sign in sign up
<<
Home , 2014 in Egypt, Carter Doctrine, Diplomacy (book), Dual containment, Ellen Schrecker, Foreign Affairs

as in Two ‘Wars’ : from the to the : How Do Countries Fit into the Scheme? Hamda Tebra

To cite this version:

Hamda Tebra. Containment as in Two United States ‘Wars’ : from the Cold War to the War on Terror : How Do Arab Spring Countries Fit into the Scheme?. History. Université Paris-Est, 2020. English. ￿NNT : 2020PESC0029￿. ￿tel-03230848￿

HAL Id: tel-03230848 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-03230848 Submitted on 20 May 2021

HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Université Paris Est Creteil UPEC

Ecole Doctorale Cultures et Sociétés

Laboratoire de Recherche: Institut des Mondes Anglophone, Germanique et Roman (IMAGER)

Thèse de Doctorat

en Langue, Littératures et Civilisations Etrangers (Anglais)

Specialité : Civilisation Américaine.

par

Mr Hamda TEBRA

Containment as Foreign Policy Doctrine in Two United States ‘Wars’: From the Cold War to the War on Terror How Do Arab Spring Countries Fit into the Scheme?

Directrice de Recherche Mme. Le Professeur Donna Kesselman Professeur des Universités en Civilisation Américaine, Université Paris Est Créteil.

Présenté et soutenu publiquement à l‘UPEC le 13 Janvier 2020 pour l‘obtention de titre de docteur en Etudes Anglophone - Civilization Americaine.

Membres du jury. Mme. Isabelle VAGNOUX, Professeure des universités, Université Aix-Marseille, Présidente. M. Olivier FRAYSSE, Professeur des universités, Université Paris-Sorbonne, Rapporteur. M. Mokhtar BEN BARKA, Professeur des universités, Université de Valenciennes, Rapporteur. M. James KETTERER, Professeur, Université Bard College, New York, Examinateur. M. Mohamed Salah HARZALLAH, Maitre de conférences HDR, Université de Sousse, Examinateur. Mme. Donna KESSELMAN, Professeure des universités, Université Paris-Est, Directrice de Recherche. Table of contents

Abstract ------v

Résumé ------vii

Dedication ------ix

Acknowledgements ------x

Acronyms ------xi

List of tables and figures ------xiii

1. INTRODUCTION ------1 The framework of neo-containment ------4 Neo-containment in the MENA ------8 Political Islam and containment ------13 The dissertation’s main hypothesis ------18 The PhD setting ------18 Methodology ------21 Dissertation outline ------23

1. HISTORIOGRAPHY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OF CONTAINMENT: THE COLD WAR AND THE WAR ON TERROR ------28

1.1 Cold War studies ------30 1.1.1 Orthodox perspective on containment ------30 1.1.2 Revisionist perspective ------39 1.1.3 Post-revisionism and the notion of containment ------51

1.2 Terrorism studies: The U.S. War on Terror and the containment policy ------60 1.2.1 Orthodox terrorism studies ------61 1.2.2 Revisionist terrorism studies ------67

1.3 Twenty-first century Cold War studies ------76

i 2. CONTAINMENT IN THE COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR PERIODS: REVISITING THE MAJOR PHASES TOWARDS NEO-CONTAINMENT ------82

2.1 Containing the in the Cold War: historical perspective------85 2.1.1 as MENA universal program ------85 2.1.2 Eisenhower: the Middle East and the rise of Nasserism ------92

2.2 Containment in the post-Cold War era ------93 2.2.1 Wars and War ------97 2.2.2 Alliance system ------100 2.2.3 War for oil and primacy ------102 2.2.4 President ’s ------103

2.3 The War on Terror: from Bush to Obama ------117 2.3.1 The War on Terror: a pretext of convenience? ------117 2.3.2 and the War on Terror in the MENA. ------120 2.3.3 War on Terror: a war for primacy ------123 2.3.4 ------124 2.3.5 War on Iraq ------132

2.4 The President Obama administration: was it a departure from the War on Terror framework? ------145 2.4.1 The Middle East as the main area for the U.S. ------148 2.4.2 : from containment to engagement ------150

3. MAJOR MECHANISMS OF CONTAINMENT FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR ------157 3.1 Economic containment ------158 3.1.1 Economic aid ------158 3.1.2 Aids as national security ------161 3.1.3 The USAID ------162 3.1.4 Forms of aids ------164 3.1.5 Fighting Poverty as a containment policy ------165 3.1.6 The Middle East and North Africa: specific region for economic aid ------169 3.1.7 Economic rewards ------171 3.2 Defending democracy as a means of containment ------173 3.3 The military containment ------188 3.3.1 Proxy wars ------188

ii 3.3.2 The shift to the militarization of containment ------190 3.3.3 Regime change ------198 3.3.4 Military spending ------199 3.3.5 The Military-Industrial complex ------201

4. CONTAINING THE MENA: ARAB SPRING COUNTRIES AS CASE STUDY ------203

4.1 U.S. Response to the Arab Spring and the alliance system ------209 4.1.1 U.S. response to the uprisings: reluctance and the arc of history------211 4.1.2 The Importance of Ben Ali to the United States ------215 4.1.3 : the U.S. response ------221

4.2 The immediate post Ben Ali Tunisia and Mubarak Egypt: primacy at stake ------230 4.2.1 Tunisia ------235 4.2.2 Egypt ------239

4.3 The Immediate post-Ben Ali and Mubarek Era ------254 4.3.1 The ‘democratic’ transition ------257 4.3.2 U.S. policy towards Morsi------264 4.3.3 Economic aid ------267 4.3.4 The Israeli- Palestine conflicts ------273 4.3.5 Iran: a key threat to U.S. primacy ------276

4.4 Restoring previous alliances ------280

4.5 Political Islam in the Arab Spring countries: the alliance at stake. ------291 4.5.1 U.S. and Political Islam: a historical background ------292 4.5.2 Egypt ------295 4.5.3 Tunisia ------296 4.5.4 Algeria ------297 4.5.5 Palestine ------298

4.5.6 The Arab Spring: neo-containment of Islamic governments ------299

5. CONCLUSION ------307

Works cited ------319

iii Labouratoire de Recherche où la thèse a été préparée : (IMAGER)

INSTITUT DES MONDES ANGLOPHONE, GERMANIQUE ET ROMAN

(IMAGER) - EA 3958

Université Paris-Est Créteil Val de Marne (UPEC)

Campus Centre - Bâtiment i3 - Bureau 202

61, avenue du Général de Gaulle

94010 Créteil Cedex

Structure(s) de rattachement :

UPEC - UFR de Lettres langues et sciences humaines

Directeur : Monsieur Le Professeur Guillaume Marche

iv Abstract

This doctoral dissertation develops the notion of neo-containment in the post-Cold War era. Its premise is that Cold War containment evolved to adapt to new challenges in a new era and continued to be the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and notably during the War on Terror and the Arab Spring period in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This research revisits the sizeable body of literature about the U.S. grand strategies from the early Cold War to the Arab Spring. It relies on data from official policy documents, policy makers‘ speeches, academic writings and various media resources to understand why, how and with what results the United States extended and developed the containment policy as its approach to the War on Terror and the Arab Spring.

The dissertation provides a balanced account of the extent to which what we have qualified as the major Cold War mechanisms of containment continued to be implemented in comparable proportions in the post-Cold War era, but to contain new adversaries, mainly in the MENA. The United States relied firstly on economic containment which consists in using its economic power either to weaken challenging rivals by imposing economic sanctions upon them or empower allies through annual economic packages. The second mechanism of containment is the commitment to defend the U.S. ideology of ―democracy‖ which continued to be a cornerstone of neo-containment policy in the 21st century. The successive U.S presidents played the democracy cardto contain allies and adversaries. They selectively accused some authoritarian governments of abusing democracy while turning a blind eye on others. Finally, military containment reflects the American administrations‘ reliance on annual military aid and training services at consistently high levels, despite the collapse of the ‗Soviet Threat,‘ to its allies, while at the same time continuing to advocate regional proxy wars in geostrategic areas to maintain its .

The dissertation also examines policies through the quest of primacy as U.S. ‗habit‘. It asserts, therefore, that the United States‘ political remained fundamentally unaltered despite the demise of the . The case study applies the dissertation hypothesis of neo-containment in U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the Arab Spring, to the U.S. quest for countering rivals such as Iran, by containing the newly elected Islamic governments in the Middle East and North Africa from 2011 to 2014. The Obama administration contained political Islam and Islamic parties in the Arab Spring countries as

v the policy response to the dilemma they posed; even though they were democratically elected, the governments represented a threat to the United States alliance system.

vi Résumé

Cette thèse de doctorat porte sur le sens et rôle de la notion de néo-endiguement dans le contexte de l‘après-Guerre-froide. Elle postule que la politique d‘endiguement a évolué depuis pour s‘adapter aux nouveaux défis que pose le nouvel ère, tout en restant fidèle aux principes de la politique étrangère américaine développés pendant la Guerre froide durant la guerre contre le terrorisme et la période du printemps arabe qui a surgit dans la région du Moyen-Orient et de l‘Afrique du Nord. Ce travail de recherche revoit la littérature portant sur les grandes stratégies américaines, de la Guerre froide au printemps arabe. Il s‘appuie sur des données issues de documents officiels, de discours politiques, des écrits académiques, et de diverses ressources médiatiques pour comprendre comment les Etats-Unis ont pu adapter et adopter la politique d‘endiguement pour contrer la montée du terrorisme et la venue du printemps arabe.

Cette thèse présente une analyse détaillée des principaux mécanismes d‘endiguement de la Guerre-froide, tels que nous les avons conçus. Aussi, elle démontre l‘emploi de ces mêmes mécanismes durant la période de l‘après-Guerre-froide pour contrer les nouveaux adversaires, notamment dans la région duMoyen-Orient et de l‘Afrique du Nord. Les États-Unis se sont d'abord appuyés sur l'endiguement économique qui consiste à utiliser l‘arme économique, soit pour affaiblir leurs rivaux, en leur imposant des sanctions économiques, soit pour soutenir leurs alliés,en leur versant des aides économiques annuels. Ensuite, il y a l'engagement des administrations américaines à défendre l‘idéologie américaine de la « démocratie dans le monde », qui constitue la pierre angulaire de la politique de la Guerre froide au néo-endiguement du 21ème siècle. Les présidents américains successifs ont joué la carte de la démocratie pour soutenir les alliés et contrer les adversaires. Ils pointent du doigt, d‘une manière sélective, certains régimes autoritaires, tout en fermant les yeux sur d‘autres. Enfin, l'endiguement militaire reflète le recours des administrations américaines à apporter une aide militaire et technique considérable au profit de leurs alliés, malgré l'effondrement de la ‗menace soviétique‘, tout en continuant à préconiser des guerres régionales par procuration dans les zones géostratégiques afin de maintenir la sphère d'influence américaine.

Cette thèse examine également les politiques étrangères du point de vue de la quête de primauté qui constitue une constante de la politique étrangère américaine. Elle met ainsi en évidence la continuité des doctrines de la politique étrangère américaine qui ne s‘est pas

vii fondamentalement modifiée, en dépit de la disparition de la menace communiste depuis la chute du mur de . Notre étude de cas confirme notre hypothèse sur le choix du néo- endiguement comme politique étrangère américaine vis-à-vis du printemps arabe, visant à isoler les gouvernements islamiques fraîchement élus au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord entre 2011 et 2014. L‘administration Obama a œuvré activement pour endiguer l'Islam politique et les partis islamiques dans les pays du printemps arabe comme réponse au dilemme qu‘ils ontposé aux Etats-Unis : bien qu‘élus démocratiquement, ils ont représenté une menace pour le système d'alliances des États-Unis.

viii

Dedication

To my mother and father

To my son Ahmed Taha

To my wife Hela

To my brothers: Karim, Wissem, Fekredine and Ramzi

To my sisters: Assia and Hamida.

ix Acknowledgements

I would particularly like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Donna Kesselman without her unending patience and supportiveness; this doctoral disseration would not have been completed.

My thanks and gratitude also go to my doctoral school L'École Doctorale Cultures et Sociétés (CS) and Institut des Mondes Anglophone, Germanique et Roman (IMAGER) at the University of Paris Est (UPEC) for their financial and logistic support and considerable patience. Without their generosity and tolerance, this thesis would not have been started, never mind finished. Grants to participate in the AFEA congrès in 2013 and research trip to the United States in 2018 have also been made possible. On these visits the Library of Congress in Washington, and Pubilic Library of New York in addition to interviews with experts and specialists were particularly helpful in assisting my research.

Secondly, I would like to thank those who have patiently accepted to read parts of my thesis and provided me with stimulating comments and suggestions. Among these, Stephen Pampinella, Professor at State University New York at New Paltz whose constructive recommendations made outstanding improvements and nuancing of my arguments. Professor Jonathon Cristol, Adelphi University, USA was so kind to read and comment upon parts of my research.

I wish to express my gratitude to my dear colleagues and friends: professors Bachar Aloui, Nesrine Triki and Adel Najlaoui for their comments, recommendations and moral support along the writing of this research.

I would like to thank also Professor James Ketterer, the Dean of International Studies at Bard College, New York and Academic Director of the Bard Globalization and International Affairs (BGIA) program who kindly hosted me as a research fellow at BGIA in 2018 and SUSI foreign policy program in 2015 in addition to his comments as a professor, experts and practioner of U.S foreign in the MENA.

I am grateful to my wife Hela ben Hassine for her unfailing optimism, support and patience.

Finally, I extend my sincere thanks to my family and close friends for their patience with all my many weird manifestations of stress and tiredness, particularly towards the last months of writing.

x Acronyms

AMFOG: The Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Election.

CCF: Congress for Cultural Freedom.

CENTO: Central Treaty Organization ―the ‖.

DAG: Democratic Army of Greece.

DOD: Department of Defense.

EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

FDR: Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

FIS: Islamic salvation Front.

FJP: Freedom and Justice Party (Jordon).

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council.

GDP: Gross Domestic Product.

IAEA: International Atomic Enegry Agency.

IAF: Islamic action Front (Jordon).

ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and Levant.

ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

JDP: Justice and Development Party (Morocco).

JDP: Justice and Development Party (Turkey).

KKE: Greek Communist Party.

MCC: The Millennium Challenge Corporation.

MENA: Middle East and North Africa.

METO: Middle East Treaty Organization.

NED: National Endorsement of Democracy.

NSC: National Security Council.

NSC-68: National Security Council.

NSR 12 The National Security Review.

xi OMA: Office Miliray Affairs.

PNAC: the American Project of New American Century.

QDDR : Quadrennial and Development Review.

SCAF: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

STAR: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

UNITA: The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

UNSCOM: The Special Commission on Iraq.

USAID: The United States Agency for International Development.

USSR: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

WMD: Weapon of Mass Destruction.

xii List of tables and figures

Figure 1: U.S. Economic aid: Cold War, Inter War period aand War on Terror ...... 172

Figure 2: Map of the Greater Middle East ...... 345

Figure 3: Countries scaled to the economic aid they receive from the United States ...... 346

Figure 4: U.S. Defense Spendong from the Cold War to the Arab Spring (1947-2020) .. 347

Figure 5: Foreign Aid: Miliray and economic Aid from 1962 to 2020 ...... 347

Figure 6: OPEC proven crude reserve by the end of 214 (Billion Barrrels) the MENA share ...... 348

Figure 7: U.S. military expenditure from the War on Terror to the Arab Uprisinhs ( 2001- 2014) ...... 349

Figure 8: Miliray expenditure as a Percentage of GDP from 1941 to 2011 ...... 350

Figure 9: U.S. military spending Percent of the World ...... 350

xiii 1. Introduction

―Containment is something with which most people in the national security community have spent most of their lives.... We have become so accustomed to it that we rarely stop to consider what its precise goals are supposed to be.…‖1. , 1986.

―Containment‖ was an American geopolitical and geostrategic grand strategy that aimed to restrict the influence and expansion of the Soviet Union during the Cold War through economic, political, diplomatic and military means. It was defined by its main framer, George Kennan as a ―long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of

Russian expansive tendencies‖2. The main stated objective of this policy was to isolate, weaken and thereby lead to the collapse of Soviet Union from within, in other words as a means of avoiding direct confrontation. Containment is also defined as a middle ground

―between and détente‖. A more accurate identification is a ―policy of creating strategic alliance in order to check the expansion of a hostile power or ideology or to force it to negotiate peacefully‖3.

Containment policy was expanded beyond the initial geographic divisions that emerged in Europe, in the wake of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences at the end-World

War II, towards continents and countries in other areas of the world where the Soviet

Union challenged the interests of the United States. The competition was between ―spheres of influence‖ and ―Leadership‖. Containment became more and more militarized when, after Greece, the two superpowers became involved in indirect proxy conflicts including all-out wars in Korea and Vietnam, signaling the militarization of containment.

1 John Lewis Gaddis and Terry L. Deibel, Containment: Concept and Policy : Based on a Symposium (National Defense University Press, 1986) 721. 2 George F Kennan, ―The Sources of Soviet Conduct,‖ 25 , no 4 (July 1947): 566-582. 3 David J. Bishop, Dismantling 's Nuclear Weapons Programs (Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 2005) 4. 1 Administrations concomitantly endeavored to spread market and counter attempts to spread through economic and military aids and what is called today ―soft power,‖ diplomatic initiatives, all of which are termed here as the ―mechanisms of containment.‖ Their consistent deployment embodies the continuity analyzed here into the post-Cold War era.

What is termed as détente in the 1970s and the in the 1980s during the

Cold War, followed by the New World Order of the early 1990s and democratic enlargement and dual containment of the 1990s, were different faces of the same coin.

They were the successive faces of the containment policy that was extended, according to the dissertation hypothesis, into the War on Terror and the Arab Spring era. What we term as ―neo-containment policy‖ is the vector of setting up the new system of post-Cold War regional alliances in the MENA in this overall framework. In the early 1990s and since the collapse of the Soviet Union, ―the United States show(ed) interest in the deepening of the neo-containment‖ with a great ―emphasis to the War on Terror‖ 4. In the MENA, since the

1979 revolution, it has been necessary to contain the regional rivalry of Iran and what other

―rogue states‖ in the MENA. The construction of the terrorist threat, the rise of political

Islam in the late 1980s and 1990s as a threatening ideology to the United States interests in the great Middle East became the guiding line of U.S foreign policy. The War on Terror was the legacies of the President George H Bush New World Order and President

Clinton‘s Dual containment.

Like during Cold War containment policy the aim was to avoid direct confrontation, to check the expansion of a hostile power or ideology while containing the

« expansive tendencies at play, and this through the rebuilding a system of strategic

4 Emanuel Pietrobon, ―The neverending containment,‖ Association of Studies, Research and Internationalization (Feb. 2019), online, internet, June 6, 2019. Availble: www.asrie.org/2019/02/the- neverending. 2 alliances in the region. American leadership has been threatened internationally by the emergence of the ascending superpowers such as and , the ex-U.S. Cold War nemesis whose attempt to gain ground in the MENA, especially since the 2010 events, has been a source of concern. Moreover Russian leaders have ―allowed China to emerge as an economic major power whose planetary ambitions are threatening the stability of the

American ‖5. These are the major factors involved in the U.S. attempt to reshape the

MENA alliance system by mobilizing traditional allies to be engaged in the New World

Order around the perusal of U.S. primacy. The 2010 Arab uprisings appeared as a concentration of these threats and as a testing ground of this strategy, as well as of its limits.

Since the onset of the Cold War between the United States and the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union, the foundations of U.S. foreign policy has been subject to debate among historians, analysts, political pundits and political- makers. More recently scholars have renewed these schools of thought to analyze the nature of the post-Cold War period and then the War on Terror.

Our contribution is to revisit these debates from our neo-containment perspective.

We do so by shedding light upon the degree of continuity that links the periods of the ―two

U.S. wars‖ and the superpower‘s policy in the MENA region. Containment policy was the core component of U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War and, as we will attempt to demonstrate here, it would continue to be the main policy pillar in post-Cold War era in the

MENA region, during the George W. Bush and Barak Obama presidencies, in the face of new challenges, notably the declared Global War on Terror. The neo-containment prism shows to what extent scholarly analysis reflects, and is even a component of, this continuity.

5 Ibid. 3 The framework of neo-containment

President Bush stated the night of 9/11 that ―the Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today,‖6 referring to the foreign attack that propelled the United States into

World War II and onto the world scene as a superpower. It was a clarion call for a revival of the U.S. grand strategy of primacy which is based on the need for U.S. leadership and its military supremacy to fight off a world-threatening enemy. This was not the starting point of neo-containment, however. A hard version had been imposed on Iraq and Afghanistan in the 1990s and yet doomed to failure, at least in terms of U.S. gains, for a military intervention to rollback the state was subsequently necessary to change the regimes and install pro-American rulers.

Afghanistan and Iraq were then to become the first countries forming ―the ‖7 according to George W. Bush, followed by Iran and North Korea. Iraq was the main concern after Afghanistan, it ―continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror‖8. Iran challenged U.S. power and ―aggressively pursues these weapons

(WMD) and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian‘s people hope for freedom‖9. According to President George W. Bush, sponsoring terror and proliferation of

WMD were the new motives to rationalize intervention in the Middle East. The message sent out through the military campaigns was that other key Middle East countries would face the same destiny if they would not cooperate in the War on Terror or challenge the

U.S. in the region. ―You are Either with us or against us‖10 in the War on Terror, stated

6 David Kohn, ―Bush on 9/11: Moment to Moment, the President Talks in Detail about His Sept.11 Experience,‖ CBC News Sept .2, 2002. Online, Internet, Dec. 15, 2015. Availabe: www.cbsnews.com/news. 7 George W. Bush. President George W. Bush Address, January 29, 2002 (Washington, D.C: United States. White House, 2002). 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 George W. Bush. President George W. Bush Address to Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001. , 2001 ( Washington, D.C: United States, 2001). 4 President Bush; the MENA were in this way called upon to demonstrate unconditional support to the United States‘ campaigns in the Arab .

The 9/11 attack was also seen by some historians as ―a new Pearl-Harbor-style‖11.

For them, however, the meaning was that the event was instrumentalized, as the historical precedent in their eyes, to rationalize intervention into countries that had been for long hostile to United States strategic interests in the region. Martin Haliwell argued that ―[9/11] was a repeat of Pearl Harbor‖12 that was exploited to justify U.S. military operations on geostrategic countries like Afghanistan and Iraq that had been outside U.S. sphere of influence. In other words, the attack was turned to the advantage of U.S. decision-makers and so was perceived as a ―pretext of convenience‖13 to carry out policies that were already on the drawing board.

The war on Afghanistan and Iraq was a preventive measure against potential attacks upon the USA. Such ‗preventive‘ measures laid the basis for our hypothesis of neo- containment. George .W. Bush was essentially giving substance to the ‗New World Order‘ doctrine developed in 1990 by President George H. Bush after the fall of the and while preparing to launch the first .

The complex and ambiguous relationship between the U.S. government, its traditional allies and international organizations such as the United Nations is also a cogent area of continuity in U.S. policy when dwelling upon how the New World Order alliance, around U.S. leadership, would be built. International organizations such as the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations along the International Monetary

Fund were traditionally integrated by successive U.S. administrations in the deployment of

11 David R Griffin, The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11 (Moreton-in-Marsh: Arris, 2007) xi. 12 Martin Halliwell and Catherine Morley, American Thought and Culture in the 21st Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 3. 13Joseph G. Peschek, The Politics of Empire: War, Terror and (Taylor & Francis, 2006) 52. 5 the containment policy since the early Cold War. The United States engaged the U.N. in sanctioning unfriendly regimes worldwide and getting Security Council resolutions to authorize interventions in countries that ran counter its interests. In 1991, George W. H.

Bush managed to form a coalition under the banner of the United Nations to attack Iraq while the next president to take the same path, George W. Bush, failed to get a resolution to legitimize the 2003 invasion. Although both the permanent members of the United

Nations, except United Kingdom, and the majority of U.S. allies rejected the suggested

American resolution to intervene in Iraq in 2003, George W. Bush authorized the war forming what he called ―coalition of the willing‖14. European countries and even Russia which had joined the first Gulf War in 1991 refused to be engaged in the 2003 War. The

Bush administration nevertheless proceeded to unilaterally initiate the with neither a U.N resolution nor the participation of the long-standing allies as France and

Germany.

So while the operation was intended to be a manifestation of U.S. world leadership, it brought instead harsh criticism of the George W. Bush administration and a repositioning of U.S. leadership. The immediate post-Cold War era had been characterized by the U.S. habit to deploy allies in its interventions abroad to both legitimize wars and at the same time lessen the burden of military spending, as was the case in the first Gulf War in 1990-1991 and Haiti in 1994. ―In eight out of ten post-Cold War military interventions‖, the United States ―has chosen to use force multilaterally rather than going alone‖15; this is the New World Order U.S. Warfare strategy that was introduced by George H. W. Bush. In his book Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold

War, Patrick A. Mello, argues that U.S. presidents from George Herbert Walker Bush to

14 George W. Bush, NATO Speech: Press Conference Bush - Havel - Prague Summit - 20 November 2002. Online, internet, Nov. 19, 2015 Available: https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021120b.htm. 15 Sarah E Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011) 1. 6 relied heavenly on multi-national war rather than going alone to wars. It relied on ―coalitions and international organization blessing‖ which ―confer legitimacy and provide ways to share what are often costly burdens of war‖16That is the costs of war expenses and the political consequences of mult-national warfare are shared, and so less expensive to the United States.

In this line of thought the Iraq War is studied from a neo-containment perspective: how was it a manifestation of the U.S. attempt to reorient the regional alliance system and primacy as a continuation of the U.S. grand strategy, in this situation where the United

States could not depend on its allies to endorse its interventions with legitimacy and credibility. The case also shows how the failure of political and economic containments led to military containment and therefore an intervention either to change the regime or destroy its economic and military power. The U.S. sphere of influence and other international organizations have been part and parcel of U.S. containment policy from the early Cold war to the Arab Spring era.

The fact that George W Bush ordered the intervention in Iraq in March 2003 without obtaining a U.N resolution, in line with standards of international law, could be seen as the pursuit of U.S. military domination. This display was a message toward enemies and allies alike to reassert U.S. leadership in the MENA and an implicit message to rival powers such as China, Russia and especially Iran. There are numerous interpretations explaining this raging aggressiveness to invade Iraq to the point of doing so through a unilateral decision, contrary to the first Iraqi War in 1991, a decade earlier, which had been waged under the U.N. banner.

16 Ibid. 7 Neo-containment in the MENA

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region were an integral part of containment policy since the early Cold War, a political strategy that, we argue, has continued in the post-Cold War era and especially in relation to the War on Terror. This takes the form of what is termed here as ―neo-containment‖. We study neo-containment by analyzing the continued application of the mechanisms of containment, from the Cold-War to the post-Cold War eras including the War on Terror and the Arab Spring eras and this through the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism.

The MENA was a key ground of dispute for the United States between the Soviet

Union and the United States throughout the Cold War. Some MENA countries adhered to the Soviet orbit while others to that of the United States. The mechanisms of containment were deployed, to various degrees and periods in the MENA in relation to Iran, Iraq,

Libya, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon etc., and notably in the two countries that will be the major focus of our study in chapter four, Egypt and Tunisia.

The United States endeavored to contain Soviet influence and at the same time, for the same reasons of defending its interests, the spread of Arab in the

Middle East and the Persian Gulf. During the Cold War, it opposed nationalization of the sector and any attempt was prevented by all means, including military coups and regime change. This is because ―U.S. companies produced about 50 percent of the Middle

East's petroleum. Of Europe's crude oil imports in 1955, 89 percent came from that region‖17. The nationalization of these sectors therefore preventing major U.S. corporations from benefiting was perceived as a serious threat to American business and hegemony.

This explains the importance of the region to the American economy and the persistence to

17Thomas G. Paterson, John Garry Clifford and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations: A history since 1895 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999) 300. 8 maintain it in its sphere of influence. In 1953, when the nationalist Mohammad

Mosaddegh planned to nationalize the Iranian oil resources, the United States, through the

CIA, orchestrated a military coup to topple the the unfriendly regime and instal a pro-

American government headed by Mohmmad Reza Pahalvi. This was arguably an important marker of the U.S. policy of containment with regards to national oil security. The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a rival power did not put an end to U.S. eagerness to acquire and maintain a vital zone like the Middle East and North

Africa. Containment and neo-containment of rivals in the rich-oil area have been the main

U.S. policy goals in the MENA since the early Cold War. U.S. Iraq wars in 1990-1991 and

2003 in addition to Afghanistan in 2001 and the involvement in Arab uprisings in the

2010s were quests for oil and primacy, as much as for U.S. strategy presence, as it is examined in details in chapter two.

Rollback, although it appears as anti-thesis of containment as it is a regime change,18 is one major mechanism of containment initiated during the Eisenhower presidency; changing regimes secretly with the assistance of the CIA was carried out : in

Egypt in 1952, Iran in 1953, Chile in 1973, and reportedly Egypt in 2013. The United

States orchestrated and sponsored dozens of military coups and regime change operations during the Cold War and the New World Order then the War on Terror to contain vital areas within U.S. interests and intimidate other countries hostile to the United States.

Regime change was exploited to enlarge U.S. influence and stop the regional and international powers from competing in these vital areas. Moreover, regime change was an intimidation to countries especially in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

Comparable military coups and proxy wars carried out during the two phases of the Cold

War and then the War on Terror reveal the continuity of containment from the 20th to the

18 Robert Litwak, Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11 (Washington, D.C: Center Press, 2007) 109. 9 21st century, between the two U.S. wars and make the link with the Arab uprisings in the early 2010s. Such a strategy was developed to contain the spread nationalism embodied mainly in political Islam in the MENA during both wars in relation to defending the U.S. sphere of influence. This continuity will be the matter of my concern when revisiting twentieth and twenty-first century historiography and the post-Cold War U.S grand strategy notably during the War on Terror.

This system of alliances aimed at allying MENA countries within the U.S. sphere of influence was shaken during and after the Iranian Islamic revolution. When the United

States ‗lost‘ Iran - one of its key allies in the region- this introduced the threat that it could lose other that embraced the same ideology of political Islam as an anti-American ideology. A second political earthquake occurred a generation later with the Arab Spring in the 2010s and the overthrow of the new vital U.S. allies. The situation became more complex with the subsequent empowerment of Islamic parties and their victory in the parliamentary and presidential elections in Tunisia and Egypt, suggesting that they could gain decisive influence in the MENA. The United States claims the mission to defend democracy and democratic elections around the world. If so, how would it balance values and interests in an increasingly strategic area where Iran has remained the primary rival since 1979?

In the post-Cold War, a neo-containment policy has developed since the mid-

1990s to enhance U.S. primacy over the region and, to this end, to isolate the main regional threat to U.S. strategic influence, Iran. Political Islam and the War on Terror would end up by fitting into this framework. The United States is of course concerned with Russia‘s new post-Cold War expansionism, as well as the emergence of China as a superpower, these concerns will only be dealt with here to the extent that it influences these regional balance of power stakes.

10 The term ―neo-containment‖ first appeared in the early 1980s to designate the

Reagan administration‘s intensifying tension with the Soviet Union.19 Then it was used in

1995 to depict a ―more modern and nuanced version of strategic (Cold War) containment‖20 which was deployed in the post-Cold War era. It was defined by the

Economist in 1995 as ―not . . . an overarching strategy for dealing with an overriding threat. But as series of mini-containments in response to the increasingly difficult

Russia‖21. Another more recent definition of neo-containment is ―a revival of George

Kennan‘s recipe for stopping subversion generated by the Kremlin‘s insatiable geostrategic hunger22.

Neo-containment strategies favored the United States in the immediate post-Cold

War era but then the situation began to change in favor of rival powers, including Russia.

While the United States focused on the War on Terror, China, Russia, and the Islamic

Republic of Iran emerged to challenge the stability of the American Empire23. ―Russia has invaded Crimea and other parts of and tried covertly to destabilize European democracies. China built artificial island fortresses in international waters, claimed vast swaths of the Western Pacific, and moved to organize Eurasia economically in ways favorable to Beijing. And the Islamic Republic of Iran has expanded its influence over much of Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and is pursuing nuclear weapons‖24. In this context, preserving its footing in the MENA, the U.S. outpost towards the global East, has taken on ever greater importance. For the U.S, the major threat to its strategic interests and

19 Stephen Woolcock, ―US-European Trade Relations,‖ International Affairs Vol. 58, No. 4 (autumn, 1982): 610-624. 20 Bob Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New (United States, Brookings Institution Press, 2009 ) 242. 21 Ibid. 22 George Anglițoiu, ―Putinization and Neo-Containment,‖ Europolity Continuity and Change in European Governance. 12.2 (2018): 179-190. 23 Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer, American Empire: A Debate (New York: Routledge, 2007). 24 Michael Mandelbaum, ―The New Containment Handling Russia, China, and Iran,‖ Foreign Affairs. 98.2 (2019): 123-131. 11 supremacy in the MENA and especially to oil rich Iraq, to Israel and its neighbors, Syria and Lebanon. According to the logic of the Cold War doctrine, adapted to the MENA in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings and the triumph of Islamic parties, the Iranian Domino could inspire new Islamic revolutions and regimes.

Neo-containment, we contend, then, applies to containing Iran in the Middle East and to political Islam in Arab Spring countries which tended to quit the U.S. sphere of influence. It was also recommended by George W Bush‘s advisers before 9/11 as a new

‗grand strategy‘ to substitute the Clinton administration‘s declared strategic ‗mission‘ of democratic transformation25. Significantly, neo-containment needed to be articulated with the War on Terror during the Bush and Obama administrations then with the Arab Uprising period in the 2010s. These new foreign policy challenges, made conciliating the defense of

U.S. strategic and economic interests, and at the same time its democratic values, even more complex. In this context, the objective of maintaining Arab Spring countries as defenders of U.S. strategic and economic interests rather than siding with Iran was an effort that was not an easy task for the U.S. Its policies at first seemed to waver and even be marked by some confusion.

Despite the difficulties, U.S. governments have encountered in finding the right policy measures and balance to implement it, neo-containment of the MENA has largely succeeded in benefiting the United States geo-strategically. At the same time, it has revived the Cold War antagonism between the United States and Russia over competition for influence in the region and especially since the Arab Uprising and within these countries. Iran‘s own ambitions and the War on Terror have further complicated the task of

U.S. policy makers. Analyzing events in Tunisia and Egypt, the first two Arab Uprising

25 Ibid. 12 countries and that also gave rise to political Islam regimes, is key to understanding U.S. foreign policy in the MENA region.

Political Islam and containment

Political Islam denotes the political interpretation of Islam that is the use of the

Islamic principles as the main source of the political practice. It is ―any interpretation of

Islam that serves as a basis for political identity and action‖.26 The term is often used interchangeably with . Although the notion was created by the Egyptian scholar

Hassan-al Banna in 1928, the term and practice remerged in the aftermath of the Six-Day

War in 196727 when Arab Nationalism lost popularity and efficiency. It was the end of

Nasserism, the main promoter of this movement and the 1967 War that ―opened new space for Islamism in the Arab world‖28. Arab Nationalism was an anti- ideology that grew hostile toward the West. It has been explained as a ―political movement that stands against western imperialism and colonization and in favor of the emancipation of the third

World‖29 and especially, the Arab world. , the main founder and key figure of Nasserism and Arab Nationalism advocated an international non-alignment policy since the early 1950s. He retreated from being included in American and Soviet sphere of influence and support revolutionary nationalism in the Arab Muslim World.

―Revolutionary nationalism had to be both anti-capitalist and geared toward a special type of ‖30. This political ideology brought American hostility to Nassser and other

Arab countries that followed the same path.

26 John O. Vall and Tamara Sonn, Political Islam: Oxford Bibiliographies online Research (Oxford University Press, 2003) 3. 27Ibid. 28 Shadi Hamid, ―The end of Nasserism: How the 1967 War opened new space for Islamism in the Arab world,‖ The Brookings Institution June 5, 2017, online, internet Jun.30, 2018. Available: https://www.brookings.edu . 29 Gerhard Bö wering, Patricia Crone and Mahan Mirza, The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought (Princeton, N.J: Press, 2012) 385. 30 Federico Vélez, Latin American Revolutionaries and the Arab World: From the to the Arab Spring (Florence Taylor and Francis, 2017) 21. 13 The targeted it in the late 1950s and the 1960s; it “sought to contain the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian president Jamal Abdel Nasser‖31. And through economic, political and military means, what can be considered already as a regional version of containment aimed at a local rival, the United States aimed to restrain

Nasserism in the Middle East. The policy failed to fully meet its objectives, however, as this ideology was transmitted to the major Arab Muslim World and even to Latin America.

Political Islam came not only as an opposition of Arab Nationalism but also as an alternative political ideology that began to emerge in the MENA in the 1970s and 1980s.

Adherents to political Islam opposed the pro-Western rulers and worked on positioning themselves on the political scene. The Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 was labeled as

―the coming of age of Political Islam‖32. Since then, Iran was, like China in 1949, ‗lost‘ and left the U.S. orbit. Iran had been a key U.S. ally in the MENA since 1953, when the

CIA orchestrated a military coup against the nationalist Mohammad Mossadegh to install

Shah Pahlavi, a pro-American ruler. U.S. policy was geared around the concern that

MENA countries were likely to follow the as Islamists there started to oppose and challenge their rulers.

Islamic-based governments and Islamic parties have been a matter of concern of

U.S. foreign policy as they have been traditionally perceived as anti-American. The application of the containment policy to stop them from spreading thus became an imperative, though a complex one, to carry out. On the one hand, the notion of ‗political

Islam‘ is essential to the War on Terror because its presence was a turned to the advantage of U.S. policy, another example of the ‗pretext of convenience‘. Although they themselves refuse to make any claim to radicalism, Islamic parties and governments are associated

31 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (The University of North Carolina Press, 2005) 2. 32 John O Voll and Tamara Sonn, Political Islam: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide (Oxford University Press, May 2010) 3. 14 with extremism and radicalism by the U.S. political machine and therefore they have been contained, but not defeated and dismantled. This is because they are essential to justify the

U.S. waging of the War on Terror33. On the other hand, when opposing its rise at all costs

American diplomacy thereby lacks consistency with its own values towards democratically elected national leaders who adhere to religious precepts in Arab spring countries, notably

Egypt and Tunisia. The problematical frame of neo-containment enters at this point. Is

Islam in government, even democratically elected, meant to be ‗contained‘? Or just

‗political Islam‘, which is equated in U.S. foreign policy with ‗terror‘? How are the two defined, perceived and distinguished in U.S. foreign policy? How does 21st century U.S. policy frame its diplomacy and interests towards Islam in government? It is in this sense that U.S. policy towards the War on Terror and towards the Muslim world and Arab Spring governments are inexorably intertwined. What, in fact, is meant to be ‗contained‘? The

Egyptian and Tunisian cases are exemplary to illustrate the commonalities and contradictions of U.S. diplomacy with regards to multiple interests in these policy areas.

As the spread of political Islam could endanger U.S. interests, a containment policy toward Iran and other threatening Arab states was the main priority in the region of

U.S. governments. This strategy is backed to the Reagan administration in the 1980s and continued to the post-Cold war era. The United States advocated an anti-political Islam policy in the MENA. It was manifested in 1982 when the United States interfered to save the Lebanese President Camille Chamoun from being overthrown by the Islamists, thereby keeping the country within the United States sphere of influence. Moreover, the United

States engaged their allies in the MENA to distance Islamists from political power. The crackdown of Islamists notably in Tunisia in the 1980s and Algeria in the 1990s best exemplify the U.S. rejection of political Islam. The Arab Spring in the 2010s then

33 Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor, ―Self-defence As a Justification for War: the Geo-Political and War on Terror Models,‖(2017): 129-174. 15 witnessed, through the initial reaction of Washington, the continuity of U.S. rejection of

Islamic-based parties and governments.

Opposition to political Islam has remained a main component of its alliance system in the MENA region. The Islamists embraced anti-imperialist ideology in search of emancipation and economic and political independence. These ambitions ran counter to

U.S regional interests and threatened to lead competitors like China and Russia to forge new alliances. To maintain its alliance system, the U.S. emboldened its allies through by implementing its policies through the major mechanisms of containment, through economic, military, diplomatic means.

What mattered for the United States, I argue, was not Islam as a religion or political Islam as such, but the preservation of its interests and alliance system that was threatened by such groups. ―This is not primarily because Iran is ‗Islamic‘ or

‗fundamentalist‘ but because Iranian nationalism, and the experience of Iran‘s mass political mobilization, represents the strongest challenge to the present configuration of

Western interests and clients regimes‖34. Moreover, the Iranian model extended to other countries in the MENA. ―Islamist Ideology extends beyond Iran to include Palestinians,

Lebanese, Egyptians, Sudanese, Tunisians, Algerians and others. All these share ‗anti- imperialism and anti-Americanism‘‖35. In response, the United States engaged the actions of the various governmental and non-governmental institutions, such as the department of

State, the CIA, the Congress, USAID, to contain the spread and empowerment of political

Islam in the MENA. In Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, under the United States umbrella,

Islamists were oppressed and elections were falsified. In April 1989, as the Islamic Party

Ennahda won around 17% of the total votes in the parliamentary election, President Ben

34 Joel and Joe Stork, Political Islam: Essays from „Middle East Report‟ (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1997) 15. 35 Ibid., 15. 16 Ali banned the party, jailed and exiled its members36. The Algerian election of December

1991 in which The Islamic Salvation Front gained 54% of the total votes37 was bloodier after the nullification of the FIS victory. The United States even claimed its responsibility for the intervention in MENA elections and notably the 1992 Algerian election38.

In this vein, how would the United States embrace and champion democracy if these groups came to power? The question was directly raised during the period studied here in light of Condoleezza Rize‘s speech in 2005 in Cairo on the American duty to spread democracy then the famous speech of Barack Obama at Cairo University in 2009 in which he promised a new phase with the MENA and the Muslim countries in terms of defending democracy. The first test was the Arab Spring when the Obama administration ended up, as we show here, back-tracking on this promise to engage in a continuity of the long-established grand strategy in the MENA. A study of U.S. response to the various phases of the Arab Spring in the MENA and especially in Tunisia and Egypt enhances the continuity thesis of primacy as the grand strategy to maintain U.S leadership and to renew the system of alliances and through the application of neo-containment.

The War on Terror was from neo-containment perspective ―selective with regards to goals, means and targets‖39. That is the United States was selective to contain specific countries to meet political goals and also took into account the cost, attempting to find the least expensive means for achieving them. In the final analysis, it prioritized stability over democracy: ―Stability is a more reasonable and achievable goal than democratization‖40.

Without meaning to undertake a comprehensive comparative historical, political and

36 Rémy Leveau, ―La Tunisie du Président Ben Ali: �quilibre Interne et Environnement Arabe,‖ Maghreb Machrek: Monde Arabe : Al-ʻā lam Al-ʻarabī. (1989): 10. 37 Robert Mecham, From the Sacred to the State: Institutional Origins of Islamist Political Mobilization (Stanford, CA: , 2006) 1. 38 Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge: University Press, 1999) 76. 39 Glenn P Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2018) 398. 40 Ibid. 17 economic analysis on this last topic, introducing this contextual and conceptual dimension will inevitably revise a number of American Superpower clichés inherited by the postwar period, notably the self-proclaimed American mission to defend ‗democracy‘ in all instances as a justification of maintaining its super-power status.

The dissertation’s main hypothesis

The thesis main hypothesis is that containment has been employed in the post-

Cold War era in order to maintain American super-power status, beyond the former post- war sphere of influence, and enhance U.S. primacy at the expense of potential rival powers. Containment remains the main foreign policy axis which has been adapted to the wars that opened the 21st century and still going on.

The aim is to study U.S. foreign policy mechanisms applied to both wars, to test the notion of ‗neo-containment‘ in the post-Cold War era. Thus renewing with the Cold

War doctrine, according this hypothesis, has found its application in the U.S. War on

Terror as well as towards Arab Spring governments. In this context, the question to be answered and to which I will attempt to answer is how the Arab Springtime fits into the overall scenario of U.S. Diplomacy, focusing on two specific countries, Egypt and Tunisia.

The PhD setting

The dissertation‘s subject is immensely broad in time and place thus stetting the boundaries temporally and geographically is needed to answer its main research questions and test its main hypotheses.

Setting the temporal boundaries:

The dissertation surveys ‗the containment policy‘ as American Cold War strategies. The focus is put mainly on the War on Terror from 9/11 to 2008 and the Obama foreign policy toward the Arab Spring countries from December 17, 2010 to the late 2014.

18 Meanwhile, the argumentation extends forwards and backwards from 1945 to 2014 to follow the continuity or discontinuity of the same grand strategy despite the fall of the

Soviet Union in 1991. It highlights the hypothesis that the post-WWII American grand strategy based on primacy has not fundamentally changed. The late phase of the Cold War from 1980 to 1990 marked the peak and fall of the containment policy. President Reagan escalated tensions in his first term as he called for the implementation of ‗rollback the state‘ as a response to the 1970s détente, coining the Soviets as ‗the evil empire‘ in 1983, however then turned back to détente in his second term. His successor George H. Bush followed the same path during the transition period from the Cold War to the post-Cold

War. His ‗New World Order‘ was based on deterring the potential threat to U.S. primacy and on the re-forging of the alliance system. This was manifested in the first Gulf War in

1991 and how the United States bolstered its alliance system on the one hand and damaged a potential threat to U.S. leadership in the Middle East and notably the rich oil countries, on the other.

The post-Cold War era could be divided into two main eras. The first extends from December 31, 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed officially to the 09/11. The interwar period - from 1991 to 2001- was an era of leadership crisis and search for a new containment policy and so, one might say, a new George Kennan. President Bill Clinton introduced the dual containment of Iran and Iraq as the main U.S. rivals in the MENA which, we argue, is a continuity of the Cold War containment. In the mid-1990s this policy was described as the ―neo-containment‖41, according to The Economist magazine. Major focus is placed on the important era between the post 9/11 and America‘s War on Terror in the MENA. It covers the President George W. Bush presidency and its main wars against

Afghanistan and Iraq then the President Barack Obama presidency policy in the MENA

41 Bobo Lo, The Axis of Convenience - Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (Washington: Brookings Institution Press and Chatham House, 2008) 249. 19 and notably during the Arab Spring countries. The main area of concern is the neo- containment policy and whether it has been applicable on the War on Terror then the Arab

Spring or not.

Geographical boundaries

Although the thesis studies the MENA region as a key area to United States foreign policy concerns during the Cold War and War on Terror, it simultaneously covers the area of conflicts during the Cold War where the policy of containment was implemented either to distance the Soviet influence or to bring countries into, or back into, the American orbit. Europe, Latin America and Asia along with the Middle East and North

Africa were subject to containment policy since the early Cold War.

The MENA typically includes Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel,

Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, , Syria,

Tunisia, , Palestine, and Yemen, Ethiopia and Sudan42. Reference is made to the MENA region when the policy overrides all countries, despite the fact that the study of the containment policy in detail throughout the entire MENA is beyond the scope of this thesis. The focus is put on key areas such as Egypt, Iraq and Iran as a particular area of conflicts between the major powers and concern of the United States from the Cold War to the Global War on Terror eras. North Africa such as Tunisia, Algeria along with Egypt has witnessed political turmoil because of the political Islam and its relations with United

States interests in the region. The Arab Spring, which occurred in the MENA region, is examined from neo-containment perspective and in relation to U.S. ‗habits‘ and grand strategy of ‗primacy‘. Tunisia and Egypt are the center of concern when dealing with the

Arab spring in chapter four.

42 Edward Burke and Sara Bazoobandi, The Gulf Takes Charge in the Mena Region (Madrid : Fride, 2010). 20 Methodology

The dissertation uses various primary sources which are linked mainly to the Cold

War policy of containment. The first material is George Kennan‘s Long Telegram which was a secret cable sent from U.S embassy in Mosco in 1946 to the State Department. Later on it was published in Foreign Affairs Magazine under the pseudo X in 1947. This document was seen as the bible of the containment policy as it coined the expansionist policy of Stalin that it claimed was aimed at world domination and recommended a series of counter policies to limit the spread of communism worldwide. It set out the framework of containment as a grand strategy. The dissertation relies on the presidential and state department secretary speeches and position statements that are relevant to the main hypothesis. Other government sources are used to reveal the national security strategies such Truman NSC-68, George H Bush‘s 1992 DPG and George W Bush 2002 NSS. A direct access to the Library of Congress in Washington and several New York Libraries allowed use relevant archives such as ―Public Papers of the Presidents of the United

States‖ in addition to declassified documents from the National Archives website. For accurate and concrete statistics, the USAID website also was fruitful to analyze data on

U.S. economic aids to countries along various periods of time. A direct access to the headquarter of the USAID in Washington and interviews with high civil servants during my research study the United States in July 2015 allowed me to use analytical data and information provided by the USAID organization.

Much attention is devoted to revisiting Cold War and post-Cold war scholarship through the lens of neo-containment. The secondary sources studied include a wide range of various books, articles and interviews with specialists in the Middle East and North

Africa studies along with War on Terror researchers in the United States and Tunisia.

Authors and writers belonging to different schools of thoughts are taken into consideration.

21 This includes their work and also the intersection between academia and politics that is pointed out and analyzed with great precaution. One noteworthy element of continuity between the two U.S. ideological wars is the phenomenon of leading and influential historians in the early Cold War and then War on Terror becoming members of American presidential administrations. John Lewis Gaddis is a case in point, the most prominent historian in the Cold War in late 1970s and 1980s who later joined George W. Bush administration. He not only showed his admiration to Bush‘s preventive War but also rationalized the War on Terror. Other examples include the orthodox Cold War historians

Herbert Fies, William McNeil and Arthur Schlesinger who were policy practitioners rather than acdemian in Truman and Eisenhower administrations to the extent that Feis was depecited as ―court historian‖43. This is an indication of the highly ideological nature of both U.S. post-WWII wars, just as of their schools of scholarship, that we attempt to deconstruct here.

To do so, the methodology adopts a close textual analysis of sources from a historical institutionalist and path dependency theoretical perspective. Data is also analyzed thanks to insight gained through interviews and collaborations with intellectuals and policy makers during and in the follow-up of the 2015 Study of the U.S. Institute

(SUSI)44 on U.S. Foreign policy. The 120-hour course entitled ―Grand Strategy in Context:

Institutions, People, and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy,‖ renown U.S. foreign policy professors and specialists including Walter Russel Mead -the authors of books such as

43 Christos Frentzos and Antonio S. Thompson, The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History: 1865 to the Present (Routledge, 2017) 170. 44 Study of the U.S. Institute (SUSI) on U.S. Foreign Policy examines how contemporary U.S. foreign policy is formulated and implemented. The Institute includes a historical review of significant events, individuals, and philosophies that have shaped U.S. foreign policy. The Institute explains the role of key players in U.S. foreign policy including the executive and legislative branches of government, the media, the U.S. public, think-tanks, non-governmental organizations, and multilateral institutions. it was designed to foster a better understanding in academic institutions overseas of how U.S. foreign policy is formulated, implemented, and taught. 22 Power, Terror, Peace of War45 and Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and

How It Changed the World 46 – were the lecturers who contributed to this dissertation. The program was also an opportunity to meet and interview with political academic and practitioners at Bard College New York, – the Congress, the United Nations and the

Department of States and the Pentagon which under the program had the opportunity to visit them and interact with key civil servant and policy makers.

The body of knowledge is then applied to studying policy evolution in order to evaluate whether one can determine either continuum – with high or low points– transitions or break of the containment doctrine, as applied through the mechanisms studied here, and leading up to the Arab uprisings in the early 2010s.

Dissertation outline

The dissertation is divided into four main parts:

Chapter one Literature Review presents a commented bibliography on how historians and political scientists have surveyed and analyzed the implementation of the containment policy in the two eras under study: the Cold War and the War on Terror. It sheds new light on traditional analyses of the major schools of thought, tracing the continuity of the intersection between politics and academia in the two eras. From historical prespective, this chapter examines the continuity or discontinuity of the same

U.S. foreign policy since the onset of the Cold War until the ―Arab Uprising‖ in early

2010s.

The historiography of the Cold War strategic doctrine of containment is presented as a pivotal in shaping American domestic and foreign credos along five decades. The

45 Walter R Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk (New York: Vintage Books, 2013). 46 Walter R Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (Burnaby, B.C: University of Simon Fraser Library, 2013). 23 historiography examines historians‘ and political scientists‘ approaches to state dynamics regarding these two conflicts. The orthodox school of thought emerged in the immediate

WWII era, for example, holds the Soviets responsible for the Cold War due to their intended extension over Europe and the U.S sphere of influence. Gaddis Smith argues that the U.S. faced ―the Soviets determination to embark upon a policy of extension‖47, portraying the U.S. as a ―democratic defensive country standing against U.S.S.R. expansionism, alongside its proxy totalitarian regimes‖48. This premise laid the groundwork for George F. Kennan‘s concept of containment: upholding ―democracy‖ – read the Western sphere of influence – by preventing the spread of communism. The official interpretation of American policymakers since the 1950s was framed as a benevolent image of the U.S. superpower until 1959 when the Revisionist school of thought emerged to challenge the common narrative on the Cold War.

Revisionists started to question the prevailing interpretation of the Cold War in the late 1950s when William Appelman Williams published his landmark book The

Tragedy of American Diplomacy in 1959. As a result, and contrary to orthodox scholars, blame for the onset of the Cold War was placed on the U.S. and its own main goals of not protecting and democratizing the world, but expanding its sphere of influence and increasing its business market and preserving its primacy at the expense of the Soviets, and this in the name of political containment 49. The total shift in focus of the Revisionist school and the unfinished battles between Orthodox and Revisionist thinkers paved the way for the emergence of another school of thought which was labeled as post-

Revisionism as a middle ground between the two previous schools. Post-revisionist historians who appeared in the 1980s introduced a balanced interpretation, a synthesis of

47Bogdan Antoniu, ―The : A Historical Review,‖ Cold War Historiography (March 2011) online, internet, Dec. 7, 2018. Available: www. fr.scribd.com/doc/49807201/cold-war-historiography. 48Ibid. 49Peter Bastian, ―Origin of the Cold War,‖ American History for Australian School (2018), online, internet, Dec. 7, 2018. Availbe: www.anzasa.arts.usyd.edu.au. 24 both orthodox and the revisionist schools50. The prominent post-revisionist historian is widely recognized as John Lewis Gaddis51. He produced a moderate version of the Cold

War, adopting some orthodox and revisionist arguments and criticizing others.

Writing the War on Terror has nearly followed the same path, a group of historians were known as the traditionalist or orthodox scholars provided a narrative on the

War on Terror as a defense war against aggressive and terrorist groups that attacked

America because of its values. Journalists and historians interchanged the same version of the war until the emergence of another group which like the Cold War revisionists challenged the dominating narratives on the U.S. War on Terror. They also were labeled as revisionists. They have also tackled the issue of terrorism and how it was exploited to insure U.S. leadership over ‗rogue states‘ and allies alike. They rode the protest against

U.S. foreign policy, challenging both predominant benign images that orthodox historians drew regarding U.S. foreign policy and policy-makers approach of the global War on

Terror.

Chapter two addresses the deployment of U.S. policy of containment in the major eras from the late Cold War to the War on Terror and especially the transition period and the global War on Terror. A heavy focus is placed on U.S. grand strategy in Afghanistan,

Iran and Iraq as a main theatre of conflicts during the Cold War and the War on Terror and a matter of dispute to U.S. primacy in the MENA. Looking backward and forward, the part examines the continuity or the discontinuity of the containment policy in the aftermath of

9/11. It studies the American quest for leadership not only towards unfriendly regimes but also its allies. President Bush‘s grand strategy was a ‗pick and mix‘ of the American presidents during the Cold War and interwar periods through various means for the same

50Bogdan Antoniu, ―The Origins of the Cold War: A Historical Review,‖ Cold War Historiography. (March 2011) ,online, Internet 7 Dec 2018. Available: www. fr.scribd.com/doc/49807201/cold-war-historiography. 51Ibid. 25 end: U.S. primacy in the post-Cold War era and deterrence of any potential threat. We examine President Obama‘s claim of discontinuity with his predecessor‘s War on Terror.

Chapter three studies the major mechanisms of U.S. foreign policy of containment: economic and military containment alongside with ―defending democracy‖.

Adopting the path dependency theoretical framework, the study of such mechanisms aims to trace the implementation of Cold War mechanisms in the post-Cold War era, and notably the War on Terror era. Economic aid was the first means to deter the communist threat in Greece and Turkey then expanded to be a part and parcel of U.S. Grand strategy in the world up until and including the 21st century. Military containment took various forms. It was initiated by the foundation of NATO in 1948 then developed to military training, equipping and cooperating. The military bases in Europe and especially in the

Middle East are manifestations of the military preponderance, which aimed at maintaining the alliance system and intimidating challenging powers. It is also a guarantee of cheap flow of oil and open markets for U.S. business. In brief, this chapter sheds light on the mechanisms of justification and legitimacy of the United States overt and covert intervention abroad to protect and expand its sphere of influence.

Chapter four tests the dissertation‘s main hypothesis in the Arab spring countries in the early 2010s. The focus is put on U.S. grand strategy policy in the Middle East and

North Africa to trace the continuity, adaptation or change of its Cold War strategies. It is devoted mainly to the neo-containment policy, if any, in the MENA and its applicability to the first so-called Arab Spring countries Tunisia and Egypt. It examines U.S. responses to the various phases of the Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt from the first day of the revolutions until the regain of the alliance system in Egypt in July 2013 and in Tunisia in

October 2014. With reference to the containment of Arab Nationalism and then the political Islam as anti-American political ideologies, this chapter bolsters the dissertation‘s

26 main hypothesis of the continuity of U.S. grand strategies from the Cold War to the War on

Terror. Although President Obama, like his predecessors, championed democracy as an essential American value, the Arab Spring period highlighted the gap between words and deeds. This chapter is studied from historical institutionalist theoretical framework that is history matters and that the U.S. grand strategy has ―proven hard to change, even amid shocks‖52.

The dissertation argues that a significant number of similarities exist between the half-century of Cold War and the first US war of the 21st century in terms of grand strategies. The end of the Cold War was not an era of world peace, neither of the ―End of

History‖, as the political scientist famously predicted at the time, and the claim of the end of the War on Terror by President Obama, under the same rhetoric, did not end the U.S. engagement in foreign countries. The end of the Cold War and especially the onset of the War on Terrors were momentous occasions for U.S. Presidents, at least until Barak Obama‘s ambiguous foreign policy ―doctrine‖, to attempt to re-bolster U.S. world leadership. Several fundamental questions are asked and guide our research. How did the United States – and to what extent did it – succeed in winning the Cold War, including ―ideologically‖, against Communism, but less so – or not? – against ―Terror‖.

How is containment used in both wars as a key foreign policy mechanism? How must the essential role of the Middle East and North African, most prominently Egypt and Tunisia, be articulated in relation to the current U.S. foreign policy crisis? What are the foundations of policies of the ‗American Superpower‘ towards the Middle East and North Africa today?

52 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 27 2. Historiography of U.S. foreign policy of containment:

the Cold War and the War on Terror

―Each age tries to form its own conception of the past. Each age writes the history of the past anew with reference to the conditions uppermost in its own time‖53.

Frederick Jackson Turner (1890)

Because much has been written about the Cold War since the late 1940s and because the War on Terror has caught the attention of historians noticeably in the aftermath of the September 11th, 2001 attacks, this introductory chapter aims to set out and revisit some schools of thought, interpretations, and writings on U.S. containment policy during the Cold War and the War on Terror from the post-Cold War era until the early 2010s.

The U.S. foreign policy of containment implemented by means of diplomacy or military intervention have been a crucial issue for historians since the post-World War II era. This chapter investigates the main premises and notably the notion of containment through the orthodox, the revisionist, and the post-revisionist schools of thought, dealing with policies during the main historical phases of the Cold War and post-Cold War era – which, itself, included a number of phases the so-called ―New World Order‖ and the

Global War on Terror – thereby revisiting and shedding new light on these major references of historical scholarship. A special focus will be devoted to the War on Terror and the apprehension of the terror phenomenon in relation to foreign policy and international relations, readdressing what can be analyzed today as deficiencies and proposing new insight.

53 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The objectivity Question and the American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 103. 28 Although there are dozens of U.S. Foreign policy schools of thought, the choice is based on some key factors. The first is that the interpretations of U.S. involvement in international affairs and notably the Cold War, the interwar period54 and the War on Terror have been evolving continuously. Studying these schools, we examine the total shift from one common perception to the contrary when dealing with the two first schools Orthodox and Revisionist- whereas the post-revisionist –as an attempt to find a balanced view of the

U.S. role in the international arena. The interpretations of the 21st century‘s schools of thought explored new perspectives such as corporatism and the ‗Third World‘. The second is that the main, and prominent, historians I deal with here are the founding fathers of these schools of thought. For example, William Appelman Williams‘ book The Tragedy of

American Diplomacy55 that was published in 1959, was the bible of the Cold War

Revisionist school of thought whereas John Lewis Gaddis‘s the Strategy of Containment

(1983)56 signaled the birth of the post-revisionist school of thought. The third is that the evolution of interpretations of the Cold War and the shift from one narrative to the contrary is characteristic of the War on Terror studies.

Historians and International Relations (IR) analysts have shed light on the convergences and divergences between schools of thoughts and the various writers who discussed the same issue. Our historiography of the Cold War and War on Terror as U.S. foreign policy basically revisits the opposing and contradictory perspectives which flourished at certain times and became well accepted narratives by historians, political analysts, and foreign policy students. This reading is necessary to test the hypothesis of the application of ‗containment‘ in the post-Cold War era, i.e., during the U.S. Global War on

Terror and whether the same narratives are repeated when dealing with the main reasons

54 Interwar period is the era between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the War on Terror 9/11. 55 Willan Appelman William, The Tragedy of the American diplomacy (Delta Book ,1981). 56 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford University Press, 1983). 29 behind the anti- terror crusade in the Post 9/11 era and the deployment of U.S. Grand

Strategy of primacy.

1.1 Cold War studies

1.1.1 Orthodox perspective on containment

The orthodox school of thought, known also as consensus or traditional school of thought emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War to designate a group of scholars who adopted and helped to forge a widely accepted version of the Cold War that the United States was reactive to aggression of the Soviets and their tendency to expand their sphere of influence. It placed the entire blame on the Soviet Union for the initiation of the Cold War and presented the benign image of the United States as a defensive force versus an aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union. This account was adopted by

American historians and politicians in the early Cold War. The orthodox approach of interpreting the Cold War which flourished in the late 1940s and 1950s was challenged in the 1960s by the Revisionists but remained a trend among historians in the academy.

