The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs in the Post-Cold War Era (Literature Review) Shannon M

McNair Scholars Journal

Volume 2 | Issue 1 Article 8

Winter 1998 The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs in the Post-Cold War Era (Literature Review) Shannon M. Ingram Grand Valley State University

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Recommended Citation Ingram, Shannon M. (1998) "The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs in the Post-Cold War Era (Literature Review)," McNair Scholars Journal: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 8. Available at: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/mcnair/vol2/iss1/8

Copyright ©Winter 1998 by the authors. McNair Scholars Journal is reproduced electronically by ScholarWorks@GVSU. http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/ mcnair?utm_source=scholarworks.gvsu.edu%2Fmcnair%2Fvol2%2Fiss1%2F8&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages The Role of u.s. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs in the Post-Cold War Era (Literature Review)

Shannon M. Ingram Historical Background of the gaps within the research on intelli.: McNair Scholar From 1940 through 1989, United States' gence reform, and suggestions for other security policy could be summed up in fruitful avenues for future research. Polly]. Diven, Ph.D. one word: containment. Containment of McNair Mentor Soviet military power and Soviet global The Intelligence Community

expansion dominated .L ... .L.1. .L'-'.L.L'-''-'',.L.L This section discusses the definition Abstract: tional relations. posed of and a brief

Theendof theCold Warinitiated a rev­ a military; political, and ideological threat overview of the .L.L.L\"''-'.L.L.L>'-.'-'.L.L'-''-' r("\1"YYYY11111,lh:T olutionary erafor theAmerican intelli­ to the United and intelligence Defining intelligence will help generate gence community. This literature review and intelligence molded insight into how to and analyzes theneweraofuncertainty and around the single of protecting the current formation the U.S. reform theintelligence community is US National interest and containing gence community currently facing. First, it presents the Soviet influence. background andstructure of theintelli­ In his 1992 article, "Winds of Defining Intelligence gence community. Next, it presents an Change," j.L. Gaddis stated, "During the The definition and scope of intelligence analysis of theintelligence community Cold War, the primary purpose of the US has been in a state of continuous evolu­ dUring the Cold War era. Finally, it ana­ intelligence community was clear. tion since its inception. In 1955, intelli­ lyzes thecontending arguments and the­ American intelligence was the spyglass gence' as defined by the j. Edgar Hoover's ories on thefuture of theAmerican focused on the Soviet Union" (p. 102). FBI administration, "dealt with all the intelligence community. Keeping track of Soviet military research things which should be known in This review takes an in-depth look and development and watching Soviet advance of initiating a course of action" at theprinCiple groupings that charac­ activities throughout the developing world (Ransom, 1970). This definition was terize current thought on thefuture role dominated the intelligence community broad and idealistic. In the 1960's, seek­ of intelligence. The two principal schools Now the Cold War is over. Adversaries ing a more realistic definition of intelli­ of thought on thefuture role of intelli­ of the US are less apparent. There is less gence, ex-Director of Central Intelligence gence are (a) those whobelieve clarity about the purpose of intelligence Admiral William E Raborn defined it as intelligence is no longer needed, and (b) and national security The virtual disap­ "information which has been carefully those who recognize a continuing need pearance of the Soviet threat, or any other evaluated as to its accuracy and signifi­ for intelligence. Thesecond school of comparable threat, and the disappearance cance" in terms of national security thought is then subdivided into two of a doctrine to guide American foreign (Ransom, 1970). In the Dictionary of fields: (b 1) literature advocating affairs mean that the intelligence communi­ United States Military Terms for joint reduced spending on intelligence, and ty must devise a new mission in a now Usage, intelligence is defined as: (b2) literature advocating reorganiza­ unstable world. Redefining the purpose of tion and restructuring of theintelligence intelligence and the role intelligence will The product resulting from the col­ community andits components. play in the now uncertain world has lection, evaluation, analysis, integra­ Finally, this literature review moved to the forefront. As American for­ tion, and interpretation of all avail­ suggests avenues forfuture research. eign policy enters a new era, intelligence able information which concerns one Suggested areas of research include (a) policy is in the spotlight. or more aspects of foreign nations or theneed to redefine the term "intelli­ This literature review will present the of areas of operations and which is gence' " (b) theneed toupdate themis­ current arguments and theories on intelli­ immediately of potentially significant sion statements ofintelligence agencies, gence reform. First, there will be a defini­ to planning. and (c) theneed toincrease intelligence tion of intelligence and a brief overview of gathering andinformation on regions the intelligence community Second will In spite of the evolution and variation in which were not emphaSized dUring the follow a summary of the role of intelli­ the defining of intelligence throughout Cold War. gence during the Cold War. Next, the two the years, one link is apparent. The defi­ primary schools of thought which struc­ nition of intelligence has always varied ture present-day intelligence theory and depending on one's position and role. its future role in foreign affairs will be pre­ Great diversity is found in the sented. Finally; there will be a discussion definition and application of the term

