is an adaptation of the Functional Safety standard IEC 61508 for Automotive Electric/ to protect against issues posed by cyber the idiosyncrasies of computing Electronic Systems. ISO 26262 defines functional systems. For example, § 450.143(b) in safety for automotive equipment applicable Canada approve all commercial software-based the final rule requires an operator to throughout the lifecycle of all automotive electronic aerospace systems. The FAA approved AC 20–115C design safety-critical systems to be fault- and electrical safety-related systems. July 2013, making DO–178C a recognized 142 DO–178C, Software Considerations in ‘‘acceptable means, but not the only means, for tolerant, fail safe, damage-tolerant, or Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification, is showing compliance with the applicable otherwise designed such that no fault the primary document by which the certification airworthiness regulations for the software aspects of can lead to increased risk to the public authorities such as FAA, EASA, and Transport airborne systems and equipment certification.’’

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security or signal interference. The FAA documentation requirements.144 In safety, and the FAA will work with an does not believe a change to the addition, under proposed § 450.143(a), applicant if it believes the applicant has regulations is necessary. Issues posed by operators required to use an FSS under failed to identify all safety-critical cyber security or signal interference that § 450.101(c) would be required to meet systems. The potential failure of safety- could pose a threat to public safety are the standards in § 450.145. critical systems is integral to the FSA, adequately addressed by the hazard The FAA also proposed to revise the and the vulnerabilities of safety-critical identification and mitigation definition of ‘‘safety critical’’ in § 401.5. systems must be accounted for in the requirements in § 450.141. As proposed, ‘‘safety critical’’ retained flight commit criteria, hazard analyses, SpinLaunch recommended that the the longstanding definition of being lightning protection criteria, proposed set of software requirements, something ‘‘essential to safe management of radio frequency to compliance plans, and test data be performance or operation,’’ and the prevent interference, and replaced with the requirement either to proposed definition further explained communications plans. submit a software plan and sample that a safety-critical system, subsystem, Virgin Galactic commented that the results or to demonstrate the capability component, condition, event, operation, requirements of § 450.143 are costly, of the software to perform as required. process, or item, is one whose proper time-consuming, burdensome, and recognition, control, performance, or contrary to the Commercial Space The requirement that an operator tolerance, is essential to ensuring public Launch Act requirement to only regulate either submit a software plan and safety. The FAA proposed to remove to the extent necessary. Virgin Galactic sample results or demonstrate the language in the existing definition requested that an applicant not be capability of the software would not stating that something is ‘‘safety mandated to comply with § 450.143 if it protect public safety adequately for critical’’ if it creates a safety hazard or can provide proof that a safety-critical three reasons. First, a software plan is provides protection from a safety system meets the safety criteria. insufficient without evidence of its hazard, because that language is The FAA acknowledges that, under execution. Section 450.141 requires an redundant. certain circumstances, an operator could operator to document a development In the final rule, the FAA adopts demonstrate that a safety-critical system process for all computing system safety § 450.143 with some revisions discussed would not need to have the robust items and provide evidence of its later in this section. The FAA also design and testing required of § 450.143. execution. Second, the minimum set of adopts the proposed definition of The FAA considered relieving an sample results that would be sufficient ‘‘safety critical’’ without substantive operator from the requirements in to verify protection of the public is the change and relocates it to § 401.7. Based § 450.143 if the safety criteria in set that meets the requirements in on the change to the definition of § 450.101 were met. However, the FAA § 450.141(b)(4) for verification of public ‘‘public’’ in the final rule, the FAA found that use of the safety criteria for safety-related functionality. Third, an changes the reference to ‘‘public safety’’ this purpose is not appropriate because adequate demonstration of software in the definition of ‘‘safety critical’’ to whereas the requirements in § 450.143 capability necessarily will include the ‘‘public safety and the safety of apply to safety critical systems—which, level of testing specified by § 450.141. property.’’ as defined, can be a system, subsystem, For these reasons, the FAA does not see Blue Origin, CSF, and one individual component, condition, event, operation, a distinction between § 450.141 and commented that the term ‘‘safety process, or item—the safety criteria in either the submission of a software plan critical’’ was ambiguous in light of the § 450.101 measure the effects of the and sample results or a demonstration proposed revision to § 401.5. failure modes of the vehicle as a whole, of software capability. A system is safety critical if its as analyzed in the FSA. Therefore, performance is essential to safe y. Safety-Critical Systems Design, Test, demonstrating compliance with the performance or operation. If the failure safety criteria in § 450.101 is not and Documentation (§ 450.143) of a system can create a hazard to the sufficient to relieve an operator from the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed public, then the system is a safety- requirements in § 450.143, because that standalone performance-based critical system. Section 450.143 would alternative would relieve the operator requirements for safety-critical systems apply to a safety-critical system unless from analyzing the vehicle’s discrete in § 450.143. The proposed an operator demonstrates through its systems, subsystems, components, requirements covered fault tolerance, flight hazard analysis that the likelihood conditions, events, operations, qualification testing, acceptance of of any hazardous condition associated processes, and items. The FAA finds hardware, and lifecycle management for with the system that may cause death or that analysis at this more discrete level all safety-critical systems including serious injury to the public is extremely is necessary to ensure safety of the FSS.143 In the NPRM, the FAA noted remote, pursuant to § 450.109(b)(3). Due public. that applicants using an FSS of any to the inherent risk to the public, an The FAA finds that a more reliability threshold would be required operator must demonstrate the appropriate method to provide to meet the proposed § 450.143 safety- reliability of a safety-critical system by flexibility and be responsive to Virgin critical system design, test, and meeting the requirements of Galactic’s concern is to rely on the flight § 450.143.145 hazard analysis in § 450.109. 143 As noted in the NPRM, an FSS is an integral The applicant’s identification and Specifically, the FAA revises tool to protect public health and safety and the proper management of safety-critical § 450.143(a) to exclude safety-critical safety of property from hazards presented by a systems is fundamental to mitigating systems for which an operator vehicle in flight. An FSS allows an operator to potential hazards and ensuring public demonstrates through its flight hazard exercise positive control of a launch or reentry vehicle, enabling an operator to destroy the vehicle, analysis that the likelihood of any terminate thrust, or otherwise achieve flight abort. 144 See 84 FR 15329. hazardous condition specifically A highly reliable FSS that controls the ending of 145 In addition to § 450.143, requirements in the associated with the system that may vehicle flight according to properly established final rule that apply to safety-critical systems are cause death or serious injury to the rules nearly ensures containment of hazards within also found in §§ 450.45(e)(3)(ii)(C), 450.103(c)(1), acceptable limits. For that reason, the FAA 450.103(d)(4), 450.107(b)(2), and 450.107(d)(1)(ii). public is extremely remote, pursuant to considers an FSS a safety-critical system. See 84 FR These requirements are discussed within those § 450.109(b)(3). As explained in the 15326. sections. preamble section associated with

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§ 450.109, the flight hazard analysis associated with these systems meet the tolerance for the design of safety-critical focuses on the reasonably foreseeable ‘‘extremely remote’’ standard in systems in the regulatory text, the FAA hazards to public safety resulting from § 450.109(b)(3) without subjecting them intended to accept other methods of the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. to the reliability requirements in safety design, including fail-safe 147 and In performing the flight hazard analysis, § 450.143. Furthermore, FSS required by damage-tolerant 148 systems like primary the operator is required in § 450.108(b)(2) must meet § 450.143 structures that generally cannot be § 450.109(b)(1)(ii) to identify reasonably without exception. redundant. This broader view of safe foreseeable hazards and corresponding The FAA also revises § 450.143(a) and design allows an operator to factor failure modes relevant to public safety removes the proposed requirement that planned operational restrictions, testing, resulting from system, subsystem, and all FSS required by § 450.101(c) must and inspection into the design to component failures or faults. Therefore, meet §§ 450.143 and 450.145. Instead, demonstrate that a system is broadly unlike the safety criteria in § 450.101, § 450.143(a) requires all safety-critical fault-tolerant. the flight hazard analysis explicitly systems except for the highly reliable The FAA acknowledges that its requires the operator to examine the FSS required by § 450.108(b)(1) to meet articulation of a fault-tolerant design hazards associated with the discrete the requirements in § 450.143. As requirement in the proposed regulation systems, subsystems, and components discussed in the flight abort section of did not accurately reflect the FAA’s of the vehicle. this preamble, an FSS required by statements in the NPRM preamble Thus, to provide increased flexibility § 450.108(b)(2) must comply only with allowing other methods of safe design, without reducing safety, the final rule § 450.143 rather than meeting the like fail-safe systems, damage-tolerant excludes certain safety-critical systems additional requirements proposed in systems, or other designs for graceful from the requirements of § 450.143 if an § 450.145. Likewise, an operator who degradation.149 A system that is operator demonstrates through its flight chooses to use flight abort as a hazard designed to be fail-safe or degrade hazard analysis that the likelihood of control strategy for reasons other than gracefully, whether it functions at a any hazardous condition specifically protecting against a high consequence reduced level or fails completely, does associated with the system that may event under § 450.101(c)(1) must also so in a way that protects people and cause death or serious injury to the satisfy the requirements of § 450.143 for property from injury or damage, or public is extremely remote, pursuant to its FSS. For reasons explained later in generally prevents a more serious failure § 450.109(b)(3). That is, the operator this section, highly reliable FSS under event. Such design is desirable, and was must show that specific requirements in § 450.145 do not need to comply with intended to be captured in the FAA’s § 450.143, which ensure that the system the general safety-critical systems design requirements for safety-critical will function reliably, are not entirely requirements of § 450.143 as was systems. In the final rule, the FAA necessary to mitigate the hazards proposed in the NPRM. amends § 450.143(b) to state only that specifically associated with the system The FAA proposed in § 450.143(b) to safety-critical systems must be designed to an extremely remote level. require that all safety-critical systems such that no credible fault can lead to For example, an operator’s launch follow reliable design principles. increased risk to the public beyond vehicle may have a number of systems Specifically, an operator would be nominal safety-critical system whose failure could potentially cause required to design those systems to be operation. The final rule gives the hazardous debris to impact the public. fault-tolerant so that no single credible operator flexibility to achieve this If an operator chooses to launch in a fault could lead to increased risk to the requirement through a design that is sparsely populated area and limit public. fault-tolerant, fail-safe, damage-tolerant, propellant loading to minimize risk to Both Sierra Nevada and Virgin or any other solution. the public to an extremely remote level Galactic commented that requiring fault The FAA views design for reduced despite the failure of one or more safety- tolerance would be so burdensome to risk as a necessary characteristic of any critical systems, then those systems the applicant that several current reliable system. The FAA recognizes would not need to be designed or tested operators would not be able to meet the there may be other acceptable design to the level set forth in § 450.143. The requirement for systems on existing principles that protect the public operator must show that the exception vehicles. Sierra Nevada commented that adequately from or in spite of a credible in § 450.143(a)(2) applies for a particular using fault tolerance as a catch-all fault. In the final rule, the FAA removed safety-critical system through its flight hazard control can add risk in certain the word ‘‘single’’ from § 450.143(b) to hazard analysis. If the operator cannot cases, and the determination regarding clarify that some design concepts may show that all hazards involving the whether something is fault-tolerant is allow faults, but that the faults should system are sufficiently mitigated to an not straightforward. not lead to increased risk to the public. extremely remote level despite a failure Fault tolerance 146 is the idea that a The FAA also removed ‘‘safety’’ from of that system, then that system must system must be designed so that it is § 450.143(b) because ensuring no meet the design and testing able to perform its function in the event increased risk to the public necessarily requirements in § 450.143. of a failure of one or more of its addresses public safety. An applicant However, the FAA anticipates that components. In a fault-tolerant design of certain systems will not qualify for the a safety-critical system, no single 147 A fail-safe design is a system that can fail in exception in § 450.143(a)(2). credible fault should be capable of a controlled way, such that the failure will still Specifically, safety critical systems that increasing the risk to public safety ensure public safety, like elevator brakes held open prevent hazards from reaching the by the tension of the elevator cable such that, if the beyond that of a nominal operation. cable snaps, the brakes engage and stop the elevator public given other system failures Although the FAA proposed fault from falling. would likely be required to meet 148 Damage-tolerant design allows for robust § 450.143. This is also true of systems 146 Typically, a fault-tolerant design applies design, or design to fail gracefully, for systems like that create hazards to the public that are redundancy or a system of safety barriers to ensure a vehicle hull that cannot be redundant or fail-safe. not otherwise mitigated by other hazard the system can function, though perhaps with Fault-tolerant, fail-safe, and damage-tolerant reduced performance. An example of a fault- designs are all design concepts meant to prevent controls. The FAA anticipates that it is tolerant design is an aircraft with multiple engines credible faults or prevent increased risk to the unlikely that an operator would be able that can continue flying even if one of the engines public if failures do occur. to demonstrate that the hazards fails. 149 84 FR 15325–15326.

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may demonstrate that no credible fault acceptance tests. Valid qualification In the final rule, the FAA makes one can lead to increased risk through testing environments should— minor revision to § 450.143(c), (d), and analysis, identification of possible • Account for material variation, (e). In each of those subsections, the failure modes, implementation of because all materials have properties FAA has changed the term ‘‘operating redundant systems or other mitigation that have a variance from nominal environment’’ to ‘‘operating measures, and verification that the values. environments’’ because all systems will mitigation measures will not fail • Account for manufacturing experience multiple operating simultaneously. variation, because the functionality of a environments. As stated in the NPRM system is not only dictated by the preamble,153 applicants must account Safety-critical systems requirements quality of materials used, but also the for all operating environments that any necessitate testing that accounts for the quality of the manufacturing processes safety-critical system is expected to operating environment the system will employed. encounter throughout the lifecycle of encounter. For that reason, the FAA • Account for environmental the system in accordance with proposed to define ‘‘operating variation, because environmental § 450.143(e), including storage, environment’’ in § 401.5 (§ 401.7 in the predictions can have a great deal of transportation, installation, and flight, final rule) as ‘‘an environment that a uncertainty, particularly early in a which generally are built into launch or reentry vehicle component program. qualification and acceptance testing will experience during its lifecycle.’’ • Demonstrate margin against failure, levels. Other than this minor revision, The proposed definition further stated because safety-critical systems often fail the FAA adopts these subsections as that operating environments include in complex and unpredictable ways. proposed. Note also that in the means of shock, vibration, thermal cycle, The FAA also proposed requirements compliance table released with the acceleration, humidity, and thermal for acceptance 151 of hardware in NPRM, the FAA identified SMC–S–016, vacuum. § 450.143(d) that required, in part, an ‘‘Test Requirements For Launch, Upper- In the final rule, the FAA adopts the operator to demonstrate any safety- Stage and Space Vehicles,’’ as an proposed definition with additional critical system functionally while acceptable means of compliance with language indicating that operating exposed to its predicted operating § 450.143. SMC–S–016 is an Air Force environments also include other environment with margin to standard that defines environmental test environments relevant to system or demonstrate that it is free of defects, free requirements for launch vehicles, material degradation. As stated in the of integration and workmanship errors, upper-stage vehicles, space vehicles, NPRM, the list of examples in the and ready for operational use. and their subsystems and units. The definition is not exhaustive, and the Acceptance testing on flight units FAA maintains that the environmental additional language in the final rule should uncover critical workmanship test levels in that standard are establishes a standard for operators to errors, and damaged, weak, or out-of- acceptable for safety-critical systems consider in assessing relevant specification components before they under § 450.143, except, as noted in the environmental factors when qualifying fail in flight. Because this testing is done means of compliance table, an FSS or other safety-critical system on flight units, valid acceptance testing protoqualification testing testing found design through testing and analysis. should avoid over-testing safety-critical in 4.2.3 and B.1.3–4, and components. This avoidance is protoqualification by similarity in In addition to meeting the design accomplished by testing significantly 4.10.1.154 requirements of § 450.143(b), the FAA under qualification levels and As noted earlier, FSS required 150 proposed qualification testing durations, but still over nominal pursuant to § 450.108(b)(2), when the requirements in § 450.143(c) that operation levels and durations. The consequence of any reasonably required, in part, that an operator FAA adopts these requirements as foreseeable failure mode in any demonstrate the design of the vehicle’s proposed, with minor editorial significant period of flight is between 1 safety-critical systems functionally at ¥2 ¥3 corrections. × 10 and 1 × 10 CEC for conditions beyond its predicted Lastly, the FAA proposed uncontrolled areas, must satisfy the operating environment. An operator requirements pertaining to the lifecycle requirements in § 450.143. This must select environmental test levels of safety-critical systems in § 450.143(e), approach is consistent with the NPRM, that ensure the design is sufficiently which required an operator to monitor which required all safety-critical stressed to demonstrate that system the flight environments experienced by systems including all FSS to satisfy the performance is not degraded due to safety-critical system components to the general requirements in § 450.143. For design tolerances, manufacturing extent necessary to validate the the reasons explained more fully in the variances, or uncertainties in the predicted operating environment.152 next section, the final rule does not environment. Qualification testing will adopt the additional requirements for demonstrate margin over all operating 151 Unlike qualification testing that is performed such an FSS that were proposed in and non-operating environments to on qualification units, acceptance testing or other § 450.145(a)(2), which would have which the flight unit can be exposed, functional demonstration of acceptance required by § 450.143(d) is performance testing conducted on required the FSS to have a design including margin over all component the actual hardware to be used on a vehicle after reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent the completion of the manufacturing process. confidence and commensurate design, 150 Qualification testing is an assessment of a Generally, acceptance tests are performed on each analysis, and testing. The FAA no prototype or other structural article to verify the article of the safety-critical flight hardware to verify structural integrity of a design. Generally, that it is free of defects, free of integration and functional demonstration of the design’s workmanship errors, and ready for operational use. generally are built into qualification and acceptance qualification at operating environments involves Acceptance testing includes testing for defects, testing levels. testing the design under a number of different along with environmental testing similar to the 153 84 FR 15323. environmental factors to stress the design, with a qualification testing described earlier. 154 Protoqualification is used when test hardware multiplying factor applied to the expected 152 Applicants must account for environments is planned to be used for flight, generally for environmental testing limit. This qualification that any safety-critical system is expected to designs that will have limited production. Tests testing is conducted for temperatures, tensile loads, encounter throughout the lifecycle of the system in conducted to demonstrate satisfaction of design handling shocks, and other expected environmental accordance with § 450.143(e), including storage, requirements use reduced margins, supplemented stressors relevant to system or material degradation. transportation, installation, and flight, which with other analyses and tests.

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¥3 longer finds this reliability value requirements, which requires an greater than 1 × 10 CEC for necessary because, as a commenter applicant to describe the standards used uncontrolled areas.156 noted, it was unnecessarily in each phase of a safety-critical As proposed in § 450.145(a)(1), if the prescriptive.155 Moreover, as discussed system’s lifecycle. This addition is consequence of any vehicle response ¥2 in the NPRM, there are no established consistent with current practice and mode was 1 × 10 CEC or greater for standards to demonstrate the 0.975 will not increase the burden on uncontrolled areas, an operator would reliability number, other than a single operators, because an operator would have been required to employ an FSS string FSS that otherwise meets the likely provide this information to with design reliability of 0.999 at 95 requirements of RCC 319. support its finding that a safety-critical percent confidence and commensurate Instead, the FAA requires system is designed such that no credible design, analysis, and testing. The FAA § 450.108(b)(2) FSS to meet the fault can lead to increased risk to the noted that RCC 319 is the only requirements in § 450.143. This public beyond nominal safety-critical government standard that would meet regulatory approach should support system operation. In addition, this the requirement for a design reliability ongoing innovation in the development description of standards is necessary to of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and of FSS. As noted in the NPRM, the help identify previous flights of a commensurate design, analysis, and commercial space transportation vehicle developed and launched or testing. industry has continued to mature and reentered in similar circumstances, as Proposed § 450.145(a)(2) required operators have proposed FSS required under § 450.131(d)(1). that, if the consequence of any vehicle × ¥2 alternatives. These alternative Virgin Galactic asked how the response mode was between 1 10 × ¥3 approaches include fail-safe single requirements of § 450.143 would apply and 1 10 CEC for uncontrolled string systems that trade off mission to safety-critical systems that have been areas, an operator would have been assurance and redundancy, other fail- licensed previously. Virgin Galactic required to employ an FSS with a safe consequence mitigation systems, generally objected to proposed design reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent and dual-purpose systems such as FSS § 450.143, arguing its requirements were confidence and commensurate design, that reuse the output of safety-critical similar to aircraft certification rules and analysis, and testing. In the NPRM, the GPS components for primary navigation would be appropriate for a more mature FAA acknowledged that, although no avionics. The FAA is publishing a industry. Virgin Galactic requested an standard exists for an FSS with this ‘‘Safety-Critical Systems’’ AC to provide exclusion from proposed § 450.143 for design reliability, it expected individual applicants to create their own FSS an acceptable means of compliance with hybrid vehicles that have been issued an requirements based on RCC 319 and § 450.143. However, the FAA does not experimental airworthiness certificate have them approved as an accepted claim that an FSS approved under by the FAA and operate as aircraft. means of compliance by the FAA prior § 450.143 necessarily has a reliability of As discussed in the preamble section to application submittal.157 The FAA 0.975. Although some standard in the on Hybrid Vehicles, the FAA does not anticipated the industry would develop future may be able to establish a agree that an airworthiness certificate voluntary consensus standards for FSS, reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent issued by the FAA should automatically confidence, that standard does not exist particularly for those FSS that are only exempt a vehicle used in a launch or required to have a design reliability of today. FSS are discussed more fully in reentry from the safety-critical system the next section of this preamble. 0.975 at 95 percent confidence. requirements in § 450.143. An applicant The FAA explained the proposed The FAA amends the proposed may make an ELOS case for a application requirements in § 450.143(f) lower reliability by noting that, for component of a launch vehicle, such as operations in which the consequence of for safety-critical systems to require that a carrier aircraft, if it holds a applicants describe the methods used to a flight failure is lower, the FSS, while airworthiness certificate with an still being reliable, may not need to be validate the predicted operating acceptable flight test history. Section environments. In order to comply with as highly reliable as an FSS for a vehicle 450.143 is flexible and broad enough operating in an area where the § 450.143(e)(2)(i), applicants must that the FAA is not aware of any validate the predicted operating consequence of a flight failure is higher. currently licensed vehicles or operators As such, in order to make regulations environments for their safety-critical in formal pre-application consultation systems. However, the NPRM adaptable to innovative operations that would not meet the new while maintaining appropriate levels of inadvertently omitted the corresponding requirements. For example, operators application requirement from proposed safety, the FAA proposed to allow an licensed under parts 431 or 435 use a FSS with less demonstrated design § 450.143(f). This change results in no system safety process to verify and additional burden as an operator would reliability for operations with lower validate the reliability and mitigation of potential consequences. In the final have to demonstrate compliance with hazards for any safety-critical system. rule, the FAA removes the proposed the substantive provision by providing The treatment of safety-critical systems requirement for an FSS with design this information. under part 431 and 435 provides an reliability of 0.975 at 95 percent The FAA also adds new ELOS to the safety-critical systems § 450.143(f)(7) to the application confidence, as will be discussed later in requirements in § 450.143. Flight Safety this preamble section. Systems (§§ 450.143 and 450.145) 155 In the final rule, the FAA has CSF commented that by binning the CEC of a vehicle and then prescribing a fixed reliability z. Flight Safety Systems (§§ 450.143 and maintained the proposed requirement requirement for the FSS, the risk of an unmitigated 450.145) CEC event is not consistent because the binning 156 As explained in the section of the preamble on requires the same FSS even though the risk varies As previously discussed, proposed high consequence events, this proposed by an order of magnitude. Although the FAA does § 450.101(c) would have required an requirement would have applied to all phases of not agree with CSF’s solution to move the entire flight unless otherwise agreed to by the concept of CEC into an Advisory Circular, as operator to use flight abort with an FSS Administrator based on the demonstrated reliability discussed earlier, the FAA does agree that it is that meets the requirements of § 450.145 of the launch or reentry vehicle during that phase unnecessary to establish a fixed reliability number if the consequence of any reasonably of flight. for all § 450.108(b)(2) flight FSS required for foreseeable vehicle response mode, in 157 The FAA indicated that this approach would operations with CECs that could be an order of be akin to ‘‘tailoring’’ RCC 319, which is current magnitude apart. any one-second period of flight, was practice at Federal launch ranges.

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for an operator to employ an FSS with accurately, as stated in the NPRM, to prior to being included in a license design reliability of 0.999 at 95 percent include FSS not onboard the vehicle in application. confidence and commensurate design, the design reliability requirements in As noted in the previous preamble analysis, and testing if the consequence § 450.145.159 Conventional FSS with section, the FAA has removed the of any reasonably foreseeable failure onboard flight termination receivers and additional requirements proposed in mode in any significant period of flight not-onboard command transmitter § 450.145(a)(2), and is relying on ¥2 is greater than 1 × 10 CEC in systems will have both onboard and not- requirements in § 450.143 to ensure that uncontrolled areas.158 Operators onboard subsystems. Many current an FSS required by § 450.108(b)(2) is currently meet this requirement for autonomous FSS only have onboard sufficiently reliable. As with the NPRM, launches conducted under legacy systems. As discussed previously, the the final rule reduces the burden on regulations by tailoring RCC 319, and an final rule requires both onboard and operators that have a lower potential for operator could submit a tailored version not-onboard FSS systems independently causing high consequence events. This of RCC 319 to the FAA as a means of to demonstrate 0.999 at 95 percent change maintains the intent of the compliance for § 450.145(b). reliability. This requirement is because proposal to protect against high In the final rule, the FAA has revised FSS with both onboard and not onboard consequence events using a means the section heading for § 450.145 from systems that individually meet 0.999 at different from the traditional highly ‘‘Flight safety system’’ to ‘‘Highly 95 percent reliability could have a reliable FSS. reliable flight safety system’’ because it combined reliability as low as 0.998 at As noted in the previous section, the now contains only those requirements 95 percent confidence, whereas FSS Safety-Critical Systems AC will provide for an FSS required by § 450.108(b)(1) with only onboard systems would be an approach to compliance with when the consequence of any required to have a reliability of at least § 450.143 that modifies the provisions reasonably foreseeable failure mode in 0.999 at 95 percent confidence. To in RCC 319. The approach uses a menu any significant period of flight is greater ensure that FSS all meet the same of potential options that, when met, × ¥2 than 1 10 CEC in uncontrolled standard required to protect public would demonstrate that an operator has areas. The FAA has also reorganized the safety, the final rule requires that met § 450.143. The AC will provide section and moved the reliability onboard systems and not onboard combinations of various tailored RCC requirements in proposed § 450.145(a) independently meet the 0.999 at 95 319 requirements that the FAA has to § 450.145(b) with revisions. percent confidence level of reliability. determined demonstrate compliance While the design reliability required The collective FSS design reliability with § 450.143. Some of the tailored for a highly reliable FSS remains 0.999 requirement is not specifically stated in requirements include: at 95 percent confidence and the final rule since the onboard FSS and • Reducing the random vibration and commensurate design, analysis, and not-onboard FSS design reliability thermal cycle qualification test margins testing, the FAA has specified in requirements are independently defined to a level and duration that remains § 450.145(b)(1) of the final rule that this in § 450.145 and the overall FSS design above acceptance test levels; reliability applies to the portion of the reliability is dependent on the type of • Reducing the number of required FSS onboard the vehicle. In addition, if FSS employed.160 qualification test units; a portion of an operator’s FSS is ground- For § 450.108(b)(1) FSS that must • Reducing the minimum required based, space-based, or otherwise not meet the requirements of § 450.145, sample size for ordnance lot acceptance onboard the vehicle, the FAA has unless alternative methods are accepted testing and ordnance qualification specified in § 450.145(b)(2) of the final by the Administrator, the FAA has testing; rule that it must have the same identified RCC 319 as an existing means • Allowing qualification by similarity reliability as the onboard portion; that of compliance to demonstrate FSS with deviations to RCC 319 qualification is, 0.999 at 95 percent confidence and reliability. This standard is currently by similarity criteria; commensurate design, analysis, and used by applicants that employ • Reducing the required number of testing. Although not all FSS have a traditional flight abort under part 417. thermal cycles for component level ground portion, this requirement The FAA expects to continue the qualification thermal cycle test reflects past and current practice for current practice of working with requirements; • launches from both Federal and non- applicants to tailor RCC 319 in order to Reducing the radio frequency link Federal sites, in which the ground comply with § 450.145. A tailored RCC margin requirements for traditional portion of an FSS and the airborne 319 that is used as a means of commanded FSS; portion of an FSS are independently • Allowing single string fail-safe FSS; compliance for § 450.145(b) must be • designed, tested, and operated to submitted to the FAA for acceptance Reducing electronic piece parts rigorous standards. This independence requirements; and • ensures that the appropriate command 159 In the NPRM, the FAA stated that the Allowing use of vehicle is sent by the ground-based system with reliability standard in proposed § 450.145(a)(1) components or systems for FSS use such a high reliability, and received and would be consistent with various sections of part as vehicle power source or flight acted upon with high reliability by the 417, in particular § 417.309(b)(2), that require major computer. FSS component systems, such as onboard flight An operator could work with the FAA onboard portion of the system, to result termination systems and ground-based command in the desired termination action. control systems, to be tested to demonstrate 0.999 to determine what combination of The reference in § 450.145(a) to an design reliability at 95 percent confidence. The options would satisfy § 450.143 for FSS ‘‘on the launch or reentry vehicle’’ FAA further noted that this reliability threshold specific FSS. In addition, an operator would have to be demonstrated for the operation of could develop its own combination of did not reflect the FAA’s intention the entire system, including any systems located on-board the launch or reentry vehicle, any ground- tailored RCC requirements to 158 As previously explained, the FAA has based systems, and any other component or support demonstrate compliance, or could elect replaced the term ‘‘vehicle response mode’’ with systems. 84 FR 15328. to use a different means of compliance ‘‘failure mode’’ and the term ‘‘one-second period of 160 As discussed earlier in the preamble, if the outside of the RCC 319 requirements. flight’’ with ‘‘significant period of flight,’’ consequence of any vehicle response mode is less ¥ An operator may demonstrate throughout the final rule. The basis for these than 1 × 10 3, the FAA will not require an FSS or changes is discussed in the preamble section on mandate its reliability if an operator chooses to use compliance with § 450.143 through flight abort. one. other means that adequately establish

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design, qualification testing, and the FAA. An applicant may propose a recommended requiring operators to acceptance testing. As mentioned tailored version of RCC 319 prior to make a safety case and moving CEC and earlier, the environmental test levels in submitting its application as a unique the reliability requirements for FSS of SMC–S–016 are acceptable for safety- means of compliance to be accepted by the NPRM to an AC. critical systems under § 450.143, the Administrator. As discussed earlier, The FAA disagrees that a safety case including some FSS components, except the Safety-Critical Systems AC will should take the place of discrete CEC protoqualification testing found in 4.2.3 provide guidance to operators on how to thresholds and the requirements for FSS and B.1.3–4, and protoqualification by comply with the requirements for in §§ 450.143 and 450.145. Although a similarity in 4.10.1. § 450.108(b)(2) FSS. This approach uses safety case is a potential approach to Lastly, the FAA also makes minor RCC 319 as one starting point. The AC applying for an ELOS determination for changes to the application requirements will also refer to SMC–S–016, as many of the regulatory requirements, in § 450.145. In the NPRM, § 450.145(d) discussed earlier. The FAA notes that, the FAA does not believe that requiring stated that an FSS includes any FSS unlike for highly reliable FSS required a safety case, by itself, provides located onboard a launch or reentry to meet § 450.145, for an FSS required sufficient regulatory clarity as to what is vehicle; any ground based command by § 450.108(b)(2) an operator is not expected of a launch or reentry operator control system; any support system, required to have a means of compliance to obtain and maintain a license. including telemetry subsystems and with § 450.143 accepted in advance of Blue Origin commented that the tracking subsystems, necessary to application submittal. However, it means of compliance for FSS support a flight abort decision; and the would be advisable for an operator to requirements in the NPRM was unclear, functions of any personnel who operate consult with the FAA early in its particularly for systems not on the the FSS hardware or software. This program’s development on the approach launch vehicle such as tracking systems, provision has been moved to the to compliance with § 450.143, whether ground systems, and flight abort crew. definition of ‘‘flight safety system’’ and for an FSS or other safety-critical As examples, Blue Origin mentioned deleted from § 450.145(d).161 systems. RCC 324 162 and EWR 127–1 163 for The FAA received several comments The performance-based nature of tracking systems, AFSPCI 91–701 164 for on the limited means of compliance §§ 450.143 and 450.145 also allows an ground systems, and AF 13–602 165 for available to demonstrate compliance industry consensus standards body to flight abort crew. with the FSS reliability requirements. submit a proposed means of compliance As discussed above, § 450.145(b) has Blue Origin commented that the to the FAA for general use. This process been amended to address more clearly industry had only been given one means is discussed in more detail in the Means the part of the FSS onboard the vehicle of compliance for both tiers of FSS of Compliance section of the preamble. and the part not onboard the vehicle, reliability. Blue Origin also commented Applicants are encouraged to work with such as ground-based and space-based that the proposal indicated the only the FAA in pre-application consultation systems. In addition, this preamble accepted means of complying with to discuss potential unique means of addresses means of compliance for FSS § 450.145 would be an untailored RCC compliance. For example, for requirements specifically, as well as 319. Blue Origin and CSF suggested that § 450.108(b)(1) FSS, an applicant could means of compliance used to meet the there exist other industry and work with the FAA during pre- requirements of part 450 more generally. government standards that should be application consultation to tailor RCC As discussed previously, an untailored accepted means of compliance with the 319 to the operation while still ensuring RCC 319–19 is currently the only means reliability requirements of § 450.145. compliance with § 450.145. The FAA of compliance the FAA has reviewed Blue Origin and Microcosm stated that will review the documents tailored to and accepted to meet the § 450.145 FSS a tailored RCC 319 or SMC–S–016 vehicle programs and mission-specific requirements; however, the FAA should also be an accepted means of applications as unique means of anticipates operators will provide compliance. SpaceX commented that compliance for a given license. unique tailored versions of RCC 319–19 RCC 319 was an acceptable standard, Blue Origin, CSF, and Virgin Galactic to the FAA for acceptance under part but only if the document may be expressed concern that a vehicle that 450. In addition, RCC 324 is an tailored for each operator. did not require an FSS under parts 431 acceptable means of compliance for the The FAA clarifies that RCC 319 is a or 435 might require one under part 450. airborne tracking sources such as C- means of compliance the FAA has The FAA disagrees. This rule maintains Band transponders used with ground identified to date that ensures the level of safety required under parts based command systems and for GPS compliance with § 450.145, but RCC 319 415, 417, 431, and 435 for FSS. receivers and inertial measurement is not the only possible means of Furthermore, as discussed in the High units used as airborne tracking data compliance that the FAA will consider. Consequence Event Protection section of sources. EWR 127–1 is not a current The performance-based nature of this preamble, the ACTA study results means of compliance for tracking § 450.145 allows an operator to submit indicate that no changes would be systems because it is out of date. its own unique means of compliance to required under the final rule regarding AFSPCI 91–701 is an acceptable means the need for an FSS for any currently of compliance for FSS-related ground 161 In the final rule, the definition of FSS is ‘‘a licensed launch vehicle launched from systems. Lastly, AFI 13–602 is an system used to implement flight abort. A flight a Federal or commercial launch or safety system includes any flight safety system acceptable means of compliance for located onboard a launch or reentry vehicle; any reentry site. Therefore, the FAA does flight abort crew. ground based command control system; any not expect to require an FSS under part support system, including telemetry subsystems 450 for any launch vehicle that would 162 RCC 324–01 Global Positioning and Inertial and tracking subsystems, necessary to support a Measurements Range Safety Tracking Systems’ flight abort decision; and the functions of any not have been required to have an FSS Commonality Standard. personnel who operate the flight safety system under parts 431 and 435. 163 hardware or software.’’ In the NRPM, the definition CSF commented that the NPRM’s Eastern and Western Range (EWR) 127–1 also included that a human can be a part of an FSS. proposed structure for requiring flight Range Safety Requirements. 164 AFSPCI 91–701, Launch and Range Safety The FAA removed this sentence from the definition abort was overly prescriptive and would because ‘‘the functions of any personnel who Program Policy and Requirements. operate the flight safety system’’ covers this not give an operator flexibility to define 165 AFI 13–602 Ready Spacecrew Program circumstance. the type of FSS to implement. CSF Training.

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Blue Origin noted that proposed that did not describe typical FSS RCC 319 unless certain criteria apply. § 450.143 appeared to be appropriately component testing adequately. FSS SpaceX suggested that this approach be performance-based and applicable to all testing generally consists of testing a taken by the FAA in accepting safety-critical systems, including certain number of units of an individual previously tailored documents. SpaceX software. Except for § 450.108(b)(1) FSS component to determine its reliability further recommended allowing such and software, the FAA agrees with Blue and confidence level, and that testing is grandfathered acceptance of different Origin that § 450.143 is appropriately part of determining the overall FSS standards such as AFSPCMAN 91–710. performance-based and applicable to all system reliability. The FAA maintains The FAA’s current practice is to safety-critical systems. The that, for most operators, testing a few accept FSS that have been approved requirements in § 450.143 are not units at greater than expected operating under a standard such as AFSPCMAN sufficient for § 450.108(b)(1) FSS environments is significantly less 91–710 and RCC 319 even after updated because those systems require a higher burdensome than testing many units at versions of those standards are released. reliability due to the potential for high expected operating environments. Licensing under part 450 should be consequence events, as measured by Operating environments include shock, consistent with that practice; a licensee CEC. As discussed earlier, the unique vibration, thermal cycle, acceleration, should be able to renew its license hazards due to software have a separate humidity, and thermal vacuum, or other without changes to its FSS simply set of requirements in § 450.141. environments relevant to system or because a standard that was used as a Otherwise, § 450.143 is sufficient for material degradation. The opportunity means of compliance has evolved with safety-critical systems and FSS that do for operators to submit new means of time. There would be exceptions, not fall under § 450.145 because it compliance to be accepted by the however, if a significant flaw was includes performance standards for Administrator prior to application discovered in the earlier version of the design, testing, and lifecycle submission will allow applicants to standard. management. Note that § 450.143 covers propose their own means of compliance SpaceX also commented on proposed a § 450.108(b)(2) FSS that an operator if they believe that another method of § 450.145(d)(3), which stated that an uses to comply with the high FSS design reliability, testing, and applicant must submit any analyses and consequence protection requirements of analysis is less burdensome than a detailed analysis reports of all FSS § 450.101(c), as well as an FSS that an means of compliance currently accepted subsystems necessary to demonstrate operator uses when it chooses flight by the FAA. the reliability and confidence levels abort as a hazard control strategy under Microcosm asked if all orbital required by proposed § 450.145. SpaceX § 450.107, notwithstanding § 450.101(c). operators launching from the United pointed out that while other government The requirements are the same for either States would be required to have a 0.999 requirements, such as RCC 319, provide FSS because, although the potential for design reliability FSS in accordance guidance on what analyses and reports a high consequence event is less of a with proposed § 450.145. The FAA does are necessary, the proposed rule was concern in the latter case, each FSS is not expect that all orbital operators unclear as to what specific analyses and critical to meeting the collective, launching from the U.S. will have reports are necessary. individual, aircraft, and critical asset operations with a potential consequence As noted earlier, RCC 319 is an risk criteria in § 450.101(a) and (b). of a reasonably foreseeable failure mode accepted means of compliance for Blue Origin sought clarification as to in any significant period of flight that is § 450.145. An FSS design, testing, and whether an operator would need to greater than 1 × 10¥2 CEC in analysis process that complies with the comply with the software requirements uncontrolled areas. The FAA notes that, analysis requirements for RCC 319, or of RCC 319 under the requirements as described in reference to the high other accepted means of compliance, proposed for § 450.145, in addition to consequence event protection will satisfy the FSS analysis the software requirements under requirements of § 450.101(c), operators requirements of § 450.145. § 450.141. An operator is not required to will be required to have an FSS if the Rocket Lab requested clarification as comply with the software requirements consequence of any reasonably to whether the FSS design reliability is of RCC 319 under the requirements for foreseeable failure mode in any for hardware components only, and how § 450.145. Section 450.141 applies to significant period of flight is greater to apply reliability requirements to ¥3 any software or data that implements a than 1 × 10 CEC in uncontrolled safety systems that include software. capability that, by intended operation, areas, and, as proposed, that FSS will The FAA notes that design reliability is unintended operation, or non-operation, need to have the high design reliability for hardware only. The computing can present a hazard to the public. of 0.999 at 95 percent confidence if the system safety requirements in § 450.141 Section 450.141 applies to FSS under consequence of any reasonably do not provide an estimated reliability, either § 450.108(b)(1) or (b)(2). An foreseeable failure mode in any but instead establish process controls operator is not required to meet RCC significant period of flight is greater that prevent or mitigate computing ¥2 319 in order to satisfy § 450.141, but than 1 × 10 CEC in uncontrolled system faults. RCC 319 is an acceptable means of areas. However, the FAA has removed The International Space Safety demonstrating compliance with the additional requirements proposed in Foundation commented that FSS is the § 450.141. § 450.145(a)(2) in the final rule if the only system of a launcher for which the Blue Origin and CSF commented that consequence of any reasonably operational experience did not provide the NPRM’s assertion that to get a 0.999 foreseeable failure mode is between 1 × reliability significant data, because the ¥2 ¥3 design reliability at 95 percent 10 and 1 × 10 CEC, and in that system was ready but rarely operated. confidence by testing at predicted scenario will only require an operator to The FAA concurs with the comment environment levels, an operator would use an FSS that complies with that there is a lack of operational have to test 2,995 units was incorrect § 450.143. experience with FSS as far as because it did not take into account the SpaceX commented that RCC 319, terminating vehicles. However, dual redundant string architecture section 1.10, allowed previously operational parameters are captured traditionally implemented for an FSS. approved components and systems to be throughout flights, whether the result is The FAA concurs that its statement in grandfathered such that they not be termination or not, and this data verifies the NPRM was an oversimplification required to meet subsequent versions of many of the expected operating modes.

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Also, reliability is gained from design The FAA acknowledges that hybrid throughout the application review to and thorough test programs, as well as operations differ from traditional rocket understand a specific operation to review of post-flight data. launches. Part 450 has been revised to determine what systems are safety The International Space Safety accommodate better all vehicle critical as defined in § 401.7. All launch Foundation also commented that to base operators, including hybrid vehicle vehicles, reentry vehicles, safety the approval of a safety-critical system operators. The accommodations include systems, processes, services, or on reliability predictions was not more performance-based requirements, personnel are eligible for safety element advisable considering the key role alternatives to flight abort, FSA approvals. The FAA will consider safety played by software, which cannot be requirements based on demonstrated element approvals on a case-by-case taken into account in the reliability reliability, use of equivalent level of basis for hybrid vehicles. This concept prediction. The International Space safety, and allowing application process is discussed in the Safety Element Safety Foundation recommended that alternatives as agreed to by the Approval section of the preamble. the FAA should instead define fault Administrator. The regulations allow An individual commenter tolerance requirements for the FSS, and currently licensed hybrid vehicle recommended that the FAA consider specific software and computing system operators to continue to use a flight other demonstrated measures of requirements in addition to generic hazard analysis as a hazard control reliability for carrier aircraft to estimate software development processes. strategy. However, one or more hazard the public risk, such as ‘‘attributed The FAA disagrees, noting that FSS control strategies may be required to reliability’’ and ‘‘validated reliability.’’ reliability is also based on design meet the safety criteria in § 450.101. In the final rule, the FAA uses the architecture, component selection, and The FAA received numerous term ‘‘demonstrated reliability’’ in testing that accounts for fault tolerance comments from industry regarding §§ 450.101(c)(3) and 450.113(b). The use and the overall system. Recognizing that safety requirements for hybrid vehicles, of this phrase in § 450.101(c)(3) allows hybrid configurations, component there are some difficulties in an operator to protect against a high systems, and related operations. The establishing reliability standards below consequence event in uncontrolled FAA addresses the hybrid vehicle a design reliability of 0.999 at 95 areas for each phase of flight by comments that would be applicable to percent confidence and commensurate establishing the launch or reentry other operators in the applicable topic design, analysis, and testing, the FAA vehicle has sufficient demonstrated area sections of this preamble. This removes the proposed additional reliability as agreed to by the section of the preamble addresses the requirements for § 450.108(b)(2) FSS Administrator based on CEC criteria comments that are specific to hybrid and instead relies solely on § 450.143 during that phase of flight. The use of operations, such as aircraft certification, for design, testing, and monitoring this phrase in § 450.113(b) provides an piloted vehicles, part 91 applicability, requirements. In addition, recognizing exception for an operator from and space support vehicles. performing and documenting an FSA for the importance of computing systems to Two commenters stated that the system reliability and public safety, the a phase of flight, if agreed to by the applicability of hybrid systems should Administrator, based on demonstrated FAA proposed, and is including in the be clarified and consolidated in a final rule robust computing system reliability. These requirements are separate section of the regulation. An discussed in more detail in the High requirements in § 450.141. Computing individual commenter recommended system requirements are further Consequence Event Protection and FSA that the preamble material include a preamble sections, respectively. discussed in the preamble section on discussion of how the regulations would Computing Systems and Software. As discussed in the Conditional be applied to hybrid configurations Expected Casualties section of this The International Space Safety since their characteristics and preamble and in the NPRM, Foundation recommended that the FAA operations are significantly different demonstrated reliability refers to set up a multidisciplinary team of from the more traditional RLV or ELV statistically valid probability of failure design and operation experts to draw a vertical launch systems. estimates based on the outcomes of all strategy for the definition of FSS design The FAA notes that the final rule previous flights of the vehicle or stage performance requirements, and for provides flexible performance-based in accordance with § 450.131, which is addressing the above issues. The FAA regulations that work for all vehicle discussed later in the preamble. The believes that standards for FSS should types, including hybrid vehicles and draft High Fidelity FSA Methods AC,166 continue to evolve and that industry other innovative architectures. Like all published with the NPRM, described should be significantly involved in their operators, an operator of a hybrid acceptable methods, including Bayesian development. An industry-led launch or reentry vehicle must choose and binomial methods, to calculate development of a voluntary consensus one or more hazard control strategies for demonstrated reliability and standard or standards addressing each phase of flight in accordance with demonstrate compliance with § 450.131. design, analysis, or testing of FSS would § 450.107. The FAA anticipates that As discussed in the draft AC, the prior be particularly beneficial. These hybrid vehicle operators will elect to estimate for the probability of failure standards could become new acceptable use a flight hazard analysis as their during a captive carry phase of flight means of compliance with FAA hazard control strategy for at least some could be based on a different flight regulations. phases of flight because the flight history database 167 compared to aa. Hybrid Vehicles hazard analysis is most similar to the traditional ELVs. For example, the prior existing system safety process in part In the NPRM, the FAA proposed one estimate for the probability of failure 431. during a captive carry phase of flight set of requirements for all vehicle types An individual commenter stated that could be based on the flight history of without distinction between traditional for hybrid vehicles, flying qualities aircraft that also used certain proven or and hybrid vehicles. Hybrid vehicles are should be identified as safety critical launch or reentry vehicles that have and as a safety element eligible for a 166 See FAA–2019–0229–0019. some characteristics of aircraft and other safety element approval. 167 More specifically, a different set of outcomes characteristics of traditional launch or The FAA will work with operators of all previous flights of vehicles developed and reentry vehicles. during pre-application consultation and launched or reentered in similar circumstances.

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industry standard design, FAA will consider the aircraft’s original to a higher level of proficiency than a manufacturing, or quality methods. certification, its current certification, crewmember who holds a private pilot Similarly, if a carrier vehicle were based and any modifications introduced certificate. In addition, crewmembers on or modified from a type certificated through issuance of supplemental type with operationally related flight commercial aircraft or used certified certificates. For example, a transport experience will have an understanding aircraft components, then the carrier category aircraft that has held a standard of the decision-making required for vehicle could be considered a derived airworthiness certificate and then been high-altitude flight and airspeed vehicle.168 In this example, the recertified to a restricted or regimes, and the recent flight experience certification results and operational experimental category. Any and training of all crewmembers is history for the unmodified components modifications to the aircraft design recognized as foundational to ensuring of the aircraft would be accounted for in certification may affect the aircraft’s a safe operating environment of an the calculation of the demonstrated reliability for the purposes of part 450, aircraft or launch vehicle. reliability. Under a performance-based and the FAA therefore will take these An individual commenter stated that regulation, an applicant is free to modifications into consideration. An the phase of a hybrid vehicle operation propose a unique means of compliance understanding of an aircraft’s past and in which the carrier vehicle is alone with other methods to calculate current operating environments and its would be required to take into account demonstrated reliability. The FAA will maintenance history are also relevant to any potential aggressive maneuvers the consider other methods to calculate the current reliability estimate. vehicle may have to make to clear a just- demonstrated reliability for hybrid In addition, the FAA may consider released rocket. The commenter further vehicles such as binomial methods other factors outside of certification, stated that a civil airworthiness consistent with Appendix A to part 417 such as a rigorous flight test program. certificate may not be adequate to cover under A417.25(b)(5), and other methods Some launch operators have or are the risks posed to the public by these used in the past for launch and reentry developing new, purpose-built launch unusual maneuvers. vehicles. vehicles that may serve as a component The FAA agrees that the entirety of a The FAA notes that other vehicle of a hybrid launch or may be designed launch or reentry operation must be characteristics, such as flying qualities, as rocket-powered aircraft and analyzed for hybrid operations. The do not lend themselves to analysis with transitioned to licensed launch FAA notes that once a rocket is released, statistical reliability measures. For operations following flight testing. the carrier vehicle remains in the launch example, acceptable flying qualities in These operators may hold experimental phase until all components of the one portion of the envelope do not airworthiness certificates for testing launch system have impacted or landed necessarily predict good flying qualities design concepts and aircraft operating on the earth and been rendered safe. throughout the full operational techniques. Experimental airworthiness Therefore, any maneuvers the carrier envelope, and small aerodynamic certificates may also be offered as part vehicle makes after a rocket is released modifications or changes to the flight of a hybrid operator’s application to but before both components have control system can lead to establish the vehicle’s demonstrated impacted or landed and been returned disproportionally large and potentially reliability. The FAA’s Office of to a safe condition will occur under the hazardous changes in flying qualities. In Commercial Space Transportation will license and be assessed consistent with these cases, the FAA would consider continue to coordinate with the FAA’s the requirements of part 450. flight test results using proven flight test Aviation Safety organization on Virgin Galactic expressed concerns techniques and data analysis methods as issuance of an experimental that rather than streamlining the validated reliability. airworthiness certificate and the requirements to create performance- An individual commenter urged the vehicle’s developmental program to based standards, the FAA is combining FAA to consider more than just the fact understand its demonstrated reliability. its requirements for ELVs and hybrid that a vehicle holds an airworthiness The FAA will also consider each RLVs so that each type of operator might certificate as evidence of demonstrated crewmember’s level of pilot certification be subject to inappropriate or reliability. and flight experience, as well as the ambiguous requirements. Virgin The FAA agrees that possession of an recency of that experience as evidence Galactic commented that it appreciated airworthiness certificate alone does not of demonstrated reliability of the launch the flexibility that some of the new guarantee that a vehicle or operation or reentry system.169 While part 460 regulations would provide but noted will have a level of reliability sufficient requires flight crew to hold at least a that others seem too vague. to meet the part 450 public safety private pilot certificate with an The FAA finds the final rule provides requirements. The FAA considers other instrument rating, operators using flight sufficient flexibility for hybrid vehicles. factors to determine reliability. The crew with higher levels of certification, The performance-based regulations in operationally related flight experience, the final rule allow operators like Virgin 168 A derived vehicle is a term used when and recent flight experience and Galactic to propose an alternate analyzing a new variant of a known rocket. A training can demonstrate higher approach by demonstrating an derived vehicle should be alike in substance or reliability. For example, a crewmember equivalent level of safety or use a essentials considering the following factors that can holding commercial and airline unique means of compliance. To retain influence the probability of failure: (1) The development and integration processes of the transport pilot certificates have more the maximum flexibility to adjust to vehicle, including the extent of testing; (2) the flight experience and have been tested dynamic industry changes, the FAA will design and manufacture of safety-critical systems, continue to offer operators the choice to including but not limited to the structure (including 169 For FSA purposes, the vehicle failure request ELOS determinations. In the payload faring), propulsion, guidance, control, probability accounts for any failure of the launch addition, 51 U.S.C. 50905(b)(3) allows and navigation; (3) all aspects of the environment or reentry system because of the way failure is experienced by the vehicles, stages, and defined in § 450.131(b). In the context of FSA, any the Secretary to waive a requirement in components that can affect performance and failure of the launch or reentry system, including the public interest and will not reliability, including but not limited to pilot error, that produced vehicle failure as defined jeopardize public health and safety, aerodynamic, thermal, acoustic, vibration, and in § 450.131(b) must be accounted for to establish safety of property, and national security inertial environments; (4) vehicle performance in the demonstrated reliability. Therefore, the FAA terms of payload capability, maximum dynamic would consider the pilot experience and training in and foreign policy interests of the pressure, and maximum velocity. making a demonstrated reliability determination. United States. Rather than explicitly