The two main orthodox scholars are Herbert Feis and William H. McNeil whose writings best elaborated the ‗orthodox thesis‘57. ―They represent the collective memory of

British and American officialdom about their wartime alliance with Soviet Russia and how it broke down‖58. Feis‘ major books that exemplified the Orthodox perspective were The

Road to Pearl Harbour (1950)59, The China Tangle (1953)60, and Roosvelt-Churchil-

57 Ian A Gwinn, Towards a Critical Historiography of Orthodox-Revisionist Debates on the Origins of the Cold War: Between Disciplinary Power and U.S. National Identity (University of Birmingham, 2009). 58 Staughton Lynd, ―How the Cold War Began‖, Norman A. Graebner ed. The Cold War: Ideological Conflict or Power Struggle (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1963) 2. 59 Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbour: The Coming of the War between the United States and Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950). 60 Herbert Feis, The China Tangle, the American Effort in China, from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission, by Herbert Feis (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1953). 30 Stalin61 (1959). McNeil‘s main book is America, Britain and Russia (1952) revealed his traditional account of the Cold War. Other prominent historians such as Arthur M.

Schlesinger Jr., whose article ―Origins of the Cold War‖62 which was published in 1967 amid the triumph of revisionism, best illustrated the Orthodox approach. John Spanier,

John Snell, and others historians provided the historiography with a variety of literature on the post second World War US-USSR conflicts.

It is worth pointing out that George Kennan, the father of containment policy, was labeled as an Orthodox historian in the 1940s and 1950s. His cable to the State

Department, which was published in 1947 in Foreign Affairs magazine, was the basis of the traditionalist presepctive. It was the starting point for historians and academic practitioners to follow the same path in writing the Cold War. The Long Telegram was also a primary source for the Orthodox school to analyze and explain the domestic politics and the ideological background of Soviets. The Soviets could be ―contained by the adroit and vigorous application of counterforce‖63 and this can take the form of political, economic and covert operation but not military according to Kennan. Though his traditionalist realist approach of the U.S. Grand Strategy and the evolution of the containment policy to the military, he was aligned with the Revisionists in terms of criticizing U.S. involvement in

Vietnam, stating that both Korea and Vietnam were not significant to U.S. interests and that the war could had been avoided. He noted in a lecture at in April

1967 that ―there was no place on the mainland of Asia where industrial strength could be developed on a scale large enough to do us significant harm‖ 64. He added that U.S

61 Herbert Feis, Churchill-roosvelet-stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace they sought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 62 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., ―Origins of the Cold War,‖ Foreign Affairs 46 (Oct. 1967): 47. 63 X, . ―The Sources of Soviet Conduct,‖ New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947. 64 George F. Kennan, ―The Conceptual Element in Recent American Foreign Policy,‖ lecture at the Charles Warren Center, Harvard University; 19 April 1967. 31 policymakers during the 1950s and 1960s ―lack[ed] conceptual element in recent American foreign policy‖65.

The U.S response according to Gaddis Smith aimed ―to protect both its legitimate security interests and democracy in the various European nations‖66. This meant standing against the Soviet Union‘s tendency to expand its sphere of influence and dominate as much of Europe as possible ―at the expense‖ of U.S. interests and security. Another crucial point worth highlighting is that the United States was depicted by Orthodox historians as

‗the savior of democracy‘ and the Soviet Union as an authoritarian monolith that endeavored to impose its way of life on European countries.67 The response of the United

States was therefore legitimate, according to Smith and his fellow thinkers. This is also implied in Smith‘s previous assimilation of protecting U.S. ‗legitimate security interests‘ to protecting ‗democracy‘: the two notions would henceforth become virtually interchangeable. The U.S. was personified as a ―free man‖ who advocates self- determination and opposes , as Orthodox historian Arthur Schlesinger wrote:

―The Cold war was the brave and essential response of free man to communist aggression‖68. The consensus over the notion of democracy and totalitarianism triumphed along the 1940s and 1950s. One of the main ends of containment policy was democratizing the world, especially Eastern Europe which was under the Soviet Influence. In short, the

Orthodox scholars perceived the ―defense of democracy in the United States even more in

Eastern Europe as the main motive force on the American side and the communist- ideological desire for expansion as the main force on the Soviet side‖69.

65 Ibid. 66Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War :1941 -1945 ( New York: Widely,1965) 11. 67 Ibid. 68Arthur Meier Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1999) 166. 69 Odd A Westad, Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013) 65. 32 This thesis was rejected and criticized by the Revisionist school of thought and notably by William Appelman Williams, who would question the efficiency and accuracy of this claim and whether democracy was the primary driving force of the United States.

The Revisionists, even before their triumph in the late 1950s and 1960s, refused this assertion, claiming that democracy was a pretext to justify U.S. interventionist policy to promote market capitalism. ―The requirement of market capitalism for constant expansion and non-interventionist political systems represented the driving forces behind the

Wilsonian goal of making ―the world safe for democracy‖ by which American actions

70 were justified‖ .

This ideology would justify the U.S. Cold War military interventions against various regimes around the world and its engagement in what would be known to be

‗proxy wars‘. The Soviet intervention in Greece and Turkey in the aftermath of the Second

World War was depicted by traditionalists as ―an ideological attack on the heart of the liberal order as represented by the Western hemisphere, to which the US needed to respond

71 as the guarantor of and capitalism‖ . Thus, it was necessary for Truman to intervene in the in 1946 to fight the pro-communist camp who were, themselves, fighting on behalf of the Soviets. In this context, Feis argued: ―it was vital to

72 American security that the communists be thwarted in Greece and Turkey‖ .

In his article ―Origins of the Cold War‖ Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.73 shed light on the Marxist-Leninist74 ideology that was adopted by the Soviet leaders as the main cause of

70 Klaus Larres and Ann Lane, The Cold War: The Essential Readings (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001) 6. 71Moritz A Pieper, "Containment and the Cold War: Reexaming the Doctrine of Containment as a Grand Strategy Driving US Cold War Interventions," Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse 4.08 (2012). web 15 Nov. 2017. 72 Warren Ferguson, ―An Analysis of Orthodox and Revisionist Historiography of America‘s Containment Policy, 1947-50,‖ University of Birmingham Research Archive online, internet Nov. 15, 2017. Available: http://shepardnotredame.weebly.com/. 73 Arthur Schlesinger, M. The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999) 188. 33 the onset of the Cold War, since, for the Soviets, ―the existence of any non-Communist state was by definition a threat to the Soviet Union‖75. This apprehension motivated the expansionist policy of the Russian leaders in the post WWII.

Schlesinger, McNail, Feis and even Kennan defended the ―inevitability of the

Cold War thesis‖, placing responsibility upon the Soviets. This was due to the embracement of the Marxist-Leninism ideology that believes in the existence of only one power and that two different ideologies could not live in peace. Lenin stated that ―As long as capitalism and socialism exist we cannot live in peace: in the end, one or the other will triumph-a funeral dirge will be sung either over the Soviet Republic or over world capitalism‖76. There is only one way of life and political and social system can exist: only one power and not two would survive. Therefore, it was Truman‘s mission to contain the spread of communism in Europe and the Middle East through economic containment by introducing the Truman Doctrine in 1947. William McNail argued that ―President

Truman‘s resistance to the spread of international communism was the reasonable response since the fall-out between the wartime allies was inevitable given the deep ideological divide‖77.

Providing an Orthodox definition, Herbert Feis argued later that containment was first implemented when ―a series of aggressive Soviet actions in 1945–47 in , Iran,

Turkey and elsewhere awakened the American public to this new danger to freedom and

President Truman responded‖78. Feis thus justified the U.S. policy of containment as a response to the Soviet threat to freedom in such strategic countries by poising Truman‘s

74 According to Marxism-Lenenism ideology all societies were inexorably destined to proceed along appointed roads by appointed stages until they achieved the classless nirvana. 75 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, ―Origins of the Cold War,‖ Foreign Affairs 46 (October 1967), 47. 76 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999) 188. 77 Christos Frentzos and Antonio S Thompson., The Routlede Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History: 1865 to Present (Routledge, 2017) 170. 78Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton University Press, 1989) 9. 34 response to assist these states as reactive. In the same vein, Gaddis Smith argued: ―in the face of the Soviet determination to embark upon a policy of expansion, the U.S. had to protect both its own legitimate security interests and democracy in the various European nations‖79. The United States aimed to restore order by ‗normalizing‘ it, through restricting the USSR‘s ‗sphere of influence‘. Significantly, the Revisionists would question the accuracy of this thesis by claiming that the driving force of U.S. Grand Strategy is ‗open door imperialism‘ for opening vast markets for the American economy.

Although the containment policy that was recommended by George Kennan in his

Long Telegram was mainly economic and political, the late 1940s and the 1950s witnessed a shift to the militarization of containment. The NATO was founded; the United States was engaged in proxy wars in Vietnam and Greece in the late 1940s and got involved in Korea in 1950. Orthodox historians justified this transformation to a more aggressive response to the Soviets through preeminent military power. Charles Maier, an Orthodox historian, stated that such ―militarization of containment is a reaction to the expansion of the Soviet threat‖ it is therefore a new phase of the containment policy that was vindicated by this school of thought80.

At the same time, history was being written in diametrically opposite terms. In defense and with directly opposing interests, orthodox Soviet historians, in turn, claimed that the Truman Doctrine and were ―American plots to encircle the Soviet

Union with hostile capitalist states‖ and that the creation of the NATO threatened Soviet

Union‘ security 81. As a consequence, this school claims that Soviet Union policy was only

79 Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy during the Second World War 1941-1945 (New York: Wiley 1965) 11. 80 Simon School, ―Cold War Containment: the Role of the Military‖, E-International Relations Students July 26, 2011. https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/26/cold-war-containment-the-role-of-the-military/ Web 10 March 2019. 81Joseph Smith, ―Origins and Ending: The Historical Debate,‖Centre for World Dialogue. Online, internet July 2, 2016. Available:http://www.worlddialogue.org/content. 35 reacting to American provocations. It aimed to protecti its sphere of influence threatened by The United States. Although the matter of our concern is American historians, we cannot ignore the fact that like Orthodox historians in the United States, Soviet historians were aligned with their own governmental official interpretations. Hence, this so-called hegemonic ‗world order‘ posited two, apparently mirror-image superpowers, and intellectual, social and institutional spheres, against each other.

One crucial point to insist upon is that the Orthodox interpretations of U.S. foreign policy in general, and its containment policy since the 1940s until the present, in particular, would be increasingly challenged for lacking objectivity, as subsequent schools of thought would demonstrate. While they may have been convincing to many in the high tension context of the Cold War order, the portrayal of the U.S. as a defensive country promoting freedom and fighting oppression and totalitarianism would hardly be accepted by historians. Whether it has been able to stand the test of time can be best evaluated when similar, if not identical, arguments and ideologies are to be used during the War on Terror.

President G.W. Bush, according to the Orthodox perspective of the War on Terror, would stress the notions of democracy and totalitarianism to defend his preemptive War in Iraq.

His claims and arguments were challenged by Revisionist scholars who considered the

War on Terror as ‗open door imperialism‘ that Bush and the conservatives in the White

House aimed to revive in the 2000s.

Both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations adopted the Orthodox account, making it the only interpretation that was spread at home and abroad. Orthodox scholars therefore enjoyed prominence in the media, think tanks, and academia. Thus, there were interchangeable roles between politicians and academies, collaborating in the construal of a unique narrative of the cause, and the purpose, of the containment policy. Several historians and IR analysts highlighted the tight relation between the governmental and

36 academic institutions in the 1940s and 1950s. Historian Michael Hunt, for example claimed that in the late 1940s and 1950s, ―the much-traveled bridge between the world of scholarship and government in diplomatic history was evident‖.82 Thus, both diplomatic and political writings were placed under the auspices of the government to the extent that there was a close tie between policymakers and historians.

It should be underlined that the late 1940s and 1950s was the McCarthyism era when the and the anti-communist crusade peaked. Intellectuals were the subject of investigation and accusations of adopting a communist ideology, which was perceived as a sign of espionage and treason. In this vein, the Orthodox scholars were to great extent oriented to following a path of interpretation based on justifying U.S. Cold War policy. ―In the view of some, this alliance of scholarship and state power was indicative of the anti- communist repression of academic freedoms and the closing down of dissent‖83.

The evident intervention of both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in the intellectuals‘ writings was manifested in the foundation of the CIA-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) in the United States and abroad. Although it aimed ―to contain

Soviet influence in cultural circles and mobilize Western intellectuals behind the American side in the Cold War‖84 and to defend and justify U.S foreign policy, the CCF was engaged in manipulating historians toward engaging in specific writings.

Interestingly the founders of this organization are intellectuals who could be seen as the pioneers of the Cold War history in the 1940s. George Kennan, for example, was a leading figure in the SCF, which he joined in 195585. He served as an expert, lecturer and

82 Michael H Hunt,―The Long Crisis in US Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure,‖ Diplomatic History Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1992):115-140. 83 , No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York: Oxford University) 84 Hogan Michael nd J H. Michael, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 ( New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 424. 85 Giles Scott-Smith, The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Political Economy of American Hegemony 1945-1955 ( Routelge, 2016). 37 as ―an important observer‖86. Arthur M. Schlesinger and other Orthodox figures were among the founding fathers of the association in 195087. In brief, nearly all historians and intellectuals either joined the CCF or worked under its instruction to forge a Cold war narrative. Historian Frances S. Saunders stated that:

Whether they liked it (CCF) or not, whether they knew it or not, there were few writers,… historians, critics …. whose names were not in some way linked to this covert enterprise, unchallenged, undetected for over twenty years. America‘s spying establishment operated a sophisticated, substantially endowed cultural front of in the West for the West, in the name of freedom of expression, defining the Cold War as a ‗battle for men‘s minds‘. It stockpiled a vast arsenal of cultural weapons: journals, books, conferences, seminars ….88.

These arguments testify to the manipulation of historians and consequently the biases of their interpretations and criticisms of events.

The last point, which is probably more interesting in confirming the inadequacy of the

Cold War narrative in the early Cold War, was that the major historians were policy practitioners in both the Truman and Eisenhower‘s administrations. Herbert Feis and

William McNeil and Schlesinger were policy practitioners. They were thus part of the very policy that they were chronicling and interpreting. Feis, for example, who served as a state department diplomat, was accused of being a ‗court historian‘89 because of his defense and justification of the administration policy90.

As a result, in the late 1950s, intellectuals challenged the orthodox assumptions, signaling the emergence of new school of thought that provided an antithetical view of the

86 Ibid. 87 Michael J Hogan and J H. Michael, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 424. 88 Janet Steele, Wars Within: The Story of tempo, an Independent Magazine in Soeharto's Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS) 2005. 89Christos Frentzos and Antonio S. Thompson, The Routledge Handbook of American Military and Diplomatic History: 1865 to the Present ( Routelge, 2017) 170. 90 ―Historian Herbert Feis,‖Alpha History, online, internet Aug. 12, 2016. Available: https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/historian-herbert-feis/. 38 events. The Revisionist school of thought led by William Appleman Williams would question the sterile consensus over U.S. Cold War policy along the 1940s and 1950s.

1.1.2 Revisionist perspective

As a reaction to the standard accepted narratives of U.S. involvement in the Cold

War and justification of the containment policy, the Revisionist school of thought emerged in the early 1960s, in the wake of the . It was known as the New Left and the left-wing school of thought. Revisionism can be divided into five sub-schools namely:

―, Right Revisionism, Left Revisionism, Vietnam Revisionism, and National

Security Revisionism‖91. While Right revisionism focuses on the Second World War, the latter three Revisionist schools of thought tend to study the various aspects of the Cold

War. The Left Wing School of thought is the matter of my concern in this part as it pertains to the Cold War and several writings were labeled as Revisionist accounts of terrorism studies and the War on Terror.

However the pioneer and the principle figure of revisionism is William Appleman

Williams who is labeled by some as the ―prickly doyen of New Left Revisionism‖92 and

―the most stimulating and provocative theory-man who has ever written on U.S. foreign policy‖93. In his landmark book, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Williams challenged the mainstream version of U.S. Cold War policy that was dominated by

Orthodox doctrine, and to a large extent reversed it. He stated that the U.S. ‗open door imperialism‘ was the main cause of the Cold War and that the tragedy of U.S. diplomacy laid in the country‘s betrayal of its principles and values for the sake of economic interests.

―The U.S. contradicted itself by advocating freedom and self-determination while

91Alexander DeConde, Richard Dean Burns and Fredrik Logevall, Encyclopedia of American foreign policy, Volume 3 (Scribner, 2002) 408. 92 Lloyd C.Gardner and Thomas J. Mc Cormicknn, ―Walter La Feber: the Making of a Wisconsin Scholl Revisionist,‖ Dipolmatic History, Vol. 28, No. 5 (November 2004): 613-624. 93 Ibid. 39 simultaneously depending on privileging American access and control‖94. This tragedy could be seen also in the U.S Grand Strategy of privacy that is still going on in the 21st cycle.

His book was considered as the bible of Revisionism and it was adopted and followed by a group of historians from the 1960s onward. ―The work sounded the basic themes of New Left historiography ever since‖95. Moreover Robert James Maddox, a

Revisionist scholar argued in his book The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War that the ―most subsequent New Left accounts seem to have provided little more than extended footnotes on interpretations Williams first put forward‖96.

The Onset and the origin of the Cold War

Rather than poising the U.S. as a defensive victim, Williams placed responsibility for the onset of the Cold war on ―the U.S. expansionist mentality and the quest for informal empire in the twentieth century‖97, at the expense of the Soviet Union. He rebutted the

Orthodox scholars‘ interpretation of containment as a response to the Soviet expansionist policy. Containment then was fundamentally a policy measure aimed at both gaining access to foreign markets and stopping the expansion of the Soviets. In this context, the

U.S. was not necessarily reactive to the Soviets‘ tendency of expansion but ―committed to enhance an ‗Open Door policy‘ aimed at breaking down the barriers to foreign investment and thus expanding the capitalist system98.

94 John L. Clark, ―A summary of William Apple man Williams' The Tragedy of American Diplomacy,‖ Infinitesque, Online, internet, Dec3, 2016. Available: http://infinitesque.net/articles/2012/Gilded%20Age/Williams/summary. 95 Francis Loewenheim, ―The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War,‖ June 17, 1973, online, internet, Sept. 15, 2016. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/1973/06/17/archives/the-new. 96 Robert J Maddox, New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (Princeton University Press, 1973) 169 97 Willan Appelman William, The Tragedy of the American diplomacy (Delta Book ,1981) 234. 98 Ibid. 40 Williams rejected the mainstream interpretation, stating that: ―Truman's speech on containment was an expression of longstanding American expansionism‖99. It was nothing but a continuity of U.S. policy of expansion since the 19th century. Containment therefore was not a new policy implemented to restrict the Soviet policy of expansion and its tendency to impose its economic and ideological models but an extension of traditional

American policy. Other prominent Revisionists such as Gar Alperovitz, Walter LaFeber and analyze what they deem as the deeply-rooted historical rivalry and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. LaFeber, for example, opposed mainstream thought that the Cold War is a legacy of breaking the post-World War

II peace agreements, dating back to the 19th century conflicts between the States and the

Soviet Union over foreign markets100. Here, we can trace the continuity hypothesis of U.S. foreign Cold War policy which, according to Revisionists, was an extension of the Soviet-

American contest and rivalry to acquire markets overseas.

In fact, Truman was only being faithful to the U.S. expansionist tradition of the

19th century rather than inventing a new strategy, according to Williams. This goes back to the US-Spain war in 1898 when the United States attacked Spanish troops in to gain access to and adjoin Latin America to its sphere of influence. The Paris Treaty was signed in December 1898 by the U.S. and Spain to end the War and liberate Cuba, Philippines,

Puerto Rico and Guam from the Spanish colonization. As a result, the U.S. gained access to new territories and therefore new markets. In light of this development, the U.S. involvement in this war was clearly not for the independence of Cuba and other colonies of the Spanish empire but for the sake of United States business interests. The U.S. intervened in its new colonies – ex-colonies of the Spanish empire – and imposed the introduction of

99Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton University Press, 1989) 9. 100Jonathan Nashel, ―Cold War (1945–91): Changing Interpretations,‖ The Oxford Companion to American Military History (Oxford University Press, NY, 1999). 41 the Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution in 1901 by which U.S. acquired a military base in Guantanamo101. In the post-WWII era, the United States searched for unrestricted and unlimited access to markets and especially to Eastern Europe, a tendency that met

Soviet opposition. From this perspective, one can wonder whether Williams‘ argument on the U.S. tradition of expansionism could be applied to the post-Cold War U.S. Grand

Strategy and notably the War on Terror. Could the U.S intervention in Afghanistan and

Iraq fit into the scheme?

The establishment of military bases is one of the U.S. longstanding policies of containment intended to maintain U.S. leadership and supremacy over rival powers. Latin

America and Europe were the first concern of U.S. governments but since the 1950s onward, the Middle East became the new target. This policy can be seen as well in the U.S.

Global War on Terror as the expansion and the foundation of military bases in the World was noticeable especially in the Middle East. This tends to validate Williams‘ continuity thesis of U.S. expansionism since the 19th century through the Cold War. Moreover, this best exemplifies the historical institutionalist path dependency assumptions that history matters and that U.S. foreign policy is hard to change, according to Porter102. Williams‘ hypothesis could, to a great extent, be validated in the modern U.S. Grand Strategy of primacy that is still effective since the Cold War and even in the MENA turmoil in the

2010s.

Economic containment

The New Left (revisionist) school of thought stresses the fact that the United

States was essentially driven by economic factors rather than real security and ideological threats by the Soviets. The enhancement of the Open Door policy was thus considered to

101 Jana K. Lipman, Guantanamo: A Working-Class History between Empire and Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009) 23. 102 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 42 be a major factor in the US-USSR conflicts during the Cold War. Open Door policy, which was defined by Williams as the ―maximizing America‘s market opportunities abroad‖103 was the main and even the sole reason behind the rising antagonism in the immediate post-

WWII era. It is the ―American eager for unrestricted access to international markets to that demand for goods of all types would be dramatically increased, prosperity restored, industrial unrest dampened, capitalism saved and, at the same time, the ‗American genius‘ for modernity and development exported worldwide‖104. In this light, unlike traditionalists, the U.S.‘s need for markets without barriers was the driving force for the Cold War rivalry, refuting the ideological factor as a main cause of the Cold War.

The eagerness to access and dominate new markets by the U.S. was opposed by the Soviets‘ need to acquire its own foreign markets and spheres of influence, which was perceived as a challenge to the U.S. supremacy over the world. Therefore, the U.S. could not achieve any peace with the Soviets without free access to foreign markets – especially in Eastern Europe where the capitalist market had been eliminated – thus economic, and not ―democratic‖ concerns, were the main determinants of foreign and domestic policy.

Economic containment lies in the U.S. ―traditional outlook of the open door expansion‖105 which was combined with other policies that led to the Cold War. William

Appleman William states that ―the open-door outlook was based on an economic definition of the world, and this explanation of reality was persistently stressed by American‘s corporate leadership as it developed its policy toward the Soviet Union and other nations‖106. Therefore, economic interests were the main priorities and motives of the

American administration to classify the USSR as aggressive and expansionist. William assures that the economic policy of containment aimed at saving the economic interests of

103 Willan Appelman William, The Tragedy of the American diplomacy (Delta Book, 1981) 26-45. 104 Ibid. 105Alexander DeConde, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy (Scribner: 2002) 229. 106. Ibid. 43 the States, became risky by the Soviets‘ tendency of expansion and acquiring new markets at the expense of the United States.

The U.S. 19th century foreign policy, marked by expansion as an impetus to promote its (economic) hegemony, was continued till the outbreak of the Vietnam War through the Open Door policy to assure ―unrestricted economic access‖107 to foreign markets. The guiding line of U.S. Grand Strategy appeared to be purely economic while the Soviets concern was mainly security as it was invaded more than once from Poland.

Securing U.S.S.R‘s borders through controlling its neighbor countries was understandable; according to Williams: ―The United States interpreted Russian resistance to the Open Door

Policy in Eastern Europe as an unfriendly act, even though Stalin acquiesced to the principle throughout the Pacific and elsewhere in the World‖108.

Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

Revisionist Denna Fleming claimed that the Truman doctrine was ―explicitly confrontational and aggressive‖ it was also

―the rashest policy ever enunciated by any American leader. For the first time, the encirclement of a great power was openly proclaimed. What it (USSR) would do after the Cold War was declared by Churchill and Truman was easily predictable by any average man. The Soviet Union would put up a bold front to cover its frightening post-war weakness and work mightily to gain strength‖109.

Fleming, like all revisionists, perceived the Soviet reaction as logical and reasonable to the abusive U.S. policy in Europe. Churchill declared the Cold War through his speech on March, 5, 1946, followed by Kennan‘s Long Telegram and the introduction of Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan to contain Europe.

107Willan Appelman Williams, The Tragedy of the American diplomacy (Delta Book ,1981) 234. 108Ibid. 109 Denna F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960 :1950-1960 (Allen and Unwin, 1961) 1046. 44 The U.S.S.R ―had no desire to war against the West, yet Soviet aggression became an accepted certainty that shaped Western policy at least until the 1960s‖110. The intervention in the Greek Civil War and providing Greece and Turkey with special aid to defeat the pro-Soviet camps was seen by the Revisionists and the Soviets as a provocative policy that challenged the Soviets‘ need for both markets and security. This need and response to U.S. intervention in the Soviets‘ spheres of influence was interpreted by U.S. policymakers as an act of aggression. Fleming‘s argument was enhanced by Gabriel and

Joce Kolko who saw the pragmatic side in Stalin‘s character, who worked on securing the borders, postulating that his policy was to a great extent independent of U.S. policy.111

The Marshall Plan was introduced by Secretary of State George C. Marshall at

Harvard on June 5, 1947 and approved by President Harry Truman on April 3, 1948. It aimed at subsidizing 16 European countries with 13 billion dollars to rebuild their economies and infrastructure after the Second World War. Like other American so-called

―humanitarian‖ programs, Appelman states that, ―the Marshall Plan was a concerted program to sustain and expand a frontier of overseas‖112. This is, therefore, a containment strategy of European countries, meant to keep them in the American orbit. The Truman

Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, which were depicted by traditionalists as a ―humanitarian gesture‖, were considered by Williams as ―two sides of the same coin of American traditional open-door expansion‖113. They provided loans and equipment aimed to control and dominates the domestic and foreign policy of the European countries, which would facilitate the expansion of the U.S. sphere of influence and therefore guarantee stable and longstanding free access to said markets.

110 Jennifer Llewellyn and Steve Thompson, ―Historian: Denna Fleming,‖ Alpha History, online,internet, Sep. 10, 2019. Available: https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/historian-denna-fleming/. 111 Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945- 1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 112 Willan Appelman William, The Tragedy of the American diplomacy (Delta Book ,1981) 268. 113Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War. Very Short Introductions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 269. 45 This interpretation led us to consider, in the same light, contemporary U.S humanitarian policy in the world and especially the Middle-East and North Africa region

(MENA) through USAID and other institutional and governmental institutions. The

Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were extended throughout the Cold War and still implemented in the key area in the MENA. The United States has continued the application of various ‗programs‘ to assist countries worldwide. Interestingly, nowadays, the United States provides aid to 96% of all countries. ―The United States remained the world‘s largest bilateral donor, obligating approximately $48.4 billion—$31.2 billion in economic assistance and $17.2 billion in military assistance‖114. The top ten receivers are the most vital areas for U.S. strategic goals. The continuity hypothesis of Williams is therefore conformed to the path dependency notion of historical institutionalism‘s path dependency.

Williams had already questioned this assumption claiming that if the Marshall

Plan was a humanitarian gesture, why were ―China and Latin America…excluded though their needs were certainly great from a humanitarian point of view?‖115 Therefore, far from being a humanitarian gesture, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine were, according to the Revisionist viewpoint, a manifestation of the U.S. policy of containment in the late

1940s, which was based on economic aid to specific countries that are either in the

American sphere of influence or likely to be. The humanitarian programs of the United

States during the War on Terror and notably in the MENA region, which are, as I contend, part of a containment strategy, will be the matter of deep analysis in chapter three of the present dissertation.

114 Merrill Mathhews, ―The U.S. Doles Out Financial Aid to 96 Percent of All Countries,‖ Institute for Policy Innovation Aug. 12, 2014, Online, internet, May 10. 2016. Available: https://www.ipi.org. 115Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War. Very Short Introductions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 269. 46 Significantly, the Soviets perceived U.S. aid as a means of dominating the sphere of influence and ―an American strategy for setting and maintaining conditions on economic development in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union‖116, and therefore refused the same loans117. In turn, they implemented a harsh political repression in Romania, Eastern

Germany and Czechoslovakia. This reaction escalated the tension between the United

States and the Soviet Union in 1948.

George Kennan

The claim that containment policy was a legacy of George Kennan‘s Long

Telegram was refuted by the Revisionists. They state that his telegram/essay ―arrived shortly after policymakers had moved away from ‗liberation‘ in Eastern Europe and the hopes of using ‗atomic diplomacy‘ to roll back Soviet influence there‖118. Accordingly,

Kennan‘ telegram was a pretext of convenience to support a predetermined policy. In addition, Williams argued that Kennan was not the founding father of the containment policy because what he presented as a ―the policy of containment‖ was nothing but the

Open Door policy and that ―among the many ironies of Kennan‘s policy of containment, perhaps is that he had internalized the assumptions and principles of the Open Door policy, that he thought he was proposing a radically different program‖119. Thus, this is another continuity and manifestation of an Open Door policy. It is worth noting that Kennan held various positions in the department of State to design U.S. Grand Strategy but his nomination as an ambassador to U.S.S.R in December 1951, was another proof of U.S. persistence on the enforcement of the containment policy. Williams claimed that ―George

Frost Kennan‘s appointment as United States ambassador to the Soviet Union was a move of vital significance in the Cold War. The choice of Kennan as self-acknowledged author

116Alexander DeConde, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy (Scribner: 2002) 271. 117Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War. Very Short Introductions (Oxford University Press, 2003) 30. 118Alexander DeConde, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy (Scribner: 2002) 348. 119Ibid., 268. 47 of the policy of containment and publicly proclaimed ‗inside strategist‘ of the Cold War, reemphasized Washington‘s determination to press the original policy of containment‖120.

By reinstalling Kennan in the U.S. embassy in Moscow, Truman aimed at reinforcing the encirclement of the Soviets. This initiative was seen by the Revisionists as an insulting and provocative measure that enhanced the expansionist policy of Truman. As a consequence, any Soviet response at this level was understandable.

Interestingly, while Kennan himself was considered as an othodox writer in the

1940s and early 1950s, he then distanced himself from orthodoxy, criticizing the turn to the militarization of containment which he had not recommended.

Militarization of containment

Unlike traditionalist scholars who argue that the militarization of containment was a response to the Soviet threat, Revisionist scholars like Arnold Offner and Richard

Freeland stated that the U.S. was responsible for the onset of the conflict and that the

―militarization of containment can be explained as the result of its bid for global hegemony, or a product of the ideological anti-communist crusade established by the

Truman Doctrine‖121. From a revisionist perspective, the main objective of containment in general, and the militarization of containment in particular, is establishing a global hegemony over the world and maintaining the United States as the sole leading world superpower. This could be achieved only through preeminent military power, which

Truman, Eisenhower, and even Kennedy adopted for the deterrence of the Soviets. The

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in April 1949 was perceived, from a

120 William A Williams and Henry W. Berger, A William Appleman Williams Reader: Selections from His Major Historical Writings(Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1992) 70. 121Simon Schoon, ―Cold War Containment : the Role of the Military,‖ E-Internatinal Relations Students July 26,2011.online, internet June 10, 2016. Available: https://www.e-ir.info/2011/07/26/cold-war- containment-the-role-of-the-military/. 48 Revisionist perspective, as ―the clearest symbol of the militarization of containment‖122, according to Richard Freeland. NATO ―provides the US a means to politically dominate its member states by using NATO led rearmament as the mechanism to organize a subservient

Western Bloc‖123. This account reveals that the main goal of the foundation of NATO was to influence and dominate its members and the rival countries alike.

The U.S. policy of containment and notably the militarization of containment in the early Cold War as it was presented by the Revisionists was in conformity with the

―strategy of primacy‖ and ―habitual ideas‖ that the United States relies both on its military power and the alliance system, which is still going on up to now.

The U.S. foreign policy of containment during the Cold War was appreciated by politicians to the extent that they ―fell in love …. with the Cold War policy‖, as William

Appelman Williams quotes the expression of James P. Warburg124. We can infer that the

United States was not frustrated with being involved in conflicts with the Communist bloc but actually enjoyed it and even ―fell in love‖ with this policy. Thus, this policy – USthe

Cold War policy – has been the policy of containment of the Soviet Union and Western

European countries for nearly a half century.

Historical institutionalism’s path dependency in Revisionism

The last point worth exploring, in light of the dissertation‘s theoretical framework, is the ‗hard‘ revisionist account of the containment policy. Unlike ‗soft‘ revisionists who examined U.S. foreign policy through policymakers as individuals, the hard revisionists attributed the expansionist aspect of the United States and the Cold War containment policy to ‗the nature of institutions or system.‘ This means that the American foreign

122 Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origin of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Schocken, 1974) 324. 123Ibid. 124 James P. Warburg is an eminent conservative student of foreign policy as he is introduced by William Appelman Williams in his landmark book The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. 49 policy, even before WWII, was shaped by institutions that had worked on maintaining

American supremacy. Thus, ―the Cold War was the inevitable result of the American system as it developed over the years‖125 and are neither due to the ideological differences between the two States nor to the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. In the same context, it is stated that ―the corporate structure itself shaped (U.S.) foreign policy‖126 Then, as they were core components of U.S. grand strategy, the corporations affected and oriented the administrations‘ decision and policy toward foreign countries. Significantly, this hypothesis demonstrates how the United States followed the same foreign policy and that the determining factors of American policy have been unchangeable and unchallengeable even when the administration changed. This hypothesis is illustrated by the historical intuitionalists and especially the notions of path dependency, habitual ideas and primacy.

To sum up, revisionists criticized the Orthodox interpretation of the Cold War stating that what they wrote was nothing but an explanation and a justification of the Cold

War policies: they (traditionalists) were ―trapped by blinkered ideology and of producing what was less a real history of the Cold War but a rationalization of U.S foreign policy in the postwar years‖127. It is noticeable also that the major traditionalist scholars served in

Truman and Eisenhower administrations, a fact that enhanced the subjectivity of their interpretations. But a criticism worth considering of the revisionists was cited by H. Stuart

Hughs, who argued that Revisionist scholars ignored the ―the full monstrousness in

Stalin‘s character‖128. The well-known Orthodox historian Schlesinger blamed the

125 Robert J. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press,, 2015) 4. 126 Ibid. 127 Cox M and C Kennedy-Pipe, ―The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan," Peace Research Abstracts Journal. 42.6 (2005). 128 Frank Costigliola and Michael J Hogan., America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge University Press 2013) 13. 50 Revisionists for not considering the Soviet as an abnormal state: ―the great omission of the

Revisionists was the fact that the Soviet Union was not a traditional national state‖129.

To sum up, the revisionist theories of U.S. foreign policy could be seen as revolutionary. They invalidated the traditionalist‘s hypothesis that put the whole blame on the Soviet Union. Rewriting U.S. foreign policy history, historians in the post-Second

World War could open a new, more objective study of the events. It is instructive to note that the revisionist account managed to challenge a common standard American narrative of the onset of the Cold War, the perception of threat, and more importantly the containment policy. The fact that revisionists brought a new version enriched the historical literature and paved the way for further investigation of the history of the Cold War.

It is during the U.S. global War on Terror that a revisionist account emerged to challenge a traditionalist interpretation of 9/11 and its legacies on U.S. grand strategy. The

War on Terror, as I explain in further detail, was based mainly on open door policy and economic interests rather than security. It is, in the words of Williams, that ―American policy can without much exaggeration be described the open door policy once and for all.‖

Their findings would be questioned by a new wave of historians known as the post-revisionists.

1.1.3 Post-revisionism and the notion of containment

Because of the unfinished debate between historians and political analysts, especially the consensus (Orthodox) school of thought and the New Left school of thought

(Revisionism), a new school of interpretation emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s known as post-Revisionism. John Lewis Gaddis, who proclaimed the birth of Post-

Revisionism, in his landmark article that entails the new interpretation, is ―The United

129 Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999)187. 51 States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947‖ which was published in 1972. ―The

Emerging post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origin of the Cold War‖, published in 1983, states that ―various labels have been proposed to characterize this new school – neo- orthodoxy, eclecticism and ‗post-revisionism‘, the latter seems to have caught on more than the others and is the one that will be used here‖130. Gaddis‘s landmark book on the

Post-Revisionist account of the U.S. foreign policy of containment is Strategies of

Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security131, which was published in 1982 and which focuses on the major phases of the Cold War containment policy from

Truman to Reagan. The revised and expanded edition was released in 2005. A new chapter on the U.S. policy of containment during the War on Terror was added in which, like

Orthodox Cold War historians, Gaddis rationalized the ‗preemptive war‘ strategy in light of the ‗national security‘ notion. Interestingly, Gaddis implicitly embraced even the

Orthodox interpretation of the Bush War on Terror.

He was dubbed by the New York Times as the ‗Dean of Cold War historians‘.

Gaddis remains one of the influencing historians who wrote on both the Cold War and the

War on Terror. Significantly, he lived and witnessed the two wars. Some other prominent post-Revisionists who tackled the Cold War from a post-Revisionist perspective were

Thomas Patterson, Ernest Mayand, and Melvin P. Leffler. The latter turned to criticize some of Gaddis‘ assumptions and notably the Kremlin‘s role in the Cold War132.

130John Lewis Gaddis, ―The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,‖ Diplomatic History 7.3 (1983): 171-190. 131 Gaddis studies and evaluates "five geopolitical codes in the postwar era" that characterize US foreign policy in the post War II era from Truman to Nixon, namely George F. Kennan's original strategy of containment from 1947 to 1949, the assumptions incorporated into National Security Council paper NSC-68 from 1950 to 1953, the Eisenhower-Dulles "new look" from 1953 to 1961, the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy from 1961 to 1969; and "detente," which was followed for the most part by Nixon, Kissinger, Ford, and Carter from 1969 until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.131 All these codes revolve around the US policy of containment in the post-Cold War era. The book was edited to fit new evidence in the Post-Cold War era in general and the Post September 11th 2001 era in particular. In the last chapter, chapter twelve, which was included in the last edition of 2005, Gaddis applied the Long Telegram thesis on Bush‘s Global War on Terror from the 9/11 onward. 132 Melvyn P. Leffler, Origins of the Cold War: An International History (New York: Routledge, 2010)16. 52 Although John Lewis Gaddis is the prominent post-Revisionist scholar, it is claimed that the starting point of Post-Revisionism interpretation dates back to 1967 with

Louis J. Halle who, in his book Cold War as History133, transcended the role of ideology as a source of rivalry, highlighting the ‗geopolitical vacuum‘ or the ‗power vacuum‘ in post-

War Europe as the main cause of the Cold War. This is a consequence of the destruction of

Europe in general, especially what the Nazi regime had caused134. This vacuum is seen as the natural cause of the Cold War rather than ideological conflicts or the expansionist tendency of Stalin. Louis‘s interpretation did catch the attention of intellectuals as it came amid the triumph of Revisionists in the 1960s.

The interpretation of post-revisionist historians and notably John Lewis Gaddis is a reassessment of the two precedent schools in order to offer ―a more ‗balanced‘ explanation of the beginning of the Cold War‖. It was a ―new consensus‖ in J. Samuel

Wolker‘s words as it ―draws from both traditional and revisionist interpretations to present a more balanced explanation of the beginning of the Cold War,‖135 The approach was innovative as a synthesis of strictly opposed interpretations of the traditionalists and

Revisionists. It was a sort of ―synthesis that integrates both the domestic and the international dimensions of American diplomacy, and to take the best elements from both approaches, modifying some of the traditional arguments, accepting some of the

Revisionist positions‖136, varying from admiration to denial‖137. Interestingly, post-

Revisionism was not as revolutionary as Revisionism. It did not invalidate either or both of the previous historical camps but built its thesis on both of them. Gaddis argued that his

133 Louis J Halle, The Cold War As History (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). 134 Jussi M. Hanhimäki Odd and Arne Westad, The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts (Oxford University Press, 2004). 135Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker. Eds., American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review ( Westport. Connecticut. 1981) 27-36. 136 Bogdan Antoniu, ―The Origins of the the Cold War: A historical Review,‖ Euro-Atlantic Studies N3 (2014): 33-64. 137Jacob Heilbrunn, ―The Revision Thing,‖ The New Republic (Aug. 1994) :31-34; 36-39, online, internet 4 July 2016. Available: http://www.unz.org/Pub/NewRepublic-1994aug15-00031?View=PDF 53 theory was a legacy of ―antagonist viewpoints to reach a third state beyond both orthodoxy and revisionism‖138. Therefore, its findings are based on the former schools of thoughts‘ interpretation of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Second World War era and notably the policy of containment, andnot a new one.

The Origin of the Cold War

The post-Revisionists put the focus more on the origin of the Cold War than the responsibility of the onset on the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

They synthesize the major Orthodox and Revisionist arguments, adopting some interpretations and criticizing others. The blame was put on ‗both‘ sides and not on one of them as the Orthodox and Revisionists did. ―Neither side can bear sole responsibility for the onset of the Cold War‖139. Thomas G. Paterson argued that both the Soviets and the

United States shared equal responsibility for the onset of the Cold War. In the aftermath of

WWII, the Soviet Union demonstrated hostility, while the United States attempted to dominate the world140.

Proving this thesis, Ernest May highlighted that the Cold War was the inevitable fate of the Soviet Union and the United States which means that circumstances, ‗habits‘ were decisive: ―There probably was never any real possibility that the post-1945 relationship could be anything but hostility verging on conflict… traditions, belief systems, propinquity and convenience all combined to stimulate antagonism, and almost no factor operated in either country to hold it back‖141. This raises two major points: the first is how

Ernest May removed any responsibility from the two states on the conflicts, attributing it to the nature of the system that is the institutions. The second point is, and this argument is an

138John Lewis Gaddis, ―Th e Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War, Diplomatic History 7.3 (1983): 171-190. 139 Alan Brinkley, American History: A Survey (New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2009) 798.

141 Alan Brinkley, American History: A Survey Vol. 2 (New York: McGraw-Hill College, 1998) 967. 54 integral part of thesis‘s theoretical framework, it was the traditions and beliefs systems that led to the Cold War. These habits made U.S. foreign policy unchangeable and all administrations have perused the same primacy Grand Strategy since WWII and even before, according to Porter.

Post-revisionism and U.S. policy of Containment

Containment, for Lewis Gaddis then, has been a strategic mechanism so central to post-war foreign policy that it has been naturalized but continued to be unclear and ambiguous to the extent that Americans ―have become so accustomed to it that we rarely stop to consider what its precise goals are supposed to be‖142. Taking a middle ground position, he stresses the fact that the objectives of U.S. policy of containment are complicated and it is hard to assume their real goals. Convergence with Revisionism lays in U.S. leaders‘ exaggeration of the Soviet threat to U.S. national security143. ‗The national security imperative‘ was the area of blame144 and not the economic factor or the ideological factors. Thus, what led to the inevitable Cold War was the ―security concern‖ of the United States and the Soviet Union. According to post-revisionists who produced a wide range of literatures within this framework in the 1970s and 1980s, the containment policy was the core component of the national security paradigm: ―The idea of containment as the central theme of postwar national security policy‖145, argued Gaddis.

Kennan and containment

John Lewis Gaddis devoted one chapter to study Kennan as a key figure in the

U.S. policy of containment during the Cold War which would constitute the cornerstone of

142Terry L. Deibel, John Lewis Gaddis, Containment: Concept and Policy: Based on a Symposium (National Defense University Press, 1986) 721. 143John Lewis Gaddis, ―Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History , (Vol.7, no 3 1983): 172. 144 Bogdan Antoniu, ―The Origins of the Cold War: a Historiographical Review,‖ online, internet July 23, 2016. Available: http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/StiintePOL/euro-atlanticstudies3-2000/cap3.pdf. 145 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategy of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) VIII. 55 U.S. policy of containment in the forthcoming decades. Post-revisionists and especially

Gaddis highlight the crucial and vital role of Kennan, stating that ―The Long Telegram was used in the United States as the single most influential explanation of postwar Soviet behavior‖146 which means that the U.S. policymaker‘s perception of the Soviet Union‘s conduct was mainly based on the content of Kennan‘s telegram. This assumption, if true, may reveal the inadequacy of the post-revisionist claim. The U.S. policy of containment then transcends Kennan‘s Telegram to more imperial policy that stretches back to the 19th century and even before, as it was stated by revisionists.

It is noteworthy that post-revisionists criticized the orthodox thesis that containment policy was ‗invented‘ by Kennan and adopted by Truman and Eisenhower‘s administration as a response to the Soviet aggression for the first time. Agreeing, to a certain extent, with the revisionists, Gaddis argued that containment dated back to the early

WWII. Accordingly, the containment policy was introduced years before Kennan‘s Long

Telegram. Gaddis claimed that ―Truman‘s March 12, 1947, proclamation that ‗it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation ..‘ has traditionally been taken as having marked a fundamental point of departure for American foreign policy in the Cold War. In fact, it can be more accurately seen as the ultimate expression of the ‗patience and firmness‘ strategy that had been in effect for the past years. The decision to aid Greece and Turkey as well as other nations threatened by the Soviet Unions had been in effect months before‖147.

Gaddis assimilated the NSC-68 and the containment policy, stating that the NSC-

68 was not the rejection of Kennan‘s principles, as introduced in ―his Long Telegram‖, but rather ―a systemization of containment‖ through the introduction and creation of other

146John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (: Oxford University Press, 1987) 39. 147 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982) 22. 56 tools to make it more efficient. He argues that ―NSC-68 was not intended as a repudiation of Kennan...the objective rather was to systematize containment and to find the means to make it work‖148. The NSC-68 was an extension and development of Kennan‘s recommended strategy of containment according to Gaddis. Thus, as the tensions escalated during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Truman administration worked more on the institutionalization of the containment policy to be more aggressive through

―preponderance‖ which is in Porter‘s words ―the United States strives to be overwhelmingly strong, maintaining a preeminent military power position beyond what it minimally needs to defend or deter threat, to be dominant in key regions beyond the

Western Hemisphere‖149. At this level, it is noticeable that the main concern remained the

National Security concern in Gaddis‘s perception. Interestingly, Kennan rejected the NSC-

68 and resigned from the U.S. Department of State‘s Policy Planning Staff few days before the approval of the document (NSC-68). The NSC-68 led to Korean and the Vietnam wars and accordingly the policy of containment was Gaddis argues: ―NSC-68 had come to overshadow, and modify, the original strategy of containment‖150 from economic, political, diplomatic and cultural containment to military containment.

Another key argument which stands against the previous schools of thoughts, especially the Orthodox interpretation, is that the U.S policy of containment has its roots in internal turmoil and not because of the perceived threat which the Soviet Union might represent. At this level, the post-Revisionists confirmed the revisionists‘ hypothesis that

U.S. political makers manipulated the American public by exaggerating and overestimating

148 Paul H Nitze and S N Drew, NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment (Washington, DC: National defence university, 1994) 90. 149 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 150 Drew S. Nelson and Paul H. Nitze, NSC-68 Forging the Strategy of Containment (DIANE Publishing) 117. 57 the Soviet threat to fulfill domestic objectives151. Therefore, the policy of containment was exploited for domestic political benefits. Gaddis states that, ―to a remarkable degree, containment has been the product, not so much of what the Russians have done, or what has happened elsewhere in the world but of internal faces operating within the United

States‖152. This assumption is a response to the new leftists (revisionists) argument that the policy of containment was imposed on the American public over their wills through propaganda and manipulation of public opinion. Some of them state that politicians and congressional representatives were aligned with policy makers, accepting and championing the policy of containment; others ensured the capacity of policymakers in convincing the

American public of the utility, efficiency, and necessity of containing the Soviets153.

Although post-revisionism contributed to Cold War historiography, as it attempted to crossover the sharp conflict between Orthodoxy and Revisionism, it could not provide a definitive version of the events. John Lewis Gaddis affirms that, ―new Cold War historians should retain the capacity to be surprised‖154. He, himself moved from post- revisionism to a more traditional interpretation of the Cold War, based mainly on the orthodox assumption. Post-revisionists, and especially Gaddis, tended to explain and rationalize U.S. Cold War Grand Strategy policy more than providing solid, new objective arguments on the main causes of the Cold war, who was to blame and the mechanisms of containment. This superficiality led him to appear as more orthodox than revisionist especially concerning the aftermath of the Cold War in his book Now We Know:

151John Lewis Gaddis, ―The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War, ‖ Diplomatic History, Vol.7, no.3, (1983): 172. 152 Ibid., 33. 153Bogdan Antoniu, ―The origin of the Cold war : a Historical Review,‖ online, internet May 10, 2016. Available: http://ebooks.unibuc.ro/StiintePOL/euro-atlanticstudies3-2000/cap3.pdf. 154John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War History (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1997). 58 Rethinking the Cold War. Mylvn Leffler argued that Gaddis ―abandons post-revisionism and returns to a more traditional interpretation of the Cold War‖155.

The most glaring point is that post-pevisionists stressed the role of institutions and

‗habits‘ as determinants in initiating the Cold War, conforming Porter‘s analysis of the

U.S. Grand Strategy of primacy as a historical institutionalism path dependency mechanism. More importantly John Lewis Gaddis, who was labeled more Orthodox than post-revisionist, wrote on U.S. War on Terror in the aftermath of the 9/11. He could be seen also as an orthodox analyst of the U.S. War on Terror as he rationalizes Bush‘s preemptive wars. Like Feis, Schlesinger and other Orthodox historians of the Cold War who served as advisers and policymakers in the Truman and Eisenhower‘s administrations,

John Lewis Gaddis was an adviser of George W. Bush. He defended the U.S. invasion of

Iraq and Afghanistan arguing that ―The world now must be made safe for democracy, and this is no longer just an idealistic issue; it‘s an issue of our own safety‖. From this the

‗national Security‘ concern continues to be the main issue in Gaddis‘s studying the War on

Terror. Gaddis turned to be ―one of the culprits‖156 according to George Kennan, who expressed his disappointment in Gaddis‘s involvement in politics and rationalizing George

Bush‘s War on Terror157.

Could the intersection of academia and politics be considered as a ‗tragedy‘ in

Williams‘ term? This implies that research of U.S. foreign policy of the Cold War and the

War on Terror is likely to remain a fertile ground, still able to produce surprising facts in the forthcoming years.

155 Melvyn P. Leffler, ―The Cold War: What Do We Now Know?‖ Peace Research Abstracts. 37.6 (2000). 156 Ordan Michael Smith, ―Kennan‘s Opposite,‖ The American Conservative Online, intenet Nov. 18, 2016. Available: www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/kennans-opposite/. 157 Ibid

59 1.2 Terrorism studies: The U.S. War on Terror and the

containment policy

Studying U.S. War on Terror from various perspectives is as complicated as analyzing the Cold War. The 9/11 event sparked scholars to write about the terrorism phenomena and the ‗U.S Global war on Terror‘ as it was coined by George W. Bush. Like the Orthodox, Revisionist and post-Revisionist approaches of the Cold War, the War on

Terror produced two remarkably opposing perspectives and often a third level balanced analysis that transcended the traditionalist approaches in the 2000s and 2010s. The

Orthodox terrorism studies are known also as the ‗traditional‘ and ‗conventional‘ approaches. The Critical Terrorism Studies is the ‗revisionist‘ interpretation that evaluated, criticized, and opposed the findings of the orthodox school.

Revisiting and studying a detailed historiography of the terrorism phenomenon and the U.S. War on Terror is beyond the scope of this study. The main objective therefore is to bring to light some controversies over U.S. involvement in the MENA from one hand and, to great extent, the similarities of the historiography of the Cold War and the Global

War on Terror.

Although terrorism studies caught scholars and academics remarkably in the immediate 9/11, Terrorism studies can be dated back to the 1960s and 1970s and even before. It fell under the ‗security studies‘ framework rather than political and sociological studies: ―a small but politically-significant academic field of ‗terrorism studies‘ has emerged from the relatively disparate research efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, and consolidated its position as a viable subset of ‗security studies‘‖158. Before this era (9/11) similar actions, sometimes punctual, sometimes comparable as a longer-term and

158 Richard Jackson, Marie Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (Routelge 2009) 49. 60 ideological reality, had been called by other names such as bombings, assassinations, kidnapping and hijacking159 but not terrorism. The terms ‗terrorist‘ and ‗terrorism‘ were used during the peak of the Cold War and the decolonization movements against western colonial countries to designate communists and anti-colonial revolutionaries. ‗Terrorism studies‘ as an academic discipline derives from the theory and practice of counterinsurgency, (which was) forged in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to

160 decolonization and the rise of the United States as a global superpower‖ .

1.2.1 Orthodox terrorism studies

The traditional account of terrorism, the ‗War on Terror‘ and U.S. involvement in international affairs, was enriched in the aftermath of 9/11 events. This growth can be dated back to a ―Specific place and time as well as context; namely the American experience of what the U.S. has defined as an age of terror‖161 that necessitated intellectuals and academies to cooperate with the administration to define, explain and recommend counter-terrorism strategy. It was just after the 9/11 attacks that intellectuals, historians, and even Cold War historians were involved in the War on Terror providing the administration with recommendations as to how to respond to the War. They ―were calling for re-examination of American foreign policy in light of the ‖. More than that, academics through writing the War on Terror ―should show (patriotic) solidarity with the majority of fellow citizens on questions regarding the appropriate response to

‗terrorism‘ ‖162. As a result a wide range of literature was written to meet this need.

159 Richard Jackson, Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) 160 David Miller and Tom Mills, ―The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: the Expert Nexus and Its Dominance in the News Media,‖ Critical Studies on Terrorism. 2.3 (2009): 414-437. 161 Poowin Bunyavejchewin, ―The Orthodox and the Critical Approach toward Terrorism: An overview,‖ University of Hull RCAPS Working Paper No. 10-3 (December 2010): 6. 162 Richard Jackson, Marie Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Routledge, 2009) 116. 61 In response to this new call to arms, whereby academics were called upon once again, as during the early Cold War, to undermine their axiological neutrality, as Max

Weber defined it, in the name of patriotism, U.S. intellectuals would respond in various ways. Experts and authors of Terrorism studies and the War on Terror have been associated with government institutions. In 2007, a data collection were cited and consulted by the English Western Media, 42% of them were ―members of state institutions such as government, security or intelligence services, policing or the military‖163. 67% ―are currently or have previously been members of private think-tanks or research institutes. Of the remaining experts, 16 out of 33 are currently or have previously worked in private security or intelligence firms or alternatively state institutions such as government, security or intelligence, policing or military service‖164. As a result a common accepted narrative of the United States‘ ‗War on Terror‘ was generated that corresponded with the official statements. It was the Al-Qaeda organization and its affiliated groups that are ―waging an essentially apolitical war against ‗Western Values‘ or the ‗Western Way of life‘‖165. This version could be likened to Cold War rhetoric when policymakers and academics accused the Soviets of managing a war against Western values of democracy and freedom.

Religion and Terrorism

In the same context, what motivated this War, according to the Orthodox account was ―hatred and religious dogmatism-implacable and unscrupulous‖.166 Islam as religion was the main source of terrorism according to Orthodox scholars such as Daniel Benjamin who explained the 9/11 attacks as a legacies of the Islamic religion. The ―9/11 attacks were intended by soldiers of God to humiliate and slaughter those who had defied the hegemony

163 David Miller and Tom Mills, ―The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: the Expert Nexus and Its Dominance in the News Media,‖ Critical Studies on Terrorism. 2.3 (2009): 414-437. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 ibid 62 of God and to please God by reasserting his primacy‖167. This assumption was also articulated in various academic and media publications, articles, and books. Brian Farmer, an American scholar, lists the motives of the Islamic terrorist, stating that ―mass killing as a wholly acts of worship, obedience, and redemption‖168. These few examples reveal how

Orthodox scholars attributed Terrorism to Islam and this argumentation was used to justify

U.S. interventions through―aggressive military action abroad and repressive policies at home‖169. Another leading figure in orthodox terrorism studies and U.S. War on Terror is

Bruce Hoffman, who not only insisted on the Islamic religion as the unique source of terrorism but linked the 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution to the development of terrorism in the Middle East. ―Islamic religious imperative for terrorism is the most important defining characteristic of terrorist activity today. The revolution that transformed Iran into an

Islamic republic in 1979 played a crucial role in the modern advent of religious terrorism‖170. This is an interpretation that rationalized U.S. foreign policy in the MENA, while at the same time targeting Iran as a source of Terrorism. It is worth noting that the

Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran overthrew a pro-American leader Rez Shah.

Interestingly, Bruce Hoffman is on the scientific board or editor of the major academic journals on Terrorism studies in the United States such as the Journal of

―Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism‖171, ―Studies in Conflict and Terrorism‖ and

―Terrorism and Political Violence‖. In addition to other orthodox analysts such as Alex

Schmid, these journals are financed by various oil and gaz industry lobbies. They receive, for example ―a grant of (US$300 000) via a lobbying subsidiary that works mostly for the

167 Kumar Ramakrishna, ―From ‗old‘ to ‗new‘ Terrorism: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects,‖ Martin L. Gill, The Handbook of Security (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 159-178. 168 Farmer Brian, American Political Ideologies: An Introduction to the Major Systems of Thought in the 21st Century (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland, 2006)174. 169 Miller David and Tom Mills, ―The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: the Expert Nexus and Its Dominance in the News Media,‖ Critical Studies on Terrorism. 2.3 (2009): 414-437. 170 Bruce Hoffman, ―Old Madness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy,‖ Rand Review, 22,2 ( 1998): 12-17.

63 oil and gas industry‖172. Then writing terrorism and the War on Terror from the perspective of and in accordance with the oil industry interests enhances the hypothesis of the politicized history that was constructed by the political and economic power elites for targeted objectives. Richard Jackson stated that ―These … biases function ideologically to construct a particular kind of political ‗knowledge‘ and to promote state and elite hegemonic projects‖173. These elite encourage policymakers to adopt certain policies that while contributing to United States leadership and hegemony; it benefits big corporations and political entities. Journalist Kevin Toolis stated that: ―throughout academia, the study of terrorism is booming. But in reality . . . these ‗experts‘ represent an ideology that has its roots in the Cold War and in Israeli conservatism‖174.

Orthodox terrorism scholars of the post-9/11 events were associated with the various government agencies such as the military and intelligences in addition to the

Media. They were coined as ―the ‗invisible college‘ who are groups of experts operates as a nexus of interests connecting academia with military, intelligence and government agencies, with the security industry and the media‖175. They were engaged in rationalizing the War on Terror and coordinating the administration‘s involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan and the whole MENA region. Such experts generate and commercialize the official interpretations. Sometimes the Orthodox scholars include criticism of the manner the administration was waging the War on Terror. For example, Daniel Benjamin and Steven

Simon, who are labeled as Orthodox terrorism scholars, criticized the U.S. War on Iraq in their book Next Attack: the failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for getting it Right

172 David Miller and Tom Mills, ―The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: the Expert Nexus and Its Dominance in the News Media,‖ Critical Studies on Terrorism. 2.3 (2009): 414-437. 173 Richard Jackson ed al, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Routledge, 2009) 218. 174 David Miller and Tom Mills, ―The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: the Expert Nexus and Its Dominance in the News Media,‖ Critical Studies on Terrorism. 2.3 (2009): 414-437. 175 Ibid. 64 176 which was published in 2006, but did not challenge the mainstream version of the causes of the War on Terror. Their book The Age of Scared Terror (2002) best exemplified the orthodox perspective as it backed the main cause of the War on Terror to the nature of

Islam as a radical religion that encourages such acts to restore its glory177. The two books were a sort of rationalizing the U.S. War on the Al-Qaeda and recommended strategies in waging the War at home and abroad. It is much like the Orthodox Cold War academia which accepted, justified, and helped coordinate governmental policies. ―The continuities with the past remain in the world of the contemporary terror expert‖178.

John Lewis Gaddis, the founder of the post-Revisionist and a leading historian figure of the Cold War shifted his focus to the War on Terror following 9/11. In 2005, he revised and expanded a new edition of his book Strategies of Containment: a Critical

Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War, which was published in 1982. He added to the book a chapter entitled ―Containment after the Cold

War‖, in which he detailed the Bush administration‘s War on Terror in Afghanistan and

Iraq from the Cold War containment perspective. He concluded that while the containment policy could not work against Al-Qaeda, it could be implemented in other states through various means to dismantle the terrorist threat. The War on Iraq, for example, was considered as ―a preemptive War‖ that aimed to uproot a sponsor of terrorism on the one hand and an intimidation of ―leaders of any states who might be harboring terrorists‖179 on the other. It was a sign of return to the containment policy, according to Gaddis, who stated

177 Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Scared Terror (Random House, 2002) 40. 178 David Miller and Tom Mills, ―The Terror Experts and the Mainstream Media: the Expert Nexus and Its Dominance in the News Media,‖ Critical Studies on Terrorism. 2.3 (2009): 414-437. 179 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005) 384. 65 that ―preemption by the Bush administration‘s logic, then led back to containment policy.

It did not replace containment‖180.

Although this strategy did not target Al-Qaeda per se, as it is a non-state actor,

States had been threatened by the terrorist organizations which in this way became more powerful than the states The 9/11 events occurred because of the weakness of ―the international state system‖ which led countries to appear unable ―to control what went on within their territories and across their borders‖181. Therefore, the economic and military aids that would be provided to these states could diminish the terrorist threat according to this assumption. In light of this analysis, Gaddis recommended a new Truman Doctrine to stand with ―free people who are resisting attempted subjugation‖182.

Gaddis‘s account of the War on Terror transcended his academic role to political rationalization and praise of the pre-emptive War and the democratization mission that

George Walker Bush was perusing in the MENA in the post-9/11 period. He rationalized rather than objectively analyzed the U.S. Grand Strategies to fight terror. Interestingly, he showed admiration and support of the Bush administration‘s War on Terror. ―This is an administration, I believe, which is thinking in global terms I think it is thinking in integrated terms, in the sense that the various parts of the strategy interconnect with each other in a fairly impressive way‖183. His assumptions and writings were criticized by

Melvyn Leffner, a Cold War Revisionist scholar who witnessed the War on Terror, and

Bruce Cummings for being biased.

180 Ibid., 384. 181 Ellen Lust, ed, The Middle East 13th edition (Washington DC: SAGE Copress) 609. 182 Our Documents: 100 Milestone Documents from the National Archives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 183 John Lewis Gaddis, ―Gaddis: Bush Pre-emption Doctrine The Most Dramatic Policy Shift Since Cold War, Interview with Bernard Gwertzman,‖ Council On Foreign relation (Feb. 10, 2004), Online, interent, Mar. 10, 2015. Available:cfr.org/interview/gaddis-bush-pre-emption-doctrine-most-. 66 Gaddis, like many traditionalist historians of the War on Terror became the academic voice of Bush administration as he was consultant in writing presidential speeches. His role was to rationalize and coordinate the administration‘s foreign policy;

Gaddis‘ writings could be accused of being biased as he appeared more policy practioner rather than academic especially in his writings on Bush‘s War on Terror.