38 The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs "intelligence" amongst agencies, foreign within this department. Intelligence for Union, because the Soviet Union did not policy elites, and administrators. As a branches of the armed services, the provide open in formation about the result, intelligence has been open to per­ National Security Agency, the National internal workings of the country: sonal interpretation, and has been a term Reconaissance Office, Central Imagery; "Information that other countries pub­ used to cover everything from clandestine and the Defense Intelligence Agency all lished as a matter of course (e.g., defense activity to espionage. Ultimatel~ the mis­ fall under DOD intelligence units. This budget or maps) was regarded as secret in use of the term has resulted in a loss of information is valuable for understanding the Soviet Union, and either was not pub­ precise meaning. Intelligence inherently some of the schools of thought in the lit­ lished or was published only in a distort­ suggests a foreknowledge of intentions erature on intelligence reform and the ed fashion" (p. 22). As a result, the United and information for better decision mak­ departments targeted for reform. States was forced to construct specialized ing, and most of the definitions in print Another crucial fact concerns the mechanisms for researching Russia in concerning intelligence imply this fact. creation of agencies within the intelli­ order to address U.S. national security However, the precise definition of intelli­ gence community: Most of the agencies interests. The United States began to form gence has become hazy: The limits and within the intelligence community were and develop an array of technical collec­ boundaries of the activities and objectives created by executive directive to counter tion methods to acquire information which are included in the bounds of a Soviet initiative during the Cold War. about the Soviet Union. The formation of intelligence have begun to elude the The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) these methods of intelligence gathering political community: is the only agency created by legislation inevitably revolutionized American for­ The haze surrounding the definition with a mission separate from Cold eign policy and historical intelligence of intelligence becomes important in War objectives. organizations. "Various sorts of technical terms of an analysis of the framework collection existed previously, but this new within which the debate on the future Intelligence during the Cold War type of intelligence had the important role of intelligence is occurring. If intelli­ To understand why intelligence reform is characteristic that it did not totally gence is not clearly defined, it is,impossi­ an issue, one must examine the role of depend on the other side not knowing ble to agree upon which intelligence activ­ intelligence during the Cold War. A Cold you were engaged in it" (p. 23). The phe­ ities should continue or be classified as War analysis of intelligence will provide nomena of technical collection proved "intelligence" in this post-Cold War era. the background needed to understand the very different from human intelligence context of current suggestions for reform. gathering, and soon the intelligence com­ Overview of the Intelligence Community In Abram Schulsky's 1992 essa~ munity evolved, serving as a countervail­ The actual scope and size of the intelli­ "What Is Intelligence? Secrets and ing force in a then bipolar world. New gence cornmunitys budget and personnel Competition Among States," he states that organization were created to sustain the remains uncertain due to the culture of before the Cold War the United States did intelligence community "With the excep­ secrecy in which the community and its not have a very extensive and active mili­ tion of the CIA, which was created by leg­ activities are set. However, some infor­ tary of intelligence establishment. During islation, the other major community mation about the structure and composi­ World War II, the department of Research organizations were created by executive tion of the intelligence community is and Analysis within the Office of Strategic directive to cope with requirements gener­ well known. The U.S. intelligence com­ Services relied heavily on open sources to ated by the Cold War" (p. 148). munity is composed of 13 agencies that aid the war effort. "The United States Through the decades of the Cold are managed by the Director of Central relied heavily upon social scientists, histo­ War, national funds flowed into the intel­ Intelligence. The DCI exercises his rians, and other academics to provide for­ ligence establishment based on public authority through the National Foreign eign policy information." (p. 19). This perception of the Soviet threat. The Intelligence Board and the National wealth of human talent provided relevant biggest economic boost for the intelli­ Intelligence Council. The DCI is responsi­ information concerning the war effort. gence community occurred in the 1980's. ble to the National Security Council and, However, when the Cold War began, "There was a broad political consensus in through this council, to the President. a different kind of intelligence problem the early Reagan years that intelligence The Department of Defense (DOD) is was posed to the United States. The needed to be strengthened with expanded the largest component of the intelligence United States could no longer rely solely covert action programs, personnel, and community: Two-thirds to three-fourths of on academics to serve as open sources to technical collection assets" (p. 25). The the federal intelligence budget is spent provide information concerning the Soviet early Reagan years became the "fat years"