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reference hybrid vehicles, the final rule casualties. The FAA notes that the final not exempt all hybrid vehicle operators provides the flexibilities to all operators, rule allows an operator to seek an ELOS from the requirement in § 450.101(f) including operators of hybrid vehicles determination for § 450.101(c)(2). because future hybrid operators could and other innovative concepts. However, an exemption for all piloted possibly generate debris capable of Virgin Galactic also stated that the carrier vehicles would not be causing a casualty from normal vehicle intent of the requirement should be appropriate for launch or reentry flight. If an operation has no planned publicly articulated in the regulations vehicle systems that have not yet been impacts from debris capable of causing and not reside in the preamble. The evaluated. Hence, an applicant can use a casualty, then no notification will be FAA notes both the preamble and the another method of measuring the necessary to comply with § 450.101(f). regulations are publicly available. The potential for a high consequence event Several commenters, including ALPA, intent behind the regulations correctly that demonstrates an equivalent level of Starfighters, and Virgin Galactic, resides in the preamble because the safety in accordance with § 450.37. submitted comments regarding the regulations contain only the regulatory Reusable vehicles and other innovative applicability of FSA requirements for requirements by which regulated architectures may be required by hybrid vehicles under proposed entities are bound. The preamble § 450.101(c) to have a method to achieve § 450.113(a)(5). Virgin Galactic noted provides further explanation as to why flight abort reliably to mitigate flight that, for the captive carry phase of a the FAA has elected to adopt the risks and consequences fully, either in hybrid vehicle mission, the FAA should regulatory requirements in order to the form of a pilot that can safely abort exempt operators from performing an provide transparency and further flight using system controls or a more FSA for a piloted aircraft that operated elaborate on the agency’s intent. traditional FSS. A pilot may provide in accordance with aviation regulations. An individual commenter stated that protection against a high consequence Virgin Galactic stated the FAA should hybrid configurations, carrier aircraft event. The FAA may consider a pilot to include such an exemption because the flying alone, and reentry vehicles using be an FSS performing a flight abort if pilot would already provide abort aerodynamic controls should follow the pilot can initiate and accomplish a capability as an FSS. Starfighters controller instructions and abide by the controlled ending to vehicle flight commented that an FSA should be general operating and flight rules of reliably to limit or restrict the hazards required only for the air-release launch aviation found in 14 CFR part 91. The to public health and safety, and the phase of a hybrid vehicle mission, not individual commented that hybrid safety of property. Under the provision the earlier captive-carry phase, which launch vehicles with pilot-in-the-loop in § 450.101(c)(3), the flight of a carrier might be many miles away from the control systems spend much more time vehicle carrying a rocket to a drop point actual release point. However, ALPA than RLV and ELV systems in restricted could be an example of sufficient stated that the FAA should require an airspace and overflying populated areas protection against a high consequence FSA for all phases of flight until and that this requires hybrid event, even if the CEC were above the 1 sufficient quantitative data for hybrid configurations to have the capability to × 10¥3 threshold, if the carrier vehicle commercial space vehicles becomes operate safely in a controlled airspace has sufficient demonstrated reliability. available for analysis and to conduct a environment like other aircraft. Demonstrated reliability and other regulatory process to standardize The FAA agrees and notes that flexibilities are discussed more fully in airworthiness requirements for hybrid applicants may elect to mitigate hazards the High Consequence Protection commercial space vehicles. An to the public by proposing applicable section of this preamble. individual commenter noted sections of part 91 to demonstrate Virgin Galactic noted that a carrier airworthiness certificates issued by the compliance with specific requirements aircraft operating under an FAA are part of a safety analysis but are in part 450. However, all components of airworthiness certificate should be not conclusive evidence of a hybrid vehicle operate solely under a exempt from proposed § 450.101(f), demonstrated reliability for the purpose license when the intent of flight is to which, for any launch, reentry, or of proposed § 450.113(a)(5). ALPA noted conduct a launch or reentry. disposal, requires an operator to notify that flight test results using proven Virgin Galactic stated that the FAA the public of any region of land, sea, or flight test techniques and data analysis should have a narrowly tailored CEC air that contains, with 97 percent methods should serve to validate exemption from the flight abort probability of containment, all debris reliability of hybrid vehicles’ carrier requirements of proposed §§ 450.101(c) resulting from normal flight events aircraft under proposed § 450.113(a)(5), and 450.145 for piloted aircraft because capable of causing a casualty. Virgin without requiring documentation and the pilot would already provide an FSS Galactic stated that the requirement was statistical analysis of all previous with abort capability. Virgin Galactic unclear because it discussed debris flights. further stated that a carrier aircraft in a resulting from normal flight events. In the final rule, the FAA is not hybrid system that operated safely Virgin Galactic requested further providing a blanket exemption to the under its experimental airworthiness clarification on the purpose of public FSA requirements for hybrid operations. certificate should not be subjected to the notification if the proposed requirement The final rule removes § 450.113(a)(5) CEC requirement in proposed was intended to address returning but maintains the flexibility proposed in § 450.101(c). vehicles that remain intact and on a the NPRM to enable an operator of a The FAA does not agree with Virgin nominal trajectory to the intended hybrid vehicle with a high level of Galactic’s comment to include an reentry site. Virgin Galactic demonstrated reliability to be exempt exemption from demonstrating recommended that, if this regulation from performing some FSAs for some protection against a high consequence was intended to apply to jettisoning of phases of flight without seeking a event for a piloted carrier vehicle orbital rocket stages and the return/ waiver. The FAA will work with hybrid because the operation of such a vehicle disposal of upper stages, it should state vehicle applicants during pre- may result in a high consequence event. as much. application consultation on how to As discussed earlier in this preamble, The FAA agrees that returning comply with FSA, CEC, and FSS operators must protect against a high vehicles on a normal trajectory do not requirements utilizing the flexibilities consequence event because such an constitute ‘‘debris’’ as the term is used that may be applicable depending on event could result in a large number of in § 450.101(f). However, the FAA will the applicant’s vehicle and concept of

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operations. For example, the FAA might industry matured. Virgin Galactic stated bb. Agreements and Airspace determine the quantitative FSA that the commercial space industry is (§ 450.147) requirements for those portions of an not at the state of maturity as In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to operation for which the vehicle operates commercial aviation, and applying these streamline the existing requirements for similarly to a civil aviation aircraft similar ‘‘certification’’ requirements is agreements by removing specific governed by civil aviation regulations contrary to the requirement in the requirements for a variety of agreements are unnecessary because the vehicle has Commercial Space Launch Act to and procedures and allowing an demonstrated reliability for operations promote the commercial space launch operator to determine what agreements using a certificated aircraft or a valid industry and only regulate to the extent would be needed for its particular airworthiness certificate with an necessary. operation. As proposed in § 450.147, a acceptable flight test history. The FAA does not agree that carrier vehicle operator would be required to The FAA expands the flexibility for vehicles operating under an FAA-issued have written agreements with any entity hybrid vehicles in proposed license with an airworthiness certificate that provides a service or use of § 450.113(a)(5) to all vehicle operators issued by the FAA should be exempt property to meet a requirement in part in the final rule in § 450.113, as from the safety-critical system 450. The regulation identified various discussed in more detail in the requirements in § 450.143. While entities for which agreements may be preamble section for FSA Requirements airworthiness certification likely required including a Federal launch Scope and Applicability. The FAA finds indicates increased reliability because a range operator, a licensed launch or this flexibility should be available to all certificated aircraft has satisfied many reentry site operator, any party that operators if agreed to by the separate FAA regulations, the provides access to or use of property Administrator based on demonstrated satisfaction of those regulations does not and services required to support a safe reliability. This wider availability will alone demonstrate that the carrier launch or reentry under part 450, the provide a common regulatory construct vehicle will meet the applicable across different operators to identify the requirements under chapter III. U.S. Coast Guard, and the FAA. In the final rule, the FAA adopts the phases of flight for which FSA must be However, an applicant may make a proposal with one minor change. The performed. Based on current licensed safety case supporting an equivalent FAA has replaced the words ‘‘Federal operations, the FAA anticipates that level of safety for a component of a launch range’’ in § 450.147(a)(1) with initially only carrier vehicles that have launch system if it holds a valid ‘‘Federal launch or reentry site’’ to an airworthiness certificate and airworthiness certificate with an encompass all Federal sites used for extensive flight history would be able to acceptable flight test history. In the final licensed activities. meet the demonstrated reliability rule, § 450.143 includes the AAAE asked whether proposed standard. Aside from some carrier requirements for all safety-critical § 450.147(a)(1) would require aircraft used as a component of a launch system components and eliminates the agreements with alternative or vehicle, no existing launch vehicle has ambiguity that existed in the part 431 contingent landing sites and requested enough history to ensure sufficient regulations regarding required testing of that the FAA expressly require such protection against a high consequence safety-critical systems. Section agreements to ensure that they are event based on demonstrated reliability 450.143(e)(3) also requires a summary of included in the licensing and launch in accordance with § 450.101(c) or the analysis detailing how applicants preparation process. In § 450.147(a)(1), enough empirical evidence to arrived at the predicted operating demonstrate compliance with the public environment and duration for all the FAA requires agreements with any risk criteria in § 450.101(a) or (b).170 qualification and acceptance testing. entity that provides access to property Virgin Galactic asked about the Such a summary is current practice, and required to support a safe launch or applicability of the rule for hybrid § 450.143(e) makes this requirement reentry. Contingency abort locations are vehicles, including certain operational explicit for all vehicles. In response to taken into consideration by the exemptions. Virgin Galactic commented Virgin Galactic’s comments regarding applicant as part of its public safety that the safety-critical system the relative maturity of commercial analyses and by the FAA in its requirements in § 450.143 should not aviation versus the commercial space environmental review. Because apply to hybrid carrier aircraft that industry and the appropriate approach contingency abort locations necessarily operate under an FAA-issued license to regulating the commercial space involve planned access to property, the and hold an airworthiness certificate industry, the FAA believes that the FAA will not revise the regulation to issued by the FAA. Virgin Galactic performance-based requirements of the expressly require agreements with noted the requirements of this section final rule fulfill statutory mandates and alternative or contingent landing sites. were akin to aircraft certification, which are appropriate for the commercial The language in § 450.147(a)(1) is are spelled out in the applicable parts of space industry’s capabilities now and as sufficient to ensure agreements are in 14 CFR Chapter 1 that have been they will evolve in the future. place for all planned locations. The developed over decades as the aviation An individual commenter stated that FAA will not require such agreements the carrier aircraft portion of their for emergency landing sites or other 170 The L–1011 carrier vehicle used for Pegasus launch system would also be capable of locations that are being considered, but launches is an example of a carrier aircraft with conducting operations as a space have not been finalized by the enough empirical evidence to demonstrate operator.171 compliance with the public risk criteria in support vehicle (SSV). The commenter § 450.101(a) or (b). Using flight history to sought clarification as to whether part demonstrate compliance with the risk criteria in 450 would require adjustment to be 171 The FAA notes that it has distinguished § 450.101(a) and (b) is relatively simple, given a consistent with new SSV operations. emergency abort landing sites from planned statistically significant number of flights relative to contingency abort sites in other rulemakings. For the expected casualty limit of 1 × 10¥4. As SSVs and SSV flight are defined in example, in the Commercial Space Transportation discussed elsewhere in the preamble, the FAA section 50902 of title 51. Requirements Reusable Launch Vehicle and Reentry Licensing notes that the operator must also perform a system to conduct the flight of a space support Regulations final rule, § 431.23 required an operator safety analysis to demonstrate that any vehicle would be promulgated pursuant to identify contingency abort sites in its application. modifications made to the carrier vehicle introduce The FAA stated that contingency abort sites are pre- only hazards to the public that are extremely to Section 44737, and are beyond the planned, and their potential use may be identified remote. scope of this rulemaking. as part of an application in order to meet mission

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Section 450.147(a)(3) requires part 450. SpaceX suggested adding addressing risks to other aviation users, operators to have written agreements language to require parties to delineate are commensurate with the expectations with FAA’s Air Traffic Organization roles and responsibilities ‘‘within their of the flying public. AOPA (ATO) or foreign air navigation service jurisdiction.’’ Indeed, an entity may recommended the FAA prioritize providers (ANSP) to establish only enter into an agreement to the funding and implementation of the procedures for the issuance of a Notices extent they are authorized, but the FAA Aeronautical Information Management to Airmen (NOTAM) prior to a launch disagrees that this language is needed in Modernization program, which would or reentry. the regulation. provide real-time airspace information. AOPA recommended that the FAA Section 450.147(d) requires operators A4A, AAAE, ACI, and AOPA establish procedures for the issuance of to describe each agreement submitted in recommended the FAA incorporate and a Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) at least accordance with the section. implement various recommendations 72 hours prior to a launch or reentry to SpaceX asked the FAA to clarify in a from the Airspace Access Priorities ARC forewarn the public about activation of guidance document the intent of and Spaceport Categorization ARC. different airspace. proposed § 450.147(d) and allow The FAA acknowledges the It would not be appropriate within operators to provide other acceptable commenters’ concerns regarding this commercial space rulemaking to documentation (e.g., business processes airspace efficiency, but these issues are impose a requirement on the FAA ATO like the Universal Documentation not within the scope of this rulemaking. or a foreign ANSP to issue NOTAMs System) to avoid literal interpretations Operational oversight and management within a particular time frame. Each of requirements. To comply with this of airspace impacts are managed at the ANSP is responsible for the safe and requirement, the operator will FAA Air Traffic Control System efficient use of its airspace and can be enumerate those services that the site Command Center. As noted in the Flight expected to provide notification operator is providing through various Hazard Area Analysis section of this consistent with its obligations. As such, agreements. The FAA may request a preamble, FAA is working to address notification requirements necessary to specific agreement that the site operator this issue through the Airspace Access protect the public, including any has established to provide such a ARC and other initiatives. minimum times for notification, should service. As long as each agreement required by this section meets the cc. Safety-Critical Personnel be determined as part of the agreement Qualifications (§ 450.149) development process with the FAA criteria set forth in § 450.147, the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to ATO or foreign ANSP. operator may choose the format of the Section 450.147(a)(4) requires an agreement. Therefore, the FAA adopts remove the certification requirements found in §§ 417.105, 417.311, and operator to enter into such agreements the proposed rule without change. 415.113 and replace them with with emergency response providers, Virgin Galactic asked whether an performance-based requirements in including local government authorities, agreement would be required with local authorities to ensure that the area is proposed § 450.149 (Safety-Critical as necessary to satisfy the requirements cleared of the public and critical assets Personnel Qualifications). Section of § 450.173 (Mishap plan—reporting, if an operator cannot meet conditional 450.149(a) would require an operator to response, and investigation risk factor criteria for an uncontrollable ensure safety-critical personnel are requirements). area of land. The FAA notes that trained, qualified, and capable of SpaceX recommended that proposed conditional risk does not trigger the performing their safety-critical tasks, § 450.147(a)(4) exclude government need for an agreement with a local and that their training is current. Under installations where responsibilities and authority. Instead, it is related to the proposed § 450.149, an applicant would mutual aid protocol rendered separate need for an FSS. However, such an be required to identify in the agreements with local authorities agreement might be a means of application all safety-critical tasks and unnecessary. SpaceX believes this mitigating conditional risk, potentially internal requirements or standards for addition would manage expectations to a degree at which the operator does personnel to meet prior to performing where multiple Federal entities may not need to employ an FSS. the identified tasks. The application have overlapping jurisdiction for A number of commenters expressed would be required to identify internal addressing mishap response. concern that the NPRM did not require training and currency requirements, Because § 450.173(d)(5) requires an that airspace efficiency be taken into completion standards, or any other operator to implement agreements with consideration as part of a launch or means of demonstrating compliance government authorities and emergency reentry operation. AAAE, A4A, ACI, with the requirements of proposed responders ‘‘as necessary’’ to satisfy the ALPA, AOPA, CAA, NATCA, RAA, and § 450.149. The applicant would also be requirements of § 450.173, no change to Southwest Airlines recommended the required to describe the process for the proposed language in § 450.147(a)(4) FAA incorporate airspace efficiency tracking training currency. is required. An operator that is consideration into the licensing process Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop launching from a Federal launch site is to minimize negative operational and Grumman, and ULA recommended that not required to execute agreements with financial impacts for airlines, the FAA require that safety-critical local authorities if the Federal site passengers, cargo shippers, and the personnel comply with the Federal already has the necessary coordination public that will result from this Drug-Free Workplace requirements set in place to satisfy the requirements in rulemaking. A4A, AAAE, and forth in 14 CFR 120. These commenters § 450.173. Southwest Airlines advocated increased noted that the Federal Drug-Free Section 450.147(b) requires that transparency and collaboration with Workplace requirements apply to agreements clearly delineate the roles airspace stakeholders in developing government contractors, but commercial and responsibilities of each party to agreements pursuant to proposed operators are only subject to company support the safe launch or reentry under § 450.147. A4A, AAAE, ACI, ALPA, policy, which may not address the use AOPA, CAA, NATCA, and RAA of drugs and alcohol. The FAA did not risk criteria and, therefore, are separate and distinct from emergency abort landing situations that may recommended the FAA ensure the propose to require drug and alcohol potentially be anywhere. 65 FR 56617, 56635 safety requirements for commercial testing and finds that such a (November 20, 2000). space operations, particularly those requirement would exceed the scope of

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this rulemaking. The FAA may consider requirements, stating that prescriptive unnecessary. The rest requirements in proposing such action in a future duty limits were necessary to reduce the § 450.151(b) ensure safety-critical rulemaking. likelihood of human error related to personnel are physically and mentally The FAA received a comment from fatigue. ALPA indicated the proposed capable of performing all tasks. It is up Blue Origin supporting the changes to rule made it possible for a commercial to the company to monitor compliance the safety-critical personnel space operator ‘‘to set unrealistic crew with its work shift and rest rules to qualifications requirements. In the final rest requirements for cost management ensure personnel are mentally and rule, the FAA adopts § 450.149 as (doing more with less) instead of physically capable of performing safety- proposed. safety.’’ ALPA recommended the FAA critical tasks. An operator must comply dd. Work Shift and Rest Requirements adopt the rest rules contained in with the rest rules accepted by the FAA (§ 450.151) § 437.51. as part of the license because it must The FAA elected a performance-based comply with the representations in its In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to requirement over a prescriptive one akin application. Therefore, even absent an combine the rest requirements of to § 437.51 in order to allow operators express requirement, an operator must §§ 417.113(f) and 431.43(c)(4) into to develop requirements that are suited monitor compliance with its rest rules § 450.151 (Work Shift and Rest to their particular operations. In in order to ensure that the objectives of Requirements), which would require an addition, prescriptive requirements fail § 450.151 are met and that the operator applicant to document and implement to account for the various factors that does not act contrary to its application. rest requirements that ensure safety- can affect crew rest, such as the time of Blue Origin asked the FAA to clarify critical personnel are physically and day of an operation, length of pre-flight the time period to which the rest rules mentally capable of performing assigned operations, and travel to and from the apply in finalizing the rest requirements tasks. These requirements would apply launch or reentry site. The performance- and the scope of license rule (§ 450.3). to operations of all launch and reentry based requirement set forth in § 450.151 Blue Origin suggested the rest vehicles and would allow operators allows operators to take into account requirements should only apply during flexibility to employ rest rules that fit such factors affecting crew rest and the period an action could present a their particular operations. Section adopt mitigations and procedures distinct impact to safety, akin to how 450.151(b)(1) would require an unique to each launch operation. The NASA closely monitors astronauts’ rest/ operator’s rest rules to include the FAA also disagrees that § 450.151 will work periods but does not mandate duration of each work shift and the enable operators to set unrealistic crew crew rest requirements for aerospace process for extending this shift, rest requirements in the interest of employees in manufacturing plants or including the maximum allowable cutting costs. Although operators can NASA mission control staff. length of any extension. An operator’s develop rest rules that fit their Although the FAA declines to limit rest rules would be required to include operations, operators must demonstrate the scope of § 450.151 as Blue Origin the number of consecutive work shift in their application that their rest rules recommends, the FAA clarifies that days allowed before rest is required. ensure safety-critical personnel are § 450.151 is intended to ensure safety- Section 450.151(b)(3) would also require physically and mentally capable of critical personnel are prepared to an operator’s rest rules to include the performing assigned tasks. The FAA perform tasks that have an inherent minimum rest period required between will evaluate the rest rules during impact on public safety. Operators must each work shift, including the period of review of the license application, and, if document and implement rest rules to rest required immediately before the accepted, they will become part of the ensure that safety-critical personnel flight countdown work shift. Applicants license. The FAA finds that no change have received adequate rest before they would be required to submit their rest to the proposed regulation is warranted. perform any safety-critical task. rules during the license application. In ALPA and Blue Origin stated the Operators would not be able to ensure the final rule, the FAA adopts § 450.151 commercial space operator should be that personnel are physically and as proposed. responsible for monitoring compliance mentally prepared to perform safety- The FAA received seven comments with work shift and rest requirements. critical tasks if the rest rules set forth in on its proposed work shift and rest Blue Origin noted the companies should § 450.151 applied only during activities requirements. Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, be responsible for monitoring that could distinctly affect safety (i.e., Virgin Galactic, and an individual compliance after the FAA accepts an during safety-critical tasks). For commenter agreed with FAA’s proposed operator’s rules through the application example, the rest rules apply to safety- requirements permitting greater and approval process. Rocket Lab critical tasks such as end to end testing flexibility in ensuring sufficient rest for commented that a specific requirement and safety-critical hardware installation safety-critical personnel. Rocket Lab for operators to monitor compliance that may occur before hazardous pre- commented that the proposed approach with work shift and rest requirements flight operations trigger the start of would enable operators to develop work was unnecessary as the regulation launch. Operators must therefore shift and rest requirements that are explicitly required that the rest rules comply with § 450.151 for the duration appropriate for the individual operating implemented ensure safety-critical of their license. The regulation is conditions, environment, and personnel are physically and mentally flexible enough that an operator can mitigations that exist. capable of performing all assigned tasks. develop rules that treat different parts of Virgin Galactic requested the FAA Operators are expected to monitor launch activity differently. The FAA provide further guidance of what would compliance with their approved crew finds that no change to the regulation is satisfy proposed § 450.151 beyond the rest rules so that personnel are fit to warranted. example of § 431.43(c)(4). Section perform safety-critical tasks and to Blue Origin suggested removing the 431.43(c)(4) or the crew rest provide records of compliance with definition of ‘‘vehicle safety operations requirements of AFSPCMAN 91–710 are those rules, as required by § 450.219(a), personnel,’’ as it has caused confusion two possible, but not the only, means of where requested by the FAA. The FAA in the industry. The FAA agrees and compliance with § 450.151. finds that a specific requirement for does not adopt the definition. ALPA opposed the performance-based operators to monitor compliance with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop approach to work shift and rest work shift and rest requirements is Grumman, and ULA asserted the

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requirements proposed in § 450.151(b) overly burdensome. The FCC requires in Blue Origin recommended proposed reflect a relaxation of work rule Section 308(b) of the Communications § 450.153 be removed since applicants standards compared to the current FAA Act of 1934, as amended, all the items were already required to address and and range policies. They further noted in proposed § 450.153(a)(1) and (a)(2) as mitigate hazards associated with other DOT-regulated industries have part of an FCC license for radiating frequency coordination or radiation explicit rest criteria and recommended systems that an operator must obtain to exposure or power limits as part of their that the FAA publish the acceptable operate radiating equipment as part of a hazard analysis. Blue Origin added that, criteria rather than having operators launch. The purpose of radio frequency for launches at Federal launch or negotiate the hours deemed safe. management, as stated in the NPRM,172 reentry sites, proposed § 450.153 would The requirements proposed in is to mitigate hazards associated with duplicate much of the information § 450.151(b) are not a relaxation of work radio frequency usage including submitted to the Federal site, whose rule standards compared to current FAA interference that could adversely affect frequency management office typically and range policies because, as the FSS or any safety-critical system of works with range scheduling to regulate previously stated, two of the ways an a vehicle, including RLVs and reentry radiation and power limits to prevent operator can show compliance with vehicles. The intent of proposed exceeding radiation exposure and power § 450.151 are to meet current FAA rules § 450.153 (a)(1) and (a)(2) was to ensure limits while on the pad and harming the (§ 431.43(c)(4)) or AFSPCMAN 91–710, radio transmissions would not interfere vehicle or payload. For operations that and the FAA retains oversight to with commanded flight termination do not occur on Federal sites, Blue determine that an operator’s rules systems and would be compatible with Origin indicated an operator would achieve the standard. the receiving system on the vehicle. The proceed as under the current part 431 by As previously stated, the FAA will FAA finds that operators can identify identifying hazards and mitigation issue an AC on a means of compliance and mitigate hazards affecting FSS or measures required to meet the public for § 450.151. The crew rest safety-critical systems effectively safety limits. According to Blue Origin, requirements previously set forth in part without duplicating information operators should incorporate hazards 431 and the current crew rest required by the FCC. In the final rule, associated with this issue in their requirements in AFSPCMAN 91–710 the FAA amends § 450.153(a) by hazard analysis, including identifying will satisfy § 450.151. replacing (a)(1) and (a)(2) with the mitigation issues. ee. Radio Frequency (§ 450.153) performance-based objective central to The FAA disagrees that § 450.153 is unnecessary or duplicative of hazard In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that, § 450.153 that requires operators to ensure radio frequency interference analysis requirements. As stated in the for any radio frequency used, an NPRM, the FAA has determined that the operator would be required to: (1) does not adversely affect performance of any FSS or safety-critical system. public safety risks posed by radio Identify each frequency, all allowable frequency interference warrant specific frequency tolerances, and each Proposed § 450.153(a)(3) is re- designated as (a)(2) and continues to attention apart from the general frequency’s intended use, operating requirement that operators identify and power, and source; (2) provide for the require operators to coordinate use of radio frequencies with any site operator mitigate hazards associated with monitoring of frequency usage and licensed activity. To the extent Federal enforcement of frequency allocations; and any local and Federal authorities, including any State, tribal, or territorial launch or reentry site procedures and (3) coordinate use of radio provide for coordination of radio authorities. frequencies with any site operator and frequencies used, an operator may rely Blue Origin commented that proposed local and Federal authorities. Proposed on those procedures to demonstrate § 450.153 added to the burden § 450.153(b) contained application compliance with § 450.153. The FAA previously placed on operators under requirements and required an applicant does not prescribe the manner in which to submit procedures or other means to part 431, which ought to be included in an operator ensures that radio frequency demonstrate compliance with the radio the FAA’s cost analysis. Blue Origin interference does not adversely affect a frequency requirements. explained an applicant would be vehicle’s FSS or any safety-critical Blue Origin, SpaceX, and Sierra required to submit to FAA the system. The FAA merely requires that Nevada commented the proposed substantive content of a frequency operators set forth in their applications requirements were duplicative of management plan and submit a means of complying with § 450.153 so Federal Communications Commission procedures to demonstrate compliance that the FAA can ensure that radio (FCC) licensing requirements and, with that plan. Blue Origin pointed out interference issues are appropriately according to Blue Origin, were an that under part 431, the FAA did not addressed. unnecessary burden on operators. Blue require operators to prove they acquired In an effort to streamline radio Origin explained that operators FCC licenses for a mission or that they frequency requirements, SpaceX coordinate frequency management coordinated the use of radio recommended the FAA revise proposed through the FCC licensing process, frequencies. § 450.153(a)(2) to require that operators which is robust in its technical review As previously explained, the FAA has ensure frequency utilization according of transmitter capabilities. Blue Origin removed the duplicative provisions to frequency authorization parameters. also noted FCC licenses are public from § 450.153, which would have SpaceX also recommended the FAA information that the FAA can verify. amounted to a greater burden on revise proposed § 450.153(b) to require Sierra Nevada suggested the regulation operators than has previously been coordination with site operators and should either require only that the required under part 431. As such, in the local and Federal authorities only for applicant demonstrate it has final rule, § 450.153 requires no more of launches that do not occur on a Federal coordinated with the FCC or be omitted operators than what part 431 required launch or reentry site with existing altogether. for analysis of hazards associated with radio frequency policies and The FAA agrees that the proposed licensed activities, creating no procedures. requirements in § 450.153(a)(1) and additional cost to operators. The FAA disagrees that any frequency (a)(2) are duplicative of FCC authorization parameters issued by the requirements for radiating systems and 172 84 FR 15334, footnote 98. FCC, which are geared toward managing

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frequency use and operation, would be Rocket Lab expressed support for the § 450.157 during inspections.173 The sufficient to assess hazards to public proposed requirements as reducing the inspections will be consistent with safety posed by radio frequency risk of unintended consequences that current practice, in which FAA interference, which are properly within resulted from stringent time inspectors often review the operator’s the FAA’s purview. As previously requirements. SpaceX recommended final communications procedures. discussed, the FAA has removed the that the FAA clarify its intent for flight Given that operators do not need to prescriptive requirements that it commit criteria in proposed demonstrate compliance with § 450.157 deemed duplicative of FCC § 450.155(b)(2) to ensure that mission at the application stage, operators may requirements in proposed § 450.153(a) success is not a factor by having be required to revise their and replaces them with a central applicants describe the criteria ‘‘to communication procedures to resolve performance-based objective. The FAA ensure public safety’’ for establishing issues identified during compliance declines to accept SpaceX’s suggestion readiness to proceed with the flight of monitoring. to amend § 450.153(b). The coordination a launch or reentry vehicle. The FAA received three comments required by § 450.153(b) allows an The FAA agrees that a change to the addressing the communications operator to operate a command proposed regulatory language would requirements proposed in § 450.157. transmitter at a frequency and power clarify the scope of the requirement. AAAE recommended the FAA require that ensures a flight termination system Therefore, the FAA revises procedures and protocols on how the signal can be successfully transmitted, § 450.155(b)(2) by adding the phrase ‘‘so operator would communicate with and thereby prevent harmful radio that public safety is maintained’’ to the contingency or alternative landing sites, interference, in the interest of public end of the paragraph. The FAA did not and emergency responders. AAAE also safety. The FAA declines to remove the adopt the language recommended by suggested the FAA consider providing requirement that all operators SpaceX because the requirement calls these same stakeholders with the ability coordinate use of radio frequencies with for criteria that establish readiness to to monitor countdown and any site operator and local and Federal proceed with flight or reentry while communications channels, just as authorities in order to protect the public ensuring public safety. The FAA’s operators would be required to provide and public property, because such revision maintains the emphasis on the FAA with such access under coordination is necessary to prevent developing criteria to determine proposed § 450.209. radio interference that could affect readiness to proceed with launch or The FAA finds no additional public safety. Users of Federal launch or reentry, and clarifies that the operator requirements are necessary, as the reentry sites may use Federal site need only identify those criteria that accident investigation and agreement procedures for radio frequency to affect public safety. requirements address AAAE’s concerns. demonstrate compliance with § 450.153. Operators must include emergency gg. Communications (§ 450.157) response procedures in their mishap Virgin Galactic asked if an operator In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to plans pursuant to § 450.173, which could contract a third party to meet the preserve the substantive could, in many instances include frequency management requirements. communications requirements from communication procedures with The FAA does not prescribe the parts 417 and 431 but eliminate the emergency response service providers. means by which an operator complies requirement to implement a In addition, operators must enter into with § 450.153. An operator could communications plan. Proposed and implement any necessary therefore enter into an agreement in § 450.157(a) would require an operator agreements with local authorities and accordance with § 450.147 to have a to define the authority of personnel to emergency response services, such as third party, such as a spaceport or issue ‘‘hold/resume,’’ ‘‘go/no go,’’ and first responders. Any other stakeholder, Federal launch or reentry site, satisfy abort commands, assign communication such as a contingency abort site, may the radio frequency management networks so those personnel have direct request to monitor channels as part of requirements contained in § 450.153. access to real-time safety-critical its agreement with the operator, but the As noted, the FAA adopts § 450.153 information, ensure those personnel FAA does not find it necessary for safety (Radio Frequency Management) with monitor each common intercom channel to mandate this type of monitoring in all revisions. The FAA replaces paragraphs during countdown and flight, and situations. (a)(1) and (a)(2) with performance-based implement a protocol for using defined Sierra Nevada commented that the objectives central to radio frequency radio telephone communications requirement to monitor each common management. Operators will be required terminology. Proposed § 450.157(c) intercom channel is excessive and to ensure that radio frequency does not would also require an operator during would decrease the safety of an adversely affect the performance of FSS each countdown to record all safety- operation. It noted that, for operators or safety-critical systems and to critical communications network with multiple channels (e.g., more than coordinate use of radio frequencies with channels that are used for voice, video, 10), monitoring each channel would any site operator and local and Federal or data transmissions to support safety- serve to decrease the overall situational authorities. critical systems. This requirement is awareness of the controller. Sierra substantially the same requirement in ff. Readiness and Rehearsals (§ 450.155) Nevada recommended the FAA revise §§ 417.111(l)(5)(vii) and 431.41. In the proposed § 450.157(a)(3) to require that In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an final rule, with the exception of personnel monitor only the applicable operator would be required to document proposed § 450.157(a)(3) as discussed intercom channels during countdown and implement procedures to assess later in this preamble section, the FAA and flight. readiness to proceed with the flight of adopts § 450.157 as proposed. The FAA agrees with Sierra Nevada’s a launch or reentry vehicle. As part of As explained in the NPRM, operators recommendation and removes the application requirements, proposed would not need to submit their § 450.157(a)(3). The persons responsible § 450.155(b)(2) would require an communication procedures during the for the launch need to maintain applicant to describe the criteria for application process as those procedures situational awareness and have all establishing readiness to proceed with generally are not mature at that time. the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. The FAA will verify compliance with 173 84 FR 15337.

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safety-critical information in order to satisfied by merely having operators The FAA changes the title of this make decisions that affect public safety. identify the launch sequence of events. section from ‘‘Surveillance and In cases in which there are multiple Furthermore, the FAA does not think a Publication of Hazard Areas’’ to channels, all channels do not have to be prescriptive requirement listing which ‘‘Control of Hazard Areas’’ to describe monitored at the same time. It is events must take place as part of a the contents of this section fully, as the common practice to turn down or turn countdown is necessary to ensure requirements cover more than off channels in order to listen to a safety. Rather, this section takes a surveillance and publication. The FAA channel that has critical information. performance based approach that also changed the proposed wording in Each person identified in paragraph focuses more comprehensively on § 450.161(a) from ‘‘publicize, survey, (a)(1) of this section is not required to verification of flight commit criteria and and evacuate’’ to ‘‘survey, publicize, listen actively at all times. Operator the operator’s ability to ensure that it control or evacuate’’ to match the personnel other than those listed in can return the vehicle to a safe state language in § 450.133(a), which (a)(1) may listen to channels as after a countdown abort or delay. The describes flight hazard area analysis. necessary to relay critical information to FAA notes that the requirements for the The term ‘‘control’’ is used to describe the personnel listed in (a)(1). flight commit criteria itself are clearly the overall management of hazard areas, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop provided in § 450.165(b). including control of entry and exit Grumman, and ULA recommended the points such as roadblocks and security FAA qualify the requirement to record ii. Control of Hazard Areas (§ 450.161) checkpoints. The FAA also adds safety-critical communications channels language in § 450.161(a) that references in § 450.157(c) as ‘‘subject to records In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that the flight hazard area requirements in retention requirements of § 450.219.’’ an operator would be required to § 450.133, which requires an applicant The FAA agrees that an operator must publicize, survey, and evacuate each to identify the flight hazard areas it record all safety-critical channels and flight hazard area before initiating flight needs to control. retain them for the time periods or reentry to the extent necessary to The FAA notes that the requirements specified in § 450.219, but does not ensure compliance with proposed in § 450.161 are consistent with the agree that a change to the regulatory text § 450.101. Proposed § 450.161(a) did not recommendations made by the National is necessary. change the need for surveillance relative Academy of Sciences National Research to the current requirements in parts 417 175 hh. Pre-Flight Procedures (§ 450.159) Council. An applicant could apply and 431 174 for people on land or aircraft conservative estimates of the ship traffic In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to because an operator must continue to and vulnerability to demonstrate streamline countdown procedures and ensure all regions where any individual acceptable public risks. However, as requirements. Specifically, the FAA member of the public would be exposed explained in the NPRM, the operators × ¥6 proposed not to include in part 450 the to more than 1 10 PC (probability still have the option to use the current requirements for safety directives or of casualty) are evacuated. However, the approach in part 417, where safety notebooks in § 431.37(a)(2) and FAA proposed to revise the requirement surveillance is required to ensure no for a countdown plan in § 417.111(l), as to evacuate and monitor areas where a ship is exposed to more than 1 × 10¥5 well as the requirement to file such waterborne vessel would be exposed to PI, because that would be sufficient to plans, because there are many methods × ¥5 greater than 1 10 PI (probability of ensure compliance with § 450.101. of documenting pre-flight procedures impact) currently required by Appendix Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop that do not involve a plan or notebook. B to part 417 under B417.5(a). The Grumman, and ULA proposed that the In addition, the FAA proposed a NPRM allowed an operator to include phrase ‘‘unless otherwise assigned performance-based requirement in people in waterborne vessels in through agreement with a launch or which an operator who needs to collective risk computations, rather than reentry facility’’ be added to proposed implement pre-flight procedures would clearing a waterborne vessel from a § 450.161(a) for clarification. Virgin verify that all flight commit criteria are hazard area because the vessel is Galactic also recommended that this satisfied before flight and ensure the ¥5 exposed to 1 × 10 PI. The NPRM requirement be handled through Letters operator is capable of returning the proposal to include people on ships in of Agreement. Although the operator vehicle to a safe state after a countdown the collective risk computation in may contract with another party for the abort or delay. In the final rule, the FAA § 450.101(a)(1) and (b)(1) would allow provision of services to meet this adopts § 450.159 (Pre-flight Procedures) the application of risk management requirement, the licensee remains as proposed. principles to protect people on responsible for complying with the Virgin Galactic commented that, if the waterborne vessels. In the final rule, the requirement. As such, the FAA does not FAA knows which events must take FAA adopts § 450.161 with revisions. It agree that this recommended addition is place as a part of a countdown, it should updates § 450.161 to be consistent with necessary. require them in proposed the language in flight hazard area SpinLaunch commented that the goals § 450.159(a)(1). Virgin Galactic analysis section, § 450.133, and adds an of the NOTAM required under proposed recommended the FAA require application requirement for a § 450.161 can be addressed through area operators to identify the sequence of description of how the applicant will designations on Sectional Aeronautical events that must take place to initiate provide for any publication of flight Charts, controlled airspace designation, flight in order to verify that flight hazard areas. and coordination with Air Traffic commit criteria are satisfied. Control. The FAA is responsible for the Flight commit criteria involve much 174 Part 417 requirements for establishing and more than the launch sequence of surveying hazard areas for ELVs are found in 175 In 2001, the National Research Council events, including interdependent §§ 417.205, 417.223, and part 417 appendix B. Part published a report on ‘‘Streamlining Space Launch conditions such as meteorological 431 does not set explicit requirements for Range Safety,’’ which included a recommendation conditions, lightning protection surveillance but both §§ 417.107(b)(2) and that ‘‘safety procedures based on risk avoidance 431.35(b)(1)(ii) require that an operator ensure all should be replaced with procedures consistent with equipment measurements, and status of members of the public are cleared of all regions, the risk management philosophy specified by EWR safety system components. Therefore, whether land, sea, or air, where an individual 127–1.’’ See p. 44 of IBSN 0–309–51648–X available the requirements of § 450.159 cannot be would be exposed to more than 1 × 10¥6 PC. at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9790.html.

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management of the NAS and establishes those areas. Sierra Nevada also asked preamble stated that, given that there the regulations, processes, and how an operator could reasonably are numerous assumptions and input procedures for restricting airspace survey an aircraft hazard area over a data that are critical to the validity of including airspace restrictions for large area of ocean. the FSA, this requirement could have a commercial space activity. Under The FAA disagrees with this comment variety of surveillance implications § 450.147, when an operator enters into and notes that this requirement codifies beyond the surveillance necessary to a letter of agreement with the FAA, the current practice. The FAA further notes ensure the public exposure at the time airspace needed to accomplish the that the only change to current of the operation is consistent with the proposed operation safely is notionally practice—the inclusion of people on assumptions and input data for the FSA. identified and air traffic control ships in collective risk—actually As described in the NPRM preamble, an coordination procedures are established decreases regulatory burden for example would be that an FSA could accordingly. The FAA did not propose waterborne vessel hazard areas. An assume that a jettisoned stage remains changes to airspace management operator is no longer required to intact to impact or breaks up into pieces regulations or processes, so evacuate and monitor areas where a that are not all capable of causing SpinLaunch’s comment is beyond the waterborne vessel would be exposed to casualties to people on the ground but ¥5 scope of this rulemaking. greater than 1 × 10 PI. In issuing its could still be capable of causing AOPA commented that airspace first waiver of the existing requirement casualties to people in a particularly hazard volumes are not communicated in § 417.107(b)(3),176 the FAA explained vulnerable class of aircraft, such as in a standardized manner today, nor are that successful application of the public helicopters. pilots educated on what to do with this risk management for the protection of In the final rule, the FAA maintains information. AOPA further commented people in waterborne vessels has the the requirement that an operator employ that a publicly accessible, authoritative potential for reducing launch costs by some type of surveillance (e.g., source for launch information would reducing delays due to ship traffic in telemetry data, or remote sensors such greatly increase awareness and mitigate warning areas while maintaining a high as a camera or radar) to verify that the adverse impacts caused by short notice level of public safety. For example, prior jettisoned stage behaves in a manner announcements of launches. The to the waiver of § 417.107(b)(3), a consistent with the FSA if that behavior commenter also suggested that launch from Cape Canaveral Air Force is germane to the size of the aircraft prospective users of the system should Station was delayed, in order to meet hazard area. The FAA clarifies that if an be part of this capability’s development the requirements of § 417.107(b)(3), by FSA includes conservative assumptions process. the presence of a tug boat towing a large and inputs, or a sensitivity analysis to As discussed more fully in the barge inside the ship hazard area. The demonstrate that the assumptions preamble section associated with Flight final rule addresses Sierra Nevada’s regarding break-up of a jettisoned stage Hazard Area Analysis, the FAA finds concerns regarding surveillance of a are not germane to the size of the that the issue raised by AOPA is best large portion of ocean by including aircraft hazard area, the operator will addressed by the NOTAM/AIM people on ships in the collective risk only be required under § 450.161(b) to Modernization effort rather than this criterion. Furthermore, the FAA notes demonstrate surveillance sufficient to rulemaking. that this requirement could be met a verify the accuracy of the FSA. If the Boeing commented that, currently, number of ways, including through an assumptions and inputs are sufficiently not all areas that are publicized are also operator agreement with a Federal conservative, this contingency could surveyed, controlled, and evacuated. launch or reentry site or the FAA. mean an operator does not need to Boeing stated that the need to survey Virgin Galactic asked whether it is employ surveillance at all. and evacuate should be scalable and necessary to require an operator to meet Blue Origin provided suggested text dependent upon the risk magnitude and the EC criteria if the operator is using a for § 450.161(b) related to vehicle area, remoteness of the hazard areas, flight hazard area, thus ensuring no tracking rather than surveillance. The capabilities for monitoring, and overall member of the public is in the area. The FAA declines to adopt this change risk/benefit tradeoff. The FAA does not FAA addressed this issue during the because vehicle tracking requirements believe a change to the proposed rule is public comment period in ‘‘Responses in § 450.167 (Tracking) are distinct from necessary to address these concerns. to the Public’s Clarifying Questions the requirement to surveil the flight The requirement to survey, publicize, Received by July 12, 2019.’’ An EC hazard areas in § 450.161. The control, and evacuate each flight hazard analysis is still required even if launch requirements and comments regarding area is scalable, as these measures are hazards are contained over regions of vehicle tracking are discussed in the required ‘‘to the extent necessary to land, sea, or air that are completely void preamble section associated with ensure compliance with § 450.101.’’ of members of the public because the § 450.167. This reference to § 450.101 means that systems necessary to achieve such CSF, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX also the need to control the hazard areas is containment, such as an FSS, may fail. commented that if a member of the dependent on the public risk criteria, as If an FSS fails, debris may fall outside public or another Federal agency well as the inputs and assumptions used of hazard areas where members of the chooses to breach a hazard area and put in the FSA. public are present. The EC analysis itself at risk, the operator should not Sierra Nevada commented that ensures that the potential failure of bear the consequences. Many § 450.161 would be an increase in those systems is accounted for when commenters identified this possibility regulatory burden due to surveillance calculating risk to the public. as a problem in the case of a hazard area over a large area being cost-prohibitive In the NPRM, proposed § 450.161(b) violation that occurs after the decision and nearly impossible to implement for would have required an operator to to commit to a reentry. smaller companies. Sierra Nevada perform surveillance sufficient to verify The FAA understands the unique recommended that operators only be or update the assumptions, input data, challenges of reentry operations with required to ensure NOTAMs and and results of the FSA. The NPRM respect to the control of hazard areas Notices to Mariners are in place prior to because of the long time lag between the operation, and should not bear 176 See Waivers of Ship Protection Probability of commitment to reenter and the planned consequences if the public breaches Impact Requirement, 81 FR 28930 (May 10, 2016). or potential unplanned vehicle presence

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in a hazard area. The FAA will work The FAA proposed in § 450.161(d)(1) The FAA agrees with Blue Origin’s with operators during the license that an applicant must submit a comment and revises § 450.163(a) by application process in applying this description of how the applicant will removing proposed § 450.163(a)(3). requirement to ensure verification provide for day-of-flight surveillance of Proposed § 450.163(a)(3) was intended procedures protect the public flight hazard areas, if necessary, to to cover an operator’s use of physical adequately for each unique operation. ensure that the presence of any member containment as a hazard control strategy In the NPRM, proposed § 450.161(c) of the public in or near a flight hazard when damage to a vehicle caused by a would require an applicant to publicize area is consistent with flight commit lightning strike would not impact the warnings for each flight hazard area, criteria developed for each launch or safety of the launch. The FAA has found except for regions of land, sea, or air reentry as required by § 450.165(b). In this section to be unnecessary because under the control of the vehicle or site the final rule, the FAA adds in lightning would not be a concern for an operator or other entity by agreement. If § 450.161(d)(1) that the applicant must operator using physical containment as the operator relies on another entity to also provide for day-of-flight control of a hazard control strategy since, by publicize these warnings, the proposed flight hazard areas. The FAA notes that definition, the launch vehicle does not rule required the operator to verify that the nature of any surveillance (in terms have sufficient energy for any hazards the warnings have been issued. CSF and of extent and frequency) necessary to associated with its flight to reach SpaceX commented that operators ensure conditions consistent with flight outside the flight hazard area. would have very little ability to ensure commit criteria is naturally linked to the Blue Origin requested that the FAA and enforce closures when launching level of control an operator can exercise define ‘‘continue safe flight’’ in from a Federal launch or reentry site or to limit access to a flight hazard area. proposed § 450.163(a)(2). In response, if the hazard area falls within a foreign In § 450.161(d)(2), the FAA adds as an the FAA modifies § 450.163(a)(2) to country’s airspace. application requirement that the require the operator to use a vehicle The FAA agrees with these comments. applicant must submit a description of designed to protect safety-critical To address this issue, the FAA changes how they will provide for any systems in the event of a direct lightning the language in proposed § 450.161(c) publication of flight hazard areas strike or nearby discharge. Thus, the from ‘‘verify that the warnings have necessary to meet the requirements of final rule requirement in § 450.163(a)(2) been issued’’ to ‘‘determine whether the § 450.161(c). This application mirrors the proposed application warnings have been issued’’ in requirement is necessary for the FAA to requirement in § 450.163(b)(2) to submit § 450.161(c)(1) in the final rule. The evaluate compliance with the documentation providing evidence that FAA recognizes that an operator would requirements of § 450.161(c), including the vehicle is designed to protect safety- be unable to meet the proposed verifying whether the warnings have critical systems against the effects of a regulation to verify the warnings have been issued. direct lightning strike or nearby been issued if the foreign Air Navigation discharge. Service Provider (ANSP) fails to jj. Lightning Hazard Mitigation publicize the warnings. The FAA also (§ 450.163) Virgin Galactic expressed concern for adds in § 450.161(c)(2) of the final rule In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to the amount of time it would take that the operator must notify the FAA if require operators to mitigate natural and operators to redesign their vehicles to the warnings have not been issued so triggered lightning by (1) implementing satisfy proposed § 450.163(a)(2) and that the FAA can determine if the flight commit criteria that avoid and asked that the FAA ‘‘grandfather’’ launch or reentry can be conducted in mitigate the potential for intercepting or currently licensed operators out of this a manner that protects the public initiating lightning strike or requirement. The FAA notes that sufficiently, and that this notification encountering discharge; (2) using a § 450.163(a) provides two ways for an must provide sufficient information to vehicle designed to continue safe flight operator to mitigate natural and enable the FAA to issue warnings to if struck by lightning or encountering a triggered lightning and does not U.S. aircraft. An involved party could nearby discharge; or (3) ensuring mandate a lightning-related design determine whether the warnings have satisfaction of the safety criteria set forth change. The decision to pursue flight been issued pursuant to the agreements in proposed § 450.101 in the event of a commit criteria versus a lightning- the operator has with, for example, a lightning strike on the vehicle. resistant vehicle rests with the operator. Federal launch or reentry site or a In the final rule, the FAA adopts The performance-based standards set foreign government. In cases in which a § 450.163 (Lightning Hazard Mitigation) forth in § 450.163 will be accompanied foreign ANSP does not issue the with modification. It revises § 450.163 by AC 450.163–1 ‘‘Lighting Hazard warnings in a timely manner, the to remove paragraphs (a)(3) and (b)(3). It Mitigation’’ in the future, which will operator must notify the FAA in adds the modifier ‘‘direct’’ to ‘‘lightning contain one, but not the only, acceptable accordance with a means of compliance strike’’ in paragraph (a)(1), to match the means of compliance for § 450.163(a)(1). accepted by the FAA. The means of application requirement in paragraph The AC will include references to compliance will describe information (b)(1). The FAA also modifies NASA–STD–4010, as well as relevant that the operators should communicate § 450.163(a)(2) in response to a standards for the design of a vehicle to to the FAA to (1) show due diligence in comment as described below. withstand the direct and indirect effects the fulfillment of their requirements in Blue Origin commented that proposed of a lightning discharge. Commenters accordance with agreements in place, § 450.163(a)(3) diverged from the largely supported this approach. Blue and (2) enable FAA to issue warnings to preamble to § 450.163 and the rest of the Origin noted that, while the Lightning U.S. aircraft. The FAA finds that the proposed rule, which clearly convey Flight Commit Criteria adopted by the final rule requirement in § 450.161(c)(2) that satisfaction of the safety criteria in FAA have successfully prevented is responsive to the comment that proposed § 450.101 was not optional. lightning attachment to vehicles in the operators have very little ability to An operator would be required to satisfy past, operators may demonstrate that the enforce closures when launching from a proposed § 450.101 regardless of avoidance criteria can be satisfied with Federal launch or reentry site or if the whether it chooses to implement flight their specific mission profile and hazard area falls within a foreign commit criteria or utilize a lightning- vehicle design. Aerospace Corporation country’s airspace. resistant vehicle. echoed support for enabling operators to

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develop new methods and evaluations lightning hazards, but instead will allow requirement is consistent with the for lighting avoidance and mitigation. applicants to develop their own means changes to the critical asset Regarding proposed § 450.163(a)(1), of complying with § 450.163. The FAA requirements discussed earlier in the two commenters expressed concern that notes, however, that the means of preamble and ensures that a flight is not the FAA, in adopting only NASA–STD– compliance identified, NASA–STD– initiated if it does not meet the risk 4010 as an accepted means of 4010, was developed by the Lightning criteria. The FAA will work with the compliance for now, may not accept Advisory Panel, and thus, would applicant to create a streamlined unique means of compliance in the achieve the same result that the process to achieve this confirmation. future. The Aerospace Corporation and commenter requests. The FAA anticipates that it will Weather Modification International Blue Origin commented that, to the generally be able to provide this argued the FAA should adopt prelaunch extent the FAA looks to aircraft confirmation well before the actual in situ measurement of electric fields as lightning protection standards (e.g., AC flight countdown. a means of demonstrating compliance 20–136B, AC 20–107B) to determine the Sierra Nevada commented that the with § 450.163, noting that NASA–STD– appropriate industry standards use of the term ‘‘surveillance’’ may be 4010 is imperfect because it relies applicable to § 450.163(a)(2), the agency broader than the FAA intended. The exclusively on observable ground data. should adopt only those standards FAA discusses surveillance in the The FAA considered using direct clearly applicable to space vehicles. The preamble section for Control of Hazard measurement of the electric field within commenter added that the use of SAE Areas (§ 450.161). a cloud as an option for compliance recommended practices would create an ll. Tracking (§ 450.167) with § 450.163. However, the ambient undue burden on applicants since the electrostatic field within and near SAE protection rules apply to transport In the NPRM, the FAA proposed electrified clouds can vary rapidly in aircraft, which require a much higher vehicle tracking requirements, including both space and time because of the level of safety than that prescribed by that an operator would be required to charge separation and redistribution part 450. measure and record in real time the processes inside and around the clouds, The FAA agrees that only those position and velocity of the vehicle. The and because lightning can rearrange this aircraft standards which are appropriate system used to track the vehicle would charge abruptly over distances of many to apply to space vehicles should be be required to provide data to determine kilometers. Because no measuring used to assess compliance with the actual impact locations of all stages technique today can be applied § 450.163(a)(2). and components, and to obtain vehicle everywhere simultaneously and it is performance data for comparison with kk. Flight Commit Criteria (§ 450.165) difficult to prove that electric field the pre-flight performance predictions. measurements taken near the flight path In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in The FAA intended the proposed at an earlier time will remain valid at § 450.165 that an operator establish and requirements to capture current the time of launch or landing, this observe flight safety rules in order to practice. As explained in the NPRM, option is not viable on its own. initiate flight. The proposed rule also tracking data sufficient to identify the The FAA agrees that the optimal required an operator to establish and location of any vehicle impacts standards for avoiding and mitigating observe flight abort rules in order to end following an unplanned event are natural and triggered lightning may be flight. Proposed § 450.165 would require necessary to ensure a proper response to achieved through technological that an operator’s flight safety rules an emergency.177 advancement in the future. Currently, include flight commit criteria CSF, SpaceX, SpinLaunch, and Virgin NASA–STD–4010 is the only standard identifying each condition necessary to Orbit commented that the proposed of which the FAA is aware that will satisfy proposed § 450.101 prior to language in § 450.167(a) could be satisfy the requirements of initiating flight. These flight commit interpreted as tracking stages and § 450.163(a)(1). However, ongoing criteria would include: (1) Surveillance; components all the way down to the research efforts could soon allow for (2) monitoring of meteorological earth or body of water. CSF also sought modifications of the NASA’s Lightning conditions; (3) implementing window clarity regarding the intent of the Launch Commit Criteria, providing closures for the purpose of collision requirement to ‘‘provide data to additional means of compliance. As avoidance; (4) monitoring the status of determine the actual impact locations of stated in the NPRM, the FAA anticipates any FSS; and (5) any other hazard all stages and components,’’ and that industry will develop and submit controls derived from system safety, whether this requirement would mean new standards to the FAA to serve as computing system safety, or FSA. that operators must predict the expected unique means of compliance under In the final rule, the FAA adopts impact locations or actual impact § 450.35(b). proposed § 450.165 with revisions. The locations. To clarify this point, CSF, The FAA also acknowledges the FAA moves the flight abort rules SpaceX, and Virgin Orbit suggested suggestion of Weather Modification proposed in § 450.165(c) to § 450.108. using the phrase ‘‘predict the expected International that the FAA take the lead The discussion of the revisions related impact locations’’ rather than in developing a definitive set of to abort rules in proposed § 450.165 is ‘‘determine the actual impact lightning standards. The FAA has in the Flight Abort Rules section of the locations.’’ The FAA concurs and traditionally relied upon the Lightning preamble. The FAA combines proposed adopts the recommended change in the Advisory Panel, with its technical § 450.165(a) and (b) into a single final rule. The change more accurately expertise in mitigating lightning paragraph (a) to reflect that this section reflects the intent of the requirement. hazards, to develop lightning standards. now only relates to flight commit Blue Origin commented that RCC 321 The FAA relied upon the lightning criteria. requirements to coordinate with the standards recommended by the In addition, the FAA adds a FAA to ensure timely notification of any Lightning Advisory Panel in developing requirement that the flight commit expected air traffic hazard do not the lightning requirements in part 417. criteria must include confirmation from actually mention vehicle tracking, and Given the performance-based nature of the FAA that the risk to critical assets that it may be possible to provide this rule, the FAA is not prescribing a satisfies the requirements of particular standard for mitigating § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4). This 177 See 84 FR 15344.