Studying the Orthodox account of terrorism and the War on Terror is significant for various reasons. First, it revealed the connection between academia and politics that aimed to construct a narrative to justify and rationalize the U.S War on Terror much more like the Cold War. This was known by critical terrorist studies as the academic-industrial complex, which influences decision-making and public opinion at home and abroad. The second is how both academia and politics worked hand in hand for the promotion of U.S. primacy in the World by providing an academic and Media cover for its policy. The third point is the interconnection between the corporate world and academia for economic and hegemonic motives. The War on Terror is also an economic war that benefits big corporations, military and oil industries. Such motives led corporations to subsidize academic journals specialized in Terrorism. Last but not least, the orthodox account of the

War on Terror is much like the orthodox approach to the Cold War in validating and justifying the administration policies. During the Cold War, major leading academic figures like Fies and Schlesinger held governmental position much like during the War on

Terror, the major figures of orthodox terrorism studies either among governmental institute and agencies‘ staff or associated members.

1.2.2 Revisionist terrorism studies

In June 2003, less than three months after the invasion of Iraq, George Walker

Bush denounced a group of historians who challenged the state narratives on the War on

67 Terror. He claimed that the United States ―acted to a threat from the dictator of Iraq, but now there are some who would like to re-write history, ‗revisionist historians‘ is what I like to call them‖184. He harshly criticized their revision of the well-accepted narratives of

U.S. involvement in the War on Terror and the preemptive wars that were led in the name of defeating terror and securing the United States and its allies. Then, revisionist historians are those who challenged the state-centric approach of U.S. foreign policy that was written within the Orthodox (traditionalist) terrorism studies framework which proliferated in government agencies and institutions in the aftermath of 9/11. The orthodox ―terrorism research …. co-opted by government interests and the associated risks of becoming an uncritical mouthpiece of state interests, rather than speaking truth to power‖185. Now amid the Bush administration‘s plan to invade Iraq, War on Terror revisionism emerged, questioning the real motives behind the global War on Terror in general and the Iraq War in particular, questioning the credibility of the Bush administration‘s narratives.

9/11 Terrorism and War on Terror revisionism attempted to get rid of the government framework and find a more profound apolitical approach to the U.S. War on

Terror, the stated and unstated motives and whether there was a new grand strategy or the same continuation of the same means to the same ends. It was part and parcel of Critical

Terrorism Studies (CTS) which like the revisionist Cold War theory questioned the widely accepted historical narratives on ―the justification of a global war on terrorism and the problematic relationship between international law, national sovereignty, and imperial power‖186. CTS researchers investigated terrorism and the War on Terror from new perspectives that were ignored by the traditionalist historians. CTS ―scholars now openly questioning widely accepted ‗wisdom‘ about terrorism in ways that were quite unthinkable

184Carl Mirra, United States Foreign Policy and the Prospects for Peace Education (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008) 120. 185 Richard Jackson, Marie Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (London: Routledge, 2009) 25. 186 Ibid 68 in the early years following the 2001‖187. The immediate 9/11 era was much like the

McCarthyism era of the late 1940s and early 1950s in which researchers, journalists and politicians were sharing the same narrative on the Soviet Union threat and the legitimacy of the containment policy.

A detailed study and revisiting of the revisionist terrorism studies are beyond the scope of this dissertation, therefore, the focus is put on some aspects of the War on Terror in relation to the policy of containment, Historical Institutionalism‘s path dependency and primacy as a U.S.Grand s trategy from the Cold War to the War on Terror.

The 9/11 attacks on the nation‘s soil paved the way for George Walker Bush and conservative policymakers such as and to launch the Global

‗War on Terror‘. It started in Afghanistan then Iraq as direct interventions then spread to the MENA region through various mechanisms. The 9/11 was a ―pretext of convenience‖188, as Joseph G Peschek and Stephen J Sniegoski state, to implement a predetermined agenda in a key geostrategic area, which had been out of the US sphere of influence at that moment. These countries which were coined as ―the axis of Evil‖189 by

George Walker Bush were accused of hiding and sponsoring terrorism. This designation was perceived as a predetermined imperial agenda that aimed to contain what has been termed in U.S. foreign policy as ‗rogue states‘ in the Cold War: Iran, Iraq and North Korea in addition to other MENA countries. ―Terrorism was immediately linked with state referents – namely, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, or, collectively, Bush‘s ―Axis of Evil‖ – in prefabricated imperial agendas that had been in the works when America‘s Cold War foil

187 Ibid., 1. 188Joseph G. Peschek, The Politics of Empire: War, Terror and Hegemony (Taylor & Francis, 2006) 28. 189 George W. Bush, President George W. Bush State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002. Washington, D.C, 2002. 69 was crumbling‖190. Such designations actually increased by the End of the Cold War to legitimize at home and abroad the necessity to contain these groups through both soft and hard containment, depending on the geostrategic importance. Moreover, ‗the Axis of Evil‘ is a revival of Regan‘s designation of the Soviet Union as the ‗Evil Empire‘ in his famous speech in 1983191.

Thus, direct intervention in some countries, such as Iraq, proxy wars in the

MENA countries such as Yamen and the imposition of strict economic and military sanctions on Iran were a continuity of U.S. grand strategy of primacy and hegemony.

The 9/11 events therefore facilitated and justified a predetermined agenda to enhance U.S domination of the world, especially in strategic and oil-rich areas. It is the manifestation of an imperialistic preexisting plan, according to revisionist historians, which had been orchestrated by pro-Zionist leaders in the Bill Clinton and George Walker Bush administrations. Stephen J. Sniegoski states that, ―it is apparent that the war was anything but an overnight improvisation to address the September 11 atrocity; rather, the September

11 atrocities provided the pretext for the United States to put her existing war plan into motion‖192. Accordingly, the U.S. intervention in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was a convenient pretext to intervene in countries of great geostrategic importance and to accede to oil fields in Central Asia rather than chasing and defeating ‗terrorists‘.

It is should be noted that, like the Cold War Revisionists, the War on Terror revisionists put the blame on Washington for the onset of an endless War on Terror. Noam

Chomsky, an outspoken revisionist, maintains that USA foreign policy and war strategies

190 Edwin Daniel Jacob, ―Cold War Theoriesn War on Terror Practices,‖ E-International Relations (Oct. 18, 2018) online, internet, June 2, 2014. Available: https://www.e-ir.info/ . 191 , ―Address to the National Association of Evangelicals,"Voices of Democracy: The U.S. Oratory Project, March 8, 1983. Online, internet Mar. 15, 2019.Available: http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/reagan-evil-empire-speech-text/. 192Stephen J. Sniegoski, ―September 11 And The Origins of The ‗War On Terrorism‘: A Revisionist Account,‖ Information Cleaning House (Mar 2002), Online, internet, June, 2, 2014. Availbale: www.informationclearinghouse.info. 70 during the War on Terror are in continuity with its Cold War grand strategy policies.193

Thus, the U.S. War on Terror in general and ―the War on Afghanistan in particular was simply an ad hoc response to the horrific events of September 11‖194. Afghanistan was out of U.S spheres of influences since the Cold War and a matter of dispute with U.S.S.R. It was controlled by Taliban regime, a regime that opposed U.S. oil and gas pipeline projects across the country. A few months before 9/11, U.S. policymakers and oil industry had been already negotiating this project with Taliban. Afghanistan was ―as indispensable to the regional control and transport of oil in central Asia as Egypt was in the Middle East‖195.

The 9/11 events could be seen as a ‗pretext of convenience‘ according to some academica sand IR analysts that facilitates the U.S. project of uprooting the Taliban regime and Al

Qaida.

―If the U.S. succeeds in overthrowing the Taliban and replacing them with a stable and grateful pro-western government and if the U.S. then binds the economies of central Asia to that of its ally Pakistan, it will have crushed not only terrorism, but also the growing ambitions of both Russia and China. Afghanistan, as ever, is the key to the western domination of Asia‖196.

Then revisionists backed the invasion of Afghanistan for economic and hegemonic motifs rather than the terrorist threat. A pro-US government in Kabul would bolster U.S. primacy in the region military and economically. ―Pipelines through

Afghanistan would allow the U.S. both to pursue its aim of ‗diversifying energy supply‘ and to penetrate the world's most lucrative markets‖197. Then these anti-theses of the orthodox narrative brought new presepctives to researchers to revisit the U.S.-Afghanistan

193Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues (London: Verso Press, 2015). 194 Stephen J. Sniegoski, ―September 11 And The Origins of The ‗War On Terrorism‘: A Revisionist Account‖, Information Cleaning House (March 22, 2002).. 195 George Monbiot, ―America's Pipe Dream,‖ The Guradian Oct. 23, 2001, online, internet, June.6, 2014. Available: www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.terrorism11. 196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 71 relation since the Cold War, the relationship of U.S. policymakers with Taliban rulers prior to 9/11 events and more importantly the connection bewteen top policymakers, like Dick

Cheney, and the oil industry in the United States.

It is equally important to examine Bush‘s War on Iraq from a Revisionist perspective. Revisionists challenged George Walker Bush‘s declaration on October 7, 2002 that he had not decided whether to use force against Iraq or not: ―I have not ordered the use of force; I hope the use of force will not be necessary‖198. In fact, the American administration and especially G.W. Bush had already planned to invade Iraq. Revisionists quoted a classified British MI-6 memo dated summer 2002 in which Britain‘s chief intelligence Richard Dearlove stated that ―Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD (weapons of mass destruction)‖199. He added that ―intelligence and fact were being fixed around the policy‖200. Then U.S. policymakers were secretly working on the implementation of the

Bush doctrine of preemptive War in Iraq. This strategy was explained, justified and defended by John Lewis Gaddis201 and other traditionalist historians who justified pre- emption action against Iraq due to the position of WMD and being a threat to U.S. allies in the MENA. Their claims and Bush‘s were refuted by Revisionists who argued that U.N. inspectors testified that Iraq had no such weapons before the invasion and after the downfall of the Saddam regime. Then President Bush‘s accusation of Iraq as it ―recently sought significant of uranium from Africa‖202, was proved wrong and unveiled the

198 George W Bush, ―Remarks on Signing the autoritization for Use of Militray Forec against Iraq Resolution of 2002,‖ October 16, 2002. In George W Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States George W. Bush 2002: January 1 to June 30 2002 (Government Printing Office, 2005) 1812. 199 Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform (New York: Press, 2014) 28. 200 Lloyd C Gardner, The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.s. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present (New York: New Press, 2010) 142. 201 John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005) 384. 202 Glen Segell, Axis of Evil and Rogue States: The Bush Administration 2000-2004 (London: Glen Segell, 2005) 313. 72 fabrication of narratives to arouse sympathy and legitimacy from Americans and the international community. These sponsored and constructed narratives aimed to bring Iraq back as a strategic country to the United States sphere of influence.

The Bush administration decided to overthrow Saddam Hussein and install a pro-

American regime that would serve U.S. primacy in the region. Moreover, it could bolster alliance system in the MENA as Iraq was perceived as a threat to U.S. allies in the Gulf countries. Although there were no obvious proofs, Bush and his neoconservative staff decided to attack Iraq. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw reported, when he receivd an intelligence memo on the Bush administration‘s determination to intervene in Iraq, that

Bush ―had made up his mind to take military action but the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbor, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North

Korea, or Iran‖203,

These statements were exploited by the Revisionists to question the U.S. war on

Iraq204. From this, it is noticeable how playing the WMD and terrorism cards were workable for Bush to justify the removal of Saddam Hussein and therefore bring Iraq back into the U.S sphere of influence. It also intimidated MENA leaders, becoming a warning against challenging U.S. supremacy in the region.

In their book, Terrorism: a Critical Introduction, Richard Jackson, Marie Breen

Smyth and others state that ―the terrorism industry has often acted as an arm of Western state policy and an apologist for state terrorism carried out by Western State and its allies‖205. This perspective goes hand in hand with the account of the Cold War and its policy of containment. Terrorism studies is depicted as a ―terrorism industry‖ in which two

203Thomas R. Mockaitis, The Iraq War: a Documentary and Reference Guide: a Documentary and Reference Guide ( ABC-CLIO, 2012 ) 49. 204 Carl Mirra, United States Foreign Policy and the Prospects for Peace Education (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008) 120. 205 Richard Jackson, et al, Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 14. 73 sides of the conflict are constructed: a Western side, including the United States who uses terrorism as an arm to accuse and attack countries that may hold terrorist groups or sympathy with terrorists whereas the target countries are placed in a position of

―apologists‖. This is strategy although appear as a security matter of U.S. administration, we argue it is a containment policy that aimed to align these countries with the United

States agenda in the area. It echoes Bush warn ―either with us or with the terrorist‖.

While recruiting John Lewis Gaddis to help write his speeches, he harshly criticized revisionist scholars claiming that ―It is deeply irresponsible to rewrite the history of how that war began‖206. Moreover, Vice-president Dick Cheney said ―any suggestions that prewar information was distorted, hyped or fabricated by the leaders of the nation is utterly false… this revisionism of the most corrupt and shameless variety‖207. In this vein, the Bush administration opposed the revisionist account of the War on Terror and notably the hidden reason behind the use of military forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Policymakers in the White House and Department of State were comfortable with the Orthodox account of U.S grand strategy.

To sum up, revisionists challenged the predominant assumption of the War on

Terror stating that the U.S. War on Terrorism was a convenient pretext for enhancing the

Open Door Policy and acquiring as much sphere of influence as possible. The revisionist account of the U.S. War on Terror is, to a high degree, a continuity of the interpretation of the Cold War. American policy, states the founding father of the Revisionist school of thought William Appelman Williams, ―can without much exaggeration be described as an effort to establish the open door policy once and for all‖208.

206 J G Clifford, Theodore A. Wilson, and Robert H. Ferrell, Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals: Essays Honoring Robert H. Ferrell (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007 ) 231. 207 Ibid. 208Willan Appelman Williams, The Tragedy of the American diplomacy (Delta Book, 1981) 239. 74 As a conclusion to this part, we can mention the pioneer of the Revisionist school of thought of the US foreign policy, William Appelman Williams, who admits in his

Tragedy of American Diplomacy: ―Since the 1820s Americans steadily deepened their commitment to the idea that democracy was inextricably connected with individualism, private property, and a capitalist marketplace economy. Even the great majority of critics sought to reform existing society precisely in order to realize that conception of the good system‖209. This means those U.S. foreign policy strategies in general and the policy of containment originated in the early 19th century and was not a new strategy. The policy makers therefore aimed to force a unique model of society in the world based on a capitalist market place which favors U.S. economic interests, regardless of the interests of other countries, which is what William Appelaman Williams calls the Tragedy of

American diplomacy.

Although Gaddis stated that ―there is no such thing as a definitive account of any historical episode, revising in history is like restaging in theater: it is what the business is all about‖210. This chapter is an attempt to scrutinize the various writings on two main eras in international relations in general and U.S. foreign policy in particular. Our main finding is that the historiography of U.S. foreign policy of containment during the Cold War is much like the historiography of the so-called Global War on Terror in terms of the study of the writing of history and of written histories of these two eras. The connection between academia and politics has been revealed when writing U.S. foreign policy during the Cold

War and then the War on Terror. U.S. policy makers were marked by the tight connection between academia and politics to rationalize the American involvement overseas to maintain the post-Cold War uni-polar world led by the United States.

209Ibid., 9. 210 Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman, Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Princeton, N.J: Recording for the Blind & Dyslexic, 2003) 308. 75 1.3 Twenty-first century Cold War studies

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a more definitive history of the Cold

War, covering the main causes and legacies of the long conflicts between the two opposing blocs, was thought to be attainable as the Cold War came to an end and the Soviet Union no longer existed as a threat. The Soviet Union declassified a huge part of its archives and therefore historians gained access to primary sources. The conflicts and opposition of the various historians and schools of thought were believed to have come to an end and the definitive interpretation of the War and final history was likely to emerge in the few years following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Another assumption was that the United States was expected to cease its policy of containment in Europe and the Third World. The Soviet Union which was the main rival of the United States was dissolved, lost its military and economic power and could not by any means be a threat to United States‘ economic, military and cultural monopoly. In this case, many assumed that the policy of containment had come to an end. In this part, the focus will be on the historiography of the United States Cold War in late 1980s to the early

2010s. The focus will be on the Realist school of thought and who it chronicled the end of the Cold War and the immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, then focus will be put mainly on the 21st century literature about U.S. foreign policy in its complexity during the Cold War and the War on Terror, studying the continuity or discontinuity of the containment policy through the latest approaches. I will comment, interpret and revisit some historical assumptions. The study of this period will focus on the

US policy of containment perspectives to treat the main perceptions and approaches during two landmark phases, the end of the Cold war and the onset of the War on Terror.

Coverage of all schools of thought approaches and perspectives of U.S. involvement in the Cold War and the War on Terror is beyond the scope of this study and 76 far-reaching due to the rich, complicated and contradictory approaches even within the same school of thought. Our main objective, however, is to cover the most important perspectives of landmark historians and international analysis and interpretation that cover these two phases. Therefore, I will focus on the Realist school of thought, and then chronicle the two wars from the Third World and corporatist perspectives. The deep analysis and rethinking of the major assumptions will be the matter of my concern throughout the dissertation.

Realism is a school of thought which coexisted in the early 1990s with other schools. Realism in foreign policy is a theory, more than a school of thought, as it is based on various notions and theories that were applied to the U.S. context. ―Realism‖ emerged as a reaction to some notions and concepts of revisionism and notably post-Revisionism‘s rejection of ideology as a main reason for the long conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Realism, as a theory of international relations, is based on the concept that ―States are motivated by a drive for power, security and pursuit of the ‗national interest‘… and that States, like men, behave in a self-interested manner‖211. From this, one can infer that the two superpowers were motivated by their eagerness for hegemony, advocated by policy makers. This notion contributed to the shape of the corporatist approach to study the motives of the two superpowers and notably the United States‘ policy of containment from ‗multidimensional perspectives.‘

Some Realist historians like Michael J Hogan, Chester J. Pach and David S.

Painter state that the policy of containment in the early years of the Cold War is affected by the ―collaboration among corporations, public and private agencies and supranational

211Jill Steans, et al, An Introduction to International Relation Theory: Perspectives and Themes (Routledge, 2013) 57. 77 organizations‖212. Such belief shaped ‗the corporatist model‘ which approached the motives of the U.S. foreign policy in the post-Second World War era assessing the policy of containment through ‗multidimensional tools.‘ It is Hogan who introduced ―corporatism as a multidimensional tool for analyzing political economic and public policies that promoted through the establishment of a ‗Corporative World Order.‘―213

Therefore, the big business and corporations are the main determinants and influencing factors in the orchestrating of U.S. foreign policy. This policy has been manifested mainly in the ―military assistance policy‖ and ―National Oil Policy‖ which is core components of the U.S. Realists interacted with other schools and most importantly the post-Revisionist to maintain the notion of shared responsibilities of the onset of the Cold War214.

Historiography reached a consensus about the U.S. quest of the Oil industry especially in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. David Painter and other historians highlight Truman‘s quest for oil and security in the Middle East215. This means that

Truman‘s policy was based mainly on the acquisition of oil sources and roads. Painter and other historians emphasize the role of oil in determining U.S. foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War, deducing that ―control over Arab oil constituted an integral part of America's search for security and that the economic interests of business and the strategic concerns of government paralleled each other‖216. Thus, the search for security equals the control over oil fields in general and notably in the Middle East, which evokes the U.S. interests in oil countries during the Cold War and the War on Terror. U.S. War on

Afghanistan in 2001 and on Iraq in 2003 best exemplified U.S. interests in building the oil and gas pipelines that cross Afghanistan and controlling Iraq the second highest oil

212Michael J. Hogan, America in the World: The Historiography of US Foreign Relations since 1941 (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 263. 213 Ibid., 250. 214 Ibid., 250 215 Ibid., 251 216 Ibid., 250 78 producer in the world. Interestingly the wars were mainly to regain these two countries to the American spheres of influence. Iraq left the American sphere of influence in the late

1980s and challenged U.S. primacy in the Gulf countries. Afghanistan is geostrategic country in oil industry and could be seen as key area to the United States in the Great

Middle East.

Controversies over U.S. policy involvement in the Cold War continued during the

1990s and the 2000s but access to the Soviet archives might have lessened the tension between historians as American researchers tended to fulfill their research about the causes of the Cold War and who was to blame and what were the main reasons and intentions of the Soviets and Americans In 1992, as the Soviet archives were opened to historians ―the era of serious and detailed study could begin, yielding definitive answers to whole series of questions‖217. However, the declassified Soviet archives did not end the historical disputes over the onset and the end of the conflicts.

In the early 21st century, a group of historians distanced themselves from investigating the main reasons of the Cold War, and on whom the blame it, to rather focus on deeper analysis of U.S. foreign policy from cultural, ideological and technological perspectives. Odd Arne Westad states that, ―The main issue is therefore to suggest ways in which the wider implications of the Cold War may more readily be seen, along the axes of politics and economics, science and technology, and culture and ideas‖218. This means that the history of the Cold War has been widened to encompass other factors that may not only contribute to Cold War history but also complicate it. The focus has been shifted from who was to blame for the onset of the Cold War to new approaches, therefore Cold War

217Jonathan Haslam, ―Russian Archival Revelations and our Understanding of the Cold War,‖ Diplomatic History, vol.21. no.2, (Spring 1997). 218 Odd Arne Westad, ―The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century,‖ Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 79 historiography has diverged more toward new perspectives which are mainly culture, corporation, technology and ‗―Third World.‖ The two latter, technology and Third World are to a great extent more innovative factors as the two former were studied in relation to the American Soviet conflicts since the late 1940s.

Professor Odd Arne Westad assures that the final and definitive history of the

Cold War is far-reaching and endowed with uncertainties219. Such assumption is based on the abundance of new materials and the intersection of disciplines and schools of thought in addition to the detachment of some historians from their own previous interpretations.

Thus, the historiography of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century has become broader to the extent that it is nearly impossible to reach a definitive conclusion about the reasons behind the U.S. policy of containment because ―at the beginning of the twenty first century, historians evidence tends to be more multiform and the research questions more varied than could have been imagined four generations ago …‖220. This implies that not only new evidence was discovered but also a variety of research questions about the complexity of U.S. foreign policy since the aftermath of the Second World War.

It was evident to contextualize the Cold War; it needs to be set ―within the wider history of the twentieth century in a global context‖221. Thus, the causes Cold War and the implementation of the containment policy should be studied within the economic, social, cultural, and military perspectives in order to shape a coherent interpretation of the motives of the Soviet Union and the United States. ―The methodologies of study of history have become more diverse and its communities more international. As a result of this increasing diversity, knowledge has become less certain and the space for conflicting interpretations

219 Ibid., 3. 220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 80 broader‖222. The changing methodologies of the study of history, as well, contributed to the uncertainty and opened a new window on the proceeding of historiography called

‗contextualization.‘

The Cold War has also begun to be analyzed more closely with reference to the

Third World; the two last decades of the Cold War, and other aspects as Westad calls

―definitory contexts such as 223 the Arab–Israeli conflict in the Middle East, the India–

Pakistan tug-of-war in South Asia, and the contention created by U.S. dominance in Latin

America – are where the fluidity and hybridity of Cold War ideologies are easiest to observe‖224. So the study of the Cold War was shifted from U.S. and Soviet Union relations motives and responsibility to the Third World and their positions in some conflicts in the various areas such as ―the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the conflicts in Asia and notably the India-Pakistan tug-of-war‖225.

During the 1960s, the United States contributed to the creation of new states and aimed at not only at creating new states but also putting an end to European colonization and influencing the newly independent nation as so as they followed the American economic and cultural model, as Westad states. He goes on further to assert that the Cold

War was a US construction for dominating the world and not because of the threat that the

Soviet Union might cause.

Another crucial point worth rising is how the United States faced the new Islamic world in the aftermath of September 11th 2001. Our attempt is to analyze the legacies of the terrorist attack on U.S. foreign policy in the MENA and to what extent it has implemented its policy of containment. Elaborating on a final and complete historiography of U.S. foreign policy regarding these issues and the 21st century, in particular, is far-

222 Ibid. 223Ibid., 1. 224Ibid., 8. 225Ibid. 81 reaching.What makes the historiography of the 21st century rich and fertile is the intersection of disciplines and the multiplicity of research on the U.S. foreign policy of containment during the War on Terror and the Cold War. In addition, there have been new multidimensional tools to study the Cold War in general and US foreign policy of containment in particular.

It is worth noting that historiography of U.S. foreign policy in general and the policy of containment is complicated, fickle and even contradictory due to the emergence of multiple angles, thus, this dissertation will be analyzed mainly from a 21st century lens. I will follow the 21st century schools of thought, trying to contextualize the events to cover the U.S. policy of containment since the onset of the Cold War. The focus will be mainly on the ‗Third World‘ angle to investigate the degree of continuity or discontinuity of the

U.S. Cold War policy of containment in the post-Cold War era and notably the Global War on Terror and the Arab Spring of the first half of the 2010s.

3. Containment in the Cold War and post-Cold War

periods: revisiting the major phases towards neo-

containment

Containment with all its mechanisms was the pillar of the U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War. U.S. institutions and culture were accustomed to the Soviet threat that guided the American political, institutional and military machines. As soon as the

U.S.S.R. collapsed officially, the United States found itself with neither an enemy nor a perceived threat to its ‗national security‘. The construction of a new threat to substitute the former Soviet nemesis had initiated with President Reagan‘s drug wars that became known as the ‗narco-terrorism‘; drug war as a new threat to legitimize intervention, however,

82 ended up as ―a failure in terms of stated objectives‖226. Therefore, a more strategic conception would be the New World Order, Democratic Enlargement, Dual Containment and ―Islamic terrorism‖ which corresponded in key areas to the United States interests.

Retired General Alfred M. Gray noted in March 1990 that ―nationalism and terrorism are on the rise… terrorism will continue to be the preferred means for radical nations and groups to achieve their ends since it is inexpensive warfare‖227.

The post-Cold War era uncertainty and search for new opponent or a threat did not last long. President George Herbert Walker Bush introduced the New World Order in

1991 and President Bill Clinton on the same path initiated the ‗dual containment‘ and the concept of Democratic Enlargement in attempt to substitute the Cold War containment policy and adopt an innovative concepts that

The subsequent George W. Bush administration, Bush junior, in line with the two previous presidencies, framed its grand strategy in the Middle East areas. The Bush doctrine of preventive wars and containment, we argue, was consistently implemented by his administration. Like President George W Bush, President Obama‘s attempt to depart from U.S. grand strategy and ‗habits was hardlidy noticed. The containment plus regime change which had been outlined by President Clinton was applied by President George W

Bush in Iraq and ‗active containment‘ policy was oriented toward Iran within the broader

U.S. grand strategy of primacy.

The post-Cold War era witnessed a remarkable shift of focus from Europe to the lesser developed world and especially the MENA as an area of special significance to the

United States. This shift was articulated by both the military and political elites. U.S. Army

Chief General Carl E Vuono noted in April 1990 that American new enemies derived from

226 Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, Brave New World Order: Must We Pledge Allegiance? (Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2017) 62. 227 Ibid. 83 the third world and that America‘s ―national interests no longer focused primarily on East to West‖228. He added that:

Because the United States is a global power with vital interests that must be protected throughout an increasingly turbulent world, we must look beyond the European continent and consider other threats to our security. The proliferation of military power in what is called the ―Third World‖ presents a troubling picture… the growing challenge of insurgencies, subversion, international terrorism and the scourge of drugs- often grouped under the term ‗low-intensity conflict‘ constitutes yet another serious threat to our interests. As a global power with economic, political and security interests spanning the world, the United States cannot ignore those political threats to those interests229.

The third world and especially the Middle East and North Africa became the target of the Bush senior administration. The shift from ‗nacre-terrorism‘ as a serious threat in Latin America to ‗Islamic terrorism‘ in the MENA could be explained by the economic and geopolitical reasons that were stressed and prioritized by the neoconservatives. ―A primary focus on the Middle East and global Islam as the principal theater for American overseas interests‖230 Washington‘s foreign agenda shifted from the control over its

‗backyard‘, namely Latin America, to Eurasia. According to Mackinder, ―Eurasia was different from any other continent, because …. of an incomparable wealth in terms of natural resources‖231.

Looking back and forward, this part examines the continuity of the containment policy in the post-Cold War era and notably the post 9/11 events. The grand strategy of

―primacy‖ remained unchanged in the post-Cold War era: Containing allies and adversaries alike as one major as the others. It studies the American quest for leadership not only over unfriendly regimes but also its allies. President Bush‘s grand strategy was a

228 Carl E. A Vuono, Trained and Ready Army: The Collected Works of the Thirty-First Chief of Staff, United States Arm : June 1987-June 1991 (Washington, D.C.?: Dept. of the Army, 1994) 258. 229 Ibid. 230 Stefan A Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 11. 231 Emanuel Pietrobon, ―The Neverdending Containment‖, Association of Studies: Research and Internalization in Eurasia and Africa (Feb. 22, 2019) online internet May 6, 2016. Available: www.asrie.org. 84 ‗pick and mix‘ of the American presidents during the Cold War and interwar periods through various means for the same end: U.S. primacy in the post-Cold War era and deterrence of any potential threat to U.S. hegemony over areas of special interests.

3.1 Containing the Middle East in the Cold War: historical perspective

3.1.1 Truman doctrine as MENA universal program Truman states ―I believe that our help should be primarily economic and financial, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.... in helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom‖232. From this perspective, the containment policy was to be applied publically and legally for the first time by Truman administration. The Truman Doctrine was the first institutionalization of the long-term

Cold War containment policy. The successive administrations re-institutionalized the containment policy with reference to Truman Doctrine and the grand strategy of ‗primacy‘.

The economic and financial aids then were the primary means of containing the communist threat that was challenging the U.S. sphere of influence in key strategic countries. The failure to provide assistance would be enormously harmful to the United States‘ sphere of influence in Europe and neighboring Middle East countries therefore an immediate response had to be taken. Truman argued ―Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action‖233. His request was approved by both houses of the

Congress and authorized a release of economic and military assistance to Turkey and

Greece.

232 Harry S. Truman, ―Address before a joint session of congress,‖ March 12 (1947): 1947. 233Ibid. 85 Since the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States was advocating the Greek government Army that was resisting the Democratic Army of Greece (DAG), the military friction of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Truman engaged the U.S. military in the Greek Civil War from March 1946 to October 1949. This was the first concrete and public commitment in containing communism overseas. The United States involvement in the Greek affairs was explained by the Communist threat, the Soviet tendency to control Greece and Turkey and more importantly to accede to the Greater

Middle East. The rationalization of Truman Doctrine was criticized and rejected by some historians who insisted on the American quest for primacry and leadership. Deborah

Welch Larson who argued that ―when the Truman Doctrine was promulgated, the Soviets had withdrawn their troops from northern Iran, allowed the puppet state to collapse, made no further demands on Turkey … and were not responsible for the outbreak of the civil war in Greece‖234. If such is the case, one can wonder about the motives behind the issuing of

Truman Doctrine first and the involvement in foreign affairs where there was no obvious threat.

Following trouble and conflicts between the pro-Western monarchists and the

Communists during Second World War, an election was held in Greece in 1946. The

Greek Communist Party boycotted the election and the National Republican Greek League won a majority of popular vote. The United States and its allies Britain and France founded

‗the Allied Mission for Observing the Greek Election‘ (AMFOG) in February 1946. The election ―marked a watershed in Greece‘s foreign relations. The USA was directly involved in Greek affairs alongside Britain, through participation in the Allied Mission for observing the Greek elections‖235. The AMFOG was headed by the American Henry F.

234 Deborah W. Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University, 1985) 14. 235Christopher M. Woodhouse, A Short History of Modern Greece (Praeger, 1968) 257. 86 Grady and composed of 1155 members from which 692 Americans: 601 military and 91 civilians. The others were British and French236. The intervention in Greek domestic affairs through controlling the election and the existence of large number of American officers and troops in Greece reflected the U.S. new grand strategy in the immediate WWII. This policy was based on affecting the democratic process by supporting one group against the other.

As a response to the March 1946 election which was reported fair by the

AMFOG,237 the Communist Party of Greece and its armed wing the Democratic Army of

Greece (DA), claimed that the election was corrupt and fraudulent238. They therefore started fighting to restore what they called democracy. The Communist Party was backed by Albania, Bulgaria and especially Yugoslavia while the Greek government army was supported by the United States. A bloody civil war lasted more than three years in which the United States was completely involved. Military advisers were sent to Greece to help in fighting the communists: ―Apart from massive aid, much of it in the form of military supplies, a joint General Staff was formed by the Greek and US governments, and

American military advisers came close to combat action in the mountains‖239. Although

Truman did not declare war, U.S. troops and advisers were fighting with the Greek

Government army. They were not only providing them with financial aid and military equipments but also with war advisers on the battle fields to the extent that they came close to combat.

A point worth highlighting is that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were providing the Greek communists with military and economic aid and not the Soviet Union.

Stalin was reluctant and not as supportive as he was expected to be. The U.S. massive aids

236 ―Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections,‖ (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. O. 1946) 237Ibid. 238―Civil War and its Legacy,‖ Britannica. 15th ed. 2005. 239Christopher Montague Woodhouse, A Short History of Modern Greece (Praeger, 1968) 259. 87 and the disagreement among the Communist allies led to the defeat of the Democratic

Army of Greece on October 16, 1949240. As a result, the United States took over Greece and continued pouring military equipments and sofficers through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The pro-western Greek government regained power and since then

Greece became a U.S. ally. More than that with U.S. support, Greece joined the NATO on

18 February 1952.

It is worth noting that in 1947, amid the Greek Civil War, Truman announced the

―Truman Doctrine,‖ requesting for $400 million to help the Greek and Turkish governments. He stated that: ―the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world. And we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation‖241. The alert of the communist threat and the urgent need to help Greece was for the sake of U.S. welfare which was jeopardized by the communists. In this line of thought, United States engagement in the Greek Civil War and the issuing of economic and military support to

Greece and Turkey fall under the policy of containment. Truman explicitly announced that such loans were not only for liberty of the peoples in Greece and Tureky but also for U.S interests. Assisting these two states could be all means guarnttees their existence withing the American sphere of influence. Since then the commitment in foreign affairs overseas has been a keystone of the containment policy. David Painter argued that ―the United

States increasingly took the view that internal arrangements in other states were linked to

240 Nikos Marantzidis and Giorgos Antoniou, ―The Axis Occupation and Civil War: Changing Trends in Greek Historiography, 1941-2002,‖ Violence and Abuse Abstracts. 10.4 (2004). 241 Carl C Hodge and Cathal J. Nolan, U.S.. Presidents and Foreign Policy: From 1789 to the Present (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2007) 400. 88 its security and economic well-being. This view was at the heart of the doctrine of containment‖242.

Empowering the Greek military capacity could safeguard the US interests.

Truman states ―the Greek government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy‖243. What Truman meant was the insurance of the ―liberal democratic order and a capitalist market‖244 according to

Bromley which was endangered by the Greek Civil war that might affect Turkey and the

Middle East. This explains Truman‘s urge to assist Greece military so as it became ‗self- governing‘, an American call that had been repeated to explain and rationalize the consistent American aids to vital countries in the world and especially in the MENA.

The fall of Greece into the communist hands could lead to the fall of other countries like Iran and Turkey, therefore Greece ―could become a destabilizing factor for neighboring Turkey and the further Middle East‖245, a geostrategic area that caught U.S. policymakers‘ attention while containing the Soviet Union. , the Secretary of State, for example, advocated a policy of containment to prevent Greece from falling into Communism. He claimed that ―stopping communism in Greece was essential in preventing the fall of the entire region of the Northern Tier to Soviet influence which was seen as a ‗buffer zone‘ protecting the Middle East‖246. So what mattered most was the

Middle East, a vital area for American corporations and notably the oil industry. Greece

242 David Painter, ―Explaining US Relations with the Third World‖, Diplomatic History vol. 19, no. 3, (1995): 525-48. 243 Steven M Gillonn, The American Paradox: A History of the United States Since 1945 (Cengage Learning, 2012) 19. 244 William Brown, Simon Bromley and Suma Athreye, Ordering the international : history, change and transformation ( London: Pluto Press ,Open University, 2004) 153. 245 Pieper, M. A, ―Containment and the Cold War: Reexaming the Doctrine of Containment as a Grand Strategy Driving US Cold War Interventions,‖ Inquiries Journal/Student Pulse, 4.08 (2012). 246 Christopher Montague Woodhouse, A Short History of Modern Greece (Praeger, 1968) 257. 89 and Turkey therefore had to be controlled by pro-American governments that could facilitate American access to oil fields while blockading the Soviets.

The potential fall of Greece into Communism might lead the entire region to follow, especially Iran and Turkey, two strategic countries to American markets and oil roads. Greece and Turkey share boarders with the major MENA countries especially the newly founded state of Israel and Iran prior to 1953. Lecture

Harper, for example, argues that: ―the most important cause of the shift in U.S. policy was a belief that the Soviet Union might be interested in pushing not only west, but most alarmingly in threatening the stability of the Northern Tier – Iran, Turkey and Greece‖247.

U.S. successive administrations have been focusing on Iran since the early Cold War to the

War on Terror. It is now a perceived challenging and influencing power in the Middle East that deters the U.S. alliance system.

Truman added that ―the future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. .. Turkey needs our support‖248. This statement echoes the pivotal role of Turkey in the projected

U.S. policy in the region and in particular the Middle East. Truman depicated the Turkish economic situation in the immediate postSecond Wolr War stating that ―since the war

Turkey has sought additional financial assistance … for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential for the preservation of order in the Middle East‖249. So the Truman Doctrine targeted as well, arguably mainly the Middle East and not only Greece and Turkey.

Controlling these two countries meant containing Iran and preparing for joining it to its

247 Lecture Harper, ―American Foreign Policy,‖ School of Advanced International Studies (Johns Hopkins University 2010). 248 Harry S. Truman, ―Address before a joint session of congress,‖ March 12 (1947) 249Ibid. 90 sphere of influence. Interestingly, Iran started to challenge the British oil companies in the aftermath of the WWII and was likely to join the communist camp.

In his Truman Doctrine speech the president states that ―the very existence of the

Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists‖250. Communists therefore were associated with terrorism in the early

Cold War, an assumption that was echoed in the subsequent threat to be fought after the dissolution of the Soviet. The armed men were depicted as terrorists who were endangering key allies in Europe and therefore U.S interests. The response of Truman adminstation was arming the friendly factions with military equipment. This strategy has continued to be a corstone of U.S containment policy till today. Presidents Carter and Reagan armed the

Mujahidin to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the late 1970s and 1980s. It continued during the Arab Uprisings as President Obama and then President Trump took part in Syria and Libya, arming and financing one military fiction to fight another. It is then a containment strategy that was adopted nearly by all American presidents from Truman to

Obama and is continuining with Trump.

―Truman had defined American policy for the next generation and beyond…All the Greek governments, or any dictatorship, had to do to get American aid was to claim that its opponents were communists‖251, stated Stephen Ambrose and .

Then the economic aids were the prize for demonstrating pro-Americanism and declaring anti-communism. This term banned economic transactions with the Soviet Union and its allies, and guaranteed U.S. leadership and supremacy over these states. The Truman

Doctrine was enhanced by the Marshall Plan which formed the core component of the U.S. foreign policy of containment along the Cold War. Its programs were extended to key

250Ibid. 251 Stephen E Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin Group Eighth Edition ,1997) 82. 91 areas in the world under different names but for the same means: promoting U.S. primacy and deterrence of any economic and military competitor. The end of the Truman presidency in 1953 paved the way for President Eisenhower to continue the heavy focus on the Middle East through the implementation of containment policy that prioritized the

Middle East.

3.1.2 Eisenhower: the Middle East and the rise of Nasserism

The Middle East as an important area to the United States became more and more visible during Eisenhower Administration from 1953 to 1961. Prime Minister Mohammad

Mosadegh introduced legislation to nationalize the oil industry and get rid of the Anglo-

Iranian Oil Company and achieve a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Although the

United States appeared to be neutral in front of this challenge, the Eisenhower administration kept an open eye on Iran. The American intelligence, ordered by President

Eisenhower, in cooperation with the British troops and intelligence successfully overthrew

Prime Minister Mohammaed Mosaddegh and advocated a pro-Western regime headed by

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

The Eisenhower Doctrine: On a Special Message to the Congress on the situation in the Middle East on January 5, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced his

Doctrine in which he asserted U.S commitment in the Middle East affairs through various means. He stated it was the United States role ―to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations ( in the Middle East), requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism‖252. By the international communism, Eisenhower referred to the Soviet

252 Dwight D. Eisenhower, ―Special Message to the Congress on the Situation in the Middle East, Jan. 5, 1957,‖ The Public papers of Presidents of the United States (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1958). 92 Union which was involved in the war. Egypt was to be ‗lost‘ to the communist orbit in the mid 1950s and therefore the loss of key road to the Middle East.

Eisenhower Doctrine also was aimed to contain the nationalism movement which was perceived as anti-Americanism ideology introduced in the 1950s in Egypt. It also

―sought to contain the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and to discredit his policy of ―positive neutrality‖ in the Cold War, which held that Arab nations were entitled to enjoy profitable relations with both Cold War blocs253. Arab nationalism was to be contained by Eisenhower‘s administration which was perceived as anti-american movement that aimed to liberate Arab nations from dependence on one of the two opposing blocs.

Like Truman, President Eisenhower asked the Congress for to ―authorize $200 million to assist the Middle Eastern countries which were much like Greece and Tureky threatened by external aggression. The goal was the same: containing the Middle East and keepit within the United States sphere.

In continuity with Truman and Eisenhower Doctrine, The Middle East was the sole issue embodied in in the late 1970s. President Reagan and then George Herbert

Walker Bush and Clinton shifted the focus heavily to the Middle East through the New

World Order, Democartic Enlargement and dual containment concepts.

3.2 Containment in the post-Cold War era

The fall of the Soviet Union and the re-emergence of the United States- as the sole world superpower in the 1990s - was thought to be the final stage in its cold and hot wars.

More importantly, for our interest here, it was supposed to have had the consequence then of putting an end to its policy of containment which had exhausted the social and military

253 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (The University of North Carolina Press, 2005) 2. 93 machine along nearly a half century and therefore departing to new phase of the U.S. foreign policy. However, it was hard if not impossible to the post-Cold War administration to invent a peace time grand strategy and therefore depart from the Cold War containment policy. it is argued that the major foreign policy of President George Herbet Bush and Bill

Clinton was a disgest of the Cold War policy.

Containment had helped the United States to triumph and guaranteed its primacy over the

Soviet Union and its allies. Now in the aftermath of the Cold war, substituting it was the main concern of Bush and Clinton‘s administrations. Then what would be the efficient and appropriate policy to substitute Cold War containment policy that could be applied to what was expected to be a peaceful word? The question I would henceforth like to ask and then try to answer is: was peace a main goal behind longstanding containment policy? In other terms, was the collapse of the Soviet Union a desired achievement of Presidents Reagan and George H.W Bush? For if peace had been achieved, if there were no longer any threat to ―democracy‖, there would be no justification for U.S. presence and universal primacy.

The urgent need of a new policy to substitute the policy of containment was

George H.W Bush‘s priority in the late 1980s. ―Despite his considerable experience, Bush did not find it easy to articulate what the U.S. role should be in the post-Cold War

World.‖254 The late 1980s and early 1990s could be perceived as years of loss due to the incapability to draw a clear grand strategy and fix U.S. priorities. It could be backed to the absence of ―imminent geopolitical challenger‖255 like the Soviet Union in second half of the twentieth Century. The United States was witnessing an unprecedented economic and military preponderance over the major world powers: ―American economy was forty percent larger than that of its nearest rival, and its defense equaled that of the next six

254 Fraser Cameron, Us Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff ( Routelge. 2006) 14. 255 Stephen M Walt ,―Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy,‖ Foreign Affairs. 792 (2000): 63-79. 94 countries combined‖256. Then the step to be taken by the Bush administration was to depart from containment policy to an era of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the world. He stated ―our review indicates that 40 years of perseverance have brought us to precious opportunity, and now it is time to move beyond containment to a new policy that for the

1990s – one that recognizes the full scope of change taking place around the world and the

Soviet Union itself‖257. The new policy aimed at engaging the Soviet Union in the international community, transcending the Cold War grand strategy. This approach could be likened to President ‘s détente in the 1970s which was a relaxation of tension between the two major powers. Accordingly258, the Soviet Union was no longer an

―Evil Empire‖ as Ronald Reagan had depicted it on March 8, 1983 in his famous speech when George H. Bush himself was Reagan‘s Vice-President but a reliable ally in Bush‘s

New World Oder.

However, President Bush displaced the threat from the Soviet Union to what had been labeled as rogue states by the Reagan administration. The Iraq paved the way for President Bush to deploy his ―previously inchoate concept of a ‗new world order‘‖259. Then this idea had been elaborated in the late 1980s when President Bush had been a Vice-President then a President. ―The Gulf crisis allowed the New World Order concept to be developed and executed, indeed prior to the crisis the notion of new era was in the air, but it was ambiguous nascent and unproven‖260. As Iraq emerged a challenger of the world order amid the end of the Cold War, President George H.W Bush introduced the

New World Order notion for the post-Cold War era. ―The Gulf crisis contributed

256 Ibid. 257 George Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush: 1989- (Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 1990) 541. 258 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991 (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University, 1998) 348. 259 Eric A Miller and Yetiv, Steve, ―The New World Order in Theory and Practice: The Bush Administration‘s Worldview in Transition,‖ Presidential Studies Quarterly, XXXI-1 (2001): 56- 68. 260 Ibid. 95 fundamentally to the development of the concept of a new world order. The end of the cold war created conditions that made a new world order possible in theory‖261.

President Bush‘s New World Order was based mainly on the United Nations mission in peacekeeping that he endowed with credibility in achieving international peace to re-order the world. It was then ―where the rule of law … governs the conduct of nations and in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and visions of the UN‘s founders‖262. At this level, this call could be seen as a retrenchment from international arena and committing the voice of international justice in resolving international conflicts worldwide. The United Nations therefore was deployed by the United States as a means of containment of ‗rogue states‘. Its mission was to approve economic sanction resolutions and authorizing coalitions to intervene in overseas countries.

Although the United Nations introduced some sanctions against Iraq during the

Cold War, the post-Cold War era witnessed a dramatic increase in the number of United

Nations sanctions: in 1990, for example, 15 UN resolutions were imposed on Iraq and 13 resolutions in 1991. The number would decrease to 2 to 3 resolutions between 1992 and

1997. The Clinton administration backed to advocate other embargoes and sanctions on

Iraq in 1998 and 1999 with 6 and 7 resolutions respectively. The economic sanctions, embargoes, disarmament and no-fly zone and other UN-US sanctions were introduced by the United States and adopted by the United Nations. President Bill Clinton, George H. W.

Bush‘s successor, maintained these measures until the end of his presidency. ―The economic sanctions will remain in place until Saddam complies fully with all U.N.

261 Ibid. 262 George H.W Bush, ― Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf and the Budget Deficit,‖ September 11,1990‖ George Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush: 1989 (Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 1990) 1868. 96 resolutions…. We will continue to enforce a no-fly zone‖263. In other words, sanctions would remain imposed until the fall of the Iraqi regime, like the Soviet Union. These measures by all means are in continuity with the Cold War policy of containment but with a high degree in the Iraqi case during the 1990s. Economic and military sanctions had been effective until the overthrow of the Iraqi regime in 2003.

Although such sanctions and embragoes extended to other rogues states such as

Iran, Libya, , Syria, Cuba and North Korea which were perceived as unfriendly states or rogue states, our focus in this part is put mainly on the Middle East and notably the Persian Gulf.

2.2.1 Persian Gulf Wars and Iraq War

The new detected threat which would frame U.S. foreign policy in the immediate

Cold war was the Persian Gulf. Iraq conquered Kuwait, an oil-rich small country and was likely to dominate the rich-oil area in the Persian Gulf. The threat of U.S. geopolitical interests motivated President Bush to cement U.S. primacy while preserving geostrategic interests in the MENA. In a speech to the Congress on September 11, 1990, he pointed out that ―The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times; our fifth objective -- a new world order -- can emerge: a new era -- freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace‖264. From this, the New World

Oder doctrine emerged and the terror threat was revived. President Reagan had used ―war against terrorism‖ in 1984 for the first time as a response to the 1983 Beirut barracks

263 Bill Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton: 1998 (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 1999) 231. 264 George H.W Bush, ―Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf and the Budget Deficit,‖ Sept. 11, 1990‖ George Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush: 1989 (Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 1990) 1868. 97 bombings. In 1990, the terror threat was rearticulated by George H. Bush and later on it would be the central theme that framed U.S. grand strategy in the 2000s and 2010s.

In the same context and in the same speech of September 11, 1990, Bush added that ―our interest, our involvement in the Gulf is not transitory. …. there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role then: to deter future aggression. Our role is to help our friends in their own self-defense. And something else: to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile and, above all, nuclear technologies‖265. The lasting role to assist the Persian Gulf aimed at cementing

U.S. primacy in key area for the U.S. economy and distance aggressors such as Iran and

Iraq from threatening oil suppliers such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Emirates. These states have been considered U.S. allies and core components of its alliance system in the

Middle East; therefore their protection was an American priority.

This lasting presence of American troops which was enhanced during the War on

Terror is an integral part of containment policy. ―The presence of the American troops can play a containment role‖266 in Gorbatchev‘s words in 1990 in a meeting with the U.S.

Secretary of State Baker. The base force was meant to guarantee free access to oil markets, to deter any competitors from challenging American domination in the Persian Gulf. This strategy was articulated and recommended by President George H.W Bush in his March

1989 the National Security Review (NSR 12). The author of the NSR 12, including Colin

Powell, ―recommended smaller permanent forces, together with periodic deployments, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to protect its interests overseas‖267. These forces which were deployed to contain Europe during the Cold War were turned to be major instrument

265 Ibid. 266 Svetlana Savranskaya, V M. Zubok, and Thomas S. Blanton, Masterpieces of History: the Peaceful End of the Cold War in Europe, 1989 National Security Archive Cold War Readers ( Central European University Press, 2010) 93. 267 Lorna S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992 (Washington: Joint History Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993). 98 of containment policy during the post-Cold War in the Persian Gulf. ―The Base Force preserved large-scale overseas deployments …. maintained the critical air, naval, and logistical capabilities necessary to dominate the global commons and project power overseas; and … to sustain America‘s military-technological edge, particularly at the higher ends of the conventional spectrum‖268. These means were still in effective in the various Persian Gulf States and especially Iraq after 2003.

These themes alongside with the terror threat were the new perceived menace to the United States. Significantly they were rearticulated by President George W Bush as rationalization of the international campaign against Iraq in 2003. Thus, the construction of new threats was an American strategy to displace the focus of containment from the Soviet

Union to the Persian Gulf and the MENA as a whole region.

The Saddam Hussein invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and his refusal to withdraw paved the way for George H.W Bush to commit the United States in a new era of rivalry, forming a coalition of 35 nations, including some Middle East states like Ehypt and Jordon in addition to Russia. Iraq, which had been advocated by the United States in 1980s in its war with Iran, became the new Soviet Union in the 1990s. The intervention in Kuwait was perceived as a serious threat to U.S. interests in the region. From American presepctive,

Iraq was likely to be a strong adversary and influencing in the Middle East in addition to

Iraq‘s role in the OPEC. On August 2, 1991, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney argued that Saddam Hussein ―has clearly done what he has to do to dominate OPEC, the Gulf and the Arab world,‖269 if he managed to do so, the United States could lose the Middle East as a whole and face a new Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf. Other American rivals such as

268 Hal Brands, ―Choosing Primacy: U.S. Strategy and Global Order at the Dawn of the Post-Cold War Era‖, Texas National Security Review Vol 1, Iss (Feb. 2, 2018), online, internet Dec. 23, 2019. Availbale: www.doi.org/10.15781/T2VH5D166. 269 Alex R Hybel and Justin M. Kaufman, The Bush Administrations and Saddam Hussein: Deciding on Conflict (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) 66. 99 Iran might follow Saddam‘s strategy of annexation of small countries. Dick Cheney stated that ―If [Saddam] succeeds, others may try the same thing. It would be a bad lesson‖270. It is therefore a fear of a in the Middle East. The lesson was learnt from the

Iranian challenge in the 1980s and the failure to bring it into its sphere of influence.

2.2.2 Alliance system

Another typical American Cold War policy, pursued into the post-Cold War era, is the relying on allies in implementing her policy in the region. George H. W Bush adds that ―Americans …. Serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians, and Africans in defense of principle and the dream of a new world order‖271. Therefore the new strategy was based on reliable allies that strated to cooperat with the United States in the War Iraq in 1991, the imposition of United Nations resolutions and embargoes. Globalizing the New

World Order and engaging allies especially MENA nations was an American strategy to bolden its primacy through the alliance system. This was through providing subsidies for key members such as Egypt, offering diplomatic cover to vulnerable participants.‖272

Egypt as Middle East country was the main ally in the Gulf Wars in 1991 and then 2003 in addition to Bill Clinton‘s four-day bombing of Iraq on December 16, 1998. In turn, it received economic, military and especially diplomatic coverage.

This echoes the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 which aimed at pushing U.S. allies in ―establish in an economic blockade on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries‖. Accordingly, each country trading with the Soviet Union could be deprived of economic assistance. Economic and military assistance therefore were granted

270 Hal Brands, From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2015) 50. 271 George Bush. Toward a New World Order ‗Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, 1990). 272 Hal Brands, ―Choosing Primacy: U.S. Strategy and Global Order at the Dawn of the Post-Cold War Era,‖ Texas National Security Review: Volume 1, Issue 2 (March 2018): 22. 100 only to those who adopt the same embargo. US allies in the post-Cold War era and especaily in Iraq war then the dual containment of Iraq and Iran were cooperative with the

United States.

It is worth noting that ―the coalition of the willing‖ that George W. Bush formed to invade Iraq in 2003 was formed mainly of third world countries such as Albania,

Georgia. Big powers except the United Kingdom did not join the War. This exemplifies the power and continuity of the containment policy of third world nations which have been benefiting from U.S various aids. These mechanisms still operated in the United States political institutions. Countries that received economic and military assistance were considered a core component of U.S. primacy in the world. They could contribute military, logistically and politically to the United States in places ofspecial interests. The political legitimacy in the international institutions like the United Nations also could be provided by such allies.

It is important to argue that Saddam used to cooperate with the Soviets in the Cold

War despite its workable relation with the American administrations which made it a difficult equilibrium in the Persian Gulf. John Sununu, the White House chief of staff, argued that ―Saddam no longer has the Soviets as friends.‖ Iran, as well, was a not an ally to Iraq but an enemy in the 1980s and 1990s. The Gulf countries feared the expansionist tendency of Iraq and therefore were looking for shelter. Iraq which was labled as a member of the ‗axis of evil‘ in George W. Bush‘s words was likened to the Soviet Union as ‗the

Evil Empire‘ according to President Reagan ―with an insatiable desire to dominate and

101 control countries‖273 and therefore ―it was the mission of the United States as a leader of the to resist this domination‖274.

All these factors led to the isolation of Iraq from its neighbors and U.S. European allies whom had made it easy for the George H. Bush administration to intervene through a

U.N. led troops. Egypt, Jordon and other Arab Muslim allies cooperated with the United

States in the first Gulf War in 1991, and even without the UN mandate, some allies such as

Egypt did so as well in 2003.

2.2.3 War for oil and primacy

U.S. policymakers framed their post-Soviet Union policy around controlling the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf. A second beside Iran was not tolerable for the

American administration. In September 11, 1990, President Bush stated that:

Vital economic interests at risks… Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world‘s proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors— neighbors who control the lion‘s share of the world are remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated but one so ruthless. And we won‘t275.

In this context historians argued that the main motives behind the first Gulf War was the primacy over the oil producers and markets. Saddam Hussein‘s invasion of Kuwait was faced by ―a dramatic escalation of American military intervention in the Gulf‖276 since the Cold War. It was justified by the fear of Iraqi control of Kuwait and Saudi oil which could represent an economic threat to the United States. Haas stated that ―the United

273 Donna Starr-Deelen, Presidential Policies on Terrorism: From Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 2. 274 Ibid. 275 George H. W Bush, ―Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf and the Budget Deficit,‖ September 11,1990 The American Presidency Project. Online, internet, Dec. 25, 2019. Available: www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18820. 276 Toby C. Jones, ―America, Oil, and War in the Middle East,‖ The Journal of American History. 99.1 (2012): 208-218. 102 States had vital national interests at stake. Saddam who controlled Kuwait would dominate the oil-rich Middle East, given the value of Kuwait‘s oil and the likelihood that other Arab

States would fear standing up to him lest they suffer Kuwait‘s fate‖277.

The first Gulf War was mainly for U.S. oil security and geostrategic interests. The fear of Domino theory could explain the perceived threat of losing MENA allies. ―Alarmed by the potential fallout of Iraq possessing not only Kuwaiti oil but also Saudi Arabian oil led the United States to mobilize more than 500,000 troops in its largest war effort since the Vietnam War‖278. Interestingly the first Gulf War was compared to Vietnam in terms of deploying military troops in the Persian Gulf. The comparison justifies the strategic importance of Iraq for U.S. oil interests in the Middle East and especially in the Persian

Gulf. It also makes a parallel, and continuity, with the Cold War Domino theory. As a consequence, a hard line policy of containment was imposed on the two percived challengers of U.S primcy in the region: Iran and Iraq. This dual containment was the major grand strategy to contain Iran and Iraq from 1993 to 2001.

2.2.4 President Bill Clinton’s Dual Containment

President Clinton was the first elected president after the Cold War, the total collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States purposeless in terms of foreign policy. It was an era when ―the US not only had difficulty defining relationships with allies and foes but also had difficulty in defining a profound sense of self without the U.S.S.R‖279. The inherited ―rogue states‖ and ―containment‖, we argue, would continue to be the Clinton

277 Richard Haass, War of Necessity: War of Choice : a Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009) 112. 278 Toby C. Jones, ―America, Oil, and War in the Middle East,‖ The Journal of American History. 99.1 (2012): 208-218. 279 Marc Barnett, ― and the Construction of the War on Terror: an analysis of Counter-terrorism Politics Under Clinton, Bush and Obama,‖ Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism. Online, internet, Dec. 26, 2019. Available:https://securitypolicylaw.syr.edu/. 103 administration guiding lines to face the post-Cold War uncertainty and disperate search for working foreign policy that guarantee U.S leadership.

While George H.W Bush had claimed ―moving beyond containment‖ when he approached the post-Cold War era, the Bill Clinton declared deprature ―from containment to enlargement‖. President Clinton‘s first national security adviser stated that ―throughout the Cold War we contained a global threat to market democracies; now, we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us.

The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement — enlargement of the world‗s free community‖280. In this vein the enlargement concepts refers to more expansionist endeavors in specific areas which were designated as vital to the United States interests.

The focus on places of special significance to the United States is a revival of what John Lewis Gaddis calls ―asymmetrical containment‖ which means targeting only the enemy in key areas and not everywhere. This strategy was exploited by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower whereas the opposite of such strategy is symmetrical containment that was manifested in President Kennedy‘s Flexible response when he uttered: ―Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty‖281. Accordingly President Clinton‘s administration attempted to achieve the goals that President George H W Bush missed in his four-year term. It could be seen also as a search for pragmatic approaches to the post-Cold war era.

Mr. Lake was supposed to be the architect of a new grand strategy to substitute the Cold War containment. His remarks entitled ―From Containment to Enlargement‖ were

280 Anthony Lake, From Containment to Enlargement: Remarks of Anthony Lake. Washington, D.C September 21, 1993: Executive Office of the President, 1993. 281 John F. Kennedy, John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address (Champaign, Ill.: Project Gutenberg, 1973) 104 an attempt to reinvent a new Long Telegram and a new George Kennan for the post-Cold

War era. However, his recommended strategies could be seen as a digest of the containment policy itself. He contended in Kennan‘s manner ―We must counter the aggression—and support the liberalization—of states hostile to democracy. . . . The United

States will seek to isolate [nondemocratic states] diplomatically, militarily, economically and technologically‖282.

Thus the first point is the enlargement of democracy and assisting oppressed people to get their freedom. A call and policy which were articulated earlier in the Truman

Doctrine speech in March 1947 in which he emphasized the notion of democracy and freedom when he stated ―I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation …. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way…. ―The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms‖283. The second point is the tendency to isolate the countries which were hostile to the United States. In fact isolation of countries diplomatically and economically is nothing but a containment policy which had been deployed to weaken the Soviet Union and its allies since 1946.

2.2.4.1 Terrorism and WMD: interconnected threats

President Clinton stressed the terrorist threat as the ‗new communism‘ for the

United States in the mid-1990s. In a 1995 speech he stated ―as the cold war gives way to the global village, we have new opportunities and new security threats. We know what those security threats are. We see them every day, the ethnic and religious hatred, the reckless aggression of rogue states, the terrorism, the drug trafficking, the weapons of

282 Anthony Lake, From Containment to Enlargement: Remarks of Anthony Lake. Washington, D.C September 21, 1993: Executive Office of the President, 1993. 283 Lake, Anthony, ―Confronting Backlash States,‖ Foreign Affairs. 732 (1994): 45-55. 105 mass destruction that are increasingly threatening us all‖284. These threats which could be opportunities for the United States were constructing around the major ―rogue states‖, Iran and Iraq which were standing against U.S. interests in the great Middle East. In the same line of thought, President Clinton and his advisers repeatedly announced terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction as the new threats facing the United States in the 21st century and that must be contained. In 1996, President Clinton noted that ―the 21st century will not be free of peril. Aggressive rogue states, global crime networks and drug traffickers, weapons proliferation, and terrorism, all these will continue to menace our security‖285.

Terrorism and WMD were rearticualed in Clinton‘s speeches when addressing the U.S. national security paradigm. ―There is a nexus of new threats: terrorists, rogue states, international criminals, drug traffickers. They, too, menace our security, and they will do more of it in the new century. They will be all the more lethal if they gain access to weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical, or biological‖286. These stated threats would be implemented by President George W Bush in his War on Terror in the post-9/11 era.

The Clinton administration reframed the American threat which was in itself rooted in the 1970s and 1980s as a serious threat to U.S. primacy and continued to be the main threat in George W Bush presidency. Anthony Lake coined ‗backlash states‘ to depict countries hostile to the United States. They soon were labled as ―rogue states‖ which were preserved as post-Cold War threats: ―there are other threats today also demand our active engagement, from North Korea‘s nuclear program to the efforts of Iran and other backlash

284 Bill Clinton, ―The President‘s New Conference With European Union Leaders in Madrid, Spian, December 3, 1995. Clinton, Bill. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William, J. Clinton (Washington, D.C: U.S.. General Services Administration, National Archives and Records Service, Office of the Federal Register, 1995) 1836. 285 Bill Clinton, ― Remarks to the Austrialian Parliament in Canberra,‖ November 20, 1996. Clinton, Bill. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton: 1998 (in Two Books) Book 2 July1 to December 31, 1998 (Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 2000) 2135. 286 Ibid. 106 states to sponsor terrorism. We‘re meeting those threats with steadiness and resolve‖287, stated President Clinton in a Radio Address on April 30, 1994. Lake wrote in Foreign

Affairs that: ―There are few "backlash" states: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya‖288.