GVSU McNair Scholars Journal VOLUME 2. 1997-1998 39 for the intelligence community The result dismantled or transformed not merely of the United States. However, he believes was an unprecedented buildup of U.S. reorganized." Advocating a cooperation that the largest issue in discussing covert intelligence assets: collection and informa­ model for international relations, Raskin action is the manner in which "Covert tion procession technologies, personnel, proposes that the CIA and other intelli­ action has been overused as an instru­ and infrastructure. Although some of the gence agencies be abolished or trans­ ment of foreign policy," and the conse­ growth of the intelligence community was formed because their presence has creat­ quent suffering of the reputation of the a result of new requirements, most of the ed a "culture of suspicion and secrecy United States (p. 48). increase was a product of the emphasis that is dangerous to a democratic society" Hilsman's argument concerning the being placed on Soviet and East-West (p. 55). Raskin criticizes the way in CIA diverges from Raskin, as Hilsman issues by the administration. which the CIA and the intelligence com­ does not believe the CIA should be Now that the Cold War is over, aca­ munity has an "above the law" status in entirely abolished. Hilsman is a propo­ demics and foreign policy leaders and American society He proposes that abol­ nent of using certain forms of intelli­ elites must decide what kind of intelli­ ishing the present CIA will further the gence-gathering within the CIA, prioritiz­ gence system will best suit the needs and quest toward a more idealistic American ing those intelligence-gathering forms, interests of the United States in the future. foreign policy and dismantling those which are ineffec­ Roger Hilsman, in the article, "Does tive. "The United States should get out of Literature on the future the CIA Still have a Role" (1995), con­ the business of both espionage and covert role of intelligence: tends that ever since the demise of the political action. However, the CIA should Two primary schools of thought Soviet Union, the CIA has been "scroung­ still have an important role to playas the Two primary schools of thought seem to ing to justify its existence," and the money independent research and analysis organi­ dominate the debate on the kind of intel­ it requires as well, which totaled $3.1 bil­ zation contemplated in the 1960s" (p. ligence system needed by the United lion in its request to Congress late last 48). Hilsman believes that implementing States to meet the challenges of the year [which year?] (45). Hilsmans argu­ this type of reform in the CIA will result future. The two principal schools consist ment attacks two of the main intelligence­ in the elimination of substantial duplica­ of the literature by authors who (a) gathering roles of the CIA: espionage and tion and substantial savings. believe that the intelligence community is covert action. Hilsman contends that espi­ no longer needed, or (b) believe that onage (to which he refers as "the stuff of Need for Intelligence intelligence is still a vital component of spy-thriller fiction") makes no significant Another school of thought argues that the American foreign policy system. The difference to foreign policy "its contribu­ intelligence is still needed. Most intelli­ literature in the second category is further tion to wise decisions in foreign policy gence scholars believe that the end of the subdivided into two subgroups. The first and defense is minimal. But the cost in Cold War is not the end of conflict of of subgroup (b1) is comprised of literature lives, treasure, and intangibles is high" threats to American national security arguing for reduced spending within the (1995). To support this idea, Hilsman Although this category shows diversity in intelligence community or reduction of uses examples from World War I to the opinion and suggested reform, all of the intelligence as a whole. The second sub­ Cold War in his effort to prove that espi­ literature acknowledges the need for group (b2) is comprised of literature onage is difficult to coordinate and main­ continued intelligence and intelligence­ advocating a reorganization of the inter­ tain, because the process of espionage is gathering. The diversity arises when nal dynamics, roles, and purposes of the intricate, dangerous, and time-consuming. discussing the kind of intelligence system intelligence community Covert action, or, as Hilsman calls it, the United States will require in order to "cloak and dagger gimmickry;"was "a fad" meet the challenges of the future. No needfor intelligence used to solve every problem during the Opinions diverge when discussing the Some analysts argue that the U.S. intelli­ Cold War (p. 45). Covert action, accord­ two key areas, budget and policy priority gence community should be abolished. ing to Hilsman, helped the United Marcus Raskin, author of the essay "Let's States get around the "moral problem of Terminate the CIA" (1992) and intervention and the political problem cofounder of the Institute for Policy of appearing to be a bully" (p. 46). Like Studies, argues that in the post-Cold War Raskin, Hilsman believes that covert world, "The CIA and other intelligence action has created an aura of secrecy and agencies of the United States should be suspicion within the democratic society