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notification of traffic hazards without 29, 2019,’’ the term ‘‘all stages and and expand the analysis requirements to the need for tracking (such as a straight components’’ does not mean that all determine launch and reentry window up suborbital trajectory 178). debris must be tracked to the ground closures, including updated protections Tracking data is an important element after a vehicle breakup. for human spaceflight and additional of current practice used to ensure the CSF and SpaceX suggested adding the closures to protect active payloads and safety of people in aircraft. In the past, word ‘‘nominal’’ to this requirement prevent orbital debris generation. The tracking vehicles was inherently a part when referring to flight tracking. The FAA proposed that all operators would of flight abort and an important means FAA declines to adopt this change be required to come into compliance to ensure safety in the event of a mishap because it is important to track during with the LCOLA requirements by the in which hazardous debris falls outside off-nominal trajectories as well, effective date of the rulemaking. of designated hazard areas. During including during normal flight and for In the final rule, the FAA adopts launch or reentry operations that lack off-trajectory malfunctions at least until § 450.169 with revisions. The finalized the ability to inform the FAA rapidly of flight abort is initiated or vehicle break- LCOLA rules better align with the the volume and duration of airspace for up occurs. Tracking data can enable an existing processes used at Federal sites, which an aircraft hazard is predicted appropriate response to an off-nominal provide adequate orbital safety following a mishap, the FAA must close situation, such as where to evacuate the measures for launch and reentry inordinately large regions of airspace to public to protect against predicted toxic operations, and incorporate updated provide a sufficient level of safety to fumes or where to apply fire options for collision avoidance analysis. aircraft flying in regions where suppression resources. The FAA maintains that all operators hazardous debris could fall in the event Blue Origin, CSF, and SpaceX must come into compliance with the of a break-up. Although RCC 321 does commented that real time telemetry is LCOLA requirements by the effective not call for tracking per se, the FAA often not possible for the entire mission, date of this rule. The FAA adds the finds tracking essential to the safe and such as when a vehicle passes over the words ‘‘are met’’ to § 450.169(b) to fix a efficient integration of launch and horizon or during a reentry blackout typographical error in the NPRM. reentry operations into the NAS. For period. The FAA concurs with the For an orbital or suborbital launch or example, the Columbia accident in commenters that real time telemetry is reentry, § 450.169(a) requires an 2003 179 demonstrated that there is often not always possible. In the past, there operator to establish window closures a significant period of time between a were times during reentry that the needed to ensure that the launch or vehicle break-up and when hazardous presence of plasma typically blocked reentry vehicle, any jettisoned debris reaches aircraft altitudes. The vehicle-to-ground communications. components, or payloads, meet the time between vehicle break-up and More recently, space-based tracking and identified requirements with respect to when hazardous debris reaches aircraft communications have made it feasible orbiting objects, not including objects altitudes enables the FAA to close a to overcome reentry plasma and over being launched or reentered as part of minimum amount of airspace while the horizon limitations. However, the the same launch or reentry activity (e.g., ensuring a high level of safety for final rule does not require operators to dual manifested payloads). In aircraft flying in regions where use space-based tracking and performing a launch or reentry collision hazardous debris could fall in the event communications to meet § 450.167 avoidance analysis against inhabitable of a break-up. As explained in the unless it is necessary to protect public objects, an operator may choose to NPRM preamble, tracking data are safety, safety of property, and national stipulate an ellipsoidal separation generally necessary to ensure a proper security and foreign interests of the distance, a spherical separation response to an emergency, facilitate United States. The FAA does not distance, or satisfy the probability of × ¥6 flight abort, obtain vehicle performance currently foresee any licensed launch or collision threshold (1 10 ). Collision data for comparison with the preflight reentry activity that will require the use avoidance analyses must also account performance predictions in accordance of space-based tracking to protect public for other orbital objects, such as with § 450.103(d), and facilitate safe and safety, safety of property, and national spacecraft, and tracked debris. For these efficient integration of launch and security and foreign interests of the uninhabitable active objects, operators reentry operations into the NAS. United States. Furthermore, ‘‘real time’’ must satisfy either a less restrictive does not mean ‘‘zero lag time.’’ The probability of collision threshold (1 × Therefore, the final rule is consistent ¥5 with the NPRM and current practice. tracking must be sufficient to meet the 10 ) or a spherical separation distance CSF, Leo Aerospace, Microcosm, requirements in § 450.167(a) to predict of 25 km. As discussed more fully later, Sierra Nevada, and SpaceX commented the expected impact locations and in response to comments, the FAA that the proposed language regarding obtain vehicle performance data for revises § 450.169(a)(3), which covers all tracking was too broad and would seem comparison with pre-flight predictions. other known orbital debris, so that to require an operator to track pieces of The FAA would not hold an operator operators must maintain either a debris to impact during an off-nominal accountable if there was some lag for spherical separation distance of 2.5 km reasons outside of the operator’s control. or a less restrictive probability of event. As clarified by the FAA during × ¥5 the public comment period in ‘‘Answers The FAA believes that this leeway collision threshold (1 10 ) from orbital debris that is medium or large in to Clarifying Questions Received by answers Blue Origin’s recommendation size (radar cross section greater than June 28, 2019’’ and ‘‘Answers to that tracking requirements be limited to 0.1m2), as identified by the FAA or Clarifying Questions Received by July phases of launch or reentry vehicle flight identified in § 450.113(a), since another Federal Government entity. The FAA also received a number of 178 A straight up suborbital trajectory is a nearly on-orbit tracking is not practical. comments to proposed § 450.169(d), vertical suborbital trajectory. ‘‘Suborbital trajectory’’ mm. Launch and Reentry Collision is defined in § 401.5 as the intentional flight path which identified when LCOLA analysis of a launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, or any portion Avoidance Analysis Requirements would not be required. This section was thereof, whose vacuum instantaneous impact point (§ 450.169) not a new requirement, but a does not leave the surface of the Earth. 179 See Report of Columbia Accident Investigation In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to consolidation of the existing Board at https://www.nasa.gov/columbia/home/ update the information required for regulations, § 417.231(d) and Appendix CAIB_Vol1.html. launch collision avoidance (LCOLA) C to part 417 under C417.11. As

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proposed, an LCOLA analysis would not analysis only for the entire segment of vehicles do not have TCAS-like be required if the maximum altitude flight of a suborbital launch vehicle operations and are not expected to attainable by a launch operator’s above 150 km. The FAA agrees with acquire such capabilities. suborbital launch vehicle and any SpaceX’s comment that requiring SpaceX asked the FAA to explain why released debris is less than 150 km. The operators to conduct LCOLA analyses § 450.169(a)(3) requires operators to proposed requirement stated that the below 150 km is unnecessary and would screen orbital debris greater than 10 cm2 maximum altitude attainable is an prove burdensome. This revision is against a spherical miss distance of 2.5 optimized trajectory, assuming consistent with the requirements for km, rather than meet a probability of maximum performance within 99.7 orbital vehicles and acknowledges that collision threshold, as the FAA allows percent confidence bounds, extended only the portions of flight above 150 km for inhabitable objects and active through fuel exhaustion of each stage, to are screened in either case. payloads. SpaceX stated that the achieve a maximum altitude. Virgin Galactic recommended that requirement to maintain a spherical SpaceX opposed the requirement that proposed § 450.169(d) be retitled, miss distance, without the option to LCOLA exclusions (launch and reentry ‘‘Applicability.’’ SpaceX recommended evaluate probability of collision, is more window closures) be based on fuel the regulation refer to a ‘‘body’’ or restrictive than current requirements depletion trajectories or the maximum ‘‘object,’’ rather than ‘‘suborbital’’ or and inconsistent with USAF practices. attainable altitude of a launch vehicle. ‘‘debris.’’ The FAA agrees with Virgin SpaceX argued there should be an SpaceX commented that both bases Galactic and SpaceX that these terms option to waive miss distance less than exceeded the scope of past requirements and the title could be clearer and more 2.5 km if probability of collision is and requested that LCOLA exclusions consistent with current usage. The FAA sufficiently low, as is done for active be based exclusively on the maximum retitles § 450.169(d) ‘‘Exception,’’ which payloads. performance case. SpaceX also more accurately describes this The FAA agrees with SpaceX that recommended the FAA delete proposed subsection, and substitutes ‘‘object’’ in probability of collision could be used § 450.169(d) due to unclear technical or place of suborbital vehicle in for medium and large orbital debris public safety benefits. Blue Origin § 450.169(d). because those objects are routinely well- recommended that fuel exhaustion from Regarding requirements proposed in tracked and have valid orbital each stage be excluded from proposed § 450.169(a) and (b), the FAA received covariances available. This option § 450.169(d) because remaining fuel will numerous comments questioning the would provide for higher fidelity always be required to land RLVs. need for a 200 km keep-away distance screening of collisions that could The FAA disagrees with the for human spaceflight and the absence produce significant amounts of orbital recommendation to remove of probability of collision screening for debris. As such, the FAA revises § 450.169(d). The FAA notes that, debris. Numerous commenters also § 450.169(a)(3) to allow operators to without this subsection, operators recommended a narrower trajectory data screen for orbital debris identified by would need to conduct LCOLA analyses requirement for suborbital launches. the FAA or other Federal Government for all launches, regardless of altitude. An individual commenter stated that entity using either a spherical The FAA has determined that no a spherical separation distance of 200 separation distance of 2.5 km or a less LCOLA analysis is needed for missions km from inhabitable objects, as set forth restrictive probability of collision that do not exceed 150 km in altitude in proposed § 450.169(a)(1)(ii) and threshold (1 × 10¥5). The use of because orbital objects below this level (a)(1)(iii), may not be appropriate due to probability of collision will require are exceedingly sparse and usually are advances in spaceflight systems such as realistic covariance data on both the not present for long durations. autonomous flight termination systems launching object and the screened Furthermore, launch operators currently (AFTS) and autonomous flight systems orbital object to produce meaningful do not provide trajectories for stages or (AFS). The commenter recommended results. Operators who do not provide objects that do not exceed 150 km. As the FAA allow the 200-km limit to be realistic covariance will be required to such, it is appropriate to specify in the tailored depending on the reaction time have the launch or reentry screened regulation when the LCOLA analysis is of the flight termination system. The with stand-off distance. The probability not required. commenter also suggested the 200-km of collision threshold required for debris The FAA agrees, however, that the limit could be tailored if the launch is the same as that required for active language proposed in § 450.169(d) did vehicle contains a traffic collision payloads in § 450.169(a)(2), which not reflect current practice and could avoidance system (TCAS) (akin to what mirrors current USAF requirements. prove impracticable. The requirement aircraft use to avoid planes) that can The USAF requirements for debris for accomplishing LCOLA for all objects reasonably avoid nearby crewed screening use the same probability of launched over 150 km was complicated vehicles. collision as a high-fidelity analysis in by existing regulatory language on The FAA disagrees that a spherical place of both 25 km and 2.5 km standoff maximum altitude calculations. LCOLA separation distance of less than 200 km screening. The FAA slightly relaxed the is accomplished using only the nominal is appropriate for inhabitable objects. debris screening size requirement to trajectory provided by the launch or No termination systems are currently include only medium (0.1 m2 to 1 m2) reentry operator. No screening is used in orbit, and termination systems and large objects (greater than 1 m2) in accomplished using maximum possible are not likely to be viable safety order to provide for accurate use of altitudes because there is no planned measures in orbit. The 200 km safety probability of collision analysis. trajectory to screen, and the FAA did standoff distance is only for orbital Medium and large debris objects are not intend for operators to develop spaceflight protection; it is not a well-tracked, and the U.S. Government alternate trajectories. Therefore, the separation standard for airspace maintains accurate covariance on these FAA revises § 450.169(d) so that no integration. An orbital termination objects. This requirement achieves the LCOLA is required if the object’s system would increase the danger to objectives stated in the NPRM of maximum planned altitude is less than human spaceflight and increase the avoiding conjunction analysis with 150 km. orbital debris population. Safety and micro-debris, while preventing the Similarly, the FAA revises efficiency must be accomplished with a generation of space debris since these § 450.169(b)(1) to require LCOLA screening prior to launch. Launch objects are well-tracked and capable of

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creating significant amounts of § 450.169(f)(1) to require that most of the LCOLA process for launch, persistent space debris in the event of a operators submit LCOLA data at least 7 reentry, and payload, for operators as collision. days in advance of launch or reentry. well as the public. In proposed § 450.169(f), the FAA However, the FAA disagrees that a The same commenters noted that the would require an operator to prepare a shorter time frame would be appropriate FAA could act as a go-between entity for collision avoidance analysis worksheet for operators that have not yet all operators in a similar manner to for each launch or reentry using a conducted launch or reentry activities. Federal sites’ processes. The FAA agrees standardized format that contains the The FAA has repeatedly noted that that operators could use the FAA or the input data required by Appendix A to LCOLA data submitted from first-time Federal sites as conduits to the LCOLA part 450. Proposed § 450.169(f)(1) would launch or reentry operators often require processing entity and recognizes that require an operator to file the input data significant reiterative work to achieve this flexibility remains in the final rule with a Federal entity identified by the an acceptable submission. As such, the language. This type of activity is FAA and with the FAA at least 15 days FAA will require operators that have not appropriately coordinated during the before the first attempt at the flight of a yet received conjunctive assessments to launch operator or reentry operator pre- launch vehicle or the reentry of a submit LCOLA data at least 15 days in application discussions. The FAA reentry vehicle or in a different time advance of launch or reentry. This disagrees with requiring the FAA to act frame in accordance with proposed approach is similar to that of the USAF, as a pass-through because the FAA § 404.15. Proposed § 450.169(f)(2) would which requires entities that have not yet believes that removing launch operators require an operator to obtain a collision received conjunctive assessments to from direct contact with the USAF 18th avoidance analysis performed by a submit LCOLA data 30 days in advance Space Control Squadron could have Federal entity identified by the FAA 6 of launch. The FAA revises unintended negative consequences. For hours before the beginning of a launch § 450.169(f)(1)(i) to require that entities instance, an early orbit breakup or reentry window. that have not yet received conjunctive emergency may require prompt CSF and SpaceX requested the FAA assessments to submit LCOLA data at exchange of data between launch alter proposed § 450.169(f)(1) to require least 15 days in advance of launch. All operators and on-orbit support services operators to file input data 7 days before other operators must submit LCOLA providers using processes already tested launch or reentry rather than 15 days. data at least 7 days in advance of during LCOLA development and adding The commenters stated the 15-day launch. a pass-through element could hamper or requirement conflicts with current The FAA agrees that the requirement slow analysis, notifications, and processes at Federal launch or reentry to receive results within 6 hours before potential mitigation actions. Moreover, sites, which allow submissions 7 to 10 beginning of the launch or reentry the FAA does not place orbital safety days before launch or reentry. CSF and window could be reduced to 3 hours. analysts on duty during launch or SpaceX stated that 7 days prior to Later delivery will produce LCOLA reentry operations. To adequately launch has proven sufficient to produce results that are timelier and therefore support the passthrough, the FAA screening results by 6 hours before more accurate for orbital safety would need to establish launch support launch. CSF and SpaceX also indicated purposes. Therefore, the FAA revises teams and exercise the team in advance that the requirement to obtain final § 450.169(f)(2) to alter delivery to 3 of emergency operations. results 6 hours before launch was hours before beginning of the launch or Blue Origin and SpaceX inconsistent with current practice. The reentry window. recommended the FAA allow LCOLA Federal entity performing LCOLA Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop analyses to be conducted by non- screenings delivers the final data hours Grumman, and ULA commented that Federal entities. Blue Origin before launch. CSF and SpaceX much of proposed § 450.169(a) focused recommended that proposed recommended adding a clause to on analysis that was not applicable to § 450.169(e) require LCOLA analyses be proposed § 450.169(f)(2) allowing operators since applicants do not have obtained from Federal entities, unless trajectory data to be delivered within the data and tools to perform LCOLA otherwise agreed to by the timelines agreed to by the launch analysis, but merely provide inputs and Administrator. SpaceX recommended operator and the entity performing the implement operational windows based proposed § 450.169(f) allow operators to screening. Alternatively, SpaceX on closures provided. The commenters file input data and obtain LCOLA recommended the FAA either require advocated for a streamlined commercial analyses from approved third parties, as the data be submitted 3 hours before process for licensed launches or opposed to Federal entities. SpaceX launch in § 450.169(f)(2), as currently reentries that do not occur at a Federal argued the FAA should foster a practiced by the USAF, or allow launch or reentry site, in which the FAA competitive market and allow flexibility operators flexibility to obtain LCOLA would take the applicant’s trajectory in using commercial services as data ‘‘within’’ 6 hours of the launch or inputs to the Federal agency responsible commercial entities enter the space reentry window beginning, but no later for LCOLA analysis and establish stay- situational awareness (SSA) market and than 3 hours before launch. out windows. The commenters argued a aim to provide the same services as The FAA partially agrees with CSF’s standardized process would eliminate Federal entities. Virgin Galactic asked if and SpaceX’s recommended changes to the need for multiple applicants to the FAA anticipated a cost associated the timelines established in establish interfaces and procedures with with obtaining the analysis from the § 450.169(f)(1) and (f)(2). For launch or an agency that rarely deals with Federal entity. reentry operations that have commercial (space transportation) The FAA declines to remove the successfully developed an internal entities. reference to Federal entities in process that results in repeatable The FAA declines to streamline the § 450.169. Although commercial entities LCOLA data submission, the FAA LCOLA process further by removing the are developing space traffic support recognizes that 7 days prior to launch is analysis requirements of § 450.169(a), services that could eventually provide an adequate time for Federal entities to such that applicants only need to adequate safety for launch collision process the LCOLA data based on recent provide data and abide by results. avoidance, to date, only Federal entities LCOLA submissions reviewed for the Transparency in LCOLA analysis have full access to the authoritative last year. The FAA revises provides confidence and understanding catalog maintained by the DOD. Rather

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than remove this clause, the FAA adds launch and reentry operations at non- In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that the phrase, ‘‘or another entity agreed to Federal sites. a Class 1 mishap would include any by the Administrator,’’ to § 450.169(e) in event resulting in (1) a fatality or serious nn. Safety at End of Launch (§ 450.171) order to provide flexibility should the injury (as defined in 49 CFR 830.2) space traffic authority and framework In the NPRM, the FAA proposed in resulting from licensed or permitted change over time. The Administrator § 450.171 (Safety at End of Launch) activity to any person who is not may allow another entity to provide this requirements for the prevention of associated with the licensed or service based on a demonstration that creating orbital debris, with which an permitted activity, or (2) a fatality or the data includes a complete and applicant would be required to serious injury to any space flight accurate catalogue of all identifiable demonstrate compliance in its participant, crew, or government objects in the relevant space application. astronaut. This proposal was consistent environment. Currently, the DOD is the In the final rule, the FAA adopts with longstanding definitions of only entity that meets this criterion. In § 450.171 as proposed. The FAA did not ‘‘launch accident’’ and ‘‘reentry response to Virgin Galactic’s question receive comments on these proposed accident’’ in § 401.5. regarding cost, the current LCOLA requirements. A fatality or serious injury to a person analysis from the U.S. Government is oo. Mishap (Definition, §§ 450.173 and associated with licensed or permitted provided free of charge. 450.175) activity constitutes a mishap under § 401.5, rather than a launch or reentry SpaceX recommended the FAA defer i. Mishap Definition to or allow operators to use the LCOLA accident. The FAA proposed to processes and standards of Federal In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to incorporate each of the mishap-related launch or reentry sites for launches from consolidate the definitions of ‘‘Mishap,’’ terms found in § 401.5 under the 180 Federal sites as means of compliance. ‘‘Launch Accident,’’ ‘‘Launch Incident,’’ definition of ‘‘mishap.’’ As such, SpaceX argues that doing so would ‘‘Reentry Accident,’’ ‘‘Reentry save for the removal of the $25,000 minimize confusion regarding the Incident,’’ ‘‘Human Spaceflight monetary threshold, all events that meet applicable standards and procedures at Incident,’’ and ‘‘Launch Site Accident’’ the current accident, incident, and different operating sites. SpaceX also under the definition of ‘‘Mishap’’ in mishap definitions would continue to suggested that § 450.169(e) be revised to § 401.5. The FAA proposed four mishap be mishaps under the consolidated 181 state that operators may use Federal categories, from most severe (Class 1) to definition. In combining the mishap- launch or reentry site services with least severe (Class 4). related terms, the FAA inadvertently existing policies and processes to ensure In the final rule, the FAA does not excluded from the proposed definition a acceptable compliance. adopt the proposed classification fatality or serious injury to persons system. Instead, the FAA combines the associated with licensed or permitted The FAA declines to defer to the substantive criteria of Mishap Classes 1 activity, which has been covered by the Federal launch or reentry sites. The through 4 under the definition of term ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.5. The FAA did FAA and Federal sites have different ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7. The revised not intend to depart from current waiver requirements and processes. The definition describes events that practice by excluding these serious FAA finds the language as proposed in constitute a mishap in a straightforward events from the definition, as evidenced the NPRM is adequate when coupled manner that better corresponds to by the NPRM preamble. In revising the with the existing waiver process and regulatory requirements. The FAA definition of ‘‘mishap,’’ the FAA stated equivalent level of safety process. In incorporates additional changes to the its intent to streamline and clarify addition, the FAA notes that launches final rule as discussed in the following existing definitions, eliminate the from non-Federal sites are not required paragraphs. monetary threshold, and consolidate the to follow Federal site practices, and Numerous commenters from industry accident and incident investigation using a single FAA standard minimizes expressed confusion about the types of sections of parts 417, 420, 431, 435, 437 confusion both on and off Federal activities that would fall under each into one section applicable to all launch or reentry sites. class. The commenters questioned the licenses, permits, and vehicles.182 In Citing the discrepancy between the necessity of classifying mishaps based proposing to consolidate existing proposed collision avoidance analysis on severity since the regulatory definitions, the FAA did not propose to and current USAF practice, CSF stated requirements were largely the same for narrow the scope of activities deemed a the proposed rule attempted to ‘‘fix’’ all mishaps. mishap. In the final rule, the FAA parts of the licensing process that were The FAA reviewed the regulatory revises the definition of ‘‘mishap’’ to not broken. requirements associated with each of include any fatality or serious injury The FAA disagrees that the collision the proposed mishap classes and agrees resulting from licensed or permitted avoidance analysis process is there were no significant differences activity, irrespective of the person’s incompatible with the current USAF among the regulatory requirements for involvement in the launch activity. practice. The procedures for launch each class. The requirements to report, The FAA consolidates under collision avoidance under §§ 417.107, respond to, and investigate mishaps are paragraph (1) of the definition those 417.231, 417.31, and 417.43 did not incumbent upon an operator regardless criteria proposed for Mishap Class 1 and reflect current practice as they excluded of a mishap’s severity. Mishap classes the previous definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in any probability of collision, referenced are not needed to achieve the objective § 401.5. This revision is consistent with outdated processes and agencies, and of consolidating mishap-related terms the mishap reporting requirements required outdated adjustments to and streamlining the requirements to closures. The updated LCOLA process is report, respond to, and investigate 180 84 FR 15351 (‘‘The proposed mishap compatible with USAF practices where mishaps. Accordingly, the FAA removes classification system would streamline and clarify appropriate (e.g., LCOLA timelines, the proposed classification system. the current accident, incident, and mishap definitions to create four mishap categories screening options for human spaceflight Except as discussed later in this organized by severity, from most severe (Class 1) to protection, and active payload preamble, the criteria proposed under least severe (Class 4).’’). protection), noting that the FAA each mishap class have been 181 84 FR 15352. regulation must also guide operations of consolidated under ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7. 182 84 FR 15351.

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under § 450.173(c)(1) for the occurrence classes. The FAA revises § 450.131(a)(2) the FAA intend the revised definition of of a fatality or serious injury during to clarify that a probability of failure ‘‘mishap’’ to expand the scope of the FAA-authorized activities. The FAA analysis must account for data on any previous ‘‘launch site accident’’ removes the phrase ‘‘including ground mishap and anomaly. While the NPRM definition under part 420. The FAA activities at a launch or reentry site’’ stated that the probability analysis must therefore revises § 420.59(a) to state that from the criterion addressing fatality or account for all partial failures and a licensee must report, respond to, and serious injury because the phrase anomalies, ‘‘including Class 3 and Class investigate mishaps that meet paragraph ‘‘events associated with a licensed or 4 mishaps,’’ the language implied that it (1) or (5) of the definition of ‘‘mishap’’ permitted activity’’ adequately covers would also apply to Class 1 and Class in § 401.7. The FAA specified in the such activities. 2 mishaps—the more severe events. The final rule that part 420 licensees must In the final rule, the FAA re- FAA replaces the mishap classes prepare mishap plans that meet designates criterion (1) of proposed referenced in § 450.173(a) with the term, § 450.173(b) through (f), including Mishap Class 2 as paragraph (2) of the ‘‘mishap.’’ Finally, the FAA replaces the allocation of roles and responsibilities definition, which applied to the mishap classes referenced in between the launch operator and site malfunction of an FSS or safety-critical § 450.219(b) with a reference to the operator for reporting, responding to, system. The FAA notes that it removed portion of the mishap definition that and investigating any mishap during the term ‘‘flight safety system’’ from corresponds to the proposed ground activities at the site, to specify paragraph (2) because an FSS is a safety- requirement: Events listed in paragraphs the scope of the mishap plan more critical system. (1) through (5) and (8). accurately. The FAA also deletes the Paragraph (7) of the definition The removal of the mishap classes word ‘‘response’’ in § 420.59(a) since consolidates two criteria proposed dispenses with commenters’ requests for § 450.173 and the rest of § 420.59 refer under Class 3 and 4 for permanent loss clarification or guidance in ACs on to a ‘‘mishap plan,’’ not a ‘‘mishap of a vehicle during licensed and applying and differentiating the response plan.’’ permitted activity, respectively. Since proposed mishap classes. AIA and Virgin Galactic commented the FAA is discarding the mishap The final rule adds three changes to that the term ‘‘failure of a safety classification system, there is no longer sections that cross-reference the mishap- organization’’ in the ‘‘mishap’’ a need to differentiate loss of a launch related terms that the FAA proposed to definition was unclear. The FAA notes or reentry vehicle during licensed replace with the revised mishap this term previously appeared under versus permitted activity. Nor does the definition: §§ 420.61(b), 437.87(b), and ‘‘launch incident’’ and ‘‘reentry FAA intend to differentiate loss of a 460.45(d). The FAA replaces the term incident’’ in § 401.5. ‘‘Failure of a safety ‘‘vehicle’’ from loss of a ‘‘launch or ‘‘launch or launch site accident’’ in organization’’ occurs when an operator reentry vehicle.’’ § 420.61(b) with a reference to the fails to complete an action expected or portions of the mishap definition that The FAA proposed to replace the required by the safety organization, or replace these terms: Paragraphs (1), (5), clause, ‘‘failure to complete a launch or when the organization stops functioning and (8). The FAA also replaces the word reentry as planned,’’ in the previous normally, such that it creates a public ‘‘shall’’ with the word ‘‘must’’ in definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.5, with safety risk. For example, the FAA would § 420.61 because ‘‘shall’’ is no longer the clause, ‘‘failure to achieve mission consider an operator’s failure to follow used in FAA regulations. Similarly, in objectives.’’ AIA, Sierra Nevada, and existing safety processes or procedures, § 437.87(b), the FAA replaces the SpaceX objected to this criterion, thereby placing the public at risk, a phrase, ‘‘launch or reentry accident or arguing that failure to achieve mission failure of a safety organization. incident,’’ with a reference to objectives related to mission assurance Additional examples include (1) the corresponding portions of the mishap and exceeded the FAA’s authority to definition in paragraphs (1) through (3), failure of operator personnel to ensure public safety. communicate a hold condition upon a Based on industry comments, the (5), and (8). As noted in the section of this preamble discussing the violation of launch commit criteria, (2) FAA reverts to the original phrase, compliance period for legacy licenses a safety official failing to report ‘‘failure to complete a launch or reentry (§ 450.1(b)), the FAA revises § 460.45(d) potential safety matters to the mission as planned,’’ but adds a citation to a to require part 415, 431, and 435 director, or (3) the failure of an regulatory requirement that narrows the licensees to apply the mishap-related organization to recognize and mitigate a scope of this criterion. Failure to definitions in § 401.5, and part 450 hazard, resulting in a public safety risk. complete a launch or reentry according licensees to apply the definitions in No change was made to the regulation to the parameters provided by the § 401.7 when describing the safety based on this comment. operator under the pre-flight reporting record of the vehicle to space flight SpaceX and Virgin Galactic sought requirements of § 450.213(b) 183 will participants. Specifically, § 460.45(d)(1) clarification on the meaning of ‘‘high constitute a mishap. This criterion more requires that part 450 licensees identify risk’’ of causing serious or fatal injury accurately reflects the scope of activities events that meet paragraphs (1), (4), (5), and ‘‘substantial damage’’ to property. that the FAA deems to be a mishap and and (8) of the definition of a mishap in SpaceX requested examples of high risk alleviates the commenters’ concerns § 401.7, which occur during and after versus non-high risk events. AIA asked about mission assurance. vehicle verification performed in how the FAA would determine whether The FAA removes from the final rule accordance with § 460.17. an event rises to the level of ‘‘high risk.’’ all references to the proposed mishap The FAA also revises § 420.59 to Virgin Galactic recommended ‘‘high identify the portions of the mishap risk’’ be defined in § 401.5 as an event 183 As discussed later in the preamble, that would have caused a casualty had § 450.213(b)(2) requires a licensee to submit definition applicable to launch site planned mission information, including the vehicle, operators licensed under part 420. Not one or more humans been present. launch site, planned flight path, staging and impact all of the events described under the The FAA has used ‘‘high risk’’ of locations, each payload delivery point, intended definition of ‘‘mishap’’ apply to part 420 causing serious or fatal injury to define reentry or landing sites including any contingency ‘‘human space flight incident’’ in abort location, and the location of any disposed licenses, which do not authorize launch launch or reentry vehicle stage or component that or reentry activities, though the NPRM § 401.5. As stated in the FAA’s is deorbited. did not state this fact expressly. Nor did ‘‘Answers to Clarifying Questions

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Received by June 28, 2019,’’ 184 the FAA Virgin Galactic suggested the FAA the requirement to report vehicle or would consider any off-nominal event develop such a process and incorporate debris impact points outside the hazard during pre-flight or flight operations it elsewhere in the regulations, not in area to the FAA, which it claimed was that posed a high probability of fatality the definition of ‘‘mishap.’’ Virgin burdensome, cost prohibitive, and or serious injury to spaceflight Galactic argued the FAA should have no unreasonable. participants, crew, government more than 14 days to make these The criterion cited by Sierra Nevada, astronauts, or the public, to be ‘‘high determinations in order to minimize now captured in paragraph (8) of the risk.’’ The FAA stated in the NPRM that operational impacts. mishap definition, does not require it would determine on a case-by-case It would not be appropriate to limit licensees to track every possible piece of basis whether damage to property not the time frame or implement procedures debris in an off-nominal scenario, but associated with the licensed activity is to determine whether an event posed a rather only debris that presents a hazard ‘‘substantial damage,’’ based on such high risk of causing serious or fatal to the public. The proposed criterion factors as direct replacement cost, repair injury or resulted in substantial damage closely followed the definitions of cost, and the property’s intended use to property. Although the FAA will ‘‘launch accident’’ and ‘‘reentry and functionality. When making a begin to evaluate a mishap upon accident’’ in § 401.5, but used ‘‘hazard substantial damage determination, the receiving notice and details of the event, area’’ in lieu of ‘‘impact limit lines’’ and FAA will include damage caused by the rate at which the FAA can make ‘‘designated’’ landing or reentry site, to debris impacts, toxic plumes, and fires these determinations will necessarily be consistent with the hazard analysis ignited by the vehicle or its debris. The depend on the attendant circumstances framework set forth in part 450. To FAA provided, as an example, structural and information supplied by the clarify the scope of this mishap damage to public property exceeding 50 licensee. Moreover, the FAA retains the criterion, the FAA replaces the term percent of its market value, such as a ability to modify its determination upon ‘‘vehicle or debris’’ in paragraph (8) failed launch attempt with debris receipt of new information about the with the term ‘‘hazardous debris,’’ impacts outside a defined hazard area mishap. which is defined in § 401.7. Thus, this resulting in a post-impact fire and loss SpaceX recommended the FAA criterion applies to the impact of of a residential structure. The FAA will remove ‘‘government astronauts’’ from hazardous debris (i.e., debris capable of evaluate unplanned damage to property the ‘‘mishap’’ definition because, unlike causing a casualty or loss of associated with a licensed or permitted the uninvolved public, those functionality to a critical asset) outside activity on the same bases. Examples individuals accept risk by virtue of their the planned landing site or hazard area. might include a major repair or informed involvement in a vehicle’s The occurrence of debris outside the replacement of launch facilities due to flight. Acceptance of risk does not hazard area that does not meet the an unsuccessful launch attempt, preclude a fatality or serious injury from definition of ‘‘hazardous debris’’ in including processing facilities, launch being considered a mishap. The FAA § 401.7 is not a mishap. pads, or propellant tanks, based on cost removes the references to space flight The FAA similarly revises of repair or replacement or loss of use. participants, government astronauts, § 450.173(c)(3)(iv) to require that Similar to the NTSB’s definition of and crew from the ‘‘mishap’’ definition operators identify ‘‘hazardous debris’’ ‘‘substantial damage’’ (49 CFR 830.2), to make it clear that the FAA will deem impact points as part of a preliminary under paragraph (6) of the ‘‘mishap’’ any fatality or serious injury associated mishap report, so that the FAA can definition in § 401.7, the FAA may with licensed or permitted activity a assess potential public safety risks. The deem any damage that adversely affects mishap irrespective of whether persons FAA makes this change to be consistent the structural strength, performance, or are involved in the licensed activity. with the new definition of ‘‘hazardous flight characteristics of a launch or SpaceX recommended the Class 2 debris,’’ and it is consistent with the reentry vehicle which normally require definition be limited to events ‘‘during intent of the proposed regulation. The major repair or replacement of the a licensed or permitted activity,’’ rather FAA also replaces the term ‘‘impact affected component, to be substantial. than events ‘‘associated with’’ licensed area’’ with the term ‘‘designated hazard The FAA declines Virgin Galactic’s or permitted activity. The commenter area’’ to be consistent with the suggested definition of ‘‘high risk’’ offered no rationale for temporally terminology used in the mishap because the suggested standard is too limiting the criteria now described in definition. This revision does not narrow and would exclude serious paragraphs (2) through (5) of the change the scope of the requirement injury short of fatality. As noted above, ‘‘mishap’’ definition, and the FAA sees from the NPRM; the FAA only requires the FAA would consider any off- no reason to do so. The FAA would only an operator to report the hazardous nominal event during pre-flight or flight deem a mishap those events that are debris impact locations, not all debris operations that pose a high probability within the scope of the FAA’s statutory impact locations. Use of the term of fatality or serious injury to spaceflight authority. No change to the regulation is ‘‘hazard area’’ is also consistent with participants, crew, government made based on this comment. requirements for an operator to establish astronauts, or the public, to be high risk. Sierra Nevada commented that ‘‘hazard areas’’ under part 450 to protect The FAA intends ‘‘high risk’’ to cover treating the impact of a vehicle, the public from hazards associated with events akin to a near miss or close-call. payload, or components thereof their operations. This approach is consistent with USAF ‘‘outside the designated area’’ as a The requirement to track and report and NASA practices. Virgin Galactic’s mishap was overly prescriptive and hazardous debris is reasonable, given suggestion would prove impracticable, unrealistic. Sierra Nevada commented that operators must employ vehicle requiring near certainty that a casualty that since hazard areas are generated as tracking for normal flight, and would have occurred. probability contours, not contours of hazardous debris falling outside the Virgin Galactic recommended the total containment, debris could designated area poses a serious risk to FAA prescribe a timeline and specific realistically exist outside the hazard public safety. In the event of a vehicle process for determining whether ‘‘high area that would not warrant segregation breakup, operators should be able to risk’’ or ‘‘substantial damage’’ occurred. in the event of a breakup scenario. approximate any hazardous debris Sierra Nevada also recommended impacts in relation to the designated 184 See FAA–2019–0229–0106. removing from proposed § 450.173(d) landing site or hazard area based on the

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vehicle’s last-known state vector or FAA revise proposed § 450.173(e), § 450.175 on the part 450 licensing other tracking resources required for which contained emergency response process. Boeing, Leo Aerospace, normal flight. requirements, to require a level of safety Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, based on its spaceport fire safety and and ULA asked how test-induced ii. Mishap Plan (§ 450.173) emergency response standards. The damage would impact the licensing In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to FAA supports the development of process. Boeing also commented that all consolidate mishap planning, reporting, industry consensus standards for fire planned test operations within the response, and investigation safety and emergency response, but scope of a license should be assessed for requirements under proposed § 450.173. disagrees that it would be appropriate to public risk during the application The FAA also proposed to revise prescribe such a code or standard in this process. Blue Origin asked what type of §§ 420.59 and 437.41 to require an performance-based rule. test is contemplated by ‘‘test-induced applicant to submit a mishap plan that In addition to removing proposed damage,’’ and if it would include tests meets the requirements of § 450.173. § 450.173(c), the FAA replaces the term conducted at a launch site with co- Proposed § 450.173(c) required an ‘‘vehicle and debris impact points, located test facilities, as opposed to operator to report to and cooperate with including those outside a planned integrated vehicle tests that traditionally FAA and NTSB investigations and landing or impact area’’ in proposed happen at a launch site. Sierra Nevada designate one or more points of contact § 450.173(d)(3)(iv) with the term and Microcosm commented that testing for the FAA and NTSB. Proposed ‘‘hazardous debris impact points, was outside the FAA’s jurisdiction, and § 450.173(d) required operators to notify including those outside a planned the proposed regulation should only the FAA of mishaps and submit a landing site or designated hazard area’’ apply to damage induced by a test preliminary report within certain time in § 450.173(c)(3)(iv).185 This change is performed under a license. frames. Proposed § 450.173(f) required consistent with changes previously The test-induced damage exception that, in the event of a mishap, an discussed in the preamble. Lastly, the set forth in § 450.175 only applies to operator must investigate the root FAA revises the emergency response license applicants or licensees seeking a causes of the mishap and report requirements in § 450.173(d)(1) to mishap exception for test activities investigation results to the FAA. include the term ‘‘property’’ because, as conducted during licensed activities. Virgin Galactic broadly expressed discussed in this preamble, the FAA The test-induced damage exception is support for the proposed rule. Boeing, removed the reference to ‘‘property’’ optional. To clarify that the test-induced Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, from the definition of ‘‘public’’ in damage exception is optional, the FAA and ULA recommended adding to § 401.7. The FAA adopts the rest of this adds paragraph (a) (Applicability), proposed § 450.173(f) a requirement for section of the proposed rule without which states that § 450.175 only applies licensees to support any NTSB or change. to license applicants or licensees who government agency-led mishap choose to pre-coordinate and apply for investigation and to cooperate with any iii. Test-Induced Damage (§ 450.175) an optional test-induced damage other government investigative agencies. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to exception. The FAA also replaces the The FAA declines to incorporate the give license applicants and licensees the word ‘‘operator’’ with the term ‘‘license suggested addition. Upon review of the option to pre-coordinate testing applicants or licensees’’ to clarify that NPRM and comments received, the FAA activities with the FAA. This pre- this provision is only available through determines that the requirement coordination would take place during the part 450 licensing process. originally proposed in § 450.173(c) FAA-licensed activities to prevent the Experimental permittees under part 437, regarding NTSB and FAA cooperation is FAA from labeling test failures or by contrast, cannot seek to pre- unnecessary. Section 450.13 (Rights Not associated damage as mishaps. coordinate test-induced damage with Conferred by a Vehicle Operator In the final rule, the FAA adopts the FAA. License) plainly states that issuance of § 450.175 with a modification. Section The exception does not apply to test a license does not relieve a licensee of 450.175 will only apply to licensees or activities that are not associated with its obligation to comply with all license applicants seeking this FAA-licensed activities, nor to any applicable requirements of law or exception. The FAA will consider test activities outside FAA jurisdiction. The regulation. The duty of operators to failures and damage covered by this information submitted by the applicant comply with lawful investigations, section, including damage to ground will define the scope and type of test whether conducted by the FAA or support equipment, ground support activities considered for test-induced another entity with investigative systems, and flight hardware, as test- damage. The FAA confirms that all authority, exists irrespective of the induced damage and not a mishap, so planned test operations occurring language proposed in § 450.173(c). long as the failure falls within the pre- during the scope of a license will be Accordingly, the FAA removes coordinated scope and FAA-approved assessed for public safety risks. As proposed § 450.173(c) from the final testing profile. Any mishap resulting in stated in the FAA’s ‘‘Answers to rule. For the same reason, the FAA also a serious injury or fatality, damage to Clarifying Questions Received by June removes paragraph (b)(2) from proposed property not associated with the 28, 2019,’’ test-induced damage refers to § 420.59 (Mishap Plan). Operators licensed activity, or hazardous debris damage expected to occur as part of a remain responsible for reporting leaving the pre-defined hazard area, will licensed activity approved by the FAA investigation results to the FAA under be treated as a mishap and not test- prior to the operation. An applicant must identify expected outcomes and § 450.173(e). induced damage, and will be subject to potential risks associated with the Sierra Nevada asked whether the reporting, response, and proposed test activity. The FAA expects licensees must coordinate with the FAA investigation requirements of § 450.173. and NTSB for all mishaps. For the Several commenters expressed an applicant to identify potential failure reasons stated above, the FAA removed confusion about the effect of proposed outcomes and their consequences or the requirement proposed in risks, and plan for them appropriately. § 450.173(c). 185 The FAA removes proposed § 450.173(c) from In order to except damage from The National Fire Protection the final rule and re-designates § 450.173(d) through becoming a mishap, the applicant needs Association (NFPA) recommended the (h) as § 450.173(c) through (g). to identify that potential damage to the

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FAA. Unanticipated test damage may be operational sequence. The FAA would require an operator to review excepted if it results from activities acknowledges the commenter’s concern operations, system designs, analysis, conducted within the scope of the FAA for the net effect of unreported and testing, and to identify any unique approval, and does not result in any of anomalies but finds it unnecessary to launch or reentry hazards not otherwise the events listed in § 450.175(b)(2). change the regulatory text. Section addressed by proposed part 450. To seek an exception, an applicant 450.175 provides an exception to the Proposed § 450.177(b) would provide must submit the information listed in ‘‘mishap’’ definition. Test-induced that the FAA may identify and impose § 450.175(c) to the FAA in advance with damage that exceeds the scope of FAA- a unique policy, requirement, or sufficient time to evaluate the proposal. approved activities will be treated as a practice, as needed, to protect the public Although the FAA anticipates the mishap. It is possible for an anomaly to health and safety, safety of property, amount of time required to evaluate an occur during pre-coordinated test and the national security and foreign applicant’s proposal will be minimal, activities. Any condition during policy interests of the United States. the scope of review required will vary licensed or permitted activity (including In the final rule, the FAA adopts based on the proposed test activities and pre-coordinated test activity) that § 450.177 (Unique Safety Policies, completeness of information provided. deviates from what is standard, normal, Requirements and Practices) with two Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop or expected during verification or revisions. For the reasons discussed Grumman, and ULA recommended operation of a system, process, facility, below, the FAA removes the references without explanation that the subheading or equipment is an anomaly under to property protection and national for proposed § 450.175(a) be changed to, § 401.7. Given that § 450.215 (Post-flight security and foreign policy interests of ‘‘Coordination of risk of test-induced Reporting) requires operators to identify the United States, and adds ‘‘safety’’ to damage.’’ The FAA declines to anomalies and corrective actions taken the section title. incorporate this recommendation, as it in response in their post-flight report, CSF, Sierra Nevada, and Spaceport does not accurately describe the the FAA finds it will have notice of the Strategies commented that proposed coordination set forth in § 450.175. The ‘‘near-miss’’ anomalies referenced by § 450.177(b) expanded regulatory possibility of test-induced damage is the commenter. uncertainty by allowing the FAA to assumed under § 450.175. Identification Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop impose new requirements when needed of potential risks associated with a Grumman, and ULA recommended that to protect public health and safety, testing activity is but one of the items proposed § 450.175(c) be made safety of property, and national security applicants must submit to seek an consistent with ground hazard analysis or U.S. foreign policy interests. CSF exception under this section. The FAA requirements in proposed § 450.185 or noted that part 417 previously allowed agrees, however, that the proposed text be deleted altogether. The FAA the FAA to impose new requirements was unclear, as the heading used the disagrees with this comment because when needed ‘‘to protect the public.’’ term, ‘‘anticipated,’’ which does not the requirements of § 450.185 apply to CSF and Sierra Nevada commented that appear in § 450.175. Accordingly, the the entire launch and reentry vehicle proposed § 450.177(b) expanded the FAA revises the subheading for lifecycle, and are therefore much more FAA’s ability to impose requirements on § 450.175(b) to clarify that operators comprehensive than the information an operator outside of regulatory would be coordinating ‘‘potential,’’ requirements for test-induced damage. process even if the operator met all rather than ‘‘anticipated,’’ test-induced Imposing ground hazard analysis other criteria. The commenters damage. requirements would place an undue suggested that the ability to impose Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop burden on applicants seeking a test- unknown requirements as a result of Grumman, and ULA also recommended, induced damage exception. Moreover, innovation will adversely impact costs without explanation, that applicants be the test-induced paradigm is intended and could have a chilling effect on required to coordinate test-induced for the testing of a specific system, innovation and investments in U.S. damage with any affected third parties function, or component during licensed space industries if the FAA’s discretion or public authorities, in addition to the activities. As stated in the NPRM, the under proposed § 450.177 was FAA. The FAA declines to incorporate test-induced damage exception is not unbounded. They further contended this recommendation. Section 450.175 available for the operation of an entire that the proposed requirement would provides a process for license applicants vehicle, but rather the testing of specific give the FAA discretion to impose new and licensees to pre-coordinate with the components and systems. Lastly, unlike requirements ‘‘as-needed’’ and result in FAA test-induced damage that would the ground hazard analysis no cost savings. CSF also expressed otherwise fall under the FAA’s requirements, the information concern that such requirements could definition of ‘‘mishap.’’ The FAA is the requirements of § 450.175(c) only apply be inequitably imposed on a singular only entity with whom coordination to applicants seeking a mishap licensee or disparately among licensees will be needed to seek exception from exception for damage resulting from developing similar technologies or the FAA’s ‘‘mishap’’ definition. It specific test activities taking place operational approaches. CSF should be noted, however, that pre- within a defined time-period, as recommended the FAA be required to coordination of test-induced damage coordinated with and approved by the collaborate with the operator or with under this section will not affect the FAA. industry before requiring a unique duty of licensees to comply with all policy, rule, or practice. CSF and Sierra other requirements of their license, and pp. Unique Safety Policies, Nevada recommended the rule be with all other applicable laws and Requirements and Practices (§ 450.177) bounded to limit the scope and timeline regulations. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed for the FAA to impose restrictions, and In reference to what is now requirements under § 450.177 for give applicants due process. § 450.175(b)(2), Boeing recommended operators to implement unique policies, The FAA agrees that it is unnecessary the FAA take into consideration insight requirements, and practices needed to to include hazards to the national gleaned from near-misses, noting that protect the public health and safety, security and foreign policy interests of while a test may not have resulted in safety of property, and the national the United States under this section damage, the same anomaly could induce security and foreign policy interests of because those considerations are significant damage in a similar the United States. Proposed § 450.177(a) adequately covered under policy and

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payload reviews in part 450. In the final the need for the use of this provision to areas. In the final rule, the FAA changes rule, the FAA removes ‘‘national be rare, as has the need to use § 417.127, the language used to describe this security and foreign policy interests of due to the comprehensiveness and coordination to ‘‘[t]he designation of the United States’’ from § 450.177(b) performance-based nature of part 450. In any ground hazard area that affects the and (c)(2). the rare instance that it is used, the FAA operations of a launch or reentry site is In the final rule, the FAA also will work with the operator to reach a coordinated with the Federal or licensed removes ‘‘safety of property’’ from mutually satisfactory solution that launch or reentry site operator.’’ This § 450.177(b) and (c). As explained in allows the activity while protecting amended language is a minor other parts of this preamble, the FAA is public health and safety, but the FAA grammatical change and is consistent retaining in the final rule only specific declines to require collaboration in the with the intent of the proposed requirements for property protection regulation, as CSF suggests. requirement. In addition, proposed (e.g. critical assets, property on orbit), § 450.181(a)(4) required an operator to which have specific safety criteria. qq. Ground Safety (§ 450.179 to coordinate with a site operator to Operators may be required to mitigate § 450.189) ensure, in part, prompt and effective hazards to property through emergency i. Ground Safety General (§ 450.179) response in the event of a mishap that response requirements in § 450.173(d), In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that could impact ‘‘public safety.’’ In the but otherwise, the FAA declines to an operator would be required to protect final rule, the FAA changes this impose a more specific property the public from the adverse effects of phrasing to require that a prompt and protection requirement at this time. hazardous operations and systems effective response ‘‘is undertaken’’ in Removal of the references to property associated with preparing a launch the event of a mishap that could impact protection and national security and ‘‘the safety of the public and property.’’ vehicle for flight, returning a launch or foreign policy interests largely The FAA changes ‘‘public safety’’ to reentry vehicle to a safe condition after dispenses with the commenters’ ‘‘the safety of the public and property’’ flight, or after an aborted launch concerns that § 450.177 would expand in the final rule because, as discussed attempt, and returning a site to a safe the scope of § 417.127. Although the earlier in this preamble, property was condition. final rule retains the provision in removed from the definition of In the final rule, the FAA adopts § 450.177(b) regarding FAA’s ability to ‘‘public.’’ Thus, the FAA makes this § 450.179 with revisions.186 This final impose a unique requirement, policy, or wording change to keep the requirement rule moves proposed subsections (b) practice needed to protect public health equivalent to what was proposed. The and (c) to § 450.179(a)(1) through (3) and safety, the FAA does not foresee a FAA adds ‘‘is undertaken’’ as a minor and adds new subsections (b) and (c). substantive change for operators from grammatical change that is consistent These additions are discussed in more § 417.127, which provides that FAA with the intent of the proposed detail in the preamble section may impose such unique requirements requirement. as needed to protect the public. addressing Launch and Reentries from a Sierra Nevada commented that The FAA’s authority to impose a Federal Launch or Reentry Site. proposed § 450.181 seems to be unique requirement, policy, or practice ii. Coordination With a Licensed duplicative of proposed § 450.147 is bounded, as it is in § 417.127, by the Launch or Reentry Site Operator (Agreements) and thus should be FAA’s statutory authority to protect (§ 450.181) removed. While agreements made with public health and safety. The FAA a Federal or licensed site operator may In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that understands the concern expressed by satisfy the requirements of § 450.181, Spaceport Strategies and others that the an operator would be required to the FAA finds the requirement to imposition of unique policies, coordinate with site operators as both coordinate with a site operator specifies requirements, or practices deemed entities have public safety obligations what coordination must be in place to necessary by the FAA to protect public during ground operations. Operators prevent unsafe interference among users health and safety has the potential to would be required to coordinate with of a site and ensure clear lines of impose additional costs on the operator. site operators to ensure that access to responsibility for related aspects of However, given the rarity of the FAA’s public sites is controlled and prevent public safety. The FAA concurs that an invocation of § 417.127, and the unsafe interference of ground hazards. applicant may be able to show prosperity of today’s commercial space For a launch or reentry conducted from compliance with both requirements by industry under part 417, the FAA does or to an FAA licensed site, an operator providing an agreement that shows not foresee any additional costs to would be required to coordinate mishap compliance with the specific criteria in operators or a chilling of innovation reporting, response, and investigations § 450.181. However, the two resulting from § 450.177. with the site operator for any mishap requirements are different and Moreover, as discussed in the NPRM during ground activities at the site. intentionally separate. Specifically, preamble, the necessity for § 450.177 is In the final rule, the FAA adopts § 450.181 provides additional detail the same as that for § 417.127: The FAA § 450.181 as proposed with two about coordination that is necessary for expects that advances in technology and exceptions. In § 450.181(a)(3), the public safety because improperly implementation of innovations by ground hazard areas must be coordinated neighboring operations that launch and reentry operators will likely coordinated with a site operator during occur on or near the launch site have introduce new and unforeseen safety the designation of those ground hazard the ability to create hazards to the challenges. These advances and public. In addition, the agreement innovations can present regulatory 186 Proposed § 450.179 required an operator at a required by § 450.147 is not an U.S. launch or landing site to protect the public challenges that are unforeseen in from adverse effects of hazardous operations and application deliverable, whereas existing regulations. In this case, the systems. The FAA changed ‘‘protect the public’’ to § 450.181 requires an application FAA must work with operators on a ‘‘protect the public and property’’ in the final rule. deliverable. Accordingly, the FAA case-by-case basis to identify and This change is because, as discussed earlier in this adopts both §§ 450.181 and 450.147. preamble, property was removed from the mitigate those unique hazards posed to definition of ‘‘public.’’ Thus, ‘‘property’’ was added Denver International Airport public health and safety, which are not to this section to keep the requirement equivalent commented that, although it supported addressed by part 450. The FAA expects to what was proposed. the proposed requirements for

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coordination with site operators, these iv. Ground Hazard Analysis (§ 450.185) Galactic also asked that existing launch requirements were too narrow to keep In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an vehicles be ‘‘grandfathered.’’ Finally, site operators and surrounding operator would be required to complete Virgin Galactic commented that communities properly informed. Denver a ground hazard analysis that would conducting a ground hazard analysis International Airport also commented include an assessment of the launch or would place a cost burden on hybrid that operators should be required to reentry vehicle, the launch or reentry vehicle operators and asked the FAA to coordinate on launch and reentry integrated systems, ground support outline its reasoning for imposing the activities and mishaps with a wider equipment, and other site hardware. In requirement on hybrid operators. group of interested and affected its analysis, an applicant must identify The FAA discusses Virgin Galactic’s stakeholders, including first responders hazards; include a risk assessment; and question regarding cost burden in the and local governments. Similarly, identify and describe mitigations, preamble section addressing Responses AAAE proposed that licensed operators controls, and provisions for hazard to Regulatory Impact Analysis be required to notify contingent landing control verification and validation. Comments. Part 431 does not have an sites and nearby airports of safety Although the analysis might incorporate explicit ground safety requirement, and hazards, including providing them with aspects of employee safety and mission as a result it is often difficult for the ground safety hazard analysis. assurance, an applicant would only be applicants to ascertain how to meet the AAAE suggested such notifications required to identify the hazards that safety standard for pre-flight operations. could be accomplished as part of the affect the public and describe how those Concurrently, the ground safety notifications required in proposed hazards are mitigated. requirements in part 417 are overly § 450.147 or as part of a broader public In the final rule, the FAA adopts prescriptive and onerous. The ground disclosure. § 450.185 as proposed, with minor edits hazard analysis requirements in part The FAA notes that the notification to remove the reference to ‘‘public 450 strike a balance between the two requirements in § 420.57 require property’’ because ‘‘property’’ has been parts, providing additional guidance to licensed site operators to notify local removed from the final rule’s definition applicants, while at the same time officials and adjacent landowners of of ‘‘public,’’ as discussed in the preserving flexibility. flight schedules. In addition, § 450.147 preamble section for Neighboring An operation that was licensed prior requires vehicle operators to have Operations Personnel. Instead, the FAA to the effective date of this rulemaking agreements with any sites or services refers to ‘‘property not associated with will be permitted to continue under its that are necessary to meet the safety the launch or reentry.’’ license for five years from the effective requirements for a license. These In response to the proposed date or when the license expires if the requirements serve to notify the requirements, NFPA suggested its own operator does not seek a renewal. For necessary entities about licensed standards as guidance for complying further discussion, please see the operations. Including notification with proposed §§ 450.179, 450.185, and preamble section on Legacy Licenses. requirements beyond those in §§ 420.57 450.189. Space Florida also commented All regulated operators, including and 450.147 is outside the needs of this that the FAA did not provide clear hybrid launch or reentry systems rulemaking to protect public health and guidance on what standards would be operators, will need to prepare a ground safety, safety of property, and national acceptable and how the agency would hazard analysis to ensure public safety security and foreign policy interests of judge the sufficiency of the ground is protected. Hybrid launch or reentry the United States. hazard analysis. Space Florida did not vehicles may still pose a risk to the Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop recommend a specific change to public; therefore, the FAA imposes its Grumman, and ULA recommended the proposed § 450.185. ground hazard analysis requirements on FAA revise proposed § 450.181(a)(3) to In response to NFPA’s comment, the hybrid launch vehicles in order to require only that coordination ensure FAA notes that applicants are free to identify and mitigate those risks. Some that any ground hazard areas are explore the use of any industry standard launch or reentry systems will have very identified. The FAA does not find the to demonstrate compliance with these limited ground hazards, and thus the commenters’ recommendation sufficient sections. If the industry standard has ground hazard analysis will be similarly to protect public safety and avoid not already been accepted by the FAA, limited. An operator would not need its adverse impacts on neighboring space the FAA would review the proposed ground hazard analysis to include operations. The vehicle operator must standard as part of an applicant’s carrier aircraft activities that do not 187 take an active role in ensuring the site application. NFPA is also welcome to constitute launch or reentry. operator is aware of ground hazard areas submit its standards to the FAA for Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop, and how they may impact other site acceptance at any time. and the ULA recommended the FAA operations. In response to Space Florida, the FAA modify proposed § 450.185(a) by adding that a ground hazard analysis must iii. Explosive Site Plan (§ 450.183) recommends that the applicant identify proposed standards and common identify system and operation hazards In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to practices during pre-application posed by the vehicle ‘‘and any of its require an applicant to include an consultation to reach an agreement with components.’’ The FAA does not adopt explosive site plan as part of its vehicle the FAA on their applicability for this change because any requirement operator license application for a launch proposed operations. For items that may levied on the vehicle also necessarily or reentry from or to a site exclusive to deviate from current standards and includes the vehicle’s components. its own use. This plan would be practices, the FAA may seek additional CSF, Sierra Nevada, and Space required to demonstrate compliance justification or analysis to determine Florida recommended that the FAA with the explosive siting requirements whether ground hazards pose a risk to consider an alternative regulatory in part 420. public safety. approach giving site operators more In the final rule, the FAA adopts Virgin Galactic asked the FAA to 187 retain the ground safety analysis Such activities may include, for example, § 450.183 (Explosive Site Plan) as activities conducted by a carrier aircraft without a proposed. The FAA received no practices used under part 431 and not rocket attached when the carrier aircraft plus rocket comments on this section. to impose proposed § 450.185. Virgin constitutes the launch vehicle.