Interestingly, three out of the four mentioned are oil-rich MENA countries which were not within the American sphere of influence according to Lake. They do ―not only choose to remain outside the family but assault its basic values‖289. Moreover, they were accused of violation of human rights as ―they suppress basic human rights and promote radical ideologies‖290. The democratic Enlargment and advocating Human rights in the world was introduced by President from 1977 to 1981. President Carter‘s foreign policy guiding lines were based mainly on advocating human rights and democracy. He stated in his inaugural address in January 20, 1977: ―Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights‖291. Then what Anthony Lake insisted as a new foreign policy was a continuity of the Cold War strategies that was exploited by all U.S. administrations since the immediate

Second World War.

The WMD which was President Bush‘s outwardly stated motive behind the War on Terror had been articulated by President Clinton in 1993, as the particular states like

Iran, Iraq and Libya were: ―embarked on ambitious and costly military programs, especially in weapons of mass destruction (WMD)‖292. Therefore Clinton‘s perception of threat derived from the previous administrations and notably his predecessor George H

287 Bill Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 1994 (Washington: G.P.O, 1995) 806. 288 Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs. 732 (1994): 45-55. 289 Ibid. 290 Ibid. 291 Jimmy Carter, ―Inaugural Address of Jimmy Carter, January 20, 1977‖. Available: https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/. 292 Anthony Lake, ―Confronting Backlash States,‖ Foreign Affairs. 732 (1994): 45-55. 107 Walker Bush. It also paved the way for his successor George Walker Bush to expoit this pretext to rationalize the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

During Clinton presidency, the United States interests were attacked at home and abroad: the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in

1995, and the in 1996. A response was made through

―…economic isolation, multilateral cooperation, increased resource allocation, and retaliation‖293. All these responses were under the aegis of United Nations and international law banners. President Clinton relied on the alliance system and using domestic law such the 1979 Export Administration Act to sanction countries that were accused of sponsoring terrorism. The alliance syetem and intrudcing sanctions were a Cold

War containment policy that aimed to check potential rivals and supporting allies at the same time.

President Clinton claimed that the United States had the right to respond to

―reduce the terrorist capabilities‖ and ‗reduce vulnerabilities at home and abroad‘‖294.

Thus, the counterterrorism policy and the War on Terror had been introduced and deployed before 9/11. In addition, the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war had been also introduced by

President Clinton and was not a revolution with the Global War on Terror. This war became a guiding line of President Clinton who ordered a hard line policy of containment against rogue states and notably Iran and Iraq. One point worth mentioning in light of the containment policy is that in his counterterrorism PDD-39, President Clinton recommended ―reduction‖ and dismantling of the terrorist capabilities and vulnerabilities.

It was therefore a containment of these perceived rival regional powers and not regime

293 Thomas J. Badey, ―US Counterterrorism: Change in Approach, Continuity in Policy,‖ Contemporary Security Policy 27, no. 2 (2006): 308–24. 294 Bill Clinton ―Presidential Decision Directives PDD-39‖ June 21, 1995. Winkler, Carol. In the Name of Terrorism: Presidents on Political Violence in the Post-World War Ii Era.( Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006)144. 108 change. The existence of these rogue states would be beneficial to the United States and the framework in which grand strategy of primacy was built. The ―rogue state‖ designation targeted mainly the Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Africa. The term was used to designate these countries but a survey indicates that these terms were mentioned by U.S. political elites between 1993 and 1998: Iran as a rogue state 71 times, Iraq 69, Libya 47 and North

Korea 30295. Thus the three first MENA countries and especially Iran and Iraq were of significant importance to the United States since in the immediate post Cold War era there was specific policy to either bring them to the international community or weaken them for the sake of U.S. MENA allies.

2.2.4.2 Dual Containment: Iraq and Iran

Under the Clinton administration, there was a policy that the president‘s national security advisers called ―dual containment‖ towards Iraq and Iran. These countries were labeled as ―rogue states‖ and ―backlash states‖ according to U.S. elites. They were perceived also as the most dangerous countries in the region according to Secretary of

State Warren Christopher. He designated Iran as a ―dangerous country ….an international outlaw and an agent of terrorism‖. , the Special Assistant to the President for

Near East and South Asian affairs, depicted Iraq as a ―criminal regime beyond the pale of international society‖. Moreover, Iraq and Iran were ―irredeemable and unpredictable.‖296

In the same line of thought Anthony Lake, the first assistant to the President for national security Affairs warned that ―as the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility … in containing the band of outlaws‖297.

295 Paul D. Hoyt, ―The ‗Rogue State‘ Image in American Foreign Policy,‖ Global Society. 14.2 (2000): 297- 310. 296 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East,‖ Annual symposium (May 1993) . 297 Anthony Lake,“Confronting Backlash States,‖ Foreign Affairs. 732 (1994): 45-55. 109 On May 18, 1993, Martin Idynk cited the major tenets of dual containment which represented an end of the 1980s era of ‗balancing‘ Iran against Iraq in favor of a strategy that relies on the MENA allies and especially the Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The GCC is a political and economic organization founded and moderated by six

Persian guld Arab and Islamic countries in the Arabian Peninusla which was established in

1981. It consists of Bahrin, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab

Emirates. The GCC institutions are monarchies and their economy relies heavily on oil.

The GCC institution was established mainly to ―promotes economic, security, cultural and social cooperation between the six states and holds a summit every year to discuss cooperation and regional affairs‖298. As far as the United States is concerned, the GCC countries ―possess almost half of the world‘s oil reserves‖299 and neighbors of Iran, the longstanding challenger of the United States primacy in the region. The successive

American administrations worked on making the GCC a more anti-Iranian alliance than an economic union and reliable ally in pursuing U.S grand strategy in the MENA region as a whole.

Idynk stated that: ―the United States will no longer play the game of balancing Iran against Iran. The strength of the United States and its friends in the region – Egypt, Israel,

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the GCC would allow Washington to counter both the Iraqi and

Iranian regimes‖300. Balancing Iraq against Iran was a foreign policy strategy that was invented by President Reagan and his Vice –Pres ident George Herbet Walker Bush to weaken Iran the declared rival but Iraq as well the potential strong nation in the Persian

Gulf. Iraq could challenge the United States primacy in the Middle East in case of its victory. Forging regional alliance to counter U.S rivals in the Persian Gulf has been a

298 ―What is GCC,‖ Aljazeera News, 4 Dec. 2017, online 10 Feb.2020. Availble: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/12/gcc-171204094537378.html. 299 Ibid. 300 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East,‖ Annual symposium (May 1993). 110 neocontainment strategy that lessened the burden on the United States military and econmy. It could be seen as a containment on the cheap that had been introduced by

President Eisengower in the 1950s.

The three main components of the new strategy were articulated by Lake who suggested three methods for containing the influence of these states: isolation, pressure and diplomatic and economic measures. ―We seek to contain the influence of these states (Iran and Iraq) sometimes by isolation, sometimes through pressure, sometimes by diplomatic and economic measures‖301. These are, I argue, digests of the Cold War strategies which had been implemented to contain the Soviet Union and its allies. The dual containment was an attempt to overcome the desperate search for a new grand strategy to substitute the

Cold War containment policy. It was presented as ―a solution to ‗the complex strategic puzzle‘ that Iraq and Iran posed‖302 since the 1980s.

As for Iran, Indky argued that the United States aimed to isolate Iran from the international community at economic and military levels by encouraging its European allies, China and Japan to avoid any ―normal commercial relations‖ with Iran. The deployment of ―active containment unilaterally, maintaining the counterterrorism sanctions and other measures enacted by previous administrations to encourage a change in Iranian behavior‖303. Active containment aimed to persuade Iran to change its behavior and ally with the international community and notably the United States. Blocking its attempt to obtain loans from international monetary institution such as the IMF was an American

301 Anthony Lake, ―Confronting Backlash States,‖ Foreign Affairs. 732 (1994): 45-55. 302 Alex Miles, Us Foreign Policy and the Rogue State Doctrine (London, Routledge, 2014) 43. 303 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East,‖ Annual symposium (May 1993) . 111 measure to limit the Iranian economic capabilities304 and prevent it from recovering its econmy and acquiring new technologies.

The non-alignment with the United States in regional conflicts was a perceived as a challenge of U.S. leadership and often was considered as a revialery. This perception was exercised in the first Gulf War in 1991, the bombareding of Irad during Clinton‘s presidency and then the unfomous War on Terror and the slogan ―either with us or with the terrorists‖. Therefore allying with the United States in the Middle East aimed to contain

Iran and Iraq and to balance regional powers against them. Mr Indyk argued that ―Iran is paradoxically both a lesser and greater challenge to our policy; lesser in the sense that Iran today does not pose the threat that Iraq did to our interests some five years ago. And our challenge is to prevent Iran five years from now from becoming the kind of threat that Iraq was five years ago.‖305 Then the main reasons behind implementing the containment of

Iran were to insure an unchallenged American primacy in the Persian Gulf and deter any potential future threat. This was achieved through economic sanctions that were enacted by the presidents as Executive Orders and the Congress in addition to exploitation of the

United Nations through sponsoring and adopting resolutions to curtail the Iranian economy.

In the context of imposing economic sanctions President Clinton issued an

Executive order on May 6, 1995 which forbade the United States from trading with Iran.

Executive Order 12957 was signed on March 15, 1995 which imposed harsh sanctions on the Iranian oil industry, therefore ―US companies and their foreign subsidiaries are hence prohibited from entering into any contract for the financing of the development of

304 Robert Litwak, ―Iraq and Iran: From Dual to Differentiated Containment,‖ Eagle Rules? (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2002). 305 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East‖ Annual symposium (The Washinton Institute DC Washington 1993) 112 petroleum resources located in Iran.‖306 Containment through such coercive economic tools lowered the oil revenues and weakened the Iranian economy. This startegy was a continuity of the previous administration. It renewed and strengthened the previous sanctions which had been effective since the early 1980s under Presidents Carter and

Reagan‘s administrations. The remarkable increase of sanctions, the international isolation and the military retaliation became more and more noticeable when Iraq decided to annex

Kweit in 1990 and there a challenge to U.S. vital sphere of influence and interests in strategic area in the Middle East.

George A. Lopez and David Cortright argue that ―The United Nations sanctions that began in August 1990 were the longest running, most comprehensive, and most controversial in the history of the world body‖307. Other international analysts and academics agreed with this assumption. For example, Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano and Mikael Eriksson state that ―sanctions on Iraq (1990 – 2003) represent one of the largest operations for peace and security performed in the history of United Nations‖308.

This demonstrates firstly the importance of Iraq to the United States role in the Persian

Gulf, secondly the implementation of the sanctions as a means of renewing with Cold War containment policy appeared efficient in containing Iraq, thirdly and most importantly, the implementation of enormous sanctions adopted by the three post-Cold War administrations before the 9/11: George H.W Bush, Bill Clinton and George W Bush.

Balancing Iran and Iraq against one another was itself a containment policy that aimed to weaken them and facilitate U.S. influence of the GCC and the MENA countries, even though the United States demonstrated a support to Iraq over Iran. The latter had been

306 Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (I.B.Tauris, 2014 ) 202. 307 George A Lopez, and David Cortright, ―Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,‖ Foreign Affairs (2004): 90- 103. 308 Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, and Mikael Eriksson, The 2004 Roundtable on Un Sanctions against Iraq-Lessons Learned, (Uppsala: Uppsala University, Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research, 2005). 113 supported by the United States before the 1979 Islamic revolution and notably in the 1960s and 1970 while Iraq had been in the Soviet Union orbit during the same era. Unlike the two

Bushs‘ administrations, Bill Clinton‘s goal was to weaken Iran and Iraq rather than to roll back the state (regime change). The Dual containment strategy therefore aimed ―to ensure that both Iran and Iraq remained equally weak for an indefinite period‖309. This condition could both rationalize U.S. continuity of the containment policy and guarantees U.S. leadership.

Although the United States supported Iraq over Iran in the premise wars of the

1980s, it turned to contain it in the 1990s and accusing it for several human rights abuses.

Saddam Hussein was accused of using chemical weapons against Iran and Kurds during the 1980s. These accusations emerged just after the invasion of Kuwait in 1990-1991 as

Iraq turned to be a serious threat to U.S. primacy in the Persian Gulf. The United States was committed to applying the United Nation resolutions. Accordingly, Iraq accepted UN resolution 715 by which a long time inspection on its military production was imposed.

Moreover, a no-fly zone was adopted on the South and North Iraq. The Iraqi sanctions during the 1990s and the coercive economic measures fall under what can be called

―aggressive containment‖ policy that aimed to ―prevent Iraq from becoming a significant military actor in the region, thus, keeping the sanctions – in one form or another – in place for an undetermined period of time‖310. This was supposed, before the 2003 invasion, to lead to the collapse of Saddama Hussien regime..

To sum up, Martin Indyk rationalized the containment policy in his article ‗The

Clintion Adminstration‘s Approach to the Middle East‖ in which he outlined the dual containment policy. he noted that dual containment ―derives in the first instance from an

309 Kourosh Ahmadi, Islands and International Politics in the Persian Gulf: Abu Musa and Tunbs in Strategic Context (London: Routledge, 2008) 159. 310 Peter Wallensteen, Carina Staibano, and Mikael Eriksson. The 2004 Roundtable on Un Sanctions against Iraq-Lessons Learned. Uppsala: Uppsala University, Dept. of Peace and Conflict Research, 2005. 114 assessment that the current Iraqi and Iranian regimes are both hostile to American interests in the region‖311 This was the main rationalization of the development of new containment policy to replace Reagan strategy balancing them against each other in the 1980s. This strategy had different objectives, while it aimed to re-engage Iran in the international community; it was oriented to overthrow the regime.

The regime change as a replacement of aggressive containment on Iraq was introduced as an idea during Clinton administration in 1998. Madeleine K. Albright, US secretary of state declared the new stage of Dual Containment against Iraq. She noted that

Washington‘s policy of Dual Containment regarding Iraq had changed to one of

―containment-Plus regime change‖312. Indyk himself would reiterate the same notion by the end of Clinton administration. He noted that ―on the Iraqi side it is containment plus regime change… on the Iranian side it is containment until they are ready for engagement.‖313 Her assumption would be reformulated differently by Morton Halperin, the former director of policy planning at the State Department, who in 2002 recommended a policy of ―containment plus‖ which aimed to ―tighten the economic embargo of material that would assist Iraq in its weapons of mass destruction and other military programs as well as reducing Iraq‘ receipt of hard currency outside the sanctions regime‖314. These claims demonstrate that containing Iraq was aimed to overthrow the regime sooner or later, a predetermined plan that was fulfilled by George W Bush administration in 2003.

However, containing Iran was more for integrating it into the international community rather than overthrowing the whole regime. This end was ascertained by President Obama

311 Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East,‖ Annual symposium (May 1993). 312 John Dumbrell, Clinton's Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes, 1992-2000 (London: Routledge, 2010). 313 Martin S. Indyk, ―United States Policy Toward the Middle East,‖ House International Relations Committee Washington, DC, June 8, 1999 U.S. Depratment of State Archives online, internet Dec. 27, 2018. Available: https://1997-2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/1999/990608_indyk_mepolicy.html. 314 George A Lopez and David Cortright, ―Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,‖ Foreign Affairs (2004): 90- 103. 115 administration in 2015 when signed a deal that relaxed tension with Iran. It was a rapprochement or a new détente between the United States and Iran that occurred for the first time since the Islamic revolution of 1979.

The dual containment was not as innovative as President Clinton advisers thought.

Many historians claimed that such policy initiated in 1979 with President Carter. Yakub

Halabi noted that ―the dual containment policy was initiated by the Carter administration in

1979.‖315 In his Report on the Bottom-up Review, in which Lee Aspin designed the

Pentagon preparation for the post-Cold War, Aspin argued that the United States was moving away from the containment policy; however, Patrick Porter invalidated Aspin‘s assumption by stating that ―the United States was ―not departing from its strategy of containment‖, but ― the Clinton administration‘s commitment to restructure the military was diluted into a modified version of the Base Force blueprint of the George H.W. Bush administration‖316. Bill Clinton‘s foreign policy in general and his dual containment policy therefore was a continuity of his predecessor in terms of containment policy. It also paved the way, through the reconstruction of the terrorist and the WMD threats, for a continuous containment policy that was ‗containment-Plus regime change‘ in Iraq and ‗active containment‘ in Iran.

From Historical Institutionalist perspective, Clinton policy much like his predecessor and successor was not innovative at means and goals. Clinton was perceived as ―operating on ‗autopilot‘‖317, according to John Lewis Gaddis and Patrick Porter.

315 Yakub Halabi, Us Foreign Policy in the Middle East: From Crises to Change (London: Taylor and Francis, 2016) 85. 316 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S.. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 317 Ibid. 116 2.3 The War on Terror: from Bush to Obama

The War on Terror as a designation of the post 9/11 events was the cause and the consequences of both President George W H Bush‘ New World Order‘ and President

Clinton‘s ‗dual containment‘ and Democratic Enlargment. It was based on the emergence of the perceived ‗rogue states‘ and ‗terrorism‘ as interconnected threats to the United

States national security.

The war on terror is the second phase of the post-Cold War era. The first is

President George W Bush unfamous War on Terror in which, we argue, was a second Cold

War that reshaped the United States grand strategy. The second is of Obama who pledged to get the United States out of the bloody interventionst policy of his predecessor and to adopt a new strategy far from Bush‘s. The Obama presidency, we argue, was continuity with high degree with President Bush War on Terror grand strategy rather than repture or departure to new foreign policy.

In this part, the focus is put on the major foreign policy of presidents George W

Bush and Barcak Obama in the MENA from 2008 to 2014 with a special focus on the War on Terror. The War on Terror, Iraq, Iran, Afgnaistan and the continuois quest of ‗primacy‘ were the key elements in U.S foreign policy in the post-9/11 era.

2.3.1 The War on Terror: a pretext of convenience?

Since the collapse of Soviet Union and Berlin Wall, George H.W. Bush and Bill

Clinton had been desperately searching for new concept such as ‗containment‘ policy.

Throughout his first term in the White House, George W. Bush worked to coin an innovative concept, slogan or an idea on which he could base his foreign policy.

‗The War on Terror‘ was articulated by President Bush in his speech before the

Congress on September 21, 2001 in which he stated that ―our war on terror begins with al

117 Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach

has been found, stopped and defeated‖318. Thus ‗the War on Terror‘ was caught by

academics and journalists alike to describe the Bush administration new approach of the

world. It later on served as the guiding lines for the President Bush foreign policy much

like containment in the immediate post-Second World War, ―‗W ar on Terror‘ a simple and

clear statement, just like containment‖319, argued Professor James M. Goldgeier, which

would rationlize U.S. policy toward hostile regimes especially in the MENA.

This phrase caught Americans‘attention and U.S. foreign allies alike. It was

deployed to depict U.S new foreign policy agenda which was based on a new military

involvement overseas. Journalists and policymakers agreed upon the phrase ‗War on

Terror‖. President Bush ―crafted a message so morally, logically, and historically

powerful that it seemingly left Americans with little choice but to accept ‗the war on

terror‘‖320. Although the War on Terror emerged as a new phrase to signal a shift in U.S.

Grand strategy, it could be argued that the 9/11 was a mere evolution of U.S. Grand

strategy of primacy that had been pursued since the Cold War.

The MENA region has been of great concern to the U.S. since the end of the

Second World War, as President Truman paid unprecedented attention to the Middle East

in the late 1940s and so did successive U.S. presidents during and after the Cold War.

While containing the Communist threat embodied in the Soviet Union and the communist

bloc, a special attention was put on the MENA. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

were the first containment strategy that aimed to secure MENA neighbor states.

Eisenhower administration policy and especially his Doctrine were strong evidence on the

318 George W Bush, Bush's address to a joint session of Congress and the Nation, Sept. 20, 2001. 319 James M. Goldgeier, ―The Fall of the Wall and American Grand Strategy,‖ Council on Foreign Relations (November 2009), online, internet Feb. 2, 2015. Available: https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/fall-wall-and- american-grand-strategy. 320 Hall Brands, From Berlin to Baghded : American‟s serach for purpose in the Post Cold War (University Press of Kentucky) 279. 118 geostrategic importance of the Middle East to the United States more than others. The U.S. grand strategies during the interwar era and especially the War on Terror were manifestations of the continuity of the containment policy.

The importance of the Middle East and North Africa lies in their strategic role in region and the loss of pro-American government may jeopardize U.S. interests as the new elected policy-makers could be more independent from the United States, therefore the

United States would lose traditional spheres of interests and its key role in these countries domestic and foreign affairs. The control of oil fields, the security of Israel and the so- called counterterrorism are the main reasons behind the U.S. keeping a good eye on the

Middle East and North Africa.

President Truman was the key player in helping the foundation of a Jewish state in

Palestine for the sake of United States‘ long-term economic and geopolitical interests. The

Truman government introduced the trusteeship of the Palestinian land and later secretary of

State George Marshall. Thus, relations with neighboring Arab countries became a strategic issue. Moreover the Arabic and Muslim World is rich with oil resource, a wealth the U.S. has been very interested in since the late 1940‘s, so trying to gain – as in the case of Egypt and the 1979 – and maintaining these countries within its sphere of influence has been among the U.S. priorities for these reasons as well. A policy mechanism, not specific to the Middle-East, was to try and set up puppet governments willing to support U.S. regional goals.

This chapter is an attempt to analytically revisit containment policy in the War on

Terror context. Looking backward and forward, it assesses the continuity, lack of continuity or else the discontinuity of U.S. policy of containment along the post-Cold War era with a particular emphasis on the War on Terror in the MENA. The study considers

Historical Institutionalism‘s path dependency and the U.S. Grand strategy of primacy as

119 the theoretical framework of the thesis. It sheds new light on American foreign policy from corporation angles.

2.3.2 Bush Doctrine and the War on Terror in the MENA.

The Bush doctrine of preemption and unilateralism was a foreign policy emerged during George W Bush War on Terror in the aftermath of 9/11. Its main tenets are

―preventive war, confronting the nexus of weapons of mass destruction WMD, ‗regime change‘ for ‗rogue states‘ and democracy promotion‖321. These core components of the

Bush doctrine were the major elements of Bill Clinton‘s ―engagement and enlargement‖ of market democracies and Bush Senior‘s New World Order doctrine. Since the electoral campaign, George W. Bush prioritized two areas in his foreign policy: an ascending China that must be contained and Persian Gulf and notably Iran and Iraq as main adversaries in continuity with President Clinton‘s dual containment. The United States ―must counter those dangerous states that threaten its closest friends, such as Israel, or its vital interests, such as maintaining access to oil in the Persian Gulf,‖ noted Robert Zoeillick.

The main theatre of the Bush Doctrine was the Middle East and North Africa.

―The Middle East has been at the heart of the Bush Doctrine.‖322 It is the source of trouble and wealth according the U.S. policymakers, over which the United States conducted the biggest war since the WWII in 1991 and then in 2003. Although President Bush Junior pursued the same containment policy and perception of threat that had been mentioned by

President Bill Clinton and Bush Senior, his doctrine was a combination of all elements at the same time, forming some observers have referred to as ‗neo-imperialism‘323. Targeting mainly the great Middle East, Bush‘ The New World Order, Clinton‘s Dual Containment

321 Mary E. A Buckley, and Robert Singh, The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences (London, UK: Routledge, 2006) 13. 322 Ibid., 105. 323 John Judis, ―Bush's Neo-Imperialist War,‖ The American Prospect, October 19, 2007, Online. Internet Nov. 22, 2018. Available: www. prospect.org/features/bush-s-neo-imperialist-war/. 120 and engagement and enlargement, the Bush doctrine was mainly designated to contain the

Middle East. It became the center of U.S. foreign policy since the early 1990s, as Bush senior increasingly established military bases in the Persian Gulf.

The Bush doctrine was initiated by reliance on the international institutions such as the NATO and the United Nations to enlarge its alliance system but when there was no agreement upon the invasion of Iraq, it transcended the United Nations and acted unilaterally. In 2004 it initiated a security program known as ―the NATO Partnership for

Peace Program‖ that included the major MENA countries: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar, and Israeli which. It was a commitment of these countries in the War on Terror as they were either source or threatened by it. The cooperation and therefore the alignement with

U.S. security strategies were a containment policy that aimed to bolster U.S leadership and maintain these countries within its orbit. The Bush administration also warned other great powers not to challenge America‘s military preeminence. The United States insists that it would not accept the rise of a ‗peer competitor‘, ―no one should want to try: everyone benefits in a world where a single superpower maintains the peace‖324.

The Bush doctrine also was much like Clinton‘s based on the democratization of the Middle East: ―America is committed to nurturing new democracies in Afghanistan,

Iraq and Palestine‖325. But what type of democracy would be promoted and nurtured from

George W Bush prespective. Iraq and Afghanistan remained far from being a democary in the aftermath of the American invasion as there was an unfinished war and guirela in addition to the direct intervention of the American admisntartion in the electoral pocess.

It is worth noting that President Bush highlighted the fact the the United States was committed to democratize Iraq for the freedom that the United States has been fighting

324 John G Ikenberry, ―Power and Liberal Order: America's Postwar World Order in Transtion,‖ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. 5.2 (2005): 133-152. 325 Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences (London: Routledge, 2006) 118. 121 for. He argued that ―securing democracy in Iraq is… a massive and difficult undertaking -- it is worth our effort, it is worth our sacrifice, because we know the stakes…The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution. … [W]e believe that freedom -- the freedom we prize -- is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind‖326.

It significantly that the War on Terror was waged under the notion of democaratization of the Middle East but this hypothesis is to a great extent unacurate. The

2006 election in Palestine was not recognized by the United States because the organization won the election. Moreover Bush administration, much like his predessors and successors ignored the autacarcies in the MENA. The selective democratization, we argue, was a containment policy of countries of special significance to the United States.

Interestingly, for bolstering U.S. hegemony in the MENA, the Bush administration benefited from the fact that ―Authoritarian regimes seek to exploit their new-found solidarity with the United States in the war against terrorism to destroy legitimate opposition groups within their own countries, thus sowing the seeds for future terrorism‖327.

As a conclusion, the Bush doctrine was an implementation of a Cold War aggressive containment policy combined with the post-Cold War neo-containment. Iraq was still perceived as the main threat to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf, more dangerous than Iran. This explains the implementation of Clinton‘s ―containment-Plus‖ regime change that was recommended by Albright in 1998 and President Bill Clinton. Regime change through the exploitation of the terrorism threat and the possibility of using WMD

326 George W. Bush, ―Address to the National Endowment for Democracy,‖ Nov. 11, 2003. Online, internet Dec 6, 2018. Available: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106- 2.html. 327 Ashley J Tellis, Assessing America's War on Terror: Confronting Insurgency, Cementing Primacy (Seattle, Wash: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004) 18. 122 against the United States were revealed threat during President Clinton administration. Iraq then had been a rogue state sponsoring terrorism and likely to provide them with biological weapons. It was argued that ―the Bush administration has put the goal of the war on terror in the same position of the goal of fighting communism during the Cold War‖328, but prioritized hard power over soft power.

2.3.3 War on Terror: a war for primacy

Although George W. Bush claimed that the containment policy was not workable in the War on Terror, academics and pundits claimed that Bush Doctrine and the global war on Terror was no thing but a revival of the containment policy. ―The Bush administration‘s logic led back to the containment policy. It did not replace it‖329.

Moreover, it was a continuity of the Cold War primacist strategy. It assured the supremacy and leadership of the United States over its adversaries and allies alike. ―American‘s security task in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is not merely to fight against terrorism but to prevent the rise of any challenges to American‘s hegemony‖330 especially in key area such as the Middle East and North Africa. The 9/11 provided U.S. policy makers with purpose and guiding lines that transcended ―the decade of transition‖ which was ―defined by uncertainty‖331. Now the War on Terror is the new phrase to rationalize the preemptive wars and the democratization of the world through imposoing sanctions and mainly toppling perceived hostile regimes. ―American foreign policy based on the ideological

328 Fawaz Al-Qahtani, ―Continuity and Change in United States‘ Foreign Policy Towards Gulf Region After the Events of September 11th, 2001: A Comparative Vision between the Bush and Obama Administrations,‖ Review of Economics and Political Science. 4.1 (2019): 2-19. 329 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 384. 330Heojeong Lee, ―The Bush Doctrine: a Critical Appraisal,‖ The Korean Journal of International Studies, (2003). 331 Riahrd N. Hass, ―Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World,‖ (April 2002) U.S Department of State Archives, online. Internet 10 Feb. 2016. Available: https://2001- 2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632.htm. 123 concept, and political-military pursuit, of democratic regime change‖332. In this vein, the

War on Terror agenda initiated by Afghanistan, picked up in Iraq as the next state and was scheduled to cover Iran. In this context, the focus was put on the U.S. War on Terror as a revival of the Cold war containment policy and pursuing of the longstanding grand strategy of primacy. Porter argued that The Bush doctrine itself ―reasserted primacy and revived

U.S. traditions of preventive war‖333.

2.3.4 Afghanistan

In his first speech in the immediate 9/11 events, George W. Bush accused Al-

Quaeda members of orchestrating the attacks on the United States. In his speech before

U.S. Congress on September 21, 2001, President Bush depicted the Taliban regime as not only hosting and hiding terrorists but also a barbaric regime which oppresses the Afghani citizens. The ―Taliban regime … is not only repressing its own people, it is threatening people everywhere by sponsoring and sheltering and supplying terrorists‖334. These claims would rationalize the U.S. plan to start the War on Terror from Afghanistan but did not stop there. Bush‘s call to free the Afghani people under the Taliban can be likened to the

Truman Doctrine speech in 1947 in which he stated that he ―believe(s) it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures‖335. Following this line of thought, this section examines the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan with reference to the Cold War containment policy. It also relies on the historical institutionalism‘s path dependency theoretical framework. Looking back and forward, this part revisits the predominant U.S. claims that

332 Ken Jowitt, ―Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change - the Urge to Speed History Along,‖ Policy Review. (2003): 33. 333 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S.. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 334 George W. Bush, ―speech before the Congress,‖ September 21, 2001, Online. Internet May 6, 2017. Available: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/nationalsecurity/text/faq-what.html. 335 Carl C Hodge and Cathal J. Nolan, U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy: From 1789 to the Present (Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2007) 400. 124 the United States objective in Afghanistan was to fight the suspected terrorists and changing the authoritarian Taliban regime by a democratic one. This section, much like the whole thesis considers ‗habits‘ and ‗primacy‘ as ‗types‘ of path dependency, whereby prior historical development limits the scope of choices set before decision makers‖336.

On October 7, 2001, the U.S. headed a military campaign against Afghanistan under the name ―Operation Enduring Freedom‖. The United Kingdom and the NATO cooperated with the U.S. until the overthrow of Taliban regime and capture of Al-Qaeda leaders Osama who were thought to be the main plotters of the 9/11 events. This military campaign was labeled as preemptive war which aimed to dismantle the terrorist camps in

Afghanistan and bring freedom and democracy to oppressed people, according to the

George W Bush speech of September 21, 2001. This is the main official narrative that was adopted and accepted by the American public and intellectuals in the early War on Terror campaign.

To understand the U.S. War on Afghanistan a brief survey of U.S.-Afghanistan relations during the Cold War is relevant to examine the post 9/11 military campaign and the installation of pro-American regimes. Looking backward into Cold War history,

Afghanistan was within the U.S. sphere of influence during the Cold War until the late

1970s when the Communist Party of Afghanistan was believed to have murdered the

American ambassador in Kaboul Spike Dubs on February 14, 1979 by kidnappers, after the failure of security forces to save him. Afghanistan was the object of the main containment strategies since the 1950s, such as 500 million loan grants between 1950 and 1979 in addition to the Kennedy Program of Peace Corps from 1962 to 1979 and the USAID operations. President Eisenhower paid remarkable attention to Afghanistan as he gave the opportunity to Afghani Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud Khan to speak before U.S.

336 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.s. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 13. 125 Congress for the first time on June 24, 1958337 in which he emphasized the close relationship between the two countries. In turn President Eisenhower visited Kabul in

December 1959 during a trip to other allies including Iran, Pakistan, Tunisia and India338.

It was in 1979 that the United States lost Afghanistan to the traditional Cold War rival, the

Soviet Union. This loss coincided with the fall of Iran to Islamic revolutionaries who overthrew the pro-American Shah regime. A political earthquake evoked Presidents Carter and Reagan to finance Islamic groups residing in Afghanistan known as the Mujahidin to fight the Soviets. An amount of $300 billion was poured in addition to military equipment to Afghanistan and a cooperating neighbor Pakistan. The CIA as Cold War vital player had coordinated with the armed fictions, including the Islamists to deter the Soviet threat and recuperate Afghanistan into the U.S. sphere of influence in the late 1970s and the 1980s.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Civil War in Afghanistan brought the Talibans to power in 1992. It provided the country with economic aid but things changed in the late 1990s when the Taliban grew hostile to U.S. strategic interests in

Afghanistan, which challenged the Bill Clinton and George W Bush administrations. The

9/11 events brought to light again Afghanistan as pivotal actors in the U.S. grand strategy of primacy and the U.S. alliance system.

The invasion of Afghanistan could be seen as a predetermined agenda of U.S. political makers before the 9/11 attacks. It has been argued that war had been scheduled beforehand and was not actually, as according to official narrative, a response to the 9/11 but a pretext to advance longstanding geopolitical objectives. ―US officials plan(ned) to invade Afghanistan before September 11‖339 according to George Arney of the BBC who was informed by ―A former Pakistani diplomat … that the US was planning military action

337 Official Congressional Directory 2015-2016: 114th Congress: Convened January 6, 2015 (Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 2016) 556. 338 Yanek Mieczkowski, Eisenhower's Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige (Cornell University Press, 2016 ) 224. 339 Ted Rall, Gas War: The Truth Behind the American Occupation of Afghanistan ( iUniverse, 2002) 78. 126 against and the Taliban even before last week's attacks. Niaz Naik, a former Pakistani Foreign Secretary, was told by senior American officials in mid-July that military action against Afghanistan would go ahead by the middle of October‖340. Nocolas

Hahher as well stated that the ―U.S. plan to topple Ben Laden had been approved by Bush the day before 9/11‖341, therefore the Taliban regime and Ben Laden topple decision had been taken and the 9/11 events were the appropriate and suitable moment to proceed the dismantle of an unfriendly regime. In his book Gas War: the Truth behind the American

Occupation of Afghanistan, Ted Rall states that: ―During the last nine months of the

Clinton presidency and the first nine months of G.W. Bush presidency, the United States attacked … the Taliban government for Afghan oil‖342. There was also the issue of the

American oil company negotiation with the Taliban regime about the Afghan pipeline route prior to the 9/11 attacks due to dispute over oil business. Taliban was outside U.S sphere of influence and opposed alignment with U.S. foreign policy along the 1990s then roll back the regime had been a strategic goal.

In continuity with the Cold War strategy, the CIA was deployed in covert operations through equipping and finacing internalopposition,―a 140- million CIA program to arm Afghanistan North Alliance and Anti-Taliban force‖343 to topple the Taliban regime. It (the CIA) ―wanted a pretext to attack Afghanistan and the 9/11 was the pretext of convenience to launch military strikes‖ 344. From this perspective, in the early 2000s the

CIA continued its Cold War role in assisting the American administration in overthrowing non-committed regimes worldwide. In 1953, the CIA officials admitted of their

340 George Arney, ―US planned attack on Taleban,‖ BBC News 18 September 2011, online, internet Dec.20, 2016. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1550366.stm. 341 Nicholas Hagger, Secret American Dream: The Creation of a New World Order with the Power to Abolish War, Poverty and Disease ( Readhowyouwant Com LTD , 2017). 342 Ted Rall, Gas War: the Truth behind the American Occupation of Afghanistan (iUniverse, 2002) 78. 343 Nicholas Hagger, Secret American Dream: The Creation of a New World Order with the Power to Abolish War, Poverty and Disease ( Readhowyouwant Com LTD , 2017). 344 Ibid. 127 responsibility for the orechestration of the Iranian military coup that toppled the nationalist

Mohammad Mosaddegh and the established of the Shah regime. Mosaddegh who had nationalized the oil industry and adherent to non-western policy was overthrown in 1953 and a pro-American regime remained in power till the Islamicrevolution of 1979.

2.3.4.1 Oil and Gaz

Afghanistan has been of a great importance to United States as it is bordered by five pivotal petroleum countries namely Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and most importantly Iran, the traditional rival since 1979. In addition, U.S. officials were longing for a new pipeline which in case approved it would enhance American influence in the region especially the Middle East. The Taliban regime stood against the cooperation with the United States despite the continuous negotiations as a result the CIA was deployed to overthrow the whole regime. U.S. top officials had been trying to include Afghanistan into its alliance system since the mid-1990s. The main objective was geostrategic and especially getting an approval on the construction of the gas pipeline which would extend from Turkmenistan to Pakistan through Afghanistan. The BBC reported that in December

1997, representatives of the Taliban government were invited to the headquarters of the

American oil company UNOCAL in Texas to negotiate an agreement around the gas pipeline project. ―A senior delegation from the Taliban in Afghanistan is in the United

States for talks with an international energy company that wants to construct a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan across Afghanistan to Pakistan‖345. Afghanistan therefore was of a great interest to the American petroleum industry primacy before the 9/11 events.

S RoB Sobhani, professor of International Relations at Georgetown University, states that ―it is absolutely essential that the US make the pipeline the centerpiece of

345 ―Taliban in Texas for Talks on Gas pipeline,‖ BBC News 4 Dec. 1997. Online.Internet May 12, 2017. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/west_asia/37021.stm. 128 rebuilding Afghanistan‖346. It‘s obvious that the U.S. priority was the construction of the

850-kilometer pipeline to cross Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban government. The project of a pipeline to the was the main driving force behind War on Afghanistan. It could be the first phase of building a pipeline bypass Iran and China after toppling the remaining reivals in the MENA and especially Iran

In September 2007, the US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher,

U.S.Assistant Secretary of State reported that ―One of our goals is to stabilize Afghanistan so it can become a conduit and hub between South and Central Asia so that energy can flow to the south… and so that the countries of Central Asia are no longer bottled up between the two enormous powers of China and Russia, but rather that they have outlets to the south as well as to the north and the east and the west‖347. Then the stability of

Afghanistan was needed to fulfill the trans-Afghan pipeline which could marginalize

China, Russia and Iran role in oil transport and bolster U.S. San Francisco system (hub- and-spoke system) with the ex-Soviet countries.

2.3.4.2 Alliance

The War on Afghanistan was Bush test of the American alliance system and outcome of a long containment policy of the third world countries worldwide. Although 18 countries joined the United States in 2002, the number increased to nearly 50 countries by

2010 meanwhile the number of troops increased by more than 8 times from November

2002 to January 2012 from 5.000 to 40.386 troops348. The major contributors were the traditional U.S.allies: The United Kingdom which deployed 900 troops, Germany 4,645

346Michel Chossudovsky, War and globalisation: the truth behind September 11 (Global Outlook, 2002) 95. 347Asad Ismi,―Russia, China, Iran defeat U.S. in the ‗pipeline wars‘,‖ Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives Monitor ( May 2010) Online, Internet, May 12, 2017. Available: www.policyalternatives.ca. 348 Ian S Livingston and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―list of countries contributing troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 2002-2012,‖ Afghanistan Index, Online, internet, May 20, 2017. Availbalbe: https://www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex. 129 and France 2,453 the total troops operating in Afghanistan by 2012 were 38,179349, in 2016 only 13,000 troops remained in Afghanistan including 9.800 U.S. troops. The major foreign troops combating in Afghanistan were U.S. European allies of the Cold War others were less important contributors in the field. In this context, the alliance system was fruitful in terms of sharing the burden of war. More importantly it signaled an international consensus over legitimization of the U.S. War on Terror.

NATO as means of containment during the Cold War was engaged by the United

States for the first time outside Europe and in the War on Terror. ―Afghanistan is NATO‘s first ―out-of-area‖ mission beyond Europe‖350. Interestingly, preparing NATO for this mission had initiated in the Washington Summit in April 1999 when ―the allies have sought to create a ‗new‘ NATO, capable of operating beyond the European theater to combat emerging threats such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction‖351. Significantly, two years before the 9/11 attacks the United States held a summit to engage NATO members in potential terrorists‘ attacks and the WMD threat.

These motives were exploited by the United States in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

While the War on Afghanistan was conducted under the banner of the NATO, the 2003Iraq war was not. From the alliance system perspective, the NATO role in the global War on

Terror in 2001 was considered ―as a test of the alliance‘s political will and military capabilities‖. It was both a checking of U.S. allies‘ willingness to cooperate with the

United States and display of military powers. In other words, the commitment of the

NATO and other allies led by the United States was a manifestation and revival of U.S. primacy over its allies and enemies at the same time. ―The mission was a test of ‗the New

349 Ian S Livingston and Michael O‘Hanlon, ―Troops Committed to NATO‘s International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)‖ Afghanistan Inde, Internet, Online, May 20, 2017. Available: https://www.brookings.edu/afghanistanindex 350 Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, Nato in Afghanistan: a Test of the Transatlantic Alliance ( DIANE Publishing, 2009). 351 Ibid. 130 NATO‘ but also of U.S. leadership, at a time when it was being questioned‖352. Therefore

President‘s Bush administration revived the leading role that the United State played in the immediate Cold War and notably in the first Gulf War and along the 1990s operations against Iraq. In 1993, Anthony Lake noted that ―The United States is also actively engaged in unilateral and multilateral efforts to restrict their (Iraq and Iran) military and technological capabilities….. to establish a favorable balance of power‖353. As allies were reliable in containing Iraq and Iran and the major regional revials in the Persian Gulf, it was a U.S. habits especially in the post-Cold War to deploy allies in its foreign policy.

2.3.4.3 U.S. primacy

The Post 9/11 era was a manifestation of the U.S. grand strategy of primacy that was pursued since the Cold War. The terror threat and Islamism were the next communism which was mentioned by George W. Bush in the immediate Cold War when he stated ―As president, I will order an immediate review of our overseas deployments - in dozens of countries. ... My second goal is to build America's defenses on the troubled frontiers of technology and terror‖354. As these threat had remained insignificant in the interwar era, that is from 1991 to 2001, the 9/11 attacks provided the George W Bush administration with guidelines to check and bolster U.S. leadership through committing its troops and allies in two wars overseas. ―With the onset of September 11, however, the administration rapidly assumed the new priority of confronting radical Islam, in addition to managing

U.S. primacy‖355. U.S. foreign policy therefore was framed around Radical Islam and suspected sponsors of terrorism. The major challengers in the MENA could easily fit into

352 Andrew M Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman, The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice (Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011) 66. 353 Anthony Lake, ―Confronting Backlash States,‖ Foreign Affairs. 732 (1994): 45-55. 354 John W. Dietrich, The George W. Bush Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches and Commentary (London: Routledge, 2015) 24. 355 Ashley J. Tellis, Assessing America's War on Terror: Confronting Insurgency, Cementing Primacy (Seattle, Wash: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004) 3. 131 the scheme i.e. they could be labeled as harbors of radical Islamists or providing them with weapons of mass destruction.

Because winning the Cold War positioned the United States as the unique superpower, bolstering U.S. leadership was initiated by George W Bush‘s administration to cement U.S. role in the world. The post 9/11 was inducement of Americans to stand behind the government in its war on terror: ―the Bush administration‘s desire to cement American primacy through multiple instruments was eminently defensible‖356. Moreover, whether the governing party was Democrat or Republican, primacy was maintained and defended.

Then U.S. presidents from George H.W Bush Barcak Obama nearly maintained the same foreign policy objective through Cold War mechanisms for preserving U.S. leadership and supremacy worldwide. ―Having won the Cold War after an arduous 50-year struggle, no governing regime in Washington could reject the country‘s now privileged position in favor of any alternative distribution of global power‖357.

2.3.5 War on Iraq

Operation Iraqi Freedom was a military campaign launched against Iraq on March

20, 2001. On May 1, 2003 President George W Bush declared the end of mission by toppling the Iraqi government and President Saddam Hussein. He argued that ―for the cause of liberty and peace of the world and prides the American military‘s great power to free nation by breaking a dangerous and aggressive regime with new tactics and precision weapons‖358. The efficiency of the War on Iraq and whether the United States achieved succesfuly its goals still debatable issue.

356 Ibid., 9. 357 Ibid. 358 George W Bush, ―Remarks by the President from the USS Abraham Lincoln, May 1, 2003, CNN May 2, 2003. Online Internet 20 July 2017. Available: https://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript/. 132 The War on Iraq was depicted by the U.S. president and his neoconservative policymakers as a War for freedom and democracy. It is a war for fighting the Iraq regime which was accused of acquiring WMD that could use them against the United States. At this level the question I would henceforth like to ask and then try to answer is: to what extent was George W Bush accurate in depicting his main goals of the War on Iraq? And was the invasion of Iraq a consequence of the 9/11 attacks or a predetermined plan for predetermined ends?

2.3.5.1 The decision to invade Iraq

On January 30, 2003, President Bush argued that containment was no longer workable against Iraq and therefore a new strategy would be deployed to change the regime. ―[Prior] to September the 11th, we were discussing smart sanctions. We were trying to fashion a sanction regime that would make it more likely to be able to contain somebody like Saddam Hussein. After September the 11th, the doctrine of containment just doesn't hold any water‖359. It was therefore an announcement of departure from containment to preemption. The shift, if any, signaled the U.S. tendency to abandon the containment policy and adopt the new Bush Doctrine of preemption. Interestingly historians and IR analysts stated that Bush‘s grand strategy in Iraq was nothing but a containment policy and the preemptive war was the Cold War preventive war strategy.

John Lewis Gaddis, the father of post-revisionism of the Cold War and a consultant of

Bush speech writing explained that ―Pre-emption by the Bush administration‘s logic, then led to containment. It did not replace containment‖360.

359 George W. Bush, George W. Bush: 2003 , Book 1 (Washington, DC: United States Government Print. Office, 2006) 107. 360 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 384. 133 It is equally important that President Bush decided to intervene in Iraq even unilaterally and without the UN consent, another component of the Bush Doctrine. U.S. traditional allies France and Germany, known as ―the axis of peace‖ which had contributed to the first Gulf War of 1991 and the 2001 Afghan War, blocked an American war resolution submitted by the United States and its two main allies Britain and Spain to the

U.N Security Council for the War on Iraq. Their blockade of the resolution was motivated by the absence of convincing proofs that linked the Iraqi regime to Al-Qaeda and President

Saddam Hussein acquisition of WMD. ―Much of the evidence they presented was so suspect that the UN, the NATO and many of American allies refused to support the war‖361. This was another strategy of unilatersim that the United States had not experienced since the Vietnam War. It was challenge of the international community and notably the United Nations.

This dissent with the traditional European allies especially France and Germany did not prevent Bush‘s administration to go to war. President Bush argued that:

Inspection teams did need more time or more personal… Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country, to our people, and to all free people. If the world fails to confront the threat posed by the Iraqi regime, refusing to use force, even as a last resort, free nations would assume immense and acceptable risks. The attacks of September 11, 2001 showed what the enemies of America did with four airplanes. We will not wait to see what terrorists or terrorist states could do with weapons of mass destruction362.

Although ―the axis of War‖ composed of the United States, Britain, and Spain failed to get a UN Security council approval, President Bush invaded Iraq on March 20,

2003.

361 Brian L Steed, Iraq War: The Essential Reference Guide (ABC-CLIO Santa Barabra, California 2019) xxiii. 362 George W. Bush, George W. Bush: 2003 , Book 1 (Washington, DC: United States Government Print. Office, 2006) 107. 134 This could be seen as a manifestation of military primacy and implicit display of military power not only to targeted rivals in the Persian Gulf but also to the Asian and

European allies. The United States could go to war even without France, Russia, and

Germany. It echoes George H. Bush‘s assumption of U.S. leadership over worldwide powers during the first Gulf crisis of 1991 when Russia and China appeared reluctant to join the coalition against Iraq. He clamored: ―the importance of the United States leadership is brought home to me clearly‖. He added that ―It is only the United States that can lead… all countries in the West clearly has to turn to us‖363. It was an insurance of the

U.S. unilateralism a test for U.S. alliance system over potential powers in the post-Soviet era such as China, Japan and Russia. ―History matters‖ according to Historical

Institutionalist‘s path dependence theory and the Iraq War of 2003 was a new check of the

U.S. alliance system on the one hand and insurance of its diplomatic and military primacy on the other. The clear outcome is ―a disunity in international community‖ especially the

―absence of France and Germany which left his administration open to strong criticism for stubbornly proceeding without broad-based European support‖364. The criticism increased years after the invasion of Iraq George W. Bush and the neoconservative policymakers failed to prove their claims right to the international community and American citizens alike.

Following the overthrow of the regime in Iraq, WMD were not found. Iraq emerged too fragile to threaten its neighbors and represent a national security threat to the

United States as the succsive administration depicted it. In addition, President Bush was briefed by CIA on the absence of proofs against Iraq: ―President Bush was told in a highly classified briefing that the U.S. intelligence community had no evidence linking the Iraqi

363 George H. W Bush, All the Best, George Bush: My Life in Letters and Other Writings (Simon & Schuste, 2014) 479. 364 Brian L Steed, Iraq War: The Essential Reference Guide (ABC-CLIO Santa Barabra, California, 2019) xiv. 135 regime of Saddam Hussein to the attacks of 9/11 and that there was scant credible evidence that Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with al-Qaeda‖365. What could explain

Bush‘s ignorance of the intelligence reports could explain the main reasons behind the decision to overthrow the Iraqi regimes. It could be seen as a threat to U.S. geopolitical interests in the region and especially U.S. allies in the MENA. Saddam Hussein‘s main plan was to annex Iran and Kuwait to Iraq, a plan that jeopardized U.S. primacy in the

MENA and menaced the flow of oil.

The possession of WMD and the attempt to acquire such kind of arms were proved wrong according to the IAEA and UNSCOM in the aftermath of the 9/11. Although

―no indication of resumed nuclear activities… nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites‖366, according to Mohamed Elbaradei of the

IAEA and that from 1999 to 2003 ―at the majority of the Iraqi sites, industrial capability has deteriorated substantially‖367. Moreover they insured the United National Security

Council that Iraq did not attempt ―to import aluminum tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment‖368. All this evidence did not prevent the United States from proceeding in regime change in Iraq. The WMD argument was a pretext and sponsoring terrorism with biological weapons was a one of Clinton‘s perception of threat that was exploited to intervene in Iraq and join it to the American sphere of influence and impose more isolation on Iran and other countries and organizations that were perceived as hostile to the United

States in the region such as Syria, the in Lebanon. The regime change in Iraq was not a failure to the dual containment and neo-containment of the 1990s and the early

2000s but a completion its main objective but chose overthrow the regime was

365 John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics (Cary: Oxford University Press, USA, 2014) 120. 366 Peter Wallensteen and Carina Staibano, International Sanctions: Between Wars and Words (London: Frank Cass, 2005) 145. 367 Ibid. 368 Ibid. 136 manifestation of military preponderance as one key element of the strategy of primacy. In

2002, President Bush affirmed that ―America has and intends to keep military strengths beyond challenge, thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace‖369. Therefore, the Iraq war in 2003 was a display of U.S. military power to allies and enemies on the one hand and overthrowing a hostile regime that stood against U.S. business interests in the region, on the other.

The Iraq War of March 2003 to a great extent was an achievement of Clinton‘s dual Containment in the 1990s. In other words, Iraq was weakened military and economically in the 1990s by the impositions on sanctions and the no-fly zones. The Iraqi military was ill-equipedwhich made it hard to resist the coalition troops. The directed containment policy issued by the United Nations and implemented and controlled by the

United States and its allies could be seen as a success in disarming Iraq. By 1997 the inspection teams of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA and the United Nations

Special Commission, UNSCOM declared that ―there are no indications that any weapon- usable nuclear materials remain in Iraq and that the ongoing monitoring and evidence in

Iraq of prohibited materials, equipment or activities‖370. Moreover, by March 1999, the

UNSCOM affirmed that ―Iraq does not pose a capability to indigenously produce either the

BADR-2000 missiles or asserts known as the Supergun‖371. Then if the uncapability of

Iraq was known to the American intelligence, why President George W Bush‘s administration declared war on Iraq? Was not a policy of containment enough to bring the regime down?

369 George W. Bush, ―Text of Bush‘s Speech at West point, June 1, 2002‖ The New York Times. Online Internet 10 Dec. 2017. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/. 370 Nafeez M. Ahmed, Behind the War on Terror: Western Secret Strategy and the Struggle for Iraq (Gabriola Island, B.C: New Society Publishers, 2003) 170. 371 Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes (Alexandria, Va: GlobalSecurity.org, 2003) Online, Internet 20 Nov.2017. Available: https://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s99- 94.htm. 137 2.3.5.2 Iraq War was scheduled before the 9/11

It is argued that changing regime in Iraq was on President Bush‘s administration agenda prior to the 9/11. A regime change plan was prepared and supported by the neoconservative policymakers since the late 1990s. In 1998 Secretary of Defense in

George H. Bush administration from 1989 to 1993 who became Vice President of

President George W. Bush in 2001 and other members of the American Project of New

American Century including (PNAC) Colin Powell and Paul Wolfowiz, asked President

Bill Clinton to topple Saddam Hussein372. Secretary of Defense in George H Bush Dick

Cheney – an then vice president in George W Bush administration – argued that the first

― Persian Gulf War would be seen as an incomplete victory, a job that needed to be finished by removing Hussein from power‖373. Interestingly the majority of the PNAC – an influencing neoconservative thank tank – members became top policymakers and advisers in George W. Bush administration in 2001 and their influence in the decision making process would be translated into Iraq War in 2003. Moreover, it is argued that

―Even before he enters the White House, two imperialistic wars are on the agenda: Iraq and

Afghanistan. Afghanistan gets the priority‖374. This is explained by the major geopolitical interests an mainly securing the flow of gaz and oil, securing Israel and more importantly bolstering U.S. primacy in the MENA and over the traditional European allies.

It is worth noting that in the immediate of the 9/11, President Bush decided collectively with his Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense to lead a War on Iraq. In December 2001, President Bush with the War cabinet ―to plan the

U.S. attack on Iraq even as his administration spokesmen insisted they were pursuing a

372 Brian L. Steed, Iraq War: The Essential Reference Guide, ( ABC-CLIO Santa Barabra, California 2019) xxxiii. 373 Ibid. 374 Rudo de Ruijter, ―Piplenes to 9/1,‖ Courtfool Info, Online, Internet, Jan. 2, 2018. Available: www.courtfool.info. 138 diplomatic solution‖375. The war therefore had been decided whether allies joined or not and whether the United Nations approved or not. Iraq was to be joined to the American sphere of influence and the challenging President Hussein destiny had been decided.

2.3.5.3 Iraq as a Key area and the Gulf War

U.S. energy supremacy could be seen as the main driving force behind U.S. the first Gulf War Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a containment policy in the 1990s and the

2003 second Gulf War Operation Enduring Freedom. Iraq has the world‘s second largest oil reserves and is ―the second-largest crude oil producer in the Organization of the

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)‖376. Then, the failure to bring down the regime through the imposition of tough containment policy along the 1990s and early 2000s and the refusal of President Saddam Hussein to come back to U.S. sphere of influence could be seen as a challenge to U.S. leadership in the MENA. Moreover, Iraq demonstrated an expansionist tendency over its neighbor Iran from 1980 to 1988 and Kuwait in 1990. It also represented a serious menace to the first world producer of oil Saudia Arabia, the U.S. key ally in the Persian Gulf. In 1991 for example ―The US strategic priority after Iraq‘s invasion was liberating Kuwait and making sure that Saddam Hussein could not dominate the oil-rich region‖377.

Economic sanctions, no-fly zone and oil for food programs in the1990‘s were an initial form of neo-containment. The Iraqi regime was accused of expanding its influence over his neighbors by invading Kuwait and challenging U.S. leadership in the Persian gulf, this along the 1991 invasion, economic, political and diplomatic sanctions were imposed

375 Elizabeth Holtzman and Cynthia L. Cooper, Cheating Justice: How Bush and Cheney Attacked the Rule of Law and Plotted to Avoid Prosecution and What We Can Do About It (Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 2012) 10. 376 ―Iraq‘s Oil Production has Nearly Doubled over the Past Decade,‖ U.S. Energy Information Admintsrtion, January,11, 2019, Online, internet, Jan.12, 2019. Available: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37973. 377 Robin B. Wright, The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace, 2011) 136. 139 on the regime. Such sanctions had already been American mechanisms of containment during the Cold War and, it continued during the George Bush senior‘s New World Order and then, to an even higher degree, during Bush junior‘s War on Terror. President Obama maintained the sanctions as a major containment policy especially towards Iran until

2015378.

The 2003 War was a revival of the same motives as U.S. interests were not changed in the Persian Gulf from one hand and the main policy actors of the 1991 War were the same in Bush administration of the 2003. They held more enthusiasm to remove

Saddam Hussein and secure U.S. allies and the flow of oil to the United States. Dick

Cheney argued as a vice-president in George W. Bush administration in 1990 and previously as Secretary of Defense that Saddam Hussein ―has clearly done what he has to do to dominate OPEC, the Gulf and the Arab world, He is forty kilometers from Saudi

Arabia and its oil production is a couple of hundred kilometers away‖379, it was then a challenge of U.S. leadership which was to recuperated in the 2000s. The 9/11 gave the neoconservatives the opportunity to revive U.S. command of the Persian Gulf countries and deter potential competitors such as China and Russia.

2.3.5.4 Iraq and the U.S. alliance system

President Bill Clinton was criticized by Dick Cheney and Rumsfeld upon his soft policy toward Iraq. The regime did not fall from within despite the continuous attacks and the no-fly zone in the North and South. Saddam Hussein used the European Euro instead of the U.S. dollar in his oil trade transaction in 2000, threatening ―the main pillar of U.S. hegemony‖. This new challenge to U.S. dollar hegemony was taken seriously by the Bush

378 Peter E Harrell, ―Trump‘s Use of Sanctions Is Nothing Like Obama‘s,‖ Foreign Policy (October 5, 2019) Online, Internet, 21 Feb, 2019. Available: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/05/trump-sanctions-iran- venezuela. 379 Steven Hurst, The United States and Iraq Since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) 91. 140 administration, arguing that the no-fly zone and the hard containment policy which had been imposed on Iraq in the 1990s were not enough to lead to the fall of the Iraqi regime.

Therefore, the Bush administration felt President Clinton did not safeguard U.S. primacy.

As a result, they would recuperate: ―This must be corrected; the United States must find a way to assert its supremacy in the world‖380. Dismantling ―the axis of evil‖ could be the first step toward assuring primacy over the Gulf countries. Iraq, according to George W

Bush, was ―building and hiding weapons that could enable him to dominate the Middle

East and intimidate the civilized world, and will not allow it‖381. These ideas were articulated by the all members of the Bush administration, despite the fact that American and European intelligence came to the conclusion that Iraq was in very weak position, had not any WMD and that there was no link between Saddam Hussein regime and Al-Quada.

Then the question might be raised and objective searched for and convincing answer is why George W Bush‘s administration insisted on toppling Iraq even the main European allies retreated from any support?

Secretary of State Colin Powell did not manage to convince the permanent members of the United Nations to vote for resolution to authorize U.N coalition against

Iraq. More than that, the UN inspection team led by Hans Blix denied the existence of any kind of weapons. Mr Blix claimed that ―They have all the methods to listen to telephone conversations, they have spies, they have satellites, so they have a lot of sources‖ to control

Iraq proliferations and WMD. He added: ―If the UK and the US ... have evidence, then one would expect that they would be able to tell us where this stuff is‖382. Such affirmation express the insistence of the United States on the invasion of Iraq regardless of the

380 George Soros, ―The Bubble of American Supremacy: Correcting the Misuse of American Power,‖ Washington Post February 27, 2004. 381 George W. Bush, ―Address on the Future of Iraq‖ 26 February 2003. George W. Bush, George W. Bush: 2003, Book 1 (Washington, DC: United States Government Print Office, 2006) 207. 382 ―Blix urges US and UK to hand over Iraq evidence‖, The Guardian, December 20, 2002. Internet, online, Oct. 5, 2017. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/20/iraq.foreignpolicy 141 pretexts. The reports of the UN inspection team in addition the CIA and FBI reports were not enough to convince Bush administration of the uncapability of Iraq to threat the United

States and its neighbours.

In this context, Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted on providing the UN

Security Council with speech on February 5, 2003 while the decision to attack Iraq had already been taken. He himself admitted few years after the Iraq war that his allegations were not accurate and that the War had been scheduled before his speech and presentation before the members of U.N Security Council. In May 2016, Mr Powell stated ―I regret the

U.N speech that I gave which was the prominent presentation of our case‖ but he affirmed that while he gave , President George W. Bush ―had already made this decision for military action‖383. Thus, the requested United Nations resolution was nothing but a legitimization of a predetermined plan to invade Iraq.

The deterrence was a means and ends for geopolitical interests. It aimed to distance a challenging power to the U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Emirates etc. more importantly it was a manifestation of U.S. quest for leadership. ―A quick and decisive victory in the heart of the Arab world would send a message to all countries, especially to recalcitrant regimes such as Syria, Libya, Iran, or

North Korea, that American hegemony was here to stay‖384.

In the same line of thought, the 2003 Iraq war was a second step, after

Afghanistan on President Bush agenda. ―Iraq was but the first of seven other states – Syria,

Somalia, Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran – the US sought to conquer in five years‖385.

The imperialist agenda would involve the major unfriendly but strategic countries to U.S.

383 Jason M. Breslow, ―Colin Powell: U.N. Speech: Was a Great Intelligence Failure,‖ Frontline (May 17, 2016), Online, internet, Feb.18, 2018. Available: www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline. 384 Ahsan I Butt, ―Why did Bush go to war in Iraq?,‖ Aljazeera, Mar.20, 2019, Online, Internet, Feb. 18,2018 available: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/bush-war-iraq-190318150236739.html. 385 Ibid. 142 primacy. Some of them were part of ―the axis of evil‖ which included some MENA countries. Syria as geostrategic countries that boarded Israel, Libya with ―the largest oil reserve and production in Africa and among the top ten largest globally‖386 which was ruled by Mummer Ghadafi, Iran ―the second largest OPEC producer and exporter of crude oil and the fourth-largest producer in the world.‖387 Such countries were labeled as ―rogue states‖ by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and ―axis of evil‖ by President George W Bush in the 2001. The importance of these states to U.S. could be explained also by Obama response to the Arab uprisings in the 2010s. While he refused to abandon Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Zine Alabddine Ben Ali in Tunisia and the Bahrini rulers, he encouraged revolts against Iran, Syria and took part in the overthrow of the Libyan regime in 2011.