40 The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs Reduction-Based Restructuring also advocates reduction-based reform: analysts who favor reducing intelligence of the Intelligence Community "The defense budget cannot afford intelli­ spending and encourage an isolationist The literature in this school of thought is gence readiness and new weapons­ foreign policy agenda in the post-Cold based on reform aimed at restructuring something has to go." McNaugher con­ War era. Clarke (1995) states that the financial and programmatic priorities tends that the Cold War mindset­ America needs to distinguish between of the intelligence community This litera­ "excessive money equals the road to "sentimentality and reality" and rediscover ture is founded on the common thread of power"-will have to go in order to suc­ its "duty to itself" (1'. 45). Clarke also thought that the intelligence community cessfully pursue a post-Cold War foreign believes that if the United States would no longer requires the substantive funds it policy (1'. 27). stop acting as a world police force, the needed during the Cold War. Conflicting substantive funds required for intelligence opinions arise in the literature over the Reform of certain would not be needed. According to this extent to which reform needs to occur intelligence-gathering forms view, a more isolationist foreign policy and what the new priorities should be. Other literature reflects the increasing will require less intelligence-gathering One main argument binds the literature skepticism concerning specific forms of capacity Others refer to this literature as that supports reduction-based reform: the intelligence-gathering. Doherty (1990) "backward-looking," since these opinions ideal intelligence configuration will be examines the broadening skepticism in aim at trying to avoid the mistakes and able to provide foreknowledge on adver­ Congress about covert aid programs. He faults the intelligence community made sary intent, even in the midst of a stream­ analyzes the consequent change in voting during the 19805, instead of necessarily lined budget. on the budgets of covert aid programs, taking into account the uncertainties of noting a significant decrease since the what lies ahead. Less Capital end of the Cold War. Schlesinger (1993) The first subgroup within reduction­ also acknowledges domestic political lim­ Reorganization ofIntelligence based restructuring of intelligence is lit­ itations on intelligence spending. He This category of literature advocates a erature that advocates reduced intelli­ notes, "While America may have the reorganization of intelligence capacity gence-gathering capacity and less money physical strength to carry on three of using similar or additional budget allo­ for intelligence-gathering. These authors more discrete operations simultaneously; cations. The literature promoting reor­ argue that intelligence is needed, but it is not physical resources that constrain ganization within intelligence is based they contend that in this time of peace, it. Our political capital, both domestic on reform aimed at altering and revising we do not need to "recklessly use funds and foreign, is limited and should not be the current intelligence community, on intelligence" or boost the intelligence spent recklessly" (1'. 22). using "forward looking" techniques. community with additional funds. This literature advocates using former Lauren Spain (1995) argues that Peace Dividends intelligence structures only as a guide although the federal government has cut Others who favor reductions and reforms for what not to do in the future. defense and national security spending of intelligence operations argue that Focusing on the uncertainty of the for the U.S., spending in many areas was "peace dividends" created from the changing world, these authors note only 7 percent lower than Cold War reduced levels of intelligence and defense areas in which the intelligence commu­ spending levels. In her essay; she discuss­ expenditures should be spent on domes­ nity is weak. They cite the need to build es why she believes deeper budget cuts tic programs such as education, home­ upon those weak areas, equipping the should be made. lessness, or deficit reduction. For exam­ intelligence community to deal with Other literature suggests diminished ple, Korb (1996) addresses the need to potential future threats. These analysts allocations to the intelligence community "decrease defense and intelligence spend­ diverge when discussing which elements and advises against spending money on ing to reduce the budget deficit" (1'. 24). and agencies of intelligence-gathering new projects. O'Hanlon (1995) discusses Carlucci (1992) advocates spending the need to be priorities. However, the argu­ "reducing the emphasis on nuclear deter­ "peace dividend" on reduction of the ments found in this literature can be clas­ rence and shaping forces more explicitly U.S. deficit. sified as advocating changes in the goals, for multilateral military activities" (1'. 32), infrastructure, emphasis, and overall pri­ in an effort to curtail the U.S. defense Reform in Foreign Policy Approach orities of the intelligence communities. budget to 75 percent of the average Cold Among those advocating a reduction in War level. Thomas McNaugher (1996) intelligence activities, there are some