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authority over ground safety. and safety of property during the request approval of an alternate method Specifically, CSF and Sierra Nevada conduct of a licensed launch or reentry for requesting license modifications recommended that the FAA consider an in proposed § 450.201, how a licensee during the application process. alternative regulatory approach that would be required to comply with a In the final rule, the FAA adopts would give the responsibility for license in proposed § 450.203 § 450.211 as proposed with only a minor assessing and controlling ground safety (Compliance with License), with revision to split the second requirement and hazards mitigations to the site financial responsibility requirements of in proposed § 450.211(a) into a new operator. part 440 in proposed § 450.205 § 450.211(b). Accordingly, proposed Historically, the launch or reentry (Financial Responsibility § 450.211(b) and (c) were renumbered to operator has been responsible for Requirements), and with human become § 450.211(c) and (d) in the final ground safety and, as reflected in the spaceflight requirements in part 460 in rule, respectively. NPRM, the FAA determined that this proposed § 450.207 (Human Spaceflight CSF and SpaceX suggested that the allocation of responsibility was Requirements). FAA could update § 413.17(a) to clarify appropriate given that the operator has In the final rule, the FAA adopts the that it would agree to a modification to the most comprehensive understanding requirements as proposed. The FAA an existing license when the FAA of the parameters of the licensed received no comments on these accepts and approves a continuing activity. The FAA expects that the proposals. accuracy submission. CSF requested that the FAA clarify its use of these launch or reentry operator will work b. Compliance Monitoring (§ 450.209) closely with the site operator to ensure terms in an AC. all requirements are met. Accordingly, In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to Virgin Galactic noted that operators the FAA retains the proposed language combine the compliance monitoring may have separate definitions for in the final rule. requirements of §§ 417.23 and 431.83 in continuing accuracy and license § 450.209. The FAA also proposed to modifications. Virgin Galactic proposed v. Ground Safety Prescribed Hazard allow an operator the option to provide what it believed to be simpler Controls (§ 450.189) the FAA with means other than a requirements for continuing accuracy In the NPRM, the FAA proposed that console for monitoring the updates and license modifications, an operator would be required to communication and countdown which in Virgin Galactic’s experience implement certain prescribed hazard channels. The compliance monitoring aligned with how the FAA has controls during the ground operations requirements of proposed § 450.209 processed Virgin Galactic’s license and period of launch or reentry. These would apply to all launch and reentry license application updates over the prescribed hazard controls would operations. Finally, proposed § 450.209 past three years. Specifically, Virgin require that an operator document how codified the FAA practice for Galactic recommended that proposed it would protect members of the public conducting compliance monitoring of § 450.211(a)(1) be rewritten to change who enter areas under the operator’s part 435 operations. In final rule, the the requirement so that after a license has been issued, a licensee would be control, and mitigate hazards created by FAA adopts § 450.209 as proposed. required to apply to the FAA for a countdown abort. They would also Virgin Galactic expressed concern modification of the license if the require the operator to establish plans regarding proposed § 450.209(b), which licensee proposes to make changes that for controlling fires and emergency stated a licensee must provide the FAA affect the license, as issued by the FAA. procedures. In the final rule, the FAA with the capability to communicate It also proposed to add the term adopts § 450.189 as proposed. with the mission director. Virgin ‘‘continuing accuracy updates’’ for AAAE suggested licensed operators be Galactic suggested replacement changes that a licensee proposes that do required to notify nearby airports and language that gave the operator the not affect the license but do affect the contingent landing sites of potential responsibility for assigning a radio license application. Virgin Galactic safety hazards and their controls, communications point-of-contact for the maintained that this approach would including those described under this FAA during operations. The FAA does provide schedule assurance for section and proposed § 450.185. The not adopt this suggestion because the operators, as license modification notification requirements in § 420.57 FAA must have direct contact with the usually involves time-intensive require licensed site operators to notify mission director during licensed coordination between the FAA and an local officials and adjacent landowners operations to ensure any risk to public safety during ongoing operations is operator. of flight schedules. In addition, Sierra Nevada commented that § 450.147 requires vehicle operators to immediately addressed. It will continue to be FAA practice not to contact the general edits to the listed documents have agreements with any sites or should not trigger the requirement of services that are necessary to meet the mission director unless there is an immediate and urgent risk to public continuing accuracy, as such a safety requirements for a license. These requirement would create an extremely requirements serve to notify the safety. The FAA also deletes § 450.209(c) burdensome amount of document necessary entities about licensed because it imposed a requirement only overhead an applicant would be operations. on the FAA and was unnecessary legacy required to maintain that is not 5. Part 450 Subpart D—Terms and language. necessary for maintaining public safety. Conditions of a Vehicle Operator The FAA does not agree that the c. Continuing Accuracy of License License suggested changes are necessary; Application; Application for however, the FAA has split the two a. Public Safety Responsibility, Modification of License (§ 450.211) requirements in § 450.211(a) so that the Compliance With License, Financial In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to application for modification of license is Responsibility, Human Spaceflight preserve the continuing accuracy in § 450.211(b) for added clarity. The Requirements (§§ 450.201 to 450.207) requirements in §§ 417.11 and 431.73, regulation states that a licensee is In the NPRM, the FAA proposed and consolidate them in proposed responsible for the continuing accuracy requirements addressing how a licensee § 450.211. In addition, the FAA of representations contained in its is responsible for ensuring public safety proposed to allow an applicant to application. A license modification is

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required only if the licensee proposes to just the FSA and any PSA 188 as of subpart D. The FAA makes similar conduct a launch or reentry in a manner suggested by Virgin Orbit. All public changes in § 450.450.215. not authorized by the license; or, if any safety requirements in part 450 are Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop representation contained in the license applicable. The FAA does agree with Grumman, and ULA commented that application that is material to public Virgin Orbit that the burden lies on the they appreciated the streamlining of health and safety or the safety of operator to determine what constitutes a pre-flight reporting. CSF recommended property is no longer accurate and material change. The FAA notes, that the FAA allow the submittal of test complete, or does not reflect the however, that an operator should reports in accordance with proposed licensee’s procedures governing the consult with the FAA regarding those § 450.213(d) less than 30 days before actual conduct of a launch or reentry. changes for which an operator is unsure flight. SpinLaunch also stated that the For representations that do not meet whether the change is material or not. proposed § 450.213(d) requirement to either of these criteria, such as Virgin Orbit requested a definition of submit test reports 30 days prior to administrative information, § 450.211(b) a ‘‘minor’’ change. It further requested launch was too burdensome. continues to require an applicant to that minor changes would not require a The FAA agrees that not all test inform the FAA of the change in order full 180-day review period, and that the reports for the FSS, such as end-to-end to ensure the representations made in regulation define a maximum review tests and pre-flight tests, can be the application are accurate. time for minor changes. The FAA does delivered 30 days before flight. The FAA therefore revises § 450.213(d) to The NPRM preamble identified the not distinguish between major and allow an operator the flexibility to following as areas that constitute a minor changes, only those changes that identify an appropriate time frame in material change: Reuse, after an earlier will or will not have a material impact coordination with the FAA. The FAA launch or reentry, of safety-critical on public safety. Categorizing all discusses this flexibility in more detail systems or components, requiring potential changes that have a material in the preamble section on Time refurbishment, re-qualification testing, impact on public safety into only two and re-acceptance testing. Virgin Frames. categories is problematic due to the AAAE noted that, under proposed Galactic believed performing variety of potential changes. The FAA refurbishment and pre-flight testing of § 450.213(f), launch schedules would be does agree, however, that not all reusable safety-critical systems or required to be provided to the FAA in requests for modification would require components would not constitute a advance. AAAE recommended that extensive review. Although the statutory material change that affects public these schedules, including any changes 180-day review period does not apply to safety. Both vehicles of a hybrid RLV to the schedule, should also be modifications, the FAA makes every launch system are reused, and pre-flight distributed to nearby airports (within at effort to act upon all requests for testing and refurbishment are performed least five nautical miles of the launch modifications in a timely manner. The prior to each mission. Virgin Galactic site or along the vehicle’s trajectory), FAA is able to respond quickly if a recommended this reuse language be contingent landing sites, and any change is indeed minor. stricken from the preamble because it is emergency responders supporting the not a material change to public safety. d. Pre-Flight Reporting (§ 450.213) launch operation. The FAA clarifies that normal pre- The FAA declines to adopt this flight testing and refurbishment that are In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to recommendation. Section 450.147 evaluated and accepted during a license require a licensee to provide the FAA requires that an operator establish application are not considered a with the following information prior to written agreements with any entity that material change. The FAA further each launch or reentry: Mission-specific provides a service that meets a clarifies that only pre-flight testing and information, FSA products, FSS test requirement. The FAA notes that these refurbishment that is not evaluated data, data required by the FAA to written agreements will include any during a licensing process will be conduct a collision avoidance analysis, agreements necessary to ensure the considered a material change. As and a launch or reentry schedule. safety of airspace. The FAA has drafted discussed above, a material change is a In the final rule, the FAA adopts § 450.147 to be as performance-based as change that affects public safety that has § 450.213 with four revisions. First, in possible; therefore, the specificity not been evaluated and authorized by § 450.213(d)(2), the FAA replaces the recommended by AAAE is unnecessary. the FAA during the licensing process. term ‘‘flight information’’ with ‘‘planned That said, the FAA agrees that such Virgin Orbit commented that some of mission information’’ because the notifications would usually be required. the changes noted in preamble, such as information required includes launch CSF noted that proposed § 450.213 retesting a valve or changing a safety site information, and the term ‘‘planned would require that the licensee provide officer, should not require a mission information’’ is used in the payload details to the FAA 60 days in modification to a license. Virgin Orbit final § 450.208(d)(6). Second, the FAA advance of a launch or reentry. CSF recommended that what constituted a revises § 450.213(d) to allow an operator commented that operators often cannot material change should be based on how the flexibility to identify an appropriate meet that time frame due to changes in the change affected public safety time frame in coordination with the manifests for passive or minor payloads elements contained within the FSA and FAA. Third, in § 450.213(e) the FAA that occur inside of 60 days before PSA. Virgin Orbit further recommended removes the reference to the time frames flight. Proposed § 404.15 would not that the FAA allow operators to to submit LCOLA data, which the FAA allow an operator to request that the determine how the areas that has revised in the final rule, so that time frame for payload notification be constituted a material change as § 450.213(e) simply requires operators to changed unless it knew more than 60 identified in the preamble affected the submit LCOLA data in accordance with days in advance of flight that the public safety elements. § 450.169(f). Lastly, the FAA replaces manifest was going to change. CSF As noted earlier, a material change is ‘‘operator’’ with ‘‘licensee’’ throughout considered the proposal inflexible and a change that affects public safety that the section to be consistent with the rest requested that FAA allow proposed has not been evaluated and authorized § 404.15 be made more flexible. The by the FAA during the licensing 188 As discussed earlier, the FAA removed the FAA disagrees with the comment, as process. These changes may go beyond requirement for a PSA from the final rule. § 404.15 currently allows for an

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applicant to request the FAA to relax alignment with the terms of the incident,’’ ‘‘launch accident,’’ ‘‘launch the 60-day pre-flight reporting Registration Convention.189 incident,’’ ‘‘public safety,’’ ‘‘reentry requirement for payload information. The FAA did not intend the accident,’’ ‘‘reentry incident,’’ and requirement to notify the FAA of objects ‘‘vehicle safety operations personnel.’’ e. Post-Flight Reporting (§ 450.215) removed from orbit to cover eventual In the final rule, the FAA does not In the NPRM, the FAA proposed an decays through atmospheric reentry. make any immediate changes to § 401.5. operator be required to provide the NZSA is correct that the Registration Instead, § 401.5 will remain in effect for actual trajectory flown by the vehicle Convention requires the notification of five years after the effective date of this and, for an unguided suborbital launch objects removed from space. Yet, the final rule, and its definitions will be vehicle, the actual impact location of all FAA does not believe there is a need to applied to parts 415, 417, 431, and 435. impacting stages and impacting require launch operators to track the After five years, § 401.5 will be removed components, if requested by the FAA. In orbital status of all objects previously from part 401 and all operators will use the final rule, the FAA adopts § 450.215 launched in perpetuity. the definitions in the new § 401.7. as proposed. 6. Changes to Parts 401, 413, 414, 420, ii. § 401.7 SpaceX generally agreed with the 433, 437, and 440 provisions of proposed § 450.215 but In the final rule, existing and suggested that the FAA remove Part 401—Organization and Definitions proposed definitions from § 401.5 are adopted as new § 401.7 (Definitions) proposed § 450.215(b)(4) because it i. § 401.5 contended that post-flight auditing was specifically applicable to part 450 In the NPRM, the FAA proposed new requirements, with the exception of the already an option for the FAA and that and amended definitions to § 401.5 the specific reference to a potential following proposed definitions: ‘‘control (Definitions). The new proposed entity,’’ ‘‘data loss flight time,’’ ‘‘dose- request for a flown trajectory was definitions in proposed § 401.5 were: redundant and unnecessary. Although response relationship,’’ ‘‘flight abort ‘‘anomaly,’’ ‘‘casualty area,’’ ‘‘command crew,’’ ‘‘gate,’’ ‘‘mishap, class 1,’’ the FAA agrees with SpaceX that the control system,’’ ‘‘control entity,’’ ‘‘mishap, class 2,’’ ‘‘mishap, class 3’’, FAA can request these data as part of its ‘‘countdown,’’ ‘‘critical asset,’’ ‘‘mishap, class 4,’’ ‘‘tracking icon,’’ and inspection, the FAA finds that the ‘‘crossrange,’’ ‘‘data loss flight time,’’ ‘‘vehicle response modes.’’ In addition, explicit reference in the regulatory text ‘‘deorbit,’’ ‘‘disposal,’’ ‘‘dose-response § 401.7 does not contain the definitions is necessary to ensure compliance. The relationship,’’ ‘‘downrange,’’ ‘‘effective for ‘‘Federal launch range’’ and ‘‘launch FAA included this requirement in the casualty area,’’ ‘‘expected casualty,’’ site safety assessment’’ that exist in proposed rule because some operators ‘‘explosive debris,’’ ‘‘flight abort,’’ § 401.5. These definitions are not failed to provide flown trajectory ‘‘flight abort crew,’’ ‘‘flight abort rules,’’ adopted because they are no longer used information when the FAA requested it ‘‘flight hazard area,’’ ‘‘flight safety in the regulations. Section 401.7 will as part of an inspection or post-flight limit,’’ ‘‘gate,’’ ‘‘hazard control,’’ apply to all of Chapter III except parts review. The FAA will only ask for flown ‘‘launch or reentry system,’’ ‘‘launch 415, 417, 431, 435, and 440, where trajectory data when necessary to verify window,’’ ‘‘liftoff,’’ ‘‘limits of a useful § 401.5 will continue to apply until five models and assess vehicle performance. mission,’’ ‘‘mishap, class 1,’’ ‘‘mishap, years after the effective date of this rule. f. Registration of Space Objects class 2,’’ ‘‘mishap, class 3’’, ‘‘mishap, The FAA notes that the proposed (§ 450.217) class 4,’’ ‘‘neighboring operations definition of ‘‘probability of casualty’’ personnel,’’ ‘‘normal flight,’’ ‘‘normal uses the phrase ‘‘serious injury or In the NPRM, the FAA consolidated trajectory,’’ ‘‘operating environment,’’ worse.’’ Consistent with current practice and updated the requirements for ‘‘operation hazard,’’ ‘‘orbital insertion,’’ for launch and reentry safety analyses, registration of space objects in proposed ‘‘physical containment,’’ ‘‘probability of as well as other DOT modal § 450.217. The FAA proposed to remove casualty,’’ ‘‘public,’’ ‘‘reentry window,’’ administrations, the FAA maintains that the caveat excluding foreign payloads ‘‘service life,’’ ‘‘software function,’’ the use of the Abbreviated Injury Scale and to add the requirement to notify the ‘‘sub-vehicle point,’’ ‘‘system hazard,’’ (AIS) Level 3 or greater (of the FAA when removing objects placed in ‘‘toxic hazard area,’’ ‘‘tracking icon,’’ Association for the Advancement of orbit. The FAA noted that it is the ‘‘uncontrolled area,’’ ‘‘unguided Automotive Medicine) is appropriate for responsibility of the U.S. Government to suborbital launch vehicle,’’ ‘‘uprange,’’ describing a medical condition register objects and launch operator data and ‘‘vehicle response modes,’’ ‘‘wind sufficiently to allow modeling of is used to make relevant decisions on weighting safety system,’’ and ‘‘window casualties for purposes of determining what to register. Proposed § 450.217(c) closure.’’ whether a launch or reentry satisfies the retained § 431.85’s requirement that an The amended definitions in proposed public risk criteria. For additional operator notify the FAA when it § 401.5 were ‘‘contingency abort,’’ information regarding casualty removes a space object. ‘‘flight safety system,’’ ‘‘instantaneous modeling, the FAA refers the reader to impact point,’’ ‘‘launch,’’ ‘‘mishap,’’ In the final rule, the FAA adopts the preamble of a previous § 450.217 as proposed. ‘‘reenter; reentry,’’ ‘‘safety critical,’’ and rulemaking.190 NZSA asked if operators would have ‘‘State and United States’’. These new The FAA adds new definitions for to report the reentry of an object due to and revised definitions were necessary ‘‘critical payload,’’ ‘‘hazardous debris,’’ atmospheric reentry, presumably much additions to accompany the proposed ‘‘key flight safety event,’’ and ‘‘useful later than launch. NZSA supported the part 450 requirements. mission,’’ which were not proposed in The FAA also proposed to remove a requirement of information on foreign- the NPRM. These definitions and the number of definitions from § 401.5 that owned space objects to determine who rationale to remove, adopt, or amend were no longer used in the regulations: would register the objects, which NZSA them are discussed in the relevant topic ‘‘emergency abort,’’ ‘‘human space flight also requires. NZSA recommended the sections of this preamble. FAA clarify whether removal would Sierra Nevada suggested including a relate only to active removal or if it 189 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space provides that the specific reference to ground safety for would include passive deorbiting. United Nations maintains a registry of objects left NZSA viewed the latter to be in in space by on data provided by the launching state. 190 See 67 FR 49464 (July 30, 2002).

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the public in the definition of ‘‘reentry.’’ license and permit applications. The alternate time frames in § 420.57. The The FAA declines to adopt this FAA adopts these changes as proposed. FAA adopts these changes as proposed. suggestion because public safety is the In the NPRM, the FAA included In § 420.59, the FAA proposed core of the FAA’s statutory mission, and license and permit renewals in the changing the heading from ‘‘Launch Site including additional reference to public flexible time frames table in Appendix Accident Investigation Plan’’ to safety for the definition of ‘‘reentry’’ is A to Part 404. The FAA inadvertently ‘‘Mishap Plan,’’ and modifying the unnecessary. omitted making the same change in the requirements for Mishap Plans to match the requirements for ‘‘mishap plans’’ in Part 413—Application Procedures corresponding regulatory text in § 413.21. The FAA adopts the change as § 450.173. As discussed in the Mishap In the NPRM, to enable incremental proposed, and revises § 413.21 to allow section of this preamble, the FAA application submission and review, the flexible time frames for license and revises § 420.59(a) to state that the FAA proposed to modify § 413.1 to permit renewals. This decision is requirements of this section only apply clarify the term ‘‘application’’ to mean further discussed in the Time Frames in the event of a mishap that meets either an application in its entirety, or section of the preamble. paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(5) of the a portion of an application for In the NPRM, the FAA proposed definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7 and incremental review and determination conforming changes in part 413 where removes the requirement for the in accordance with proposed § 450.33. a part 414 safety approval is referenced, licensee to cooperate with an FAA or In the final rule, the FAA adopts the to change those references to ‘‘safety NTSB investigations of a mishap for provision as proposed. This decision is element approval.’’ The FAA adopts the launches launched from the launch site. further discussed in the Incremental changes as proposed. This decision is Lastly, in § 420.61(b), the FAA Review section of the preamble. The further discussed in the Safety Element replaces the word ‘‘shall’’ with the word FAA did not receive any comments on Approval section of the preamble. ‘‘must,’’ and replaces the term ‘‘launch this part. or launch site accident’’ with a reference In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to Part 414—Safety Element Approvals to the portions of the ‘‘mishap’’ revise the table in § 413.1 by replacing In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to definition that replace this term: parts 415, 417, 431, and 435, with part change the part 414 term ‘‘safety paragraphs (1), (5), and (8). As 450. The FAA adopts the proposed table approval’’ to ‘‘safety element approval,’’ explained in the Mishap section of this with revisions as discussed in the to distinguish it from the term ‘‘safety preamble, the NPRM inadvertently preamble section for Compliance Period approval’’ as used in parts 415, 431, and omitted these changes necessitated by for Legacy Licenses. 435, and proposed part 450. Also, the the revised definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to § 401.7. amend § 413.7(a)(3) to allow an FAA proposed to modify part 414 to applicant the option to submit its enable applicants to request a safety Part 433—License To Operate a Reentry application by email as a link to a element approval in conjunction with a Site secure server and removed the license application in accordance with proposed part 450. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed requirement that an application be in a changes to the environmental format that cannot be altered. The FAA In the final rule, the FAA adopts the changes as proposed with minor requirements in § 433.7 to align them adopts § 413.7(a)(3) as proposed and with the environmental requirements in this decision is further discussed in the editorial corrections. The FAA did not receive any comments on this part. proposed § 450.47 and removed and Application Process section of the reserved § 433.9. preamble. Part 420—License To Operate a Launch In the final rule, the FAA adopts the In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to Site proposed requirements in § 433.7 with revise § 413.11(a) by removing the revisions to align with the revisions in reference to initiate a review ‘‘required In the NPRM, the FAA proposed multiple changes in part 420. § 450.47. The revisions are discussed in to make a decision about the license or the Environmental Review section of the permit.’’ This revision would enable Specifically, the FAA proposed changes in §§ 420.5, 420.15, 420.51, 420.57, preamble. The FAA also adopts the incremental application submission and proposal to remove and reserve § 433.9. review. In the final rule, the FAA adopts 420.59, and 420.61 to align with requirements in part 450. The FAA did not receive any comments the change as proposed. on these proposals. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed a In § 420.5, the FAA proposed to change to § 413.15 to allow the FAA to remove the definitions of Part 437—Experimental Permits establish a time frame for any ‘‘instantaneous impact point,’’ ‘‘launch In the NPRM, the FAA proposed the incremental review with an applicant site accident,’’ and ‘‘public’’ from following changes to part 437 on a case-by-case basis during pre- § 420.5. The FAA did not receive (Experimental Permits). application consultation. In the final comments on these changes and adopts • First, the FAA proposed to remove rule, the FAA adopts this change with them as proposed. the definition of ‘‘anomaly’’ from a revision. The FAA revises the explicit In § 420.15(b), the FAA proposed to § 437.3 and include a modified version time frames in § 413.15 to reference the revise the environmental review in proposed § 401.5. time frames specified in 51 U.S.C. requirements under part 420 to match • Second, the FAA proposed to 50905(a)(1) and 50906(a) so that a future the environmental review requirements modify the environmental requirements rulemaking will not be required if the proposed in § 450.47. As discussed in in § 437.21(b)(1) to match the time frames are modified in the statute. the Environmental Review section of environmental requirements proposed This decision is further discussed in the this preamble, the FAA adopts this in § 450.47. Incremental Review section of the change as proposed, with revisions that • Third, the FAA proposed to change preamble. affirmatively state the responsibilities of the name of ‘‘safety approval’’ to ‘‘safety In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to the FAA and an applicant in accordance element approval’’ in § 437.21. correct the section heading of § 413.21 with FAA Order 1050.1. • Fourth, the FAA proposed to to reflect the content of the section, and The FAA proposed a minor edit to modify the mishap plan requirements in to correct § 413.21(c) to reference both § 420.51, and proposed to allow § 437.41 to require that they meet the

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requirements of proposed § 450.173 and 7. Miscellaneous Comments providing multiple options for remove and reserve the requirements in i. General Support/Opposition complying with the regulations. § 437.75. Similarly, the FAA disagrees that it Several commenters generally • Fifth, the FAA proposed to change would be necessary or feasible to create supported the proposed rule as a much- an exception in the licensing process for the requirements in § 437.65 for needed effort to consolidate and update collision avoidance to match proposed ‘‘space startups.’’ the licensing process in a way that The FAA disagrees further that the § 450.169. would foster innovation and growth of • administrative requirements to be Finally, the FAA proposed allowing the space industry. Individual placed on the FAA will prove for alternate time frames for pre-flight commenters supported streamlined impracticable to administer. The final reporting in § 437.89. licensing as a way for space startups to rule upholds the FAA’s responsibility to In the final rule, the FAA adopts the enter the industry. protect public safety and safety of proposed requirements with the The FAA also received comments property. In addition, the final rule following exceptions. The FAA revises stating the NPRM fell short in makes no change to the FAA’s the environmental requirements in streamlining rules and procedures, as assessment of environmental impacts. § 437.21 to align with § 450.47, and directed by SPD–2. The FAA received As such, the FAA disagrees that the replaces the word ‘‘envelope’’ with the comments that the proposed rules made final rule will enable operators to secure word ‘‘scope.’’ ‘‘Scope’’ more accurately obtaining launch licenses too difficult or licenses for launches or reentries that do captures ‘‘envelope, parameter, or expensive for small companies because not satisfy the FAA’s public safety or situation’’ as used in the definition of they require legal or technical experts environmental review criteria. ‘‘safety element approval.’’ The for small, low-risk launches. An Finally, commenters’ concerns rationale for this revision is discussed in individual commenter asserted the FAA regarding Camden Spaceport are beyond the Environmental Review section of the should ease restrictions for space the scope of this rulemaking. startups. Another individual commenter preamble. The FAA also aligns the ii. Miscellaneous Comments recordkeeping requirements in stated the NPRM added administrative § 437.87(b) for an event that meets requirements that the FAA would not be Starfighters Aerospace asked if all paragraph (a)(1) through (a)(3), (a)(5), or able to manage. Virgin Galactic present restrictions on compensation or (b)(3) of the definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in requested that the safety, efficiency, and hire would be removed for licenses and § 401.7, for which a permittee must clarity of the current regulatory regime certificates developed collaboratively preserve all records related to the for suborbital, reusable vehicles be between AVS and AST. mishap event. The FAA removes the maintained in any new rulemaking. The FAA notes that this rule will not Individual commenters asserted the definition of ‘‘anomaly’’ from § 437.3 change any current practice or NPRM did not contain adequate and includes a revised definition of regulation regarding compensation or standards to evaluate the adverse effects ‘‘anomaly’’ in § 401.7 instead of in hire restrictions under aviation of licensed activities on public safety § 401.5 as proposed. The FAA also regulations. Changes to compensation or and the environment. The Center for a amends the language in § 437.87(b) to hire are outside the scope of this Sustainable Coast (Center) stated the state that records must be retained until rulemaking. FAA should require applicants to An individual commenter stated that completion of any Federal investigation analyze risks to private or public the FAA should have incorporated the and the FAA advises the permittee that property, including infrastructure and proposed regulatory text the ARC the records need no longer be retained. natural resources. Without such a included at the end of its report, or, These changes will clarify the records requirement, the Center and other alternatively, the FAA should reconvene retention requirements and ensure commenters argued the proposed rule the SLR2 ARC. Two individuals consistency with part 450. The changes would make it easier to launch over commented that the FAA did not do not modify the scope of the residential areas, environmental provide sufficient public engagement for requirements. The FAA did not receive preserves, or other areas presenting a this rule. SpaceX and two individuals any comments on this portion of the high risk of harm to persons, property, commented that the proposed rule did proposed rule. and natural resources. The FAA also not adequately address stakeholder Part 440—Financial Responsibility received comments raising concerns concerns. Several commenters, about Camden Spaceport, citing the including SpaceX and Virgin Orbit, In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to proposed rule’s lack of noise requested a public meeting. modify § 440.15 to allow for alternate limitations, emissions requirements, As noted in the NPRM, the FAA does time frames. The FAA also proposed to and attention to the effects on the not address the ARC’s recommended modify the definition of ‘‘maximum environment and residential areas. regulatory text because the probable loss’’ in § 440.3 to exclude The FAA notes that the commenters recommended text did not receive broad neighboring operations losses from did not recommend specific changes to consensus within the ARC. The FAA losses to third parties that are the proposed rule, nor did they provide also disagrees that commenters did not reasonably expected to result from a cost data to substantiate the economic have sufficient opportunity to comment licensed or permitted activity and that concern for small companies. As such, on the NPRM. Although the FAA did have a probability of occurrence of no the FAA cannot provide a specific not hold a public meeting, as some × ¥8 less than one in ten million (1 10 ), response to these comments but notes commenters requested, the FAA and to include those losses to its general disagreement with the claim accepted written questions seeking neighboring operations personnel that that the new rule will make it too clarification on the NPRM and, upon have a probability of occurrence of no difficult or expensive for small publication of the FAA’s responses to less than one in one hundred thousand companies to secure commercial space those questions, extended the comment × ¥5 (1 10 ). launch and reentry licenses from the period to allow commenters sufficient In the final rule, the FAA adopts these FAA. In fact, publicly available means time to review the FAA’s clarifications. changes as proposed. The FAA did not of compliance will assist small Similarly, while the FAA did not receive any comments on this proposal. companies in entering the market by reconvene the SLR2 ARC, the FAA

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relied heavily upon the vehicle, resource inputs, infrastructure understanding the performance-based recommendations of the ARC, in requirements, and payload requirements as proposed. The addition to industry and other public considerations. The net cost savings proposed requirements, along with comments, in promulgating this rule. provided by this rule do not discussions in the preamble, provided Relativity Space commented that the significantly change the relative costs of ample notice to the public. An AC NPRM preamble and proposed rule operating from U.S. Government ranges would provide one means, but not the diverged from stakeholder expectations in favor of locations elsewhere given only means, of meeting any particular and appeared contradictory. Sierra these considerations of scale and requirement. Nevada requested that the FAA identify complexity of operations. In addition, iv. Designated Engineering in the docket any contractor support U.S. companies need a license from the Representative Model used to develop and draft the NPRM. FAA for a commercial space launch The FAA generally disagrees that the regardless of where the launch occurs— Blue Origin recommended the preamble contradicted the proposed this rule does not change that. Designated Engineering Representative regulation, but notes that, as explained Currently, and prior to this rule, U.S. (DER) model to determine compliance herein, the FAA has revised particular companies operate at locations outside with the FAA’s launch and reentry provisions that commenters specifically of U.S. Government ranges in remote regulations. identified as unclear or impracticable. locations and abroad, such as New Delegating the agency’s authority to The question of contractor support is Zealand. make engineering compliance findings irrelevant to this rule or its to qualified individuals (DERs) in the iii. Advisory Circulars (ACs) promulgation by the FAA. context of licensing commercial space CSF and SpaceX commented that the CSF, Sierra Nevada, Space Florida, transportation is beyond the scope of FAA should revise § 440.15(c) so that SpaceX, and two individuals (including this rulemaking. The FAA may consider operators would not need to submit Congressman Steven M. Palazzo) such a recommendation in the future. commented that the FAA had failed to proof of insurance, as required by v. Request for SNPRM § 440.9, more than once if the insurance provide sufficient accompanying policy covered multiple licensed guidance documents and ACs to allow The FAA received a number of activities. industry to provide meaningful input on comments requesting that the FAA issue CSF, Rocket Lab, and SpaceX the proposed regulations. CSF and an SNPRM. Denver International requested the FAA revise SpaceX both commented that the FAA’s Airport commented that the FAA § 440.15(c)(1)(iv) through (c)(1)(vi) to approach to publish many ACs with the should wait to issue this rule until allow use of electronic signatures, in final rule did not allow industry to Congress adopts the Space Frontier Act, lieu of original signatures, for each party consider the proposed rules and the and then, if required, issue an SNPRM. to the required waiver of claims. draft ACs as a complete package. Virgin One individual commenter asked the Denver International Airport asked Galactic recommended that the FAA FAA to restart the rulemaking process the FAA to broaden the scope of release updated ACs and guidelines to and work closely with industry and the financial responsibility required by part coincide with the new rule’s going into ARC to produce a final rule that would 440 to include employees, site effect, or allow a grace period for meet industry needs and would comply operators, neighboring communities, applicants and currently licensed with the Commercial Space Launch Act and other stakeholders. operators to be compliant. and SPD–2. Boeing and Northrop Grumman The FAA acknowledges the The FAA disagrees that the final rule recommended the FAA add to § 404.5(b) commenters’ concerns, but disagrees is inconsistent with either the a requirement that petitions for waivers that the lack of draft ACs, which are Commercial Space Launch Act or SPD– specify the duration or specific mission necessarily rooted in the text of 2. Through this rule, the FAA for which petitioner seeks relief, noting regulations, prevented commenters from streamlines the licensing process for the FAA should not assume a waiver substantively commenting on the commercial launch and reentry applies to the entire license. proposed rule. The preamble and table operations, and replaces many The FAA notes that the previous four of accepted means of compliance prescriptive requirements with issues raised by the commenters are all provided sufficient detail to support the performance-based criteria, as directed beyond the scope of this rule because proposal. The ACs will be non-binding by SPD–2. To forego rulemaking until they contained comments on areas of guidance documents designed to Congress passes additional legislation the commercial space transportation provide specific examples of means of on commercial space operations, as regulations that were not part of the compliance and recognized practices Denver International Airport suggested, proposal. without prescribing regulatory would contravene the President’s policy CSF commented that the NPRM was requirements. The public and interested directive. anti-competitive and discouraged parties will have an opportunity to The FAA finds no circumstances that operations from U.S. Government provide comment on the ACs. would justify a second round of notice ranges, thereby favoring operators As noted under the performance- and comment or SNPRM. The FAA located elsewhere, including outside the based regulations discussion, CSF and provided ample opportunity for United States. SpaceX stated that some of the proposed members of the public to submit The FAA notes that CSF does not rules may be performance-based, but it comments and supporting evidence to explain why it thinks the rule will was difficult to make that determination the administrative record, as shown by discourage operations from U.S. without reviewing the accompanying the large volume of substantive, diverse Government ranges and favor operators ACs. Space Florida commented that comments received. The FAA also located elsewhere, including outside the there was an absence of performance provided two sets of written responses United States. Based on applications criteria and guidance providing to clarifying questions, and extended received by the FAA, the locations of acceptable approaches. the comment period following operations are ultimately determined by The FAA does not agree that the publication of those responses. the scale and complexity of operations, absence of additional draft ACs Although the FAA has adjusted and including the size and type of launch prevented members of the public from revised parts of the NPRM in light of the

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comments received and interagency 8. Responses to Regulatory Impact concern that the FAA may determine review, the final rule does not Analysis Comments that new or supplemental materially differ from the proposed rule i. Compliance Period for Legacy environmental analyses would be such that an SNPRM would have been Licenses necessary for operators opting for a warranted. Nor does the FAA view the single vehicle license with vehicle and presence of the circumstances that CSF commented that if the FAA site flexibility. The commenter was required holders of licenses issued might otherwise necessitate publishing concerned that such analyses would be under current regulations to seek an SNPRM (e.g., availability of new required before the determination to add renewals under part 450, operators and studies or experiments affecting the multiple vehicle configurations, the FAA would experience significant agency’s analysis; supervening legal operational parameters, or launch site additional cost and regulatory burdens locations to an operator’s single license. developments that significantly affect because currently licensed operators the rulemaking; or any other important Spaceport Strategies also expressed under parts 431 and 435 would have to concern that the FAA had not analyzed change to the agency’s analytical come into compliance with certain framework in the rulemaking). the cost to launch operators or to launch additional requirements in part 450. site operators for additional or vi. Airspace Blue Origin also expressed concern that, redundant environmental reviews that without grandfathering, there would be the FAA would likely require of an The FAA received a number of a cost to transition a license to part 450. operator under the new rule in order for comments on the effect of space Blue Origin pointed out that, according an operator to obtain a single license operations on the NAS. A4A, AAAE, to the NPRM, upon license renewal, an covering multiple launch or reentry ACI, ALPA, AOPA, CAA, NATCA, and existing operation would have to sites or multiple vehicle configurations RAA recommended the FAA implement comply with part 450. Blue Origin and flight operations. Spaceport tools to integrate commercial space disagreed with the FAA’s conclusion Strategies noted that the added costs of activities safely and expeditiously into that operators would not have great repetitive or redundant environmental the NAS and to harmonize the difficulty transitioning existing reviews would cause unquantified cost regulatory regime governing aviation programs to part 450. It cited, in impacts on licensees, including State and commercial space. These particular, proposed CEC and associated and local launch site license applicants. commenters argue that greater requirements in proposed § 450.145. CSF stated that applicants using the communication and coordination with The FAA notes that any request to licensing option to include multiple NAS users was needed to reduce delays renew a current license submitted after sites under one license may be and obstacles faced by both industries the effective date of the rule will result vulnerable to time and cost uncertainty (e.g., coordinated vehicle surveillance, in a license valid for no more than five resulting from these environmental traffic management, and hazard years after the effective date of this rule. review requirements. mitigation plans). However, upon the effective date, the The FAA does not agree that the final operator will be required to come into rule will impose additional costs The same commenters recommended compliance with COLA and critical beyond what is currently required of the FAA incorporate into the rule the asset requirements. The FAA does not applicants for environmental reviews, recommendations of the ongoing estimate additional costs for those two including applications for a single Airspace Access ARC. AOPA stated the requirements because the operator will vehicle license or licenses that include COMSTAC and SLR2 ARC should have provide the same information the multiple sites, as the final rule codifies included general aviation operator currently provides, and the current practice. NEPA requires that an representation. U.S. Government will perform the environmental review be completed for A4A and Southwest Airlines asked necessary analyses, as discussed in the each site covered by the FAA license. that aviation stakeholders be given an preamble sections for Critical Asset and As such, the final rule makes no change opportunity to identify potential NAS COLA. to the existing requirement that impacts during the licensing process. After five years from the effective date applicants submit information allowing A4A, AAAE, ACI, ALPA, CAA, NATCA, of the final rule, all vehicle operators the FAA to fulfill its responsibility and RAA recommended the FAA must be in compliance with part 450, under NEPA to assess the require licensees to identify and but information previously submitted to environmental impacts associated with mitigate negative operational and the FAA in obtaining a license under the proposed activities, at each site financial impacts to NAS users resulting parts 417 and 431 may be referenced as where the licensed activities will occur. from licensed activities. A4A added that means of compliance to meet the An applicant must submit these hazard mitigation plans and the FAA’s requirements of part 450. Concerns over materials to allow the FAA to conduct accepted means of compliance should costs of proposed CEC and FSS site-specific reviews regardless of be subject to public comment, or requirements in § 450.145 are discussed whether multiple sites or vehicles are otherwise allow NAS users the in the remainder of this section. There covered under one license or several opportunity to identify airspace and may be costs to transition licenses licenses. This could be accomplished by ground safety risks. following the 5-year period after the including multiple sites into one NEPA rule’s effective date. However, as document, or separating them into The FAA did not propose any changes mentioned previously, the FAA individual NEPA documents. for the protection of aircraft other than anticipates few, if any, additional Spaceport Strategies commented that the aircraft risk criteria proposed in requirements that could not be fulfilled the FAA did not consider the offsetting § 450.101(a)(3). As such, these by referencing previous submittals. costs of environmental reviews for the comments are beyond the scope of this new vehicles and launch sites for which rule. Recommendations from the ii. § 450.47 Environmental Review cost savings were assessed. The FAA Airspace Access ARC, which included Several commenters stated that the notes it did not include offsetting costs commercial space and aviation industry proposed requirements would impose for new vehicles and launch sites representatives, may inform future added costs for which the FAA did not because the same costs for actions addressing aircraft protection. account. Space Florida expressed environmental reviews will be imposed

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under the current regulations. There iii. § 450.101(a)(b) Neighboring The alternative chosen by the FAA will be no change in costs. Operations provides cost savings compared to the Spaceport Strategies commented that current regulations, and the FAA the FAA’s re-write of environmental Virgin Orbit believed the costs of the believes that this approach is consistent review requirements was more than a additional EC analysis to use in with the intent of SPD–2. The FAA simple ‘‘consolidation’’ as reported in determination of neighboring operations acknowledges that other approaches the Preliminary Regulatory Impact personnel would be $10,000. As exist, and considered three alternatives Assessment. The commenter stated that discussed in the preamble section for that are discussed in the Regulatory the proposed requirements had Neighboring Operations Personnel, the Flexibility Act section of this preamble. unquantified cost impacts upon FAA acknowledges that this Spaceport Strategies commented that licensees, including State and local requirement will require additional the labor categories used to calculate launch site license applicants, for the analysis; however, the FAA expects that neighboring operations personnel additive costs of repetitive or redundant this analysis will involve minor savings (engineers and technicians) did environmental reviews. additional effort because the operator not align with the restricted categories As discussed in the Environmental already has to perform a similar analysis of work functions allowed to remain Review section of this preamble, the for the public and will only need to (such as personnel required for safety, final rule codifies existing account for the population of security, or critical tasks), indicating environmental review requirements. neighboring operations personnel, if that the FAA’s savings estimates may The commenter did not identify the any. not actually be realized. environmental reviews it deems Blue Origin expressed concern that The FAA received input from repetitive or redundant. However, the the FAA might implement a licensed operators on the labor FAA confirms that in codifying existing requirement for which compliance categories that might be allowed to practice, the final rule will not impose would be impossible, or would lead to remain on the launch site and, based on additional costs for environmental the creation of a sole source provider for that input, is confident that these are review. a service necessary to demonstrate reasonable labor categories. Spaceport Strategies commented that compliance, if the FAA does not explain licensees would face significant costs to how the transfer of neighboring iv. § 450.101(a) Incorporate Waterborne redo environmental analyses for operations personnel population data Vessels Into Collective Risk Criteria previously studied and permitted sites. would take place. Sierra Nevada To incorporate waterborne vessels As an example, the commenter referred expressed concern regarding an into collective risk assessment, Virgin to Space Florida’s being required to applicant’s ability to perform Orbit requested the FAA and other spend almost $239,000 for another calculations to determine which regulators work with launch service environmental assessment for its neighboring operations personnel could providers by providing databases on Launch Site Operator License for remain on a launch site, because the global marine traffic. Virgin Orbit also horizontal launch at the former Shuttle applicant would need to get accurate requested guidance on debris size/ Landing Facility, when NASA had data regarding the populations and fragment velocities that would result in completed two previous environmental locations of neighboring operations. injury to marine traffic, in an appendix assessments on the same facility. Sierra Nevada pointed out that, because or AC. Virgin Orbit asserted that this The FAA notes this rule will impose data could be on personnel performing requirement is not found in the existing no additional environmental reviews operations for competing companies, regulations, and estimated that the nor require a redo of an environmental the data could be proprietary or additional cost to analyze and document assessment if an operator’s operation sensitive. Sierra Nevada suggested the the effort would be approximately remains within the scope of the original FAA could perform this function to $20,000 per launch, which would assessment. However, consistent with guard the proprietary nature of the data. become significant costs for a large NEPA, an operator will be required to number of launches. do additional environmental reviews if In the final rule, the FAA notes that The FAA does not agree that there the scope of its operation has changed. the Federal or licensed site operator will Spaceport Strategies commented that determine those personnel who are will be additional costs of any the FAA did not address environmental eligible for neighboring operations significance from the requirement to review regulations derived from personnel status in coordination with incorporate waterborne vessels into practices and policies being codified the launch operators, because the site collective risk criteria. The operator can into rules as potential federalism issues operator is in the best position to continue its current practice and with the State and local jurisdictions identify which personnel are required to demonstrate compliance in accordance that operate the part 420-licensed sites. perform safety, security, or critical tasks with the RCC 321–20 Supplement. The The commenter stated that the FAA also at the launch site. Further, as previously FAA does not find a need to provide did not consider that some, if not all, of discussed, both the launch or reentry databases on global marine traffic the local and State authorities are small operator and the neighboring site because there are several public sources governmental entities for purposes of operator benefit from this treatment of of data on ship traffic available through the Regulatory Flexibility Act. neighboring operations personnel. the internet which aggregate near real- The FAA determines that this rule Spaceport Strategies faults the FAA time Automatic Identification System 191 codifies existing requirements in FAA for not comparing the estimated (AIS) data from satellites and ground Order 1050.1 and will not affect the marginal productivity improvement stations. The FAA notes that all vessels applicability of NEPA or any other created by allowing certain personnel of over 300 tons on an international Federal environmental law to non- neighboring operators to remain at work voyage, all domestic vessels over 500 Federal launch or reentry sites. during nearby operations with adverse tons, and all passenger carriers, are Therefore, the FAA finds that the final schedule and competitiveness losses if 191 AIS is a standardized maritime navigation rule will not have an additional cost the FAA did not adopt the alternative safety communications system that provides vessel impact on small governmental approaches suggested by the ARC and information automatically to appropriately jurisdictions. CSF. equipped shore stations, other ships, and aircraft.

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required to operate ‘‘Class A’’ AIS demonstrate that the risk level to an FAA’s Preliminary Regulatory Impact transponders, broadcasting continually- individual does not exceed 1 × 10¥6 Analysis, which identified no costs updated data, such as identity, position, probability of casualty per mission. The associated with its implementation. As course, speed, ship characteristics, part 431 requirement is equivalent to proposed, this requirement would apply cargo, and voyage information, to other the corresponding part 450 requirement, to all licensed launches and reentries vessels and the shore. The United States which requires that the probability of wherever they may occur, at any site in Coast Guard requires AIS Class A impact with debris capable of causing a the United States. The commenter noted transponders on all U.S. vessels engaged casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 × that in the Baseline Analysis of the cost in commercial service that are (1) self- 10¥6. Because people in aircraft are not impacts and cost savings of proposed propelled and over 65 feet in length, or excluded from the part 431 requirement, § 450.101, the FAA claimed no cost (2) towing vessels of 26 feet or more in part 450 is not adding a new impact for a new requirement that length and more than 600 horsepower. requirement to demonstrate risk level clearly would add cost burden to every The USCG also requires AIS Class B for aircraft. In addition, § 417.107(b)(4) licensee, as well as to the FAA itself. transponders on smaller vessels, such as is identical to the requirement in The FAA notes that under the final fishing industry vessels.192 Detection of § 450.101(a)(3). Part 450 does not rule the U.S. Government will perform smaller vessels, which tend to remain require a collective risk assessment for the identification and analysis of critical close to shore, can be accomplished aircraft, so aircraft traffic densities, data assets. The FAA expects these costs to without AIS by fixed ground-based and on civil and general aircraft, and be relatively small. The Federal launch ship-board radar, as well as surveillance predicted air traffic, are not necessary. or reentry site will perform the analysis aircraft. The FAA will publish an AC on for launch or reentry operations from vi. § 450.101(a)(4) Critical Assets population exposure analyses that Federal sites, and the FAA will perform includes details about available Blue Origin commented that because the analysis for operations from non- databases that provide valid data on operators on non-Federal launch or Federal launch or reentry sites. ship traffic, including near real-time reentry sites would be required to Therefore, operators should incur no ship traffic useful for EC analyses. The comply with USAF Federal site costs for determination of critical assets. forthcoming RCC 321 Supplement will requirements, the FAA would need either to confirm it had considered vii. § 450.101(c) High Consequence also include this information. Event Protection The ship probability of impact private and licensed spaceports in its contours (PI) and individual risk cost assessment and that those operators Spaceport Strategies stated that the contours are already required and would not need to complete any critical proposed requirement to use the CEC computed based on current practice to asset analyses, or to confirm they were analysis tool would be prohibitively establish ship hazard areas. The FAA not included. The commenter also expensive—even technologically Office of Commercial Space stated that it was possible the new infeasible—to use, and faulted the Transportation will facilitate access to requirement would impose costs for Preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis for not including these costs. The the ship traffic densities so that the EC operators not at Federal sites. contribution from ships can be Spaceport Florida voiced concern commenter also criticized the FAA for computed with a spreadsheet. about the creation of a new category of not including the costs for operators to property designated as a ‘‘critical asset,’’ learn the skills or contract for the v. § 450.101(a)(3) Aircraft Risk which would be required to be analysis. In addition, they stated that Virgin Orbit commented on the protected against ‘‘loss of functionality’’ the FAA did not include its cost to hire proposed requirement for an operator to by prescribed risk criteria limiting each in-house personnel or contractor skills establish aircraft hazard areas necessary designated asset’s exposure to launch or to validate that the operator’s analysis to ensure the probability of impact with reentry hazards. The commenter justifies not needing an FSS. debris capable of causing a casualty for indicated concerns about extraordinary CSF found the CEC to be a new and aircraft does not exceed 1 × 10¥6. To analysis requirements, unknown costs, costly calculation that may require incorporate airborne vessels into the and program risks asking what limits significant resources, including possible collective risk assessment, Virgin Orbit the types and numbers of assets that reliance on contracts for expensive requested FAA databases on civil and may be designated by multiple parties modeling capabilities. The commenter general aircraft, predicted air traffic, and within proximity to a licensed launch feared that meeting the CEC may result debris size and velocities that would activity. in substantial increase in cost to those result in aircraft casualties in order to Spaceport Strategies commented that operators currently able to show comply with this requirement. Virgin the FAA had not conducted certain compliance. Based on its understanding Orbit stated guidance on debris size and analyses. These included analyzing the of the proposed rule, CSF concluded fragment velocities could be added in an cost to a licensee to perform a risk that the majority, if not all, of the appendix or AC. Virgin Orbit indicated assessment on each FAA-identified operators would be captured by that this is a new requirement relative critical asset to be incorporated into a proposed § 450.145(a)(1) and would be to the existing regulations and estimated flight safety risk analysis, analyzing the required to implement an FSS of the that the additional cost to analyze and cost to identify critical assets to be highest reliability. CSF disagreed with document the effort would be $20,000 evaluated as a property at risk, and the FAA’s estimated FSS cost savings per launch. While not significant by analyzing operator time to process and indicated there would be cost itself, Virgin Orbit stated that the waivers required for an operator’s own increases. additional cost for a large number of critical assets or for an asset that may be Virgin Orbit stated that CEC, as a new launches becomes significant. at risk for a particular critical licensed requirement, would be burdensome to The FAA does not agree that this is activity. Spaceport Strategies expressed implement and would require changes a new requirement. Current part 431 concern that the proposed requirements to its in-house algorithm to compute regulations require an operator to duplicated existing standards imposed flight corridors with associated EC. by NASA and the USAF, and noted that According to Virgin Orbit, this new 192 USGC regulations regarding AIS are given in there was only brief mention of this burden would impact timelines for 33 CFR 164.46. newly proposed requirement in the future launches and would have

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significant costs to implement. The are included in the Regulatory Impact the vehicle. Rocket Lab pointed out that commenter recommended CEC be Analysis. this was overly burdensome. included as one method to determine Applicants using an FSS can use The FAA disagrees with the whether an FSS was needed and not as hazard containment or analysis of CEC commenters. The FAA is only a required calculation. The commenter as key criteria in the determination of concerned with ensuring consistency further noted that CEC, as proposed, flight safety limits. The cost to interpret between the assumptions used for any would be better suited in an AC. Blue CEC results for flight safety limit safety analysis and associated mitigation Origin described the proposed CEC as a development is expected (after the and hazard control measures. It is complicated analysis with debatable debris analysis is run) to reduce the industry practice to review post-flight accuracy. Several commenters disagreed costs nominally compared to existing data to address vehicle reliability and with the FAA’s conclusion that this new containment approaches. mission success. ‘‘consequence risk’’ methodology Using its CEC tool, ACTA, under The FAA further notes that current aligned with current practices. contract to the FAA, has identified regulations already require that any Rocket Lab explained that, because several launches in the launch forecast representation contained in the license that will not need an FSS. The application that is material to public proposed CEC disregarded demonstrated reliability and experience, it appeared Regulatory Impact Analysis includes health and safety or the safety of almost impossible for any orbital launch more information on these launches, as property be kept accurate and complete, well as an updated estimate of cost therefore any additional burden from vehicle to meet the prescribed CEC thresholds. Preliminary calculations savings anticipated because these § 450.103(d) will be minimal. Currently, suggested that the majority of orbital launches will not need an FSS. operators review the post-flight data The FAA notes that any operator that launch vehicle operators would be because it provides valuable agrees to have a § 450.145-compliant directed toward a flight abort system of information on future operations. At a FSS does not have to do a CE analysis the highest prescribed reliability. C minimum, in the final rule, to determine the required reliability § 450.103(d)(1) will require that an The FAA does not agree that the cost level of the FSS. However, a CEC operator employ a process for evaluating to use CEC is prohibitive or that Virgin analysis may still be needed to post-flight data to ensure consistency Orbit will be required to make determine the flight safety limits. As between the assumptions used for the significant changes to its in-house discussed in the High Consequence hazard control strategy determination, algorithm. Additional costs associated Event Protection preamble section, the any hazard or FSA, and associated with modifications of analysis tools, final rule now has a number of mitigation and hazard control measures. adjustments to data development, flexibilities in § 450.101(c). With respect to § 450.103(d), the FAA additional analysis runtime, and Nevertheless, an operator could opt to will evaluate the post-flight data review interpretation of the results as detailed use the flight safety limits approach in process during the application below, should not be significant. current § 417.213 as a means of evaluation. Applicants will not be The modification of existing analysis compliance with § 450.108(5), and thus required to provide information tools is expected to take only a few avoid any costs associated with CEC obtained from the post-flight data hours. As explained earlier, CEC is analysis. review to the FAA unless specifically inherent in the calculation of total requested to do so during the casualty expectation. If the capability to viii. System Safety Program, Post-Flight Data Review, Post-Flight Reporting compliance monitoring process. The output the CEC values is not already part FAA finds that it has always been the of the calculation tool, adding the CSF disagreed with the FAA’s operator’s responsibility to ensure the output of this value for each scenario rationale that any added burden of this accuracy of the relevant safety analyses. should require no more than a few section would be minimal because Operators must review flight data in hours of effort. This estimate is included industry practice was to review post- order to ensure that the operation is in the Regulatory Impact Analysis for flight data for reliability and mission conducted as predicted, and to inform those operators who choose to do the success. CSF maintained that the necessary safety analysis changes for analysis. proposed post-flight data requirement future flights. Because the CEC metric is more extended beyond industry practice. The Section 450.215 will continue to sensitive to the input data and to commenter also stated that it was not require licensees to submit a post-flight numerical sampling approaches than clear whether the process for evaluating report no later than 90 days after an the collective EC metric, more rigor post-flight data would be subject to FAA operation if there are any anomalies in needs to be applied to the analysis or review and approval, which would the flight environment material to more uncertainty accepted in the result. create an even larger burden. Sierra public health and safety and the safety Some data development may need to be Nevada also commented that the of property, and if there is a need for of higher fidelity and more computation proposed requirements extended associated corrective actions. This samples run to achieve a statistically beyond the industry practice of practice is currently required by meaningful answer. Therefore, the FAA reviewing post-flight data for reliability § 417.25(c). While RLV operators finds there will be additional cost to and mission success, to requiring an licensed under part 431 are not perform the analysis. To comply with operator to develop and employ a currently required to submit a post- § 450.101(c), the operator first calculates process for evaluating post-flight data to flight report, they are required to ensure the CEC, assuming no FSS is present, to ensure consistency between the that all assumptions and representations determine whether flight abort with an assumptions used for preliminary safety made in their application that are FSS meeting the requirements of assessment, any flight hazard or FSA, material to public health and safety or § 450.108(b) is needed. These and associated mitigation and control the safety of property are kept accurate calculations will incur 5 percent of the measures. Rocket Lab and Sierra Nevada and complete, in accordance with debris analysis costs.193 These estimates stated the proposed § 450.103(d) would §§ 413.7 and 431.73(b)(2). As such, the require the operator to address any FAA expects the added burden to be 193 Debris cost analysis is estimated to cost anomaly identified and resolve minimal because launch and reentry $50,000. inconsistencies prior to the next flight of operators regularly track anomalies and