Conclusion

Afghanistan and Iraq were the main targets of the United States since the early post-Cold War. George H.W Bush invaded Iraq in 1991 and so did his successor Bill

Clinton in 1998. Continued air strikes along no-fly zone and a hard line policy of containment were imposed on Iraq after the liberation of Kuweit in 1991 till March 2003.

The George W. Bush administration invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, I argue was a war for U.S. leadership and revival of the Cold War militarization of the containment more than for fighting terrorism and democracy. The allegations especially against Iraq were proved wrong as Colin Powell admitted in 2016 and Kofi Annan, the Secretary

General of the United Nation who argued ―I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN Charter. From our point view, from the cheerer point of view it was illegal.‖

386 Horace Campbell, Global Nato and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa in the Forging of African Unity (New York: Press, 2013) 88. 387 Glenn E, Curtis and Eric J. Hooglund, Iran: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 2008) 162. 143 If so why did President Obama, though he promised to leave Iraq, failed to withdraw the American troops? Iraq by all means represents a vital area for the United

States in the MENA. In 2019, Eighteen years after the 9/11, U.S. military bases and troops are still stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq. In brief, Afghanistan and Iraq wars were motivated by a desire to (re)establish American standing as the world's leading power.‖388

The United States demonstrated supremacy over the ―axis of evil‖ and even its traditional allies such as France and Germany. The invasion of Afghanistan and especially Iraq

―demonstrated robust global demand for such U.S. leadership‖389.

As a sign of continuity with the Cold War policy commitment to defending democracy and freeing oppressed people President Bush revived the liberty and freedom tradition which was articulated in all American presidents and on which the Cold War was framed. He stated that this rhetoric was ―asserted in the Truman Doctrine and Ronald

Reagan‘s ―Evil Empire‖390 then the invasion of Iraq derives its legitimacy not only from the terrorist threat but also from historical figures and events in U.S. foreign policy: the

Truman Doctrine which was the first institutionalized containment strategy that initiated the Cold War and Ronald Reagan‘s coining the Soviet Union as ―the Evil Empire‖ in his famous speech of 1983. Interestingly President Truman initiated the Cold War and Ronald

Reagan ended it by pushing the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both presidents relied on the military preponderance to deter the Soviet threat and contain it and bolster the alliance.

It was also George H Bush in the late 1980s and very early 1990s that insisted on preponderance – which is one of the four elements of the strategy of primacy – as defense

388 Ahsan I Butt, ―Why did Bush go to war in Iraq?,‖ Aljazeera, Mar. 20, 2019, online. Internet, Feb. 18, 2018. Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/bush-war-iraq-190318150236739.html 389 Hal Brands, ―Choosing Primacy: U.S. Strategy and Global Order at the Dawn of the Post-Cold War Era,‖ Texas National Security Review: Volume 1, Issue 2 (March 2018): 20. 390 Ibid. 144 planning that ―envisaged the United States generating overwhelming military superiority to prevent the reemergence of rivals‖391.

2.4 The President Obama administration: was it a departure from the War on Terror framework?

Although the Obama election was seen as a relief from the bloody war on Terror, several academics argued that by the end of his second term, President Obama maintained the same grand strategy of his predecessor. Although he vowed to depart from the War on

Terror phase by putting an end to U.S. involvement in Iraq and withdrawing the American troops, he failed to fulfill his electoral campaign promises. He did not manage to shut down Guantanamo bay detention camp which was seen as the worst image of the violation of the basic human rights of detainees in the world.

Much like the post-Cold War admisntartions of George H W Bush and Bill

Clinton, the attempt to depart for a new strategy was articulated by Secretary of State

Hilary Clinton. She affirmed that she and ―President Obama believe that the U.S. must adopt a new approach in Foreign policy that makes the U.S. able to remain a positive power in the world, including strengthening partnership with allies and institutions and trying to connect with adversaries‖392. The move toward a flexible diplomacy to deal with rivals could be seen as new strategy compared to President George W. Bush who started a regime change program in the Middle East but a Cold War policy of containment that adopted by the Nixon and Ford administration in the 1970s and President Reagan in his second term in 1985. It was revived by President Obama in the case of Iran.

391 Patrick E. Tyler, ―U.S.. Strategy Plan Calls for insuring No Rivals Develop,‖ New York Times Mar. 30, 1992,Online, Internet, June, 14, 2014. Available: www.nytimes.com. 392 Fawaz Al-Qahtani, ―Continuity and Change in United States‘ Foreign Policy Towards Gulf Region After the Events of September 11th, 2001: A Comparative Vision between the Bush and Obama Administrations,‖ Review of Economics and Political Science. 4.1 (2019): 2-19. 145 The member of ‗the axis of evil‘in George W. Bush terms was to be committed in negotiations to be brought to the international community. This approach is likened to the active containment that had been issued by Clinton‘s administration. However an aggressive containment had been oriented toward Iraq that aimed to push the regime to collapse from within.

President Obama reintroduced the notion of ―‖ as a new strategy to contain the adversaries. Smart power ―is a concept that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action393‖. It is also defined by as a ―to counter the misperception that soft power alone can produce effective foreign policy‖394.

It is a policy that relies on attraction more than coercion in attempt to break with the Bush regime change by force. If we focus on the elements of ―smart power‖, we can deduce that it should differ to the soft power. That is the Obama administration worked on distancing it to the bad image that the War on Terror brought to the United States. He aimed introduce a new strategy by which allies willingly join the United States mission in the world. It is noticeable that the means are partnership which is the both the Cold War and the post-Cold War alliance system, partnership which itself a Cold War policy that aimed to attract countries to the American sphere of influence and the institutions such as the NATO, the IMF and the UN which were exploited by the various administrations to contain the allies and adversaries alike during and after the Cold War. ‗Smart power $ as containment tool aimed to enlarge the American influence worldwide and especially endowed its interventions with international legitimacy. The smart power rhetoric was

393 Implementing Smart Power: Setting an Agenda for National Security Reform : Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, , One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, April 24, 2008 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2009) 11. 394 Joseph Nye, ―Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,‖ Foreign Affairs. 88.4 (2009): 160-163. 146 articulated by President Obama in his Cairo Speech to the Muslim world in which he enthusiastically vowed to advocate democracy. He ―brought a new tone of humility by emphasizing engagement and partnership with Arabs and Muslims, thus raising expectations that his administration would bring a new U.S. foreign policy in the Middle

East.‖395.

Although the smart power concept is rooted in history, it emerged in the post-Cold

War era by Joseph Nye and Suzane Nossel396, Deputy to U.S. Ambassador at the United

Nations during Clinton presidency. The smart power concept had been introduced by assistant Secretary of Defense for international Security Affairs in Clinton administration

Joseph Nye397 who recommended a ‗smart power‘ to approach a peacetime moment. It relies mainly on diplomacy as a main source of containing threat and attracting countries for joining the U.S. sphere of influence. Secretary of State stated that

The best way to advance America's interests in reducing global threats and seizing global opportunities is to design and implement global solutions. ...We must use what has been called "smart power," the full range of tools at our disposal -- diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural -- picking the right tool or combination of tools for each situation. With smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of our foreign policy398.

And attract ―mind and hearts‖ as a strategy to win the War and overcome the failure of Bush‘s War in Iraq and Afghanistan. This strategy could be labled as neo- containment that had been approached since the early Cold War. ―No matter how

395 Fawaz A. Gerges, Obama and the Middle East: The End of America's Moment?(New York: St. Martin's Press, 2014 ) 102. 396 Suzane Nossel, ―Smart Power,‖ Foreign Affairs (March 2004). 397 Joseph S Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (Public Affiars,New York 2012) 32. 398 US Presidential Doctrines Handbook - Volume 1 President Barack - Strategic Information and Materials (Washington DC: International Business Publication) 124. 147 hard President Obama tries to turn the page on the previous administration, he can‘t‖399, noted Frank Rich in the New York Times.

2.4.1 The Middle East as the main area for the U.S.

As for his foreign policy toward the MENA and notably the GCC countries,

President Obama continued articulating the same old for example, he threatened to use force to protect U.S. interests in the Gulf in case of a threatening challenge, the commitment to defend allies especially the Persian gulf countries, the secure of the flow of oil and his commitment to the War on Terror and forbidding the WMD: ―We all commit to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and pursuing a world without them‖400, Stated

President Obama. This commitment is a manifestation of ―primacy‖ as a U.S. grand strategy.

The U.S. involvement in foreign countries did not decrease during the Obama administration. Obama vowed to withdraw from Iraq while increasing the number of troops in Afghanistan. He declared that fighting troops and only peacekeeper troops would be engaged in ―training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security Forces as long as they remain non-sectarian; conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting our ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq‖401. Then these missions could be seen as a continuity of the United States engagement in Iraq rather than disengagement. Obama reorganized and reinforced the American presence in Iraq rather than freeing it.

Notwithstanding, Obama announced on August 30, 2010 that the combat troops were withdrawn, after less than four years he ordered their return on August 2014 as a response:

399 Frank Rich, ―Obama Can‘t Turn the Page on Bush,‖ New York Times May 16,2009 ,online, Internet, Nov. 10, 2016. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17rich-5.html. 400 U.S. Presidential Doctrines Handbook Volume 1 President Barack Obama Doctrine - Strategic Information and Materials (Lulu Com, Waghington, 2017) 75. 401 Barak Obama, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Barack Obama (Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2010) 160. 148 ―Today I authorized two operations in Iraq – targeted airstrikes to protect our American personnel, and a humanitarian effort to help save thousands of Iraqi civilians who are trapped on a mountain without food and water and facing almost certain death.‖402

In both cases he remained in the two countries pursuing nearly the same War on

Terror strategies of his predecessor. ―Those expecting wholesale changes to US counterterrorism policy … misread Obama‘s intentions. Obama always intended to deepen

Bush‘s commitment to counterterrorism while at the same time ending the ‗distraction‘ of the Iraq war‖403. The war on Terror therefore was not rejected by Obama administration.

What he did was to modify the strategies then continued on the same path.

The engagement in the Middle East through aids and soft power was confirmed by Hillary Clinton, secretary of State who developed a containment guiding line known as

―the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review QDDR.‖ Mrs Clinton identified

―as a blueprint for how we can make the State Department and USAID more nimble, more effective, and more accountable, a blueprint for how our country can lead in a changing world through the use of what I call ‗civilian power‘ – the combined force of all of the civilians across the United States Government who practice diplomacy, carry out development projects, and act to prevent and respond to crisis and conflict‖404.

These initiatives are what were known as neo-containment which emerged, as we argue, in the mid-1990s. It is series of mini-containments there were implemented separately or collectively depends on the case. The redeployment of diplomacy as a main mechanism of containment is a back to the smart power strategy. The USAID as key

402 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President, August 7, 2014. Online, internet, Mar. 13, 2016. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statement- president. 403 Michael Bentley and Jack Holland. Obama's Foreign Policy: Ending the War on Terror (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2018) 17. 404 Hillary Clinton, ―Former Secretary of State Remarks,‖ Archived content U.S. Department of State, online, internet, Mar. 13, 2016. Available: https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/index.htm retrieved on 30.10.2018. 149 organization in the containment policy was reengaged in developing projects in the third world. It is then ―wining heard and mind‖ for maintaining or renewing alliance. The

―civilian power‖ would replace the ―military power‖ that President George W. Bush administration relied on heavily.

Gerges demonstrates that in actuality, there has been more continuity than change in Obama‘s policies. This is especially the case in areas of geostrategic importance to the

U.S., including the Gulf, the Israel-Palestine conflict, as well as those states now on the front line on the US‘s battle against extremism. As for the Palestine-Israeli conflict, in his early days in the White House, the President ordered more than $20 million for the strip of

Gaza. Hilary Clinton pledged $900 for the reconstruction of Gaza after the War. But at the same speech in which he vowed a new phase with the Arab Muslim and the Palestine,

Barak Obama turned to the longstanding U.S. foreign: policy alliance system. In his Cairo speech of June 2009, he noted that ―Palestinians must abandon violence. Resistance through violence and killing is wrong and does not succeed‖405.

2.4.2 Iran : from containment to engagement

The most stimulating force in the Persian Gulf is Iran on which U.S. grand strategy was shaped since the downfall of the Iraq Regime. It was the second member of

―the Axis of Evil‖ according to President Bush and rogue State according to Presidents

Reagan and Clinton.

If George W. Bush, like Reagan intensified tension against Iran, Obama adopted

Nixon‘s détente by an attempt to bring Iran to the international community in mid 2000s as he managed to reach the nuclear deal which was the first deal since 1979. President Obama was the first U.S. President to negotiate ―with an Iranian Leader leader since 1979 when

405 Barack Obama, ―The President‘s Speech in Cairo: ‖, June 4, 2009, Online, internet, Mar. 14, 2016. Available: www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 150 President Jimmy Carter spoke to Mohammed Reza Pahlvi shortly before the Shaj left the country‖406 just after the 1979 Islamic revolution. It was therefore President Obama attempt, unlike his predecessors “to scrap the 35-year-old U.S.. policy of seeking to contain

Iranian influence in the Middle East‖407. This approach is a revival of the dual containment of the 1990s through what is known as ―active containment‖ to bring Iran into the international community. The United States engaged the major world power and the permanent members of the United Nations to form what was known as The P5+1. It consisted of the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, Germany and France as negotiators of the Iranian nuclear program.

The negotiations with a rival power, that was perceived as an enemy forover 35 years, was a new détente of the late 1960s and 1970s adopted by Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. This relaxation of tension was introduced as a consequence of the embroilment in the Vietnam War and the failure of the militarization of containment. The Iraq war as another type of aggressive containment and militarization of containment is likened to the

Vietnam in terms of causalities and public outrage. Obama‘s ―smart power‖ toward Iran could be perceived as cause and consequence for U.S. militarism in Iraq. The main objective was to include Iran to the international community and notably the United States sphere of influence. Iran was seen as serious threat to the United States existence especially when the military option was seen as ill-favorite choice against Iran due to the disastrous legacies of Iraq War. Iran was listed in President‘s Bush War on Terror. In

November 2001, Richard Perle assistant Secretary of Defense noted that ―Iraq would be

―phase two‖ in the war on terror followed by Iran, Libya, Syria, and Sudan408. William

406 Astrid Boening, The Arab Spring: Re-balancing the Greater Euro-Mediterranean (Springer, 2016) 71. 407 Editorial Board, ―An end to Iran‘s containment?,‖ March 12, 2015, Online, internet, Mar. 15, 2016. Available: https://www.washingtonpost.com. 408 Mary Buckley and Robert Singh, The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism: Global Responses, Global Consequences (London: Routledge, 2006) 110. 151 Bennett an American conservative pundit and politician who served in President Reagan and George W. Bush administration ―urged that the U.S. declare war on Iraq, Iran, Syria,

Libya, and whoever else harbored terrorists‖409. Iran therefore was on the United States agenda after Iraq. This was backed to the failure of the containment policy through sanctions which had been imposed successively from 1979 to 2009. Now the Obama administration moved away from this choice to more nuanced containment program that was directed to Iran and would be expanded to other rivals such as Cuba.

Obama initiatives toward Iran could not be seen as departure from the longstanding containment policy, even in the post-Cold War, is not accurate. It was a neo- containment strategy based on prioritizing engengement on confronation. The deal that was signed in 2015 although it was perceived as an achievement of Obama administration, it threatened U.S alliance system in the MENA especaillythe . Normalization of relation between Teheran and Washington and potential rapprochement could strengthen

Iran over its neighbors and especially the long stranding autocracies in the Persian Gulf and Israel. As a result, Secretary of state John Kerry stated in early March 2015 that ―we are seeking a grand bargain. We will not take our eye off of Iran‘s other destabilizing actions in places like Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula‖410. The United

States did not ignore the maintenance of the balance of power in the MENA. Kerry aimed to tranquilize U.S. allies which were threatened by Iran influence and power.

Approaching a ―constructive engagement‖ of Iran was an attempt to cut with the aggressive and military containment that had been deployed by George W. Bush to deploy the smart power. This could be seen as divergence toward a neo-containment strategy that may be more efficient, workable and more importantly acceptable by the international

409 Douglas M. K. Kellner, From 9/11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) 65. 410 Editorial Board, ―An end to Iran‘s containment?‖ The Washington Post March 12, 2015, online, internet, Mar. 15, 2016. Available: https://www.washingtonpost.com. 152 community. However, this policy was new toward Iran but not as an American grand strategy. The deal between Iran and the P5+1 was a renewal and referesh of the American alliance system that was shaken during the 2003 Iraq War. President Bush went to Iraq without the main European allies France and Germany. In 2015, the European allies including the United Kingdom were the main participant in the Iranian talks in addition to

Russia and China.

Because Libya and Syria were among the ―rogue states‖ that were perceived as hostile friends to the United States since Reagan administrations, Obama response to the uprisings occurred in these two countries in 2011 could be seen as a fulfillment of longstanding U.S. foreign policy. Presidents Reagan, Bush Senior, Clinton and Bush

Junior contained were pursuing a containment-plus to change the regime. In Libya when there was an opportunity to topple the Libyan regime of Maamar Ghaddafi in 2011, the

United States led a NATO campaign against Libya and overthrew the regime. This strategic mission was supported also by the Arab public opinion which was urgently needed by the Obama administration to pursue a regime change. The United States existence was more complicated because of the existence of the rival power and especially

Iran in the battlefield. The intervention of Russia also to protect the Syrian regime hardened the United States mission which remained a secondary actor. However, weakening the Syrian regime and the total destruction of its military capability fulfilled objectives that other powers made it on behalf of the United States.

The Obama administration‘s commitment could be summarized in his first speech on January 20, 2009 as he noted: ―To all the other peoples and governments who are watching today…know…that we are ready to lead once more‖411. The United States pursued a foreign policy of ―primacy‖ to contain rival powers in the MENA. The

411 The White House, ―President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 2009‖, Online, Internet April 2, 2016. Available: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/. 153 combination of soft power and hard power was Obama‘a approach which diifers from

President George W. Bush‘s heavy reliance on militarism. Howaver, terrorism remained the main perceived threat to the United States national security. The War on Terror in the

MENA therefore continued to be at the heart of the U.S. foreign policy during Obama two-term presidency. He increased troops in Afghanistan, returned other troops to Iraq in

2014 after their withdrawal in 2011 and more importantly, increased U.S. troops in 15 countries more than his predecessor President Bush. Then, although he criticized the War on Terror, ―he was a true believer in the ―War on Terror,‖ supporting and expanding the military operations ―in Afghanistan as well as US troop presence to 75 countries, 15 more than under the Bush Administration‖412. Then how did he put an end to the Waron Terror while he increased troops and engagement overseas. Obama therefore could be seen a continuation of Bush crusade but with more diplomatic rhetoric. He ―recycled the ‗War on

Terror' phrase, but this change was mainly cosmetic as other rhetorical flourishes and policy remained untouched‖413.

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union the reemergence of the classical theorem for creating national unity was no coincidence, but a political construction. The rogue states, terrorism threat, the WMD were means for the same ends that is construction of threat to substitute the communist threat of the Soviet Union. Sanctions and coercive economic tools were introduced by the United Nations and or the United States. They were supported by the United States‘ allies against any country hostile to the United States primacy. The economic, political and diplomatic sanctions had been an American strategy of containment during the Cold War and, continued during the George H Bush ‗New

World Order‘ and we argue a high degree during President Clinton administration from

412 Marc Barnett, ―American Exceptionalism and the Construction of the War on Terror: An Analysis of Counterterrorism Policies Under Clinton, Bush and Obama Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University ,‖ (November 2016) Online, Internet, April 10, 2016. Available: https://securitypolicylaw.syr.edu/. 413 Ibid. 154 1993 to 2001. Prior to the ‗War on Terror‘ in his earlier age before the March by the United States troops, ‗smart‘ sanctions were introduced to strengthen the previous ones against Iraq, targeting mainly more weakening of the military capabilities.

Leffler likened the goal of George W Bush foreign policy to the rhetoric of John

F. Kennedy‘s inaugural address, to ―oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty‖414. A more aggressive foreign policy based on militarism and display of power in contrast with ―the smart power‖ approach of Obama Administration. It could, we argue fall under what John Lewis Gaddis called ―asymmetric containment‖ a term was introduced by John Lewis Gaddis in his book Strategies of containment. This type of policy ―stresses the priority of certain region and the wisdom of dealing from strength‖415.

As far as a containment policy President George W Bush adopted the containment policy or to more accurate a neo-containment policy mainly toward the Middle East countries. Iraq was approached via the ―containment-Plus‖ regime change strategy which had been introduced by Madeline Albright in 1998 while an ―active containment‖ targeted

Iran, ―the Bush administration spent its first two years methodically and effectively rebuilding an international consensus behind containment. By the fall of 2002, it had constructed the core elements of an effective long-term containment system -- only to discard this achievement in favor of war416. The war, we argue, in the case of Iraq is a containment policy of some MENA countries such as Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Libya.

More than that it is a manifestation of power over traditional allies themselves as the

United States, unlike its post-Cold War intervention, went to Iraq unilaterally forming a

414 ―President John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address,‖ January 20, 1961, Papers of John F. Kennedy: President's Office Files, 01/20/1961-11/22/1963 (John F. Kennedy Library; National Archives and Records Administration). 415 Gaddis Smith and John L. Gaddis, ―Strategies of Containment,‖ Foreign Affairs. 60.4 (1982): 962. 416 George A Lopez and David Cortright, ―Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,‖ Foreign Affairs (2004): 90- 103. 155 ―coalition of the willing‖ outside the banner of the international community represented by the United Nations.

The containment for the regime change was a continuity of President Clinton

―dual containment in the 1990‘s that was the main objective of President Clinton dual containment in the 1990s. Then the claim that Bush War on Terror was a revolution in U.S. grand strategy was far from reality. A deep analysis of the major policy from 2001to 2009 showed that the construction of the terrorist threat and the WMD had initiated since the late 1980s and enlarged in the 1990s with President Clinton‘s administration.

156 4. Major Mechanisms of Containment from the Cold

War to the War on Terror

Throughout the Cold War, the United States implemented various strategies and means to contain the Soviet Union and its allies while at the same time endeavoring to expand its own sphere of influence in key areas. These strategies and means were deployed separately or in a combined way, depending on the circumstances. The fall of the Soviet

Union in the late 1980s and its official demise in 1991 did not produce any new policy paradigm to approach the post-Cold War era. The use of economic instruments as an initial tool to fulfill geopolitical objectives has remained a particular feature of the United States grand strategy of primacy that extended to the post-Cold war era and notably to the War on

Terror. The second mechanism which we argue was in continuity with the Cold War policy is defending democracy as an idealist motive that had been used by presidents from

Truman to Obama. Democratizing the world and assitinng ―subjected people who yearn for democary‖ was repeated rhetoric that is still used in the post-Cold War. The War on Terror was waged in the name of freeing the Afghani and Iraqi people from tyranny. The third mechanism studied in this chapter is the military and how the United States relied on military capabilities and complexes to deter the Soviet threat and then ant-Americanism in the MENA.

The main objective of this part is to focus on the means of implementing foreign policy objectives as an indicator for tracing the degree of continuity, if any, highlighting the consistency or inconsistency of the containment policy in the seemingly different eras and policymakers but who ended up ultimately following the same strategies to reach the same goals. This continuity and consistency are tested in major U.S foreign policies in key areas of the world but with a special focus on the MENA region to see how these

157 mechanisms were implemented and to what extent they were efficient in George Walker

Bush‘s and Barack Obama‘s War on Terror.

3.1 Economic containment

―Practice power by economic means‖417 has been the pillar of U.S. foreign policy through initiating foreign aids for some countries and economic sanctions and embargoes for others. This is known as economic containment or geo-economics. It was deployed during the Cold War and decreased in the post-Cold War era but then peaked abruptly during the War on Terror period. After a brief break, ―foreign aid returned to the Cold War level in the immediate 9/11attacks418.

Economic containment has two components. The first is how the United States grand strategy in the Cold War, and then the War on Terror, is driven mainly by economy as a means and end through continuous assistance to particular countries in particular regions and how this aid shifted heavily to particular areas such as the MENA and South

Asia in the post 9/11 era. The second is how economic sanctions were deployed to contain countries hostile to the United States and ran counter to its interests in a particular area of the world. Therefore, continuous assistance to specific countries and imposing economic sanctions or embargoes on others is a longstanding containment tradition that continued to exist in the post-Cold War era.

3.1.1 Economic aid

Although Economic aids was the pillar of the United States foreign policy in the early Cold War; the 9/11 attacks revived this strategy to become one of the most widely

417 Sören Scholvin and Mikael Wigell, ―Geo-Economics as Concept and Practice in International Relations: Surveying the State of the Art,‖ Finnish Institute of International Affairs (April 2018) online,Internet, March 20, 2019. Available: https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/dd73604f-ffee-44e2- 8960-4ecd8927fa32/pdf. 418 Robert K Fleck and Christopher Kilby, ―Changing Aid Regimes? U.s. Foreign Aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror,‖ Journal of Development Economics. 91.2 (2010): 185. 158 used tools, alongside diplomacy and the military. In the congressional research paper entitled ‗Foreign Aid: an introduction to U.S. programs and Policy‘ Marian L. Lawson and

Emily M. Morgenstern argued that: ―the focus of U.S. foreign aid policy has been transformed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Global development, a major objective of foreign aid, has been cited as a third pillar of U.S. national security, along with defense and diplomacy, in the national Security strategies of the George W. Bush and

Barack Obama Administrations‖419. Economic aids therefore linked to national security.

On September 22, 2010 in his remarks to the UN Millennium Development Goals Summit

President Obama announced a U.S. foreign aid shift to more effective foreign aids. ―As a

President‖ he noted ―I have made it clear. My national security strategy recognizes development not only as a moral imperative, but a strategic and economic imperative.‖420

Moreover, he engaged the various governmental and non-governmental NGO agencies to bolster economic aids. He added that:

―Secretary of State Clinton is leading a review to strengthen and better coordinate our diplomacy and our development efforts. We‘ve reengaged with multilateral development institutions. And we are rebuilding the United States Agency for International Development as the world‘s premier development agency. In short, we‘re making sure that the United States will be a global leader in international development in the 21st century‖421.

The rebuilding of the USAID is an attempt to depart from the Bush militarization of containment to using more economic power as a tool to influence the world. In this speech Obama pledged to increase the various types of economic and social aids such as the health care through the USAID. As for the MENA, foreign aids targeted U.S traditional allies such as Israel, Egypt and Jordon. Afghanistan and Iraq which had been

419 Marian L. Lawson and Emily M. Morgenstern, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.s. Programs and Policy, April 2019, Online, internet , June, 2, 2019. Available: https://crsreports.congress.gov. 420 Barack Obma, ―Remarks by the President at the Millennium Development Goals Summit in New York, September 22, 2010 New York,‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary September 22, 2010 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 421 Ibid. 159 under U.S economic embargoes before 9/11 became recipients of U.S. annual packages through the various federal agencies.

This mechanism had been the first and foremost U.S. containment policy since the growing antagonism with the Soviets in the immediate post- Second World War. The first containment program based on economic aid was the ―Truman Doctrine‖ which was initiated by President Harry Truman in March 1947, following his infamous speech in the

Congress in which he requested an approval of budget of $ 400 million to assist Turkey and Greece. The economic package was oriented to prevent a takeover of Communists in this area and therefore a loss of vital sphere of influence and especially access to the

Middle East. The second recovery program; the Marshall Plan, was for the same ends and targeted Europe, a continent that was devastated by WWII. It was initiated following

Secretary of State George Marshall‘s visit to Europe in 1948. He reported the poor conditions of Europe and her likely fall in the hands of the Communists, especially after

Czechoslovakia joined the Soviet Union sphere in 1948. Since then such programs became the core component of the containment policy. It has extended and expanded to minor programs such as isolating some countries from international markets and finance.

Economic aid was perceived as an efficient and working soft power for alignment with the donor. It aims to ―purchase political support‖422. President Kennedy enlarged the aid program to contain Communism. The glaring example is the USAID which was founded in

1961, the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. The Peace Corps, USAID, and the

Alliance for Progress Vietnam received the lion share of aid in the 1960s. In the 1970s and for geostrategic interests, there was a remarkable increase in assistance to the Middle East and notably Egypt and Israel following the Camp David accord of 1978. In the 1980s: ―the

422James Lee, ―Economic Aid and the Strategy of Containment,‖ International Political Economy Society (Nov. 2017) online, internet, 2 Feb. 2018. Available: https://www.internationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/sites/default/files/paper-uploads/2017-11-07- [email protected]. 160 Reagan administration had started funneling the same kind of money into El Salvador,

Honduras, Guatemala, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Zaire.

3.1.2 Aids as national security

In Congressional research on U.S. foreign aids, it is stated that: ―Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign aid has increasingly been associated with national security policy‖423. This statement was enhanced by Fleck, Robert who argued that in the aftermath of the 9/11: ―aid reemerged as an important geopolitical tool to the State

Department‖424. In this regard, the question to be asked is what similarities can be drawn between the Cold War and the War on Terror?

George W. Bush‘s U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 NSS2002 brought back to light foreign aid as a main tool in the global War on Terror. Chapter six of the

NSS2002, which is entitled ―Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth Through Free

Markets and Free Trade‖, begins by quoting from George Bush‘s speech in Monterrey,

Mexico on March 22, 2002 in which he stated that: ―when nations close their markets and opportunity is hoarded by a privileged few, no amount – no amount – of development aid is ever enough. When nations respect their people, open markets, invest in better health and education, every dollar of aid, every dollar of trade revenue and domestic capital is used more effectively‖425. The insistence on aid as a means to fight terrorism and development is not a new in the presidential discourse but the heavy focus on it demonstrates the importance of economic aid in President Bush‘s discourse and national security programs. This tendency was translated into National Security adviser

Condoleezza Rice as she noted that: ―President Bush and the United States of America are

423 Curt Tarnoff and Emily M. Morgenstern, Foreign Aid: an Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, April 2018, online, internet, June, 2, 2019. Available: https://crsreports.congress.gov. 424 Robert K Fleck and Christopher Kilby, "Changing Aid Regimes? U.s. Foreign Aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror," Journal of Development Economics. 91.2 (2010): 185. 425 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: Executive Office of the President, 2002) 17. 161 committed to channeling our noble energies into an effort to encourage development and education and opportunity throughout the world, including the Muslim world.‖426 The focus on development and education in the less developed countries and especially allies was seen for cooperation and more importantly alignment with the United States against states accused of sponsoring terrorism.

The frontline countries were the major recipients of the U.S. aid. In 2002, for example, 28 countries that either cooperated in the War on Terror or were menaced by the terrorists received the share lions of foreign assistance427. And in 2004 President Bush ordered ―$657 million for Afghanistan, $460 million for Jordan, $395 million for Pakistan, and $255 million for Turkey‖428. This aid could not be seen as assistance to deter the terrorist threat but mostly for purchasing political support and alignment. Bolstering or purchasing alliance was necessary for the United States to pursue its agenda especially in

Iraq and Afghanistan. President Bush founded a new agency to cope with the new threat economically and humanitarian alongside the military, the Millennium Challenge

Corporation (MCC). It was President Bush‘s project following a statement in the inter-

American Development Bank meeting in March 2002 in which he pledged an increase of

50% in US aid as a response to the terrorism threat by 2006 and another double in 2010429.

3.1.3 The USAID

Foreign aid was institutionalized and bolstered by President Kennedy who enacted the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961 by which the United States Agency for International

Development, USAID, was founded. It was seen as the second ―milestone for foreign

426 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ―Remarks by the National Security Advisor to the Conservative Political Action Conference,‖ February 1, 2002. Online, internet 25 Mar.2017. Available: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020201-6.html. 427 Bahram M Rajaee and Mark J. Miller, National Security Under the Obama Administration (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 315. 428 Steven C Radelet, ―Bush and Foreign Aid,‖ Foreign Affairs. 825 (2003): 104-117. 429 ―About MCC,‖ Millennium Challenge Corporation (September 4, 2016) online, internet 30 Mar.2016 available: https://www.mcc.gov/about. 162 assistance‖ following Truman and the Marshall Plan, which ―marked a significant increase in U.S. foreign assistance efforts … whose primary focus was long-term global development to include economic and social progress.‖430 USAID‘s stated role is to

―advance U.S. national security and economic prosperity, demonstrates American generosity, and (to) promote a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience.‖431 The assistance then aimed to advocate national security through consolidating the alliance system in key regions and maintaining a working sphere of influence. However, the claim that its main goal is to develop other states‘ economies or prosperity and a sign of

American generosity toward underdeveloped states is inaccurate. USAID was a key player in the Cold War containment policy. It managed the flow of various types of aids to countries of particular significance to the United States such as Latin America and the

Middle East.

In continuity with the Cold War containment policy, USAID was oriented to the national security objective in the War on Terror: ―In the post 9/11, USAID, has been undergoing a transformation that will more closely align its activities with the State

Department and the Pentagon‖432. The coordination with the federal agencies and departments in the War on Terror became a priority during Presidents Bush and Obama administrations. This transformation signaled a departure from its main role in providing economic assistance to coordinating and executing the foreign policy agenda. Interestingly in 2005, the USAID‘s new department the Office Military Affairs (OMA) was founded ―to serve as the focal point for interaction between USAID and the Department of Defense

430 ―What is U.S. Government Foreign Assistance?,‖ Foreign Assistance.GOV,online, internet 5 April, 2016. Available: www.foreignassistance.gov. 431 ―What We Do,‖ U.S. Agency for International Development, online internet, July 20, 2016. Available: https://www.usaid.gov/. 432 Bill Berkowitz ―Politics: Remaking USAID for a Permanent War on Terror?,‖ Inter Presse Service Jan 27 2006, online, internet July 29, 2017. Available: http://www.ipsnews.net. 163 DOD433. It therefore shifted from a basically humanitarian and development project to outwardly promoting political and military concerns that were in tight relation with the administration strategic interests throughout the world. USAID‘s role in the War on Terror is in continuity with the Cold War policy; however the difference lies in its role that became explicitly and publically associated with the security and political institutions.

USAID‘s main function was to coordinate and cooperate with the Department of State and the Pentagon to ―fund many of the assistance and training programes, which are in keeping with President Bush‘s stated goal, as expressed in a recent radio address, ‗to pursue a confident foreign policy agenda that will spread freedom and hope and make our nation more secure‘‖434.

3.1.4 Forms of aids

The USAID, the Department of State alongside dozens of agencies and departments have been committed to managing and providing foreign aid. These economic aids were, we argue, for geopolitical and economic objectives rather than for humanitarian.

First, countries that benefited from these aides were meant to remain in the United States sphere of influence as soon as they receive the aids. Moreover, they cooperated with

Washington in containing the Soviet Union and in the post-Cold War aligned with the

United States foreign policy overseas and especially in the Persian Gulf. Secondly these programs were beneficial not only for the strategic goals abroad but also to the American economic machines as well. The federal agencies recruited American corporation to deliver services or products to foreign states. 70% of the amount was given in forms of

433 Military Review: The Professional Journal of the United States Army (Fort Leavenworth, Kan: US Army Command & Gen. Staff Coll, 1994) 106. 434 Tomas E Cooney, ed, Improving Lives: Military Humanitarian and Assistance Program ( Diane Publishing) 1. 164 commodities supplied by American companies 435 and not cash. The rest varied depending on the significance of these countries to the United States and the American economy as a whole.

The aid was given in the form of food, grants to buy equipment, improvements to transport systems, and everything 'from medicine to mules'. Most (70 per cent) of the money was used to buy commodities from US suppliers: $3.5 billion was spent on raw materials; $3.2 billion on food, feed and fertilizer; $1.9 billion on machinery and vehicles; and $1.6 billion on fuel‖436.

The economic aids have been increasingly supplied by U.S companies as services, equipment etc. if 70 % of aids were given as grants:

―Assistance can take the form of cash transfers, equipment and commodities, infrastructure, or technical assistance, and, in recent decades, is provided almost exclusively on a grant rather than loan basis.‖

3.1.5 Fighting Poverty as a containment policy

On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall stated the Marshall Plan was

―against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." And so did President Truman. Poverty has been depicted by the successive policymakers as a threat to the United States national security. It is stated that from the American perspective: ―global poverty and inequality threaten U.S. security and national interests‖ during the Cold War and then the War on

Terror. Although foreign aid returned back to the Cold War level and even more so in the post 9/11, it was oriented to countries of special interests to the United States. These countries are in the front-line countries or the close allies notably in the War on

Afghanistan and Iraq

435 ―The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan,‖ BBC News Nov. 26, 2017, online, internet Jan. 6, 2018. Available: https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zx9782p/revision/2. 436 Ibid. 165 Much like the Cold War, poverty was depicted as either the main cause or the fertile ground where terrorism flourishes, according U.S. official discourse. This hypothesis was supported by some economists while rejected by others. Some research on the link between terrorism and poverty has shown, for example, the inaccuracy of the hypothesis that poverty is the main reasons of terrorism. In his book What Makes a

Terrorist?: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism, Alan B. Krueger ensures the absence of any remarkable links between poverty and terrorism. ―The bottom line from the work of hate crimes which carries over my research on the economics of terrorism is that poor economic conditions do not seem to motivate people to participate in terrorist activities… there is very little support for connection between poverty and terrorism‖437. From this we can deduce that the economic motives that the United States Presidents and policy makers use to justify the need to assist countries lack the accuracy. Kruger et. al, added that ―so many prominent, well intended world leaders and scholars would draw this connection without having an empirical basis for it‖438. This could explain the urge to implement an economic containment policy which supposedly would automatically guarantee the alignment with the U.S.

Bush‘s adherence to economic aid as a means of containment was articulated several times in his speeches. On March 14, 2002, six months after 9/11 events, he ordered a ―three-year $5 billion increase conditioned by initiating reforms and open markets‖439.

He added that ―Persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair.

And when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror‖440. His continuous insistence on economic aid to contain

437Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism ( Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 2018) 12. 438Ibid. 439George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush (Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2002) 409. 440Ibid. 166 terrorism was also highlighted in an international conference on Financing for

Development in Monterrey, Mexico on March 22, 2002 when he stated: ―we fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror”441. These statements could be likened to

Truman speech in a joint session of congress in which he stated that ―Totalitarian regimes spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife‖ and that ―it must be the policy of the

United States to support free people who resist attempted subjection by armed minorities or by outside pressure‖442. Bush‘s justification of economic aid in the immediate aftermath of the onset of his War on Terror was then nearly the same of as Truman‘s 55 years previously, when the antagonism was intensified between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

President Bush amidst the War on Terror targeted poor countries (social and health problems such as diseases like AIDS in Africa and so did his successor President

Obama who carried on the same path. One unstated objective behind the championing of these programs was that ―foreign aid allows the United States to project ‗soft power‘ to accompany, and sometimes offset, its use of military power‖443.

President Obama focused on poverty as a threat to national security and encouraged wealthy nations to contribute to American efforts in lifting countries out of poverty. Poverty then ―feeds the despair that can fuel instability and violent extremism‖444.

Therefore, providing aid to needy countries could: ―advance the prosperity and security of people far beyond their borders, including my fellow Americans.‖ This explains President

Obama‘s tendency to offer ―nations and peoples a path out of poverty‖445.

441Ibid., 473. 442 Daniel S Papp, Loch K. Johnson, and John E Endicott, American Foreign Policy: History, Politics and Policy ( New York: Pearson Longman, 2005) 159. 443 Steven C. Radelet, ―Bush and Foreign Aid,‖ Foreign Affairs. 825 (2003): 104-117. 444 Barack Obama, ―Remarks by the President at the Millennium Development Goals Summit in New York, New York, September 22, 2010 The White House Office of the Press Secretary online, internet,Aug. 5 2018. Available: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov 445Ibid. 167 Fighting poverty through economic aid was typically a Cold War strategy that aimed at containing the Soviet influence and preventing countries from falling into communism. In addition to the Truman Doctrine which targeted mainly Greece and Turkey in the early Cold War, another crucial program also targeted Europe was the Marshall Plan.

It was outlined by Truman‘s Secretary of State George Marshall when he stated on June 5,

1947 that the United States ―should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health to the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace‖446. It is therefore the economic aid, according to George Marshall, that leads to political stability and peace. This affirmation echoes the Bush campaign for economic aid in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks as a response to the terrorist threat in the word and notably the MENA. Like the Cold War, nearly all U.S. presidents relied on economic aid to target poverty in their War on communism and then the War on Terror.

Much like communism and terrorism, poverty is needed to turn the American foreign policy machine. Intervening overseas for lifting peoples out of poverty or disease could provide a benevolent image of the United States as it contributes to the welfare of nations. The second is that it demonstrates the human aspect of the United States, far from militarism and imperialism ―The United States needs poor countries to support the values it champions and to believe that they, too, can achieve openness and prosperity. But they need U.S. support to make it happen‖447. Then the United States‘ role became indispensable to the countries‘ prosperity. In turn they had to demonstrate a declared alignment with U.S. foreign policy. ―President Bush famously demanded in the aftermath

446 Robert G Torricelli and Andrew Carroll, In Our Own Words: Extraordinary Speeches of the American Century (New York: Kodansha International, 1999) 165. 447 Steven C Radelet, ―Bush and Foreign Aid,‖ Foreign Affairs. 825 (2003): 104-117. 168 of September 11 that countries would have to choose to be either with the United States or with the terrorists‖448.

Fighting poverty as the main objective behind the different U.S. foreign aid programs could be seen as an inaccurate hypothesis. Moreover, the objective of aid has not aimed to lift peoples out of poverty but to lessen its effects to maintain the indispensable relation with the recipient countries. Issuing economic and social program is a continuation of the Cold War containment policy that had initiated by President Truman and still in effect.

3.1.6 The Middle East and North Africa: specific region for economic aid

Presidents Bush and later on Obama focalized on this key region, notably the

Middle East and North Africa, much like Eisenhower did in late 1957 when he initiated his doctrine to provide economic and military assistance to Egypt, one of the most influential countries not only in the Middle East but also the Arab Muslim world. The huge amount of economic aid to the MENA, and notably Egypt, is motivated by the geo-economic objectives in the region. The aid is meant to result in reinforcing alliances with the United

States and to influence these populations‘ perceptions and world views: ―By coming to the table, the Arab States become more pro-American and Israeli conception of the new

Middle East‖449.

Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon and Carter followed the same path of Truman by orienting the economic assistance to specific countries to contain the Soviets and so did

Presidents Reagan and George Bush in the late 1980s and early 1990s, then Clinton in the inter-war era that is 1991-2000. In his speech on U.S. War in Vietnam in November 1969,

448 Ibid. 449 Ibid. 169 Richard Nixon refereed to President Dwight Eisenhower‘s economic assistance to

Vietnam, claiming that ―President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover‖450.

This economic aid can be likened to the huge budget that was directed to countries that are perceived today to be threatened by terrorism. The economic assistance to U.S. allies in the

War on Terror and especially the MENA peaked remarkably while it skyrocketed to the main targeted countries, namely Iraq and Afghanistan.

The NNS 2002 like the Truman Doctrine and Eisenhower Doctrine and even

President Carter‘s policy focalized on aid to the Middle East and North Africa as a key area to the American interests. Among the well known assistance programs is The Middle

East Partnership Initiative. It was initiated by Secretary of State Colin Powell to provide various types of assistance and notably economic to 17 Middle Eastern and North African countries as a response to the terrorist threat, according to Powell. The budget devoted to such program has increased steadily. It started by an amount of $29 million in the early

2003 but more than doubled in 2005 to reach $75 million and remarkably skyrocketed with the Obama administration to $530 million451.

The vast majority of these big amounts were poured into specific areas, i.e., the

Middle East and South Asia as a soft power to bolden the alliances, influence the domestic and foreign policy of these states so that they both serve U.S. interests in the region and not to challenge U.S. existence and policy in the region. ―Foreign aid seeks to directly influence the governments and peoples that receive the aid to act in ways that are in

450 Richard A Harris and Daniel J. Tichenor, A History of the U.s. Political System: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions (ABC-CLIO, 2009) 324. 451 Steven C Radelet, ―Bush and Foreign Aid,‖ Foreign Affairs. 825 (2003): 104-117. 170 accordance with US interests or to not act in ways that are deleterious to US interests.……. in countries crucial to US interests, such as those in the Middle East and South Asia‖452.

It is worth stressing that, based on these assumptions; we can deduce that the U.S. policy of containment is based on economic factors rather than national security concern.

The Afghan and Iraqi regimes threatened U.S. geostrategic interests and notably free access to oil. It is comparable to the policy of the Cold War era as the United States was fundamentally acting according to its economy and especially to advance the interests of big corporations, depicting communism as a serious threat worth fighting. At this level the construction of the suitable identification of key terms in U.S. foreign policy and therefore the proscription of nations, groups or individuals, was basically an American strategy to manage the perceived threat legally, economically diplomatically and military.

3.1.7 Economic rewards

Foreign aid could be attributed only as a reward of alignment or at least non- opposition of U U.S. foreign policy in certain areas. The ―U.S as provides aid to reward its clients for maintaining … instead of using aid to promote development‖453. The economic assistance is conditioned by cooperation with the United States in its foreign affairs; otherwise the aid is cut or reduced. Jordan is one example as U.S. aid was curtailed to around 75% as a response to King Hussein‘s ignoring the U.S request to fight with the coalition forces against Iraq in 1991454. In the same context, countries were rewarded with economic aid for their contribution and cooperation to the U.S. War on Terror.

452 Carolina B Ana, ―American Foreign Aid: Recent Trends in Goals and Allocation,‖ Social Sciences Journal. 10.1 (2017). 453 James Lee, ―Economic Aid and the Strategy of Containment,‖ International Political Economy Society (Nov. 2017) online, internet, Feb.2, 2018. Available: https://www.internationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/sites/default/files/paper-uploads/2017-11-07. 454 Avi Shlaim, Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace (New York: Vintage Books, a division of Random House, 2009). 171 The donor‘s primary goal is to influence the foreign policy of the recipient, with economic development being of secondary importance. ―It is worth noting that the end of the Cold War and the perceived fall of the communist Soviet threat did not put an end to economic aid which continued in the inter-war era. The average of foreign aid in the era

1955-1989 was $16.9 billion annually, an amount that was slightly reduced to $15.2 billion in the interwar period 1989-2001 but that nearly doubled in the first five years of the

Global War on Terror as it reached $25 billion455.

Figure 1: U.S. Economic aid: Cold War, Inter War period aand War on Terror

Banfield states that: ―The idea that a nation should promote the welfare of other nations is new in the history of political thought and of international relations.‖456 This statement credibility questions the notion of economic aid in U.S. foreign policy as a means to assist people all over the world. Another crucial point is that 9/11 provided the purpose for providing aid byBush and Obama administrations to focus on an area of great importance to the U.S. economy: the MENA. The shift of the focus was in accordance to

U.S economic world interests that mainly concern the oil-rich countries.

In brief, economic assistance is functional means of containment that contributed to U.S. welfare more than to that of recipient countries and achieved remarkable success in

456Carolina B Ana, ―American Foreign Aid: Recent Trends in Goals and Allocatio,‖ Social Sciences Journal. 10.1 (2017). 172 maintaining vital countries in its sphere of influence. ―U.S. policymakers regularly employed economic means to achieve strategic interests‖457 in vital areas such as the

MENA.

Economic aid to Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries was to purchase political support, alignment with U.S. foreign policy and especially free access to natural resources, such as oil and containing rival power such as

Iran and Russia.

3.2 Defending democracy as a means of containment

Tony Smith states that ―trying to understand American foreign policy through the twentieth century without reference to American democracy is almost impossible‖458. This means that the notion of defending democracy characterized the U.S. foreign policy throughout the 20th century as it was the duty of the United States to promote democracy in the world in general. The waves of democratization motivated U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War and it is assumed that it continued during the post-cold War era and mainly the War on Terror era.

So what does ―defending democracy‖ mean? And how did American presidents use ―democracy‖ rhetoric to contain? What exactly is the United States defending when it defends ―democracy‖? Is there a common democratic standard which has been applied for all states? If so what is the standard all about? Or, is there ―a United States standard for democracy‖ that is particular to some countries and not others? Is this mechanism consistent over time? Has there been continuity in utilizing the same slogan in the post-

457 Robert D, Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, ―The Lost Art of Economic Statecraft: Restoring an American Tradition,‖ Foreign Affairs. 95.2 (2016): 99-110. 458 Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch and Nicolas Bouchet, US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From to Barack Obama (Routledge. 2013) 1. 173 Cold War era and notably the so-called War on Terror? If so, to what extent was the democracy issue implemented in the War on Terror and currently the Arab uprisings?

This part looks at the U.S. foreign policy of containment in defense of this standard, as it is applied to the post-Cold War era and notably the War on Terror with reference to major phases of the Cold War. It is a comparative perspective analysis of how

American presidents portray this standard with regards to the substance of U.S. policy actions. It especially looks at the Cold War notion of containment to see if it is a workable notion in the 21st century foreign policy arena and notably the U.S. War on Terror – and therefore whether it represents the standard.

Defending democracy‖ and democratization of the world could be considered simultaneously as a traditional mechanism that was to be renewed and exploited in the U.S. global War on Terror. This mechanism was a core component of the United States foreign policy of containment during the Cold War and even before. Defending democracy has been the slogan for waging the War on Terror in the MENA in the Post 9/11 era, during the

George Bush and continued into Obama administrations. Recently, the United States committed itself in the early the Arab uprisings, championing the advocacy of democracy and free elections in the MENA.

The democratization of the world during George Walker Bush‘s presidency started in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and progressed to a ‗coercive democracy‘‘ that targeted mainly Afghanistan and Iraq. The mission was to democratize these two countries as Bush stated in 2005 ―our efforts to help the Iraqi people build a lasting democracy in the heart of the Middle East‖. He added that ―citizens in that region have been victims and

174 subjects -- they deserve to be active citizens‖459. Interestingly, the United States commitment in the democratization of the greater Middle East- which covers the Middle

East countries plus Afghanistan, Turkey - could be traced back to neo-Wilsonianism, in

Fukyama‘s words. It echoes President George W. Bush‘s declaration of enforcing democracy which can be seen corercive containment.

To justify the American troops‘ mission, George W. Bush claimed that the United

States aims to liberate ―subjected people‖ who were oppressed by the Taliban regime in

Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein‘s dictatorship in Iraq. Such claim could be likned to the early Cold War Truman Doctrine‘s speech and his commitment to support subjected people in the globe, referring to the people of the communist countries. Truman pledged to defend Democracy and support subjugated peoples throughout the globe. In his joint speech in the Congress on March 12, 1947, in which he announced the Truman Doctrine,

Therefore, democracy and liberation was an integral part of the Cold War policy of containment. It was based on the strategy and rhetoric, of defending American values such as defending democracy in the communist countries. The democratization of the world and the enlargement of democratic values mission continued and became in itself a grand strategy in the inter-War period, that is, from the end of the Cold War to September 11,

2001. Democratic enlargement was the new containment policy during the Bill Clinton administration from 1993 to 2001. Then the War on Terror was waged under the democratic rhetoric. The lack of democracy in the MENA was, like poverty, perceived as a fertile ground for terrorism and therefore the United States was committed to spreading democracy to fight terror.

459 George W Bush, ―President's Remarks at Jon Kyl for Senate Dinner‖, November 28, 2005, George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush (Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2010) 1788.

175 It is worth noting that both the Afghani and Iraqi governments grew hostile to the

United States and had been outside the American sphere of influence in the inter-wars period- that is between the Cold War and War on Terror. The Afghan regime opposed the

California Energy Company Unocal‘s request to build pipelines to pump oil and gas across

Afghanistan. Such interest was the matter of concern of American oil corporations and policymakers who had been trying to reach an agreement with Taliban members since before 9/11460. The Taliban aggression and undemocratic governance and violation of human rights, and notably women‘s rights, were not condemned by the United States in the

1990s in the hope that the pipelines project would be approved by the Talibans. But with the rejection of U.S. interests in the region, along with hosting Osama Ben Laden who called for immediate withdrawal of the American troops from the Middle East and notably

Saudi Arabia, it turned into being a great enemy in the late 1990s. As Afghanistan became a serious threat to American business in the region, the overthrow of Taliban was moved up to being a U.S. policy priority. ―Democratization‖ of Afghanistan and helping the subjected Afghans to get rid of the Talban regime was depicted as the main reason behind the call for democratization.

The non-alignment of any government with the United States interests could lead to its classification as undemocratic and authoritarian. Iraq had been an American ally in the Middle East since in the 1980s. It was committed to a proxy war against Iran on behalf of the United States. During the war there was neither condemnation of violation of human rights nor criticisms based on lack of democracy, but things was changed in the 1990s when Saddam Hussein crossed over the red line drawn by the American administration and challenged U.S. leadership by invading Kuwait, threatening U.S. interests in one of the

460Seth Stevenson, ―Pipe Dream: The origin of the "bombing-Afghanistan-for-oil-pipelines theory,‖ SLATE News and Politics Dec, 6, 2001, Online, internet, Oct.17, 2017. Availbale: https://slate.com/culture/2001/12/is-the-afghan-war-about-an-oil-pipeline.html. 176 most oil-rich countries. The non-alignment and rivalry of Iraq to the United States and its tendency to join other spheres of influence was counter to the U.S. geostrategic agenda in the area. Iraq was important to U.S. interests as the world‘s second biggest producer of oil and a fertile country for international business. Therefore, a regime change through coercive democratization was meant to bring in pro-American rulers. In the Bush administration, political analysts highlight the importance of democratic imperialism and the deployment of military to promote democracy.

President Bush‘s use of democracy promotion as a frame for the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq and the U.S. war on terror more generally (with its emphasis on Bush‘s ―Freedom Agenda‖) changed many people‘s view of the democracy promotion enterprise. Western democracy assistance was no longer seen as a post-Cold War effort to foster a globalizing set of political values, but instead as the hard political edge of a newly militaristic, interventionist U.S. geo- strategy‖461.

Like foreign assistance and fighting poverty, which were fought with coordination with the military, President Bush transcended the traditional role of the NGO agencies like the USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in providing assistance for defending democracy, to the imposition of democracy by military means.

Because of its geostrategic importance to the United States, the Middle East was the main targeted area for democratization in the post-Cold War era. President Clinton‘s dual containment and democratic enlargement were mainly a Middle East approach to contain two major adversaries Iran and Iraq. The War on Terror was also waged under the democratization of the Middle East. President George W. Bush expressed his endorsement to ―defending democracy‖ in the world as an American value. On November 7, 2003, in a statement to the NED he noted that: ―commitment to democracy is also tested in the

Middle East, which is my focus today, and must be a focus of American policy for decades

461 Thomas Carothers, ―U.S. Democracy Promotion During and After Bush,‖ (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007). 177 to come in many nations of the Middle East‖462. Then it became an engagement to democratize the Middle East. This commitment was recommended to the upcoming

American administration. In fact both his predecessor and successor followed the same path in bolstering U.S. leadership in the MENA through advocating democracy.

Unlike the deployment of the military to democratize the Middle East, President

Obama adopted soft power rather than hard power. This could be seen as an attempt to use

Kennedy‘s ―win hearts and minds‖ strategy that refers to the strategy and programs used by the U.S. governments towards during the Vietnam War to win the popular support of the Vietnames people and to help defeat the Viet Cong insurgency. Pacification, or hearts and minds objectives were often in diametric opposition to the strategy of mobilizing the militiary. This was in line with the Obama administration‘s departure from military mobilization. It was from his early months as president that he vowed to defend democracy in the MENA in his speech at Cairo University in June 2009. ―Obama‘s promotion of democracy was based mainly on ‗partnerships‘ and ‗sustainability‘ in its efforts to create the long-term conditions for freedom, peace and prosperity‖463. Restoring the MENA people‘s confidence and initiating partnership programs were the main strategy of the

Obama administration. It was also executed through existing institutions that had been working for the same goal such as ―USAID, NED, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), the

National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the International Republican Institute (IRI), along with a global network of democracy promotion leaders, NGOs and activists.‖464

The democratization of the Muslim world started by Afghanistan and Iraq and was target other specific countries of special interests to the United States. President

462George W. Bush, ―Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,‖ George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush: 2001- (Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 2003) 1470. 463 Emiliano Alessandri, Hassan Oz and Ted Reinert, ―U.S. Democracy Promotion from Bush to Obama,‖ Eurspring ( April 2015), online, internet, Feb,17,2016. Available: http://aei.pitt.edu/64170/1/us_dem_promotion_april15.pdf 464 Ibid. 178 George W. Bush stated he would target other Middle Eastern countries. Iraq was the ―latest front in the global democratic revolution‖465 that the United States was leading while highlighting U.S. achievements in democratizing Iraq. So the commitment is a moral one and is in defense of the democratic values that the United States has stood for throughout history. In the case of Iraq, ―defending democracy‖ rhetoric was highlighted by the Bush administration as the main objective behind regime change. This was due to failure of proving the link between Saddam Hussien and terrorism and WMD, which were stated as the main objectives of the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In his speech, Bush applauds some states that he considered as democratic or on the road to democracy, such as Bahrain, Oman, Morocco, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait and

Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Meanwhile, he mentioned other countries which were not as democratic such as Iran. However, one wonders about the type of democracy that

President Bush praisee in the Middle East. The Economist Intelligence Unit‘s measure of democracy released the 2007 report which segments the world‘s countries into four sections, ranked according to their adherence to democracy. The first 28 countries are designated as ‗full democracy‘; the following 54 countries as ‗flawed democracy‘ the 70 countries that are labeled as ‗hybrid regimes‘ whereas the last ranking 55 are designated as

‗Authoritarian regimes‘. Interestingly, the Middle East praised countries by Bush are considered authoritarian regimes according to the Economist Democracy Index466. And by the end of his administration and even by the end of the Obama administration, there was no advancement of democracy in these countries.

465 George W. Bush, ―Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,‖ (6 Nov. 200) George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush: 2001- (Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 2003) 1470. 466“Democracy Index 2007”: The Economist Intelligence Unit‟s index of democracy, online, internet, Nov. 20, 2018. Availbale: https://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf 179 The United States designation of countries based on their democratization has been endowed with geopolitical interests. Some are monarchial systems that are based on a monopoly of decisions and appointments. In the other countries mentioned, like Yemen and Egypt, the same president had been governing for more than two decades. Bush classifying them as ―on their way towards democracy‖ could be explained by their alignment with the United States in its war on terrorism, whereas rival countries were designated as undemocratic, Iran. Bush noted that: ―the demand for democracy is strong and broad… the regime in Tehran must heed the democratic demands of the Iranian people or lose its last claim to legitimacy‖467. It was a continuous call, from the Clinton to Obama calling for democracy in Iran while turning blind-eye on autocratic monarchies.

The praise or condemnation of the Middle East countries in term of democracy, have been based on their relations with the United States. Egypt, Yemen and the monarchial states have been traditional allies of the United States and therefore their lack of democracy, freedom and human rights violations have been silenced. Applauding democracy in these countries does not correspond to reality, to say the least, and at the same time, criticizing Iran based on its democracy is a blatant double standard in George

Bush Jr‘s speech. At this point, we can deduce that Washington‘s policy of ―defending democracy‖ translates into recommending and recognizing democracy in particular countries while defending and turning a blind eye to the undemocratic state of others. This ambivalence and double standard were unveiled in the Palestine election with the victory of the Hamas movement in Gaza strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. Despite its encouragement for a democratic election in Palestine, Washington did not welcome the

467 George W. Bush, ―Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,‖ (6 Nov. 200) George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush: 2001- (Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 2003) 1470. 180 Hamas victory. Washington then aimed to annul the result and prevent a coalition government between the two factions: Fatah and Hamas468.

The United States took the responsabilty to liberate people of some undemocratic countries. Cuba, Burma and North Korea, Iran and Iraq are some examples which have been hostile to the United States since the Cold War469. Thus, the U.S. is committed to target such countries which have been outside the U.S. sphere of influence. Despite the longstanding diplomacy and military containment, these countries were far from being contained and continued to threaten U.S. primacy in strategic areas. The mission therefore was enhancing the Wilsonian democratic ideals that the United States has the right to advance throughout the world. North Korea was labeled as one of ―the axis of evil‖ in

Bush‘s speech in 2002 and until 2009 it remained ―a rogue state‖ alongside Cuba and Iran.

The Bush democratic agenda, which had started with Afghanistan in 2001, covered Iraq in

2003 and North Korea, and could have been the ―next undemocratic domino to fall,‖470 if the Iraq campaign had succceded.

During the two terms of Bush Jr.‘s presidency, the democratization issue was exploited heavily to justify Washington‘s intervention in foreign countries. More importantly, policies of ―defending democracy,‖ and supporting freedom and liberation of oppressed people during the early Cold war continued through Truman‘s early Cold war discourses. Thus, democracy was a means and a mechanism of containment of states that were not in the US sphere of influence since the early Cold War. It aimed either to bring unfriendly and challenging states into Washington‘s orbit or to punish them. ―Defending

468John B Judis, ―Clueless in Gaza: New evidence that Bush undermined a two-state solution,‖ New Republic Feb. 19, 2013. Online, internet, Mar. 20, 2017. Availbale: https://newrepublic.com/article/112456/george-w- bushs-secret-war-against-hamas. 469George W. Bush, ―Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,‖ (6 Nov. 200) George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush: 2001- (Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 2003) 1470. 470 John Feffer, ―After Iran, Is North Korea Next?,‖ Foreign Policy in Focus (Feb 2013) online,internet , 2 Feb. 2017. Availbale: https://fpif.org/after-iran-is-north-korea-next/. 181 democracy‖ is by all means the defense of U.S. geopolitical and economic interests rather than for the advancement of democratic values and principles.

The second phase of the U.S. War on Terror and the defense of democracy in the globe and mainly in the Middle East manifested itself in Obama‘s speech at Cairo

University. He stated that it is the United States‘ responsibility to defend democracy, which was followed by a famous speech at Cairo University on April 4, 2009 in which he renewed the American commitment to defend democratic ideas through the globe stating that: ―These are not just American ideas; they are human rights. And that is why we will support them everywhere471. Obama enthusiastically reminded his audience of Abraham

Lincoln‘s famous government of the people by the people and for the people. He added,

―Governments that protect these rights are ultimately more stable, successful and secure.

And we will welcome all elected, peaceful governments – provided they govern with respect for all their people‖472. But throughout his presidency, defending democracy was more rhetoric than actions. By the end of his presidency, the Middle Eastern states remained at the bottom of democratic states with unconditional support for autocracies in the MENA.