GVSU McNair ScholarsJournal VOLUME 2. 1997-1998 41 Goals cratic 'old age'... no longer up to its job those that have sought to alter the outputs Some authors believe that the intelligence and incapable of changing its ways" (p. of an agency rather than looking inward. community needs to construct a new 7). However, these authors believe that Thus, by understanding the daily work overarching purpose to replace the Cold the real question "is not whether intelli­ and operating culture of the agencies War purpose of containing Soviet global gence will be a factor in the future but within the intelligence community and expansion and presence. Former whether the large intelligence bureaucra­ finding the breakdown in the link Congressman Dave McCurdy (1994) con­ cies spawned by World War II and the between these routines and the policy tends that the Cold War doctrine provid­ Cold War continue to suit U.S. national objectives they should fulfill, effective ed a uniting vision of objective for the security needs" (p, 9). reorganization can occur. "The reason for intelligence communityr, where everyone In his article, Intelligence for aNew my suspicion is that reorganization plans knew their mission and the primary rea­ World Order, " Stansfield Turner (1995) tend to be developed by staff people who son behind their actions. Therefore, an argues that information is the key to are brought in from outside the govern­ uncertainty concerning the responsibilities power. Thus, the goal of U.S. intelli­ ment and know little about the agencies and duties of the intelligence community gence should be obtaining information they propose to change" (p. 32). accompanied the end of the Cold War. that will boost its hegemonic power and McCurdy believes, "The U.S. intelligence "identifying today exactly what informa­ Infrastructure community needs a new defining purpose tion will give us the most power a During the Cold War, the intelligence that serves to focus and justify the com­ decade or so from now" (p. 153). Turner community acted in secrecyr, with activi­ munitys efforts" (p. 127), a purpose believes that this goal can be achieved ties hidden from the scrutiny of public which will provide "the leaders of U.S. by maintaining and expanding human opinion. In this period, there was little intelligence with a grander notion of what intelligence efforts and by building a coordination between intelligence agen­ they are about and a more sweeping robust network of satellites with a vari­ cies, between intelligence agencies and notion of their job" (p. 129). McCurdy ety of sensors. Turner suggests that the policy makers, between intelligence agen­ suggests that the following three points preeminent threat to U.S. national secu­ cies and the military, and between the should be a part of the new and reformed rity lies in the economic sphere. intelligence community and the general mission for intelligence: "RevitalizingU.S. In his 1992 essay, "Thinking About public. Some analysts believe that cooper­ economic strength and competitiveness, Reorganization," James Q. Wilson, once a ation within the infrastructure of intelli­ maintaining a strong defense posture, and member of the Presidents Foreign gence will produce a more efficient and promoting democracy abroad" (p. 129). Intelligence Advisory Board, believes that thorough intelligence communityr, as well In his article, "Intelligence Backing there are two types of agencies. The first as erase past Cold War mindsets of intera­ into the Future," Ernest may (1994) con­ type includes the agencies that produce gency separation. tends that in this changed world, we outcomes that can be specified in In the article, "U.S. Intelligence in an need an intelligence community that will advance. "The State Department, the FBI, Age of Uncertainty: Refocusing to Meet "serve the needs of the government as a the DEA, and the CIA are agencies of the the Challenge," Paula Scalingi (1992) pre­ whole in an effective and timely manner" second type; we cannot say in advance dicts that "the effectivenessof U.S. intelli­ (p. 67). According to May, "serving the what we want these agencies to produce gence will depend on how well Congress, needs of the government as a whole and we will not find it easy to agree on the executive branch, and the community implies generating information and analy­ whether they have produced it: (p. 30). cooperate in undertaking the necessary sis about new subjects and new things" Wilson believes that the goal of reorganiz­ initiatives" (p. 148). Scalingi contends (p. 68). Therefore, May contends that the ing type-two agencies should be "deciding that the demise of Soviet and other inter­ goal of the intelligence community what operating culture we wish to pro­ national conflicts has birthed a new should be striving for a higher level of duce amongst rank-and-file employees demand for "constant congressional moni­ preparedness in all areas, especially non­ and then designing an organizational toring" (p. 148). Scalingi implies a need traditional areas. structure that will increase the chances of for reform aimed at restructuring the tra­ Godson, May, and Schmitt (1995) that culture being created and sustained" ditional relationships between the intelli­ believe that the reform debate concern­ (p, 32). From his earlier experience as a gence community and its consumers by ing intelligence in the mid-1990's reorganizer for the Drug Enforcement reducing secrecy: became a dispute over "whether U.S. Agency; he believes that the most unsuc­ Bruce Weinrod (1996) agrees with intelligence had reach a kind of bureau- cessful reorganization ventures have been Scalingi'sadvocacy of reform aimed at