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implement corrective actions for performance-based objectives are the applicant’s analysis was already an mission assurance, continuing license elements of software development and expensive and burdensome aspect of the accuracy, and safety purposes. The FAA testing processes that enable an current rules that should be ended. A is normally made aware of any understanding of the public safety couple of commenters provided anomalies and corrective actions that implications of each software estimates of additional hours of work are material to public health and safety component, and the objectives are that might be required to conduct through its inspection program. structured to mirror typical software independent analyses. safety application data submissions to As mentioned previously, the goal is ix. § 450.141 (Proposed § 450.111) minimize or eliminate the need to adapt for the FAA to evaluate, in an efficient Computing Systems and Software existing software safety processes to fit and thorough manner, the validity of the Systems the new regulations. The final analysis. The FAA finds that conducting Several commenters expressed performance-based objectives expand an independent analysis is typically the concern that the NPRM proposed a the range of software safety approaches most efficient and thorough means to prescriptive approach to the software that could meet the regulation to enable verify compliance with the FSA hazard, which would impose a more innovation while keeping the requirements for novel launch or reentry significant burden on operators to meet compliance burden at or below the level operations or operators that propose to all of the proposed requirements and proposed in the NPRM. use substantially new FSA methods. structure. Furthermore, the FAA plans to provide An individual commenter estimated x. Proposed § 450.113(a)(5) Flight benchmarks for comparison purposes that changing the review process and Safety Analysis Requirements that operators can reference to as part of structure of software would require a Virgin Galactic commented that its the validation and verification of their substantial new effort and add costs of launch system had an FSS in the form analysis methods. over $40,000 per launch. Blue Origin of its pilot, rendering the need for Therefore, the FAA does not faulted the FAA for proposing overly ‘‘demonstrated reliability’’ unnecessary. anticipate this rule will impose an prescriptive regulations governing how In addition, unlike the ELVs addressed additional cost burden for independent the operator would design and test by part 417, Virgin Galactic’s launch analyses because conducting software. Blue Origin also contended system does not have a large effective independent analyses is current that the prescriptive proposed casualty area, which raised the question practice. requirements did not integrate well with of whether the risks truly justified the xi. § 450.135 Debris Risk Analysis most industry applications and best costs of the proposed requirement, practices and failed to address critical particularly to small businesses. An individual commenter indicated aspects of safety sufficiently for Under this rule, currently licensed that the proposed rule would add aeronautical databases, complex hybrid systems will not have to do an significant work in additional debris distributed software systems, new FSA for phases of flight that have a risk analysis beyond what the operator techniques, and machine learning. Blue flight history to demonstrate reliability was doing to comply with the current Origin indicated that these would based on operational and flight history regulations. The commenter specified threaten progress being made towards in lieu of a traditional risk analysis. This that the proposed rule would add safer, lower cost and higher quality allowance is discussed in greater detail requirements on explosive debris, toxic software approaches. CSF maintained in the Hybrid Vehicles section of the release effects from the debris, that the requirements of proposed preamble. accounting for sheltering of individual § 450.111 prescribing how the operator from buildings and vehicles, a casualty would design and test software, and xi. § 450.115 Flight Safety Analysis mode that included ricochet fragments, providing only one way to demonstrate Methods and impacts to critical assets. It would that software was safe, failed to allow CSF commented that prescriptive FSA also add reporting requirements for the development of new technologies that requirements are inappropriate for some top ten impacted population centers and could lead to safer solutions, and would vehicles and operations. An applicant the need to perform conditional greatly increase costs. Leo Aerospace would have to propose an alternative probability calculations in the FSA. stated that the testing requirements of method of compliance or submit a The FAA notes that an explosive proposed § 450.111(d)(2) and (f)(1) were waiver request, resulting in an increase debris or toxic release effects analysis so prescriptive that they would be cost- in the amount of work. The lack of tool- will not be required if the vehicle does prohibitive. availability might also cause some not have explosive debris and toxics. In the final rule, the FAA revises applicants to incur costs of performing Explosive debris or toxic release effects § 450.111 to mirror the typical structure these analyses themselves. CSF noted analysis are currently required for ELVs of computing system safety application these costs had not been included in the under § 417.107(b)(1) and for RLVs data submissions and adds flexibility in cost analysis. The FAA agrees that under § 431.35(b)(1)(ii), so the the means of compliance for key aspects prescriptive requirements are not requirement for those analyses under of safe computing system development. appropriate and revises the part 450 would not impose additional The FAA notes that these revisions requirements to be more performance- costs. The final rule requirements allow address the key aspects of commenters’ based. operators to determine how to conduct concerns. The final rule on computing their debris risk analysis. For example, and software systems, now located in x. Independent Analyses an operator will not need to update the § 450.141, aggregates the requirements CSF stated that the NPRM’s Flight debris risk analysis to account for in proposed § 450.111 into performance- Safety Analysis sections (proposed sheltering or ricochet if it uses a based objectives set in the context of the §§ 450.119 and 450.135) include conservative estimate of the casualty appropriateness of each element for the multiple references to an applicant area for people in the open pursuant to system as a whole. This aggregation submitting any additional products that § 450.101(g). Under the final rule, the removes any prescriptive requirements allow an independent analysis as FAA or Federal launch or reentry site and replaces them with the requested by the Administrator. CSF will do any critical asset risk performance-based objectives. The stated that this behavior of recreating an assessment. The cost of the CEC

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assessment is addressed in the High whether the vehicles would fly from prohibitive, and increase the risk to the Consequence Event Protection preamble existing or newly licensed or private public. As clarified by the FAA in section. Reporting the top ten launch sites. It expressed that the ‘‘Answers to Clarifying Questions population centers is a minimal amount uncertainties made the projected Received by June 28, 2019’’ and of additional paperwork. savings an overstatement. ‘‘Answers to Clarifying Questions Received by July 29, 2019,’’ the term xii. § 450.143 Safety-Critical System The FAA disagrees that most, if not ‘‘all stages and components’’ does not Design, Test, and Documentation all, operators will be required to implement an FSS of the highest imply that all debris must be tracked to An individual commenter expressed reliability. For some launches, no FSS the ground after a vehicle breakup. In concern that the proposed rule would may be required; for others, an FSS will the final rule, the FAA replaces the constrain the design by prescribing fault be required, but not of the highest requirement to ‘‘determine the actual tolerance where an operational reliability. The FAA sponsored an impact locations’’ with the phrase, mitigation solution might exist, and analysis performed by ACTA 194 using a ‘‘predict the expected impact locations,’’ stated that this would result in a large 195 CEC model to evaluate selected in § 450.167. Hence, the FAA finds the burden. prospective launches and determine final rule requirements are consistent The FAA finds that industry those which would not need a FSS to be with current practice and thus incur no interpreted this regulation to be in compliance with part 450. The FAA additional costs. burdensome due to a misunderstanding then determined which of these xvi. § 450. 173 Mishap Plan— of the breadth of possible means of launches identified as not needing an compliance to the ‘‘fault-tolerant’’ Reporting, Response and Investigating FSS under part 450 would be required Requirements requirement in § 450.143(b). In the to employ an FSS under part 431 or NPRM, the FAA noted that while current practice. Based on cost input Sierra Nevada recommended redundancy was a currently prescribed received from industry on FSS costs, the removing the mishap plan requirement requirement for some safety-critical FAA then estimated cost savings due to to report debris impact points, including components, the intent of this the fact that some launches would not those outside a planned landing or requirement was to accept other need an FSS under part 450, as impact area as proposed in methods, including fail safety and determined by the ACTA analysis. The § 450.173(d)(3)(iv), this requirement damage tolerance for systems like cost savings calculations are in the would be burdensome, cost prohibitive, primary structures that could not be and not reasonable. Sierra Nevada stated Regulatory Impact Analysis. redundant. This flexibility permits that this burden would follow because operational restrictions, testing, and xiv. § 450.161 Control of Hazard Areas hazard areas are generated as probability inspection to factor into the design to CSF stated that, in cases in which the contours and not contours of total demonstrate that a system is fault- hazard area locations were in extremely containment. The commenter further tolerant. The FAA resolves these remote locations or significant distances stated it was realistic that, in the event concerns by revising § 450.143(b) to away from the launch and reentry site, of a breakup scenario, debris would allow for other means of compliance. it was unreasonable for cost and exist outside the hazard area but not at xiii. § 450.145 Flight Safety System logistics reasons to expect that a a high enough probability to warrant commercial company could provide segregation. Several commenters took issue with The FAA notes that the requirement such surveillance. The FAA notes that the FAA’s assessment of cost savings to report hazardous debris impact points § 450.161 only requires surveillance to associated with the new approach to is consistent with the current 5-day the extent necessary to ensure FSS implementation. CSF disagreed reporting requirements for ELVs. It is there would be cost savings and compliance with § 450.101. Hence, not the FAA’s intent to require tracking expressed that the majority of operators surveillance will be unnecessary in and surveillance for every possible would be required to implement an FSS extremely remote locations. piece of debris in off-nominal scenarios. of the highest reliability. CSF concluded xv. § 450.167 Tracking However, based on the vehicle’s last- that the result would be significant known state vector, an operator should Sierra Nevada expressed that, as increases in cost and oversight burdens be able to calculate approximate written, the proposed rule seemed to to every operator not already operating hazardous debris impact points, imply that tracking would be required at a U.S. Federal site that has not yet including those points outside a for every possible piece of debris in off- implemented a RCC 319–4-compliant planned landing site or designated nominal scenarios. Sierra Nevada noted FSS. Rocket Lab stated that preliminary hazard area. The FAA will consider an this would be burdensome, cost calculations suggested that the majority event that results in hazardous debris of orbital launch vehicle operators impact points outside a planned landing 194 ACTA, LLC is a risk management company would be directed toward a flight abort that evaluates safety hazards and risks from space site or designated hazard area as a system of the highest prescribed launch vehicle debris, blast, fire, and toxic gases. mishap. Considering the potential reliability. Blue Origin stated that most, The FAA sponsored ACTA to perform a series of increased risk to public safety resulting if not all, operators (whether smaller tasks to investigate the potential conditional risks from hazardous debris impacts outside associated with past and foreseeable launch suborbital launch vehicles operating in operations. The study provided an independent planned landing site or designated remote locations, or larger orbital evaluation of the potential for the CEC related hazard area, the FAA finds that this launch vehicles operating at Federal requirements in the NPRM to necessitate changes to requirement is reasonable and sites) would be forced down a path of current practice for more than a dozen missions necessary. involving large, medium, and small launch vehicles implementing an FSS that must comply from a wide variety sites. In addition to requiring submission of with an unmodified set of prescriptive 195 In selecting which launches to analyze, the a 5 day report in all mishap cases, there USAF requirements. Spaceport FAA analyzed those launches planned from remote might be some additional cost Strategies criticized the FAA’s analysis areas, suborbital and launches with a certain kind associated with submitting debris of upper stage. This is because orbital launches that of cost savings from launches not are not from remote areas are going to exceed the impact location data, which is not requiring an FSS as being speculative risk threshold of greater than 1 × 10¥3 conditional currently required under part 431. Part and not providing information on expected casualties for uncontrolled areas. 417 requires submission of this data

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only for debris that lands outside the requires agencies to analyze the • Incorporates additional data to impact limit lines. economic impact of regulatory changes update savings estimates for changes to The FAA does not agree that this on small entities. Third, the Trade an FSS. requirement will be costly or Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96–39 as • Updates data and analysis of unreasonable for the following reasons. amended) prohibits agencies from neighboring operations (number of First, the requirement has been changed setting standards that create personnel that evacuate) that decreased to require that only hazardous debris be unnecessary obstacles to the foreign savings. reported. Second, operators currently commerce of the United States. In • Updates wage data and adds/ must employ vehicle tracking for developing U.S. standards, the Trade clarifies small costs. normal flight. In the event of a vehicle Agreements Act requires agencies to Statement of Need breakup, operators should be able to consider international standards and, approximate any hazardous debris where appropriate, that they be the basis In 2018, DOT was directed by the impacts in relation to the designated of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded National Space Council and SPD–2 to landing site or hazard area, based on the Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. streamline the regulations governing vehicle’s last known state vector or 104–4) requires agencies to prepare a commercial space launch and reentry other tracking resources required for written assessment of the costs, benefits, licensing. The purpose of the final rule normal flight. In other words, this and other effects of proposed or final is to streamline and simplify the requirement will involve only minimal rules that include a Federal mandate licensing of launch and reentry costs because an operator can leverage likely to result in the expenditure by operations by relying on performance- vehicle tracking data it already collects State, local, or tribal governments, in the based regulations rather than in order to submit the debris impact aggregate, or by the private sector, of prescriptive regulations. This action location data. In addition, the FAA $100 million or more annually (adjusted consolidates and revises multiple believes the operator will benefit from for inflation with base year of 1995). commercial space launch and reentry reporting this debris.196 The FAA has provided a more detailed regulations addressing licensing into a single regulatory part that states safety xvii. § 450.185 Ground Hazard Regulatory Impact Analysis of the objectives to be achieved for the launch Analysis benefits and costs of this final rule in the docket of this rulemaking. This of suborbital and orbital launch Virgin Galactic commented that the portion of the preamble summarizes the vehicles, and the reentry of reentry ground hazard analysis requirements findings of this analysis. vehicles. This action also enables proposed in the NPRM would represent In conducting these analyses, FAA flexible time frames, removes new requirements and a new cost has determined that this rule will unnecessarily burdensome ground burden, creating new work outside of its unleash economic benefits that will safety regulations, redefines when existing license. Virgin Galactic outweigh its costs. This rule is a launch begins to allow specified pre- requested that the FAA determine significant regulatory action, as defined flight operations prior to license whether a ground hazard analysis in section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, approval, and allows applicants to seek would be necessary for hybrid as it raises novel policy issues. This rule a license to launch from multiple sites. operators, in accordance with the is also significant under DOT’s This rule is necessary to reduce the Congressional direction that the FAA administrative procedure rule on need to file and process waivers, regulate only to the extent necessary. rulemaking at 49 CFR 5.13 for the same improve clarity of the regulations, and The FAA included estimated costs for reason. The rule will have a significant relieve unnecessary administrative and ground hazard analyses in the NPRM. economic impact on a substantial cost burdens on industry and the FAA. For the final rule, the FAA estimates number of small entities. It will not The intended effect of this action is to that 75 percent of operators will spend create unnecessary obstacles to the make commercial space transportation no more than 80 hours on the ground foreign commerce of the United States, regulations more efficient and effective, hazard and 25 percent of the operators and will not impose an unfunded while maintaining public safety. will spend no more than 160 hours mandate on State, local, or tribal (non-recurring one time per license). Affected Operators and Launches governments, or on the private sector. IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses At the time of writing based on FAA Changes to Regulatory Impact Analysis license data, the FAA estimates this rule A. Regulatory Evaluation Since the Proposed Rule will affect 12 operators that have an Changes to Federal regulations must The FAA updates its analysis for active license or permit to conduct undergo several economic analyses. changes incorporated in the final rule launch or reentry operations. In First, Executive Order 12866 and and additional information and data addition, the FAA estimates this rule Executive Order 13563 direct that each identified during the comment period. will affect approximately 672 to 800 Federal agency shall propose or adopt a The following is a summary of these launches over the next 10 years, with a regulation only upon a reasoned changes (see the Regulatory Impact base or primary estimate of 197 determination that the benefits of the Analysis available in the docket for approximately 737 launches. The intended regulation justify its costs. In additional discussion and detail). addition, DOT rulemaking procedures • 197 Based on historical launch data from the FAA Changes period of analysis from 5 Office of Commercial Space Transportation and the in Subpart B of 49 CFR part 5 instruct to 10 years to capture the effects of a 2020 FAA Aerospace Forecast (https:// DOT agencies to issue a regulation upon five-year compliance period and www.faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_ _ _ _ a reasoned determination that benefits recurring impacts of the rule. forecasts/media/FY2020-40 FAA Aerospace exceed costs. Second, the Regulatory • Forecast.pdf). See the Regulatory Impact Analysis Provides a range of net impacts of this rule in the docket for more information. The Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) from low to high based on launch FAA acknowledges that there is uncertainty forecast that includes base, low, and estimating future launches over a 10-year period 196 The debris data reported can be valuable in high scenarios. The FAA uses the base since industry is expanding and planning for more assessing the current license representations to launches in the future given expected business and allow for adjustments to expand launch availability scenario as the primary estimate of the economic conditions. In addition, historical data or enhance the safety of operations. net impacts of this rule. Continued

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FAA anticipates this rule will reduce a three percent discount rate, the net reduce the number of personnel that the costs of current and future launch present value savings for the FAA is must evacuate and will enable operations by removing current about $2.3 million with annualized net operations that are more concurrent by prescriptive requirements that are often cost savings of about $0.27 million. accepting a small safety risk tradeoff. burdensome to comply with or require The largest quantified cost saving for The FAA has monetized the value of a waiver. The FAA expects these industry will result from eliminating or this small increased safety risk as changes will lead to more efficient modifying requirements for an FSS on summarized in the following tables. The launch operations and have a positive some launches: About $52.6 million in FAA estimates the present value of effect on expanding the number of present value savings over 10 years at a these small increased safety risks to be future launch and reentry operations. seven percent discount rate or about about $0.16 million discounted at seven Summary of Impacts $66.6 million at a three percent discount percent or about $0.2 million rate. As previously discussed, the FAA discounted at three percent over ten The FAA bases the analysis of this will move from prescriptive FSS years. rule on a launch forecast that includes requirements to performance-based The FAA estimates some small costs base, low, and high scenarios. requirements. The rule will not require to industry that will assist both industry Accordingly, this analysis provides a all launch vehicles to have an FSS. and the FAA in the implementation of range of net impacts from low to high based on these forecast scenarios. The Launch vehicles that have a very low this final rule, such as providing FAA uses the base scenario as the probability of multiple casualties even if information to the FAA that other primary estimate of the net impacts of vehicle control fails will not be required agencies frequently request or this rule. to have as robust an FSS. In addition, performing one-time updates of flight For the primary estimate, over a 10- vehicles that have moderately low safety limit analyses and ground hazard year period of analysis, the rule will probability of casualty, even if vehicle analyses that will be used to determine result in present value net cost savings control fails, will not be required to performance-based means of 198 to industry of about $53.9 million at a have robust FSS. These performance- compliance that provide future savings. seven percent discount rate with based requirements will reduce costs for In addition, there may be additional annualized net cost savings of about some vehicle operators, especially for costs for the modification of existing $7.7 million. At a three percent discount small vehicles or those operating in licenses to benefit from the cost saving rate, the 10-year present value net cost remote locations. provisions of this final rule. The FAA savings to industry is about $68.3 The final rule will also generate will also incur small costs for payload million with annualized net cost savings another important area of quantified review, flight hazard analysis, ground of about $8.0 million. The rule will also savings by providing a new definition of hazard analysis, and the review of result in net present value savings for ‘‘neighboring operations personnel’’ and modifications to existing licenses. the FAA of about $1.7 million at a seven establishing new criteria for neighboring The following tables present a percent discount rate over the same launch site personnel for the purposes summary of the primary, low, and high period of analysis, with annualized net of risk and financial responsibility. The estimates of the quantified savings, cost savings of about $0.24 million. At change will allow affected operators to costs, and the net impacts of the rule.

SUMMARY OF 10-YEAR QUANTIFIED SAVINGS, COSTS AND NET IMPACTS—BASE SCENARIO OR PRIMARY ESTIMATE [Presented in thousands of dollars]

Industry Industry FAA FAA Impact present value present value present value present value (7%) (3%) (7%) (3%)

Cost Savings ...... $54,634.8 $69,193.0 $1,864.2 $2,468.3 Costs ...... ¥733.3 ¥872.2 ¥162.7 ¥199.6

Net Cost Savings ...... 53,901.5 68,320.7 1,701.5 2,268.7

Annualized Net Cost Savings ...... 7,674.4 8,009.3 242.3 266.0

Increased Safety Risks ...... ¥158.5 ¥197.3 ......

Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ...... 53,743.0 68,123.5 1,701.5 2,268.7

Annualized Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ...... 7,651.8 7,986.1 242.3 266.0 Notes: In this and the following tables, the sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding. Negative signs used to indicate costs and increased safety risks. Present value estimates provided at seven and three percent discount rates per OMB guidance.

SUMMARY OF 10-YEAR QUANTIFIED SAVINGS, COSTS AND NET IMPACTS—LOW SCENARIO [Presented in thousands of dollars]

Industry Industry FAA FAA Impact present value present value present value present value (7%) (3%) (7%) (3%)

Cost Savings ...... $44,274.1 $56,404.8 $1,850.3 $2,449.5

has shown that there is uncertainty and variation with the number of planned launches that result in 198 See discussion in the FSS preamble section. actual launches on annual basis.

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SUMMARY OF 10-YEAR QUANTIFIED SAVINGS, COSTS AND NET IMPACTS—LOW SCENARIO—Continued [Presented in thousands of dollars]

Industry Industry FAA FAA Impact present value present value present value present value (7%) (3%) (7%) (3%)

Costs ...... ¥695.3 ¥828.0 ¥146.8 ¥180.6

Net Cost Savings ...... 43,578.8 55,576.7 1,703.5 2,268.9

Annualized Net Cost Savings ...... 6,204.6 6,515.3 242.5 266.0

Increased Safety Risks ...... ¥143.8 ¥179.6 ......

Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ...... 43,435.0 55,397.2 1,703.5 2,268.9

Annualized Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ...... 6,184.2 6,494.2 242.5 266.0

SUMMARY OF 10-YEAR QUANTIFIED SAVINGS, COSTS AND NET IMPACTS—HIGH SCENARIO [Presented in thousands of dollars]

Industry Industry FAA FAA Impact present value present value present value present value (7%) (3%) (7%) (3%)

Cost Savings ...... $64,993.7 $81,979.8 $1,878.4 $2,487.5 Costs ...... ¥769.6 ¥914.8 ¥179.2 ¥219.4

Net Cost Savings ...... 64,224.1 81,065.0 1,699.3 2,268.1

Annualized Net Cost Savings ...... 9,144.1 9,503.3 241.9 265.9

Increased Safety Risks ...... ¥172.5 ¥214.3 ......

Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ...... 64,051.6 80,850.7 1,699.3 2,268.1

Annualized Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ...... 9,119.5 9,478.2 241.9 265.9

The following table summarizes the Regulatory Impact Analysis in the high estimates of quantified impacts by quantified impacts by provision docket for tables presenting low and provision category). category for the primary estimate (see

SUMMARY OF 10-YEAR QUANTIFIED SAVINGS, COSTS AND NET IMPACTS BY PROVISION BASE SCENARIO—PRIMARY ESTIMATE [Presented in thousands of dollars]

Industry Industry FAA FAA Provision category/impact present value present value present value present value (7%) (3%) (7%) (3%)

Waiver Avoidance: —Definition of ‘‘Launch’’ ...... $23.7 $32.1 $7.5 $10.1 —Waterborne Vessel Hazard Areas ...... 47.5 64.2 14.9 20.2 —Waiver for 48 Hour Readiness ...... 29.7 40.1 9.3 12.6 System Safety Program—Safety Official ...... 28.4 38.4 33.3 45.0 Duration of a Vehicle License ...... 36.6 49.4 76.1 102.8 Readiness—Elimination of pre-launch meeting 15 days prior ...... 860.7 1,169.5 155.9 211.8 Flight Safety System—Not required for all launches ...... 52,618.2 66,554.4 1,453.9 1,912.7 Flight Safety Analysis no longer required for hybrids ...... 34.4 46.7 4.4 6.0 Neighboring Operations * ...... 873.6 1,087.4 ...... Ground Hazard Analysis ...... 81.9 110.7 108.8 147.0

Total Cost Savings ...... 54,634.8 69,193.0 1,864.2 2,468.3

Payload Review and Determination ...... ¥52.5 ¥71.2 ¥54.0 ¥73.4 Safety criteria ...... ¥55.3 ¥64.1 ...... Flight Hazard Analysis ...... ¥56.9 ¥68.0 ¥15.9 ¥19.0 Flight Abort—Flight Safety Limits Constraint ...... 58.5 79.0 ...... Flight Safety Limit Analysis ...... ¥114.0 ¥143.3 ...... Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis ...... ¥2.9 ¥3.9 ...... Safety-Critical System Design ...... ¥19.3 ¥26.1 ...... Ground Hazard Analysis ...... ¥42.4 ¥57.3 ¥19.8 ¥26.8

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SUMMARY OF 10-YEAR QUANTIFIED SAVINGS, COSTS AND NET IMPACTS BY PROVISION BASE SCENARIO—PRIMARY ESTIMATE—Continued [Presented in thousands of dollars]

Industry Industry FAA FAA Provision category/impact present value present value present value present value (7%) (3%) (7%) (3%)

Waivers for Neighboring Operations Personnel ...... ¥171.5 ¥192.9 ¥54.0 ¥60.7 Modification Costs for Existing Licenses ...... ¥160.2 ¥166.4 ¥19.0 ¥19.8

Total Costs ...... ¥733.3 ¥872.2 ¥162.7 ¥199.6

Net Cost Savings ...... 53,901.5 68,320.7 1,701.5 2,268.7

Annualized Net Cost Savings ...... 7,674.4 8,009.3 242.3 266.0

Increased Safety Risks: Neighboring Operations * ...... ¥158.5 ¥197.3 ......

Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ...... 53,743.0 68,123.5 1,701.5 2,268.7

Annualized Net Cost Savings less Increased Safety Risks ...... 7,651.8 7,986.1 242.3 266.0 Table notes: The sum of individual items may not equal totals due to rounding. Negative signs used to indicate costs and increased safety risks in this table. Present value estimates are provided at seven and three percent discount rates per OMB guidance. * Changes to Neighboring Operations requirements result in net savings are less increased safety risks.

The FAA also expects industry will requirements that will reduce the future The following table summarizes some gain additional unquantified savings cost of innovation and improve the of the changes that will result in and benefits from the final rule, because efficiency and productivity of U.S. unquantified savings. the rule provides flexibility and commercial space transportation. scalability through performance-based

UNQUANTIFIED SAVINGS

Change Savings

Time Frames ...... The rule revises time frames in parts 404, 413, 414, 415, 417, 420, 431, 437, and 440 that may be burden- some for some operators. This will increase flexibility by allowing an operator the option to propose alter- native time frames that better suit its operations. Eligible time frames include preflight and post-flight re- porting among others listed in Appendix A to Part 404—Alternative Time Frames. Safety Element Approval ...... The rule removes the requirement in part 414 to publish in the Federal Register the criteria upon which safety element approvals were based. The purpose of this notification requirement was to make clear the criteria and standards the FAA used to assess a safety element, particularly when no clear regulatory re- quirement existed and there could be other potential users of the safety approval. However, the FAA finds that this requirement is unnecessary, and has potentially discouraged applications for safety ele- ment approvals due to concerns that proprietary data may be disclosed. The FAA anticipates that remov- ing this requirement will lead to increased use of safety element approvals, reducing industry burden, and potentially improving safety. Mishaps ...... The rule provides the following mishap-related enhancements, which will better tailor mishap responses. • Replaces current part 400 mishap related definitions with a consolidated mishap definition (stream- lines and reduces confusion). • Consolidates existing part 400 mishap/accident investigation and emergency response plan require- ments into a single part (streamlines and reduces confusion). • Exempts pre-coordinated test-induced property damage from being a mishap (removes need to con- sider test-induced property damages from mishap requirements and likely results in fewer investiga- tions of minor mishaps). • Eliminates the small $25,000 monetary threshold from the current mishap and accident investigation requirements potentially reducing the number of mishaps investigated that do not pose a threat to public safety. Minor damage that does not pose a threat to public safety can easily exceed the $25,000 monetary threshold, triggering potentially costly and burdensome notification, reporting, and investigation requirements. • Clarifies that a mishap is triggered by hazardous debris falling outside a planned landing site or des- ignated hazard area. As a result, non-hazardous debris, no matter where it falls, will not be consid- ered a mishap potentially avoiding unnecessary notification, reporting, and investigation require- ments. Toxics ...... The rule replaces part 417 toxic release hazard analysis requirements with performance-based regulations that will provide flexibility for operators to comply with the required risk criteria in varied and innovative ways for their ground operations. Lightning protection requirement ... The rule removes Appendix G to part 417, Natural and Triggered Lightning Flight Commit Criteria, and re- places it with the performance-based requirements. The current requirements are outdated, inflexible, overly conservative, and not explicitly applicable to RLVs and reentry vehicles.

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The FAA analyzed the impacts of this a substantial number of small entities subcontractors, suppliers, or service rule based on the best available data at and therefore has performed the providers to licensed launch or reentry the time of writing. The FAA following Final Regulatory Flexibility operators, both in regard to a particular acknowledges that there are Analysis in accordance with section event and in the activities of uncertainties with the savings and costs 604(a)(1)–(a)(6). neighboring operations not involved in of this rule given the variety of (1) A statement of the need for, and a particular licensed or permitted event. operators, locations of operations, and objectives of, the rule. The FAA finds these subcontractors, the scale and complexity of operations. The Department of Transportation suppliers, or service providers to In addition, there is uncertainty was directed by the National Space licensed launch and reentry operators regarding how operators holding an Council in February 2018, and SPD–2 to are not directly impacted by the rule. active license, or who have an accepted streamline the regulations governing The RFA requires an agency to perform license application, will choose to commercial space launch and reentry a regulatory flexibility analysis of small operate during the five-year compliance licensing. The goal of the streamlining entity impacts only when a rule directly period after the effective date of the rule rule is to create a single licensing regime regulates small entities. A commenter (i.e., choose to operate under part 450 or for expendable and reusable launch indicated that small State or local operate under the legacy parts 415 and vehicles and reentry vehicles. governmental jurisdictions might be 417 for expendable launch vehicles, part The purpose of the final rule is to affected by the rule and these were not 431 for reusable launch vehicles, and streamline and simplify the licensing of mentioned by the FAA in the RFA. The part 435 for reentry vehicles). Lastly, launch and reentry operations by commenter appeared to be referring to there is uncertainty in the range and relying on performance-based potential costs from environmental scope of future means of compliance, regulations rather than prescriptive review practices and policies now being since this rule replaces many regulations. This action consolidates codified into rules. The FAA addresses prescriptive regulations with and revises multiple commercial space concerns related to potential costs from performance-based rules, giving launch and reentry regulations this codification in the comment section industry greater flexibility to develop addressing licensing into a single of this preamble and finds that the means of compliance that meet their regulatory part that states safety potential costs are negligible. unique business objectives while objectives to be achieved for the launch An individual commenter claimed maintaining public safety. All of these of suborbital and orbital expendable and several proposed new flight safety factors may result in variation of savings reusable launch vehicles, and the requirements would impose complex and costs for individual operators reentry of reentry vehicles. This action and costly risk analyses on small during and after the five-year also enables flexible time frames, entities, including the ‘‘consequence compliance period. As previously removes unnecessarily burdensome protection’’ requirement, the ‘‘critical discussed, the FAA will continue to ground safety regulations, redefines assets’’ risk assessment requirement, work with industry to identify when launch begins to allow specified and flight software requirements. Also, alternative means of compliance to pre-flight operations prior to license the commenter pointed out the provide future savings and efficiencies approval, and allows applicants to seek duplicative or conflicting rules among from this rule as industry continues to a license to launch from multiple sites. overlapping Federal jurisdictions as evolve. This rule is necessary to reduce the creating a barrier for small startups. need to file and process waivers, The FAA finds the costs of these B. Regulatory Flexibility Act improve clarity of the regulations, and critical asset and consequence The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 relieve administrative and cost burdens protection requirements will be small or (Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a on industry and the FAA. The intended nonexistent. Operators in remote principle of regulatory issuance that effect of this action is to make locations will likely be able to avoid the agencies shall endeavor, consistent with commercial space transportation higher costs of a highly reliable FSS by the objectives of the rule and of regulations more efficient and effective, demonstrating through a CEC analysis applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and while maintaining public safety. that the launch in question will not informational requirements to the scale (2) A statement of the significant exceed a certain risk threshold. The of the businesses, organizations, and issues raised by the public comments in initial CEC analysis under § 450.101 that governmental jurisdictions subject to response to the initial regulatory is estimated to cost $2,500 may relieve regulation. To achieve this principle, flexibility analysis, a statement of the some operators from the expense of any agencies are required to solicit and assessment of the agency of such issues, FSS. If a determination is made that an consider flexible regulatory proposals and a statement of any changes made in FSS is necessary, further analysis under and to explain the rationale for their the proposed rule as a result of such § 450.108 will be performed to actions to assure that such proposals are comments. determine the flight safety limits needed given serious consideration.’’ The RFA Commenters indicated that the FAA for the FSS. The FAA estimated the cost covers a wide-range of small entities, only identified two small entities that of the additional analysis to account for including small businesses, not-for- will be affected by the rule and left out CEC in the flight safety limit is $10,000. profit organizations, and small numerous small entities that will be Of course, an operator could avoid these governmental jurisdictions. affected. The FAA has reevaluated and analysis costs simply by choosing to use Agencies must perform a review to identified at least five small entities that a highly reliable FSS, but the FAA determine whether a proposed or final will be affected by the rule and assumes that an operator would not rule would have a significant economic indicates this fact in the description of perform these analyses if it expected impact on a substantial number of small small entities section in this Final that it would still need the most highly entities. If the determination is that it Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. reliable FSS. The worst case would be would, the agency must prepare a An individual commenter also noted that the operator would incur $12,500 in regulatory flexibility analysis as that beyond the small entities not costs but still need an FSS, just not a described in the RFA. addressed in the analysis as noted highly reliable FSS. The final rule also The FAA estimates this final rule will above, the FAA’s proposal would also allows an applicant to propose an have a significant economic impact on impact small companies that are alternative to CEC that would measure

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or mitigate the potential for a high (3) Paperwork submitted by legacy license requirements, it falls under the consequence event by use of other who would like to waive the higher authority delegated by the Act. safeguards. conditional expected casualty level for b. Alternatives Considered The identification of critical assets neighboring operations under the current regulations, or the new ground safety and the analysis to determine how to The FAA considered three requirements for RLV operators; and alternatives to the proposed rule. The protect the critical assets will be (4) Paperwork costs for those operators performed by the ranges for launches who modify their licenses in the first five FAA restates these alternatives below. from Federal sites and by the FAA for years to comply with the new regulations. The FAA did not receive comment convincing it that any of these launches from non-Federal sites. The paperwork costs are discussed in Therefore, small entities will not bear alternatives would be better than the more detail in the Paperwork Reduction rule it proposed and is now finalizing. these costs. Analysis section of this preamble. (3) The response of the agency to any (6) A description of the steps the i. No Change to Current Regulations comments filed by the Chief Counsel for agency has taken to minimize the This alternative was not chosen Advocacy of the Small Business significant economic impact on small because the current regulations are Administration in response to the entities consistent with the stated outdated, prescriptive, and do not proposed rule, and a detailed statement objectives of applicable statutes, adequately reflect industry current of any change made to the proposed including a statement of the factual, practices or technology development. rule in the final rule as a result of the policy, and legal reasons for selecting The inefficiency of the licensing process comments. the alternative adopted in the final rule due to current regulations risks stifling The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of and why each one of the other innovation and growth of the industry, the Small Business Administration did significant alternatives to the rule especially for small operators. not file comments in response to the considered by the agency which affect proposed rule. the impact on small entities was ii. Propose a More Process-Based (4) A description of and an estimate rejected. Regulatory Approach of the number of small entities to which With this alternative, the FAA would a. Factual, Policy, and Legal Reasons for the rule will apply or an explanation of have proposed less detailed regulations Selecting the Adopted Alternative why no such estimate is available. that would have relied primarily on the The FAA identifies at least five The Commercial Space Launch Act of outcome of an operator’s system safety licensees that would qualify as small 1984, as amended and re-codified at 51 process to protect public safety. The businesses. The rule will have a large U.S.C. 50901–50923 (the Act), FAA did not chose this alternative effect in terms of cost savings on some authorizes the Department of because it would have lacked regulatory of these small businesses. In addition to Transportation, and the FAA through clarity and hazard control flexibility. the five operators, there are two delegation, to oversee, license, and System safety process is one method to licensees that will be affected by the regulate commercial launch and reentry derive hazard controls; however, there rule that may fall under the small activities, and the operation of launch are other hazard control strategies that business threshold in terms of number and reentry sites as carried out by U.S. are more appropriate for some of employees, but they are subsidiaries citizens or within the United States. operations. Specifically, physical of large parent companies and therefore Section 50905 directs the FAA to containment, wind weighting, and, most are not considered small businesses. exercise this responsibility consistent importantly, flight abort are often (5) A description of the projected with public health and safety, safety of sufficient. Part 450 incorporates the reporting, recordkeeping, and other property, and the national security and flexibility of part 431, but acknowledges compliance requirements of the rule, foreign policy interests of the United the acceptability of other hazard control including an estimate of the classes of States. The FAA is authorized to strategies. Part 450 also builds on the small entities that will be subject to the regulate only to the extent necessary to precedent set by part 431’s limits on the requirement and the type of professional protect the public health and safety, foreseeable consequences of a failure in skills necessary for preparation of the safety of property, and national security terms of conditional expected casualties report or record. and foreign policy interests of the and establishes a less stringent The rule will result in a reduction in United States. In addition, section threshold.With this final rule, the FAA reporting requirements because there 50903 requires that the FAA encourage, declines to adopt this alternative. will be fewer requests for waivers to facilitate, and promote commercial iii. Propose a Defined Modular certain provisions, fewer requests to space launches and reentries by the Application Process modify licenses when a safety officer private sector. changes, and fewer licenses having to be This rulemaking streamlines and With this alternative, the FAA would issued because there will be extension increases flexibility in the FAA’s have proposed similar safety of RLV licenses up to five years. The commercial space regulations. This requirements but would have added a documentation accompanying a ground action consolidates and revises multiple more defined incremental or modular hazard analysis for ELV operators will regulatory parts to apply a single set of application process. The final rule be reduced due to change in launch licensing and safety regulations across enables an incremental application scope. several types of operations and vehicles. process, but does not define one with Some new requirements will result in It also replaces many prescriptive explicit modules and time frames. This additional reporting. This reporting regulations with performance-based alternative was not chosen because the includes the following: rules, giving industry greater flexibility FAA has no experience with an to develop means of compliance that incremental or modular application (1) Paperwork associated with payload review and determination, and safety criteria maximize their business objectives process with which to base a rule. In analyses; while maintaining an equivalent level of addition, a more defined incremental or (2) Paperwork resulting from the flight safety to the agency’s current modular application process may be less safety limits analysis and the far-field regulations. Because this rulemaking flexible and scalable and therefore more overpressure blast effects analysis; amends the FAA’s launch and reentry burdensome to small operators.

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The FAA expects this final rule will to perform a flight hazard analysis. RLV protection of safety, and does not provide regulatory relief to small operators currently do flight hazard operate in a manner that excludes entities from current prescriptive analyses, while ELV operators do not. imports that meet this objective. The requirements and result in net savings. To save the costs of an FSS, an ELV statute also requires consideration of Accordingly, the FAA declines to adopt operator will have to use another hazard international standards and, where this alternative. control strategy which will likely be a appropriate, that they serve as the basis flight hazard analysis. In the regulatory for U.S. standards. The FAA has c. Cost Savings to Small Entities impact analysis, two small businesses assessed the potential effect of this final The following sections identifies key have to perform a flight hazard analysis. rule and determined that it will not provisions of the rule that minimize However, the cost savings of not having create unnecessary obstacles to the impacts to and expand flexibilities for to have an FSS will far exceed the costs foreign commerce of the United States. small entities. of the flight hazard analysis. D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment i. Readiness—Elimination of Pre-Launch iii. Flight Abort (§ 450.108(d)) Flight Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Meeting 15 Days Prior (§ 450.155) Safety Limits Constraint Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) ELV operators might save $4,683 per Some operators will choose to do a requires each Federal agency to prepare avoided launch readiness meeting; CEC analysis voluntarily as part of the a written statement assessing the effects however, this assumes the average flight safety limits analysis so they can of any Federal mandate in a proposed or number of people at each meeting expand the area their flights can pass final agency rule that may result in an would be 25 and this might not apply through. These operators would only do expenditure of $100 million or more (in to a small business. this additional analysis if they expected 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, the benefit to exceed the cost. The local, and tribal governments, in the ii. Flight Safety System—Not Required aggregate, or by the private sector; such for All Launches (§ 450.145) estimated voluntary cost of $10,000 per license could be incurred by small a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant For launches for which an FSS would businesses. regulatory action.’’ The threshold after not be required under the proposal, ELV adjustment for inflation is $150 million operators might save $100,000 to iv. Far-Field Overpressure Blast Effects using the most current annual (2017) $680,000 per launch and RLV operators Analysis (§ 450.137) Implicit Price Deflator for Gross might save $20,000 per launch vehicle. Additional costs are $330 per Domestic Product from the U.S. Bureau ELV operators might save between application. of Economic Analysis. This final rule $479,000 and $1.4 million in non- does not contain such a mandate; recurring costs and RLV operators might v. Safety-Critical System Design therefore, the requirements of Title II of save approximately $375,000 for new (§ 450.143) the Act do not apply. FSS designs by not having to incur all Additional documentation costs are E. Paperwork Reduction Act the research, design, testing, materials, $1,649 per application. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and installation costs for an FSS. This vi. Ground Hazard Analysis (§ 450.185) is likely to benefit small operators (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the launching from remote sites. RLV applicants might incur about FAA consider the impact of paperwork $7,254 more per application due to and other information collection iii. Ground Hazard Analysis (§ 450.185) having to perform ground hazard burdens imposed on the public. An ELV operator might save analyses under the final rule. According to the 1995 amendments to approximately $28,026 per application As previously discussed, the FAA the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR by not having to do a ground hazard provides a compliance period of five 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not analysis under this final rule. years in the final rule for holders of collect or sponsor the collection of current licenses at the effective date of information, nor may it impose an d. Costs to Small Entities the final rule and those who have an information collection requirement, The following sections identify accepted application within 90 days of unless it displays a currently valid provisions of the rule that might result the effective date of the final rule. This Office of Management and Budget in additional costs for small entities. will give all businesses, including the (OMB) control number. However, the rule provides a small operators, more time to comply This action contains the following compliance period of five years for with the final rule. This will reduce the proposed consolidation of two existing holders of current licenses at the burden on small entities. information collection requirements, effective date of the final rule and those previously approved under OMB C. International Trade Impact Control Numbers 2120–0608 and 2120– who have an accepted application Assessment within 90 days of the effective date of 0643, under a new OMB control the final rule. This will provide small The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 number. As required by the Paperwork operators more time to comply with the (Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. final rule and will reduce costs. Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 3507(d)), the FAA will submit the L. 103–465), prohibits Federal agencies proposed information collection i. Payload Review and Determination from establishing standards or engaging requirements to OMB for its review. In (§ 450.43) in related activities that create addition, the FAA has published a The final rule could cause small unnecessary obstacles to the foreign separate notice of the proposed operators to incur about $206 more per commerce of the United States. requirements for public comment, and launch than due to additional payload Pursuant to these Acts, the has included the notice in the docket for review and determination costs. establishment of standards is not this rulemaking. The notice includes considered an unnecessary obstacle to instructions on how to submit ii. Flight Hazard Analysis (§ 450.107) the foreign commerce of the United comments specifically to the proposed Operators who do not need FSS, and States, if the standard has a legitimate information collection requirements. choose to operate without one, will have domestic objective, such as the Additional details on assumptions and

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calculations used in this section are to be more flexible and scalable, with to five years, it is likely that fewer presented in the Preliminary Regulatory reduced timelines and minimal licenses will be issued, resulting in less Impact Analysis available in the docket duplicative jurisdiction. The net result paperwork. Due to the change in launch of this rulemaking. The following will be reduced paperwork for scope, the documentation estimates are included in the total operators, although for some provisions accompanying a ground hazard analysis savings and costs summarized in the paperwork would increase. for ELV operators would be reduced. Regulatory Evaluation section and Use: The information would be used considered in the Regulatory Flexibility by FAA to evaluate the launch and Industry Cost Savings Determination section of this proposed reentry operators’ applications and to The following table indicates the rule. ensure safety. Because the FAA is allowing a five frequency of responses, the estimated year compliance period for existing Paperwork Impact to Industry time per response, the burdened wage operators holding a license under parts Respondents: The information rate, annual hours, and the cost for each 417, 431, or 435, OMB Control Numbers collection will potentially affect 12 cost saving provision. Response 2120–0608 and 2120–0643 will operators based on available data at the frequency is provided for the estimated continue to be renewed for five years. time of writing. number of waivers avoided (§ 450.3), After five years, all operators are Annual Burden Estimate: Most estimated reduction in annual number expected to comply with part 450 and changes in part 450 will result in a of licenses modified (§ 450.103), the new OMB number for collections. reduction in paperwork burden. The estimated reduction in annual license Summary: The FAA proposes to paperwork associated with industry renewals, and estimated annual number consolidate under a new part 450, the requesting waivers to certain provisions of launches for which there would be a requirements currently contained in will be alleviated. Paperwork associated reduction in ground hazard analysis parts 415 and 417 for the launch of an with industry requesting license paperwork (§ 450.185). An estimated ELV, in part 431 for the launch and modifications would also be reduced time for each response is also indicated reentry of an RLV, and in part 435 for because an operator will not have to below, as are burdened hourly wage the reentry of a reentry vehicle other modify a license if the specific safety rates for the specific personnel than an RLV. The result of this effort official were to change. In addition, associated with each provision and will be streamlined regulations designed with the extension of RLV licenses to up annual hours and total cost savings.

INDUSTRY PAPERWORK COST SAVINGS

Estimated Response time per Industry Annual Cost Description frequency response wage rate hours savings (hours)

Waiver Avoidance (§ 450.3) ...... 17 20 $101.52 340 $34,518 System Safety Program—Safety Official (§ 450.103) ...... 5.6 24 72.40 134.4 9,731 Duration of a Vehicle License (§ 450.7) ...... 1.2 126.5 82.43 151.8 12,513 Ground Hazard Analysis (§ 450.185) ...... 1 340 82.43 340 28,026

Total Annual Savings ...... 24.8 ...... 966 84,788

Cost savings includes paperwork potential of payload materials, alone requires RLVs to submit information to related to waivers avoided due to the and in combination with other materials the FAA. definition of ‘‘launch,’’ waterborne on the payload for launches, as well as The table below indicates the vessel protection, and removal of the 48- the appropriate transit time to final orbit frequency of responses, estimated time hour readiness requirement. for payloads with significant transit per response, burdened hourly wage rate, annual hours, and the cost for each Industry Paperwork Burden time after release from the vehicle. The FAA is adding requirements for ground provision that would add burden. An Other changes will result in an hazard analysis (§ 450.185) for RLV estimated time per response is also increase in paperwork burden. The launches. The provisions that will lead indicated below, as are burdened hourly Payload Review and Determination to additional paperwork burdens are wage rates for the specific personnel section (§ 450.43) adds requirements for listed in the table below. The final rule associated with each provision and applicants to provide explosive annual hours and total cost savings.

INDUSTRY PAPERWORK BURDEN

Estimated Response time per Industry Annual Description frequency response wage rate hours Cost (hours)

Explosive Potential (§ 450.43) ...... 82 2 $82.43 164 $13,519 Transit time (§ 450.43) ...... 82 0.5 82.43 41.0 3,380 Ground Hazard Analysis (§ 450.185) ...... 2 88 82.43 176 14,508 Safety criteria (§450.101(c)) ...... 4 60.66 82.43 80.88 6,667 Flight Hazard Analysis (§ 450.107) ...... 2 53 82.43 106.67 8,793 Flight Abort (§ 450.108(d)) Flight Safety Limits Constraint 2 121 82.43 242.63 20,000 Flight Safety Limit Analysis (§ 450.123) ...... 12 58 82.43 692 57,042 Far-field Overpressure Blast Effects Analysis (§ 450.137) .. 3 4 82.43 12 989

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INDUSTRY PAPERWORK BURDEN—Continued

Estimated Response time per Industry Annual Description frequency response wage rate hours Cost (hours)

Safety-Critical System Design ...... 4 20 82.43 80 6,594 Waivers for Neighboring Operations Personnel ...... 18.9 20 101.52 378 38,375 Modification Costs for Existing Licenses ...... 3 693 82.43 693 57,124 Records set up, record, archive ...... 82 4 89.72 328 29,429 Records retrieve and present ...... 1 8 74.15 8 593

Total Cost Burden ...... 298 ...... 3,002 257,012

The following table summarizes the savings, total annual paperwork burden industry total annual paperwork and the net annual paperwork savings.

INDUSTRY NET PAPERWORK SAVINGS

Description Annual hours Cost savings

Total Annual Savings ...... 966 $84,787 Total Annual Burden ...... 3,002 257,012

Net Annual Burden ...... 2,036 172,225

Paperwork Burden to the Federal receives burden relief from waivers will impose additional paperwork Government avoided due to the definition of burden to the FAA are detailed in the ‘‘launch,’’ waterborne vessel protection, tables below. See the Regulatory Impact The following tables summarizes FAA and removal of the 48-hour readiness Analysis available in the docket for paperwork savings and burden. Similar requirement. Other provisions the FAA more details on these estimates and to industry burden savings, the FAA receives relief from and provisions that calculations.

Estimated time Description per response FAA wage rate Annual hours Cost savings (hours)

FAA Paperwork Cost Savings

Waiver Avoidance (§ 450.3) ...... 7.5 $85.17 127.5 $10,859 System Safety Program—Safety Official (§ 450.103) ...... 24 84.79 134.4 11,396 Duration of a Vehicle License (§ 450.7) ...... 253.5 85.54 304.2 26,021 Ground Safety (§ 450.185) ...... 439 84.79 439 37,223

Total Annual Savings ...... 1,005 85,499

FAA Paperwork Burden

Explosive Potential (§ 450.43) ...... 2.0 84.79 164 13,906 Transit time (§ 450.43) ...... 0.5 84.79 41 3,476 Ground Safety (§ 450.185) ...... 40 84.79 80 6,783 Flight Hazard Analysis (§ 450.107) ...... 47 78.27 31 2,452 Waivers for Neighboring Operations Personnel ...... 8 85.17 142 12,094 Modification Costs for Existing Licenses ...... 80 84.79 80 6,783 Records retrieve and present ...... 20 84.79 20 1,696

Total Annual Burden ...... 558 47,191

FAA NET PAPERWORK SAVINGS

Description Annual hours Cost savings

Total Annual Savings ...... 1,005 $85,499 Total Annual Burden ...... 558 47,191

Net Annual Savings ...... 447 38,308

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Individuals and organizations may C. Executive Order 13211, Regulations Small Business Regulatory Enforcement send comments on the information That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Fairness Act collection requirement to the address Distribution, or Use The Small Business Regulatory listed in the ADDRESSES section at the The FAA analyzed this final rule Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of beginning of this preamble by March 10, under Executive Order 13211, ‘‘Actions 1996 requires FAA to comply with 2021. Comments also should be Concerning Regulations that small entity requests for information or submitted to the Office of Management Significantly Affect Energy Supply, advice about compliance with statutes and Budget, Office of Information and Distribution, or Use’’ (May 18, 2001). and regulations within its jurisdiction. Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk The agency has determined that it is not A small entity with questions regarding Officer for FAA, New Executive a ‘‘significant energy action’’ under the this document, may contact its local Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street executive order and it is not likely to FAA official, or the person listed under NW, Washington, DC 20053. have a significant adverse effect on the the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT supply, distribution, or use of energy. heading at the beginning of the F. International Compatibility preamble. To find out more about D. Executive Order 13609, International In keeping with U.S. obligations SBREFA on the internet, visit http:// Cooperation www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ under the Convention on International _ Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to Executive Order 13609, ‘‘Promoting rulemaking/sbre act/. conform to International Civil Aviation International Regulatory Cooperation,’’ List of Subjects Organization (ICAO) Standards and promotes international regulatory 14 CFR Part 401 Recommended Practices to the cooperation to meet shared challenges maximum extent practicable. The FAA involving health, safety, labor, security, Organization and functions has determined that there are no ICAO environmental, and other issues and to (Government agencies), Space Standards and Recommended Practices reduce, eliminate, or prevent Transportation and exploration. unnecessary differences in regulatory that correspond to these proposed 14 CFR Part 404 regulations. requirements. The FAA has analyzed this action under the policies and Administrative practice and G. Environmental Analysis agency responsibilities of Executive procedure, Space transportation and Order 13609, and has determined that exploration. FAA Order 1050.1 identifies FAA this action will not affect international actions that are categorically excluded regulatory cooperation. 14 CFR Part 413 from preparation of an environmental Confidential business information, VI. How To Obtain Additional assessment or environmental impact Space transportation and exploration. statement under the National Information 14 CFR Part 414 Environmental Policy Act in the Rulemaking Documents absence of extraordinary circumstances. Airspace, Aviation safety, Space The FAA has determined this An electronic copy of a rulemaking transportation and exploration. document may be obtained by using the rulemaking action qualifies for the internet— 14 CFR Part 415 categorical exclusion identified in FAA Order 1050.1 paragraph 5–6.6 and 1. Search the Federal eRulemaking Aviation safety, Environmental involves no extraordinary Portal at http://www.regulations.gov; protection, Space transportation and circumstances. 2. Visit the FAA’s Regulations and exploration. Policies web page at http:// 14 CFR Part 417 V. Executive Order Determinations www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting A. Executive Order 13771, Reducing 3. Access the Government Printing Office’s web page at http:// and recordkeeping requirements, Space Regulation and Controlling Regulatory transportation and exploration. Costs www.gpo.gov/fdsys/. Copies may also be obtained by 14 CFR Part 420 This final rule is considered an E.O. sending a request (identified by notice, Environmental protection, Reporting 13771 deregulatory action. Details on amendment, or docket number of this and recordkeeping requirements, Space the estimated cost savings of this final rulemaking) to the Federal Aviation transportation and exploration. rule can be found in the rule’s economic Administration, Office of Rulemaking, analysis. ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue SW, 14 CFR Part 431 Washington, DC 20591, or by calling B. Executive Order 13132, Federalism Aviation safety, Environmental (202) 267–9677. protection, Investigations, Reporting The FAA has analyzed this final rule Comments Submitted to the Docket and recordkeeping requirements, Space under the principles and criteria of transportation and exploration. Comments received may be viewed by Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism.’’ 14 CFR Part 435 The agency determined that this action going to http://www.regulations.gov and will not have a substantial direct effect following the online instructions to Aviation safety, Environmental on the States, or the relationship search the docket number for this protection, Investigations, Reporting between the Federal Government and action. Anyone may search the and recordkeeping requirements, Space the States, or on the distribution of electronic form of all comments transportation and exploration. received into any of the FAA’s dockets power and responsibilities among the by the name of the individual 14 CFR Part 437 various levels of government, and, submitting the comment (or signing the Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting therefore, does not have federalism comment, if submitted on behalf of an and recording keeping requirements, implications. association, business, labor union, etc.). Space transportation and exploration.