Obama was aware of the controversy surrounding the democratic rhetoric that his predecessors had been championing in public but opposing in practice: ―I know there has been controversy about the promotion of democracy in recent years,‖ he stated, in relation mainly to the Iraq war, and ensured that the Iraq of 2009 was better than it was before

March 2003. He highlighted the controversy had been mentioned before in Egypt by

Condoleezza Rice in a speech at the American University in Cairo on June 20, 2005. She admitted then, that ―for 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the

471Barck Obama, ―Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 6-04 -09‖, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 4 June 2009, online, internet Jan.16, 2014. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-cairo-university-6-04-09. 472 Ibid. 182 expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither.

Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people‖473, referring to Bush‘s commitment to promote democracy when he said: ―Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, to attain their own freedom, and to make their own way‖474. But Rice admitted the ambivalence of U.S. policy in defending democracy in the previous 60 years, i.e. since the onset of the Cold War, while Obama mentioned the ambivalence and only the controversy in the recent years, i.e. Bush, Jr.‘s presidency. Both Obama and Bush, by pushing democracy, were nearly identical and yet there has been no real advancement in democratic processes in the world and notably in the

Middle East.

Despite their enthusiasm and determination to defend democracy for the benefit of humanity regardless of the US relation‘s with them, the U.S. advocates ‗democracy‘ only in states, which are not part of the American sphere of influence such as Iran, North Korea,

China etc. Obama ignores the dictatorships in Latin America and the Middle East, which have had the same presidents in their countries for decades. The American democracy doctrine under Obama was in line with his predecessors. Only the ideals of Wilson‘s theory were being employed while the practices of Hamilton‘s ideals were used to advance

U.S. interests. Criticisms were issued to some countries hostile to United States interests while the U.S. was more flexible with longstanding friendly monarchial and non- democratic governments in the Middle East and North Africa. This double standard was backed by U.S. interests and a sphere of influence in the globe, which were the main objectives of US foreign policy.

473 Condoleezza Rice, ―Remarks Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the American University in Cairo,‖ June.20, 2005. Online, internet, Jan.16, 2014. Available: https://2001-2009. state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/. 474 George W. Bush, ―President Bush's Second Inaugural Address,‖ Jan.20, 2005. George W. Bush, Former President of the United States Leadership, Vision, Reforms (International Business Publications, 2007).

183 In this part, the aim is to demonstrate the notion of defending democracy as a neo- containment policy which was exploited by President Bush‘s administration from 2001 to

2009 and then in the subsequent Obama terms following 2009. Defending democracy as a response to terrorism could be seen as a containment policy, alongside other strategies that had been exploited by U.S. administrations to either regain spheres of influence or embolden the alliance with others. A heavy focus on the MENA in the post-Cold war era could notably be explained by economic motives rather than morals. One can deduce that the business of democracy is business.

In their article ― Should Democracy be Promoted or Demoted‖ Fukyama and

McFaul point out the ambivalence of the U.S. in defending democracy, stating that because of market interests, autocracies in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and Egypt are its closest allies475. U.S. criticism of the lack of democracy differs from one state to another, just as defending democracy in some countries and ignoring the reality of political practices in others. Then, is democracy a business interest rather than universal values that US leaders adhere to? Is ―defending democracy‖ in the American context a veil of geopolitical and economic interests? Is it continuity of the implementation of the same mechanism of containment since the early Cold War?

Continuity or lack of continuity

As we skim through the major events and presidential and state departments secretaries ‗speeches we studied above, we notice that U.S. Chef Executives have been championing democracy from Truman to Obama, claiming the United States has a moral commitment to spread Democracy in the world, but while a concrete and pragmatic adherence to democracy was, to great extent, linked to U.S. interests. The condemnation of

475 Francis Fukuyama, and McFaul, Michael, ―Should Democracy Be Promoted or Demoted?,‖ The Stanley Foundation (June 2007).

184 some countries and the ignorance of others have been based on the degree of cooperation with the United States which usually unveiled a double standard in dealing with such value.

All US presidents for the same ends exploited the policy of ―defending democracy,‖ which had been used as a containment mechanism. Truman sparked the Cold

War under the banner of the promotion of democracy, and Reagan waged war in the late years of the Cold War in the name of democracy to contain both communism and terrorism. Democracy was used as a tool of the New World Order whereas the Clinton administration used the idea of spreading democracy as a pretext for the enlargement of economic interests.

This assumption could be applied to the twenty-first century as U.S. foreign policy is still carried out under the banner of defending democracy. George Walker Bush invaded Iraq, as well, to liberate Iraq, root out a dictator and establish a democratic government. Then Obama promised to enhance democracy in the world, specifically in the

Middle East and the North African region in his famous speech at Cairo University.

What is the democracy that Obama was championing? Would it be different from his predecessors or another side of the same coin? Is it the usual American democracy that had been continually implemented in the World?

Communist containment rhetoric and concerns still continued to be ever-present in the early 21st century. This resulted in the insisting on ―democratic‖ standards in both wars when U.S ideology was, and continued to be, fundamentally, only containment.

While this is not new, the post-Cold War usage, which is detailed below, and in comparative analysis, needs to be fully understood in greater depth.

185 Like the U.S wars on Communism which were waged under the umbrella of defending democracy and making ―the world safe for liberal democracy and liberal capitalism‖476, the War on Terror was basically carried out in the name of liberating oppressed people and enhancing democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq. The new public enemy Number One became the Islamic extremists who were depicted, like the communists, as opposing democracy. The US War on Terror was then a war for freedom and democracy and more importantly apolitical, according to George Bush who stated that

―Dictatorships shelter terrorists, and feed resentment and radicalism, and seek weapons of mass destruction. Democracies replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror. Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer, and so we will act boldly in freedom's cause‖477.

Accordingly, dictatorship is associated with terrorism and quest of acquiring weapon of mass destruction. Therefore, the Bush administration committed itself to fighting terrorism in the name of advocating democracy. In this speech Bush Jr refers to U.S. War I in

Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq 2003.

The defending democracy rhetoric and the condemnation of dictatorship are in continuity with the anti-communism crusade in the aftermath of Second World War, which was rearticulated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Such a claim affected the predominant, previously existing, narratives, causing the emergence of counter narratives in which historians and political analysts claimed that U.S. wars were a manifestation of the American Empire and imperialism. The notion of defending democracy was nothing but means of containment in the Third World that had been carried out under different pretexts in different international contexts.

476Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: the Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Houghton Mifflin, 1977) 84. 477 George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George W. Bush (Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2006) 147. 186 U.S. foreign policy had been waged under several moral values such as fighting poverty, communism tyranny, and terrorism but an analysis of the major events unveils the main objectives behind such policy. The soft-power government agencies such as USAID and NGOs such as the NED aimed at energizing underdeveloped countries, but actually worked on the containment of the spheres of influence for U.S. strategic and business interests. In 2014, USAID stated: ―by advancing broad-based economic growth, democracy, and human progress, we energize global economy and represent the best of our values to the world‖478. Then if the USAID and the deployed federal agencies were committed to spreading democracy in the world and notably in the MENA how could the targeted countries still be ranked in the bottom in the democracy index?

Figure 1: Democratic ranking of MENA countries: U.S. allies (Ovrall democary ranking in the

Arab League States)

478USAID Administrator, ―Message from the USAID Administrator,‖ Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan Report (April 2, 2014). 187 In sum, ―defending democracy‖ is a US mechanism of containment that was deployed continuously with a high degree of frequency from the Cold War to the War on

Terror and beyond. The promotion of democracy in some countries and the support autocracies in others reflected the U.S. foreign policy tradition that was driven by U.S. interests rather than values. American democracy was the distancing of potential rivals in the region and overthrowing unfriendly governments. Democracy rhetoric was exploited to enhance U.S. primacy in areas of particular significance to the United States. In 2010, the

MENA region which was the main targeted area of democratization remained at bottom of the democracy index according to the Economist intelligence Unit479. The figure above demonstrates how the MENA and notably the GCC countries such as Bahrin, Qatar, and

Saudi Arabi were in the bottom division. That is despite President Clinton‘s democratic enlargement idea, President George Bush‘s democratization of the Middle East mission which was articulated by Condelza Rice in Cairo in 2005, and President Obama‘s unfamous speech in June 2009 on promoting democary in the Arab world at Cairo

University, the MENA countries including Egypt, Tunisia and the GCC countries remained the major undemocracy worldwide. All these countries have been the United States allies.

They annually benifet from economic, military, and financial packages that falls under a policy of neo-contain.

3.3 The military containment

3.3.1 Proxy wars

While no direct, potentially all-out nuclear ―hot wars‖ took place during the Cold

War period, many proxy or indirect wars opposed the Superpowers. It is interesting to study the policy justifications, contemporary attitudes and even wording of official policy

479 ―Overalla Democracy Ranking out of 167 countries‖, Economist intelligence Unit ( December 2010), online, internet, Jan. 20, 2017. Available: https://search.eiu.com/Default.aspx. 188 statements during this period to see to what extent containment really became integrally integrated into the foreign policy establishment. And the curve of direct or indirect reference is important, especially leading up until the current post-Cold War period. The

United States engaged in proxy wars as a means of containment of the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. It was involved in

Civil Wars in China, Greece, Nigeria, Angola, and Nicaragua during the Cold War and also in the and African and Middle East internal conflicts in the Global

War on Terror‖ in the post 9/11 events.

The U.S. policy of containment is based on avoiding direct conflicts with the

Soviet Union and therefore a ―hot‖ war; the proxy wars around the world was the strategy adopted to protect its sphere of influence and attempt to expand it. Proxy wars are defined as indirect involvement in foreign countries, by advocating, supporting and providing one country with economic and military aid to fight. Indirectly, the United States backed the opposing forces or any internal groups that stand against the United States interests. Proxy wars in Third World and notably the Islamic states are still underway as a strategy of containment during the War on Terror. The Middle East and North Africa have been the main targeted sphere of influence since the early 2000s and notably the 2010s amid the

Arab Uprising.

U.S. policymakers have engaged in unfinished proxy wars since the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to ―save‖‘ or acquire an extended sphere of influence for the sake of their economy. There are two main types of proxy wars, namely the proxy civil war and the direct proxy. Proxy civil war is the United States engagement in the internal affairs of a country, in a civil war to assist one faction at the expense of the other that may or may not have as an objective regime change; it includes the direct intervention to topple a hostile government to replace it with a U.S. ally. The meaning of a direct proxy

189 war is when the United States commits itself indirectly in a war in an unfriendly country by advocating another country to help on its behalf. Another new type of proxy war – even if it is hidden and ―cold‖, in the sense of not directly active – has been intensively implemented by the United States in the 21st century as it pours diplomatic and financial assistance into opposition parties to fight governments which normally represent a potential threat to the United States. Such types of proxy wars, used highly during the Cold

War period, have been widely implemented – through not labeled as such – by the United

States during War on Terror of the 21st century.

Two examples will be taken here. The first is the example of the direct proxy war, the first one to occur, that of the 1950-1953 , that was aimed at containing

Soviet expansion. The second is the proxy civil war for regime change in Guatemala in

1954 that aimed to replace a recalcitrant leader, in the eyes of U.S. policy makers, with an ally.

The involvement on the MENAregion and notably the Arab uprisings could be seen as a continuation of the relying on allies in strategic wars for preserving the alliance system. It was eveident that the United Statesinvolvement in the Yamen, and Syria uprsisngs for the preservation of the longstanding alliance system. Suadi Arabia and

Emerates have been fighting in Yamen and Syria on behalf of the United States while

Russia and China have advoacating Iran. The proxy conflict Russian Prime Minister

Dmitry Medvedev as the New Cold war‖480.

3.3.2 The shift to the militarization of containment

The United States deployement of military to contain the hostile regimes such as

Iraq and Afghansitan back to the early Cold War when the Truman administration failed to

480 Chris J Dolan, Obama and the Emergence of a Multipolar World Order: Redefining U.S. Foreign Policy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018) 88. 190 bring some regimes such as Korea and Vitenam to its sphere of influence. The failure of the containment strategy towards some regime necessitated the exploition of the military of in attempt to overthrow the regime and substitute it by friendly leaders. This strategy was revived in the post-Cold War era when both containment and neo-containment were not enough to regain Iraq and Afghnaistan to the American orbit.

The Peninsula of Korea was a Japanese colony since 1910. It was divided into two parts in the aftermath of the Second World War as a consequence of Japan‘s defeat. The decision of dividing Korea was taken by the American President Franklin Roosevelt,

Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister and the Chinese Chiang Kai-shek during the

Cairo conference, in Egypt in November 1943. The Democratic People‘s Republic of

Korea known as North Korea was a pro-communist bloc, under the Soviet Union influence and the Republic of Korea known as South Korea was a pro-Western capitalist countries, under the influence of the United States. The North Korea invasion of South Korea to unite the two Koreas in June 1950 faced fierce response by the United States. Harry Truman responded immediately by ordering the American troops to support South Korea.

American troops, under United Nations cover, headed a collation of states to support South

Korea force back the North Korean troops.

Several policy makers and advisers including George Kennan advocated the

American military commitment in Korea to block the spread of Communism in the Korean

Peninsula. Kennan stated: ―We would have to act with all necessary force to repel this attack‖481. This statement refers to the shift to the militarization of containment and the policymaker‘s eagerness to impede the communist threat. This paved the way for the U.S. to intervene in Korea indirectly in a proxy war by providing the anti-communists with

481 Alexander Deconde, Richard Dean Burns and Fredrik Legivall, Encyclopedia of American foreign policy (Scribner 2002) 257. 191 military equipments and advisers, then an overt engagement in fighting beside the South

Korean troops.

The Korean War was the first U.S. military intervention abroad to contain the spread of communism which was backed by the Soviet Union and China. It is considered to be a proxy war as the United States troops were fighting on the side of South Korea against North Korea. In fact, the United States was engaged in the war not against North

Korea per se, but because the defeat of South Korean was would have meant and extension of the Soviet sphere of influence, to be added at the expense of the American‘s. More importantly, the potential unification of the Koreas would lead to a communist Korea and therefore loss of vital sphere of influence and any U.S. ‗raison d‟être‟ in Asia. Another motif behind Truman‘s urge to intervene was the security of Japan which was jeopardized by the communist influence. Yong Ci Kim: ―The recognition that the security of Japan required a non-hostile Korea led directly to President Truman's decision to intervene.‖482

In June 1950, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that: ―Korea is a symbol to the watching world, if we allow Korea to fall within the Soviet orbit, the world will feel we have lost another round in our match with the Soviet Union, and our prestige and the hope of those who place their faith in us will suffer accordingly‖483. Acheson emphasizes the significance of Korea to the United State because it would reflect the nation‘s image before the world as a fighter of Communism and defender of ―free peoples‖. Therefore, preventing the ―loss‖ of Korea to Communists was the foreign policy priority.

Truman defended his policy in Korea stating in April 1951, in his ―Korean War and the Policy of Containment‖ speech in April 1951, that ―the question we have had to

482 Yong Ci Kim, Major Powers and Korea ( Research Institute on Korean Affaires 1973) 46 . 483Vladimir Donskoi, Passion, Politics, and the Past: The Role of Affect in U.S. Decision-making during the Korean War (VDM Publishing, 2008) 102. 192 face is whether the communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there‖484. Truman belief‘s of the need to contain the Korean threat in Korea was shared by members of the United Nations, thus endowing the war with international legitimacy and national wisdom, i.e. the Truman administration decision to commit the American troops was the best choice and chance that was supported by the international community.

There was a serious debate over the U.S. policy of containment in Korea and the reasons behind it. Orthodox historians, for example, supported the hypothesis that the

Korean War ―was an internal aggression by the U.S.S.R to spread communism using the puppet regime of Kim II- Sung485. David Rees writes that Truman ordered troops to support pro-American South Korea in order to avoid Koreans falling into the hands of

Communists and therefore a loss of a vital zone. The Orthodox assumption is to a great extent convincing because the Korean War was a proxy war rather than ―a hot‖, or a declared war between the two main powers.

Amid the anti-communist crusade of the early 1950s, American policy makers, military officials and members of Congress were enlisted to fight Communism by any and all means. Intervening in Korea was to a great extent the consequence of the anti- communist crusade at home and abroad. Communist Korea was perceived to put U.S. interests and those of its allies in jeopardy and the Soviets would dominate the Korean

Peninsula if the United States remained neutral. Kennan stated in 1951 that that ―there was no objective reason to assume that the Soviet leaders would leave the Korean nook unfilled if they thought they had a chance of filling it at relatively little risk to themselves and saw

484William L. Hosch, The Korean War and the Vietnam War: People, Politics, and Power (The Rosen Publishing Group, 2010) 37. 485 Jeong Jae Yun, ―The Korean War in European Social Studies,‖ The Review of Korean Studies, Volume 12, Issue 1 ( 2008) 193 time running out‖486. Therefore, the United States was committed to fill the gap in Korea and prevent the Soviet infiltration.

David Painter states that: ―the United State increasingly took the view that internal arrangements in other states were linked to its security and economic well-being. This view was at the heart of the doctrine of containment‖487. Accordingly, Korean political and economic arrangements were of a high importance to the United States economy and security. That is why it implemented the policy of containment to limit the spread of

Communism and therefore the restriction of the Soviet Union sphere of influence. Such statements echo the U.S. Policy in the post Cold War Era.

The U.S. War on Korea signaled the militarization of containment, i.e. the United

States devoted all its military efforts to combat in Korea and domestic military budgets multiplied between 1949 and 1952488. ―In July 1950, less than a month after the outbreak of the Korean War, Truman asked the congress for additional budget to finance the War:

―as early as July 1950, Truman requested that congress add 10 billion dollars added to the

14 billion dollars defense budget‖489.

It is worth noting also that that the Korean War was the direct legacy of NSC 68 which was approved in April 1950, two months before the outbreak of the War and adopted in the summer of 1950. The NSC 68, which was dealt with previously, was created to ―foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish‖490.

And this objective would not be achieved if North Korea succeeded in unifying the two

Koreans because the Republic of China and the Soviet Union would dominate it and consequently the U.S. would lose Korea to communists, as it had ―lost‖ China before.

486Barton J. Bernstein, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy (Bernstein, Barton, 2002) 357. 487 David Painter, ―Explaining US Relations with the Third World‖ Diplomatic History vol 19, no.3 , 1959): 525-48. 488Carter Malkasian, The Korean War (Rosen Publishing Group Inc, 2009) 71. 489Ibid. 490 Ross Gregory, Cold War America from 1946 to 1990 (Info Base Publishing, 2003) 591. 194 To sum up, the Korean War represented the escalation of US-Soviet tensions and the militarization of containment through the NSC68. Military budgets peaked and massive aids were provided to South Korea to halt the spread of communism and therefore push back the influence of the Soviets and its pro-communist countries. The fall of other

Europeans countries to communism was considered to be very likely unless the United

States troops interfered, claimed the containment doctrine. The War ended on 27 June,

1953 where it started at line 38 parallel after 3 years of battles. By the end of the War there were various attitudes towards the War‘s outcome and whether it was a success or failure in terms of U.S. policy of containment.

Some labeled it as a major U.S. achievement during and after the War. Dean

Acheson stated in July 1950 that the US-UN invaded of Korea ―solely for the purpose of restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior to the invasion from the North.‖491 The goal was achieved by pushing back the North Korean troops and restored South Korea in

July 1951. On July 27 1953, the Korean armistice Treaty was signed by the representative of the United Nations, the US Army Lieutenant General William Harrison, and the North

Korean Nam II who represented North Korea and China. The ceasefire treaty aimed at

―insuring a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved‖492. Both sides of the conflict agreed on the establishment of a military demarcation line, the demilitarization zone between the two

Koreans and the release of war prisoners. The refusal of communist war prisoners to return to North Korea and China increased Eisenhower popularity and enhanced the legitimacy of

U.S. intervention into Korea.

The U.S. objective was, to a certain extent, achieved by signing this Armistice

Treaty with South Korea. U.S. political makers, especially Truman, Kennan and Acheson

491 Bong Le, The Unfinished War: Korea (Algora Publishing, 2003) 131. 492 James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide (ABC-CLIO, 2012) 269. 195 and later on Eisenhower were seen as skilled architerctures of the militarization of containment in Korea. But the claim that the U.S. intervention in Korea was mainly to push back the North Vietnam troops is less convincing. As the American troops were engaged in the battle, the goal was to unite the two Koreas under a unique capitalist regime.

It is worth noting also that the U.S. involvement unveiled the weakness of the

U.S. military as American troops appeared ill-prepared in the summer 1950. In August

1950, for example, North Korea and its allies had devastated South Korea and were about to defeat it. More importantly, the U.S. signed the armistice treaty in June 1950 to end the

War where it started but if the main goal of the United States was to rollback communism; it could have defeated the North Korea and unified it under one capitalist system. Because the main stated objective of the UN-US intervention was to establish ―a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea‖493, but in October 1950, a consequence of the fierce defense and attack of the North Koreans and Chinese volunteers, the US-UN objective shifted to pushing back the North Korea and Chinese troops before line 38th parallel.

The U.S. proxy war in Korea was of a high point in terms of containment as the

United States exploited all means politically, economically and especially militarily for containing communism. The Korean War is perceived by historians as the turning point in the US policy of containment which was henceforth overtly militarized.

Another point worth noting is that the war casualties were around 2.5 million494.

U.S. deaths were 36,516, according to the Department of State, and South Korean and U.S. troops killed 406,000 military and around 600,000 civilians whereas South Korea 217,000 military and one million civilians. China lost 600,000 military. In addition ―40 percent of

493 Robert Barnes, The US, the UN and the Korean War : Communism in the Far East and the American Struggle for Hegemony in America‟s Cold War (I.B.Tauris, 2014) 262. 494―Encyclopedia Britannica,‖ INC. Yayinlari, C 9 (2000). 196 North Korean children suffer from stunted growth. 20 percent are underweight”495. The number of casualties and the chilling effects of the war on Americans and Koreans alike demonstrate the heavy cost of the militarization of containment in the U.S. deployment of its troops in a proxy war.

The United States has not been in peace with North Korea since the ceasefire in

June 1953. In fact, it has been continued to contain North Korea through U.N. sanctions and economic restrictions. North Korea is still a challenging power in Asia that is a continuation of containment even in the post-Cold War.

The United States still has military bases in South Korea for the security and containment of the potential threat which North Korea may cause. On January7, 2014, in a meeting with South Korean foreign Minister Yun Byung, John Kerry, the US Secretary of

State, cited Barak Obama‘s statement about US-South Korea relations: ―South Korea is one of our closest allies and there is no greater sign of the United States commitment to regional security than the 28,500 troops stationed in South Korea‖496. From this, we infer that the US still commits itself to contain the Asian sphere of influence through maintaining military bases in South Korea. Communism is no longer a serious threat. New threats such as nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction have become the new justifications for containment of North Korea. Such ‗pretexts‘ can be compared to the reasons behind the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 in the War on Terror and the dispute over the .

As far as the U.S. policy of containment is concerned, it is instructive to highlight the domino theory in Korea and Vietnam in the 1950 and 1960 as one of the main motives

495 James Brooke, ―North Korea Says Bumper Crop Justifies Limits on Aid,‖ New York Times 6 October 2005. 496John Kerry, ―Remarks With Republic of Korea Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se After Their Meeting,‖ Washington Dc Jan. 7, 2004, U.S Department of State: Archivied content,available: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/01/219446.htm. 197 of U.S. intervention to avoid neighbor countries from falling into Communism and consequently the Soviet Union sphere of influence. The Domino theory is, to a great extent, the same argument used in First Gulf War in 1991, the Second Golf War in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001: the disassociation of Iraq and Afghanistan from the U.S. sphere of influence might lead other strategic countries to follow them. Preventive wars on Terror were launched in the Middle East in the post 9/11 attacks to contain the spread of

Terrorism. Like during the Cold War, the United States militarized its containment during the Global War on Terror in ‗rogue states‘ such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The goal has been then to restore countries to its sphere of influence under various pretexts and through all means including the military.

The legacy of the Korean War 1950-1953 still affects US-North Korean relations until the present as the United States failed to contain the communist North Korea and join it to its sphere of influence. The attempt to contain Iran and North Korea due to their nuclear program remains an unachieved U.S. foreign policy goal.

3.3.3 Regime change

Regime change and military coups have been a strategic mechanism of containment that characterized the U.S. foreign policy since the early Cold War. It was adopted for the first time by President Eisenhower in 1953 and was considered a cornerstone of his New Look policy. Covert operation strategy was a response to the huge military budget that was devoted to the military containment and the involvement of

American troops overseas to contain the Soviets. Presdenet Eisenhower introduced these new containment strategies known as ―containment on the cheap‖ and deployed the CIA to intervene secretly to topple Communist affiliated or sympathizer Presidents. Focus will be put on some sponsoring military coups and changing regimes during the Cold War , the so

198 called New World Era in relation to the Global War on Terror in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks.

Interventions in foreign countries to overthrow unfriendly government, oust its

President and appoint a puppet government have been the standards of U.S. foreign policy since the post-World War Two, claiming to defend democracy, in line with the ―U.S. as the leader of the Free World‖ claim. Such policies were depicted as ―terrifying momentum toward disaster‖497, according to the Revisionist scholar William Appeleman Williams.

The disaster is what this policy ended up resulting in, the so called War on Terror especially in the Middle East. During its war on Communism, the U.S. intervened in several countries, ousting its leaders and ushering in pro-American Presidents, Prime ministers or Kings. The U.S.‘s most noticeable intervention was in Iran in 1953 when the

CIA orchestrated ―the operation boot‖ to overthrow the Iranian Prime Minister Mohamed

Mossadegh. The latter showed an alignment with the Soviets, nationalized the oil industry and aimed at implementing a ‗democratic‘ regime to reflect the will of the Iranian people.498 Such policies did not please the American government, which consequently plotted against Mossadegh with the cooperation of British Prime Minister Winston

Churchill. The CIA and MI6 managed to oust Mossadegh on 19 August 1953499, and substitute him by the U.S. selected leader the General Fazlollah Zahedi.

3.3.4 Military spending

During the Cold War, the U.S militarized its policy of containment through the building of its military-industrial complex as a response to Soviets. This also included

497 William A Williams and Henry W. Berger, A William Appleman Williams Reader: Selections from His Major Historical Writings ( Chicago, IL: I.R. Dee, Inc, 1992) 158. 498 Andrew Burke, Mark Elliott and Kamin Mohammadi, Iran (Lonely Planet, 2004) 34. 499James Risen, ―Secret of History: The CIA in Iran: the Coup First Few Days Look Disastrous‖ The New York Times Aug. 15, 2019, online internet Feb 20, 2017. Available: https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast. 199 providing vast sums of military aid to U.S. allies. It would be difficult to see anything but continuity in this policy, from one war to the next. Historians have argued that military spending remarkably peaked during the four phases since the onset of the Cold war: the

Korean war, the Vietnam War, the Reagan presidency with his STARTS I and in the aftermath of September 11th 2001500. Military spending during these phases reached $400 billion annually501.

Moreover, the central issue of military budgets in the context of domestic economic crisis or prosperity is an indispensable dimension – corollary? – of foreign policy-making during both periods. The significant proposition of direct and indirect military production often surpassed 25% of the U.S. manufacturing base in the 1960s.

Despite expectations to the contrary, with the end of the Cold War, the arms industry reached new heights and has reasserted itself as being inseparable from Washington, maintaining its marked political influence502. Since the 9/11 events, the 2010 Pentagon budget was around $700 billion which represents 4.8% of the US GDP. USA spending during the War on Terrorism was bigger even than when communism was the official threat during the Cold War‖503. In 2020 military spending will raise for the 5th consecutive year, and the United States is expected to spend more on its military in 2020 than at any point since World War II, except for a handful of years at the height of the Iraq War.

Of course, the effects that military spending has on the economy continues to be a subject of considerable debate, with a lack of consensus in the literature. Some claim that government spending, in particular on the military, accounted for nearly half of the

500 ―Military Industrial Complex,‖ New World Encyclopedia, online, internet, Feb. 20, 2017. Available: ttps://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Military-industrial_complex#Cold_War.2FKorean_War 501Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004) 56. 502 ―Monthly Federal Spending,‖ US Government Spending, online, internet 21 Feb.2017. Available: http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/defense_spending. 503Michael E. O‘Hanlon, ―Is US defense spending too high, too low, or just right?,‖ Policy Brookings, October 15, 2019. Available: https://www.brookings.edu/. 200 acceleration of economic growth since mid-2017504. Others contend that defense spending does not significantly affect the U.S. economy 505 or that increased military spending leads to slower economic growth, that military spending tends to have a negative impact on economic growth506.

Beyond the scholarly debate as to its actual consequences upon economic growth, military spending has been part and parcel of the U.S. foreign policy machine, and its grand strategy of primacy through containment, since the Cold War.

3.3.5 The Military-Industrial complex

The well-known military-industrial complex‘s growing influence was famously denounced by President Eisenhower – the former five-star general in the United States

Army during World War II who served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in

Europe – who had an insider‘s view of the topic. The admonition pronounced in his

Farwell speech on January 17th 1961 has not waned, as U.S. military spending has not stopped growing since, even though there have been variations, and that are discussed here in relation to the post-Cold War era. Eisenhower alerted Americans about ―an immense military establishment and large arms industry‖507, stating that ―in the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist‖508.

504 Kate Davidson, “A Big Reason U.S. Economy Is Accelerating: Government Spending‖, Wall Street Journal (October, 2018). 505 Uk Heo, "The Relationship between Defense Spending and Economic Growth in the United States,‖ Political Research Quarterly. 63.4 (2010): 760. 506 Giorgio d'Agostino, J. Paul Dunne and Luca Pieroni, ―Does Military Spending Matter for Long-run Growth?‖, Defence and Peace Economics Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), 217): 429-436. 507Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, eds, Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s (Illinois Books Edition, 1989) 59. 508Edward C. Mendler, Policies for a President: A Manifesto for 2008 and Beyond (Xlibris Corporation, 2007) 41. 201 And even while warning about immense military spending, he nevertheless promotedthe global policy of containment which ―must be patiently pursued with the help of the military establishment‖ which must be ―mighty, ready for instant action so that potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction‖509. Therefore, the military force and industry remained an imperative means of containment during Eisenhower‘s presidency in the 1950s. He thus also recommended in his Farwell Speech in 1961 a strong military establishment in order to stand against the ―potential aggressor‖, which is the

Soviet Union, which had become the classical, ―external‖ enemy of the United States during Eisenhower presidency, and would remain so during several future presidencies.

The military industrial complex was the crucial factor in U.S. the foreign policy of containment since the late 1940s and served as the basic means to frighten and alarm the

Soviets, resulting in the Cold War‘s .

The military industrial complex has played a vital role in U.S. foreign policy in general and the policy of containment in particular. In addition to keeping the sector active in the U.S. economy by protecting its foreign markets for trade, arms production contributed to the U.S. economy –weapons, tanks and aircrafts – so US major policymakers can be considered to be active promoters of the weapons industry. As a result, interventions through all means, directly related to expanding arms industry markets, and indirectly through military aid to allies, were enhanced heavily during the

Cold War then during the War on Terror.

Nonetheless, unlike in the past, military budget spending and arms industry production have not been sufficient economic drivers of U.S. prosperity in the 21st century.

While the war economy pulled the U.S. out of the 1938 recession and military production

509Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, eds, Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s (Illinois Books Edition, 1989) 59. 202 remained at war-like levels until the 1980s, renewed 21st century spending was not able neither to avoid the economic recession of 2008 nor, as such, pull the U.S. economy out of it. However, it has been demonstrated that military spending started to rise again in the early 2000s and increased by 85 per cent from FY (fiscal year) 2001 to FY 2007510. The

September 11 attack was a renewed impetus for the U.S. arms industry whose level by

2007 was higher than any point since the end of the Second World War511. The major turn of the arms industry‘s influence on foreign policy is occurring at a time when there is no longer any consensus around its contribution to US economic, if not political interests.

This creates contradictory dynamics for U.S. domestic democracy itself.

5. Containing the MENA: Arab Spring countries as case

study

Since the onset of the Cold War, the Great Middle East, with its oil-rich countries, has been the ground of conflicting interests and also conflict for the superpower rivals, the

United States and the Soviet Union. American dominance was shaken when the regional powers like Iran fled from the American orbit. Since the fall of the pro-American Shah regime in 1979, Iran turned the fate of the Iranian regime into a major stake. The Iranian

Shah regime served U.S. hegemony since the 1953 military coup against the democratically elected Iranian nationalist Prime Minister and the advocation of autocratic regime led by Mohammad Reza Shah and the Iranian

Revolution512. The entire Arab Muslim world, especially the MENA, was then under U.S.

510Petter Stallenhain, Cataline Perdom and Elisabeth Skons, Military Expenditure, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 175. 511 Ibid. 512Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009) Perface. 203 sphere of influence, except for Iran. Containing Iran then became the main foreign policy priority along maintaining U.S alliance system and guaranteeing primacy in the region.

The Toppling American strategic allies in the MENA region, amid what is dubbed

―the Arab Spring‖ that was triggered off in early 2011, can be considered as the most momentous geopolitical earthquake in the region since the Iranian revolution in 1979. The changing regimes and the overthrow of the U.S. allies meant that the U.S. leadership and influence was at stake. A new threatening and challenging alliance could be formed as a consequence of the empowerment of political groups emerging out of the Arab Spring.

The American alliance system in the region, which emerged out of the Cold War, would henceforth prove be hard to maintain in the MENA, mainly with the advent of potentially unfriendly governments coming to power in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. The traditional American rivals to U.S. hegemony, especially Iran, but for that matter Russia, could draw them into their spheres of influence and challenge U.S. interests.

Since the early Cold War, U.S. alliance system in the Gulf and Arab Muslim

World has been an integral part of the containment policy. It worked to distance the Soviet

Union from influence in the region and maintain U.S primacy in the world. Immediately after the fall of the U.S.S.R, the United States adjusted its policy of containment and oriented it mainly towards the MENA as the geostrategic area to the United States. This was for two reasons. First of all, the strategy of containment continued, as according to the hypothesis of historical institutionalism, because institutions structure actors‘ behavior for long periods of time that extend well beyond immediate historical circumstances in most cases. At this level according to path dependency- as the main component of historical institutionalism- ―which explains how the set of decisions one faces for any given circumstances is limited by the decisions one has made in the past or by the events that one has experienced, even though past circumstance many no longer be relevant to the present

204 ones‖513. In other words, initial choices made by actors set up engrained institutions that generate their own interests and logic. They create increasing returns which lead to recurring forms of political behavior despite changing conditions. Therefore path dependency means ―history matters‖ and then the result continuity overtime.

As the Iran threat proceeded- and then pursued after - the end of the Cold War, it represented the very embodiment of continuity of containment. Secondly, and more fundamentally from a political perspective, the U.S. doctrine of hegemonic primacy continued to dominate in U.S. foreign policy in the region, and primacy is a path- dependent strategic habit. In this sense, we will see, the Obama administration wavered around the doctrine of ―primacy‖ based upon containment, when attempting to replace it by initiating that of ―leading from behind‖, but did not succeed in doing so.

U.S. primacy in the Middle-East was based on an alliance system, as we explained earlier. The long-standing system of alliances built to uphold U.S. interests and stability in the region has been deeply grounded since the Camp David Accords in 1978 which brought Egypt into the U.S. sphere. The elimination of this serious border threat to its main ally, Israel, removed a major stumbling block to the U.S. stronghold in the region it was used to contain the nemesis of Israel, and so to the United States. The Arab Spring revolutions could potentially give way to rival powers capable of allying with Iran, and or

Russia, making it difficult to maintain the alliance system which emerged out of the Cold

War.

This alliance system represents the support system of institutional continuity of containment in the region. It follows that with the collapse of this system, the need for new alliances, those that would be capable of renewing the conditions for containment or stability in U.S interests more generally, was its policy priority and strategic

513 Allen R. Nissenson and Edgar V. Lerma, Nephrology Secrets (Philadelphia, PA: Elsevi, 2019) 616. 205 determinant514. The major tests were policy choices towards the first Arab Spring countries, Tunisia and Egypt that were two key allies during the Cold War and notably the

Post Cold War era. The dilemma is either to adhere to idealism and embrace the American values, breaking up with the longstanding Grand Strategy of primacy or to continue along the same path; that is, working on containing any new emerging political power in the

MENA countries. How America stuck to the traditional alliance system in the Arab Spring countries is examined in this part.

It is on December 17, 2010 that the Arab uprisings started in Sidi Bouzid – a small city in the center of Tunisia - when Mohamed Bouazizi, a 27-year-old street vendor set fire to himself as a response to what he considered as outrageous the Mistreatment and the expropriation of his merchandise by municipal officers. The event sparked riots, strikes and sit-ins through the whole country. Civil society, trade unions and, in particular, unemployed youth and impoverished people demonstrated calling for employment opportunities, democratic reforms, and transparency. Confrontations between protesters and security forces caused some 338 lives and more than 2100 wounded. As a result, on

January 14, 2011 the longstanding Tunisian president Zine-Al-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to leave power and flee the country to Saudi Arabia. An interim Prime Minister and

President took office in accordance with article 56 of the Tunisian Constitution.

The second case of uprisings took place in Egypt, a more geostrategic country to the United States since the early Cold War. After the ouster of the Tunisian President, a popular rebellion initiated in Egypt on January 25, 2011 and spread throughout the country. Bloody clashes between the security forces and protesters increased dramatically in violence and led to an ever-increasing number of victims: 840 people were killed and

514Aaron Stein, ―U.S. Containment Strategy for Syria: To Beat the Russians, Let Them Win,‖ Foreign Policy (March, 2018).

206 more than 6,000 injured 515 according to Amnesty International Report. Under internal and international pressure, President Hosni Mubarak, the longstanding American and Western ally was overthrown on February 11, 2011 and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

(SCAF) took power. Mubarak‘s last cabinet was maintained to run on the country until the upcoming election. Calls for political and social reforms spread to the whole region and shook the long-established regimes in the MENA.

If one is to take U.S. policy at face value, the ouster of these regimes in hopes of establishing more democratic alternatives should have been welcomed. The U.S. reaction to the uprisings then is a test to the policy doctrine of defending democracy and championing such widely proclaimed American values516. But the potential democracy that the Arab Spring could have brought actually endangered U.S. allies in the region.

According to Gregory Aftandilian, former U.S. State Department Middle East analyst, for

Obama, ―democracy promotion had proven to be very difficult and had angered longstanding U.S. allies in the region‖517. Overthrowing U.S. allies could, therefore, be costly by all means and Obama was hesitant to embrace a new Grand Strategy to democratize the MENA.

These spontaneous popular movements represent the first success for internal dissidents in uprooting such long-established authoritarian rulers in the MENA region, which the United States had been accused of defending since the Cold War. Having long since distanced any official opposition, these regimes fraudulently rigged elections and, more importantly, refused to peacefully transfer power, despite internal and often external voices calling upon them to step down. For the American alliance system, the United

515Lateef Mungin, ―Amnesty: Egypt far from justice over unrest that killed more than 800,‖ CNN May 19, 2011, online, internet, June 5, 2018. Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/world. 516 Gregory Aftandilian, ―United States Policy Towards the Arab Middle East,‖ Center for Peace, Development and Culture (University of Massachusetts Lowell,2012): 4. 517 Ibid.

207 States managed to contain these countries which were within the American sphere of influence and in accordance with U.S. foreign policy and interests in the MENA.

Tunisia and Egypt are momentous to the geopolitical interests of the United States in the MENA and the two presidents were American allies par excellence for several decades. In this context, this upheaval shook both longstanding regimes in the region as well as their western allies, notably the United States, which had been a vital supporter of these longtime entrenched autocratic rulers. The changing regime therefore would not only affect the geopolitical landscape in the MENA but also become a strain on U.S. Foreign policy in the region. The threat of toppling these rulers and other allies could harm the alliance system that had upheld U.S. policy interests the United States since the Cold War and throughout the post-cold war, War on Terror strategy that was also entwined with the containment, which supports our institutional continuity argument.

The situation became more complex with the entry of political Islam as a major political ideology in the international political landscape and the noticeable triumph of

Islamic parties in the first two Arab Spring countries, Tunisia and Egypt. These Islamic leaders broke with pro-U.S. doxa by opening diplomatic channels with the Islamic

Republic of Iran. Then, the question becomes: How would these events affect the institutional framework that had been sustained throughout the Cold War and post-cold war period, and thus, according to the terms of our hypothesis, the continuity of containment as foreign policy?

I test my argument by examining Obama administration policy toward the Arab

Spring countries, Tunisia and Egypt in light of the Grand Strategy of ‗primacy‘, and whether like President Bill Clinton he ―preserved primacy in its essentials‖518. Digging

518 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 208 deeper into U.S. approaches towards the Arab Spring from late 2010 to 2014, key issues will be studied linked to the re-emergence of Islamic led-governments in relation to U.S. vital interests in the MENA region such as the strategic presence, the control of natural resources, the secure access to the oil-rich countries and maintaining stability.

5.1 U.S. Response to the Arab Spring and the alliance system

Top U.S. policy makers‘ response to the Arab Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt could be perceived as lacking sufficiently long-term consideration. This resulted in the de facto continuation of the Grand Strategy of ―primacy‖ that characterized U.S. Foreign policy during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era until the Arab Spring era in the

2010s. Once this policy was destabilized, the official positions and statements taken by both President Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton swung from neutrality to taking sides and vice-versa during and after the uprisings. In this context, the Obama administration policies in the various phases of the uprisings appeared to waver between an idealistic and a realistic approach in the MENA amid the political transition underlying these official policy statements.

The regime change and the overthrow of U.S. allies in the MENA threatened the alliance system that the United States had exploited for decades to maintain its hegemony in the MENA region. U.S. rivals like Iran and Russia and, to a lesser extent, Turkey could benefit from the new political scene and might replace the United States as the unique influencing superpower. In this vein, the dilemma was whether to adhere to the American values and break with path dependency habits or to continue the Grand Strategy of

―primacy. ―The Arab Spring has put the United States and President Barack Obama in a very difficult position on the one hand as world power, you do not want to lose your allies

209 but as a democratic world power, you do not want to be opposed to democratizing‖519.

Despite this dilemma, according to the hypothesis developed here, the U.S. Grand Strategy during and following Arab Spring era inevitably did not change from the Cold War era.

Alliance and commitments that were built up during the Cold War were hard to give up or modify once it was over. Thus, the preservation of allies to maintain U.S. hegemony was the utmost priority and prevented any lasting policy change.

As we study the various phases of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the policy references to primacy and containment are conceived within the theoretical framework of historical institutionalism (HI). This includes path dependency, primacy which accounts for the historical continuities in U.S. foreign policy from the Cold War to the Arab Spring. The first phase covers the outburst of protests and how U.S. policy players responded to the crackdown on protestors. The second phase is the transitional period from the ousters of Ben Ali from Tunisia and Mubarak from Egypt until the first elections in the two countries. The third is a more important time-frame which features the

U.S. response to the first elected governments and the rise of the Islamic parties to power, a serious threat that reshaped the alliance system especially with regards to Iran. The last phase encompasses the military coup, the dissolution of the Islamic Freedom and Justice

Party and the return of the military rule in Egypt and, in Tunisia, the weakening of the

Islamic Party to the newly founded political Party „Nida Tounes‟ (Call for Tunisia) which signaled the return of the old regime rulers under different name. From a U.S. perspective, the major phases of the Arab Spring are trials to restore an alliance system that would characterize the post-Cold War Grand Strategy in the MENA, implemented through an updated version of containment.

519 Pierre M. Atlas, ―U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests,‖ Digest of Middle East Studies. 21.2 (2012): 353-385. 210 5.1.1 U.S. response to the uprisings: reluctance and the arc of history

Along the 27-day uprisings in Tunisia, the United States did not get involved in the ongoing events – neither praising the revolution nor condemning the security forces that suppressed protests, at least not until the last moment when it was clear the regime was about to fall. ―Not one word of condemnation, not one word of criticism, not one word urging restraint came from Barak Obama or Hillary Clinton as live ammunition was fired into crowds of unarmed men, women and children in recent weeks‖520, wrote the British journalist Yvonne Ridley. The absence of denunciation of the Tunisian crackdown on protesters fit the continuity thesis of U.S. Grand Strategy in the MENA region.

Nevertheless, on January 11, 2011, just two days before the ouster of President

Ben Ali, Mrs. Clinton stated:

We are worried, in general, about the unrest and the instability, and what seem to be the underlying concerns of the people who are protesting. It seems to be a combination of economic and political demonstrations, and the government's reaction, which has been unfortunately leading to the deaths of some of the protesters. So we are not taking sides in it, we just hope there can be a peaceful resolution of it‖521.

This statement, though it cannot be seen to constitute an outright condemnation of the police force‘s crackdown and murder of protesters, is to a certain extent the first sign of change in the American official discourse and attitude toward the ongoing bloody events.

The terms were carefully chosen and the message was plausible, to the extent that the

United States could see the writing on the wall, i.e., that the regime was on the verge of collapse. The United States expressed worry but did not take sides.The ―peaceful resolution‖ that Secretary of State Mrs Clinton recommended fit into the path dependency framework. In other words, regardless of the type of resolution, what counted were

520 Yvonne Ridley, ―Tonigh twe are all Tunisian,‖ The Journal of Foreign Poliy (January 2011), Online, internet, Oct. 10, 2015. Availbale: www.foreignpolicyjournal.com retrieved on 10 Oct.2015. 521 Hillary Clinton, ―Interview with Taher Barake of Al Arabiya,‖ US Department of State archived Content. Dubai UAE, Jan. 11, 2011. Available: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton. 211 stability and the maintenance of a reliable American ally in North Africa. At this level, the

American administration aimed to avoid an extended revolutionary movement that would shock the alliance system.

In terms of path dependency, the absence of any real condemnation and the attempt to remedy the shaken Ben Ali regime was the first instance in which the United

States was beginning to depart from its historical pattern. In this context, the fall of the regime would certainly harm U.S. geopolitical interests and her alliance system in the whole region. A vital and contained ally was not to be abandoned easily much like other

MENA allies that were threatened by the uprisings. Obama was ―hard pressed to assure other autocratic allies that the U.S. did not hastily abandon its friends‖522.

What enhanced U.S. ―habits‖ was the continuous adherence to the Tunisian regime at the expense of the American values. This was justified by the vital U.S. interests that had to be preserved in Tunisia. When she was asked about the U.S. position towards the violent oppression of protesters in Tunisia, Mrs. Clinton asserted the U.S. neutrality, highlighting the longstanding good relations with the Tunisian governments. ―Well,‖ she stated, ―we regret that because, obviously, we have got a lot of very positive aspects of our relation with Tunisia‖523. This statement reflects the continuity and priority of American interests in the region that guaranteed her ―primacy‖. It is therefore ―state interests, rather than their values or ideological preferences, are the reason behind every state act‖524.

Significantly, the strategy of ―wait and see‖ was implemented and even articulated publicly by the top U.S. policymakers. They did not take sides for nearly one month of the uprisings. On January 11, 2011, two days before the overthrow of the Tunisian president

522 Maria C Pinto, ―Mapping the Obama Administrations Response to the Arab Spring,‖ Revista Brasileira De Política Internacional. 55.2 (2012): 115. 523Hillary Clinton, ―Interview with Taher Barake of Al Arabiya,‖ US Department of State archived Content. Jan. 11, 2011. Available: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton. 524James L Ray and Juliet Kaarbo, Global Politics (Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 2008) 5. 212 Secretary of State Mrs Clinton stated: ―I think we will wait and see. I mean they are in the middle of a crisis‖525. The U.S. administration hoped to save President Ben Ali up to the last moment. The situation had not reached a point of real turmoil, according to Clinton.

The ―wait and see‖ policy was the cautious and uncertain policy that the Obama administration espoused along nearly one month of crackdown, injuries and deaths.

It is worth noting that neither the White House nor the State department abandoned Ben Ali along the protests until the last moment. The diplomatic channels and the human rights associations did not condem the Tunisian government‘s oppression of protests.526 ―U.S. criticism of the Tunisian government‘s response to the December-

January demonstrations (was) initially muted‖527. Even the American press did not pay attention to the protests in Tunisia. The Washington Post editorial and other magazines had never published a word on the events528. The expression of continuity then took the form of advocating allies by ignoring their crackdown of protests. The policy had been guaranteeing regional stability which was necessary to U.S. interests in the MENA region and had been prioritized by the successful U.S. presidents since the Cold War.

A total shift in official discourse was articulated only on January 14, 2011 – the date of the fall of the Tunisian regime. Immediately following Ben Ali‘s removal, Obama stated: ―I condemn and deplore the use of violence against citizens peacefully voicing their opinion in Tunisia‖529. The U.S. muted response to the demonstration was transformed to

525Hillary Clinton, "Interview with Taher Barake of Al Arabiya," US Department of State archived Content. Jan. 11, 2011. Available: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton. 526 Lotfi B Rejeb, ―La Politique Américaine Envers La Tunisie: Quelle Nouvelle Approche Depuis La Révolution ? ,‖ Politique Amé ricaine. 2013.22 (2013): 86. 527 Lotfi B Rejeb, ―United States Policy towards Tunisia: What New Engagement after an Expendable Friendship,‖ Nouri Gana, The making of the Tunisianrevolution: Contexts, architects, prospects (Edinburgh UniversityPress, 2013) 90. 528Marc Lynch, ―Where are the DemocracyPromoters on Tunisia?,‖ Foreign Policy (Juan. 2011) online, internet Dec12, 2018. Available: https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/13/where-are-the-democracy-promoters- on-tunisia/. 529Barack Obama, ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa‖, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Jan. 20, 2018. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- office/2011/01/14/statement-president-events-tunisia. 213 harsh criticism which appeared as a new approach to the uprisings. Moreover in the same press release, Obama said: ―I applaud the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people‖530 who were fighting for the ―universal rights that the United States and the international community ―must all uphold‖531. At this point, the ―wait and see‖ policy had been surpassed and the need to adapt to new circumstances was the new objective. Now the loyal ally for more than two decades in North Africa was ―lost‖ and it was necessary to redress and be the right ‗side of history‘. Whether the overthrow of Ben Ali was really a welcome opportunity for the American administration or not the new situation necessitated the adjustment of the official discourse. ―These sudden and deep political transformations are not ones the U.S. has sought, but are instead new realities it now finds itself obliged to come to terms with‖532. It is therefore the ―new engagement‖ of the United States in the

Arab Spring that Obama would mention in his Mideast speech of May 2019 when he stated that in Tunisia and Egypt ―the stakes are high‖.

It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that the gap between the president‘s words and actions might signal a dramatic change and departure from ―habits‖. Habit is a type of path dependency, the process whereby prior historical developments limit the scope of choices set before decision makers‖533. The total shift in the official discourse is balancing values and interests to contain allies and detain potential threats. In other words, as Ben Ali stepped aside and there was a power vacuum, the U.S. administration coped with the new circumstance for the sake of U.S. geopolitical interests in MENA. It also reveals the prioritizing of interests over defending universal rights and values which

Obama had claimed to embrace.

530Ibid. 531 Ibid. 532 Lotfi ben Rejeb, ―La Politique Américaine Envers La Tunisie: Quelle Nouvelle Approche Depuis La Révolution ?,‖ Politique Amé ricaine. -. 2013.22, (2013): 86 533 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment, ‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 214 The remarkable shift to the values that he had campaigned for in his ―much promoted public address to Muslim world‖ from Cairo in June 2009534 was a replacement of credence and pivot toward Wilsonism that could put U.S. primacy at stake. The Obama administration‘s ―catch up policy‖ aimed at recuperating what had been missed or the failure to maintain a U.S. ally in power. It was therefore a case of adjusting the discourse and updating the decision-making machines in the federal institutions, at least theoretically. Although some analysts stated that ―The United States shifted its prioritization from interests to values‖535, the ability and capacity to make this shift was tested in the upcoming phases of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and whether it was breaking with such habits of path dependency through commencement of a new political scene. The balance between values and interests in the Tunisian case as well as the maintenance of

U.S. preponderance and hegemony over her rivals in the MENA region were the main directive of U.S. policy in Tunisia in the early revolutions.

5.1.2 The Importance of Ben Ali to the United States

To understand why the U.S. stuck to Ben Ali up until to the last moment and the consensus in the White House, the Department of State and the Congress, it would be interesting to examine the main reason in light of U.S. Grand Strategy of primacy in

Tunisia. It has been argued that the War on Terror was the main reason for U.S. support of

Ben Ali since his coming to power in 1987. Tunisia cooperated heavily with the United

States to oppress suspected radical Islamists and even to carry out interrogations and torture of potential terrorists caught by the United States536. Tunisia was also ―an Associate

534 Diehl Jackson, ―Obama lagging on the Arab Spring,‖ The Washington Post Dec. 11, 2011. Available: ashingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-lagging-on -the-arab-spring/. 535 Pierre M. Atlas, ―U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests,‖ Digest of Middle East Studies. 21.2 (2012): 353-385. 536 Zoubir Yahia and Gregory White., North African Politics: Change and Continuity (Taylor and Francis, 2015) 287. 215 of NATO‘s Counterterrorism Surveillance in the Mediterranean‖537. Therefore, it was a collaborator in controlling potential terrorist plots in the Mediterranean and provided the

United States with intelligence in the matter. In addition, the Tunisian Parliament enacted an antiterrorism law in December 2003 which was derived mainly from the U.S. Patriot

Act of October 2001538. This law, which is inspired by the Chris Cylkeand American law, demonstrates the high degree of cooperation and harmony between the United States and

Tunisia in the so-called War on Terror.

The law which was criticized by Human rights activists and organizations as it violates the basic human rights539 was welcomed and praised by the U.S. Department of

State calling it ―a comprehensive law to support the international effort to combat terrorism and money laundering‖540. Criticism of the exportation of U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 to the third world was articulated by various IR analysts and academics. In her article entitled

‗Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the War on Terror in the Third World‘, Beth

Elise Whitaker stated that the adoption of the U.S. Patriot Act and related ―anti-terrorism law has provided leaders with the tools they needed to silence critics and punish political opponents‖541. It was therefore a continuity of U.S. strategic alliances in the MENA region and the empowerment of vital allies that ensured the stability needed to deter Americans rivals.

Ben Ali cooperated heavily with the United States in the global War on Terror, exploiting various means: legal, logistic, military and diplomatic in order to fight and contain terrorism on behalf of the United States in the Maghreb. Tunisian authorities

537Nouri Gana, The making of the Tunisianrevolution: Contexts, architects, prospects (Edinburgh UniversityPress, 2013) 86. 538 Ibid. 539 Tunisia : Continuing Abuses in the Name of Security (London, England: Amnesty International Publications, 2009). 540 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2001) 68. 541 Beth E. Whitaker, ―Exporting the Patriot Act?, Democracy and the 'war on Terror' in the Third World,‖ Third World Quarterly 28.5 (2007): 1017-1032. 216 tightened their hold on the religious practices and notably politicians who had Islamic backgrounds. During his five successive terms in power, Ben Ali‘s authorities jailed, executed and exiled political opponents in the name of the War on Terror.

As ―Islamism was the new Bolshevism‖ 542 in the post Cold War, stated Margaret

Thatcher in 2002, Islamists were the main target of Ben Ali‘s proxy war on terror in

Tunisia since his coming to power. Ben Ali‘s anti-Islamists crusade, including the moderate Islamist groups, was expected to be rewarded by President George W. Bush.

―When Ben Ali Visited Washington on February 18, 2004, he wanted to show his zeal in handling Islamic radicals and probably expected to be congratulated for it.‖543 The fact that the United States relied on oppressive regime to deter the terrorist threat falls under one of the four interlocking parts of the Grand Strategy of primacy: ―to reassure and contain allies‖544. The shared interests were to ensure U.S. leadership and prevent not only potential terrorists but also anti-Americanism in Tunisia. The emergence of other competent political power in Tunisia and notably the Islamists could harm U.S. interests.

―We have an interest in preventing Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other extremist group from establishing a toehold here (in Tunisia)‖545 wrote Ambassador Robert F.

Godec, U.S. ambassador to Tunisia on July 17, 2009.

The United States‘ support of Ben Ali was motivated by many issues including the War on Terror according to U.S. officials546 and was displayed through intelligence cooperation, military aid and training. Moreover, the common target of Ben Ali and the

542Margret Thatcher, ―Islamism the New Bolshevism,‖ The Guardian Feb. 12, 2002, online internet Nov 16, 2017. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/12/afghanistan.politics. 543Nouri Gana, The Making of the TunisianRevolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UniversityPress, 2013) 87. 544 Porter, Patrick, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.s. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 545 ―US embassy cables: Tunisia - a US foreign policy conundrum, Friday july 2009‖ The GuradianDec. 7, 2010, online, internet, Nov. 22, 2015. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables- documents/217138. 546Yahia H. Zoubir, Gregory White, ed. North African Politics: Change and Continuity (Taylor and Francis, 2015) 287. 217 United States was the Islamic groups with political ambitions for they represented the main challenging opposition to the government on the one hand and a perceived threat to

American interests in the region on the other. A potential rise of Islamic groups could challenge U.S. primacy in the MENA region and form new alliances with the traditional regional rivals of the United States such as Iran. The American backing of anti-Islamist government was justified by the potential security threat but it was at the same time a continuity of U.S. Grand Strategy of serving its interests under various pretexts: ―The Bush crew is playing a favorite card; as a word, terrorism can easily frighten the public and keep politicians at bay‖547. This card has been played by the various American administrations in Tunisia and even in the whole MENA since the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet

Union. The Islamists and those politicians who adhered to political Islam as a whole were crushed in Tunisia with American blessings, until the onset of the Tunisian revolution. At the same time, Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and other MENA autocrats played the extremism card to secure American backing. This backing was the reward for their cooperation.

―Playing the terrorism card continues‖548 after the 9/11 as it served U.S. primacy.

It was therefore beneficial to both the United States‘ alliance system in the region and Ben

Ali regime‘s continuity as president of Tunisia with the support of Bush and Obama‘s administrations, turning a blind eye to the oppressions, absence of democracy and the violation of human rights. The United States found in Ben Ali a very useful ally to their strategic objectives by his policy of containment of the rise of Islamism in the region549.

This policy is a manifestation of the grand strategy of primacy which is an extention from the Cold War period.

547 Pieter T Veer and Shoma Munshi, Media, War, and Terrorism: Responsesfrom the Middle East and Asia. (Psychology Press, 2005) 54. 548Ibid. 549 Lotfi Ben Rejeb, ―La Politique Américaine Envers La Tunisie : Quelle Nouvelle Approche Depuis La Révolution ?,‖ Politique Amé ricaine. 22.2 (2013): 41. 218 In Wikileaks cable EO12958 of July 17, 2009, released by the Guardian

Newspaper on December 7, 2010, a few weeks before the onset of the Tunisian revolution, the U.S. Ambassador in Tunisia informed the American administration of the increase of corruption in Tunisia caused by the President‘s clans, alerting Washington of the possible repercussions of denying these facts regarding U.S. interests while ensuring the need of containing Tunisia and keeping it within the American orbit. ―Notwithstanding the frustration of doing businesses here, we cannot write off Tunisia; we have too much at stake‖550. Therefore, the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia, an official and reliable voice who transmits relevant information on the regime, insisted on Tunisia as a strategic ally in the region and called the American administration to focus on the possibility of a destabilized

Tunisia, due to internal political troubles, in order to maintain it in the American orbit.

In brief, during his twenty three years in power, Ben Ali‘s regime supported the

United States ―in extraordinary rendition‖551. As a consequence, Washington backed Ben

Ali until the last moment before his ouster. Then, which policy should the American administration implement to keep Tunisia in its sphere of influence?

From a path dependency perspective, the U.S. has continued to advocate Israel‘s right to exist and to protect its security in the Middle East. It aimed to integrate it within the U.S. alliance system, i.e., to persuade MENA allies to normalize relations with Israel, even secretly. In this context one reason behind unconditional U.S. backing of Ben Ali for more than two decades was the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that had been a focal issue to

U.S. policy interests in the region. It was a strong motive to maintain autocratic regimes in power in the MENA. Israel had been part and parcel of the U.S. Grand Strategy of primacy in the MENA since its creation in 1948. In his speech on the Arab Spring on May 2011,

550Alexander Star,Open Secrets: Wikileaks, War and American Diplomacy (New York, N.Y: Grove Press, 2011). 551 Zoubir Yahya and Gregory White, ed, NorthAfricanPolitics: Change and Continuity (Taylor and Francis, 2015) 287. 219 President Obama enhanced primacy. Among the ―set of core interests in the region‖ he mentioned ―standing up for Israel‘s security and pursuing Arab-Israel peace‖552. Israel therefore was a watchdog on U.S. interests in the Middle East. It has been ―an important strategic ally for the United States against the regional influence‖553 of Iran and Russia. ―It became even more of reliable regional partner in the face of growing instability as a result of … the Arab Uprisings‖554. The security of Israel then was the major concern of Obama administration and the longstanding status-quo had to be maintained, that is avoiding the emergence of anti-Israel regimes.

Despite the significance of the Palestinian issue to the Muslim world in general, the Tunisian government and nearly all MENA leaders did neither cooperate with the

Palestinian authorities nor condemn the American heavy support of Israel at the expense of

Palestine. Both regimes – the Tunisian and Egyptian – assisted Palestinians, people and government, publically whereas they did not grow hostile toward the U.S. policy regarding the Palestine case. ―The (Arab) rulers rhetorically championed support of the Palestinians in an attempt to galvanize domestic support, while in reality back-stabbing the Palestinians at every available opportunity‖555. The Tunisian regime of Ben Ali was contained and silenced on the Palestinian case and the apparent boycotting of Israel was nothing but to calm sympathizers with Palestine. Both Bush and Obama continued on the same path of primacy by ―reassurance and containing allies‖ and ―integrating other States into U.S.- designed institutions and markets‖556. Tunisia, like Egypt and the major MENA countries, was contained and integrated for the sake of U.S. leadership in the region. As this Grand

552Barack Obama, ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa‖, May 19, 2011, available: www.obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 553 Matthias Maass, The World Views of the Obama Era: From Hope to Disillusionment (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018)183. 554 Ibid. 555Hishem H Ahmed, ―The Arab Spring, the West and the Political Islam,‖ Solidarity (Feb. 2012), Online, internet Nov. 2, 2018. Availbale: www.solidarity-us.org/node/3492. 556Patrick Porter, ―WhyAmerica's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S.Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 220 Strategy was working and serving U.S. interests, the American administrations continued the same policy despite claims of change.

5.1.3 Egypt: the U.S. response

If in the Tunisian case, the United States found herself outside of the ―arc of history‖ during the Tunisian revolution, could we assume that during the Egyptian revolution the lesson had been learnt and that Obama administration would not repeat the same ―mistakes‖? In other words, did this administration break with path dependency and initiate a new phase with the Muslim World and especially the Egyptians as Obama had promised in June 2009? In fact, during eighteen days of protests in Egypt, the main U.S. policy makers in Washington stood firm behind Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. U.S.