42 The Role of U.S. Intelligence in American Foreign Affairs greater communication and more joint projects created during the 19805 and cratic governance based on an informed coordination among the intelligence com­ mistakenly categorized as intelligence due public. During the Cold War, the need munity and other members of the political to bureaucratic momentum. for secrecy led to intelligence gathering community "The intelligence community It has been often stated, "There can­ activities which were conducted outside in the post-Cold War era can make its not be agreement on a solution if there is democratic controls. information and reports as user-friendly as no agreement on how to prob­ In the post-Cold War era, the chal- possible" (p. 88). Weinrod and Scalingi lem." Actual implementation of revisions lenge of a uniting for the both propose that the United will to the community will be and intelligence community that will best pre­ require an intelligence community that is sparse, until a ror'hr:lrtorlr'1CT pare and gird it against the unknown will uniformed and networks from within in tion of intelligence occurs. Without a be a continuously evolving effort. order to produce efficient foreknowledge rechartering of the term and what it and maintain its superpower status. entails, the intelligence community will continue trying to provide foreknowledge Areas for further research to its consumers following an outdated The literature indicates a broad range of mission encased within an unrestrained opinions as to how intelligence should definition. Wilson (1992) states, be defined, structured, and funded in the "Reorganization is a favorite Washington post-Cold War era. Much of the diversity activity; not because it is a proven method found in the literature can be directly for achieving certain policy goals, but linked to the fact that what qualifies as because it is a strategy that can accommo­ intelligence has not been revisited or date so many motives ... inevitably it's like revised as the intelligence community pushing a wet string" (p. 31). Miles has evolved. (1977) wrote, "Repetitive reorganization In the post-Cold War era, the without proper diagnosis is like repetitive redefining of intelligence is crucial to the surgery without proper diagnosis; obvi­ larger debate over the reorientation and ously an unsound and unhealthy restructuring of the intelligence commu­ approach to the cure of the malaclY" (32). nity As stated earlier, the definition of The United States cannot fight the intelligence is outdated, lacking preci­ non-traditional issues it currently faces in sion and specificity As a result, it has its foreign affairs with Cold War tactics. been manipulated and used to cover a New mission statements need to be con­ host of activities. The term intelligence structed to increase effectiveness and pre­ and consequently the application of the cision of duty within the intelligence term has been open to individual inter­ community Modified mission statements pretation since the evolution f the intel­ will also cut down on the large amounts ligence community of overlap found within the intelligence A definition helps bind and provide community Additional research into the ceilings and walls within which to contain two subgroups within the literature on the concept being defined. Now, as ways intelligence reform is also necessary A of restructuring and reorienting intelli­ common suggestion by policymakers and gence are being discussed, it is also neces­ members of Congress is for intelligence sary to wade through what has been ille­ involving less secrecy and more coopera­ gitimately and what has been justly called tion. Suggestions also include an increase intelligence in the past, and to determine in the 'amount of information being dis­ which activities will qualify as intelligence closed to the American public, and a in the future. This process of "separating greater check and balance system for the the sheep from the wolves" will streamline intelligence community There is an many agencies and rid the intelligence inherent conflict between the secrecy community of financially draining involved in covert operations and demo-

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