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14 CFR Part 440 includes all components needed to send vehicle sub-vehicle point. The term Indemnity payments, Insurance, a flight abort control signal to the on- downrange may also be used to indicate Reporting and recordkeeping board portion of a flight safety system. direction. requirements, Space transportation and Contingency abort means a flight Effective casualty area means the exploration. abort with a landing at a planned aggregate casualty area of each piece of location that has been designated in debris created by a vehicle failure at a 14 CFR Part 450 advance of vehicle flight. particular point on its trajectory. The Aircraft, Aviation safety, Countdown means the timed effective casualty area for each piece of Environmental protection, sequence of events that must take place debris is a modeling construct in which Investigations, Reporting and to initiate flight of a launch vehicle or the area within which 100 percent of the recordkeeping requirements, Space reentry of a reentry vehicle. population are assumed to be a casualty, transportation and exploration. Crew means any employee or and outside of which 100 percent of the In consideration of the foregoing, the independent contractor of a licensee, population are assumed not to be a Federal Aviation Administration transferee, or permittee, or of a casualty. amends chapter III for commercial space contractor or subcontractor of a licensee, Equivalent level of safety means an transportation rules of title 14, Code of transferee, or permittee, who performs approximately equal level of safety as Federal Regulations as follows: activities in the course of that determined by qualitative or employment or contract directly relating quantitative means. PART 401—ORGANIZATION AND to the launch, reentry, or other Expected casualty means the mean DEFINITIONS operation of or in a launch vehicle or number of casualties predicted to occur reentry vehicle that carries human per flight operation if the operation ■ 1. The authority citation for part 401 beings. A crew consists of flight crew were repeated many times. continues to read as follows: and any remote operator. Expendable launch vehicle means a Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50101–50923. Critical asset means an asset that is launch vehicle whose propulsive stages essential to the national interests of the are flown only once. ■ 2. Amend § 401.5 by revising the United States. Critical assets include Experimental permit or permit means introductory text to read as follows: property, facilities, or infrastructure an authorization by the FAA to a person § 401.5 Definitions. necessary for national security to launch or reenter a reusable For the purposes of parts 415, 417, purposes, high priority civil space suborbital rocket. 431, 435, 440, and 460 of this chapter, purposes, or assured access to space for Explosive debris means solid the following definitions apply: national priority missions. propellant fragments or other pieces of a vehicle or payload that result from * * * * * Critical payload means a payload and essential infrastructure directly breakup of the vehicle during flight and § 401.5 [Removed and Reserved] supporting such a payload that is a that explode upon impact with the ■ 3. Effective March 10, 2026, remove critical asset that: Earth’s surface and cause overpressure. and reserve § 401.5. (1) Is so costly or unique that it cannot Federal launch or reentry site means be readily replaced; or a launch or reentry site, from which ■ 4. Add § 401.7 to read as follows: (2) The time frame for its replacement launches routinely take place, that is § 401.7 Definitions. would adversely affect the national owned and operated by the government For the purposes of this chapter interests of the United States. of the United States. unless otherwise excepted, the Crossrange means the distance Flight abort means the process to limit following definitions apply: measured along a line whose direction or restrict the hazards to public safety, Act means 51 U.S.C Subtitle V, is either 90 degrees clockwise (right and the safety of property, presented by Programs Targeting Commercial crossrange) or counter-clockwise (left a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, Opportunities, chapter 509— crossrange) to the projection of a including any payload, while in flight Commercial Space Launch Activities, 51 vehicle’s planned nominal velocity by initiating and accomplishing a U.S.C. 50901–50923. vector azimuth onto a horizontal plane controlled ending to vehicle flight. Anomaly means any condition during tangent to the ellipsoidal Earth model at Flight abort rules means the licensed or permitted activity that the vehicle’s sub-vehicle point. The conditions under which a flight safety deviates from what is standard, normal, terms right crossrange and left system must abort the flight to ensure or expected, during the verification or crossrange may also be used to indicate compliance with the safety criteria in operation of a system, subsystem, direction. § 450.101. process, facility, or support equipment. Deorbit means the flight of a vehicle Flight crew means crew that is on Associate Administrator means the that begins with the final command to board a vehicle during a launch or Associate Administrator for Commercial commit to a perigee below 70 nautical reentry. Space Transportation, Federal Aviation miles (approximately 130 kilometers), Flight hazard area means any region Administration, or any person and ends when all vehicle components of land, sea, or air that must be designated by the Associate come to rest on the Earth. surveyed, publicized, controlled, or Administrator to exercise the authority Disposal means the return or attempt evacuated to ensure compliance with or discharge the responsibilities of the to return, purposefully, a launch vehicle the safety criteria in § 450.101. Associate Administrator. stage or component, not including a Flight safety limit means criteria to Casualty means serious injury or reentry vehicle, from Earth orbit to ensure that public safety and critical death. Earth, in a controlled manner. assets are protected from the flight of a Casualty area means the area Downrange means the distance vehicle when a flight safety system surrounding each potential debris or measured along a line whose direction functions properly. vehicle impact point where serious is parallel to the projection of a vehicle’s Flight safety system means a system injuries, or worse, can occur. planned nominal velocity vector used to implement flight abort. A flight Command control system means the azimuth into a horizontal plane tangent safety system includes any flight safety portion of a flight safety system that to the ellipsoidal Earth model at the system located on board a launch or

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reentry vehicle; any ground based Mishap means any event, or series of thermal vacuum, or other environments command control system; any support events associated with a licensed or relevant to system or material system, including telemetry subsystems permitted activity resulting in any of the degradation. and tracking subsystems, necessary to following: Operation hazard means a hazard support a flight abort decision; and the (1) A fatality or serious injury (as created by an operating environment or functions of any personnel who operate defined in 49 CFR 830.2); by an unsafe act. the flight safety system hardware or (2) A malfunction of a safety-critical Operation of a launch site means the software. system; conduct of approved safety operations at Hazard control means a preventative (3) A failure of the licensee’s or a permanent site to support the measure or mitigation put in place for permittee’s safety organization, safety launching of vehicles and payloads. systems or operations to reduce the operations, safety procedures; Operation of a reentry site means the severity of a hazard or the likelihood of (4) High risk, as determined by the conduct of safety operations at a the hazard occurring. FAA, of causing a serious or fatal injury permanent site on Earth at which a Hazardous debris means any object or to any space flight participant, crew, reentry vehicle and its payload, if any, substance capable of causing a casualty government astronaut, or member of the is intended to land. or loss of functionality to a critical asset. public; Operator means a holder of a license Hazardous debris includes inert debris (5) Substantial damage, as determined or permit under 51 U.S.C. Subtitle V, and explosive debris such as an intact by the FAA, to property not associated chapter 509. vehicle, vehicle fragments, any detached with licensed or permitted activity; Orbital insertion means the point at vehicle component whether intact or in (6) Unplanned substantial damage, as which a vehicle achieves a minimum fragments, payload, and any planned determined by the FAA, to property 70-nautical mile perigee based on a jettison bodies. associated with licensed or permitted computation that accounts for drag. Hazardous materials means activity; Payload means an object that a person hazardous materials as defined in 49 (7) Unplanned permanent loss of a undertakes to place in outer space by CFR 172.101. launch or reentry vehicle during means of a launch vehicle, including Instantaneous impact point means a licensed activity or permitted activity; components of the vehicle specifically predicted impact point, following thrust (8) The impact of hazardous debris designed or adapted for that object. termination of a vehicle. outside the planned landing site or Person means an individual or an Key flight safety event means a flight designated hazard area; or entity organized or existing under the activity that has an increased likelihood (9) Failure to complete a launch or laws of a State or country. of causing a failure compared with other reentry as planned as reported in Physical containment means a launch portions of flight. § 450.213(b). vehicle does not have sufficient energy Launch means to place or try to place Neighboring operations personnel for any hazards associated with its flight a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle and means those members of the public to reach the public or critical assets. any payload or human being from Earth located within a launch or reentry site, Physical electronic storage means a in a suborbital trajectory, in Earth orbit or an adjacent launch or reentry site, physical device that can store electronic in outer space, or otherwise in outer who are not associated with a specific documents and files including but not space, including activities involved in hazardous licensed or permitted limited to an optical disc, a memory the preparation of a launch vehicle or operation currently being conducted, card, a USB flash drive, or an external payload for launch, when those but are required to perform safety, hard drive. activities take place at a launch site in security, or critical tasks at the site and Pilot means a flight crew member who the United States. are notified of the operation. has the ability to control, in real time, Launch operator means a person who Nominal means, in reference to a launch or reentry vehicle’s flight path. conducts or who will conduct the launch vehicle performance, trajectory, Populated area means— launch of a launch vehicle and any or stage impact point, a launch vehicle (1) An outdoor location, structure, or payload. flight where all vehicle aerodynamic cluster of structures that may be Launch or reentry system means the parameters are as expected, all vehicle occupied by people; integrated set of subsystems, personnel, internal and external systems perform (2) Sections of roadways and products, and processes that, when exactly as planned, and there are no waterways that are frequented by combined, carries out a launch or external perturbing influences other automobile and boat traffic; or reentry. than atmospheric drag and gravity. (3) Agricultural lands, if routinely Launch site means the location on Normal flight means the flight of a occupied by field workers. Earth from which a launch takes place properly performing vehicle whose real- Probability of casualty means the (as defined in a license the Secretary time vacuum instantaneous impact likelihood that a person will suffer a issues or transfers under this chapter) point does not deviate from the nominal serious injury or worse, including a fatal and necessary facilities at that location. vacuum instantaneous impact point by injury, due to all hazards from an Launch vehicle means a vehicle built more than the sum of the wind effects operation at a specific location. to operate in, or place a payload in, and the three-sigma guidance and Public means, for a particular licensed outer space or a suborbital rocket. performance deviations in the uprange, or permitted launch or reentry, people Launch window means an approved downrange, left-crossrange, or right- that are not involved in supporting the period of time during which the flight crossrange directions. launch or reentry and includes those of a launch vehicle may be initiated. Normal trajectory means a trajectory people who may be located within the Liftoff means any motion of the that describes normal flight. launch or reentry site, such as visitors, launch vehicle with intention to initiate Operating environment means an individuals providing goods or services flight. environment that a launch or reentry not related to launch or reentry Limits of a useful mission means the vehicle component will experience processing or flight, and any other trajectory data or other parameters that during its lifecycle. Operating operator and its personnel. bound the performance of a useful environments include shock, vibration, Reenter; reentry means to return or mission, including flight azimuth limits. thermal cycle, acceleration, humidity, attempt to return, purposefully, a

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reentry vehicle and its payload or Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, transactions entered into by human being, if any, from Earth orbit or American Samoa, the United States management. Ownership of at least fifty- from outer space to Earth. Virgin Islands, Guam, and any other one percent of the equity in an entity by Reentry operator means a person commonwealth, territory, or possession persons described in paragraph (1) or (2) responsible for conducting the reentry of the United States. of this definition creates a rebuttable of a reentry vehicle as specified in a Suborbital rocket means a vehicle, presumption that such interest is license issued by the FAA. rocket-propelled in whole or in part, controlling. Reentry site means the location on intended for flight on a suborbital Uprange means the distance Earth where a reentry vehicle is trajectory, and the thrust of which is measured along a line that is 180 intended to return. It includes the area greater than its lift for the majority of degrees to the downrange direction. within three standard deviations of the the rocket-powered portion of its ascent. Useful mission means a mission that intended landing point (the predicted Suborbital trajectory means the can attain one or more objectives. three-sigma footprint). intentional flight path of a launch Validation means an evaluation to Reentry vehicle means a vehicle vehicle, reentry vehicle, or any portion determine that each safety measure designed to return from Earth orbit or thereof, whose vacuum instantaneous derived from a system safety process is outer space to Earth substantially intact. impact point does not leave the surface correct, complete, consistent, A reusable launch vehicle that is of the Earth. unambiguous, verifiable, and designed to return from Earth orbit or Sub-vehicle point means the location technically feasible. Validation ensures outer space to Earth substantially intact on an ellipsoidal Earth model where the that the right safety measure is is a reentry vehicle. normal to the ellipsoid passes through implemented, and that the safety Reentry window means an approved the vehicle’s center of gravity. measure is well understood. period of time during which the reentry System hazard means a hazard Verification means an evaluation to of a reentry vehicle may be initiated. associated with a system and generally determine that safety measures derived Remote operator means a crew exists even when no operation is from a system safety process are member who— occurring. effective and have been properly (1) Has the ability to control, in real Tether system means a device that implemented. Verification provides time, a launch or reentry vehicle’s flight contains launch vehicle hazards by measurable evidence that a safety path; and physically constraining a launch vehicle measure reduces risk to acceptable (2) Is not on board the controlled in flight to a specified range from its levels. vehicle. launch point. A tether system includes Wind weighting safety system means Reusable launch vehicle (RLV) means all components, from the tether’s point equipment, procedures, analysis and a launch vehicle that is designed to of attachment to the vehicle to a solid personnel functions used to determine return to Earth substantially intact and base, that experience load during a the launcher elevation and azimuth therefore may be launched more than tethered launch. settings that correct for wind effects that one time or that contains vehicle stages Toxic hazard area means a region on an unguided suborbital launch vehicle that may be recovered by a launch the Earth’s surface where toxic will experience during flight. operator for future use in the operation concentrations and durations may be Window closure means a period of of a substantially similar launch vehicle. greater than accepted toxic thresholds time when launch or reentry is not Risk means a measure that accounts for acute casualty, in the event of a permitted in order to avoid a collision for both the probability of occurrence of worst case release or maximum credible with an object in orbit. A window a hazardous event and the consequence release scenario during launch or closure may occur within a launch or of that event to persons or property. reentry. reentry window, may delay the start of Safety critical means essential to safe Uncontrolled area is an area of land a window, or terminate a window early. performance or operation. A safety- not controlled by a launch or reentry critical system, subsystem, component, operator, a launch or reentry site PART 404—REGULATIONS AND condition, event, operation, process, or operator, an adjacent site operator, or LICENSING REQUIREMENTS item, is one whose proper recognition, other entity by agreement. ■ control, performance, or tolerance, is Unguided suborbital launch vehicle 5. The authority citation for part 404 essential to ensuring public safety and means a suborbital rocket that does not continues to read as follows: the safety of property. contain active guidance or a directional Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. Service life means, for a safety-critical control system. ■ 6. Revise § 404.5 to read as follows: system component, the sum total of the United States citizen means: component’s storage life and operating (1) Any individual who is a citizen of § 404.5 Filing a petition for waiver. life. the United States; (a) A petition for waiver must be Sigma means a single standard (2) Any corporation, partnership, joint submitted at least 60 days before the deviation from a fixed value, such as a venture, association, or other entity proposed effective date of the waiver, mean. organized or existing under the laws of unless the Administrator agrees to a Software function means a collection the United States or any State; and different time frame in accordance with of computer code that implements a (3) Any corporation, partnership, joint § 404.15. requirement or performs an action. This venture, association, or other entity (b) The petition for waiver must includes firmware and operating which is organized or exists under the include: systems. laws of a foreign nation, if the (1) The specific section or sections of Space flight participant means an controlling interest in such entity is 14 CFR chapter III from which the individual, who is not crew, carried held by an individual or entity petitioner seeks relief; aboard a launch vehicle or reentry described in paragraph (1) or (2) of this (2) The extent of the relief sought and vehicle. definition. Controlling interest means the reason the relief is being sought; State and United States means, when ownership of an amount of equity in (3) The reason why granting the used in a geographical sense, the several such entity sufficient to direct request for relief is in the public interest States, the District of Columbia, the management of the entity or to void and will not jeopardize the public

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health and safety, safety of property, chapter III sections listed in Appendix health and safety, safety of property, and national security and foreign policy A to part 404. The request must be— and national security and foreign policy interests of the United States; and (1) Emailed to ASTApplications@ findings; (4) Any additional facts, views, and faa.gov in accordance with § 413.7; or (2) The FAA will provide its decision data available to the petitioner to (2) Mailed to the Federal Aviation in writing; and support the waiver request. Administration, Associate (3) The FAA may grant the request, Administrator for Commercial Space ■ deny the request, or grant an alternative 7. Add § 404.15 to read as follows: Transportation, Room 331, 800 time frame that differs from what was § 404.15 Alternative Time Frames. Independence Avenue SW, Washington, requested. DC 20591. Attention: Alternative Time (a) General. Unless otherwise ■ 8. Add appendix A to part 404 the Frame Request. read as follows: approved by the Administrator, an (c) Administrator review. The applicant, a licensee, a permittee, or a Administrator will review and make a Appendix A to Part 404—Alternative safety element approval holder must decision or grant a request for an Time Frames meet the time frames set forth in this alternative time frame as follows: A404.1 General chapter. (1) The FAA will conduct its review (b) Request to change a time frame. on a case-by-case basis, taking into Alternative time frames. This appendix lists the sections and corresponding An applicant, a licensee, a permittee, or account the complexity of the request, paragraphs in this chapter that provide the a safety element approval holder may the timeliness of the request, and eligible time frames for an applicant, file a written request to the FAA to whether the requested alternative allows licensee, permittee, or safety element propose an alternative time frame to any sufficient time for the FAA to conduct approval holder, as applicable, to request an of the time frames included in the its review and make the requisite public alternative time frame.

TABLE A404.1—ELIGIBLE TIME FRAMES

Sections Paragraphs

§ 404.5—Filing a petition for waiver ...... (a). § 413.23—License or permit renewal ...... (a). § 414.31—Safety element approval renewal ...... (a). § 420.57—Notifications ...... (d). § 437.89—Pre-flight reporting ...... (a), (b). § 440.15—Demonstration of compliance ...... (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(4). § 450.169—Launch and Reentry Collision Avoidance Analysis Requirements ...... (f)(1). § 450.213—Pre-flight reporting ...... (b), (c), (d), (e). § 450.215—Post-flight reporting ...... (a)

PART 413—APPLICATION § 413.1 Scope of this part. in its entirety, or a portion of an PROCEDURES (a) This part explains how to apply for application for incremental review and a license or experimental permit. These determination in accordance with ■ 9. The authority citation for part 413 procedures apply to all applications for § 450.33 of this chapter. obtaining a license or permit, continues to read as follows: (b) Use paragraphs (b)(1) through (7) transferring a license, and renewing a Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. in the following table to locate specific license or permit. In this part, the term ■ 10. Revise § 413.1 to read as follows: application means either an application requirements:

Subject Part

(1) Obtaining a Launch License (only applications accepted before June 8, 2021) ...... 415 (2) License to Operate a Launch Site ...... 420 (3) Launch and Reentry of a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) (only applications accepted before June 8, 2021) ...... 431 (4) License to Operate a Reentry Site ...... 433 (5) Reentry of a Reentry Vehicle other than a Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) (only applications accepted before June 8, 2021) 435 (6) Experimental Permits ...... 437 (7) Launch and Reentry License Requirements ...... 450

■ 11. Effective March 10, 2026, futher (b)(1) through (4) and removing § 413.1 Scope of this part. amend § 413.1 by revising paragraphs paragraphs (b)(5) through (7). * * * * * The revisions read read as follows: (b) * * *

Subject Part

(1) License to Operate a Launch Site ...... 420 (2) License to Operate a Reentry Site ...... 433 (3) Experimental Permits ...... 437 (4) Launch and Reentry License Requirements ...... 450

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■ 12. Amend § 413.7 by revising the determination in accordance with ■ 17. Effective March 10, 2026, § 413.23 section heading and paragraph (a)(3) to § 450.33, if the FAA does not make a is further amended by revising read as follows: decision in accordance with the time paragraphs (a) and (d) to read as follows: frame specified in 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1) § 413.7 Application submission. for an accepted license application or 51 § 413.23 License or permit renewal. (a) * * * U.S.C. 50906(a) for an accepted permit * * * * * (3) For an application submitted by application, the FAA informs the (a) Eligibility. A licensee or permittee email, an applicant must send the applicant, in writing, of any outstanding may apply to renew its license or permit application as an email attachment, or information needed to complete the by submitting to the FAA a written as a link to a secure server, to review, or of any issues that would application for renewal at least 90 days [email protected]. The affect the decision. before the license expires or at least 60 application and the email to which the ■ 15. Amend § 413.21 by revising days before the permit expires, unless application is attached or linked must pargraphs (b) and (c) to read as follows: the Administrator agrees to a different also satisfy the following criteria: time frame in accordance with § 404.15. (i) The email to which the application § 413.21 Denial of a license or permit * * * * * is attached or linked must be sent from application. (d) Renewal of license or permit. After an email address controlled by the * * * * * the FAA finishes its reviews, the FAA person who signed the application or by (b) If the FAA has denied an issues an order modifying the expiration an authorized representative of the application in its entirety, the applicant date of the license or permit. The FAA applicant; may either— may impose additional or revised terms (ii) The email must identify each (1) Attempt to correct any deficiencies and conditions necessary to protect document that is included as an identified and ask the FAA to public health and safety and the safety attachment or that is stored on a secure reconsider the revised application, in of property and to protect U.S. national server; and which case the FAA has 60 days or the security and foreign policy interests. (iii) The electronic files must be date- number of days remaining in the review * * * * * stamped and have version control period, whichever is greater, within ■ documentation. which to reconsider the decision; or 18. Revise part 414 to read as follows: (2) Request a hearing in accordance * * * * * PART 414—SAFETY ELEMENT with part 406 of this chapter, for the ■ 13. Amend § 413.11 by revising APPROVALS paragraph (a) to read as follows: purpose of showing why the application should not be denied. Sec. § 413.11 Acceptance of an application. (c) An applicant whose application is Subpart A—General * * * * * denied after reconsideration under (a) The FAA accepts the application paragraph (b)(1) of this section may 414.1 Scope 414.3 Definitions. and will initiate review; or request a hearing in accordance with paragraph (b)(2) of this section. 414.5 Applicability. * * * * * 414.7 Eligibility. ■ ■ 14. Revise § 413.15 to read as follows: 16. Amend § 413.23 by revising paragraphs (a) and (d) to read as follows: Subpart B—Application Procedures § 413.15 Review period. 414.9 Pre-application consultation. § 413.23 License or permit renewal. (a) Review period duration. Unless 414.11 Application. otherwise specified in this chapter, the * * * * * 414.13 Application separate from a vehicle (a) Eligibility. (1) A licensee or operator license application. FAA reviews and makes a license or 414.15 Application concurrent with vehicle permit determination on an accepted permittee may apply to renew its license or permit by submitting to the FAA a operator license application. application in accordance with the time 414.17 Confidentiality. frame specified in 51 U.S.C. 50905(a)(1). written application for renewal at least 414.19 Processing the initial application. The FAA will establish the time frame 90 days before the license expires or at 414.21 Maintaining the continued accuracy for any incremental review and least 60 days before the permit expires, of the initial application. unless the Administrator agrees to a determination with an applicant on a Subpart C—Safety Element Approval case-by-case basis during pre- different time frame in accordance with Review and Issuance § 404.15. application consultation. 414.23 Technical criteria for reviewing a (b) Review period tolled. If an (2) A request to renew a licensed under parts 415, 431, and 435 may be safety element approval application. accepted application does not provide 414.25 Terms and conditions for issuing a sufficient information to continue or granted with a non-standard duration so safety element approval; duration of a complete the reviews or evaluations as not to exceed March 10, 2026. safety element approval. required by this chapter for a license, * * * * * 414.27 Maintaining the continued accuracy permit, or incremental determination, or (d) Renewal of license or permit. After of the safety element approval an issue exists that would affect a the FAA finishes its reviews, the FAA application. 414.29 Safety element approval records. determination, the FAA notifies the issues an order modifying the expiration date of the license or permit. The FAA 414.31 Safety element approval renewal. applicant, in writing, and informs the 414.33 Safety element approval transfer. applicant of any information required to may impose additional or revised terms 414.35 Monitoring compliance with the complete the application. If the FAA and conditions necessary to protect terms and conditions of a safety element cannot review an accepted application public health and safety and the safety approval. because of lack of information or for any of property and to protect U.S. national 414.37 Modification, suspension, or other reason, the FAA will toll the security and foreign policy interests. revocation of a safety element approval. review period until the FAA receives The renewal period for a license issued Subpart D—Appeal Procedures under parts 415, 431, or 435 of this the information it needs or the applicant 414.41 Hearings in safety element approval resolves the issue. chapter cannot extend beyond March actions. (c) Notice. Except for applications 10, 2026. 414.43 Submissions; oral presentations in under incremental review and * * * * * safety element approval actions.

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414.45 Administrative law judge’s (1) A designer, manufacturer, or (i) The application must include a recommended decision in safety element operator of a launch or reentry vehicle cover letter that is printed on paper and approval actions. or component thereof; signed by the person who signed the Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. (2) The designer or developer of a application or by an authorized safety system or process; or representative of the applicant; Subpart A—General (3) Personnel who perform safety- (ii) The cover letter must identify each critical functions in conducting a document that is included on the § 414.1 Scope. licensed launch or reentry. physical electronic storage; and This part establishes procedures for (c) A safety element approval (iii) The physical electronic storage obtaining a safety element approval and applicant must have sufficient must be in a format such that its renewing and transferring an existing knowledge and expertise to show that contents cannot be altered. safety element approval. Safety element the design and operation of the safety (3) For an application submitted by approvals issued under this part may be element for which safety element email, an applicant must send the used to support the application review approval is sought qualify for a safety application as an email attachment, or for one or more vehicle operator license element approval. as a link to a secure server, to requests under other parts of this (d) Only the safety elements defined [email protected]. The chapter. under this part are eligible for a safety application and the email to which the element approval. application is attached must also satisfy § 414.3 Definitions. the following criteria: Safety element. For purposes of this Subpart B—Application Procedures (i) The email to which the application is attached must be sent from an email part, a safety element is any one of the § 414.9 Pre-application consultation. items or persons (personnel) listed in address controlled by the person who The applicant must consult with the paragraphs (1) and (2) of the definition signed the application or by an FAA before submitting an application. of ‘‘safety element approval’’ in this authorized representative of the Unless the applicant or the FAA section. applicant; and requests another form of consultation, (ii) The email must identify each Safety element approval. For consultation is oral discussion with the document that is included as an purposes of this part, a safety element FAA about the application process and attachment or that is stored on a secure approval is an FAA document the potential issues relevant to the server; and containing the FAA determination that FAA’s safety element approval decision. (iii) The electronic files must be date- one or more of the safety elements listed stamped and have version control § 414.11 Application. in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this documentation. definition, when used or employed An applicant may submit an (b) The application must identify the within a defined envelope, parameter, application for a safety element following basic information: or situation, will not jeopardize public approval in one of two ways: (1) Name and address of the health and safety or safety of property. (a) Separate from a vehicle operator applicant. A safety element approval may be license application in accordance with (2) Name, address, and telephone issued independent of a license, and § 414.13; or number of any person to whom does not confer any authority to conduct (b) Concurrent with a vehicle operator inquiries and correspondence should be activities for which a license is required license application in accordance with directed. under 14 CFR chapter III. A safety § 414.15. (3) Safety element as defined under element approval does not relieve its § 414.13 Application separate from a this part for which the applicant seeks holder of the duty to comply with all vehicle operator license application. a safety element approval. applicable requirements of law or (c) The application must contain the (a) An applicant must make an regulation that may apply to the following technical information: application in writing and in English. holder’s activities. (1) A Statement of Conformance letter, The applicant must file the application (1) Launch vehicle, reentry vehicle, describing the specific criteria the with the Federal Aviation applicant used to show the adequacy of safety system, process, service, or any Administration either by paper, by use identified component thereof; or the safety element for which a safety of physical electronic storage, or by element approval is sought, and (2) Qualified and trained personnel, email in the following manner: showing how the safety element performing a process or function related (1) For an application submitted on complies with the specific criteria. to licensed activities or vehicles. paper, an applicant must send two (2) The specific operating limits for copies of the application to the Federal § 414.5 Applicability. which the safety element approval is Aviation Administration, Associate sought. This part applies to an applicant that Administrator for Commercial Space (3) The following as applicable: wants to obtain a safety element Transportation, Room 331, 800 (i) Information and analyses required approval for any of the safety elements Independence Avenue SW, Washington, under this chapter that may be defined under this part and to persons DC 20591. Attention: Application applicable to demonstrating safe granted a safety element approval under Review. performance of the safety element for this part. Any person eligible under this (2) For an application submitted by which the safety element approval is part may apply to become the holder of use of physical electronic storage, the sought. a safety element approval. applicant must either mail the (ii) Engineering design and analyses application to the address specified in § 414.7 Eligibility. that show the adequacy of the proposed paragraph (a)(1) of this section or hand- safety element for its intended use, such (a) There is no citizenship deliver the application to an authorized that the use in a licensed launch or requirement to obtain a safety element FAA representative. The application reentry will not jeopardize public health approval. and the physical electronic storage or safety or the safety of property. (b) You may be eligible for a safety containing the application must also (iii) Relevant manufacturing element approval if you are— satisfy all of the following criteria: processes.

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(iv) Test and evaluation procedures. contains the identifying legend to the applicant must submit a written (v) Test results. data or information for which statement to the Associate (vi) Maintenance procedures. confidential treatment is sought. Administrator explaining the (vii) Personnel qualifications and (b) If the applicant requests circumstances and providing the new or training procedures. confidential treatment for previously corrected information. The revised (d) The application must be legibly submitted data or information, the FAA application must meet all requirements signed, dated, and certified as true, will honor that request to the extent under § 414.13 or § 414.15. complete, and accurate by one of the practicable in case of any prior following: distribution of the data or information. Subpart C—Safety Element Approval (1) For a corporation, an officer or (c) Data or information for which Review and Issuance other individual authorized to act for confidential treatment is requested or § 414.23 Technical criteria for reviewing a the corporation in licensing or safety data or information that qualifies for safety element approval application. element approval matters. exemption under section 552(b)(4) of (2) For a partnership or a sole title 5, U.S.C., will not be disclosed to The FAA will determine whether a proprietorship, a general partner or the public unless the Associate safety element is eligible for and may be proprietor, respectively. Administrator determines that issued a safety element approval. The (3) For a joint venture, association, or withholding the data or information is FAA will base its determination on other entity, an officer or other contrary to the public or national performance-based criteria, against individual duly authorized to act for the interest. which it may assess the effect on public joint venture, association, or other entity health and safety and on safety of in licensing matters. § 414.19 Processing the initial application. property, in the following hierarchy: (e) Failure to comply with any of the (a) The FAA will initially screen an (a) FAA or other appropriate Federal requirements set forth in this section is application to determine if the regulations. application is complete enough for the sufficient basis for denial of a safety (b) Government-developed or adopted element approval application. FAA to start the review. (b) After completing the initial standards. § 414.15 Application concurrent with screening, the FAA will inform the (c) Industry consensus performance- vehicle operator license application. applicant in writing of one of the based criteria or standard. (a) An applicant for a vehicle operator following: (d) Applicant-developed criteria. license may also identify one or more (1) The FAA accepts the application Applicant-developed criteria are sections of its application for which it and will begin the reviews or performance standards customized by seeks to obtain a safety element evaluations required for a safety element the manufacturer that intends to approval concurrently with a license. approval determination under this part. produce the system, system component, An applicant applying for a safety (2) The FAA rejects the application or part. The applicant-developed criteria element approval concurrently with a because it is incomplete or indefinite, must define— license must— making initiation of the reviews or (1) Design and minimum (1) Meet the applicable requirements evaluations required for a safety element performance; of part 450; approval determination under this part (2) Provide the information required inappropriate. (2) Quality assurance system in § 414.13(b)(3) and (c)(2) and (3); and (c) The written notice will state the requirements; (3) Specify the sections of the license reason(s) for rejection and corrective (3) Production acceptance test application that support the application actions necessary for the application to specifications; and for a safety element approval. be accepted. The FAA may return a (4) Continued operational safety (b) The scope of the safety element rejected application to the applicant or monitoring system characteristics. approval will be limited to what the may hold it until the applicant provides application supports. The technical more information. § 414.25 Terms and conditions for issuing criteria for reviewing a safety element (d) The applicant may withdraw, a safety element approval; duration of a safety element approval. submitted as part of a vehicle operator amend, or supplement an application license application are limited to the any time before the FAA makes a final (a) The FAA will issue a safety applicable requirements of part 450. determination on the safety element element approval to an applicant that approval application by making a meets all the requirements under this § 414.17 Confidentiality. written request to the Associate part. (a) To ensure confidentiality of data or Administrator. If the applicant amends (b) The scope of the safety element information in the application, the or supplements the initial application, approval will be limited by the scope of applicant must— the revised application must meet all the safety demonstration contained in (1) Send a written request with the the applicable requirements under this the application on which the FAA based application that trade secrets or part. the decision to grant the safety element proprietary commercial or financial data approval. be treated as confidential, and include § 414.21 Maintaining the continued in the request the specific time frame accuracy of the initial application. (c) The FAA will determine specific confidential treatment is required. The applicant is responsible for the terms and conditions of a safety element (2) Mark data or information that continuing accuracy and completeness approval individually, limiting the require confidentiality with an of information provided to the FAA as safety element approval to the scope for identifying legend, such as ‘‘Proprietary part of the safety element approval which it was approved. The terms and Information,’’ ‘‘Proprietary Commercial application. If at any time after conditions will include reporting Information,’’ ‘‘Trade Secret,’’ or submitting the application, requirements tailored to the individual ‘‘Confidential Treatment Requested.’’ circumstances occur that cause the safety element approval. Where this marking proves information to no longer be accurate and (d) A safety element approval is valid impracticable, attach a cover sheet that complete in any material respect, the for five years and may be renewed.

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§ 414.27 Maintaining the continued (d) Grant of safety element approval performed by a holder of a safety accuracy of the safety element approval renewal. If the FAA makes a favorable element approval or its contractor. The application. safety element approval determination, FAA may also inspect a safety element (a) The holder of a safety element the FAA issues an order that amends the approval process or service, including approval must ensure the continued expiration date of the safety element training programs and personnel accuracy and completeness of approval or issues a new safety element qualifications. representations contained in the safety approval. The FAA may impose added element approval application, on which or revised terms and conditions § 414.37 Modification, suspension, or revocation of a safety element approval. the approval was issued, for the entire necessary to protect public health and term of the safety element approval. safety and the safety of property. (a) The safety element approval (b) If any representation contained in (e) Written notice. The FAA will holder. The safety element approval the application that is material to public provide written notice to the applicant holder may submit an application to the health and safety or safety of property of its determination on the safety FAA to modify the terms and conditions ceases to be accurate and complete, the element approval renewal request. of the holder’s safety element approval. safety element approval holder must (f) Denial of a safety element approval The application must meet all the prepare and submit a revised renewal. If the FAA denies the renewal applicable requirements under this part. application according to § 414.13 or application, the applicant may correct The FAA will review and make a § 414.15 under this part. The safety any deficiency the FAA identified and determination on the application using element approval holder must point out request a reconsideration of the revised the same procedures under this part any part of the safety element approval application. The applicant also has the applicable to an initial safety element or the associated application that would right to appeal a denial as set forth in approval application. If the FAA denies be changed or affected by a proposed subpart D of this part. the request to modify a safety element modification. The FAA will review and approval, the holder may correct any make a determination on the revised § 414.33 Safety element approval transfer. deficiency the FAA identified and application under the terms of this part. (a) Only the FAA may approve a request reconsideration. The holder also transfer of a safety element approval. has the right to appeal a denial as set § 414.29 Safety element approval records. (b) Either the holder of a safety forth in subpart D of this part. The holder of a safety element element approval or the prospective (b) The FAA. If the FAA finds it is in approval must maintain all records transferee may request a safety element the interest of public health and safety, necessary to verify that the holder’s approval transfer. safety of property, or if the safety activities are consistent with the (c) Both the holder and prospective element approval holder fails to comply representations contained in the transferee must agree to the transfer. with any applicable requirements of this application for which the approval was (d) The person requesting the transfer part, any terms and conditions of the issued for the duration of the safety must submit a safety element approval safety element approval, or any other element approval plus one year. application according to § 414.13 or applicable requirement, the FAA may— § 414.15, must meet the applicable (1) Modify the terms and conditions § 414.31 Safety element approval renewal. requirements of this part, and may of the safety element approval; or (a) Eligibility. A holder of a safety incorporate by reference relevant (2) Suspend or revoke the safety element approval may apply to renew it portions of the initial application. element approval. by sending the FAA a written (e) The FAA will approve a transfer of (c) Effective date. Unless otherwise application at least 90 days before the a safety element approval only after all stated by the FAA, any modification, expiration date of the approval, unless the approvals and determinations suspension, or revocation of a safety the Administrator agrees to a different required under this chapter for a safety element approval under paragraph (b)— time frame in accordance with § 404.15. element approval have been met. In (1) Takes effect immediately; and (b) Application. (1) A safety element conducting reviews and issuing (2) Continues in effect during any approval renewal application must meet approvals and determinations, the FAA reconsideration or appeal of such action all the requirements under § 414.13 or may incorporate by reference any under this part. § 414.15. findings made part of the record to (d) Notification and right to appeal. If (2) The application may incorporate support the initial safety element the FAA determines it is necessary to by reference information provided as approval determination. The FAA may modify, suspend, or revoke a safety part of the application for the expiring modify the terms and conditions of a element approval, we will notify the safety element approval or any safety element approval to reflect any safety element approval holder in modification to that approval. changes necessary because of a safety writing. If the holder disagrees with the (3) Any proposed changes in the element approval transfer. FAA’s determination, the holder may conduct of a safety element for which (f) The FAA will provide written correct any deficiency the FAA the FAA has issued a safety element notice to the person requesting the identified and request a reconsideration approval must be described and must safety element approval transfer of our of the determination. The applicant also include any added information determination. has the right to appeal the necessary to support the fitness of the determination as set forth in subpart D proposed changes to meet the criteria § 414.35 Monitoring compliance with the of this part. upon which the FAA evaluated the terms and conditions of a safety element safety element approval application. approval. Subpart D—Appeal Procedures (c) Review of application. The FAA Each holder of a safety element conducts the reviews required under approval must allow access by, and § 414.41 Hearings in safety element this part to determine whether the safety cooperate with, Federal officers or approval actions. element approval may be renewed. We employees or other individuals (a) The FAA will give the safety may incorporate by reference any authorized by the Associate element approval applicant or holder, as findings that are part of the record for Administrator to inspect manufacturing, appropriate, written notice stating the the expiring safety element approval. production, testing, or assembly reason for issuing a denial or for

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modifying, suspending, or revoking a ■ 22. Add § 415.2 to read as follows: of this chapter contain requirements for safety element approval under this part. preparing a license application to (b) A safety element approval § 415.2 Licenses issued under this part. conduct a launch, including information applicant or holder is entitled to a (a) Definitions. For the purposes of reviewed by the FAA to conduct a determination on the record after an this part, the definitions of § 401.5 of policy, safety, payload, and opportunity for a hearing. this chapter apply. environmental review, and a payload (b) Compliance with part 450 of this determination § 414.43 Submissions; oral presentations chapter. Operations under this part (b) Applicability. (1) The in safety element approval actions. must comply with launch and reentry administrative requirements for filing (a) Determinations in safety element collision avoidance requirements in material with the FAA in subpart A of approval actions under this part will be § 450.169 of this chapter and critical this part apply to all licensed launches made on the basis of written asset protection requirements in from a Federal launch range or a non- submissions unless the administrative §§ 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) of this Federal launch site, except where noted. law judge, on petition or on their own chapter. (2) The safety requirements of initiative, determines that an oral ■ 23. Amend § 415.3 by adding subparts B through E of this part apply presentation is required. paragraph (c) to read as follows: to all licensed launches of expendable (b) Submissions must include a launch vehicles. See paragraph (d) of detailed exposition of the evidence or § 415.3 Types of launch licenses. this section for exceptions to this arguments supporting the petition. * * * * * provision. (c) Petitions must be filed as soon as (c) Notwithstanding the duration for a (c) ‘‘Meets intent’’ certification. For a practicable, but in no event more than license established in paragraphs (a) and licensed launch from a Federal launch 30 days after issuance of decision or (b) of this section, no license issued range, a launch operator need not finding under § 414.37. under this part will be valid after March demonstrate to the FAA that an § 414.45 Administrative law judge’s 10, 2026. alternative means of satisfying a recommended decision in safety element ■ 24. Amend § 415.35 by revising requirement of this part provides an approval actions. paragraph (d) to read as follows: equivalent level of safety for a launch if written evidence demonstrates that a (a) The Associate Administrator, who § 415.35 Acceptable flight risk. will make the final decision on the Federal launch range has, by the matter at issue, will review the * * * * * effective date of this part, granted a recommended decision of the (d) Operation. A launch vehicle must ‘‘meets intent certification,’’ including administrative law judge. The Associate be operated in a manner that ensures through ‘‘tailoring,’’ that applies to the Administrator will make such final that flight risks meet the criteria of requirement and that launch. See decision within 30 days of issuance of paragraph (a) of this section and in paragraph (e) of this section for the recommended decision. accordance with collision avoidance exceptions to this provision. Written (b) The authority and responsibility to requirements in § 450.169 and critical evidence includes: review and decide rests solely with the asset protection requirements in (1) Range flight plan approval, Associate Administrator and may not be § 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4). An applicant (2) Missile system pre-launch safety delegated. must identify all launch operations and package, procedures that must be performed to (3) Preliminary and final flight data PART 415—LAUNCH LICENSE ensure acceptable flight risk. packages, (4) A tailored version of EWR 127–1, ■ 19. The authority citation for part 415 Appendix A to Part 415—[Removed (5) Range email to the FAA stating continues to read as follows: and Reserved] that the MIC was approved, or Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. ■ 25. Remove and reserve appendix A to (6) Operation approval. part 415. (d) Waiver. For a licensed launch from PART 415—[REMOVED AND a Federal launch range, a requirement of RESERVED] PART 417—LAUNCH SAFETY this part does not apply to a launch if written evidence demonstrates that a ■ 20. Effective March 10, 2026, remove ■ 26. The authority citation for part 417 Federal launch range has, by the and reserve part 415. continues to read as follows: effective date of this part, granted a ■ 21. Revise § 415.1 to read as follows: Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. waiver that allows noncompliance with the requirement for that launch. See § 415.1 Applicability and scope. PART 417—[REMOVED AND paragraph (e) of this section for (a) Applicability. This part applies to RESERVED] exceptions to this provision. Written the following: evidence includes: (1) Licenses issued under this part ■ 27. Effective March 10, 2026, remove (1) Range flight plan approval, before June 8, 2021; and and reserve part 417. (2) Missile system pre-launch safety (2) Licenses issued on or after June 8, ■ 28. Revise § 417.1 to read as follows: package, 2021, if the FAA accepted the (3) Preliminary and final flight data application under § 413.11 of this § 417.1 General information. packages, chapter before that date. (a) Scope. This part sets forth— (4) A tailored version of EWR 127–1, (b) Scope. This part prescribes (1) The responsibilities of a launch (5) Range email to the FAA stating requirements for obtaining a license to operator conducting a licensed launch that the waiver was approved, or launch an expendable launch vehicle of an expendable launch vehicle (6) Operation approval. and post-licensing requirements with pursuant to a license issued under part (e) Exceptions to Federal launch which a licensee must comply to remain 415 of this chapter; and range meets intent certifications and licensed. Requirements for preparing a (2) The requirements for maintaining waivers. Even if a licensed launch from license application are in part 413 of a launch license obtained under part a Federal launch range satisfies this subchapter. 415 of this chapter. Parts 413 and 415 paragraph (c) or (d) of this section for a

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requirement of this part, the ■ 32. Amend § 417.113 by revising ■ 38. Amend § 420.15 by revising requirement applies and a launch paragraphs (c)(1) introductory text and paragraph (b) to read as follows: operator must satisfy the requirement, (c)(1)(iii) to read as follows: obtain FAA approval of any alternative, § 420.15 Information requirements. or obtain FAA approval for any further § 417.113 Launch safety rules. * * * * * noncompliance if— * * * * * (b) Environmental. The FAA is (1) The launch operator modifies the (c) * * * responsible for complying with the launch vehicle’s operation or safety (1) The flight-commit criteria must procedures and policies of the National characteristics; implement the flight safety analysis of Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and (2) The launch operator uses the subpart C of this part and collision other applicable environmental laws, launch vehicle, component, system, or avoidance requirements in § 450.169 regulations, and Executive Orders prior subsystem in a new application; and critical asset protection to issuing a launch site license. An (3) The FAA or the launch operator requirements in § 450.101(a)(4) and applicant must provide the FAA with determines that a previously unforeseen (b)(4). These must include criteria for: information needed to comply with or newly discovered safety hazard exists * * * * * such requirements. The FAA will that is a source of significant risk to (iii) Implementation of any launch consider and document the potential public safety; or wait in the launch window for the environmental effects associated with (4) The Federal launch range purpose of collision avoidance in issuing a launch site license. (1) Environmental impact statement previously accepted a component, accordance with collision avoidance or environmental assessment. When system, or subsystem, but did not then requirements in § 450.169. directed by the FAA, an applicant identify a noncompliance to a Federal * * * * * must— launch range requirement. § 417.121 [Amended] (i) Prepare an Environmental (f) Equivalent level of safety. The Assessment with FAA oversight; requirements of this part apply to a ■ 32. Amend § 417.121 by removing and reserving paragraph (c). (ii) Assume financial responsibility launch operator and the launch for preparation of an Environmental operator’s launch unless the launch § 417.231 [Removed and Reserved.] Impact Statement by an FAA-selected operator clearly and convincingly ■ 33. Remove and reserve § 417.231. and -managed consultant contractor; or demonstrates that an alternative (iii) Submit information to support a approach provides an equivalent level Appendix A to Part 417—[Amended] written re-evaluation of a previously of safety. ■ 34. Amend appendix A to part 417 by submitted Environmental Assessment or § 417.3 [Amended] removing and reserving section Environmental Impact Statement when requested by the FAA. ■ 29. Amend § 417.3 by removing the A417.31. ■ (2) Categorical exclusion. The FAA definitions for ‘‘conjunction on launch’’ 35. Amend appendix C to part 417 by may determine that a categorical and ‘‘launch wait’’. revising paragraph (a) in section C417.1 exclusion is appropriate upon receipt of ■ and removing section C417.11. supporting information from an 30. Amend § 417.11 by adding The revision reads as follows: paragraph (f) to read as follows: applicant. Appendix C to Part 417—Flight Safety (3) Environmental information. An § 417.11 Continuing accuracy of license Analysis Methodologies and Products application must include an approved application; application for modification of FAA Environmental Assessment, license. for an Unguided Suborbital Launch Vehicle Flown With a Wind Weighting Environmental Impact Statement, * * * * * Safety System categorical exclusion determination, or (f) The Administrator may determine written re-evaluation covering all * * * * * that a modification to a license issued planned licensed activities in under this part must comply with the C417.1 General compliance with NEPA and the Council requirements in part 450 of this chapter. (a) This appendix contains methodologies on Environmental Quality Regulations The Administrator will base the for performing the flight safety analysis for Implementing the Procedural determination on the extent and required for the launch of an unguided Provisions of NEPA. complexity of the modification, whether suborbital launch vehicle flown with a wind weighting safety system, except for the * * * * * the applicant proposes to modify ■ multiple parts of the application, or if hazard area analysis required by § 417.107, 39. Revise § 420.51 to read as follows: the application requires significant which is covered in appendix B of this part. This appendix includes methodologies for a § 420.51 Responsibilities—general. evaluation. trajectory analysis, wind weighting analysis, A licensee must operate its launch ■ 31. Amend § 417.107 by adding debris analysis, and debris risk analysis. site in accordance with the paragraph (b)(5), and removing and * * * * * representations in its application. reserving paragraph (e). ■ 40. Amend § 420.57 by revising The addition reads as follows: PART 420—LICENSE TO OPERATE A paragraph (d) to read as follows: LAUNCH SITE § 417.107 Flight safety. § 420.57 Notifications. * * * * * ■ 36. The authority citation for part 420 * * * * * (b) * * * continues to read as follows: (d) At least 2 days prior to flight of a (5) A launch operator may initiate Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. launch vehicle, unless the flight of a launch vehicle only if all of Administrator agrees to a different time the risks to the public satisfy the criteria § 420.5 [Amended] frame in accordance with § 404.15, the in the critical asset protection ■ 37. Amend § 420.5 by removing the licensee must notify local officials and requirements in § 450.101(a)(4) and definitions of ‘‘Instantaneous impact all owners of land adjacent to the (b)(4). point’’, ‘‘Launch site accident’’, and launch site of the flight schedule. * * * * * ‘‘Public’’. ■ 41. Revise § 420.59 to read as follows:

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§ 420.59 Mishap plan. (c) Equivalent level of safety. Each Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. (a) General. A licensee must report, requirement of this part applies unless ■ 51. Revise § 433.7 to read as follows: respond to, and investigate any event the applicant or licensee clearly and that meets either paragraph (1) or (5) of convincingly demonstrates that an § 433.7 Environmental. the definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7 of alternative approach provides an (a) General. The FAA is responsible this chapter. A licensee must submit a equivalent level of safety to the for complying with the procedures and mishap plan that meets the requirement of this part. policies of the National Environmental requirements of § 450.173(b) through (f). ■ 46. Add § 431.2 to read as follows: Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable (b) Launch mishaps. A launch site environmental laws, regulations, and operator’s mishap plan must also § 431.2 Licenses issued under this part. Executive Orders prior to issuing a contain procedures for participating in (a) Definitions. For the purposes of reentry site license. An applicant must an investigation of a launch mishap for this subpart, the definitions of § 401.5 of provide the FAA with information launches launched from the launch site. this chapter apply. needed to comply with such (c) Other agency procedures. (b) Compliance with part 450 of this requirements. The FAA will consider Emergency response and investigation chapter. Operations under this part and document the potential procedures developed in accordance must comply with launch and reentry environmental effects associated with with 29 CFR 1910.119 and 40 CFR part collision avoidance requirements in issuing a license for a reentry site. 68 will satisfy the requirements of § 450.169 of this chapter and critical (b) Environmental impact statement § 450.173(d) and (e) to the extent that asset protection requirements in or environmental assessment. When they include the elements required by § 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) of this chapter. directed by the FAA, an applicant § 450.173(d) and (e). ■ 47. Amend § 431.3 by adding must— ■ 42. Amend § 420.61 by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows: (1) Prepare an Environmental paragraph (b) to read as follows: § 431.3 Types of reusable launch vehicle Assessment with FAA oversight; mission licenses. (2) Assume financial responsibility for § 420.61 Records. preparation of an Environmental Impact * * * * * * * * * * (c) Duration of license. Statement by an FAA-selected and (b) For any event that meets any of Notwithstanding the duration for a -managed consultant contractor; or paragraph (1), (5), or (8) of the definition (3) Submit information to support a license established in paragraphs (a) and of ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7 of this chapter, written re-evaluation of a previously (b) of this section, no license issued a licensee must preserve all records submitted Environmental Assessment or under this part will be valid after March related to the event. Records must be Environmental Impact Statement. 10, 2026. retained until completion of any Federal (c) Categorical exclusion. The FAA ■ investigation and the FAA advises the 48. Amend § 431.43 by revising may determine that a categorical licensee that the records need not be paragraph (a)(1) and removing and exclusion is appropriate upon receipt of retained. reserving paragraph (c)(1). supporting information from an The revision reads as follows: * * * * * applicant. § 431.43 Reusable launch vehicle mission (d) Environmental information. An PART 431—LAUNCH AND REENTRY operational requirements and restrictions. application must include an approved OF A REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE (a) * * * FAA Environmental Assessment, (RLV) (1) That ensure RLV mission risks do Environmental Impact Statement, not exceed the criteria set forth in categorical exclusion determination, or ■ 43. The authority citation for part 431 §§ 431.35, 450.169, and in written re-evaluation covering all continue to read as follows: § 450.101(a)(4) and (b)(4) for nominal planned licensed activities in Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. and non-nominal operations; compliance with NEPA and the Council * * * * * on Environmental Quality Regulations PART 431—[REMOVED AND ■ for Implementing the Procedural RESERVED] 49. Amend § 431.73 by adding paragraph (f) to read as follows: Provisions of NEPA. ■ 44. Effective March 10, 2026, remove § 431.73 Continuing accuracy of license § 433.9 [Removed] and reserve part 431. application; application for modification of ■ 52. Remove § 433.9. ■ 45. Revise § 431.1 to read as follows: license. PART 435—REENTRY OF A REENTRY § 431.1 General. * * * * * (f) The Administrator may determine VEHICLE OTHER THAN A REUSABLE (a) Applicability. This part applies to that a modification to a license issued LAUNCH VEHICLE (RLV) the following— under this part must comply with the (1) Licenses issued under this part requirements in part 450 of this chapter. ■ 53. The authority citation for part 435 before June 8, 2021; and The Administrator will base the continues to read as follows: (2) Licenses issued on or after June 8, determination on the extent and Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. 2021, if the FAA accepted the complexity of the modification, whether application under § 413.11 of this the applicant proposes to modify PART 435—[REMOVED AND chapter before that date. multiple parts of the application, or if RESERVED] (b) Scope. This part prescribes the application requires significant requirements for obtaining a reusable ■ evaluation. 54. Effective March 10, 2026, remove launch vehicle (RLV) mission license and reserve part 435. and post-licensing requirements with PART 433—LICENSE TO OPERATE A ■ 55. Revise § 435.1 to read as follows: which a licensee must comply to remain REENTRY SITE licensed. Requirements for preparing a § 435.1 General. license application are contained in part ■ 50. The authority citation for part 433 (a) Applicability. This part applies to 413 of this subchapter. will continue to read as follows: the following—

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(1) Licenses issued under this part consider and document the potential § 437.41 Mishap plan. before June 8, 2021; and environmental effects associated with An applicant must submit a mishap (2) Licenses issued on or after June 8, proposed reusable suborbital rocket plan that meets the requirements of 2021, if the FAA accepted the launches or reentries. An applicant § 450.173 of this chapter. application under § 413.11 of this must provide the FAA with information ■ 62. Revise § 437.65 to read as follows: chapter before that date. needed to comply with such (b) Scope. This part prescribes requirements. The FAA will consider § 437.65 Collision avoidance analysis. requirements for obtaining a license to and document the potential For a permitted flight with a planned reenter a reentry vehicle other than a environmental effects associated with maximum altitude greater than 150 reusable launch vehicle (RLV), and post- proposed reusable suborbital rocket kilometers, a permittee must obtain a licensing requirements with which a launches or reentries. collision avoidance analysis in licensee must comply to remain (ii) Environmental Impact Statement accordance with § 450.169 of this licensed. Requirements for preparing a or Environmental Assessment. When chapter. license application are contained in part directed by the FAA, an applicant 413 of this subchapter. must— § 437.75 [Removed and Reserved] (c) Equivalent level of safety. Each (A) Prepare an Environmental ■ 63. Remove and reserve § 437.75. requirement of this part applies unless Assessment with FAA oversight; ■ 64. Amend § 437.87 by revising the applicant or licensee clearly and (B) Assume financial responsibility paragraph (b) to read as follows: convincingly demonstrates that an for preparation of an Environmental alternative approach provides an Impact Statement by an FAA-selected § 437.87 Records. equivalent level of safety to the and -managed consultant contractor; or * * * * * requirement of this part. (C) Submit information to support a (b) For any event that meets any of ■ 56. Add § 435.2 to read as follows: written re-evaluation of a previously paragraphs (1) through (3), (5), or (8) of submitted Environmental Assessment or the definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7 of § 435.2 Licenses. Environmental Impact Statement. this chapter, a permittee must preserve (a) Definitions. For the purposes of (iii) Categorical exclusion. The FAA all records related to the event. Records this subpart, the definitions of § 401.5 of may determine that a categorical shall be retained until any Federal this chapter apply. exclusion determination is appropriate investigation is complete and the FAA (b) Compliance with part 450 of this upon receipt of supporting information advises the permittee that the records chapter. Operations under this part from an applicant. need not be retained. must comply with launch and reentry (iv) Information requirements. An * * * * * collision avoidance requirements in application must include an approved ■ 65. Amend § 437.89 by revising § 450.169 and critical asset protection FAA Environmental Assessment, requirements in § 450.101(a)(4) and paragraphs (a) introductory text and (b) Environmental Impact Statement, to read as follows: (b)(4). categorical exclusion determination, or ■ 57. Amend § 435.3 by adding written re-evaluation covering all § 437.89 Pre-flight reporting. paragraph (c) to read as follows: planned licensed activities in (a) Not later than 30 days before each compliance with NEPA and the Council § 435.3 Types of reentry licenses. flight or series of flights conducted on Environmental Quality Regulations under an experimental permit, unless * * * * * for Implementing the Procedural the Administrator agrees to a different (c) Duration of license. Provisions of NEPA. time frame in accordance with § 404.15, Notwithstanding the duration for a (2) Financial responsibility. An a permittee must provide the FAA with license established in paragraphs (a) and applicant must provide the information the following information: (b) of this section, no license issued required by part 3 of appendix A of part * * * * * under this part will be valid after March 440 for the FAA to conduct a maximum 10, 2026. (b) Not later than 15 days before each probable loss analysis. permitted flight planned to reach greater PART 437—EXPERIMENTAL PERMITS (3) Human space flight. An applicant than 150 km altitude, unless the proposing launch or reentry with flight Administrator agrees to a different time ■ 58. The authority citation for part 437 crew or a space flight participant on frame in accordance with § 404.15, a continues to read as follows: board a reusable suborbital rocket must permittee must provide the FAA its demonstrate compliance with §§ 460.5, Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. planned trajectory for a collision 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, 460.15, 460.17, avoidance analysis. § 437.3 [Amended] 460.51, and 460.53 of this subchapter. (c) Use of a safety element approval. ■ 59. Amend § 437.3 by removing the PART 440—FINANCIAL If an applicant proposes to use any definitions for ‘‘anomaly’’ and ‘‘key RESPONSIBILITY reusable suborbital rocket, safety flight-safety event’’. system, process, service, or personnel ■ 66. The authority citation for part 440 ■ 60. Amend § 437.21 by revising for which the FAA has issued a safety continues to read as follows: paragraphs (b) and (c) to read as follows: element approval under part 414 of this Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. chapter, the FAA will not reevaluate § 437.21 General. ■ that safety element to the extent its use 67. Amend § 440.3 by revising the * * * * * introductory text and the definition for (b) Other regulations—(1) is within its approved scope. As part of the application process, the FAA will ‘‘maximum probable loss (MPL)’’ to read Environmental—(i) General. The FAA is as follows: responsible for complying with the evaluate the integration of that safety procedures and policies of the National element into vehicle systems or § 440.3 Definitions. Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and operations. Except as otherwise provided in this other applicable environmental laws, * * * * * section, any term used in this part and regulations, and Executive Orders to ■ 61. Revise § 437.41 to read as follows: defined in 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923, or in