President Barack Obama called for ―reform from within‖557 assuring that Mubarak is the appropriate man to lead such a process. ―Egypt is a strong ally‖558 confirmed the White

House spokesman Richard Gibbs as an answer to a question about whether the United

States would back Mubarak during the beginning of the uprisings or not.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reiterated the White House view, stating that the

American ―assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people,‖559 (a sign of continuity of path dependency). Accordingly, there was no call for removal and not even a criticism, despite the human rights associations‘ condemnation of the military and police brutal crackdown on the protesters. ―In the early weeks of the crisis, the majority of

Washington‘s political establishment believed in Mubarak‘s resilience, as no one in the bureaucracy wished to be the first to ‗make the call‘ that the president was on his way

557Gamal M Selim, The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt: The Limits of Externally- Induced Change (Springer, 2015) 97. 558Ibid. 559 David E Sanger, ―As Mubarak Digs In U.S. Policy in Egypt Is Complicated‖ The New York Times Feb. 5, 201. Online, internet Aug.25, 201. Availabe at http://www.nytimes.com/. 221 out‖560. In this context, it should be noted that the reluctance to denounce Mubarak was an attempt to save a close ally who had served U.S. interests in the region. If we examine top

U.S. policymakers‘ response, the break with longstanding U.S. Grand Strategy of ―habits‖ was hardly to occur, hence a continuity of the Cold War policy toward Egypt despite the

―waves of changes‖ that were threatening U.S. allies in the region.

Far from directing any criticism, Obama, Gibbs and Mrs. Clinton sided with

Mubarak, affirming his ability to respond to the protesters‘ demands. In January 2011, a few days before Hosni Mubarak‘s overthrow, Mrs. Clinton stated, that he (Mubarek) is

―the appropriate person to implement democracy in Egypt‖561. This support and loyalty, in some way, foregrounded the contradiction of U.S. outward claims to uphold democratic principles and positions while enhancing the continuity of primacy as its Grand Strategy.

The U.S. policy makers‘ commitment to defend Mubarak was justified by the vital role that the regime had been playing in the MENA region and even in the Arab and

Muslim World and their strategic role in the American alliance system in the MENA562.

The hypothesis was enhanced by a straightforward statement articulated by U.S. Vice

President , who refused to refer to Mubarak as ―a dictator‖ amid the Egyptian

Revolution on January 27, 2011, praising his role in the Middle East peace process and highlighting his tight relationship with the American Administration. He stated: ―Mubarak has been an ally of ours in a number of things and he has been very responsible, relative on geopolitical interests in the region … the Middle East peace effort; the action Egypt has taken relative to normalizing relationship with – with Israel… I would not refer to him as a

560 Maria C. Pinto, ―Mapping the Obama Administration‘s Response to the ArabSpring,‖ RevistaBrasileira De Política Internacional. 55.2 (2012): 109-130. 561Gamal M. Selim, The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt: The Limits of Externally- Induced Change (Springer, 2015) 98. 562Jermy Sharp and Library of the Congress, Congressional Research Service, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington DC: G.P.O, 2012) 1. 222 dictator‖563. Biden‘s statement summarized the long-established working alliance with

Egypt and its efficient cooperation with the United States and its neighbors - notably,

Israel, since the Camp David Accords in 1978.

Thus to label him a ―dictator‖ publicly would be counterproductive to U.S. strategic alliance system in the MENA. It could be also departure of the Cold War ―habits‖ of prioritizing interests over values. Washington tried hard to maintain him in power,564 turning a deaf ear to the popular demands for democracy and showing no consideration for human rights highlighted by Obama in his Cairo speech doctrine. More than that, Biden ignored the protesters‘ calls for Mubarak to resign and as an answer to New Hours Host

Jim Leherer declared on January 27, 2011, ―… I think the time has come for President

Mubarak to begin to move in the direction that – to be more responsive to some... of the needs of the people out there‖565. Mr Biden and Mrs Clinton insisted on saving Mubarak beause ―for 30 years he has been a pillar of American foreign policy in a volatile region‖566. Therefore, the policy quandary became how it would be possible to preserve the

Egyptian present without responding to the increasing protests? The Egyptian case was more complicated and embarrassing to the American administration. The revolutions

―presented a dilemma for the U.S‖567 grand strategy of primacy in a key country in MENA.

It is threatened by regional rivals like Iran and the U.S. proscribed terrorist organizations and political parties like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine.

In this vein, and in line with the Obama administrations‘ attempt to break with the primacy doctrine and appear as safeguard of democracy and human rights, Obama‘s

563Dan Murphy, ―Joe Biden says Egypt's Mubarak no dictator, he shouldn't step down,‖ The Christian Science Monitor (Jan. 27, 2011). 564 Efraim Inbar, The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramifications (Routledge, 2014) 53. 565Blake Hounshell, ―Biden on Mubarak: ‗I would not refer to him as a dictator,‖ Foreign Policy (Jan. 28, 2011), online, internet, Oct. 20, 2017. Availbale: https://foreignpolicy.com. 566Jamil Effarh, Think Palestine: To Unlock U.S. Israelis and Arabs Conflicts (Authorhouse, 2013) 439. 567 Colin H Kahl and Marc Lynch, ―U.S. Strategy after the Arab Uprisings: Toward Progressive Engagement,‖ The Washington Quarterly. 36.2 (2013): 39-60. 223 national security advisers Denis McDonough and Benjamin Rhodes who had written the

President‘s 2009 Cairo speech568, recommended turning the Arab Spring from a ―dilemma to welcome opportunity‖ by taking sides with the Egyptian protests and being in ―the arc of history‖ and on the right side of history. The President could refer to the 1989 Eastern

European revolutions and ―forge a new relationship with the Egyptian Society‖569 turning the dilemma into a welcome opportunity. In the final analysis, these pieces of advice were difficult, if not impossible to be implemented due to the persistence of the ―‗habitual ideas‘ that make the U.S. grand strategy hard to change‖570, despite the successive attempts since the post-Cold war Era. These habits were nicknamed by Deputy National Security adviser

Benjamin Rhodes as ―Blob‖ that included a ―class of officials and commentators who worry incessantly about ‗the collapse of the American security order‖571.

But Mrs. Clinton, one of ―the Blobs‖ who was committed to ―primacy‖ labeled some of Obama‘s advisers as ―naïve‖572, stating that ―Mubarak has been a friend for 30 years, and if you walk away from your friends, every other ally in the region is going to doubt your word‖573. It was an emphasis on maintaining the alliance system in the Middle

East, guaranteeing protection to the longtime American allies in the region.

Such a debate among the various governmental departments and officials reflects the uncertainty and reluctance toward Egypt on the one hand, and the indecision between continuity with the containment doctrine of primacy or change, that took the outward ideological form of idealism and realism within the democratic administration on the other hand. Furthermore, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s adherence to Mubarak‘s stand was

568Geoff Dyer and Hiba Saleh, ―Clinton and Obama: An American Rift over an EgyptianDespot,‖ Financial Times Oct. 26, 2016, online, internet, Oct.20, 2017. Availbale: www.ft.com. 569 Ibid. 570Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 571Ibid. 572James Traub, ―The Hillary ,‖ Foreign Policy (Nov. 6, 2015). 573Ibid. 224 also indicative of cautiousness, for fear of the domino theory, which is a manifestation of the longstanding Cold War containment policy by which the abandon of allies could frighten and disappoint the current American friendly regimes in the region. It was in 1945 that President Harry Truman highlighted the communist threat of Vietnamese who claimed independence from France as a justification for pouring economic and military assistance to French troops to prevent Vietnam from turning communist, thus falling into the Soviet sphere. Therefore, the fall of close allies in the MENA could lead to the loss of other allies to Iran. It could harm the post-Cold War alliance system in the MENA and jeopardize U.S. hegemony.

It should be noted that Obama would have liked to change his doctrine towards human rights as his young advisers suggested a shift to alternative Grand Strategy but the continuity of the policy of primacy based on the institutions of ―containment‖ and the influence of the ―Blobs‖ such as Secretary of State Hilary Clinton would be ultimately imposed. Porter states that in America, ―grand strategy change is therefore rare, hard wired beliefs are resistant to change‖574. The attempt to change at the last moment was faced by fierce resistance from top policymakers who could not be ignored. Obama ceased to support Mubarak only at the last moment after knowing that protests were out of control.

The abandonment of Mubarak at the last moment appeared as a shift toward new foreign policy based on democratization of the MENA and advocating Human rights. In fact, it was recalculation based on U.S. interests. ―U.S. calculated that Mubarak had to be sacrificed in order to preserve U.S. vital interests in Egypt and the entire region and called for his resignation‖575. Another point worth exploring is that Obama played a secondary if not insignificant role in discarding Mubarak and that there was no other alternative. Lizza

574 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 18. 575 Efraim Inbar, The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramifications (Routelge, 2014) 53. 225 stated that ―that course of action represented less of an Obama‘s doctrine, and more of a choice based on a realistic assessment of the sobering facts on the ground‖576.

The importance of Mubarak to the U.S.

Egypt was an important partner in longstanding peace negotiations. Since the

Camp David Accords between Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat and Israel, which were concluded by the Egypt-Israel Treaty in Washington in 1979, Egypt recognized the state of

Israel, which, in turn, restored the occupied . Hosni Mubarak‘s regime carried on El Sadat‘s path, maintaining the security of Israel and providing the United

States with military and geopolitical facilities. In turn, he benefited from annual packages.

The American aid was motivated by the role that Egypt had been playing for U.S. interests in the MENA. A key ally needed for American policy of containment of hostile Iran which was challenging U.S. interests in the Muslim world and threats to Israel. In secret cables dated to March 2009, U.S. ambassador to Egypt wrote to Norton A. Schwartz, an U.S. Air

Force general telling him that ―Since our Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program began almost 30 years ago, our strong military relationship has supported peace between

Egypt and Israel and ensured critical Suez Canal over flight access for U.S. military operations‖577. Significantly, Mubarak‘s regime had been contained through the reception of loans, military equipment and training programs. In turn, Egypt had to serve U.S. alliance system in the region.

As for the U.S. global War on Terror, the Egyptian ousted President was a main partner of Bush and Obama administrations. Journalists in the Washington Post stated that

―for decades, Egypt's government has been a critical partner for U.S. intelligence agencies, sharing information on extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and working hand in glove on

576Ryan Lizza. ―The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama‖s Foreign Policy‖, The New Yorker May 2, 2011, online, internet, Oct. 25, 2017. Availbale: http://www.newyorker.com/. 577 ―US embassy Cables: Egypt's strategic importance to the US,‖ The Guradian, Jan.28, 201, online, internet Dec. 2, 2018. Available: www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/199866. 226 counterterrorism operations‖578. Mubarak joined the Unites States in its war on Iraq in

2003 and so did he in 1991 when George Bush Senior attacked Iraq. Joining the American troops to fight Iraq and providing logistic facilities to the United States in its GWT made

Mubarak the number one U.S. man in the MENA.

In the WikiLeaks cables 09CAIRO549 dated to March 2009 and published by The

Guardian, the U.S. ambassador to Egypt informs the White House of Mubarak‘s cooperation in combating smuggling arms to Gaza, urging the U.S. government to cooperate in ―combating emerging threats, including border security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and peacekeeping‖579. Egypt played a vital role in blockading the Gaza Strip, which had been ruled by Hamas, a U.S.-proscribed terrorist organization. The Egyptian policy toward regional actors was aligned with the United States‘ along three decades.

From a path dependency perspective the United States Grand Strategy of primacy in Egypt did not change. Even during and after the Arab uprisings Obama adopted the same core of foreign policy.

Mubarak and his last vice-President Omar Suleiman were the two men of the

United States and Israel according to WikiLeaks. Suleiman was coined as Israel‘s Man

Number Two after Mubarak and the favorite man to succeed Mubarak‖580 acccording

WikiLeaks cable released in February 2011 and dated August 2008.

U.S‘s main interests in Egypt have been the security of Israel and free access to oil in the Gulf Countries. In a conference on Obama policy in the Arab Spring countries,

578Mary Beth Sheridan and Joby Warrick, ―Mubarak resignation throws into question U.S.-Egyptian counterterrorism work,‖ The Washington Post Sunday Feb. 13, 2011, Online, internet, Nov. 10, 2018. Available: www.washingtonpost.com/national/joint-counterterrorism-efforts-could-face-public- opposition/2011/02/12/ABu2. 579 ―US embassy Cables: Egypt's strategic importance to the US,‖The Guradian Jan.28, 2011, online, internet, Dec 2, 2018. Available: www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/199866. 580 ―Defense Minister Barak‘s discussions in Egypt focus on Shalit, Tahdiya, Anti-smuggling and Iran, 2008 August 29,‖ The Telghraph Feb. 7, 2011, online, internet, Dec. 2, 2018. Available: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/egypt-wikileaks-cables/8309338 227 Martin Indyk emphasized ―the importance of two critical interests in the Middle East: the survival and wellbeing of Israel and the free flow of oil at reasonable prices from the

Gulf‖581. These interests might have been deterred by Iran and could be maintained only through allies like Egypt. The loss of a cooperative regime could by all means jeopardize

American leadership and hegemony over challenging regional rivals. Then, which regime would be as cooperative as Mubarak‘s? Which appropriate foreign policy would be adopted in Egypt in the aftermath of the ouster of the regime? Would the U.S. manage in preventing the newly elected governments from seeking ―to go alone‖?

From the strict viewpoint of defending ―U.S. interests in the regimes‖, then, upholding the Mubarak regime or not was debated in such terms and therefore was in fact a tactical choice of political opportunisms, not principled choice. Historical institutionalists state that ―habit is a type of path dependency, the process whereby prior historical developments limit the scope of choices set before decisions makers‖582. Therefore, the

Obama approach to the Arab Spring could by no means diverge from the longstanding

Grand Strategy of primacy that takes into consideration U.S. interests and hegemony rather than values.

To sum up, the White House attempted to be ―on the side of history‖ at the last moment in Tunisia and Egypt by welcoming the new political scenes, calling for free elections and highlighting the readiness of the United States to respond to the voices of changes in these countries. The Arab Spring was the first test to Obama himself who, according to Juan Cole, was ―in a very difficult position‖583 due to the dilemma of balancing interests and values while managing the uprisings. Significantly, the waves of

581Martin Indyk, ―Assessing Obama‘s Middle East Policies,‖ Brookings (Nov. 2011), online, internet, Dec. 3, 2018. Available: www.brookings.edu. 582 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 583Juan Cole and Amy Frykhom, ―Obama and the Arab Spring,‖ The Christian Century (June 7, 2011), online, internet, April 22, 2018. Availbale: www.christiancentury.org. 228 changes targeted U.S. allies since the Cold War. It ―was a popular movement against authoritarian U.S. allies‖ which could affect negatively U.S. interests and other monarchies in the Gulf. ―As a world power, you don't want to lose your allies.

As a democratic world power, you do not want to be opposed to democratizing. So

Obama was between a rock and a hard place‖584. Finally he sacrificed Ben Ali and

Mubarak respectively when his attempts to remedy the regimes from within failed more than once. In this context, the balance of pragmatism and opportunism was the adjustment and update of the adopted approaches for the sake of U.S. supremacy in the region.

Tellingly, the waves of protests and the ouster of two vital allies revealed the ambivalence and often the contradiction of U.S. foreign policy in the MENA. Ignoring peoples‘ demands of the very universal values that all American presidents and top policymakers have been championing and claiming to be defended by the United States is significant in unveiling the paradox of the official discourse when vital allies are at stake.

This dilemma was even converted – albeit inadequately – into a welcome opportunity. The objective therefore was more than avoiding the legacies of likely criticism of its neutrality during the first wave of the Arab Spring but restructuring new alliance through a modified version of primacy strategy. The U.S. commitment in Tunisia and Egypt was fundamentally a continuity of the inherited Grand Strategy of primacy that has ―proven hard to change, even amid shocks 585 according to Porter. It was therefore a modified approach to meet the new political landscape which threatened by ascending regional powers.

584Ibid. 585 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 229 The U.S. response to the Arab Spring during and after the fall of Ben Ali and

Mubarak was also a manifestation of the neo-containment policy as it shifted from total support to autocrats to the total backing of protesters.

―In response to these challenges the United States moved quickly in the direction of containment the Arab Uprisings through different strategies. In Tunisia and Egypt, the United States openly supported Ben Ali, Mubarak and Salah regimes before and during the mass protests. However when it becomes clear that dictators were collapsing, the United States changed tactics by siding with the revolutionary forces, while working to maintain the main power structures that would serve American interests‖586.

Thus, what mattered more was the U.S. strategic alliance system in the MENA region that had previously been served by dictators. As they were about to be overthrown, the Obama administration shifted tactics by appearing on the side of the protesters. In fact, the objective was to maintain the status quo by substituting old dictators by more faithful agents to the United States.

5.2 The immediate post Ben Ali Tunisia and Mubarak Egypt: primacy at stake

In his book, Nouri Gana stated that ―When the United States Congress gave a standing ovation to the Tunisian revolution on January 25, 2011; it did so not so much as a gesture for a change of policy as an attempt to ride on the revolutionary wave it had deliberately missed before‖587. This claim concurs with Porter‘s hypothesis on U.S. continuity to adopt the same Grand Strategy of primacy. Then Washington would work to contain, integrate and align the new political powers with its interests in the

MENA.

586Gamal M. Selim, Global and RegionalApproaches to Arms Control in the Middle East: A Critical Assessmentfrom the Arab World (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013) 101. 587Nouri Gana, the Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects (Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 5. 230 The first transitional period covered the era following the demise of the two presidents. That is, in Tunisia, from Ben Ali‘s ouster on January 14, 2011 until the first election on October 23, 2011 and in Egypt, from the ouster of Mubarak on February 11,

2011 until the first presidential election of June 30, 2012. This era was characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity in U.S. foreign policy establishments as the debatable question was how Washington would approach the new political scenes and whether there was a willingness to democratize Tunisia and Egypt after the open support of dictators for decades.

In theory, Obama‘s approach should be analyzed with regards to his promises to start a new phase with the Muslim world in terms of advocating democracy and human rights. As for Tunisia, the White House released a press statement to congratulate the

Tunisian people. A few hours after the overthrow of Ben Ali on January 14, 2011, Obama mentioned Tunisia in his speech before the United States Congress on January 25, 2011: the Tunisian ―people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: The United States of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people‖588. This sudden change falls under what is known as balancing values and interests and adjusting an outdated policy in approaching the new political landscape. He added: ―our success in this new changing world will require us to approach that world with a new level of engagement in our foreign affairs‖589. At this level could Obama challenge the longstanding Grand Strategy of ―primacy‖ to adopt a new one?

Or was it just a different means for the same ends: continuity of the U.S. alliance system in the MENA?

588 Barack Obama, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack Obama. 2011. Book 1 (Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2014) 56. 589Ibid. 231 Because of the heavy effect of the former allies‘ ouster, U.S. top policymakers engaged in a policy of ‗remedy‘ to align themselves with the unstopped waves of change in the MENA. Several U.S. top policymakers visited Tunisia in the first few weeks following the overthrow of Ben Ali and Mubarak. Jeffrey Feltman, the assistant secretary of state for

Near East affairs, William Burns, the U.S. under-secretary of state for political affairs, and

Senators Joseph Lieberman and John McCain travelled to Tunisia and the immediate aftermath of January 14, 2011. Moreover Secretary of state Mrs. Clinton flew from Egypt to Tunisia to meet caretaker government to ensure the partnership and support of Obama administration to Tunisia and Egypt. She stated: ―I intend to convey strong support of the

Obama administration and the American people that we wish to be a partner in the important work that lays ahead as they embark on a transition to a genuine democracy‖590.

The Chief U.S. diplomat expressed the American mission and commitment to support the two new governments in the transitional period. She stressed the unconditional engagement of the United States ―with the Middle East as the new order emerges‖591. ―The new world order‖ refers to George Herbert Walker Bush approach to the immediate post-Cold War period after the collapse of the Soviet Union as The New World Order was an era of uncertainty in U.S. foreign policy much like the immediate ouster of U.S. allies in the early

2011 in the MENA.

In addition to diplomatic and institutional containment, U.S. economic aid was well known for its effects on the ongoing internal and foreign policy within countries. In her visit to Egypt on March 15, 2011, the Secretary of State ―pledged $90 million in

590 Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2012: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session (Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2011) 6. 591 ―Hillary Clinton arrives in Tunisia,‖ Al Jazeera Mar. 17, 2011, online, internet Jan. 17, 2015. Availbale: www.aljazeera.com/new. 232 Emergency Economic assistance‖592, ensuring the continuity of American aid flow. In her same tour, she vowed to ―push for 20 million dollars for Tunisia to respond to some of (the

Tunisian) needs‖593. These engagements were important for two reasons: the first was that the receivers were the SCAF, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt, a long- established ally to the United States that assumed power to govern Egypt from departing

President Hosni Muabarak, and in Tunisia an interim Prime Minister Mr Essebssi and

President Mubazaa, who had served as speakers of the Parliament during Ben Ali‘s presidendency. The second is that the deployment of economic assistance was a containment of former allies that were under threat of regional powers. These promised economic packages to Tunisia and Egypt were a continuity of the Cold War economic containment and enhancement of the long-term aid programs.

The U.S. involvement in the Tunisian internal affairs was significant in terms of following the political transition and the potential outcome of the elections that would take place in October 2011. Secreatry of State Mrs Clintion argued: ―We need to have a very big commitment to Tunisia, that we can be ready to help them economically as well as with their democratic transformation‖594. Therefore, what counted at this moment were the democratic transition and its effects on U.S. geopolitical interests in the whole region. The

United States aimed to shepherd the transition and safeguard a cooperative relationship with Tunisia that had extended from the early Cold War. This according to Mrs. Clinton at the time ―presents very significant challenges to America‘s position, to our security and to our long-term interests‖595.

592 ―Clinton 'deeply inspired' by Egyptian change,‖ CNN Mar. 15, 2011, online, internet, Jan. 17, 2015. Availbale: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/US/03/15/clinton.egypt.change/index.html. 593 Ibid. 594 HearingsBefore a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One HundredTwelfthCongress, First Session (Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2011) 32. 595Ibid., 6. 233 The meeting with interim president Fouad Mebazza and Prime Minister Essebsi was part of the follow up strategy that the Secretary of State was working on in Egypt and

Tunisia in March 2011. The tour was scheduled two months after Ben Ali‘s ouster and a few weeks after the ouster of Mubarak. Like in Egypt, Clinton‘s visit and promises were faced by protestors in Tunis who ―marched in the capital under tight security to protest against Clinton's visit, the third such demonstration in three days‖596. They considered the

American response to the Tunisian uprisings and especially Hillary Clinton‘s visit at this moment ―as cynical and the height of hypocrisy‖597. In Egypt, the chief Head of

Diplomacy invited the ―25 January Revolution Youth Coalition‖ for a meeting during her visit to Egypt but they refused, accusing ―her negative stance towards the revolution during its inception and the approach of the U.S. administration towards the Middle East

Region‖598.

The presidents‘ ousters were perceived as a turning point in the MENA history but the regime change did not occur entirely and the old satrap of the old regimes and military institutions caught power and were charged with leading the transitional period.

―During the Egyptian uprising, the White House did not promote popular sovereignty but instead backed an ‗‖orderly transition‖ by one of Mubarak‘s cronies‖599. The orderly and smooth transition aimed at appointing one of the infamous intelligence service agents,

Omar Suleiman. The American administration ―hoped to install ex-intelligence agent chief and newly appointed vice president Omar Suleiman in power‖600 who could sustain U.S. geopolitical interests and avoid a complete transition away from powerful U.S. alliance

596 ―Hillary Clinton arrives in Tunisia,‖ Al Jazeera Mar. 17, 2011, online, internet Jan. 17, 2015. Availbale: www.aljazeera.com/new. 597Adil E. Shamoo and Bonnie Bricker, ―No Moral Consistency in Obama‘s Middle East Policy,‖ Foreign Policy in Focus April 8, 2011, online, internet, Feb. 18, 2015. Available: www.fpif.com. 598 CQ Researcher, Issues in Comparative Politics: Selections from Cq Researcher (Los Angeles, Calif: SAGE/CQ Press, 2012) 6. 599Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2012) 2. 600 Ibid. 234 systems. The threat was that of an unknown and unpredicted political scene emerging after the collapse of Mubarak‘s regime. The appointment of Suleiman during the last days of

Mubarak as a vice President was a catch up of the previous American ―intelligence failure‖ in predicating the downfall of strategic ally in the Middle East. And the recommendation of Suleiman to substitute Mubarak ―could placate Mubarak‘s critics without disrupting

U.S.-Egypt cooperation‖601. This failure led the Obama administration to push the SCAF to shepherd the post-Mubarek era. ―First you lean into the idea of Mubarak leading a transition. When that doesn‘t work, you lean into Omar Suleiman, and when that idea goes down, too, you think, ‗ok let‘s work with the SCAF‘ ‖602 a state department official argued. Then one of the features of U.S. grand strategy of primacy was presenting and advocating their close agents in power and this explains the engagement of the military institution in the transitional period in Egypt.

The SCAF therefore was plan ―C‖ after the failure to get approval on

Mubarak and Suleiman. All the three plans could be seen as valuable choices that could maintain U.S. interests and especially Israel security and deterrence of the regional threats.

5.2.1 Tunisia

It should be noted that Tunisia mattered less than Egypt in the MENA in terms of its population and strategic role in North Africa. This does not mean that the United States abandoned it. Top policymakers in Washington especially President Obama and Secretary of State‘s Mrs. Clinton deployed all diplomatic means to save the regime but as protests were out of control they let Ben Ali go. Just after the former presidents‘ flight, and unlike

Egypt, a civilian government held power. According to the Tunisian constitution, the

601Ibid. 602 Alian Gresh, ―Barack Obama, ‗lackey‘ of Egypt‘s ,‖ Orient XXI (Sept. 2018), online, internet, Mar. 27, 2019. Availballe: https://orientxxi.info/magazine/barack-obama-lackey-of-egypt-s-muslim- brotherhood,2623. 235 speaker of the parliament substitutes the President in case of vacancy. Therefore, Foued

Mebazaa became an interim President and Béji Caid Essebssi, an interim prime minister, conducted a caretaker government in the transition period. Significantly both the President and Prime Minister were satraps of the old regimes who served high ranking positions in the two former autocratic presidents Habib Bourguiba and Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali and their duties to hold the first democratic elections were questionable for the democratic movement. The first reluctance to transfer power, like SCAF in Egypt, was the postponement of the first parliamentary election which had been scheduled to July 2011 but was then delayed to October 23, 2011. Although he promised to serve only during the transitional period and to resign after the first scheduled election on October 23, 2011,

Essebsi would come to power with a political project that aligned itself with the major western governments‘ interests, including the United States and the counter-revolution powers in the Arab World.

To preserve its strategic primacy, the United States deployed its diplomatic and economic means to support Tunisia. A loan of $39 million was given as assistance to

Tunisia603. Moreover, the interim Prime Minister Caid Essebsi was the first Arab Spring politician to visit Washington on October 7, 2011 – two weeks before the first election of

23 October 2011 – and meet the President Barack Obama and secretary of State Hillary

Clinton. They vowed a concrete economic assistance to Tunisia in its peaceful transition to post Ben Ali era. Obama told Essebssi that ―The United States has an enormous stake in seeing the success in Tunisia and the creation of greater opportunity and more business

603―Remraks Following a Meeting with Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebssi of Tunisia and an Exchange With Reporters‖, October 7, 2011, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack Obama, 2011, Book 2, July 1 to Decvember 31, 2011(Government Printing Office, 2016) 1227. 236 investment in Tunisia‖604. Obama valued Tunisia and his commitment to bolster its economy in a critical period is an extension of an applicable containment policy.

The success of Tunisia became a priority for Washington which translated into concrete support to the Tunisian economy through the commitment in the creation of business opportunities and an aid package ―that includes loan guarantees, assistance in encouraging trade and foreign investment, a whole range of support program‖605.

The U.S. commitment in Tunisia through deployment of containment policy was announced publically by the White House just after the meeting of the two presidents.

Obama ―plans to work with the Congress to provide up to $30 million in loan guarantees to

Tunisia and to launch a $ 20 million Tunisia Enterprise Fund to support private Sector‖606.

Moreover Obama ―discussed an aid package worth $50 million in loan guarantees and enterprise seed capital‖607with Prime Minister Essebsi. Significantly, Obama‘s engagement few weeks before the first scheduled election, and the Chief U.S. diplomat Clinton‘s pledge of a $20 million package few weeks after the topple of Ben Ali aimed to ―reassure and contain allies‖608 as one of the main parts of U.S. grand strategy of primacy.

In this context, the economic assistance and the total commitment to the interim

Prime Minister was an attempt to keep Tunisia under control through the classical mechanism of the Cold War containment. If the United States abandoned Tunisia, regional and international powers that had been working for the extension of their influence could affect Tunisia and join it to their orbit. Obama vowed to assist Tunisia in order to prevent its fall in hands of unfriendly political powers inside and notably perceived anti-American

604Ibid. 605Ibid. 606 ―Obama pledges support for 'inspiring' Tunisia,” Aljazeera Oct. 8, 2011, Online, internet, May 6, 2016. Availbale: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2011/10/2011107231659304991.html. 607Alister Bull, ―Obama hails Tunisia as ‗inspiration‘ of Arab Spring,‖ October 7, 2011, Online, internet May 6, 2016. Availbale: www.reuters.com 608 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.s. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 237 political groups such as Iran, Turkey and other regional and world powers. This strategy echoes the Truman Doctrine that made economic aid as a universal American policy tool in addition to the fear of the Domino theory in the MENA that could damage more key allies.

It can also be read as a strategy to recuperate the U.S. intelligence failure to predict the ouster of pivotal – allies and forge said alliances anew. Interestingly, Prime Minster

Essebsi – reproducing an old-aged long-practiced politician since the 1950s – reassured the

American administration that there would not be a place for Islamic extremism in Tunisia, ensuring the continuity of the longstanding alliance with the United States in its War on

Terror in the region.

Mrs. Clinton stated that ―there will be times when not all of our interests align.

We work to align them, but that is just reality…. As a country with many complex interests, we‘ll always have to walk and chew gum at the same time‖609 The alignment of interests was by all means the adjustments, even temporarily, with the revolutionary waves in the whole region. It is also coping with the circumstances to maintain Tunisia and Egypt within the American orbit. The main goal of Mrs. Clinton, therefore, is to protect U.S. interests and to bolster U.S. leadership and hegemony at the expense of potential adversaries. This could be achieved by economic and diplomatic assistance. The problematic question that remains is whether The United States would stick to its promises in the MENA, that is supporting the democratic transition and standing for the American values, or whether it would slide back to the entrenched U.S. policy in the region of prioritizing American interests over values for its long-standing policy of primacy.

609 Oz Hassan, Constructing America's Freedom Agenda for the Middle East: Democracy and Domination (Routelege 2012) 180. 238 5.2.2 Egypt

In Egypt, after the rejection of the satraps of the old regimes, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) caught power and engaged in leading the transition. The intervention of the military in civilian and political affairs in Egypt was an attempt to contain the outcome of the revolution and maintain Egypt in the American orbit. ―when intervened, the SCAF circumscribed the uprising and safeguarded its ties to Washington.

Similarly U.S. officials accepted a change in leadership that would protect its interests‖610.

The military was therefore a bulwark against the regional and international rivals, especially Iran and Hezbollah. The deployment of the military rulers was a skillful strategy to enlist Egypt in containment against U.S. adversaries in the region. This could only be achieved by reliable agents who had served U.S. interests against regional powers. The weakening of revolutionary spirits especially those that tend to neglect U.S. role as a main player in the MENA and the restriction of revolutionary movements in the post Mubarak era could be carried out ―through a tactic alliance with anti-revolutionary forces. This includes the military as a key institution since 1952 and the cornerstone of the Egyptian-

American strategic alliance‖611. Therefore, the reliance on the military rulers to recuperate what was about to be lost was the main target after the fall of Mubarak. Interestingly, after the election, it was the SCAF that seized control of the political scene and led the transition from Mubarak to Morsi. As perceived unfriendly political powers threatened the U.S. alliance system and notably scared U.S. key allies, it was the SCAF that in one year overthrew the elected president Mohamed Morsi and turned Egypt into pre-Mubarak . A political scene endowed with stability was needed for U.S. primacy and its habits that sustain autocratic rulers if they serve the American regional alliance system.

610Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2012) 2. 611Gamal M Salim, ―Egypt under Scaf and the Muslim Brotherhood: the Triangle of Counter- Revolution,‖ Arab Studies Quarterly. 37.2 (2015): 177-199. 239 In this context, it is important to remember that since 1952, the Egyptian presidents came out of the military institution. It was the country‘s tradition since 1952‖ to be governed by the military that the United States has been fully committed to train, finance and equip the Egyptian military especially after the Camp David accord. The aid skyrocketed in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution in 1979 when the pro-American ruler

Mohammad Rezia known as the Shah was overthrown by the Islamic leader Ayatollah

Khomeini and U.S. leadership was damaged heavily by the challenge of Iran that had been longing for primacy in the MENA. Iran was about to normalize relations with Egypt but

―the SCAF backtracked on what appeared to be an orientation towards the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran‖612 Thus, it was evident the Egyptian military was the safeguard of U.S. alliance system in the MENA but one can wonder whether the military rulers would relinquish power and handle it easily to an elected government. IR analysists asked such problematic questions regarding the role of the military in the short and long terms. ―The key questions remain unanswered. Will the Supreme Council of the Armed

Forces (SCAF) be willing to cede power to democratically determined civilian leaders, particularly from the ancien régime‟s archrival, the Muslim Brotherhood which won in a close election?‖613.

In this sense, it was clear the SCAF was the decisive power that best guaranteed the containment of the uprisings and best controlled the triumph of potential anti-

Americanism in Egypt, especially through the Muslim Brotherhood. What enhanced the habits ideas of U.S. Grand Strategy establishment was the containment made possible by key members of Egyptian military. One of them openly highlighted the continuity of U.S.-

Egyptian military at all levels including the Camp David Accords. On July 27, 2011,

612Gamal M Salim, Global and Regional Approaches to Arms Control in the Middle East: A Critical Assessment from the Arab World (Berlin: Springer, 2013) 101. 613 Pierre M Atlas, ―U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests,‖ Digest of Middle East Studies. 21.2 (2012): 365. 240 nearly seven months after the overthrow of Mubarak he stated: ―we have strong strategic relations with the United States since 1979 Camp David Accords. In military to military relations, the U.S. is our pillar we have been supported by the United States and we are proud to protect United States interests‖614. This statement reveals the continuity of U.S. supremacy and heavy influence on the military institution through a long-established policy of containment based on annual packages delivered uniquely to the military institution. In turn, as it was cited openly, the SCAF sustained U.S. interests in the MENA.

At this level one can wonder: if the United States decided for one reason or another to cut aids and depart from its habits and primacy, would the military remain faithful and secure the U.S. alliance?

The answer to such debatable question can be reflected though the U.S.‘s total commitment with the SCAF along 16-month rule in the aftermath of Mubarak. The Obama administration engaged with the SCAF in maintaining stability and continuing the U.S.-

Egyptian cooperation. The SCAF contained the triumph of Islamic parties in the first parliamentary elections via practices such as the suspension of the constitution and the dissolution of the parliament. The SCAF also would cancel two elections that brought the

Freedom and Justice Party to power with 47,2% in the elections of November 2011 and

January 2011. In June 2012 two weeks before the second round of the presidential election that expected to bring another Muslim Brotherhood figure to the presidency, the Supreme

Court, affected by the SCAF, dissolved the parliament, curtailing the executive and legislative powers.

As according to ―habit‖ in U.S. grand strategy, rulers who represent a threat to

U.S. leadership and alliance system have to leave office one way or another. This strategy was adopted during the Cold War as the United States orchestrated military coups against

614Gamal M Selim Global and Regional Approaches to Arms Control in the Middle East: A Critical Assessment from the Arab World (Berlin: Springer, 2013)101. 241 presidents and politicians who stood against its interests. This can be achieved only by local agents. The SCAF put an end to the first democratically elected president in Egyptian history, the Muslim brotherhood‘s Mohamed Morsi, when he diverged from the designated path. Significantly, the United States refused to call it a ―coup‖ and prudently reacted to the events without neither support nor condemnation of the ouster, reverting to the ―wait and see‖ strategy that had been adopted during the uprisings in January and February 2011.

The Unites States ensured the continuity of the military cooperation on one side and boosted the Egyptian economy on the other. ―After Mubarak‘s resignation in February

2011, the Administration made several aid proposals for Egypt. In the weeks following the resignation, the Obama Administration reprogrammed $165 million in already appropriated ESF for support to Egypt's economy ($100 million) and political transition

($65 million)‖615. By this aid, along with USAID agency involvement, the United States tried to recuperate Egypt – which, like Tunisia, was in jeopardy. The military, economic and political assistance were means to the same end i.e. that of maintaining Egypt in the

American orbit and distancing it from rival competitors like Iran, China and Russia. Egypt had been an American ally in the Middle East and had to be contained through economic assistance, which was the main mechanism since the late 1970s.

In the same vein, the American administration bolstered its commitment in the new Arab Spring countries by initiating various measures to assist the transitional governments. Obama poured $2 billion to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation

(OPIC) to revive and encourage investment616. Concurrently, it worked on engaging international monetary institutions and organizations such as the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to

615 Jeremy M. Sharp, ―Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations,‖ Congressional Research Service February 8, 2012, online, internet, June, 20, 2016. Available: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f842ccb2.pdf. 616 Ibid. 242 provide Tunisia and Egypt with credit facilities. The European Union through the initiation of the Comprehensive Trade and Investment Partnership Initiative in the Middle East617 was committed to advocating the transition period, as long as the SCAF in Egypt and the old regime presidents and Prime Minister in Tunisia ensured the United States of backing its interests unconditionally. At the G8 Summit of May 2011, Barak Obama promised U.S.

$4 billion dollars to promote ―democracy‖ in North Africa and the Middle East, mainly

Tunisia and Egypt . He stated that although ―these countries may be a great distance from our shores; we know that our own future is bound to this region by the forces of economics and security, by history and by faith‖618. What counted here more was to great extent, the economy and the free access to the Gulf Oil and the security of allies that protect its vital business interests in the MENA.

This ordered economic assistance was by all means a continuity of both the Cold

War and post-Cold War policy of containment. Aids and commitment in moderating internal conflicts within newly Arab Spring countries was typically a tool of the American

Cold War and the policy was continued to contain new regimes in the MENA. It should be underlined therefore that the loans provided targeted two countries whose political alienation was still unknown and unpredictable. Moreover, by publicly pledging these aids, the U.S. appeared to be faithful to pro-democratic countries, which commit themselves to promoting democracy and sponsor the transition regime until the election of a new government.

In his remarks on U.S. foreign policy in the Arab Spring on May 2011, Obama ensured his engagement in the transitional period in Tunisia and Egypt and the role that the

United States would play. He highlighted publically the U.S. interests in the region that

617 Ibid. 618Shahram Akbarzadeh, American Democracy Promotion in the Changing Middle East: From Bush to Obama (Routlege, 2013) 82. 243 needed to be protected such as ―countering terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons; securing the free flow of commerce and safe-guarding the security of the region; standing up for Israel‘s security and pursuing Arab-Israeli peace‖619. These are the four interlocking parts of U.S. Grand Strategy of ―primacy‖ that Patrick Porter mentions ―to be military preponderant; to reassure and integrate allies; to integrate other states into U.S. designed institutions and markets; and to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons‖.620These goals have been the guiding lines of the various administrations in the post-Cold War era.

A sign of continuity of the same policy and discourse of U.S. top policy makers was also seen in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‘s keynote address to the National

Democratic Institute on November 7, 2011, six months after Obama‘s speech. She repeated the same rhetoric and motives behind the necessity of engaging and containing Tunisia and

Egypt; she stated ―our fight against al-Qaida, defense of our allies, and a secure supply of energy. Over time, a more democratic Middle East and North Africa can provide a more sustainable basis for addressing all three of those challenges.‖621 Thus, these countries matter to the United States due to the geostrategic role they have been playing. The War on

Terror, the flow of energy and the security of Israel are the main motives behind the support of the Arab Spring Countries according to President Obama and Secretary of State

Mrs. Clinton. It was therefore a more realist than idealist approach to the Arab Spring trouble and the changing regimes in Tunisia and Egypt.

The claim that democratic Middle East and North Africa facilitated the achieving of the stated goals could be seen as an inaccurate thesis that U.S. policymakers had

619Barack Obama, ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 19, 2011, Online, internet June, 20, 2016. Availbale: www. obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/. 620 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 621 Hillary Clinton, ―Keynote Address at the National Democratic Institute's 2011 Democracy Awards Dinner,‖ Nov. 7, 2011, U.S. Department of State, Archived Content. Online, internet, June 21, 2016. Available: https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/11/176750.htm. 244 repeatedly uttered when they were asked about their role in the Arab Spring. Steven

Levitsky of Harvard University noted that ―U.S. foreign policy goals helped cement a relationship with Egypt‘s autocratic rulers that persisted throughout the Arab Spring and continued to hinder democratization, challenging the widely held view that the United

States was a broadly pro-democratic actor in the post–Cold War era‖622.

Containment, therefore, could be achieved through installing autocratic rulers who easily responded to the American geopolitical needs in the neighboring countries. Levistky added that ―U.S. officials repeatedly concluded that their geopolitical goals in the Middle East required autocratic governments that could undertake policies that ran counter to domestic public opinion‖623. In this line of thought, what Brownlee deduced in his book ―prevention democracy‖ enhances the continuity hypothesis that the United States sole interest was its primacy in the

MENA. What counted therefore was the cooperation in the War on Terror, securing oil sources and the security of Israel, which could be achieved only by autocratic regimes. The support of the democratic transition was only ―on the theoretical level‖ as President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asserted the classical U.S. idealist stance on a realist level however prudence was the watchword‖624 and the hidden goal was to install a new

Mubarak for the sake of U.S. primacy in the region.

It was therefore U.S. interests in the region that the Obama administration had to protect by cooperating with the interim government in Tunisia and the SCAF in Egypt.

These concerns enhanced U.S. engagement in the region in the transitional period to catch up and recuperate the ‗intelligence failure‘ of not predicting the Arab uprisings and the uproots of two key allies in the MENA, that is building new bridges to save American

622 Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (Cambridge University Press, 2012) ii. 623Ibid. 624 Louise Fawcett, International Relations of the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2013) 339. 245 interests that were jeopardized by its approach to the popular revolutions. As an oriented policy of containment and in continuity with the idealist discourse, Obama emotionally pledged a new approach in dealing with the MENA, which is based on advocating economic and political reforms through American aid. He promised to ―support political and economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa that can meet the legitimate aspirations of ordinary people throughout the region‖625. He added: ―Our support for these principles is not a secondary interest. Today I want to make it clear that it is a top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic and strategic tools at our disposal‖626.

The commitment of Obama to respond to the aspirations and voices of the oppressed peoples in the MENA is what could place him and the United States on ―the right side of history‖. Still, the huge gaps between words and actions in Obama‘s speeches were translated in the upcoming phases of the Arab Spring. He was criticized for the distance between his rhetorical talents and his effectiveness in realizing his principles‖627.

But one can think in the longstanding grand Strategy of primacy and how U.S. foreign policy was ―hard to change even amid shocks‖628. Thus, Obama was bound by classical unchangeable foreign policy that was adopted during the Cold War and reinforced in the post-Cold War era. For this reason, the U.S. continued to adopt a realist approach in the transitional period to protect her interests and notably allies under threat. This explains

U.S. policymakers‘ ―desire to control the revolutions through managed transition‖ 629.

625Barack Obama, ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 19, 2011, Online, internet June, 20, 2016. Availbale: www. obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 626Ibid. 627Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, ―Reflections on President Obama‘s Speech on the Middle East and North Africa,‖ Deliberately Considered May 19, 2011, online, internet July 9, 2016. Availbale: www.deliberatelyconsidered.com/. 628 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9. 629Larbi Sadiki, RoutledgeHandbook of the ArabSpring: RethinkingDemocratization (Routledge 2017) 633. 246 In this context, it would not be surprising that the SCAF did not expedite the transition to a civilian government in the following 6 months after Mubarak‘s ouster as it had announced in February 11, 2011 but extended the duration to more than one year.

During this period, the delay allowed the dissolution of the two chambers of the parliament, invalidating two parliamentary elections, in addition to crackdowning protesters who demanded military generals to cede power to civilian governments. The military role in the transitional era fell under the ―manageable transition‖ that ensured U.S. primacy in Egypt and the MENA. The SCAF stuck to power, which led popular protesters to demand to accelerate the process toward an election and an immediate end of the emergency state that had been since the late 1970s. ―On July 8, 2011, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians rallied in Tahrir square, expressing dissatisfaction with the slow pace of change and reminding the military rulers that ―the public will consider them guilty of backsliding from revolutionary aims until they prove themselves innocent‖630.

Although the military generals vowed in the early August 2011 to end the emergency law, they retracted their pledges, announcing that ―state of emergency would remain in effect until order was restored‖631. Without consulting any political or civil society parts, The SCAF proceeded to introduce unilaterally the electoral law that generated an interim constitution to be adopted. Moreover, these measures were taken also without ―prior consultation with the political parties and the civil society organizations.‖632

The SCAF was reluctant to peacefully handle power to a civic elected government. In this context, the question that should be raised is whether the military had an intention to retreat from politics in Egypt for the first time in time since the 1950s or to continue playing a leading, if not, a key role in Egyptian political scene in short and long terms. Another

630 John Davis, the ArabSpring and ArabThaw Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy (London: Taylor and Francis, 2016) 127. 631Ibid. 632Ibid. 247 problematic quest was about the U.S. commitment to advocate the SCAF and the Egyptian military in leading the transitional era.

The SCAF had been a vital ally of the United States since late 1970s as it had been cooperating with the major U.S. policies in the Middle East ―Egypt, since the late

1970s, had close military relations with the United States and had granted over-flight rights and expedited transit through the Suez Canal, for U.S.. military aircraft and naval ships, respectively‖633. All these facilities were provided and protected by the Egyptian military and the presidents who since 1950s came from the military institution. In fact, the ―the institution (SCAF) that was in charge temporarily was the Egyptian military which generally had a favorable attitude toward the United States. The leaders of the Egyptian military were well-known to U.S. defense officials, and the communication between the two militaries during the revolutionary upheaval was reassuring to Washington‖634. Hence, the United States continue to provide mainly the Egyptian military institution with various aids which served U.S. key role in Egypt and more importantly her leadership in the

MENA.

Despite U.S. criticism of the military crackdown of protests in November 2011 and the arrest of American NGO‘s activists in Egypt in January 2012, aids were preserved.

Secretary of state Hilary Clinton bypassed an omnibus bill the congressional restrictions on aids to Egypt in March 2012. ―In releasing U.S. aid to Egypt, she exercised the national security waiver in the legislation‖635. Thus, a legal card was exploited by the executive body to continue the release of aids to the Egyptian military. Obama justified this initiative by ―the need ... to maintain links with the Egyptian military in the face of a new dynamic

633 Gregory Aftandilian, ―United States Foreign Policy towards the Arab Spring,‖ Middle East Center For Peace, Develompment, and Culture (2012): 11. 634 Ibid. 635Joshen Rogin, ―Clinton Waives Restrictions on U.S. Aids to Egypt,‖ Foreign Policy (March 22, 2012) , online, internet Sept. 15, 2017. Availbale: https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/22/clinton-waives-restrictions- on-u-s-aid-to-egypt/. 248 within the Egyptian policy‖636. Obama and Clinton‘s insistence on the unstoppable flow of aids to the SCAF in all cases was a manifestation of the Grand Strategy of primacy as the containment of the military institution through continuous flow of aids could preserve U.S. hegemony in the MENA. Moreover, this followed ―habit‖, or one type of path dependency, which means that the United States did not have the means to cease to support the Egyptian military especially in the transition period after the overthrow of Mubarak.

The heavy reliance on the military, therefore, was a typically American maneuver of containment of Egypt in a moment of turmoil and unpredicted political scene which could affect U.S. interests in the region. This is explained by the consistency of U.S. annual aid. The U.S. maintained the $1.3 annual aid to the military, which was not affected by any circumstances. Even when the American agencies and government decided to decrease aid to Egypt, the military consistently received the same amount and package.

―When overall assistance dropped to $1.5 and to $1.6 billion, the military share remained at $1.3 billion‖637. The military in Egypt, therefore, remained the cornerstone and the main partner of U.S.-Egypt relationship that could be seen as the safeguard of American interests. It received ―the lion‘s share‖ of the total American annual aids to Egypt. At this level, one can think of the motives behind the United States‘ unconditional defense of

SCAF from any criticism in the Congress and why both President Obama and Secretary of

State Hilary Clinton prevented the freezing of aids amid the transition period despite the congressional restriction.

The military intervention in the political transition aimed to distance any perceived unfriendly political elites that might threaten the Egyptian long-term allies and more importantly normalizing relationships with Anti-American powers in the region

636 Gregory Aftandilian, ―United States Foreign Policy Towards the Arab Spring,‖ Middle East Center For Peace, Develompment, and Culture (2012): 11. 637 Ibid. 249 especially Iran. The Egyptian parliamentary elections which were scheduled for September

2011 were postponed to November 28, 2011 and January 1, 2012 then were canceled on

June 14, 2012 as they brought the Islamic Party Freedom and Justice to power with a remarkable majority in both chambers. But amid controversial debate on the constitutionality of the election, the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) under the ruling

SCAF, dissolved the parliament two days before the first presidential elections.

Interestingly the dissolved parliament was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood Freedom and Justice Party and the Salafist Al-Nour Party, two Islamic parties which were perceived as a threat to U.S. alliance system in the MENA. The SCC decision was labeled as ―a total

638 639 coup…‖ by the winning parties and ―a complete disregard for the free will of voters‖ .

The tendency to bypass the old regime agents was hard to achieve and the two main institutions – the SCAF and SCC – were a serious obstacle to depart from the old system that was blamed for serving foreign powers including the United States more than Egypt.

Significantly, the Supreme Court, whose members were appointed by Mubarak, ruled the

Political Exclusion Law unconstitutional640. As a result, former politicians and ministers of

Mubarak were allowed to run for election and hold high ranking positions. The SCC decision allowed former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik to run for the presidential election in 2012.

The SCAF and the SCC worked together to handicap the democratic transition and to install former regime members in power and emboldening the military institution in the post-Mubarak era. They delayed parliamentary elections then canceled them, then

638―Egypt supreme court calls for parliament to be dissolved,‖ BBC News June, 14, 2012, online, interent, Nov 26, 2017. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18439530. 639Ibid. 640 Ibid. 250 postponed the presidential election then postponed the result for several days641. This enhanced the fact that the military and the old regime members backed by the United

States played a pivotal role to maintain Egypt within the American orbit, by preventing the revolutionary forces from holding powers and deterring U.S. interests. The SCAF re-rooted itself in the political scene by claiming that military leaders would control the writing of the new constitution and that the Defense Ministry would not led by civilian ministers in the future governments: the ―SCAF announced that it would oversee the writing of the new constitution, and that control of the army and the defense Ministry would be kept out of the hands of a future civilian government‖642. The military in orienting the future political scene occurred several times during the transitional period in the 16 months after the ouster of Mubarak and even during the one-year presidency of President Morsi. This led to skepticism about whether the SCAF had intentions to relinquish or clutch power to civilian government. ―The SCAF had been vague about when they would relinquish power-- exacerbating instability in the country‖643.

Since the ouster of Mubarak, the military elites cooperated with Washington to prevent any divergence of the outcome of the regime change and to tighten control on the civil society organizations, political parties and the emerging political figures. ―When it intervened, the SCAF circumscribed the uprisings and safeguarded its ties to Washington; similarly, U.S. officials accepted a change in leadership that would protect its interests‖644.

The strategic cooperation and ties to American were ensured by the military rulers in the

641Mariam Fam and Abdel Latif Wahba, ―Egypt Postpones Elections, Purges Police Following Protests,‖ Bloomberg July 13, 2011, online, internet, Nov. 26, 2017. Available: /www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-07-13. 642 Pierre M Atlas, ―U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring,‖ Digest of Middle East Studies. 21.2 (2012): 353-385. 643 Gregory Aftandilian ―United States Foreign Policy towards the Arab Spring,‖ Middle East Center For Peace, Develompment, and Culture (2012): 11. 644 Jason Rownlee, Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 2. 251 transitional period and would be enhanced after the military coup against elected president

Mohamed Morsi in early July 2013.

It should be emphasized that the Egyptian military had been a pivotal factor in the

U.S-Egyptian relation since the Cold War. Cooperation with the U.S. troops in Iraq and

Afghanistan wars and the logistic facilities to the airline forces were noticeable and indisputable. Moreover, they had been safeguarding Israel‘s security since the Camp David

Accord of 1978, to which the SCAF, during the transitional period, ensured the Egyptian adherence. Security of Israel has been one of the basic elements in the US-Egyptian alliance; Egypt was committed to all regional and international obligations and treaties645.

This was a reassurance appreciated by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu646 who ―welcomes the statement of the Egyptian military that Egypt will continue to honor the peace treaty with Israel‖647. Such an announcement by the SCAF and reflection by Netanyahu were by all means favorable to the American interest in the region; therefore, more cooperation and coordination were expected between Washington and Cairo in the following phases. The military, as we will examine, would topple the elected Muslim Brotherhood affiliated president Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, ban the Justice and Freedom Muslim

Brotherhood party and jail and execute any opposition to the military rule.

It is therefore significant to notice that the first elections and the transition to a civilian political system in Egypt was thwarted by the SCAF, a long-entrenched institution which had been playing a vital role in Egyptian politics since the Egyptian coup d‟état of

1952. Since then, all Egyptian presidents have come from the military and have served

American interests – notably cheap access to oil suppliers, counter-terrorism and more

645Janine Zacharia, ―Israel's Netanyahu welcomes Egyptian Military's Pledge to Honor Peace Accord,‖ Waghington Post February 12, 201, online, internet, Nov. 30, 2017. Available: www.washingtonpost.com. 646 ―Army Council: Egypt is committed to all treaties,‖ BBC News Feb, 12, 2011, Online, internet Dec. 02, 2017. Availbale: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12440138. 647 ―Israel welcomes Egyptian treaty announcement,‖ Reuters Feb. 12, 2011, Online, internet Dec 5, 2017. Available: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-israel-netanyahu/israel-welcomes-egyptian-treaty.

252 importantly, as I will examine in details latter on, guaranteeing Israel‘s security and influencing the Arab Muslim world to normalize the Arab-Israeli relationship. The military leaders, especially the SCAF, sabotaged the transition by delaying the parliamentary elections then dissolving the parliament which was dominated by the Freedom and Justice

Party members. Significantly, the Egyptian military orchestrated a military coup to overthrow Mohamed Morsi. The pro-American SCAF hijacked the revolution during the revolution, in the transition period. The following sections shall give details on how one year after the first reportedly democratic election of June 22, 2012, the military toppled the government, dissolved the parliament and the FJP, establishing a new dictatorship even more autocratic than Mubarak. The leader of the military coup was ‗even worse‘: ―Egypt faced terrible repression during the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak eras, but nothing like today‘s sustained cruelty‖648. The new dictatorship was needed for U.S. primacy and leadership over competing regional and international powers.

Therefore, major mechanisms of containment were implemented to counter the potential rise of anti-American governments that may cooperate with American rivals in the region. Despite his claim of making ―supporting the aspiration of people the top priority that must be translated into concrete actions, and supported by all of the diplomatic, economic tools at our disposal‖649, Obama‘s promises were difficult to implement as U.S. Grand Strategy was hard to change for the sake of democracy at the expense of U.S. interests and alliance system in the MENA. It should be stressed that there are extreme costs to changing policy away from finding allies who are supportive of containing U.S. threats, and that costs of abandoning that policy orientation are often

648Steven A Cook, ―Sisi Isn‘t Mubarak. He‘s Much Worse,‖ Foreign Policy (Dec. 2018), online, internet, Feb. 26, 2019. Availbale: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/19/sisi-isnt-mubarak-hes-much-worse/. 649Barack Obama, ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,‖Obama White Housse Press Office May 19. 2001. Online, internet, Feb, 26, 2019. Available: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the- press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa. 253 higher than any perceived benefits. This was translated in continuing unconditional support of the SCAF in Egypt and the satraps of old regime in Tunisia.

In this vein, two important reflections can be highlighted. The first is that the means to contain Tunisia and Egypt were through the same long-standing Cold War mechanisms of containment: economic, military and diplomatic support to the interim governments in Tunisia and the SCAF in Egypt. The second is that Obama‘s pledge is a digest of his 2009 speech at Cairo University, which proved wrong, especially in the

Egyptian case. IR analysts also doubted his vows as U.S. habit favors interests over values in continuity of the traditional U.S. Grand Strategy. Obama‘s concrete actions in the transition period were a continuity of the longstanding American foreign policy of containment. Economic, military and diplomatic supports reflect the American full engagement in the two first Arab Spring countries, Tunisia and Egypt. Obama reiterated on several occasions the U.S. duty to support Tunisia in its transition to democracy. ―The president said the U.S. would play a strong, supportive role as Tunisia transitions toward full democracy‖650. The same commitment was made to Egypt, a more interesting and pivotal ally in the MENA.

5.3 The Immediate post-Ben Ali and Mubarek Era

The transition period in Tunisia and Egypt covers the eras from the ouster of Ben

Ali on January 14, 2011 to the first reportedly democratic election in Tunisia of October

23, 2011 and in Egypt from the overthrow of Mubarak on February 11, 2011 to the first presidential election of June 30, 2012. By studying in parallel these eras, even if they extend over different durations in the two countries, the aim is to trace the similarities and

650 ―Obama meets Tunisian Prime Minister,‖ AP TELEVISION, Oct. 7, 2011, online, internet Dec 10, 2019. Available: http//www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/e1328d2c6d02b0ca15ccee78fc8ccf75.

254 the continuity of U.S. longstanding Grand Strategy of primacy that was the main guiding line of President Obama and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton.

The American task in maintaining and securing the MENA region in post-Ben Ali of Tunisia and post-Mubarak of Egypt could be seen as problematic and even embroiling issues to the United States at first. This can be explained by a dilemma in balancing values and interests and the ambiguity of the forthcoming political scene that undoubtedly affects

U.S. short and long-term geostrategic affairs. While approaching the uprisings and the abdication of Ben Ali and Mubarak was a little different, the Obama administration was more consistent, despite inadequacy, in the transitional period from the overthrow of the presidents to the first elections. President Obama and Mrs. Clinton demonstrated a high degree of engagement, repeatedly championing the American values, vowing to stand by the Arab Spring countries in their transitional period at least at the theoretical level.

As for Tunisia, the United States policy has not changed despite Obama‘s speeches praising the revolution and vowing to advocate a new era of democracy. Lotfi

Ben Rjeb labels U.S. encouragement of the Tunisian people ―Ironic‖651 due to its support of autocratic regimes since the independence in 1956. He adds that ―the United States that had a stake in the region did precious little to bring that democratic transformation about, although it consistently paid lip service to advancing democratic values‖652.

And the adjustment of the discourse in the aftermath of the overthrow of Ben Ali was a strategic approach to contain the revolutionary forces and sponsor the transition period with a heavy focus on U.S. interests. Thus, as historical nationalist path dependency claims ―history matters‖ and U.S. grand strategy was hard to change

651Lotfi Ben Rejeb, ―United States Policy towards Tunisia: What New Engagement after an Expendable ‗Friendship‘?‖ Nouri Gana (ed.), The Making of the Tunisian Revolution (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press Ltd 2013) 81. 652 Nouri Gana, The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 5. 255 hence even when Obama praised Tunisia in his 2011 speech he ―did so not so much as a gesture for a change of policy as an attempt to ride on the revolutionary wave the

United States had deliberately missed before‖653. Thus, the package offered to Tunisia and mutual visits of the high-ranking officials aimed to maintain Tunisia within the

United States orbit and prevent influence and interventions of regional powers that threaten U.S. strategic objectives and interests in North Africa.

Although Tunisia was vital to the U.S. alliance system in the MENA, Egypt was a more far-reaching partner of United States. As ―a lynchpin of the American security architecture for the greater Middle East‖654 the United States put a heavy focus on

Egypt through continuing the flow of annual package aids as a sign of engagement in the transition period. One remarkable fact is that although the aid diminished in 2012, the military institution represented by the SCAF received the same amount in continuity of

U.S. support of the military since late 1979. In fact, the U.S. engaged in ―manageable transition‖ with the SCAF to secure U.S. strategic interests that had been threatened by the revolutionary forces. As a result, the SCAF intervened heavily in the political process and canceled two elections, imposing rules on the upcoming leaders to be followed. These rules guarantee the supremacy of the SCAF over the Ministry of defense and the political process in Egypt.

Like in Tunisia, the United States emerged as an advocator of the democratic transition but in practice, what mattered was recuperating and maintaining U.S. role in

Egypt, due to its vital and strategic role in the region. ―As the world's largest Arab nation, Egypt is critically important to U.S. foreign policy‖655 as it is bordering Israel and

653Ibid. 654Maria C. Pinto, ―Mapping the Obama Administration's Response to the Arab Spring,‖ RevistaBrasileira De Pol�ticaInternacional. 55.2 (2012): 109-130. 655 Nouri Gana, The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contexts, Architects, Prospects (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013) 5. 256 the most influencing country in the Arab and Muslim world which can affect the alliance system that the United States had been working on to maintain since the Second World

War. By the end of the transition period, one can wonder whether the United States would continue the same policy toward Tunisia and Egypt, notably after the emergence of Islamic parties in power in both countries.

5.3.1 The ‘democratic’ transition

The U.S. and the first elected governments since the Tunisian and Egyptian presidents‘ ousters, high ranking U.S. policymakers had been engaged in the transition process with the satraps of the old regime in Tunisia and the SCAF in Egypt. The main concern was the phase following the transition period that is the outcome of the ―awaited democracy‖ that had been championed by Obama in his statements on the Arab Spring.

The main problem was how the United States would shift its policy from unconditional longstanding allies to unknown leaders with uncertain and unclear policy. In Tunisia, revolutionary powers including Islamic movement ‗Ennahda (Renaissance) Party‘ came to power in October 2011 to dominate the National Assembly. In Egypt, Islamic party,

Freedom and Justice Party FJP, won the landslide majority in the parliamentary elections of November 2011 and January 2012, followed by the victory of Mohmmad Morsi the presidential candidate of the FJP on June 30, 2012. The new political scene in the two first

Arab Spring countries worried U.S. top policymakers who expressed their worries.

―Members of the U.S. senate Foreign Relations Committee have expressed concern that secular autocrats would be supplanted by Israel-hating Islamist autocrats‖656 whereas

Obama stressed the ―new engagement‖657 approach with the Arab spring for the sake of the national interests. William J Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs recommended

656Lotfi Ben Rejeb, ―United States Policy towards Tunisia: What New Engagement after an Expendable ‗Friendship‘?‖ Nouri Gana (ed.), The Making of the Tunisian Revolution (UK: Edinburgh University Press Ltd 2013) 90. 657Ibid. 257 adjustment of U.S. policy toward the Arab Spring countries, calling for departure from the old cold War policy in which U.S. ―had only two choices – the autocrats you know or the

Islamic extremist you fear‖658.