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§ 401.5 or § 401.7 of this chapter shall must be submitted at least 30 days in Other Prescribed Hazard Controls have the meaning contained therein. advance of its expiration date, unless 450.147 Agreements. * * * * * the Administrator agrees to a different 450.149 Safety-critical personnel Maximum probable loss (MPL) means time frame in accordance with § 404.15. qualifications. the greatest dollar amount of loss for * * * * * 450.151 Work shift and rest requirements. 450.153 Radio frequency management. bodily injury or property damage that is ■ 70. Add part 450 to read as follows: 450.155 Readiness. reasonably expected to result from a 450.157 Communications. licensed or permitted activity; PART 450—LAUNCH AND REENTRY 450.159 Pre-flight procedures. (1) Losses to third parties, excluding LICENSE REQUIREMENTS 450.161 Control of hazard areas. Government personnel and other launch 450.163 Lightning hazard mitigation. or reentry participants’ employees Sec. 450.165 Flight commit criteria. 450.167 Tracking. involved in licensed or permitted Subpart A—General Information activities and neighboring operations 450.169 Launch and reentry collision personnel, that are reasonably expected 450.1 Applicability. avoidance analysis requirements. 450.171 Safety at end of launch. to result from a licensed or permitted 450.3 Scope of a vehicle operator license. 450.5 Issuance of a vehicle operator license. 450.173 Mishap plan—reporting, response, activity are those that have a probability 450.7 Duration of a vehicle operator license. and investigation requirements. of occurrence of no less than one in ten 450.9 Additional license terms and 450.175 Test-induced damage. million. conditions. 450.177 Unique safety policies, (2) Losses to Government property 450.11 Transfer of a vehicle operator requirements, and practices. and Government personnel involved in license. Ground Safety licensed or permitted activities and 450.13 Rights not conferred by a vehicle neighboring operations personnel that operator license. 450.179 Ground safety—general. are reasonably expected to result from 450.181 Coordination with a site operator. Subpart B—Requirements to Obtain a 450.183 Explosive site plan. licensed or permitted activities are those Vehicle Operator License 450.185 Ground hazard analysis. that have a probability of occurrence of 450.31 General. 450.187 Toxic hazards mitigation for no less than one in one hundred 450.33 Incremental review and ground operations. thousand. determinations. 450.189 Ground safety prescribed hazard * * * * * 450.35 Means of compliance. controls. 450.37 Equivalent level of safety. Subpart D—Terms and Conditions of a § 440.3 [Amended] 450.39 Use of safety element approval. Vehicle Operator License ■ 450.41 Policy review and approval. 68. Effective March 10, 2026, further 450.201 Responsibility for public safety and amend § 440.3 in the introductory text 450.43 Payload review and determination. 450.45 Safety review and approval. safety of property. by removing ‘‘ in §§ 401.5 or 401.7’’ and 450.47 Environmental review. 450.203 Compliance. add, in its place, ‘‘in § 401.7’’. 450.205 Financial responsibility ■ 69. Amend § 440.15 by revising Subpart C—Safety Requirements requirements. 450.207 Human spaceflight requirements. paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) to read as Safety Criteria 450.209 Compliance monitoring. follows: 450.101 Safety criteria. 450.211 Continuing accuracy of license § 440.15 Demonstration of compliance. System Safety Program application; application for modification of license. (a) * * * 450.103 System safety program. 450.213 Pre-flight reporting. (1) All reciprocal waiver of claims Hazard Control Strategies 450.215 Post-flight reporting. agreements required under § 440.17(c) 450.217 Registration of space objects. must be submitted at least 30 days 450.107 Hazard control strategies. 450.219 Records. before the start of any licensed or 450.108 Flight abort. Appendix A to Part 450—Collision Analysis 450.109 Flight hazard analysis. Worksheet permitted activity involving a customer, 450.110 Physical containment. crew member, or space flight 450.111 Wind weighting. Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. participant; unless the Administrator agrees to a different time frame in Flight Safety Analyses Subpart A—General Information accordance with § 404.15; 450.113 Flight safety analysis § 450.1 Applicability. (2) Evidence of insurance must be requirements—scope. submitted at least 30 days before 450.115 Flight safety analysis methods. This part prescribes requirements for commencement of any licensed launch 450.117 Trajectory analysis for normal obtaining and maintaining a license to or permitted activity, and for licensed flight. launch, reenter, or both launch and 450.119 Trajectory analysis for malfunction reenter, a launch or reentry vehicle. reentry no less than 30 days before flight. commencement of launch activities 450.121 Debris analysis. § 450.3 Scope of a vehicle operator involving the reentry licensee, unless 450.123 Population exposure analysis. license. the Administrator agrees to a different 450.131 Probability of failure analysis. time frame in accordance with § 404.15; 450.133 Flight hazard area analysis. (a) General. A vehicle operator license (3) Evidence of financial 450.135 Debris risk analysis. authorizes a licensee to conduct one or responsibility in a form other than 450.137 Far-field overpressure blast effects more launches or reentries using the insurance, as provided under § 440.9(f) analysis. same vehicle or family of vehicles. A must be submitted at least 60 days 450.139 Toxic hazards for flight. vehicle operator license identifies the before commencement of a licensed or Prescribed Hazard Controls for Safety- scope of authorization as defined in permitted activity, unless the Critical Hardware and Computing Systems paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section or Administrator agrees to a different time 450.141 Computing systems. as agreed to by the Administrator. frame in accordance with § 404.15; and 450.143 Safety-critical system design, test, (b) Scope of launch. A vehicle (4) Evidence of renewal of insurance and documentation. operator license authorizes launch, or other form of financial responsibility 450.145 Highly reliable flight safety system. which includes the flight of a launch

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vehicle and pre- and post-flight ground necessary to return the reentry vehicle, determination. The FAA may modify a operations as follows: or vehicle component, to a safe license to reflect any changes necessary (1) Launch begins when hazardous condition on the ground after impact or as a result of a license transfer. pre-flight operations commence at a landing. (f) The FAA will provide written U.S. launch site that may pose a threat (d) Application requirements. An notice of its determination to the person to the public. Hazardous pre-flight applicant must identify pre- and post- requesting the vehicle operator license operations that may pose a threat to the flight ground operations at a U.S. launch transfer. public include pressurizing or loading site sufficient for the Administrator to of propellants into the vehicle, determine the scope of activities § 450.13 Rights not conferred by a vehicle operator license. operations involving a fueled launch authorized under the license. vehicle, the transfer of energy necessary Issuance of a vehicle operator license to initiate flight, or any hazardous § 450.5 Issuance of a vehicle operator does not relieve a licensee of its activity preparing the vehicle for flight. license. obligation to comply with all applicable Hazardous pre-flight operations do not (a) The FAA issues a vehicle operator requirements of law or regulation that include the period between the end of license to an applicant who has may apply to its activities, nor does the previous launch and launch vehicle obtained all approvals and issuance confer any proprietary, reuse, when the vehicle is in a safe and determinations required under this part property, or exclusive right in the use of dormant state. for a license. any Federal launch or reentry site or (2) At a non-U.S. launch site, launch (b) A vehicle operator license related facilities, airspace, or outer begins at ignition or at the first authorizes a licensee to conduct space. movement that initiates flight, launches or reentries, in accordance whichever occurs earlier. with the representations contained in Subpart B—Requirements to Obtain a (3) Launch ends when any of the the licensee’s application, with subparts Vehicle Operator License C and D of this part, and subject to the following events occur: § 450.31 General. (i) For an orbital launch of a vehicle licensee’s compliance with terms and without a reentry of the vehicle, launch conditions contained in license orders (a) To obtain a vehicle operator ends after the licensee’s last exercise of accompanying the license, including license, an applicant must— (1) Submit a license application in control over its vehicle on orbit, after financial responsibility requirements. accordance with the procedures in part vehicle component impact or landing on § 450.7 Duration of a vehicle operator 413 of this chapter; Earth, after activities necessary to return license. (2) Obtain a policy approval from the the vehicle or component to a safe Administrator in accordance with condition on the ground after impact or A vehicle operator license is valid for § 450.41; landing, or after activities necessary to the period of time determined by the Administrator as necessary to conduct (3) Obtain a favorable payload return the site to a safe condition, determination from the Administrator in whichever occurs latest; the licensed activity but may not exceed 5 years from the issuance date. accordance with § 450.43, if applicable; (ii) For an orbital launch of a vehicle (4) Obtain a safety approval from the with a reentry of the vehicle, launch § 450.9 Additional license terms and Administrator in accordance with ends after deployment of all payloads, conditions. § 450.45; upon completion of the vehicle’s first The FAA may modify a vehicle (5) Satisfy the environmental review steady-state orbit if there is no payload operator license at any time by requirements of § 450.47; and deployment, after vehicle component modifying or adding license terms and (6) Provide the information required impact or landing on Earth, after conditions to ensure compliance with by appendix A of part 440 for the activities necessary to return the vehicle the Act and regulations. Administrator to conduct a maximum or component to a safe condition on the probable loss analysis for the applicable ground after impact or landing, or after § 450.11 Transfer of a vehicle operator licensed operation. activities necessary to return the site to license. (b) An applicant may apply for the a safe condition, whichever occurs (a) Only the FAA may transfer a approvals and determinations in latest; vehicle operator license. paragraphs (a)(2) through (6) of this (iii) For a suborbital launch that (b) Either the holder of a vehicle section separately or all together in one includes a reentry, launch ends after operator license or the prospective complete application, using the reaching apogee; transferee may request a vehicle application procedures contained in (iv) For a suborbital launch that does operator license transfer. part 413 of this chapter. not include a reentry, launch ends after (c) Both the holder and prospective (c) An applicant may also apply for a vehicle or vehicle component impact or transferee must agree to the transfer. safety approval in an incremental landing on Earth, after activities (d) An applicant for transfer of a manner, in accordance with § 450.33. necessary to return the vehicle or vehicle operator license must submit a (d) An applicant may reference vehicle component to a safe condition license application in accordance with materials previously provided as part of on the ground after impact or landing, part 413 of this chapter and must meet a license application in order to meet or after activities necessary to return the the requirements of part 450 of this the application requirements of this site to a safe condition, whichever chapter. part. occurs latest. (e) The FAA will transfer a license to (c) Scope of reentry. A vehicle an applicant that has obtained all of the § 450.33 Incremental review and operator license authorizes reentry. approvals and determinations required determinations. Reentry includes activities conducted in under this part for a license. In An applicant may submit its Earth orbit or outer space to determine conducting its reviews and issuing application for a safety review in reentry readiness and that are critical to approvals and determinations, the FAA modules using an incremental approach ensuring public health and safety and may incorporate by reference any approved by the Administrator. the safety of property during reentry findings made part of the record to (a) An applicant must identify to the flight. Reentry also includes activities support the initial licensing Administrator, prior to submitting an

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application, whether it will submit a international obligations of the United (v) For each orbital mission, the range modular application for any approval or States. of intermediate and final orbits of each determination. (b) Interagency consultation. (1) The vehicle upper stage and their estimated (b) An applicant using an incremental FAA consults with the Department of orbital lifetimes. approach must have the approach Defense to determine whether a license approved by the Administrator prior to application presents any issues affecting § 450.43 Payload review and determination. submitting an application. In reviewing U.S. national security. a proposed approach, the Administrator (2) The FAA consults with the (a) General. If applicable, the FAA will consider the following: Department of State to determine issues a favorable payload (1) Whether the modules can be whether a license application presents determination for a launch or reentry to reviewed independently; and any issues affecting U.S. foreign policy a license applicant or payload owner or (2) Whether the modules will be interests or international obligations. operator if— submitted in a workable chronological (3) The FAA consults with other (1) The applicant, payload owner, or order. Federal agencies, including the National payload operator has obtained all (c) The Administrator may make Aeronautics and Space Administration, required licenses, authorizations, and incremental determinations as part of authorized to address issues identified permits; and this review process. under paragraph (a) of this section, (2) Its launch or reentry would not associated with an applicant’s proposal. jeopardize public health and safety, § 450.35 Means of compliance. (c) Issues during policy review. The safety of property, U.S. national security (a) Prior to application acceptance, a FAA will advise an applicant, in or foreign policy interests, or means of compliance must be accepted writing, of any issue raised during a international obligations of the United by the Administrator for the following: policy review that would impede States. (1) Section 450.115(b)(1) regarding issuance of a policy approval. The (b) Relationship to other executive flight safety analyses; applicant may respond, in writing, or agencies. The FAA does not make a (2) Section 450.139(e)(1) regarding amend its license application as determination under paragraph (a)(2) of toxic hazards for flight; required by § 413.17 of this chapter. this section for— (3) Section 450.145(b) regarding (d) Denial of policy approval. The (1) Those aspects of payloads that are highly-reliable flight safety system; FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if subject to regulation by the Federal (4) Section 450.163(a)(1) regarding it has denied policy approval for a Communications Commission or the lightning hazard mitigation; and license application. The notice states Department of Commerce; or the reasons for the FAA’s determination. (5) Section 450.187(e)(1) regarding (2) Payloads owned or operated by the The applicant may seek further review toxic hazards mitigation for ground U.S. Government. of the determination in accordance with operations. (c) Classes of payloads. The FAA may § 413.21 of this chapter. review and issue findings regarding a (b) A person requesting acceptance of (e) Application requirements for a proposed means of compliance proposed class of payload, including policy review. In its license application, communications, remote sensing, or outside a license application must an applicant must— submit the proposed means of navigation. However, prior to a launch (1) Identify the model, type, and or reentry, each payload is subject to compliance to the FAA in a form and configuration of any vehicle proposed manner acceptable to the Administrator. verification by the FAA that its launch for launch or reentry by the applicant; or reentry would not jeopardize public § 450.37 Equivalent level of safety. (2) Describe the vehicle by health and safety, safety of property, characteristics that include individual U.S. national security or foreign policy (a) An applicant must demonstrate stages, their dimensions, type and compliance with each requirement of interests, or international obligations of amounts of all propellants, and the United States. this part, unless the applicant clearly maximum thrust; and convincingly demonstrates that an (d) Payload owner or payload (3) Identify foreign ownership of the operator may apply. In addition to a alternative approach provides an applicant as follows: launch or reentry operator, a payload equivalent level of safety to the (i) For a sole proprietorship or owner or payload operator may request requirement of this part. partnership, identify all foreign (b) Paragraph (a) of this section does ownership; a payload review and determination. not apply to § 450.101(a), (b), (c)(1) and (ii) For a corporation, identify any (e) Interagency consultation. The FAA (3), (d), (e)(1), and (g). foreign ownership interests of 10 consults with other agencies as follows: percent or more; and (1) The Department of Defense to § 450.39 Use of safety element approval. (iii) For a joint venture, association, or determine whether launch or reentry of If an applicant proposes to use any other entity, identify any participating a proposed payload or payload class vehicle, safety system, process, service, foreign entities; and would present any issues affecting U.S. or personnel for which the FAA has (4) Identify the proposed vehicle national security; issued a safety element approval under flight profile, including: (2) The Department of State to part 414 of this chapter, the FAA will (i) Launch or reentry site, including determine whether launch or reentry of not reevaluate that safety element any contingency abort locations; a proposed payload or payload class during a license application evaluation (ii) Flight azimuths, trajectories, and would present any issues affecting U.S. to the extent its use is within its associated ground tracks and foreign policy interests or international approved scope. instantaneous impact points for the obligations; or duration of the licensed activity, (3) Other Federal agencies, including § 450.41 Policy review and approval. including any contingency abort the National Aeronautics and Space (a) General. The FAA issues a policy profiles; Administration, authorized to address approval to an applicant unless the FAA (iii) Sequence of planned events or issues of public health and safety, safety determines that a proposed launch or maneuvers during flight; of property, U.S. national security or reentry would jeopardize U.S. national (iv) Normal impact or landing areas foreign policy interests, or international security or foreign policy interests, or for all mission hardware; and obligations of the United States,

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associated with the launch or reentry of (x) Any encryption associated with (1) General. An application must— a proposed payload or payload class. data storage on the payload and (i) Contain a glossary of unique terms (f) Issues during payload review. The transmissions to or from the payload; and acronyms used in alphabetical FAA will advise a person requesting a and order; payload determination, in writing, of (xi) Any other information necessary (ii) Contain a listing of all referenced any issue raised during a payload to make a determination based on material; review that would impede issuance of a public health and safety, safety of (iii) Use equations and mathematical license to launch or reenter that payload property, U.S. national security or relationships derived from or referenced or payload class. The person requesting foreign policy interests, or international to a recognized standard or text, and payload review may respond, in writing, obligations of the United States. define all algebraic parameters; or amend its application as required by (2) For reentry of a payload: (iv) Include the units of all numerical § 413.17 of this chapter. (i) Payload name or class of payload, values provided; and (g) Denial of a payload determination. and function; (v) Include a legend or key that The FAA notifies an applicant, in (ii) Physical characteristics, identifies all symbols used for any writing, if it has denied a favorable dimensions, and weight of the payload; schematic diagrams. payload determination. The notice (iii) Payload owner and payload (2) Site description. An applicant states the reasons for the FAA’s operator, if different from the person must identify the proposed launch or determination. The applicant may seek requesting the payload review and reentry site, including contingency abort further review of the determination in determination; locations, and submit the following: accordance with § 413.21 of this (iv) Type, amount, and container of (i) Boundaries of the site; chapter. hazardous materials and radioactive (ii) Launch or landing point locations, (h) Incorporation of payload materials in the payload; including latitude and longitude; determination in license application. A (v) Explosive potential of payload (iii) Identity of any site operator; and favorable payload determination issued materials, alone and in combination (iv) Identity of any facilities at the site for a payload or class of payload may be with other materials found on the that will be used for pre- or post-flight included by a license applicant as part payload or reentry vehicle during ground operations. of its application. However, any change reentry; and (3) Vehicle description. An applicant in information provided under (vi) Designated reentry site. must submit the following: (i) A written description of the vehicle paragraph (i) of this section must be § 450.45 Safety review and approval. reported in accordance with § 413.17 of or family of vehicles, including (a) General. The FAA issues a safety this chapter. The FAA determines structural, thermal, pneumatic, approval to an applicant if it determines whether a favorable payload propulsion, electrical, and avionics and that an applicant can conduct launch or determination remains valid in light of guidance systems used in each vehicle, reentry without jeopardizing public reported changes and may conduct an and all propellants. The description health and safety and safety of property. additional payload review. must include a table specifying the type (i) Application requirements. A A license applicant must satisfy the and quantities of all hazardous materials person requesting review of a particular application requirements in this section on each vehicle and must include payload or payload class must identify and subpart C of this part. propellants, explosives, and toxic the following: (b) Services or property provided by a materials; and (1) For launch of a payload: Federal launch or reentry site. The FAA (ii) A drawing of each vehicle that (i) Payload name or class of payload, will accept any safety-related launch or identifies: and function; reentry service or property provided by (A) Each stage, including strap-on (ii) Description, including physical a Federal launch or reentry site or other motors; dimensions, weight, composition, and Federal entity by contract, as long as the (B) Physical dimensions and weight; any hosted payloads; FAA determines that the launch or (C) Location of all safety-critical (iii) Payload owner and payload reentry services or property provided systems; operator, if different from the person satisfy this part. (D) Location of all major vehicle requesting payload review and (c) Issues during safety review. The control systems, propulsion systems, determination; FAA will advise an applicant, in pressure vessels, and any other (iv) Any foreign ownership of the writing, of any issues raised during a hardware that contains potential payload or payload operator, as safety review that would impede hazardous energy or hazardous material; specified in § 450.41(e)(3); issuance of a safety approval. The and (v) Hazardous materials as defined in applicant may respond, in writing, or (E) For an unguided suborbital launch § 401.7 of this chapter, radioactive amend its license application as vehicle, the location of the rocket’s materials, and the amounts of each; required by § 413.17 of this chapter. center of pressure in relation to its (vi) Explosive potential of payload (d) Denial of a safety approval. The center of gravity for the entire flight materials, alone and in combination FAA notifies an applicant, in writing, if profile. with other materials found on the it has denied a safety approval for a (4) Mission schedule. An applicant payload; license application. The notice states must submit a generic launch or reentry (vii) For orbital launches, parameters the reasons for the FAA’s determination. processing schedule that identifies any for parking, transfer and final orbits, and The applicant may seek further review readiness activities, such as reviews and approximate transit times to final orbit; of the determination in accordance with rehearsals, and each safety-critical pre- (viii) Delivery point in flight at which § 413.21 of this chapter. flight operation to be conducted. The the payload will no longer be under the (e) Application requirements. An mission schedule must also identify day licensee’s control; applicant must submit the information of flight activities. (ix) Intended operations during the required in the ‘‘Application (5) Human space flight. For a lifetime of the payload, including requirements’’ paragraphs in individual proposed launch or reentry with a anticipated life span and any planned sections in subpart C of this part, as well human being on board a vehicle, an disposal; as the following: applicant must demonstrate compliance

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with §§ 460.5, 460.7, 460.11, 460.13, address compliance with any other probability of loss of functionality, must 460.15, 460.17, 460.51, and 460.53 of applicable environmental laws, not exceed the following probabilities: this chapter. regulations, and Executive Orders (A) For each critical asset, except for (6) Radionuclides. The FAA will covering all planned licensed activities a critical payload, 1 × 10¥3 ; and evaluate the launch or reentry of any in compliance with NEPA and the (B) For each critical payload, 1 × radionuclide on a case-by-case basis, Council on Environmental Quality 10¥4. and issue an approval if the FAA finds Regulations for Implementing the (ii) The Administrator will consult that the launch or reentry is consistent Procedural Provisions of NEPA. with relevant Federal agencies, and each with public health and safety, safety of agency will identify, for purposes of this property, and national security and Subpart C—Safety Requirements part, any critical assets that the agency foreign policy interests of the United Safety Criteria owns or otherwise depends on. For States. For any radionuclide on a launch purposes of this part, the Administrator or reentry vehicle, an applicant must— § 450.101 Safety criteria. will accept any identification by the (i) Identify the type and quantity; (a) Launch risk criteria. For any Secretary of Defense that an asset is (ii) Include a reference list of all launch, an operator may initiate the critical to national security. documentation addressing the safety of flight of a launch vehicle only if all risks (iii) The Administrator or Federal site its intended use; and to the public satisfy the criteria in this operator will notify the licensee of any (iii) Describe all approvals by the paragraph (a). For an orbital launch, the risk to critical assets above the risk Nuclear Regulatory Commission for pre- criteria in this paragraph apply from criteria in paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this flight ground operations. liftoff through orbital insertion. For a section. (7) Additional material. The FAA may suborbital launch, or a suborbital launch (iv) The Administrator may also request— and reentry, the criteria in this determine, in consultation with relevant (i) Any information incorporated by paragraph apply from liftoff through Federal agencies, that a more stringent reference in the license application; and final impact or landing. probability is necessary to protect the (ii) Additional products that allow the (1) Collective risk. The collective risk, national interests of the United States. FAA to conduct an independent safety measured as expected number of (v) The risk criteria in paragraph analysis. casualties (EC), consists of risk posed by (a)(4)(i) of this section do not apply to impacting inert and explosive debris, § 450.47 Environmental review. property, facilities, or infrastructure toxic release, and far field blast (a) General. The FAA is responsible supporting the launch that are within overpressure. Public risk due to any the public area distance, as defined in for complying with the procedures and other hazard associated with the policies of the National Environmental part 420, appendix E, tables E1 and E2 proposed flight of a launch vehicle will or associated formulae, of the vehicle’s Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable be determined by the Administrator on environmental laws, regulations, and launch point. a case-by-case basis. (b) Reentry risk criteria. For any Executive Orders prior to issuing a (i) The risk to all members of the reentry, an operator may initiate the launch or reentry license. An applicant public, excluding persons in aircraft and deorbit of a vehicle only if all risks to must provide the FAA with information neighboring operations personnel, must the public satisfy the criteria in this needed to comply with such not exceed an expected number of 1 × paragraph (b). The following criteria requirements. The FAA will consider 10¥4 casualties. apply to each reentry, other than a and document the potential (ii) The risk to all neighboring suborbital reentry, from the final health environmental effects associated with operations personnel must not exceed ¥ check prior to initiating deorbit through issuing a launch or reentry license an expected number of 2 × 10 4 final impact or landing: consistent with paragraph (b) of this casualties. section. (2) Individual risk. The individual (1) Collective risk. The collective risk, (b) Environmental Impact Statement risk, measured as probability of casualty measured as expected number of casualties (EC), consists of risk posed by or Environmental Assessment. When (PC), consists of risk posed by impacting directed by the FAA, an applicant inert and explosive debris, toxic release, impacting inert and explosive debris, must— and far field blast overpressure. The toxic release, and far field blast (1) Prepare an Environmental FAA will determine whether to approve overpressure. Public risk due to any Assessment with FAA oversight; public risk due to any other hazard other hazard associated with the (2) Assume financial responsibility for associated with the proposed flight of a proposed deorbit of a reentry vehicle preparation of an Environmental Impact launch vehicle on a case-by-case basis. will be determined by the Administrator Statement by an FAA-selected and (i) The risk to any individual member on a case-by-case basis. -managed consultant contractor; or of the public, excluding neighboring (i) The risk to all members of the (3) Submit information to support a operations personnel, must not exceed a public, excluding persons in aircraft and written re-evaluation of a previously probability of casualty of 1 × 10¥6 per neighboring operations personnel, must submitted Environmental Assessment or not exceed an expected number of 1 × launch. ¥ Environmental Impact Statement. (ii) The risk to any individual 10 4 casualties. (c) Categorical exclusion. The FAA neighboring operations personnel must (ii) The risk to all neighboring may determine that a categorical not exceed a probability of casualty of operations personnel must not exceed ¥ exclusion is appropriate upon receipt of 1 × 10¥5 per launch. an expected number of 2 × 10 4 supporting information from an (3) Aircraft risk. A launch operator casualties. applicant. must establish any aircraft hazard areas (2) Individual risk. The individual (d) Application requirements. An necessary to ensure the probability of risk, measured as probability of casualty application must include an approved impact with debris capable of causing a (PC), consists of risk posed by impacting FAA Environmental Assessment, casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 × inert and explosive debris, toxic release, Environmental Impact Statement, 10¥6. and far field blast overpressure. Public categorical exclusion determination, or (4) Risk to critical assets. (i) The risk risk due to any other hazard associated written re-evaluation, which should to critical assets, measured as the with the proposed flight of a launch

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vehicle will be determined on a case-by- (e) Protection of people and property safety policies, safety procedures, and case basis. on orbit. (1) A launch or reentry licensing requirements. (i) The risk to any individual member operator must prevent the collision (3) Addressing safety official of the public, excluding neighboring between a launch or reentry vehicle concerns. The mission director must operations personnel, must not exceed a stage or component and people or ensure that all of the safety official’s probability of casualty of 1 × 10¥6 per property on orbit, in accordance with concerns are addressed. reentry. the requirements in § 450.169(a). (b) Hazard management. For hazard (ii) The risk to any individual (2) For any launch vehicle stage or management: neighboring operations personnel must component that reaches Earth orbit, a (1) An operator must implement not exceed a probability of casualty of launch operator must prevent the methods to assess the system to ensure 1 × 10¥5 per reentry. creation of debris through the the validity of the hazard control (3) Aircraft risk. A reentry operator conversion of energy sources into strategy determination and any flight must establish any aircraft hazard areas energy that fragments the stage or hazard or flight safety analysis necessary to ensure the probability of component, in accordance with the throughout the lifecycle of the launch or impact with debris capable of causing a requirements in § 450.171. reentry system; casualty for aircraft does not exceed 1 × (f) Notification of planned impacts. (2) An operator must implement 10¥6. For any launch, reentry, or disposal, an methods for communicating and (4) Risk to critical assets. (i) The risk operator must notify the public of any implementing any updates throughout to critical assets, measured as the region of land, sea, or air that contains, the organization; and probability of loss of functionality, must with 97 percent probability of (3) Additionally, an operator required not exceed the following probabilities: containment, all debris resulting from to conduct a flight hazard analysis must (A) For each critical asset, except for normal flight events capable of causing implement a process for tracking a critical payload, 1 × 10¥3 ; and a casualty. hazards, risks, mitigation measures, and (B) For each critical payload, 1 × (g) Validity of the analysis. For any verification activities. 10¥4. analysis used to demonstrate (c) Configuration management and (ii) The Administrator will consult compliance with this section, an control. An operator must— (1) Employ a process that tracks with relevant Federal agencies, and each operator must use accurate data and configurations of all safety-critical agency will identify, for purposes of this scientific principles and the analysis systems and documentation related to part, any critical assets that the agency must be statistically valid. The method the operation; owns or otherwise depends on. For must produce results consistent with or (2) Ensure the use of correct and purposes of this part, the Administrator more conservative than the results appropriate versions of systems and will accept any identification by the available from previous mishaps, tests, documentation tracked in paragraph Secretary of Defense that an asset is or other valid benchmarks, such as higher-fidelity methods. (c)(1) of this section; and critical to national security. (3) Document the configurations and (iii) The Administrator or Federal site System Safety Program versions identified in paragraph (c)(2) of operator will notify the licensee of any this section for each licensed activity. risk to critical assets above the risk § 450.103 System safety program. (d) Post-flight data review. An criteria in paragraph (b)(4)(i) of this An operator must implement and operator must employ a process for section. document a system safety program evaluating post-flight data to— (iv) The Administrator may throughout the lifecycle of a launch or (1) Ensure consistency between the determine, in consultation with relevant reentry system that includes the assumptions used for the hazard control Federal agencies, that a more stringent following: strategy determination, any flight hazard probability is necessary to protect the (a) Safety organization. An operator or flight safety analyses, and associated national interests of the United States. must maintain a safety organization that mitigation and hazard control measures; (c) High consequence event has clearly defined lines of (2) Resolve any inconsistencies protection. An operator must protect communication and approval authority identified in paragraph (d)(1) of this against a high consequence event in for all public safety decisions. At a section prior to the next flight of the uncontrolled areas for each phase of minimum, the safety organization must vehicle; flight by: have the following positions: (3) Identify any anomaly that may (1) Using flight abort as a hazard (1) Mission director. For each launch impact any flight hazard analysis, flight control strategy in accordance with the or reentry, an operator must designate a safety analysis, or safety-critical system, requirements of § 450.108; position responsible for the safe conduct or is otherwise material to public safety; (2) Ensuring the consequence of any of all licensed activities and authorized and reasonably foreseeable failure mode, in to provide final approval to proceed (4) Address any anomaly identified in any significant period of flight, is no with licensed activities. This position is paragraph (d)(3) of this section prior to ¥ greater than 1 × 10 3 conditional referred to as the mission director in the next flight as necessary to ensure expected casualties; or this part. public safety, including updates to any (3) Establishing the launch or reentry (2) Safety official. For each launch or flight hazard analysis, flight safety vehicle has sufficient demonstrated reentry, an operator must designate a analysis, or safety-critical system. reliability as agreed to by the position with direct access to the (e) Application requirements. An Administrator based on conditional mission director who is— applicant must submit in its application expected casualties criteria during that (i) Responsible for communicating the following: phase of flight. potential safety and noncompliance (1) A description of the applicant’s (d) Disposal safety criteria. A launch issues to the mission director; and safety organization as required by operator must ensure that any disposal (ii) Authorized to examine all aspects paragraph (a) of this section, identifying meets the criteria of paragraphs (b)(1) of the operator’s ground and flight safety the applicant’s lines of communication through (3) of this section, or targets a operations, and to independently and approval authority, both internally broad ocean area. monitor compliance with the operator’s and externally, for all public safety

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decisions and the provision of public (2) Meets the requirements of safety system and failure of the flight safety services; and § 450.143 if the consequence of any safety system; (2) A summary of the processes and reasonably foreseeable failure mode in (6) Are designed to avoid flight abort products identified in the system safety any significant period of flight is that results in increased collective risk program requirements in paragraphs (b), between 1 × 10¥2 and 1 × 10¥3 to the public in uncontrolled areas, (c), and (d) of this section. conditional expected casualties for compared to continued flight; and uncontrolled areas. (7) Ensure that any trajectory within Hazard Control Strategies (c) Flight safety limits objectives. An the limits of a useful mission that is § 450.107 Hazard control strategies. operator must determine and use flight permitted to fly without abort would (a) General. To meet the safety criteria safety limits that define when an meet the collective risk criteria of of § 450.101(a), (b), or (c) for the flight, operator must initiate flight abort for § 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1) when analyzed or any phase of flight, of a launch or each of the following— as if it were the planned mission in reentry vehicle, an operator must use (1) To ensure compliance with the accordance with § 450.213(b)(2). (e) End of flight abort. A flight does one or more of the hazard control safety criteria of § 450.101(a) and (b); not need to be aborted to protect against strategies identified in § 450.108 (2) To prevent continued flight from high consequence events in through § 450.111. increasing risk in uncontrolled areas if uncontrolled areas beginning (b) Hazard control strategy the vehicle is unable to achieve a useful immediately after critical vehicle determination. For each phase of flight mission; parameters are validated, if the vehicle during a launch or reentry, an operator (3) To prevent the vehicle from is able to achieve a useful mission and must use a functional hazard analysis to entering a period of materially increased the following conditions are met for the determine a hazard control strategy or public exposure in uncontrolled areas, remainder of flight: strategies that account for— including before orbital insertion, if a critical vehicle parameter is outside its (1) Flight abort would not materially (1) All functional failures associated decrease the risk from a high with reasonably foreseeable hazardous pre-established expected range or indicates an inability to complete flight consequence event; and events that have the capability to create (2) There are no key flight safety a hazard to the public; within the limits of a useful mission; (4) To prevent conditional expected events. (2) Safety-critical systems; and ¥ (f) Flight abort rules. For each launch casualties greater than 1 × 10 2 in (3) A timeline of all safety-critical or reentry, an operator must establish uncontrolled areas due to flight abort or events. and observe flight abort rules that due to flight outside the limits of a (c) Flight hazard analysis. An govern the conduct of the launch or useful mission from any reasonably operator must conduct a flight hazard reentry as follows. foreseeable off-trajectory failure mode in analysis in accordance with § 450.109 of (1) Vehicle data required to evaluate any significant period of flight; and this part for the flight, or phase of flight, flight abort rules must be available to of a launch or reentry vehicle if the (5) To prevent the vehicle state from the flight safety system under all public safety hazards cannot be reaching identified conditions that are reasonably foreseeable conditions mitigated adequately to meet the public anticipated to compromise the during normal and malfunctioning risk criteria of § 450.101(a), (b), and (c) capability of the flight safety system if flight. using physical containment, wind further flight has the potential to violate (2) The flight safety system must abort weighting, or flight abort. a flight safety limit. flight: (d) Application requirements. An (6) In lieu of paragraphs (c)(2) and (4) (i) When valid, real-time data indicate applicant must submit in its of this section, to prevent debris capable the vehicle has violated any flight safety application— of causing a casualty due to any hazard limit developed in accordance with this (1) The results of the hazard control from affecting uncontrolled areas using section; strategy determination, including— a flight safety system that complies with (ii) When the vehicle state approaches (i) All functional failures identified § 450.145. identified conditions that are under paragraph (b)(1) of this section; (d) Flight safety limits constraints. An anticipated to compromise the (ii) The identification of all safety- operator must determine flight safety capability of the flight safety system and critical systems; and limits that— further flight has the potential to violate (iii) A timeline of all safety-critical (1) Account for temporal and a flight safety limit; and events. geometric extents on the Earth’s surface (iii) In accordance with methods used (2) A description of its hazard control of any reasonably foreseeable vehicle to satisfy (d)(3) of this section, if strategy or strategies for each phase of hazards under all reasonably foreseeable tracking data is invalid and further flight. conditions during normal and flight has the potential to violate a flight malfunctioning flight; safety limit. § 450.108 Flight abort. (2) Account for physics of hazard (g) Application requirements. An (a) Applicability. This section applies generation and transport including applicant must submit in its application to the use of flight abort as a hazard uncertainty; the following: control strategy for the flight, or phase (3) Account for the potential to lose (1) A description of the methods used of flight, of a launch or reentry vehicle valid data necessary to evaluate the to demonstrate compliance with to meet the safety criteria of § 450.101. flight abort rules; paragraph (c) of this section, including (b) Flight safety system. An operator (4) Account for the time delay, descriptions of how each analysis must use a flight safety system that: including uncertainties, between the constraint in paragraph (d) of this (1) Meets the requirements of violation of a flight abort rule and the section is satisfied in accordance with § 450.145 if the consequence of any time when the flight safety system is § 450.115. reasonably foreseeable failure mode in expected to activate; (2) A description of how each flight any significant period of flight is greater (5) Account in individual, collective, safety limit and flight abort rule is than 1 × 10¥2 conditional expected and conditional risk evaluations both evaluated and implemented during casualties in uncontrolled areas; or for proper functioning of the flight vehicle flight, including the quantitative

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criteria that will be used, a description section through validation and (2) A description of the methods used of any critical parameters, and how the verification. Verification includes: to ensure that flight hazard areas are values required in paragraphs (c)(3) and (i) Analysis; cleared of the public and critical assets. (e) of this section are identified; (ii) Test; (3) A graphic depiction or series of (iii) Demonstration; or § 450.111 Wind weighting. depictions of flight safety limits for a (iv) Inspection. (a) Applicability. This section applies representative mission together with the (c) New Hazards. An operator must to the use of wind weighting as a hazard launch or landing point, all establish and document the criteria and control strategy for the flight of an uncontrolled area boundaries, the techniques for identifying new hazards unguided suborbital launch vehicle to nominal trajectory, extents of normal throughout the lifecycle of the launch or meet the safety criteria of § 450.101(a), flight, and limits of a useful mission reentry system. (b), and (c). trajectories, with all trajectories in the (d) Completeness Prior to Flight. For (b) Wind weighting safety system. The same projection as each of the flight every launch or reentry, the flight flight of an unguided suborbital launch safety limits; and hazard analysis must be complete and vehicle that uses a wind weighting (4) A description of the vehicle data all hazards must be mitigated to an safety system must meet the following: that will be available to evaluate flight acceptable level in accordance with (1) The launcher azimuth and abort rules under all reasonably paragraph (b)(3) of this section. elevation settings must be wind foreseeable conditions during normal (e) Updates. An operator must weighted to correct for the effects of and malfunctioning flight. continually update the flight hazard wind conditions at the time of flight to analysis throughout the lifecycle of the provide impact locations that will § 450.109 Flight hazard analysis. launch or reentry system. ensure compliance with the safety (a) Applicability. This section applies (f) Application requirements. An criteria in § 450.101; and to the use of a flight hazard analysis as applicant must submit in its application (2) An operator must use launcher a hazard control strategy to derive the following: azimuth and elevation angle settings hazard controls for the flight, or phase (1) Flight hazard analysis products of that ensures the rocket will not fly in an of flight, of a launch or reentry vehicle. paragraphs (b)(1) through (5) of this unintended direction accounting for Hazards associated with computing section, including data that verifies the uncertainties in vehicle and launcher systems and software are further risk elimination and mitigation design and manufacturing, and addressed in § 450.141. measures resulting from the applicant’s atmospheric uncertainties. (b) Analysis. A flight hazard analysis flight hazard analyses required by (c) Analysis. An operator must— must identify, describe, and analyze all paragraph (b)(5) of this section; and (1) Establish flight commit criteria reasonably foreseeable hazards to public (2) The criteria and techniques for and other flight safety rules that control safety resulting from the flight of a identifying new hazards throughout the the risk to the public from potential launch or reentry vehicle. Each flight lifecycle of the launch or reentry system adverse effects resulting from normal hazard analysis must— as required by paragraph (c) of this and malfunctioning flight; (1) Identify all reasonably foreseeable section. (2) Establish any wind constraints hazards, and the corresponding failure under which flight may occur; and mode for each hazard, associated with § 450.110 Physical containment. (3) Conduct a wind weighting analysis the launch or reentry system relevant to (a) Applicability. This section applies that establishes the launcher azimuth public safety, including those resulting to the use of physical containment as a and elevation settings that correct for from: hazard control strategy for the flight, or the windcocking and wind-drift effects (i) Vehicle operation, including phase of flight, of a launch or reentry on the unguided suborbital launch staging and release; vehicle to meet the safety criteria of vehicle. (ii) System, subsystem, and § 450.101(a), (b), and (c). (d) Stability. An unguided suborbital component failures or faults; (b) Containment. To use physical launch vehicle, in all configurations, (iii) Software operations; containment as a hazard control must be stable throughout each stage of (iv) Environmental conditions; strategy, an operator must— powered flight. (v) Human factors; (1) Develop the flight hazard area in (e) Application requirements. An (vi) Design inadequacies; accordance with § 450.133; applicant must submit in its application (vii) Procedure deficiencies; (2) Ensure that the launch vehicle the following: (viii) Functional and physical does not have sufficient energy for any (1) A description of its wind interfaces between subsystems, hazards associated with its flight to weighting analysis methods, including including any vehicle payload; reach outside the flight hazard area; its method and schedule of determining (ix) Reuse of components or systems; (3) Ensure the hazard area is clear of wind speed and wind direction for each and the public and critical assets; and altitude layer; (x) Interactions of any of the above. (4) Apply other mitigation measures (2) A description of its wind (2) Assess each hazard’s likelihood necessary to ensure no public or critical weighting safety system including all and severity. asset exposure to hazards, such as equipment used to perform the wind (3) Ensure that the likelihood of any control of public access or wind weighting analysis; and hazardous condition that may cause placards. (3) A representative wind weighting death or serious injury to the public is (c) Application requirements. An analysis using actual or statistical winds extremely remote. applicant must submit in its application for the launch area and samples of the (4) Identify and describe the risk the following: output. elimination and mitigation measures (1) A demonstration that the launch Flight Safety Analyses required to satisfy paragraph (b)(3) of vehicle does not have sufficient energy this section. for any hazards associated with its flight § 450.113 Flight safety analysis (5) Document that the risk elimination to reach outside the flight hazard area requirements—scope. and mitigation measures achieve the developed in accordance with (a) An operator must perform and risk level of paragraph (b)(3) of this § 450.133; and document a flight safety analysis for all

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phases of flight, except as specified in § 450.117 Trajectory analysis for normal § 450.119 Trajectory analysis for paragraph (b) of this section, as flight. malfunction flight. follows— (a) General. A flight safety analysis (a) General. A flight safety analysis (1) For orbital launch, from liftoff must include a trajectory analysis that must include a trajectory analysis that through orbital insertion, and through establishes, for any phase of flight establishes— all component impacts or landings; within the scope as provided by (1) The vehicle’s deviation capability (2) For suborbital launch, from liftoff § 450.113(a), the limits of a launch or in the event of a malfunction during through all component impacts or reentry vehicle’s normal flight as flight, landings; defined by the nominal trajectory, and (2) The trajectory dispersion resulting (3) For disposal, from the initiation of the following sets of trajectories from reasonably foreseeable the deorbit through final impact; and sufficient to characterize variability and malfunctions, and (4) For reentry, from the initiation of uncertainty during normal flight: (3) For vehicles using flight abort as the deorbit through all component (1) A set of trajectories to characterize a hazard control strategy under impacts or landing. variability. This set must describe how § 450.108, trajectory data or parameters (b) An operator is not required to the intended trajectory could vary due that describe the limits of a useful perform and document a flight safety to conditions known prior to initiation mission. The FAA does not consider the analysis for a phase of flight if agreed to of flight; and collection of data related to a failure to be a useful mission. by the Administrator based on (2) A set of trajectories to characterize (b) Analysis constraints. A demonstrated reliability. An operator uncertainty. This set must describe how malfunction trajectory analysis must demonstrates reliability by using the actual trajectory could differ from account for each cause of a malfunction operational and flight history to show the intended trajectory due to random flight, including software and hardware compliance with the risk criteria in uncertainties in all parameters with a failures, for every period of normal § 450.101(a) and (b). significant influence on the vehicle’s flight. The analysis for each type of behavior throughout normal flight. § 450.115 Flight safety analysis methods. malfunction must have sufficient (b) Trajectory model. A final trajectory (a) Scope of the analysis. An temporal and spatial resolution to analysis must use a six-degree of establish flight safety limits, if any, and operator’s flight safety analysis method freedom trajectory model to satisfy the must account for all reasonably individual risk contours that are smooth requirements of paragraph (a) of this and continuous. The analysis must foreseeable events and failures of safety- section. critical systems during nominal and account for— (c) Atmospheric effects. A trajectory non-nominal launch or reentry that (1) The relative probability of analysis must account for atmospheric could jeopardize public safety. occurrence of each malfunction; conditions that have an effect on the (b) Level of fidelity of the analysis. An (2) The probability distribution of trajectory, including atmospheric operator’s flight safety analysis method position and velocity of the vehicle profiles that are no less severe than the must have a level of fidelity sufficient when each malfunction trajectory will worst conditions under which flight to— terminate due to vehicle breakup, might be attempted, and for uncertainty ground impact, or orbital insertion along (1) Demonstrate that any risk to the in the atmospheric conditions. public satisfies the safety criteria of with the cause of termination and the (d) Application requirements. An § 450.101, including the use of state of the vehicle; applicant must submit the following: mitigations, accounting for all known (3) The parameters with a significant sources of uncertainty, using a means of (1) A description of the methods used influence on a vehicle’s flight behavior compliance accepted by the to characterize the vehicle’s flight from the time a malfunction begins to Administrator; and behavior throughout normal flight, in cause a flight deviation until the time each malfunction trajectory will (2) Identify the dominant source of accordance with § 450.115(c). terminate due to vehicle breakup, each type of public risk with a criterion (2) The quantitative input data, ground impact, or orbital insertion; and in § 450.101(a) or (b) in terms of phase including uncertainties, used to model (4) The potential for failure of the of flight, source of hazard (such as toxic the vehicle’s normal flight in six degrees flight safety system, if any. exposure, inert, or explosive debris), of freedom. (3) The worst atmospheric conditions (c) Application requirements. An and failure mode. applicant must submit— (c) Application requirements. An under which flight might be attempted, and a description of how the operator (1) A description of the methodology applicant must submit a description of used to characterize the vehicle’s flight the flight safety analysis methodology, will evaluate the atmospheric conditions and uncertainty in the behavior throughout malfunction flight, including identification of: in accordance with § 450.115(c). (1) The scientific principles and atmospheric conditions prior to initiating the operation; (2) A description of the methodology statistical methods used; used to determine the limits of a useful (4) Representative normal flight (2) All assumptions and their mission, in accordance with trajectory analysis outputs, including justifications; § 450.115(c). (3) The rationale for the level of the position velocity, and orientation for (3) A description of the input data fidelity; each second of flight for— used to characterize the vehicle’s (4) The evidence for validation and (i) The nominal trajectory; malfunction flight behavior, including: verification required by § 450.101(g); (ii) A set of trajectories that (i) A list of each cause of malfunction (5) The extent to which the characterize variability in the intended flight considered; benchmark conditions are comparable trajectory based on conditions known (ii) A list of each type of malfunction to the foreseeable conditions of the prior to initiation of flight; and flight for which malfunction flight intended operations; and (iii) A set of trajectories that behavior was characterized; and (6) The extent to which risk characterize how the actual trajectory (iii) A quantitative description of the mitigations were accounted for in the could differ from the intended trajectory parameters, including uncertainties, analyses. due to random uncertainties. with a significant influence on the

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vehicle’s malfunction behavior for each § 450.123 Population exposure analysis. across flight phases and failure modes. type of malfunction flight characterized. (a) General. A flight safety analysis The distribution must be consistent (4) Representative malfunction flight must account for the distribution of with— trajectory analysis outputs, including people for the entire region where there (1) The data available from all the position and velocity as a function is a significant probability of impact of previous flights of vehicles developed of flight time for— hazardous debris. and launched or reentered in similar (i) Each set of trajectories that (b) Constraints. The exposure analysis circumstances; and characterizes a type of malfunction must— (2) Data from previous flights of flight; (1) Characterize the distribution of vehicles, stages, or components (ii) The probability of each set of people both geographically and developed and launched, reentered, trajectories that characterizes a type of temporally; flown, or tested by the subject vehicle malfunction flight; and (2) Account for the distribution of developer or operator. Such data may (iii) A set of trajectories that people among structures and vehicle include previous experience involving characterizes the limits of a useful types; similar— mission as described in paragraph (a)(3) (3) Use reliable, accurate, and timely (i) Vehicle, stage, or component of this section. source data; and design characteristics; (4) Account for vulnerability of (ii) Development and integration § 450.121 Debris analysis. people to hazardous debris effects. processes, including the extent of (a) General. A flight safety analysis (c) Application requirements. An integrated system testing; and must include an analysis characterizing applicant must submit: (iii) Level of experience of the vehicle the hazardous debris generated from (1) A description of the methods used operation and development team normal and malfunctioning vehicle to develop the exposure input data in members. flight as a function of vehicle flight accordance with § 450.115(c), and (e) Observed vs. conditional failure sequence. (2) Complete population exposure rate. Probability of failure allocation (b) Vehicle impact and breakup data, in tabular form. must account for significant differences in the observed failure rate and the analysis. A debris analysis must account § 450.131 Probability of failure analysis. for: conditional failure rate. A probability of (a) General. For each hazard and failure analysis must use a constant (1) Each reasonably foreseeable cause phase of flight, a flight safety analysis of vehicle breakup and intact impact, conditional failure rate for each phase of for a launch or reentry must account for flight, unless there is clear and (2) Vehicle structural characteristics vehicle failure probability. The and materials, and convincing evidence of a different probability of failure must be consistent conditional failure rate for a particular (3) Energetic effects during break-up for all hazards and phases of flight. or at impact. vehicle, stage, or phase of flight. (1) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with (f) Application requirements. An (c) Propagation of debris. A debris fewer than two flights, the failure analysis must compute statistically applicant must submit: probability estimate must account for (1) A description of the methods used valid debris impact probability the outcome of all previous flights of distributions. The propagation of debris in probability of failure analysis, in vehicles developed and launched or accordance with § 450.115(c); and from each predicted breakup location to reentered in similar circumstances. impact must account for— (2) A representative set of tabular data (2) For a vehicle or vehicle stage with and graphs of the predicted failure rate (1) All foreseeable forces that can two or more flights, vehicle failure influence any debris impact location; and cumulative failure probability for probability estimates must account for each foreseeable failure mode. and the outcomes of all previous flights of (2) All foreseeable sources of impact the vehicle or vehicle stage in a § 450.133 Flight hazard area analysis. dispersion, including, at a minimum: statistically valid manner. The outcomes (a) General. A flight safety analysis (i) The uncertainties in atmospheric of all previous flights of the vehicle or must include a flight hazard area conditions; vehicle stage must account for data on analysis that identifies any region of (ii) Debris aerodynamic parameters, any mishap and anomaly. land, sea, or air that must be surveyed, including uncertainties; (b) Failure. For flight safety analysis publicized, controlled, or evacuated in (iii) Pre-breakup position and purposes, a failure occurs when a order to control the risk to the public. velocity, including uncertainties; and vehicle does not complete any phase of The analysis must account for, at a (iv) Breakup-imparted velocities, normal flight or when any anomalous minimum— including uncertainties. condition exhibits the potential for a (1) The regions of land, sea, and air (d) Application requirements. An stage or its debris to impact the Earth or potentially exposed to hazardous debris applicant must submit: reenter the atmosphere outside the generated during normal flight events (1) A description of all scenarios that normal trajectory envelope during the and all reasonably foreseeable failure can lead to hazardous debris; mission or any future mission of similar modes; (2) A description of the methods used vehicle capability. (2) Any hazard controls implemented to perform the vehicle impact and (c) Previous flight. For flight safety to control risk from any hazard; breakup analysis, in accordance with analysis purposes— (3) The limits of a launch or reentry § 450.115(c); (1) The flight of a launch vehicle vehicle’s normal flight, including— (3) A description of the methods used begins at a time in which a launch (i) Atmospheric conditions that are no to compute debris impact distributions, vehicle lifts off from the surface of the less severe than the worst atmospheric in accordance with § 450.115(c); Earth; and conditions under which flight might be (4) A description of the atmospheric (2) The flight of a reentry vehicle or attempted; and data used as input to the debris analysis; deorbiting upper stage begins at a time (ii) Uncertainty in the atmospheric and in which a vehicle attempts to initiate conditions; (5) A quantitative description of the a reentry. (4) All hazardous debris; physical, aerodynamic, and harmful (d) Allocation. The vehicle failure (5) Sources of debris dispersion in characteristics of hazardous debris. probability estimate must be distributed accordance with § 450.121(c); and

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(6) A probability of one for any those to be published, in accordance (iii) Impact speed and angle, planned debris hazards or planned with § 450.161, prior to any proposed accounting for motion of impacted impacts. operation; vehicles; (b) Waterborne vessel hazard areas. (ii) Representative 97 percent (iv) Uncertainty in input data, such as The flight hazard area analysis for probability of containment contours for fragment impact parameters; and waterborne vessels must determine the all debris resulting from normal flight (v) Uncertainty in modeling areas and durations for regions of events capable of causing a casualty for methodology. water— all locations specified in paragraph (a) (c) Application requirements. An (1) That are necessary to contain, with of this section; applicant must submit: 97 percent probability of containment, (iii) Representative individual (1) A description of the methods used all debris resulting from normal flight probability of casualty contours for all to demonstrate compliance with the events capable of causing a casualty to locations specified in paragraph (a) of safety criteria in § 450.101, in persons on waterborne vessels; this section, including tabular data and accordance with § 450.115(c), including (2) That are necessary to contain graphs showing the hypothetical a description of how the operator will either where the probability of debris location of any member of the public account for the conditions immediately capable of causing a casualty impacting that could be exposed to a probability of prior to enabling the flight of a launch on or near a vessel would exceed 1 × casualty of 1 × 10¥5 or greater for ¥ vehicle or the reentry of a reentry 10 5, accounting for all relevant neighboring operations personnel, and 1 vehicle, such as the final trajectory, ¥ hazards, or where the individual × 10 6 or greater for other members of atmospheric conditions, and the probability of casualty for any person on the public, given all foreseeable exposure of people; board a vessel would exceed the conditions within the flight commit (2) A description of the atmospheric individual risk criteria in § 450.101(a)(2) criteria; data used as input to the debris risk or (b)(2); and (iv) If applicable, representative 1 × ¥ ¥ analysis; (3) Where reduced vessel traffic is 10 5 and 1 × 10 6 probability of impact (3) The effective unsheltered casualty necessary to meet the collective risk contours for all debris capable of area for all fragment classes, assuming a criteria in § 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1). causing a casualty to persons on a representative impact vector; (c) Land hazard areas. The flight waterborne vessel regardless of location; (4) The effective casualty area for all hazard area analysis for land must and fragment classes for a representative × ¥6 × determine the durations and areas (v) Representative 1 10 and 1 type of building, ground vehicle, ¥7 regions of land— 10 probability of impact contours for waterborne vessel, and aircraft, (1) That are necessary to contain, with all debris capable of causing a casualty assuming a representative impact 97 percent probability of containment, to persons on an aircraft regardless of vector; all debris resulting from normal flight location. (5) Collective and individual debris events capable of causing a casualty to risk analysis outputs under any person on land; § 450.135 Debris risk analysis. representative conditions and the worst (2) Where the individual probability (a) General. A flight safety analysis of casualty for any person on land must include a debris risk analysis that foreseeable conditions, including: (i) Total collective casualty would exceed the individual risk demonstrates compliance with safety expectation for the proposed operation; criteria in § 450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2); and criteria in § 450.101, either— (3) Where reduced population is (1) Prior to the day of the operation, (ii) A list of the collective risk necessary to meet the collective risk accounting for all foreseeable conditions contribution for at least the top ten criteria in § 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1). within the flight commit criteria; or population centers and all centers with (d) Airspace hazard volumes. The (2) During the countdown using the collective risk exceeding 1 percent of flight hazard area analysis for airspace best available input data, including the collective risk criteria in must determine the durations and flight commit criteria and flight abort § 450.101(a)(1) or (b)(1); volumes for regions of air to be rules. (iii) A list of the maximum individual submitted to the FAA for approval— (b) Casualty area and consequence probability of casualty for the top ten (1) That are necessary to contain, with analysis. A debris risk analysis must population centers and all centers that 97 percent probability of containment, model the casualty area, and compute exceed 10 percent of the individual risk all debris resulting from normal flight the predicted consequences of each criteria in § 450.101(a)(2) or (b)(2); and events capable of causing a casualty to reasonably foreseeable failure mode in (iv) A list of the conditional collective persons on an aircraft; and any significant period of flight in terms casualty expectation for each failure (2) Where the probability of impact on of conditional expected casualties. The mode for each significant period of an aircraft would exceed the aircraft risk casualty area and consequence analysis flight under representative conditions criterion in § 450.101(a)(3) or (b)(3). must account for— and the worst foreseeable conditions. (e) Application requirements. An (1) All relevant debris fragment applicant must submit: characteristics and the characteristics of § 450.137 Far-field overpressure blast effects analysis. (1) A description of the methodology a representative person exposed to any to be used in the flight hazard area potential debris hazard; (a) General. A flight safety analysis analysis in accordance with (2) Statistically-valid debris impact must include a far-field overpressure § 450.115(c), including: probability distributions; blast effect analysis that demonstrates (i) Classes of waterborne vessel and (3) Any impact or effects of hazardous compliance with safety criteria in vulnerability criteria employed; and debris; and § 450.101, either— (ii) Classes of aircraft and (4) The vulnerability of people to (1) Prior to the day of the operation, vulnerability criteria employed. debris impact or effects, including: accounting for all foreseeable conditions (2) Tabular data and graphs of the (i) Effects of buildings, ground within the flight commit criteria; or results of the flight hazard area analysis, vehicles, waterborne vessel, and aircraft (2) During the countdown using the including: upon the vulnerability of any occupants; best available input data, including (i) Geographical coordinates of all (ii) Effect of atmospheric conditions flight commit criteria and flight abort hazard areas that are representative of on debris impact and effects; rules.

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(b) Analysis constraints. The analysis other members of the public, given (5) Account for any operational must account for— foreseeable conditions; constraints and emergency procedures (1) The explosive capability of the (7) The maximum expected casualties that provide protection from toxic vehicle and hazardous debris at impact that could result from far-field release. and at altitude; overpressure hazards given foreseeable (d) Toxic containment. An operator (2) The potential influence of conditions; and using toxic containment must manage meteorological conditions and terrain (8) A description of the the risk of any casualty from the characteristics; and meteorological measurements used as exposure to toxic release either by— (3) The potential for broken windows input to any real-time far-field (1) Evacuating, or being prepared to due to peak incident overpressures overpressure analysis. evacuate, the public from any toxic below 1.0 psi and related casualties hazard area in the event of a worst-case § 450.139 Toxic hazards for flight. based on the characteristics of exposed release or maximum-credible release windows and the population’s (a) Applicability. (1) Except as scenario; or susceptibility to injury, with specified in paragraph (a)(2), this (2) Employing meteorological considerations including, at a section applies to any launch or reentry constraints to limit an operation to minimum, shelter types, window types, vehicle, including all vehicle times during which prevailing winds and the time of day of the proposed components and payloads, that use and other conditions ensure that any operation. toxic propellants or other toxic member of the public would not be (c) Application requirements. An chemicals. exposed to toxic concentrations and applicant must submit a description of (2) No toxic release hazard analysis is durations greater than accepted toxic the far-field overpressure analysis, required for kerosene-based fuels, thresholds for acute casualty in the including all assumptions and unless the Administrator determines event of a worst-case release or justifications for the assumptions, that an analysis is required to protect maximum-credible release scenario. analysis methods, input data, and public safety. (e) Toxic risk assessment. An operator (b) General. An operator must— results. At a minimum, the application using toxic risk assessment must (1) Conduct a toxic release hazard must include: establish flight commit criteria that (1) A description of the population analysis in accordance with paragraph demonstrate compliance with the safety centers, terrain, building types, and (c) of this section; criteria of § 450.101. A toxic risk window characteristics used as input to (2) Manage the risk of casualties that assessment must— the far-field overpressure analysis; could arise from the exposure to toxic (2) A description of the methods used release through one of the following (1) Account for airborne concentration to compute the foreseeable explosive means: and duration thresholds of toxic yield probability pairs, and the (i) Contain hazards caused by toxic propellants or other chemicals. For any complete set of yield-probability pairs, release in accordance with paragraph (d) toxic propellant, other chemicals, or used as input to the far-field of this section; or combustion product, an operator must overpressure analysis; (ii) Perform a toxic risk assessment, in use airborne toxic concentration and (3) A description of the methods used accordance with paragraph (e) of this duration thresholds identified in a to compute peak incident overpressures section, that protects the public in means of compliance accepted by the as a function of distance from the compliance with the safety criteria of Administrator; explosion and prevailing meteorological § 450.101, including toxic release (2) Account for physical phenomena conditions, including sample hazards. expected to influence any toxic calculations for a representative range of (3) Establish flight commit criteria concentration and duration in the area the foreseeable meteorological based on the results of its toxic release surrounding the potential release site; conditions, yields, and population hazard analysis and toxic containment (3) Determine a toxic hazard area for center locations; or toxic risk assessment for any the launch or reentry, surrounding the (4) A description of the methods used necessary evacuation of the public from potential release site for each toxic to compute the probability of window any toxic hazard area. propellant or other chemical based on breakage, including tabular data and (c) Toxic release hazard analysis. A the amount and toxicity of the graphs for the probability of breakage as toxic release hazard analysis must— propellant or other chemical, the a function of the peak incident (1) Account for any toxic release that exposure duration, and the overpressure for a representative range could occur during nominal or non- meteorological conditions involved; of window types, building types, and nominal flight; (4) Account for all members of the yields accounted for; (2) Include a worst-case release public who may be exposed to the toxic (5) A description of the methods used scenario analysis or a maximum- release, including all members of the to compute the probability of casualty credible release scenario analysis for public on land and on any waterborne for a representative individual, each process that involves a toxic vessels, populated offshore structures, including tabular data and graphs for propellant or other chemical; and aircraft that are not operated in the probability of casualty, as a function (3) Determine if toxic release can direct support of the launch or reentry; of location relative to the window and occur based on an evaluation of the and the peak incident overpressure for a chemical compositions and quantities of (5) Account for any risk mitigation representative range of window types, propellants, other chemicals, vehicle measures applied in the risk assessment. building types, and yields accounted materials, and projected combustion (f) Application requirements. An for; products, and the possible toxic release applicant must submit: (6) Tabular data and graphs showing scenarios; (1) The identity of toxic propellant, the hypothetical location of any member (4) Account for both normal chemical, or combustion products or of the public that could be exposed to combustion products and any unreacted derivatives in the possible toxic release; a probability of casualty of 1 × 10¥5 or propellants and phase change or (2) The applicant’s selected airborne greater for neighboring operations chemical derivatives of released toxic concentration and duration personnel, and 1 × 10¥6 or greater for substances; and thresholds;

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(3) The meteorological conditions for in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, (3) Provide documentation of the the atmospheric transport and buoyant commensurate with its degree of control development processes that meets cloud rise of any toxic release from its over hazards to the public and the paragraph (c) of this section; source to downwind receptor locations; severity of those hazards. (4) Provide evidence of the execution (4) Characterization of the terrain, as (b) Safety requirements. An operator of the appropriate development process input for modeling the atmospheric must develop safety requirements for for each computing system safety item; transport of a toxic release from its each computing system safety item. In and source to downwind receptor locations; doing so, the operator must: (5) Provide evidence of the (5) The identity of the toxic (1) Identify and evaluate safety implementation of each safety dispersion model used, and any other requirements for each computing system requirement. input data; safety item; § 450.143 Safety-critical system design, (6) Representative results of an (2) Ensure the safety requirements are test, and documentation. applicant’s toxic dispersion modeling to complete and correct; predict concentrations and durations at (3) Implement each safety (a) Applicability. This section applies selected downwind receptor locations, requirement; and to all safety-critical systems, except to determine the toxic hazard area for a (4) Verify and validate the for— (1) Highly reliable flight safety released quantity of the toxic substance; implementation of each safety systems covered under § 450.145; or (7) A toxic release hazard analysis in requirement by using a method (2) Safety-critical systems for which accordance with paragraph (c) of this appropriate for the level of criticality of an operator demonstrates through its section: the computing system safety item. For flight hazard analysis that the likelihood (i) A description of the failure modes each computing system safety item that of any hazardous condition specifically and associated relative probabilities for is safety critical under § 401.7, associated with the system that may potential toxic release scenarios used in verification and validation must include cause death or serious injury to the the risk evaluation; and testing by a test team independent of the public is extremely remote, pursuant to (ii) The methodology and development division or organization. § 450.109(b)(3). representative results of an applicant’s (c) Development process. An operator (b) Design. An operator must design determination of the worst-case or must implement and document a safety-critical systems such that no maximum-credible quantity of any toxic development process for computing credible fault can lead to increased risk release that might occur during the system safety items appropriate for the to the public beyond nominal safety- flight of a vehicle; level of criticality of the computing critical system operation. (8) In accordance with § 450.139(b)(2), system safety item. A development (c) Qualification testing of design. An (i) A toxic containment in accordance process must define: operator must functionally demonstrate with paragraph (d) of this section, (1) Responsibilities for each task the design of the vehicle’s safety-critical identify the evacuation plans or associated with a computing system systems at conditions beyond its meteorological constraints and safety item; predicted operating environments. The associated launch commit criteria (2) Processes for internal review and operator must select environmental test needed to ensure that the public will approval—including review that levels that ensure the design is not be within a toxic hazard area in the evaluates the implementation of all sufficiently stressed to demonstrate that event of a worst-case release or safety requirements—such that no system performance is not degraded due maximum-credible release scenario; or person approves that person’s own to design tolerances, manufacturing (ii) A toxic risk assessment in work; variances, or uncertainties in the accordance with paragraph (e) of this (3) Processes to ensure development environment. section: personnel are trained, qualified, and (d) Acceptance of hardware. An (A) A demonstration that the safety capable of performing their role; operator must— criteria in § 450.101 will be met; (4) Processes that trace requirements (1) Functionally demonstrate any (B) The population characteristics in to verification and validation evidence; safety-critical system, while exposed to receptor locations that are identified by (5) Processes for configuration its predicted operating environments toxic dispersion modeling as toxic management that specify the content of with margin, is free of defects, free of hazard areas; each released version of a computing integration and workmanship errors, (C) A description of any risk system safety item; and ready for operational use; or mitigations applied in the toxic risk (6) Processes for testing that verify (2) Combine in-process controls and a assessment; and and validate all safety requirements to quality assurance process to ensure (D) A description of the population the extent required by paragraph (b)(4) functional capability of any safety- exposure input data used in accordance of this section; critical system during its service life. with § 450.123. (7) Reuse policies that verify and (e) Lifecycle of safety-critical systems. Prescribed Hazard Controls for Safety- validate the safety requirements for (1) The predicted operating Critical Hardware and Computing reused computing system safety items; environments must be based on Systems and conditions predicted to be encountered (8) Third-party product use policies in all phases of flight, recovery, and § 450.141 Computing systems. that verify and validate the safety transportation. (a) Identification of computing system requirements for any third-party (2) An operator must monitor the safety items. An operator must identify: product. flight environments experienced by (1) Any software or data that (d) Application requirements. An safety-critical system components to the implements a capability that, by applicant must: extent necessary to— intended operation, unintended (1) Identify and describe all (i) Validate the predicted operating operation, or non-operation, can present computing system safety items involved environments; and a hazard to the public; and in the proposed operations; (ii) Assess the actual component life (2) The level of criticality of each (2) Provide the safety requirements for remaining or adjust any inspection computing system safety item identified each computing system safety item; period.

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(f) Application requirements. An including all components, component applicable air navigation authority to applicant must submit to the FAA the functions, and possible operational establish procedures for the issuance of following as part of its application: scenarios. a Notice to Airmen prior to a launch or (1) A list and description of each (2) Flight safety system diagram. An reentry, for closing of air routes during safety-critical system; applicant must submit a diagram that the respective launch and reentry (2) Drawings and schematics for each identifies all flight safety system windows, and for other measures safety-critical system; subsystems and shows the necessary to protect public health and (3) A summary of the analysis to interconnection of all the elements of safety; and determine the predicted operating the flight safety system. The diagram (4) Mishap response. Emergency environments and duration to be must include any subsystems used to response providers, including local applied to qualification and acceptance implement flight abort both on and off government authorities, to satisfy the testing covering the service life of any the vehicle, including any subsystems requirements of § 450.173. safety-critical system; used to make the decision to abort (b) Roles and responsibilities. The (4) A description of any method used flight. agreements required in this section must to validate the predicted operating (3) Flight safety system analyses. An clearly delineate the roles and environments; applicant must submit any analyses and responsibilities of each party to support (5) A description of any detailed analysis reports of all flight the safe launch or reentry under this instrumentation or inspection processes safety system subsystems necessary to part. to monitor aging of any safety-critical calculate the reliability and confidence (c) Effective date. The agreements system; levels required by paragraph (a) of this required in this section must be in effect (6) The criteria and procedures for section. before a license can be issued, unless disposal or refurbishment for service life (4) Tracking validation procedures. otherwise agreed to by the extension of safety-critical system An applicant must document and Administrator. components; and submit the procedures for validating the (d) Application requirements. An (7) A description of the standards accuracy of any vehicle tracking data applicant must— used in all phases of the lifecycle of utilized by the flight safety system to (1) Describe each agreement in this each safety-critical system. make the decision to abort flight. section; and (2) Provide a copy of any agreement, § 450.145 Highly reliable flight safety (5) Flight safety system test plans. An system. applicant must submit acceptance, or portion thereof, to the FAA upon qualification, and preflight test plans of request. (a) General. For each phase of flight any flight safety system, subsystems, for which an operator must implement § 450.149 Safety-critical personnel and components. The test plans must flight abort to meet the requirement of qualifications. include test procedures and test § 450.108(b)(1), the operator must use a environments. (a) General. An operator must ensure highly reliable flight safety system on (6) Monitoring plan. An applicant safety-critical personnel are trained, the launch or reentry vehicle, vehicle must submit a description of any qualified, and capable of performing component, or payload with a design method used to validate the predicted their safety-critical tasks, and that their reliability in accordance with this operating environments. training is current. section. (b) Application requirements. An (b) Reliability. A highly reliable flight Other Prescribed Hazard Controls applicant must— safety system must, using a means of (1) Identify safety-critical tasks that § 450.147 Agreements. compliance accepted by the require qualified personnel; Administrator— (a) General. An operator must (2) Provide internal training and (1) Have a design reliability of 0.999 establish a written agreement with any currency requirements, completion at 95 percent confidence and entity that provides a service or standards, or any other means of commensurate design, analysis, and property that meets a requirement in demonstrating compliance with the testing for the portion of the flight safety this part, including: requirements of this section; and system onboard the vehicle; and (1) Launch and reentry site use (3) Describe the process for tracking (2) Have a design reliability of 0.999 agreements. A Federal launch or reentry training currency. at 95 percent confidence and site operator, a licensed launch or commensurate design, analysis, and reentry site operator, or any other § 450.151 Work shift and rest testing for the portion of the flight safety person that provides services or access requirements. system not onboard the vehicle, if used. to or use of property required to support (a) General. For any launch or reentry, (c) Monitoring. An operator must the safe launch or reentry under this an operator must document and monitor the flight environments part; implement rest requirements that ensure experienced by any flight safety system (2) Agreements for notices to safety-critical personnel are physically component to the extent necessary to— mariners. Unless otherwise addressed in and mentally capable of performing all (1) Validate the predicted operating agreements with the site operator, for assigned tasks. environment; and overflight of navigable water, the U.S. (b) Work shifts and deviation (2) Assess the actual component life Coast Guard or other applicable approval process. An operator’s rest remaining or adjust any inspection maritime authority to establish requirements must address the period. procedures for the issuance of a Notice following: (d) Application requirements. An to Mariners prior to a launch or reentry (1) Duration of each work shift and applicant must submit the information and other measures necessary to protect the process for extending this shift, identified below, for any highly reliable public health and safety; including the maximum allowable flight safety system: (3) Agreements for notices to airmen. length of any extension; (1) Flight safety system description. Unless otherwise addressed in (2) Number of consecutive work shift An applicant must describe the flight agreements with the site operator, the days allowed before rest is required; safety system and its operation in detail, FAA Air Traffic Organization or other (3) Minimum rest period required—

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(i) Between each work shift, including direct access to real-time, safety-critical (1) A description of how the applicant the period of rest required immediately information required to issue ‘‘hold/ will provide for day-of-flight before the flight countdown work shift; resume,’’ ‘‘go/no go,’’ and any abort surveillance and control of flight hazard and commands; and areas, if necessary, to ensure that the (ii) After the maximum number of (3) Implement a protocol for using presence of any member of the public in work shift days allowed; and defined radio telephone or near a flight hazard area is consistent (4) Approval process for any deviation communications terminology. with flight commit criteria developed from the rest requirements. (b) An operator must ensure the for each launch or reentry as required by (c) Application requirement. An currency of the communication § 450.165(b); applicant must submit rest rules that procedures, and that all personnel are (2) A description of how the applicant demonstrate compliance with the working with the approved version of will provide for any publication of flight requirements of this section. the communication procedures. hazard areas necessary to meet the (c) An operator must record all safety- requirements of this section; and § 450.153 Radio frequency management. critical communications network (3) A description of how the applicant (a) General. For any radio frequency channels that are used for voice, video, will establish flight commit criteria used, an operator must— or data transmissions that support based on the results of its toxic release (1) Ensure radio frequency safety-critical systems during each hazard analysis, toxic containment, or interference does not adversely affect countdown. toxic risk assessment for any necessary performance of any flight safety system evacuation of the public from any toxic or safety-critical system; and § 450.159 Pre-flight procedures. hazard area. (2) Coordinate use of radio (a) An operator must implement pre- frequencies with any site operator and flight procedures that— § 450.163 Lightning hazard mitigation. any local and Federal authorities. (1) Verify that each flight commit (a) Lightning hazard mitigation. An (b) Application requirements. An criterion is satisfied before flight is operator must— applicant must submit procedures or initiated; and (1) Establish flight commit criteria other means to demonstrate compliance (2) Ensure the operator can return the that mitigate the potential for a launch with the radio frequency requirements vehicle to a safe state after a countdown or reentry vehicle intercepting or of this section. abort or delay. initiating a direct lightning strike, or (b) An operator must ensure the encountering a nearby discharge, using § 450.155 Readiness. currency of the pre-flight procedures, a means of compliance accepted by the (a) General. An operator must and that all personnel are working with Administrator; or document and implement procedures to the approved version of the pre-flight (2) Use a vehicle designed to protect assess readiness to proceed with the procedures. safety-critical systems in the event of a flight of a launch or reentry vehicle. direct lightning strike or nearby These procedures must address, at a § 450.161 Control of hazard areas. discharge. minimum, the following: (a) General. The operator must (b) Application requirements. (1) An (1) Readiness of vehicle and launch, publicize, survey, control, or evacuate applicant electing to comply with reentry, or landing site, including any each flight hazard area identified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section must contingency abort location; accordance with § 450.133 prior to submit flight commit criteria that (2) Readiness of safety-critical initiating flight of a launch vehicle or mitigate the potential for a launch or personnel, systems, software, the reentry of a reentry vehicle to the reentry vehicle intercepting or initiating procedures, equipment, property, and extent necessary to ensure compliance a direct lightning strike, or encountering services; and with § 450.101. a nearby lightning discharge. (3) Readiness to implement the (b) Verification. The launch or reentry (2) An applicant electing to comply mishap plan required by § 450.173. operator must perform surveillance with paragraph (a)(2) of this section (b) Application requirements. An sufficient to verify or update the must submit documentation providing applicant must— assumptions, input data, and results of evidence that the vehicle is designed to (1) Demonstrate compliance with the the flight safety analyses. protect safety-critical systems against requirements of paragraph (a) of this (c) Publication. An operator must the effects of a direct lightning strike or section through procedures that may publicize warnings for each flight nearby discharge. include a readiness meeting close in hazard area, except for regions of land, time to flight; and sea, or air under the control of the § 450.165 Flight commit criteria. (2) Describe the criteria for vehicle operator, site operator, or other (a) General. For each launch or establishing readiness to proceed with controlling authority with which the reentry, an operator must establish and the flight of a launch or reentry vehicle operator has an agreement. If the observe flight commit criteria that so that public safety is maintained. operator relies on another entity to identify each condition necessary prior publicize these warnings, it must: to flight to satisfy the requirements of § 450.157 Communications. (1) Determine whether the warnings § 450.101, and must include: (a) An operator must implement have been issued; and (1) Surveillance of any region of land, communication procedures during the (2) Notify the FAA if the warnings sea, or air in accordance with § 450.161; countdown and flight of a launch or have not been issued so that the FAA (2) Monitoring of any meteorological reentry vehicle that— can determine if the launch or reentry condition necessary to— (1) Define the authority of personnel, can be conducted in a manner that (i) Be consistent with any safety by individual or position title, to issue sufficiently protects the public. This analysis required by this part; and ‘‘hold/resume,’’ ‘‘go/no go,’’ and abort notification must provide sufficient (ii) If necessary in accordance with commands; information to enable FAA to issue § 450.163, mitigate the potential for a (2) Assign communication networks warnings to U.S. aircraft. launch or reentry vehicle intercepting a so that personnel identified in (d) Application requirements. An lightning strike, or encountering a paragraph (a)(1) of this section have applicant must submit— nearby discharge;

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(3) Implementation of any launch or (2) For objects that are neither orbital avoidance analysis worksheet for each reentry window closure in the launch or debris nor inhabitable, one of the two launch or reentry using a standardized reentry window for the purpose of criteria below must be met: format that contains the input data collision avoidance in accordance with (i) The probability of collision required by appendix A to this part, as § 450.169; between the launching or reentering follows: (4) Confirmation that any safety- objects and any object must not exceed (1) Except as specified in paragraphs ¥ critical system is ready for flight; 1 × 10 5; or (f)(1)(i) and (ii) of this section, an (5) Confirmation from the FAA that (ii) The launching or reentering operator must file the input data with an the risk to critical assets satisfies the objects must maintain a spherical entity identified in paragraph (e) of this requirements of § 450.101(a)(4) or (b)(4); separation distance of 25 km from the section and the FAA at least 7 days (6) For any reentry vehicle, except a object. before the first attempt at the flight of a suborbital vehicle, monitoring by the (3) For all other known orbital debris launch vehicle or the reentry of a operator or an onboard system that the identified by the FAA or other Federal reentry vehicle. status of safety-critical systems is Government entity as large objects with (i) Operators that have never received 2 healthy before enabling reentry flight, to radar cross section greater than 1 m and a launch or reentry conjunction assure the vehicle can reenter safely to medium objects with radar cross section assessment from the entity identified in 2 2 Earth; and 0.1 m to 1 m : paragraph (e) of this section, must file (7) Any other hazard controls derived (i) The probability of collision the input data at least 15 days in from any safety analysis required by this between the launching or reentering advance. part. objects and any known orbital debris (ii) The Administrator may agree to an must not exceed 1 × 10¥5; or (b) Application requirements. An alternative time frame in accordance (ii) The launching or reentering applicant must submit a list of all flight with § 404.15; objects must maintain a spherical commit criteria. (2) An operator must obtain a separation distance of 2.5 km. collision avoidance analysis performed § 450.167 Tracking. (b) Screening time. A launch or by an entity identified in paragraph (e) reentry operator must ensure the (a) General. During the flight of a of this section, no later than 3 hours requirements of paragraph (a) of this launch or reentry vehicle, an operator before the beginning of a launch or section are met as follows: must measure and record in real time reentry window; and (1) Through the entire segment of the position and velocity of the vehicle. (3) If an operator needs an updated flight of a suborbital launch vehicle The system used to track the vehicle collision avoidance analysis due to a above 150 km; must provide data to predict the launch or reentry delay, the operator (2) For an orbital launch, during must file the request with the entity expected impact locations of all stages ascent from a minimum of 150 km to and components, and to obtain vehicle identified in paragraph (e) of this initial orbital insertion and for a section and the FAA at least 12 hours performance data for comparison with minimum of 3 hours from liftoff; the pre-flight performance predictions. prior to the beginning of the new launch (3) For reentry, during descent from or reentry window. (b) Application requirements. An initial reentry burn to 150 km altitude; applicant must identify and describe and § 450.171 Safety at end of launch. each method or system used to meet the (4) For disposal, during descent from (a) Orbital debris mitigation. An tracking requirements of paragraph (a) initial disposal burn to 150 km altitude. operator must ensure for any proposed of this section. (c) Rendezvous. Planned rendezvous launch that for all vehicle stages or § 450.169 Launch and reentry collision operations that occur within the components that reach Earth orbit— avoidance analysis requirements. screening time frame are not considered (1) There is no unplanned physical a violation of collision avoidance if the (a) Criteria. Except as provided in contact between the vehicle or any of its involved operators have pre-coordinated paragraph (d) of this section, for an components and the payload after the rendezvous or close approach. payload separation; orbital or suborbital launch or reentry, (d) Exception. A launch collision an operator must establish window (2) Debris generation does not result avoidance analysis is not required for from the conversion of energy sources closures needed to ensure that the any launched object if the maximum launch or reentry vehicle, any jettisoned into energy that fragments the vehicle or planned altitude by that object is less its components. Energy sources include components, or payloads meet the than 150 km. following requirements with respect to chemical, pressure, and kinetic energy; (e) Analysis. Collision avoidance and orbiting objects, not including any analysis must be obtained for each object being launched or reentered. (3) For all vehicle stages or launch or reentry from a Federal entity components that are left in orbit, stored (1) For inhabitable objects, one of identified by the FAA, or another entity energy is removed by depleting residual three criteria below must be met: agreed to by the Administrator. fuel and leaving all fuel line valves (i) The probability of collision (1) An operator must use the results open, venting any pressurized system, between the launching or reentering of the collision avoidance analysis to leaving all batteries in a permanent objects and any inhabitable object must establish flight commit criteria for × ¥6 discharge state, and removing any not exceed 1 10 ; collision avoidance; and remaining source of stored energy. (ii) The launching or reentering (2) The collision avoidance analysis (b) Application requirement. An objects must maintain an ellipsoidal must account for uncertainties applicant must demonstrate compliance separation distance of 200 km in-track associated with launch or reentry with the requirements in paragraph (a) and 50 km cross-track and radially from vehicle performance and timing, and of this section. the inhabitable object; or ensure that each window closure (iii) The launching or reentering incorporates all additional time periods § 450.173 Mishap plan—reporting, objects must maintain a spherical associated with such uncertainties. response, and investigation requirements. separation distance of 200 km from the (f) Timing and information required. (a) General. An operator must report, inhabitable object. An operator must prepare a collision respond to, and investigate mishaps, as

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defined in § 401.7 of this chapter, in property following a mishap as coordinated with the FAA in paragraph accordance with paragraphs (b) through necessary including, but not limited to: (b)(1) of this section. (g) of this section using a plan or other (i) Evacuating and rescuing members (c) Application requirements. An written means. of the public, taking into account debris applicant must submit the following (b) Responsibilities. An operator must dispersion and toxic plumes; and information— document— (ii) Extinguishing fires; (1) Test objectives; (1) Responsibilities for personnel (2) Maintain existing hazard area (2) Test limits; assigned to implement the requirements surveillance and clearance as necessary (3) Expected outcomes; of this section; to protect public safety; (4) Potential risks, including the (2) Reporting responsibilities for (3) Contain and minimize the applicant’s best understanding of the personnel assigned to conduct consequences of a mishap, including: uncertainties in environments, test investigations and for anyone retained (i) Securing impact areas to ensure limits, or system performance; by the operator to conduct or participate that no members of the public enter; (5) Applicable procedures; (6) Expected time and duration of the in investigations; and (ii) Safely disposing of hazardous test; and (3) Allocation of roles and materials; and (iii) Controlling hazards at the site or (7) Additional information as required responsibilities between the launch by the FAA to ensure protection of operator and any site operator for impact areas. (4) Preserve data and physical public health and safety, safety of reporting, responding to, and property, and the national security and investigating any mishap during ground evidence; and (5) Implement agreements with foreign policy interests of the United activities at the site. States. (c) Mishap reporting requirements. An government authorities and emergency response services, as necessary, to operator must— § 450.177 Unique safety policies, (1) Immediately notify the FAA satisfy the requirements of this section. requirements, and practices. (e) Mishap investigation requirements. Washington Operations Center in case (a) Unique hazards. An operator must In the event of a mishap, an operator of a mishap that involves a fatality or review operations, system designs, must— serious injury (as defined in 49 CFR (1) Investigate the root causes of the analysis, and testing, and identify any 830.2); mishap; and unique hazards not otherwise addressed (2) Notify within 24 hours the FAA (2) Report investigation results to the by this part. An operator must Washington Operations Center in the FAA. implement any unique safety policy, case of a mishap that does not involve (f) Preventative measures. An operator requirement, or practice needed to a fatality or serious injury (as defined in must identify and implement preventive protect the public from the unique 49 CFR 830.2); and measures for avoiding recurrence of the hazard. (3) Submit a written preliminary mishap prior to the next flight, unless (b) Unique requirements. The FAA report to the FAA Office of Commercial otherwise approved by the may identify and impose a unique Space Transportation within five days Administrator. policy, requirement, or practice as of any mishap. The preliminary report (g) Mishap records. An operator must needed to protect the public health and must include the following information, maintain records associated with the safety. (c) Application requirements. An as applicable: mishap in accordance with § 450.219(b). (i) Date and time of the mishap; (h) Application requirements. An applicant must— (1) Identify any unique safety policy, (ii) Description of the mishap and applicant must submit the plan or other requirement, or practice necessary in sequence of events leading to the written means required by this section. mishap, to the extent known; accordance with paragraph (a) of this (iii) Intended and actual location of § 450.175 Test-induced damage. section, and demonstrate that each the launch or reentry or other landing (a) Applicability. This section applies unique safety policy, requirement, or on Earth; to license applicants or operators practice protects public health and (iv) Hazardous debris impact points, seeking an optional test-induced safety. including those outside a planned damage exception. (2) Demonstrate compliance with each landing site or designated hazard area; (b) Coordination of potential test- unique safety policy, requirement, or (v) Identification of the vehicle; induced damage. Test-induced damage practice imposed by the FAA in (vi) Identification of any payload; is not a mishap if all of the following are accordance with paragraph (b) of this (vii) Number and general description true: section. of any fatalities or injuries; (1) A license applicant or operator Ground Safety (viii) Description and estimated costs coordinates potential test-induced of any property damage; damage with the FAA before the § 450.179 Ground safety—general. (ix) Identification of hazardous planned activity, and with sufficient (a) At a U.S. launch or reentry site, an materials, as defined in § 401.7 of this time for the FAA to evaluate the operator must protect the public and chapter, involved in the event, whether operator’s proposal during the property from adverse effects of on the vehicle, any payload, or on the application process or as a license hazardous operations and systems ground; modification; associated with— (x) Action taken by any person to (2) The test-induced damage did not (1) Preparing a launch vehicle for contain the consequences of the event; result in any of the following: flight; (xi) Weather conditions at the time of (i) Serious injury or fatality (as (2) Returning a launch or reentry the event; and defined in 49 CFR 830.2); vehicle to a safe condition after landing, (xii) Potential consequences for other (ii) Damage to property not associated or after an aborted launch attempt; and similar vehicles, systems, or operations. with the licensed activity; or (3) Returning a site to a safe (d) Emergency response requirements. (iii) Hazardous debris leaving the pre- condition. An operator must— defined hazard area; and (b) An operator is not required to (1) Activate emergency response (3) The test-induced damage falls comply with §§ 450.181 through services to protect the public and within the scope of activities 450.189 of this part if:

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(1) The launch or reentry is being §§ 420.63, 420.65, 420.66, 420.67, (2) A list of all systems and operations conducted from a Federal launch or 420.69, and 420.70 of this chapter. that may cause a hazard involving the reentry site; (b) Application requirement. An vehicle or any payload; and (2) The operator has a written applicant must submit an explosive site (3) The ground hazard analysis agreement with the Federal launch or plan in accordance with paragraph (a) of products of paragraphs (a) through (e) of reentry site for the provision of ground this section. this section, including data that verifies safety services and oversight; and the risk elimination and mitigation (3) The Administrator has determined § 450.185 Ground hazard analysis. measures. that the Federal launch or reentry site’s An operator must perform and ground safety processes, requirements, document a ground hazard analysis, and § 450.187 Toxic hazards mitigation for ground operations. and oversight are not inconsistent with continue to maintain it throughout the the Secretary’s statutory authority over lifecycle of the launch or reentry (a) Applicability. (1) Except as commercial space activities. system. The analysis must— specified in paragraph (a)(2), this (c) In making the determination (a) Hazard identification. Identify section applies to any launch or reentry required by paragraph (b)(3) of this system and operation hazards posed by vehicle, including all vehicle section, the Administrator will consider the vehicle and ground hardware, components and payloads, that use the nature and frequency of launch and including site and ground support toxic propellants or other toxic reentry activities conducted from the equipment. Hazards identified must chemicals. Federal launch or reentry site, include the following: (2) No toxic release hazard analysis is coordination between the FAA and the (1) System hazards, including: required for kerosene-based fuels, Federal launch or reentry site safety (i) Vehicle over-pressurization; unless the Administrator determines personnel, and the Administrator’s (ii) Sudden energy release, including that an analysis is required to protect knowledge of the Federal launch or ordnance actuation; public safety. reentry site’s requirements. (iii) Ionizing and non-ionizing (b) General. An operator must— radiation; (1) Conduct a toxic release hazard § 450.181 Coordination with a site (iv) Fire or deflagration; analysis in accordance with paragraph operator. (v) Radioactive materials; (c) of this section; (a) General. For a launch or reentry (vi) Toxic release; (2) Manage the risk of casualties that conducted from or to a Federal launch (vii) Cryogens; could arise from the exposure to toxic or reentry site or a site licensed under (viii) Electrical discharge; and release through one of the following part 420 or 433 of this chapter, an (ix) Structural failure. means: operator must coordinate with the site (2) Operation hazards, including: (i) Contain hazards caused by toxic operator to— (i) Propellant handling and loading; release in accordance with paragraph (d) (1) Ensure public access is controlled (ii) Transporting of vehicle or vehicle of this section; or where and when necessary to protect components; (ii) Perform a toxic risk assessment, in public safety; (iii) Vehicle testing; and accordance with paragraph (e) of this (2) Ensure launch or reentry (iv) Vehicle or system activation. section, that demonstrates compliance operations are coordinated with other (b) Hazard assessment. Assess each with the risk criteria of § 450.185(c). launch and reentry operators and other hazard’s likelihood and severity. (3) Establish ground hazard controls affected parties to prevent unsafe (c) Risk acceptability criteria. Ensure based on the results of its toxic release interference; that the risk associated with each hazard hazard analysis and toxic containment (3) Designate any ground hazard area meets the following criteria: or toxic risk assessment for any that affects the operations of a launch or (1) The likelihood of any hazardous necessary evacuation of the public from reentry site; and condition that may cause death or any toxic hazard area. (4) Ensure a prompt and effective serious injury to the public must be (c) Toxic release hazard analysis. A response is undertaken in the event of extremely remote; and toxic release hazard analysis must— a mishap that could impact the safety of (2) The likelihood of any hazardous (1) Account for any toxic release that the public and property. condition that may cause major damage could occur during nominal or non- (b) Licensed site operator. For a to property not associated with the nominal launch or reentry ground launch or reentry conducted from or to launch or reentry must be remote. operations; a site licensed under part 420 or 433 of (d) Risk mitigation. Identify and (2) Include a worst-case release this chapter, an operator must also describe the risk elimination and scenario analysis or a maximum- coordinate with the site operator to mitigation measures required to satisfy credible release scenario analysis for establish roles and responsibilities for paragraph (c) of this section. each process that involves a toxic reporting, responding to, and (e) Validation and verification. propellant or other chemical; investigating any mishap during ground Document that the risk elimination and (3) Determine if toxic release can activities at the site. mitigation measures achieve the risk occur based on an evaluation of the (c) Application requirement. An levels of paragraph (c) of this section chemical compositions and quantities of applicant must describe how it is through validation and verification. propellants, other chemicals, vehicle coordinating with a Federal or licensed Verification includes: materials, and projected combustion launch or reentry site operator in (1) Analysis; products, and the possible toxic release compliance with this section. (2) Test; scenarios; (3) Demonstration; or (4) Account for both normal § 450.183 Explosive site plan. (4) Inspection. combustion products and any unreacted (a) Explosive siting requirements. For (f) Application requirements. An propellants and phase change or a launch or reentry conducted from or applicant must submit— chemical derivatives of released to a site exclusive to its own use, an (1) A description of the methodology substances; and operator must comply with the used to perform the ground hazard (5) Account for any operational explosive siting requirements of analysis; constraints and emergency procedures

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that provide protection from toxic (5) The identity of the toxic an operator must establish, maintain, release. dispersion model used, and any other and perform procedures for controlling (d) Toxic containment. An operator input data; hazards related to the vehicle and using toxic containment must manage (6) Representative results of an returning the vehicle, stages, or other the risk of casualty from the exposure to applicant’s toxic dispersion modeling to flight hardware and site facilities to a toxic release either by— predict concentrations and durations at safe condition. When a launch vehicle (1) Evacuating, or being prepared to selected downwind receptor locations, does not liftoff after a command to evacuate, the public from any toxic to determine the toxic hazard area for a initiate flight was sent, an operator hazard area in the event of a worst-case released quantity of the toxic substance; must— release or maximum credible release (7) For toxic release hazard analysis in (1) Ensure that the vehicle and any scenario; or accordance with paragraph (c) of this payload are in a safe configuration; (2) Employing meteorological section: (2) Prohibit entry of the public into constraints to limit a ground operation (i) A description of the failure modes any identified hazard areas until the site to times during which prevailing winds and associated relative probabilities for is returned to a safe condition; and and other conditions ensure that the potential toxic release scenarios used in (3) Maintain and verify that any flight public would not be exposed to toxic the risk evaluation; and concentrations and durations greater (ii) The methodology and safety system remains operational until than accepted toxic thresholds for acute representative results of an applicant’s verification that the launch vehicle does casualty in the event of a worst-case determination of the worst-case or not represent a risk of inadvertent flight. release or maximum credible release maximum-credible quantity of any toxic (d) Fire suppression. An operator scenario. release that might occur during ground must have reasonable precautions in (e) Toxic risk assessment. An operator operations; place to report and control any fire using toxic risk assessment must (8) For toxic containment in caused by licensed activities. manage the risk from any toxic release accordance with paragraph (d) of this (e) Emergency procedures. An hazard and demonstrate compliance section, identify the evacuation plans or operator must have general emergency with the criteria in § 450.185(c). A toxic meteorological constraints and procedures that apply to any risk assessment must— associated ground hazard controls emergencies not covered by the mishap (1) Account for airborne concentration needed to ensure that the public will plan of § 450.173 that may create a and duration thresholds of toxic not be within any toxic hazard area in hazard to the public. propellants or other chemicals. For any the event of a worst-case release or (f) Application requirement. An toxic propellant, other chemicals, or maximum credible release scenario. applicant must submit the process for combustion product, an operator must (9) For toxic risk assessment in protecting members of the public who use airborne toxic concentration and accordance with paragraph (e) of this enter any area under the control of a duration thresholds identified in a section: launch or reentry operator in means of compliance accepted by the (i) A demonstration that the risk accordance with paragraph (b) of this Administrator; criteria in § 450.185(c) will be met; section. (2) Account for physical phenomena (ii) The population characteristics in expected to influence any toxic receptor locations that are identified by Subpart D—Terms and Conditions of a concentration and duration in the area toxic dispersion modeling as toxic Vehicle Operator License surrounding the potential release site; hazard areas; (3) Determine a toxic hazard area for § 450.201 Responsibility for public safety (iii) A description of any risk and safety of property. each process surrounding the potential mitigation measures applied in the toxic release site for each toxic propellant or risk assessment; and A licensee is responsible for ensuring other chemical based on the amount and (iv) A description of the population public safety and safety of property toxicity of the propellant or other exposure input data used in accordance during the conduct of a licensed launch chemical, the exposure duration, and with § 450.123. or reentry. the meteorological conditions involved; § 450.203 Compliance. (4) Account for all members of the § 450.189 Ground safety prescribed hazard public that may be exposed to the toxic controls. A licensee must conduct a licensed release; and (a) General. In addition to the hazard launch or reentry in accordance with (5) Account for any risk mitigation controls derived from an operator’s representations made in its license measures applied in the risk assessment. ground hazard analysis and toxic hazard application, the requirements of (f) Application requirements. An analysis, an operator must comply with subparts C and D of this part, and the applicant must submit: paragraphs (b) through (e) of this terms and conditions contained in the (1) The identity of the toxic section. license. A licensee’s failure to act in propellant, chemical, or combustion (b) Protection of public on the site. An accordance with the representations products or derivatives in the possible operator must document a process for made in the license application, the toxic release; protecting members of the public who requirements of subparts C and D of this (2) The applicant’s selected airborne enter any area under the control of a part, and the terms and conditions toxic concentration and duration launch or reentry operator, including: contained in the license, is sufficient thresholds; (1) Procedures for identifying and basis for the revocation of a license or (3) The meteorological conditions for tracking the public while on the site; other appropriate enforcement action. the atmospheric transport and buoyant and cloud rise of any toxic release from its (2) Methods the operator uses to § 450.205 Financial responsibility source to downwind receptor locations; protect the public from hazards in requirements. (4) Characterization of the terrain, as accordance with the ground hazard A licensee must comply with input for modeling the atmospheric analysis and toxic hazard analysis. financial responsibility requirements of transport of a toxic release from its (c) Countdown abort. Following a part 440 of this chapter and as specified source to downwind receptor locations; countdown abort or recycle operation, in a license or license order.

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§ 450.207 Human spaceflight approve an alternate method for any analysis product within the final 30 requirements. requesting license modifications. The days before flight; A licensee conducting a launch or licensee must indicate any part of its (iii) Must submit the analysis reentry with a human being on board license or license application that products using the same format and the vehicle must comply with human would be changed or affected by a organization used in its license spaceflight requirements of part 460 of proposed modification. application; and this chapter as specified in a license or (d) Upon approval of a modification, (iv) May not change an analysis license order. the FAA issues either a written approval product within the final 30 days before to the licensee or a license order flight unless the licensee has a process, § 450.209 Compliance monitoring. amending the license if a stated term or approved in the license, for making a (a) A licensee must allow access by, condition of the license is changed, change in that period as part of the and cooperate with, Federal officers or added, or deleted. An approval has the licensee’s flight safety analysis process. employees or other individuals full force and effect of a license order (d) Flight safety system test data. Any authorized by the FAA to observe any and is part of the licensing record. licensee that is required by § 450.101(c) of its activities, or any of its contractors’ to use a flight safety system to protect or subcontractors’ activities, associated § 450.213 Pre-flight reporting. public safety must submit to the FAA, with the conduct of a licensed launch or (a) Reporting method. A licensee must or provide the FAA access to, any test reentry. send the information in this section as reports, in accordance with approved (b) For each licensed launch or an email attachment to ASTOperations@ flight safety system test plans, no less reentry, a licensee must provide the faa.gov, or other method as agreed to by than 30 days before flight, unless the FAA with a console for monitoring the the Administrator in the license. Administrator agrees to a different time progress of the countdown and (b) Mission information. A licensee frame in accordance with § 404.15 in the communication on all channels of the must submit to the FAA the following license. These reports must include: countdown communications network, mission-specific information no less (1) A summary of the system, unless the licensee has another than 60 days before each mission subsystem, and component-level test acceptable means. A licensee must also conducted under the license, unless the results, including all test failures and provide the FAA with the capability to Administrator agrees to a different time corrective actions implemented; communicate with the mission director frame in accordance with § 404.15 in the (2) A summary of test results designated by § 450.103(a)(1). license, except when the information demonstrating sufficient margin to predicted operating environments; § 450.211 Continuing accuracy of license was provided in the license application: (1) Payload information in accordance (3) A comparison matrix of the actual application; application for modification of qualification and acceptance test levels license. with § 450.43(i); and (2) Planned mission information, used for each component in each test (a) A licensee is responsible for the compared against the predicted flight continuing accuracy of representations including the vehicle, launch site, planned flight path, staging and impact levels for each environment, including contained in its application for the any test tolerances allowed for each test; entire term of the license. locations, each payload delivery point, intended reentry or landing sites and (b) After a license has been issued, a (4) A clear identification of any licensee must apply to the FAA for including any contingency abort location, and the location of any components qualified by similarity modification of the license if— analysis or a combination of analysis (1) The licensee proposes to conduct disposed launch or reentry vehicle stage or component that is deorbited. and test. a launch or reentry in a manner not (e) Collision avoidance analysis. A (c) Flight abort and flight safety authorized by the license; or licensee must submit to a Federal entity analysis products. A licensee must (2) Any representation contained in identified by the FAA and to the FAA submit to the FAA updated flight abort the license application that is material the collision avoidance information in and flight safety analysis products, to public health and safety or the safety appendix A to part 450 in accordance using methodologies previously of property is no longer accurate and with § 450.169(f). approved by the FAA, for each mission complete or does not reflect the (f) Launch or reentry schedule. A no less than 30 days before flight, unless licensee’s procedures governing the licensee must file a launch or reentry the Administrator agrees to a different actual conduct of a launch or reentry. A schedule that identifies each review, time frame in accordance with § 404.15 change is material to public health and rehearsal, and safety-critical operation. in the license. safety or the safety of property if it alters The schedule must be filed and updated or affects— (1) A licensee is not required to in time to allow FAA personnel to (i) The class of payload; submit the flight abort and flight safety participate in the reviews, rehearsals, (ii) The type of launch or reentry analysis products if— and safety-critical operations. vehicle; (i) The analysis submitted in the (iii) The type or quantity of hazardous license application satisfies all the § 450.215 Post-flight reporting. material; requirements of this section; or (a) A licensee must submit to the FAA (iv) The flight trajectory; (ii) The licensee demonstrated during the information in paragraph (b) of this (v) The launch site or reentry site or the application process that the analysis section no later than 90 days after a other landing site; or does not need to be updated to account launch or reentry, unless the (vi) Any system, policy, procedure, for mission-specific factors. Administrator agrees to a different time requirement, criteria, or standard that is (2) If a licensee is required to submit frame in accordance with § 404.15 of safety critical. the flight abort and flight safety analysis this chapter. (c) An application to modify a license products, the licensee— (b) A licensee must send the following must be prepared and submitted in (i) Must account for vehicle- and information as an email attachment to accordance with part 413 of this mission-specific input data; [email protected], or other chapter. If requested during the (ii) Must account for potential method as agreed to by the application process, the FAA may variations in input data that may affect Administrator in the license:

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(1) Any anomaly that occurred during and the FAA advises the licensee that (3) Position Covariance, if probability of countdown or flight that is material to the records need not be retained. The impact analysis option is desired; and public health and safety and the safety licensee must make all records required (4) Separate trajectory files identified by of property; to be maintained under the regulations valid window time frames, if launch or reentry trajectory changes during launch or (2) Any corrective action available to Federal officials for reentry window. implemented or to be implemented after inspection and copying. (e) Screening. An operator must select the flight due to an anomaly or mishap; Appendix A to Part 450—Collision spherical, ellipsoidal, or collision probability (3) The number of humans on board screening as defined in this paragraph for Analysis Worksheet the vehicle; determining any conjunction: (4) The actual trajectory flown by the (a) Launch or reentry information. An (1) Spherical screening. Spherical vehicle, if requested by the FAA; and operator must file the following information: screening centers a sphere on each orbiting (5) For an unguided suborbital launch (1) Mission name. A mnemonic given to object’s center-of-mass to determine any vehicle, the actual impact location of all the launch vehicle/payload combination conjunction; (2) Ellipsoidal screening. Ellipsoidal impacting stages and impacting identifying the launch mission distinctly from all others; screening utilizes an impact exclusion components, if requested by the FAA. (2) Launch location. Launch site location ellipsoid of revolution centered on the § 450.217 Registration of space objects. in latitude and longitude; orbiting object’s center-of-mass to determine (3) Launch or reentry window. The launch any conjunction. An operator must provide (a) To assist the U.S. Government in or reentry window opening and closing times input in the UVW coordinate system in implementing Article IV of the 1975 in Greenwich Mean Time (referred to as kilometers. The operator must provide delta- Convention on Registration of Objects ZULU time) and the Julian dates for each U measured in the radial-track direction, Launched into Outer Space, each scheduled launch or reentry attempts delta-V measured in the in-track direction, licensee must submit to the FAA the including primary and secondary launch or and delta-W measured in the cross-track information required by paragraph (b) of reentry dates; direction; or this section for all objects placed in (4) Epoch. The epoch time, in Greenwich (3) Probability of Collision. Collision Mean Time (GMT), of the expected launch space by a licensed launch, including a probability is calculated using position and vehicle liftoff time; velocity information with covariance in launch vehicle and any components, (5) Segment number. A segment is defined position. except any object owned and registered as a launch vehicle stage or payload after the by the U.S. Government. thrusting portion of its flight has ended. This PART 460—HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT (b) For each object that must be includes the jettison or deployment of any REQUIREMENTS registered in accordance with this stage or payload. For each segment, an section, no later than 30 days following operator must determine the orbital ■ 71. The authority citation for part 460 the conduct of a licensed launch, a parameters; continues to read as follows: licensee must file the following (6) Orbital parameters. An operator must identify the orbital parameters for all objects Authority: 51 U.S.C. 50901–50923. information: achieving orbit including the parameters for ■ 72. Amend § 460.45 by revising (1) The international designator of the each segment after thrust ends; paragraph (d) to read as follows: space object; (7) Orbiting objects to evaluate. An (2) Date and location of launch; operator must identify all orbiting object § 460.45 Operator informing space flight (3) General function of the space descriptions including object name, length, participant of risk. object; width, depth, diameter, and mass; * * * * * (4) Final orbital parameters, (8) Time of powered flight and sequence of (d) An operator must describe the including: events. The elapsed time in hours, minutes, safety record of its vehicle to each space and seconds, from liftoff to passivation or (i) Nodal period; flight participant as follows: (ii) Inclination; disposal. The input data must include the time of powered flight for each stage or (1) For licenses issued under part 450 (iii) Apogee; jettisoned component measured from liftoff; of this chapter, the operator’s safety (iv) Perigee; and and record must cover any event that meets (5) Ownership, and country of (9) Point of contact. The person or office any of paragraph (1), (4), (5), or (8) of the ownership, of the space object. within an operator’s organization that definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7 that (c) A licensee must notify the FAA collects, analyzes, and distributes collision occurred during and after vehicle when it removes an object that it has avoidance analysis results. verification performed in accordance previously placed in space. (b) Collision avoidance analysis results with § 460.17, and include: transmission medium. An operator must § 450.219 Records. (i) The number of vehicle flights; identify the transmission medium, such as (ii) The number of events that meet (a) Except as specified in paragraph voice or email, for receiving results. (c) Deliverable schedule/need dates. An any of paragraph (1), (4), (5), or (8) of the (b) of this section, a licensee must definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7 of this maintain for 3 years all records, data, operator must identify the times before flight, referred to as ‘‘L-times,’’ for which the chapter; and and other material necessary to verify operator requests a collision avoidance (iii) Whether any corrective actions that a launch or reentry is conducted in analysis. The final collision avoidance were taken to resolve these mishaps. accordance with representations analysis must be used to establish flight (2) For licenses issued under part 415, contained in the licensee’s application, commit criteria for a launch. 431, or 435 of this chapter, the the requirements of subparts C and D of (d) Trajectory files. Individual position and operator’s safety record must cover this part, and the terms and conditions velocity trajectory files, including: launch and reentry accidents and contained in the license. (1) The position coordinates in the Earth- human space flight incidents as defined (b) For an event that meets any of Fixed Greenwich (EFG) coordinates system by § 401.5, that occurred during and paragraph (1) through (5) or paragraph measured in kilometers and the EFG velocity components measured in kilometers per after vehicle verification performed in (8) of the definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in second, of each launch vehicle stage or accordance with § 460.17, and include: § 401.7 of this chapter, a licensee must payload starting below 150 km through (i) The number of vehicle flights; preserve all records related to the event. screening time frame; (ii) The number of accidents and Records must be retained until (2) Radar cross section values for each human space flight incidents as defined completion of any Federal investigation individual file; by § 401.5; and

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(iii) Whether any corrective actions (d) An operator must describe the definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in section were taken to resolve these accidents safety record of its vehicle to each space § 401.7; and and human spaceflight incidents. flight participant. The operator’s safety (3) Whether any corrective actions * * * * * record must cover any event that meets were taken to resolve these mishaps. any of paragraph (1), (4), (5), or (8) of the * * * * * ■ 73. Effective March 10, 2026, further definition of ‘‘mishap’’ in § 401.7 that amend § 460.45 by revising paragraph Issued under authority provided by 49 occurred during and after vehicle U.S.C. 106(f) and 51 U.S.C. Chapter 509 in (d) to read as follows: verification performed in accordance Washington, DC, on September 30, 2020. with § 460.17, and include: § 460.45 Operator informing space flight Steve Dickson, participant of risk. (1) The number of vehicle flights; Administrator. * * * * * (2) The number of events that meet [FR Doc. 2020–22042 Filed 12–2–20; 4:15 pm] any of paragraph (1), (4), (5), or (8) of the BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

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