Based on these facts and from a Historical institutionalism path dependency perspective, this section examines the U.S. approach of the newly elected Islamic parties in

Tunisia and Egypt. In other words, which policy fit the situation and how would the United

States protect its sphere of influence and contain the newly elected governments? How would it cope with the new, emerging, and apparently ―challenging‖ rulers in the MENA that might deter the U.S. alliance system in the region? It also investigates the consistency of President Obama and whether his vows would be ―translated into concrete actions‖659 in favor of the Arab Spring countries or the same Grand Strategy of primacy until deployed for the sake of U.S. leadership at the expense of democratic values.

In his newspaper article entitled ―Ben Ali Tunisia was model U.S. Agent‖ dated

January 25, 2011 Richard Falk argues that ―policymakers in Washington and Tel Aviv will be particularly nervous if Islamic influence emerges in the months ahead, even if vindicated by electoral outcomes‖660. Such statement is enhanced by Fisk who writes that

Ben Ali was ―praised for being a ‗friend‘ keeping firm hands on all those Islamists‖661.

Then what type of ―new engagement‖ would proceed from Obama administration in the following phase of the Arab Spring?

658Popular Uprising in the Middle East: The Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 17, 2011 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2011) 7. 659 BarackObama, ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,”The White House Office of the Press Secretary May 19, 2011. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 660Richard Falk, ―Ben Ali Tunisia was model US client,‖ Aljazeera English Jan.25, 2011, online, internet, Mar. 20, 2019. Available: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/01/201112314530411972.html. 661Robert Fisk, ―The Brutal Truth about Tunisia,‖ Independent Jan 17, 2011, online, internet, Mar. 20, 2019. Availbale: ttps://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/the-brutal-truth-about-tunisia. 258 The Enahdah Paryy which had been banned in the aftermath of the Tunisian parliamentary election of 1989 was licensed on March 1, 2011. In the first reported democratic election in Tunisian political history on October 23, 2011, Ennahda Party won

41.2% of the total seats in the first parliamentary election, leading a coalition government with two center-left parties namely ―The Congress for the Republic‖ and ―The Democratic

Forum for Labour and Liberties‖662. The Ennahda Party controlled the Constitutional

Assembly by a majority of two-fifths, whereas other seats were divided by 15 parties and independents. Its secretary general Hamadi Jebali, who had been serving a sixteen-year sentence, became Prime Minister of Tunisia on December 14, 2011. An expected but problematic outcome of these elections was to put the American administration in a dilemma: engaging and cooperating with a political power that had been rejected by the successive administrations especially since the Iranian revolution of 1979. If the latter choice was to be adopted, Obama administration could appear ambivalent.

The dilemma was enhanced by the landmark victory of the Muslim Brotherhood‘s

Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). The FJP, which was legalized on April 30, 2011663, gained 47.2 percent: ―47 percent of all seats in the national elections for the lower house of parliament‖664. Moreover, the FJP and other Islamic parties won 70 percent in the parliamentary elections in Egypt. ―Islamists won 70 % of seats in the Egyptian parliament‖665 according to the early January 2012 results. In light of the total control of both elections, how would the Obama administration react? Taking into consideration the cooperation of the SCAF in dissolving of the parliament on June 14, 2012, the plausible reality was that the Muslim Brotherhood, FJP, and its candidates, were enjoying popularity

662―Final Tunisian election results announced,‖ Aljazeera Nov. 14, 2011, online, interne, Ap.17, 2019. Available: www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/20111114171420907168.html. 663Said Shehata, ―Profile: Egypt‘s Free Egyptians Party,‖BBC News Nov.25, 2011, online, internet, Sept. 13, 2016. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15899997. 664David D. Kirkpatrick, ―Islamists Win 70% of Seats in the Egyptian Parliament,‖ The New York Times Jan. 21, 2012, online, internet Sept 13, 2016. Available: www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/. 665 Ibid. 259 and likely to govern in the upcoming periods. This fact was proved right when in June

2012; the FJP candidate Mohamed Morsi was elected president, signaling a new era in

Egyptian and MENA history.

The triumph of Islamic governments in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in

Tunisia and Egypt was unprecedented in the MENA region. It was then the first time an

Islamic Party came to power through parliamentary and presidential elections in

longstanding strategic U.S. sphere of influence. The proscribed (prior to the Arab Spring in

Egypt and Tunisia) Islamic-based groups, the Muslim Brotherhood‘s FJP and Ennahda

Party became the major political powers in the MENA. In fact, U.S. policymakers were

aware of the new challenge of the Arab spring rulers that might run counter U.S. primacy

in the region and notably a potential rapprochement with Iran and other regional unfriendly

powers in the MENA such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Aaron David Miller, an expert in the

MENA affairs and an adviser of six Secretaries of States including Colin Powell stated that

―as public opinion becomes more influential in shaping domestic and foreign policies in the Arab countries, the space available for U.S. policies and influence may contract. The acquiescent autocrats have acquiesced, albeit often grudgingly, in our approach to Iran, Gaza, Israel, and counterterrorism. The new regimes won‘t, or at least not as easily. Since most of our policies won‘t change quickly, or at all, the United States will likely be in for a rough ride, with both emerging governments and old ones‖666.

Unlike the autocratic rules of Ben Ali and Mubarak, the new governments are hardly to shape in the upcoming months and years. The change of the regimes and the entire political scene in the region could not be accompanied by a change in U.S. Grand Strategy.

666 Aaron David Miller, ―For America, an Arab Winter,‖ Wilson Quarterly. 35.3 (2011): 36-42. 260 U.S. policy therefore ―won‘t change quickly‖667 affirms A.D Miller, much like Porter‘s thesis that U.S. Grand Strategy is hard to change even at the moment of shock668.

The Tunisian Ennahda Party and Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party were

expected neither to totally align with nor to obediently serve the United States interests in

the MENA. Moreover, they could reflect anti-Americanism in the region. In addition, they

were perceived as hostile to United States interventionist policy in the region and its basis

in the Palestine-Israeli conflicts. They opposed and criticized the United States for its

unconditional support of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, for the Iraq War and for

its longstanding support of autocracies and dictatorships in the region. The Egyptian-

Iranian relation had been cut in solidarity with the United States and the Tunisian Iranian

relation was insignificant during Ben Ali presidency. Containing the MENA, especially

Iran, necessitated strong cooperative allies like the ousted presidents. Thus, a potential shift

of U.S. foreign policy and the architecture of new Grand Strategy based on ―mutual

respect‖ and cooperation with newly independent based-Islamic parties and governments

in the MENA was uncertain.

It is not surprising that the U.S. engaged with the FJP during the first phases of the

parliamentary elections, as it was obvious to the Obama administration that the popularity

of the FJP gives it a chance to dominate the Egyptian political scene in the forthcoming

elections. On December 10, 2011, Senator John Kerry, head of the U.S. Senate foreign

relations Committee, and U.S. ambassador to Egypt Anne W. Patterson met top four

members of the FJP, including the then president Mohamed Morsi. The latter highlighted

the Egyptian commitment to democracy, human rights and, notably, to the international

treaties, valuing U.S. role in the democratic transition in Egypt and the Arab Muslim

667Ibid. 668 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security. 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 261 World.669 In turn, Mr Morsi ensured that ―the 1979 Camp David Treaty with Israel as one guiding line in U.S. Foreign policy in the MENA that would not be challenged. This reassurance could be seen as an alignment of the Muslim brotherhood with U.S. interests in the region. Yet, whether this Egyptian positioning was satisfactory to U.S. policymakers and whether there were other interests to be threatened was debatable.

As a response, in January 2012, amid the third round of the parliamentary election and the enormous victory of the FJP, Mr. Kerry argued that ―the United States needs to deal with the new reality, and it needs to step up its game‖670. ―The new reality‖ - like ―the new beginning‖ in Obama‘s speech of 2009 and the ―new engagement‖ in Obama‘s statement in 2011, was a new approach to contain the potential challenge of the FJP through the same mechanisms for the preservation of geopolitical interests. U.S. policymakers kept open eyes on the possibility of a divergence in Egypt alliance camp in the Middle East. Interestingly, five months after Kerry substituted Hillary Clinton in the

Department of State, the Muslim Brotherhood elected President with whom Kerry had met in December 2011 was overthrown by the military. Significantly Mr. Kerry comments that

―the military restored Democracy in ousting Morsi‖671. This statement reflects not only the restoration of the status quo in Egypt by the military for the old alliance system but also the continuity of the habit of primacy as the main unchangeable U.S. Grand Strategy since the

Cold War.

Now, the former allies were ousted and political parties that espoused political

Islam and Islamic identity came to power. A new political scene raised problematic

669 Eric Trager, Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014) 115. 670 David D Kirkpatrick and Steen Lee Myers, ―Overtures to Egypt‘s Islamists Reverse Longtime U.S. Policy,‖ The New York Times Jan, 3, 2012, online, internet, Mar. 28, 2018. Available: www.nytimes.com/2012/01/. 671Michael R. Gordon and Kareem Fahim, ―Kerry Says Egypt‘s Military Was ‗Restoring Democracy‘ in Ousting Morsi,‖ New York Times Aug. 1, 2013, online, internet, Mar. 28, 2018. Available: www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/. 262 questions about the appropriate approach to deal with such new political scene in the

MENA and whether it was an American occasion to be on the side of history and cooperate with the elected members of parliament and presidents whoever their ideological backgrounds are.

In this context, the Arab Spring brought and is likely to bring uncooperative, if not challenging, rulers of U.S. interests in the region. The independent policy-decision making in Tunisia and especially in Egypt alarmed U.S. policy actors and analysts about the future of U.S. role in the MENA. Several voices stressed the fact that old regimes, even autocratic, were better serving U.S. geopolitical interests. On March 9, 2012, Wesely

Clark, a CNN journalist, reported that ―in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, strong Islamic sentiments have inevitably surfaced despite the democratic and Western-oriented facade of the initial Arab Spring uprisings. The future orientation of these states is likely to be less helpful to U.S. aims and policies in the region than their predecessors‖672. The alliance system was therefore threatened by the potential power of Islamic parties and governments that are not guaranteed to cooperate with the United States. As they share their ideological and religious background with rival powers in the MENA, the emerging powers of the

Arab Spring may not only jeopardize the long-established alliance but also help Iran to bolster its role and influence in the MENA. Russia also could forge new alliance in the region. The ―Arab Spring will make it much tougher to for the United States to pursue its traditional policies. For America, the Arab Spring may well prove to be more an Arab

Winter‖673, according to Millar.

672 Wesley Clark, ―Why US Shouldn‘t Rush to War in Syria,‖ CNN Mar. 9, 2012, online, internet, Apr. 02, 2018. Available:https://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/08/opinion/clark-syria. 673 David Aaon Miller, ―For America, an Arab Winter,‖ Wilson Quarterly. 35.3 (2011): 36-42. 263 5.3.2 U.S. policy towards Morsi

In June 2012, it was evident the FJP was the main, if not the sole, political power in Egypt and that the United States had to continue its engagement and containment.

Although the SCC ruled that the parliamentary election was unconstitutional and ordered to dissolve the two chambers, the FJP candidate won the presidential election in the second round, on June 30, 2012, defeating Ahmed Chafik, ex-prime minster in the Mubarak regime. The outcome of the election was predicted by the Obama administration that was obliged, more than any other time, to cope with the new situation. As a result, the White

House released an announcement which stated that ―President Obama called President- elect Morsi and congratulated him.‖ A routine diplomatic correspondence followed by emphasis on U.S. total engagement in Egypt under the FJP control. ―The United States will continue to support Egypt‘s transition to democracy and stand by the Egyptian people as they fulfill the promise of their revolution‖674. It is noteworthy that the

American administration theoretically stuck to its habits of committing itself to advocate the democratic transition but in practice. But ―the gap between America‘s values and its policies in the region may narrow but will remain‖675.

The American values were manifested in the congratulation of the President-elect

Morsi and the promise of cooperating with the new government. The new political scene was portrayed as a welcome opportunity to the Obama administration. Press secretary Jay

Carney stated: ―we look forward to working together with President-elect Morsi and the government he forms, on the basis of mutual respect, to advance the many shared interests between Egypt and the United States‖676. To put it simply, the Egyptian government was

674―Readout of the President‘s Call with President-Elect Morsi of Egypt,‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary June 24, 2012. Availbale: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 675 Banu Elig�r, ―The Arab Spring: Implications for US-Israeli Relations,‖ Israel Affairs. 20.3 (2014): 281- 301. 676 ―Readout of the President‘s Call with President-Elect Morsi of Egypt,‖ The White House 264 invited even explicitly to cooperate with the U.S.; in turn, the annual package would continue to flow. In addition, the United States ―believe(s) it is essential for the Egyptian government to continue to fulfill Egypt‘s role as a pillar of regional peace, security and stability‖677. The Egyptian role is safeguarding U.S. primacy in the MENA and especially the security of Israel and the containment of Iran, an influencing and challenging power to the United States. These two major issues were not fulfilled by the government of Morsi as the Iran-Egypt relations were restored and Egypt tended to play a unilateral role in

Palestine.

It is significant that the U.S. State Department scheduled two-day visit to Egypt on July 14 and 15, 2012, less than a month after the election of Mohamed Morsi. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met the new President Mohamed Morsi to reiterate Obama administration‘s vows: ―We want to be a good partner and we want to support the democracy that has been achieved by the courage and sacrifice of the Egyptian people‖678.

While highlighting her will to cooperate with the Egyptian government, she mentioned the existence of ―disagreement‖ and ―differences‖679 with the government upon various points.

At this level one can think of two interesting points: the first is how and why the

Chief Diplomat Mrs Clinton visited Egypt just a couple of weeks following the Election.

The second is the insistence on the partnership, which had been ensured by President

Morsi a few months before the election. An additional point which is worth emphasizing is her meeting with the head of the (SCAF), Hussein Tantawi, to discuss the military

Office of the Press Secretary June 24, 2012. Availbale: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/ 677 Byron Tau, ―White House congratulates Egypt's Morsi,‖ Politico Jun 24, 2012, online, internet, May 9, 2019. Available: www.politico.com. 678 ―Hillary Clinton meets Egypt leader Mohammed Mursi,‖ BBC News 14 July 2012, online, internet, Dec. 10, 2018. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18840168. 679 ―Clinton supports ‗full transition‘ in Egypt,‖ Al-Jazeera July 15, 2012, online, internet, Dec 11, 2018. Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/20127148304248811.html. 265 disagreement and even a ―clash‖680 with president Morsi over the latter‘s decision to reinstall the dissolved parliament until the upcoming elections. Secretary of State discussed

U.S. aid plan with Tantawi, the aid being a key factor in the U.S.-SCAF. This echoes the strength and importance of the military to the United States. Bypassing the Executive power to discuss aid with foreign country could be relevant to the U.S. intention to

―betray‖ Morsi.

The U.S. involvement in the Egyptian affairs less than a month after the election especially with the SCAF is an old habit of primacy that relies equally on the President and the head of SCAF. In this case, the SCAF was more interested in achieving U.S. geopolitical interests in the region. Tantawi was ―Mubarak‘s poodle‖681 and so of the

United States. It was therefore the SCAF and the military that could restrain the President in case of challenging U.S. role and interests in Egypt. The communication with the military was a plan that the Obama administration thought of even before the ouster of

Mubarak: ―It's a plan that relies on long relationships with military men ….To the regret of some U.S.. diplomats, it's also a plan that steers around the Muslim Brotherhood, the powerful Islamist political movement that almost surely would play a central role in any future popularly chosen government‖682. Then the meeting falls under this plan that only the military can play a proxy clash with the FJP for the preservation of the status quo. This hypothesis is proved right by early July 2013 when the military ousted President Morsi and

U.S. policy makers refused to call the ouster as a military coup. Henceforth, engagement with the military reverted Egypt to a Mubarak era level of cooperation, and the Obama administration turned a blind eye to the crackdowns on protests, executions, jailings and restrictions of liberties. Significantly, as I will elaborate in detail below, Obama‘s claims

680 ―Hillary Clinton meets Egypt leader Mohammed Mursi,‖ BBC News 14 July 2012, online, internet, Dec, 10, 2018. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18840168. 681 Gilbert Achcar, The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising (University of California Press, 2013) 226. 682 Ibid. 266 and vows to support democratic transition proved wrong when unwanted political entities, the FJP, came to power. Such a policy may exemplify what Obama called ―new engagement‖ in the Arab Spring countries. But it was pursuing the Grand Strategy of

―primacy‖ and American ‗habits‘ in favoring interests over values and even ignoring completely the American values for the sake of American hub-and-spoke alliance system in the MENA.

5.3.3 Economic aid

One point worth exploring is the economic and military aid along the major phases of the Arab Spring. The U.S.-Egyptian relations were based mainly on the annual package of aids that continued to flow regularly since 1979. However, as Mubarak was ousted, these aids witnessed turmoil based on the threatening of U.S. interests and the fierce opposition of the Congressmen. In the transition period, Secretary of State Mrs.

Clinton‘s ―pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in debt relief, private investment and job creation funds - money the U.S. administration had earlier promised‖683. But the arrest of U.S. NGO employees in Egypt and the fear of less commitment to the security of Israel and the smuggling in Gaza led the congress to block these aids in March 2013, during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi. It was argued that Obama‘s offer of ―$450 million cash transfer to the central bank‖684 in the second half of 2012 was a sign of U.S. commitment to revive and assist the FJP led-government. In stabilizing Egypt and, more interestingly, in maintaining U.S. interests especially Israel security. The commitment of the Obama administration was manifested by delivering of $190 in the first half of 2013. It was seen as ―as a good will gesture‖ in assisting the FJP led government regardless of their failure to meet their commitment.

683 ―Clinton supports ‗full transition‘ in Egypt,‖ Al-Jazeera July 14, 2012, Online, internet May 16, 2018. Available: www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/201271. 684 Steven Lee Myers, ―White House Move to Give Egypt $450 Millions in Aid Meets,‖ The New York Times Sep. 29, 2012, online, internet, May 16, 2018. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world. 267 In the first half of 2013, Egypt continued its struggle to get the loans promised by

Obama and the IMF but in vian. Tough measures were put as a reaction to reportedly domestic instability and Morsi‘s unilateral decision in domestic and regional affairs. In his first trip outside the United States, Secretary of State John Kerry who took office on

February 1, 2013 met president Morsi on March, 2, 2013. After long negotiations, he ordered a $250 million aid loan in addition to releasing frozen aid on May 10, 2013. As the congressmen opposed such decision, Mr. Kerry ensured the Congress that Morsi would not cancel peace treaties with Israel. The State Department committed itself ―to give Egypt

$1.3 billion each year in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) specifies that to get the money, the secretary of State must certify that Egypt is honoring its peace treaty with Israel‖685.

The release of annual aid and the promised special loans are conditioned by meeting the

Congress demands. This strategy exploits economic assistance to contain Egypt that longed for independent and free diplomatic initiative worldwide.

Congress, however, resisted releasing Aids to Egypt under Morsi despite John

Kerry and Obama‘s commitment. Kay Granger, the Chairwoman of the Congress‘ House

Appropriations Committee, decided to block the release of the pleaded aid, stating that

―This proposal comes to Congress at a point when the U.S- Egypt relationship has never been under more scrutiny, and rightly so. I am not convinced of the urgent need for this assistance and I cannot support it at this time. As Chair of the Subcommittee, I have placed a hold on these funds‖686. The blockage of such aids is explained by the non- alignment of The Muslim Brotherhood led-government with U.S. vital interests in the region. The economic aids were to be delivered unconditionally in case of the complete fulfillment of the longstanding role of Egypt in the Middle East and especially Security of

685 Josh Rogin, ―Kerry‘s Secret Gift to Egypt,‖ Daily Beast Jun. 6, 2013, online, internet, Feb. 20, 2016. Available: https://www.thedailybeast.com/kerrys-secret-gift-to-egypt. 686 ―Granger Holds Cash Transfer to Egypt,‖ Press Release of US Congress woman Kay Granger, 12th District of Texas Sept. 28, 2012, Online, internet Feb 20, 2016. Availbale: https://kaygranger.house.gov/press-release/granger-holds-cash-transfer-egypt, acceded 20.032019. 268 Israel. More to the point, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce justified the hold by the disruption of the Egyptian government, arguing:

Our approach is not the full-throttle administration approach of delivering all the aid that they wanted to deliver, but rather a measured approach of tying tranches to results as it pertains to the peace treaty with Israel, to cooperation with respect to smuggling [into Gaza] and with respect to economic reforms to guarantee civil rights and the rule of law within Egypt,….. That‘s the pressure that we're applying687.

During the presidency of Morsi, the United States tightened up on the Egyptian government through freezing and blocking the aids. The apparent conflicts between the

Congress and the administration upon whether to continue assisting Egypt or not turned to consensus when President Obama criticized the Egyptian government in his second mandate inaugural speech while Kerry alarmed the Egyptian government by saying that

―The United States can and wants to do more …. When Egypt takes the difficult steps to strengthen its economy and build political unity and justice, we will work with our

Congress at home on additional support‖688. It is reasonable to assume that this continuous criticism and these imposed terms are reflections of the reluctance to cooperate with the government, even though it was an elected government, and that democracy in Egypt was threatening the status quo in the region. Along with other factors, the United States would abandon Morsi government for the military after one year of his presidency. Significantly, in the aftermath of the overthrow of Morsi, the annual assistance – though it was suspended temporarily – continued to flow to the military and was even bolstered.

Economic containment had targeted Tunisia as well during the Ennahda Party led- government, President Obama, secretary of State Hillary Clinton, then John Kerry demonstrated commitment to assist Tunisia. When Tunisian interim Prime Minister

687Julian Pecquet, ―Congress blocked Kerry from offering more aid to Egypt,‖ The Hill Mar. 3, 2013, online, internet, 20 Feb, 2016. Available: https://thehill.com/policy/international/287129-congress-blocked-kerry. 688 Gamal M Selim, The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt: The Limits of Externally- Induced Change (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015) 71. 269 Hamadi Jebali visited the United States for the first time, President Obama promised to

―work with Congress to provide up to $30 million in loan guarantees to Tunisia and to launch a $20 million Tunisia Enterprise Fund to support private sector growth‖689. At the same time, Mrs Clinton suggested a boost to the Tunisian economy by holding a meeting with about ―200 American investors on November 15, 2011‖690 in order to invest in

Tunisia. Along the three years from 2011 to 2014, ―The Obama Administration allocated over $570 million in aid‖691 to Tunisia. The United States was cautious of directing aid to an Islamic government. The Troika government led by Ennahda, under internal pressure, withdrew to a technocrat on January 29, 2014 following a dispute among ruling parties and the opposing ones. The decision had been taken on December 2013, one month after an

FBI report by James Comey, Director of the FBI, that stated that Tunisia and Lybia ―pose a high threat to U.S. and Western interests... especially at embassies, hotels, and diplomatic facilities‖692. The change of the government was seen as ―‗normalization‘ of aids‖ after a decrease following the attack of U.S Embassy in Tunis Tunisia on September 14, 2012.

Following a travel to Tunisia in February 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry showed U.S

―commitment to stand with Tunisia and to help down this road to democracy‖. Foreign aid to Tunisia reached 62,8million in 2014 and would be $ 66 million in 2015. The military aid would be tripled in 2015693. These aids reflect the re-engagement of the American government in Tunisia. The new government, despite appearing technocrat was considered more efficient to U.S. geopolitical interests than the previous post-Ben Ali governments.

Antony Blinken, U.S. deputy secretary of state stated that The United States‘ ―goal is to

689―Overview of U.S. Economic Assistance to Tunisia,‖ Fact Sheet Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC Archived Content, Feb. 25, 2012, available: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184649.htm. 690Ibid. 691 Alexis Arieff and Carla E. Humud, ―Political Transition in Tunisia,‖ Congressional Research Service, (2014), online, internet, June 6, 2017. Available: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/. 692 Threats to the Homeland: Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, November 14, 2013 (Waghinton Dc, G.P.O , 2014 ) 60. 693 Tarak Amara,‖ U.S. to triple its military aid to Tunisia,‖ Reutres Ap. 10, 2015, online, internet, Oct 20, 2018. Available: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-us/u-s-to-triple-military-aid-to-tunisia. 270 enhance their (Tunisians) ability to defeat those who threaten the freedom and safety of the nation‖694. These aids were oriented also under the banner of fighting terrorism. The

American continuous commitment to allocate different aids to Tunisia fall under a containment policy that aimed to maintain Tunisia within the American sphere of influence.

One of the new and unusual discourse of Egyptian presidents was President

Morsi‘s, which asserted the need for ―mutual respect and interests‖695 between the U.S. and Egypt, stating that his country and the U.S. were cooperating, emphasizing mutual respect and interests which could be seen as a redline to Washington and an invitation to treat Egypt differently. He implicitly stated that Egypt, under the governance of the

Freedom and Justice Party was looking out for the interests of its people, guaranteeing the mutual respect with any country including the U.S., as long as it recognized the democratic will of the Egyptian people. In this context, the new Egyptian president adopted unusual

―peer-to-peer‖ discourse, which appeared to be challenging to the supremacy of the United

States in Egypt, as established during Mubarak‘s presidency of three decades.

The new U.S.-Egypt relationship witnessed a remarkable change in terms of communication with the American administration. The era of ―meddling in Egyptian affairs‖696 become a matter of the past when President Mubarak had been serving as

―puppet of the United States‖ in domestic, regional and international affairs697. The new regime brought an apparently independent decision-making machine that initiated unusual peer-to-peer negotiation of the all issues based on ―mutual respects‖. Significantly, the beginning of the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood‘s FJP in the parliamentary election of

694 Ibid. 695 ―Remarks on 'Zionists' taken out of context: M ursi,‖ Arab News Jan. 16, 2013, Online, internet Oct 25, 2018. Available: https://www.arabnews.com/remarks-zionists-taken-out-context-mursi. 696 Pierre M. Atlas, ―U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring,‖ Digest of Middle East Studies. 21.2 (2012): 353-385. 697Ibid. 271 the late 2011 and early 2012 coincided with a challenging tone to the United States and its main ally Israel.

The FJP started to challenge U.S. interests by threatening to cancel the Camp

David Treaty of 1979 if aid was to be cut698. The United States officials threatened to stop releasing aid to Egypt on the basis of human rights violations. In a challengingly tone,

Essam el-Erian, the deputy leader of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) stated that ―We

[Egypt] are a party [to the treaty] and we will be harmed so it is our right to review the matter …. The aid was one of the commitments of the parties that signed the peace agreement. So, if there is a breach from one side it gives the right of review to the parties,‖

(FJP)‖699. The ostensibly new peer-to-peer negotiation is, as I previously stated, uncommon since the early 1950s. Mubarak had served the United States obediently in containing Iran, fighting terrorism and intermediating in the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts along the three decades, but now things had changed dramatically and the Obama administration was hastened to contain the new regime.

Similarly, in an interview with the New York Times, President Morsi put the blame on the United States for the double standards in fulfilling the Camp David accord stating that ―Americans have a special responsibility‖ for honoring all the terms of the agreement and not some of them. The 1978 agreement ―called for the withdrawal of the

Israeli troops from the West Bank and Gaza and for full Palestinian self-rule‖700. He added that ―As long as peace and justice are not fulfilled for the Palestinians, then the treaty remains unfulfilled‖701. Thus, the Camp David accords were threatened by the FJP members including the President who started playing a pivotal role. His commitment to

698 ―Egypt‘s Brotherhood Warns US over aid cut-off,‖ Aljazeera Feb16, 2012, online, internet, Oct. 26, 2018. Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/2012216192619753593.html. 699 ―Egypt‘s Brotherhood Warns US over aid cut-off,‖ Aljazeera Feb16, 2012, online, internet, Oct. 26, 2018. Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/2012216192619753593.html. 700 David D. Kirkpatrick and Steven Erlanger, ―Egypt‘s New Leader Spells out Terms for U.S.-Arab Ties,‖ New York Times Sept. 22, 2012. Available: https: www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/world/middleeast/egyptian. 701Ibid. 272 support the Palestinians and his solidarity with the various organizations and political parties including the proscribed terrorist organization Hamas appear as a historic shift in the Egyptian role in the Middle East conflicts.

The commitments to the two Arab Spring countries were translated in cautious statements by U.S. senior officials who espoused a pragmatic approach in dealing with the emerging powers. Pragmatism necessitated cooperation with the new parties, despite undeclared hostility. A senior official stated that ―it is totally impractical not to engage with the Muslim Brotherhood because of U.S. security and regional interests in Egypt.

There doesn‘t seem to me to be any other way to do it, except to engage with the party that won the election. ‖702 The engagement is therefore linked to U.S.. interests and seemingly more than championing the American values and goes beyond mere calls to democratize the MENA.

5.3.4 The Israeli- Palestine conflicts

In an unusual initiative approach, the ruling Ennahda Party and the FJP pledged to strongly support the Palestine case, cooperating with the proscribed Hamas movement which was labeled as a ―terrorist organization‖ by the United States. The warm relation was translated by mutual visits of Tunisian and Egyptian leaders to the Gaza strip.

President Mohamed Morsi led initiatives to conciliate the Palestine factions Fateh and

Hamas, pledging to provide support to the Palestinians. He stated that ―Cairo will not leave

Gaza on its own‖703. He added that ―I tell them in the name of all the Egyptian people that the Egypt of today is not the Egypt of yesterday and that the Arabs of today are different

702Ibid 703―Egypt's Mursi says Cairo ‗will not leave Gaza on its own‘,‖ Reuters Nov 16, 2012, online, internet, Mar. 2, 2013. Available: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-mursi/-mursi-says-cairo. 273 than the Arabs of yesterday‖704. This statement, and the visit of Egyptian Prime Minster to Gaza strip during the Hamas Israel war in November 2012, reflected the new Egyptian approach towards Palestine – one which was in total opposition of the former President

Hosni Mubarak policy and the Egyptian Intelligence chief Omar Suleiman. The latter was in total cooperation with the CIA and Israel according to the released Wikileaks cable ―a diplomatic memo 06CAIR2933‖ backed to May 14, 2006. He worked on ―Egypt -

U.S. intelligence collaboration with Omar Suleiman on how to best marginalize Hamas in

Palestine‖705. ―Our intelligence collaboration with Omar Suleiman, who is expected in

Washington next week, is now probably the most successful element of the relationship‖706. Now FJP politicians were cooperating with Hamas and Palestine which could be perceived as a challenge to the United States role from one hand and its alliance system in the Middle East. This new unilateral Egyptian policy in the MENA that transcended the American role in the Middle East peace talks could be perceived as a threat to Israel security which had been the cornerstone of the Camp David Accord.

In the same way, the Tunisian Ennahda Party and its allies in the government, including the Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki, had shown official sympathy to the

Gaza strip during the eight-day Gaza-Israel conflicts which stated on November 14, 2012.

They also condemned the economic blockade on Gaza and its damaging legacies. This new official discourse reflects the change in power balance in the region, signaling a more independent diplomatic approach. The immediate post-Arab Spring adminstartions, therefore, ―are likely to be less accommodating regarding Western economic and strategic

704―Egypt PM decries Israeli 'aggression' on Gaza,‖ Aljazeera Nov. 16, 2012, online, internet Mar. 2, 2013. Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/201211166273719642.html. 705 Richard Smallteacher, ―Egypt - U.S. intelligence collaboration with Omar Suleiman ‗most successful,‘‖ WikiLeaks Feb. 1, 2011, online, internet, Nov 16, 2018. Available : http://wikileaks.softalogic.nl/U-S- intelligence-collaboration.html. 706 Ibid. 274 interests than authoritarian regimes that do not openly challenge the regional balance of power‖707.

Security of Israel and the normalization of relation with the major Arab states have been the major objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the MENA. This is because U.S. hegemony necessitated maintaining an alliance system ―between the U.S., Israel, and the

―Arab Façade‖ while isolating and marginalizing Hamas organization and its leaders. The initiatives to open diplomatic channels with such an organization could not be welcomed by the American administration. On January 5, 2012, Hamas Prime Minister of Gaza

Ismail Haniya visited Tunisia for the first time since he was elected in 2006. He met Prime

Minister Hamadi Jebali, the leader of Ennahda Rachid Ghanouchi, and the Tunisian

President Moncef Marzouki. Haniyeh stated that ―We have suffered from an economic and political blockade. Former governments have neglected us but through this invitation,

Tunisia has brought justice to Gaza‖708. This statement also showed the shift of the

Tunisian foreign policy towards the Palestinians, from aloofness to outright support.

Haniya‘s visit was scheduled by the Ennahda Party.

The reshaping of new alliance system was translated in Hamas‘s Prime Minister‘s tour which included Egypt, Turkey, Sudan and Iran. This rapprochement had the potential of forging a new alliance of the Arab Spring countries with regional powers such as Iran, the traditional rival of the United States in the MENA since 1979 along with Turkey and

Hamas. This was considered a serious threat to the U.S primacy in the MENA region and especially the Persian Gulf. Iran, which had been playing a key role in Iraq since the 2003, aimed to influence the Arab Spring counties especially Hamas. Hesham Mohamed Gandil,

Egyptian Prime Minister in Morsi‘s government from 2012 to July 2013, visited Gaza in

707 Gudrun Krämer, ―Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World,‖ Middle East Research (Jan/Feb. 1992):35. 708Asma Ghribi, ―Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas Leader Warmly Greeted in Tunis,‖ Tunisialive Jan. 5, 2012, online, internet, Mar. 2, 2013. Available: http://tn-news.com/v4_portal/article/view/802383?page=5. 275 the wake of the three day bombing of the Gaza Strip in November 2012 to express his sympathy and to back the Palestinian people and government, and so did Tunisian senior officials such as Rafik Abdesslaem, Minister of foreign affairs and a member of Ennahda

Party.

The Egyptian and Tunisian commitment to take the side of Palestinian activists and notably Hamas leaders was considered as a challenge to the United States alliance system and primacy in the MENA. The Egyptian role in brokering ―the Fatah-Hamas

Palestinian unity agreement signed in May 2012, without consulting with Washington, was a telling sign of how much things had already changed‖709. It was a unilateral role that the

Egyptian diplomacy started to play in the Middle East, a departure from the traditional

Egyptian foreign policy that goes backs to Washington in all diplomatic relations and initiatives. This independence would threaten U.S. interests, allies and notably Israel. The

Arab Spring countries foreign policy was not welcomed by the United States. This explains the U.S. abandonment of President Mohamed Morsi following his overthrow by military general A-Sissi who would become the Egyptian President in 2014. The latter was depicted by The Economist as ―the most pro-Israeli Egyptian leader ever‖710.

5.3.5 Iran: a key threat to U.S. primacy

Another key factor in U.S. relation to the Arab Spring countries, Tunisia and

Egypt, was their relationship to Iran. It is an ascending regional power and potential rival to the United States geopolitical positioning in the MENA that had worked, and managed, to reopen diplomatic channel with Egypt. Iran could be perceived as one glaring factor behind U.S‘s abandonment of Morsi. ―The U.S. wants to keep Egypt in the anti-Iranian

Arab camps as well as to ensure that the new leaders maintain the 1979 treaty with

709Aaron David Miller, ―For America, an Arab Winter,‖ Wilson Quarterly 35.3 (2011): 36-42. 710Anton La Guardia, ―Israel and Palestine,‖ The Economist (May 2016). 276 Israel‖711. The threat to U.S. leadership in the MENA was in the normalization of

Egyptian-Iranian relations, which had been cut-off since 1979, the date of the Iranian

Islamic Revolution and the overthrow of the longstanding pro-American regime in Iran.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its affiliated the Quods Force

(Jerusalem Forces) were founded and worked on exporting the revolution abroad712.

Therefore, the exportation of the Iranian models in the MENA was of high concern of the

American administration. President Morsi opened the longstanding closed diplomatic channels with Iran when he visited Tehran in August 2012, less than two months after his election, to participate in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), in turn, on February 6,

2013; he invited the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadi Najed to Cairo to attend the summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)713. Such an unusual initiation of an independent Egyptian foreign policy could be perceived as unprecedented in the region, and as operating outside the American orbit, which explains America‘s frustration with the

Egyptian foreign policy in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and North Africa as a whole.

Significantly, the Arab uprisings which uprooted long-established allies of the

United States in the MENA and the subsequent election of Islamic Parties and notably the

Muslim Brotherhood was depicted by the Iranian officials as an ―‗Islamic Awakening‘ in the Arab countries‖714. The statement that could only alarm the American administration regarding the potential cooperation and alliance between Iran and the newly elected

Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt and the potential domino theory in the whole region: that is, if one country followed the Iranian model then others will follow and fall like dominoes

711 Pierre M. Atlas, ―U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests,‖ Digest of Middle East Studies. 21.2 (2012): 353-385. 712Michael R Pompeo, ―Confronting Iran: The Trump Adminstartion‘s Strategy,‖ Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec. 2018): 61. 713 Prasanta Kumar Pradhan, ―Post-Morsi Egypt: Saudi Manoeuvring and Iranian Dilemma,‖ Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (Sept 27. 2013) online, internet, Dec. 11, 2016. Available: www. idsa.in/issuebrief. 714 Ibid. 277 one after the other. Arab Spring then could turn to be an American winter if these parties would ally with Iran.

In this context, Egypt unexpectedly initiated an independent foreign policy that undoubtedly ran counter to the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. The normalization of the Egyptian and Iranian relations was a special challenge to the supremacy of the

United States in the region. Mr. Morsi‘s visit to Iran and the warm welcome of the Iranian

President in Egypt put U.S. security and interests at risk as Iran, the longstanding enemy of the United States, began to consolidate its influence in the Middle-East and North Africa.

By cooperating with Iran, the Egyptian authority begins to act outside the American orbit.

Iran also threatened Israel and the GCC allies. Therefore, president Morsi was not aligned with the United States policy in the Middle East and that made it plausible that the Iranian model of 1979 revolution could spread to Egypt, Tunisia and the other ongoing revolutions in Libya and Syria, or at least, that these countries strengthen alliances with Iran, at the expense of those with the U.S. In light of these challenges, the new regimes in Tunisia and

Egypt complicated the American task in the MENA. In addition, the cooperation and harmony between the Egyptian and Tunisian governments put the American geopolitical interests to a test.

Based on the newly independent foreign policy and specially the Egyptians‘, it became clear that some measures would be taken to contain the potential threat that the

Islamic parties could constitute with regards to U.S. interests in the region. A policy of containment could be workable with the FJP and Ennahda movement and this could be mainly through economic and military aids. The U.S. continued its economic assistance and supply of military equipment in addition to specific aid dedicated to the democratic transition and to helping the recovery of the local economies. Meanwhile, members of

Congress and influencing policymakers in Washington expressed their irritation vis-à-vis

278 the governance of the Islamists in Tunisia and notably in Egypt. It therefore was becoming increasingly evident that the two parties had to step down no matter what the justification was – a task to be achieved either through enhancing the opposition or by dismantling the ruling parties once and for all - to be substituted by more cooperative regimes.

The late 2012 and the first half of 2013 was an era of struggle and hardship to the two Arab Spring governments in Tunisia and Egypt. Economic and social problems made things worse, leading to thousands of protests that called for an end of the governments of

Islamic parties and leaders. In Egypt, the first half of 2013 witnessed unprecedented turmoil: anti-government protests and terrorist insurgencies in the Sinai. The Egyptian economy had slumped to low levels. ―Foreign reserves, which had fallen in each consecutive month from $36 billion before the uprising began, edged up to $15.21 billion at the end of April from $15.12 billion at the end of March, the central bank data showed on Sunday‖715. The situation was mainly due to the blocking of American aids and the reluctance of the IMF, under U.S. influence, to approve the Egyptian requests.

The United States‘ freezing of the annual aids to Egypt in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Morsi by the military in July 2013716 and the rapprochement with the SCAF and military officers had occurred from the outset of The Muslim

Brotherhood‘s Morsi presidency. On July 3, 2013, The Minister of Defense and army chief

Abdul Fattah al-Sisi led a military coup to overthrow and arrested ―Egypt's first democratically-elected president, Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood‖717. What is most important, as I will deal with in the next section, was the United States‘ response to the military coup and how it approached the second government change.

715Tom Pfeiffer, ―Egypt foreign reserves see first gain since 2010,‖ Reutres May 6, 2012, online, internet, Mar. 22, 2017. Available: www.reuters.com. 716David Usborne, ―U.S. Military Aid to Egypt suspended after Morsi Overthreow,‖ Independent Oct. 9, 2013, online, internet. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-military-aid. 717 Lucia Volk, The Middle East in the World: An Introduction ( Routledge, 2015) 176. 279 In Tunisia, political assassinations and fierce opposition of the counter- revolutionary forces, which were backed by regional and western countries, ended with the resignation of Mohammed Jebali on March 13, 2013 after his failure to form a new government in response to the opposition‘s demands. M. Jebali headed the Tunisian Troika government led with Ennahda party majority from December 24, 2011 to March 13, 2013.

Another Troika government substituted the former but in less than one year it resigned on

February 2, 2014. A technocrat government was formed to lead the transition and the

Islamic Party Ennahda under internal and external pressure resigned willingly718. The withdrawal to a technocrat government was forged by external threats, especially the threat of a potential military coup much like the Egyptian‘s.

The two first Arab Spring countries‘ governments were forced to leave office unwillingly during the ―democratic period‖. In Egypt, the military ousted Morsi on July 3,

2013 and banned the FJP; meanwhile Ennahda stepped down in January 2014. The U.S. response to the dismantling of the FJP and the jailing of President Morsi, and the military approach of the third phase of the transition in Egypt had been cautious at the beginning by suspending the annual aids. This ―wait and see policy‖ was shifted to total harmony and cooperation with the new regime that was depicted by civil rights activists as worse than

Mubarek‘s.

5.4 Restoring previous alliances

In his article entitled ―the Brutal Truth about Tunisia‖, Robert Fisk wrote the

Americans ―will do what (they) want. Ben Ali has fled. The search is now on for a more pliable dictator in Tunisia – a ‗benevolent strongman‘ as the news agencies like to call

280 these ghastly men‖.719 Whether this statement was accurate or not concerning the predicted U.S. foreign policy toward the Arab Spring countries, it could be wise to argue that dictators have been the reliable servants of U.S. interests worldwide and especially in the MENA since the Cold War. In Tunisia, a less important strategic country, the satraps of the old regimes came to power after fierce resistance from the revolutionary forces and a peaceful acceptance of the outcome of the first parliamentary and presidential elections in autumn 2014. In Egypt, a bloody subversion of power dismantled the FJP and imprisoned

President Morsi putting an end to the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood government.

The era was a turning point as it enhanced the hypothesis of the continuity of U.S.

Grand Strategy of prioritizing interests over values, especially in the Egyptian case. The study of this era examines the continuity of the policy of containment through the historical institutional path dependency framework. Tunisia and Egypt moved back to the American sphere even with more cooperation. General El-Sessi, an ―American trained general‖720 ally as a Minister of Defense, overthrew President Morsi to take office few months after the coup. Meanwhile Interim Prime Minister Essebssi during the immediate post Ben Ali

Tunisia until the first election of October 23, 2011 was elected a President of Tunisia on

December 22, 2014. His political career as a strongman of both previous autocratic presidents Ben Ali and Habib Bourguiba along with his anti-revolution discourse echoed his qualification of retreating back to the old regime system. He assembled the excluded members of the dissolved political party the Democratic Constitutional Rally known as

RCD to stand against both the Islamic party Ennahda Party and other revolutionary political powers. A few months after leaving office in April 2012, Béji Caid Essebsi and

719Robert Fisk, ―The brutal truth about Tunisia,‖ Independent Jan. 17, 2011, online, internet, Dec. 12, 2017. Available: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/the-brutal-truth-about-tunisia. 720 Kareem Fahim, ―Egypt General Has Country Wondering about Aims,‖ The New York Times Aug. 2, 2013, online, internet, Dec 25, 2018. Available: www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/world/middleeast/egypts. 281 the satraps of the dissolved RCD Party founded a new party known as ―Niddaa Tounes‖, translated as ―Call for Tunisia‖.

It is therefore constructive to highlight the U.S. relationship of close alliance when

Essebsi was holding key positions in Bourguiba and then Ben Ali governments maintaining a workable and confidential relationship with the United States. Living through the Cold War and witnessing its end, he was the Minister of Foreign affairs from

1981 to 1987 bolstering, like President Bourguiba, relationship with the United States and distancing Tunisia from the communist bloc. As an American ally Tunisia was seen in

Washington as a pole of stability in the Maghreb that should be protected against the threat from the Libyan ―rogue state;‖ significantly Libya was under the Soviet sphere of influence and perceived as threat to U.S. alliance system in the MENA. President Essebssi allied with Ben Ali in November 7, 1987 to remove President Habib Bourguiba in a

‗smooth coup‘. He served as an ambassador to Germany from 1987 to 1990 then, a president of Chamber of Dubieties from 1990 to 1991. During this era, amid turmoil in the neighboring Algeria, the United States poured military equipement to Tunisia.721 In response to this military sales and economic assistance was provided to strengthen the

Tunisian military and protect the alliance system.

As a man of the two previous autocratic regimes that were close allies to the

United States since the Cold War, Essebsi‘s party was founded mainly to oppose Ennahda

Party Playing the Islamism threat card Essebsi could be ―the benevolent strongman‖722 of the U.S. administration and its proxies in the MENA who could contain, on behalf of the

United States, Libya and Algeria as two of the richest oil countries in North Africa.

Economically, Tunisia continued to suffer serious problems and Nidda Tounes-led

721 Yahia H Zoubir, ―Algeria and U.S. Interests: Containing Radical Islamism and Promoting Democracy,‖ The West and the Middle East: Critical Concepts in Political Science (2010). 722Robert Fisk, ―The brutal truth about Tunisia,‖ Independent Jan. 17, 2011, online, internet, Dec. 12, 2017. available: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/the-brutal-truth-about-tunisia. 282 government failed to find concrete solutions to the social turmoil and notably the ascending percentage of unemployment. In this context, the United States enhanced its commitment to assist Tunisia economically and militarily. While ―Bilateral assistance from the U.S. government alone doubled between 2014 and 2015‖723, military assistance was to be tripled by 2015724 while security assistance budget would be increased by 200 percent725, according to Deputy Secretary who visited Tunisia on April 10,

2015. He ―reiterated the U.S.‘s commitment to and support for the government and people of Tunisia‖726. Tunisian role, therefore, even if it were not as strategic as Egypt‘s, it remained a key player in North Africa against the anti-American regional and world rivals.

U.S. Alliance system and vital interests have been at stake in neighboring Libya and

Algeria. Turkey, Qatar, Russia and especially Iran are seen as a menace to MENA,

Tunisia, thus, is a key player that could assist the United States in its containment policy, pursuing a Grand Strategy of primacy.

One point worth stressing is that the Ennhada party members either, within the

Tunisian coalition government from 2014 until 2019 or in the parliament, were in total alignment with Westerners and mainly the United States. Communication between U.S. policymakers and high ranking leaders of the Tunisian Ennahda was held regularly as of

2011 but increased from 2014 on. The meeting of Deputy Secretary Blinken and U.S. ambassador to Tunisia with the president of Ennhada and other key members in April 2015 could be seen as a turning point in the U.S relation to Islamic parties in the MENA. The meeting was insurance of the commitment of U.S. in supporting Tunisia and acceptance of

723 Robert Kubinec, ―How foreign aid could hurt Tunisia's transition to democracy‖, Washington Post Dec. 19, 2016, online, internet, Nov. 22, 2018. Available: www.waghingtonpost.com . 724 Tarek Amara, ―U.S. to triple military aid to Tunisia,‖ Tunis Reuters Ap. 10, 2015, online, internet, Dec. 28, 2018. Available: https://www.reuters.com. 725 ―Deputy Secretary Antony Blinken Press Statement at U.S. Embassy Tunis‖ US Embassy in Tunisia Website April 10, 2015, online, internet, Nov 23, 2018 Available: https://tn.usembassy.gov/. 726 Ibid.

283 Ennahda as key player in the Tunisia, unlike the FJP of Egypt, In light of the U.S. alliance system Mr Blinken discussed the Libyan turmoil and how Tunisia could help in reaching peace. The United States therefore with the assistance of the policymakers including the

Islamists worked on restoring cooperative allies in the region.

The U.S. approach to Tunisia differed entirely to the Egyptians‘ in 2013 and 2014.

The Islamic party Ennhada Movement adopted a conciliatory approach and involved in political consensus that made it compatible to U.S. interests in the MENA while the FJP, lacking expertise in the international arena, stuck to democratic outcome of 2012 elections.

The Ennahda led government stepped aside in 2013 for a technocrat government despite its eligibility to remain in power until the upcoming election, accepting to form a coalition government with satraps of the old regime, and even if some of them, including President

Essebssi, was responsible for their torture in prison and exile. But this sign of acceptance of policy constraints and the regional conflicts perceived from the U.S. perspective

―received approbation in many Western and international political institutions‖727.

President Morsi was removed by the military after one year of his presidency.

The point worth exploring is U.S. response to this event which was endowed with ambiguity and uncertainty. The Obama administration adopted the ―wait and see‖ policy immediately after the military coup. President Obama‘s statement on Egypt on the same day was devoid of any straightforward condemnation of the military. He stated:

―We are deeply concerned by the decision of the Egyptian Armed Forces to remove President Morsi and suspend the Egyptian constitution. I now call on the Egyptian military to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority back to a democratically elected civilian government

727 ―Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood Leader Meets with US State Department,‖ The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch April 13, 2015, online, internet Nov 30, 2018. Available: https://www.globalmbwatch.com/2015/04/13/tunisian-muslim-brotherhood-leader-meets-with-us-state-dep. 284 as soon as possible through an inclusive and transparent process, and to avoid any arbitrary arrests of President Morsi and his supporters‖728.

It is therefore obvious that Obama did not condemn the ouster of elected President in addition to the absence of any threat to the military due to the removal of the President.

U.S. commitment in changing the regime in Egypt for a pro-American agent could be noticed when both Obama and Kerry not only refused to call the act a ―coup‖ but also claimed that the military was restoring democary‖729. Moreover, the White House and

State department officers refused to name the event a ―coup‖, ―Officials at the White

House and State Department refused to characterize last week‘s events in Egypt as a military coup‖730. This could be likened to the refusal of calling Mubarek a ―dictator‖ amid the uprisings in February 2011. This denial of naming the removal of an elected president by the military by its name could be backed to legacies on the annual aids to the military that could be cut in case the act was labeled a ―coup‖. In this vein it was unexpected that

Obama administration would side the elected government and impose a restoration of elected governments, aligning himself with his promises of his 2009 Cairo speech and proving his commitment to democracy in the Arab Spring countries. The Arab Spring was an opportunity for Obama but as Porter states ―no fundamental review of U.S. Grand

Strategy will occur despite incentives and opportunities‖731 that meant continuity of

―primacy‖ as the main and the sole U.S. Grand Strategy that could be implemented in the

Arab Spring countries.

728 Barack Obama, ―Statement by President Barack Obama on Egypt,‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary July 3, 2013, online, internet, Dec. 10, 2018. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 729 Michael Gordon and Kareem Fahim, ―Kerry Says Egypt‘s Military Was ‗Restoring Democracy‘ in Ousting Morsi,‖ New York Times Aug. 1, 2013, Online, internet Dec 11, 2018. Available: www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/egypt-warns-morsi-supporters-to-end-prote. 730 John Hudson, ―Obama Administration Won‘t Call Egypt‘s Coup a Coup‖, Foreign Policy (July, 2013), Online, internet, Aug. 19, 2018. Available: https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/08/obama-administration. 731 Patrick Porter, ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S.Foreign Policy Establishment,‖ International Security 42.4 (2018): 9-46. 285 The ‗wait and see‘ policy that was adopted in the immediate ouster of Morsi changed fundamentally when top policy makers backed longstanding policy toward Egypt to signal the continuity thesis. Just one month after the overthrow of Morsi, Secretary of

State John Kerry rationalized the topple of the regime by stating that ―the military was asked to intervene by millions and millions of people, all of whom were afraid of a descent into chaos, into violence and the military did not take over, to the best of our judgment so far‖732. He later, on November 3, 2013 visited Egypt vowing of a total commitment with interim government and the military when he met the interim president and the then president General Al-Sissi. The backing of the military was articulated also in the statement of Elizabeth Jones, Acting Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs. She said: ―Mr

Morsi proved unwilling or unable to govern inclusively… Responding to the desires of millions of Egyptians who believed the revolution had taken a wrong turn and you saw a return to security and stability‖733. This testimony before the congress by E. Jones was in line of U.S. foreign policy in Egypt since the 1970s that favor interests over values.

The U.S‘s vital cards were both the economic aids delivered to the government and the military aids which were consistently transferred to the SCAF for more than 40 years. Following the ―wait and see‖ policy, the aids were suspended for a short period then released and the U.S. returned to cooperation with the Egyptian Military. Obama stated that ―Given today‘s developments, I have also directed the relevant departments and agencies to review the implications under U.S.. law for our assistance to the Government of Egypt‖734. This review or the temporary suspension of the aid was a ‗wait and see policy‘ that took into consideration the potential failure of the military coup but as soon as

732 ―Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 'disappointed' by John Kerry's remarks,‖ The Guradian Aug. 2, 2013, online, internet Aug. 19, 2018. Available: https://www.theguardian.com. 733 Next Steps on Egypt Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, October 29, 2013 (Washington, G.P.O, 2014). 734 Barack Obama, ―Statement by President Barack Obama on Egypt,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary July 03, 2013. Available: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 286 the military managed to suppress protests, military aids returned to flow. The economic and military aid continued to flow and cooperation with General Abdel Fatah El Essi reached the peak in the following months. The Obama ―administration softened its stance towards al-Sisi‘s government by reinstating economic aid and releasing certain large-scale military systems‖735.

Overthrowing regimes or sponsoring military coups was the main Cold War policy known as Covert operation and was adopted in the early 1950s during the

Eisenhower presidency. It was known as ―containment on the cheap‖ as it did not need military forces to remove unfriendly presidents. The case was well-known in Iran in 1953 when the CIA orchestrated the military coup ―Operation Ajax‖ of the Mohammad

Mossadegh government and replaced him with a pro-American Prime Minister.

The most notorious example of covert operation was in Chile in 1973 when the

CIA orchestrated a military coup to topple Allende‘s Regime. The Chilean president‘s attempt to nationalize the U.S. international cooperation, United Fruit Company, and its large area of lands, in addition to economic measures in favor of the Chilean economy, were the main causes of ―needing to eliminate‖ him. Salvador Allende was a matter of concern for U.S. policy makers since the 1950s because of his Marxist thoughts and his nationalist measures, which stood against the United States interests. The U.S. administration plotted against him in the Chilean presidential elections in 1953, 1958 and

1964 by supporting his opponents and financing propaganda against him. But his victory in

1973 could not be prevented; therefore, it ―necessitated‖ a military coup on September 11,

1973 to topple him by the CIA and military officers, led by August to Pinochet who came to power and established a dictatorship. The same occurred in Egypt when General

Abdelfatah Essisi orchestrated a military coup then ascended to power and suppressed any

735 Maria C. P. Arena, ―Changing Foreign Policy: the Obama Administration‘s Decision to Oust Mubarak,‖ Revista Brasileira De Política Internacional 60.1 (2017). 287 voice of criticism. The United States alignment with Egypt, like with the Iranian Shah in

1953 and Pinochet in 1973, was a continuity of the same Cold War strategy. It was therefore ―reasonable to assume that having gone through 30 years of close relations with the Egyptian military and intelligence community, the U.S. was relatively well-acquainted with the main actors who would serve as interlocutors on the Egyptian side in the immediate post-Mubarak situation, and would carry on protecting U.S. interests‖736.

Regardless of whether the United States intelligence and government were well- informed of the military coup in Egypt or not, the White House and the various agencies statements demonstrate that the U.S. welcomed the removal of Mr. Morsi in 2013. The ouster of Morsi and the transition of power from civilian President to Military agent could be seen as a welcome opportunity by U.S. policy makers. In the hearing before the committee on foreign affairs, which was held in the House of Representative on October

26, 2013, four months after the ouster of the the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) government, support of the military and a condemnation of the ousted members of the

Justice and F was recommended. In hearing before the congress, the FJP members were accused of violence by U.S. congressional representatives and mainly their hostility to U.S. interests in the MENA. One said: ―those brotherhood activists who are deeply committed to violence and tyranny. The fact that these extremists are actively hostile to American interests binds us with the Egyptian government. That is why I support a continued and robust military relationship with Egypt‖737. U.S. abandonment of Morsi was mainly for

U.S. interests and especially for the alliance system and the security of Israel, the main aspects of U.S. foreign policy.

736 Ibid. 737 Next Steps on Egypt Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, October 29, 2013 (Washington, G.P.O, 2014). 288 Even adequately and inconsistently, the Obama administration followed the same path in its approach towards the Arab uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Arguably, like in

Tunisia as soon as Mubarak left power, a White House Press release on the events on

Egypt was issued, in which President Obama ensured the United States commitment to advocate democracy and stand by the Egyptian people. After praising the bravery of

Egyptians, Obama ensured the continuity of U.S.-Egyptian partnership in the Post

Mubarak era. ―The United States will continue to be a friend and partner to Egypt. We stand ready to provide whatever assistance is necessary -- and asked for -- to pursue a credible transition to a democracy‖738, stated Obama. His call for a ―peaceful transition to democracy‖ also was articulated just in the aftermath of the ouster of the Tunisian

President Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. It was repeated in the Egyptian context immediately after the ouster of Mubarak on February 11, 2011 and again the same call would be made during military overthrow of the Muslim brotherhood and president

Mohammed Morsi after July 3, 2013.

Historical institutionalism‘s doctrine of path dependency is explicit in his approach to the overthrow of President Morsi. In this sense, President Obama stated: ―I now call on the Egyptian military to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority back to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible through an inclusive and transparent process‖739. The statement did not include condemnation of the violation of the democratic process that the United States had long advocated and committed to support moreover he refused ―to describe the July 2013 Egyptian military‘s overthrow of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood regime as a military

738 Barack Obama, ―Statement by President Barack Obama on Egypt,” The White House Office of the Press Secretary July 03, 2013. Available: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov. 739 Ibid. 289 coup‖740. The expression of concern then ―wait and see‖ policy and later on total engagement explain the difficulty and even the impossibility to adopt a change in the grand strategy, reluctance to act that indicates that Obama administration policy falls under HI path dependency ―path dependency can also be a result of an inability or a reluctance to commit to change because of the cost implications‖741. The Obama administration apparently, though experienced internal resistance between young advisers and the ―blobs‖ who resisted change, upholding the Cold War policy of primacy that favor interests over values for the sake of U.S. leadership and regional presence through alliances. The phenomenon then fits the path dependency which is a ―phenomena whereby history matters and what has occurred in the past persists because of resistance to change‖742.

The point worth reemphasizing is that the last phase of the Arab Spring, as I call it, which covers the smooth coup against the Ennahda led-government in January 2014 and the ―military coup‖ against the FJP president Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, falls into the U.S.

Grand Strategy of primacy that had been adopted from the Cold War even at the moment of scoks, as Porter states. In both Tunisia and Egypt, the Obama administration ―has supported transitions that feature prominent roles for elites associated with the former autocratic regime‖743. In Tunisia, all the satraps of the ousted Ben Ali regime came to power, some of them were back to the positions they previously held during Ben Ali regime, signaling a turn back to the old system meanwhile in Egypt, Muabrek‘s men regained power and the military tied on all activists either Islamists or secularists.

740 Anthony Celso, "Obama and the Arab Spring: the Strategic Confusion of a Realist-Idealist,‖ Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs. 2.2 (2013). 741 Caroline Banton, ―Path Dependency,‖ Investopidia, online, internet, Feb. 20, 2019. Available: www.investopedia.com/terms/p/path-dependency.asp. 742 Ibid. 743 Anthony Celso, "Obama and the Arab Spring: the Strategic Confusion of a Realist-Idealist,‖ Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs. 2.2 (2013). 290 5.5 Political Islam in the Arab Spring countries: the alliance at stake. This part sets out the U.S. perception of Islamic governments and political Islam since the late Cold War. It formulates an attempt to trace the continuity of such a perception through the examination of policy-maker discourses and official government positions. The emergence of Islamic Parties and Political Islam leaders will be questioned in terms of the U.S. foreign policy of containment. It builds on the past framing research to probe the impact of the triumph of Political Islam and Islamic parties in Tunisia and Egypt upon the U.S. regional alliance system in the MENA, attempting to cast new light on the implicit and explicit response to the victory of Ennahda Party in Tunisia and the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt.

The purported U.S. fear of Islam and Muslims will be investigated, notably by questioning the credibility of linking Islam to terrorism. In other words: is the allegation that political Islam poses a real threat to U.S. security an umbrella for containing the Arab

Spring countries or merely a displacement of the classical ―external enemy‖ concept from the former Soviet threat? Is it essentially meant for internal consumption, and for domestic

U.S. political and industrial aims? Specific themes in the following section include: definitions of ―politicized Islam‖; Islam as religion of terror, reality or myth? What is the real influence of new Islamic regimes in the region upon U.S. foreign policy and do they remain in the U.S. sphere of influence? Is there a causality factor in answering this last question with regards to the political and or religious nature of the government in place?

Thus, this analysis will help construct a comparative paradigm – change versus continuum

– of U.S. policy towards Islamic regimes in the past and present and the main strategies adopted to contain them. We will also carry out in-depth analyses of the continuity or discontinuity of U.S. foreign policy when purportedly defending democracy and liberty, from the Cold War to the War on Terror.

291 Specific themes that are of interest in this endeavor concern policy options accompanying the emergence of political Islam in the region. On the one hand there is the

U.S. publicly stated opposition to the triumph of Islamic parties and the likelihood of their spreading through the whole MENA region and the more complex reality of underlying policy options as expressed through especially concrete actions. The influence of new

Islamic regimes upon U.S. foreign policy is complex. Thus, this analysis will help construct a comparative paradigm – concisely bringing to light policies change and continuum– of U.S. attitudes towards Islamic regimes in the past and present.

5.5.1 U.S. and Political Islam: a historical background

The political constraints over any political party with Islamic background in the

MENA were obvious to observers and publically stated by the presidents and policy makers in the region and usually applauded by the U.S. policymakers in Washington.

Thus, it is rather surprising that the U.S. government was caught so off-guard, since there were signs of unrest everywhere and since the U.S. government had openly been warned by specialists. In a conference of held in 1994 to examine the threat of Islamism in North Africa744, Kenneth Katzman, policy analyst for Middle East affairs, predicted the Arab revolution, recommending to the U.S. administration to avoid it by persuading Arab dictators to undertake a dialogue with the Islamists. He publically stated that ―Islamic regimes look dangerous to the U.S. when they come to power through revolution, not evolution‖745. This warning was not unique, in a secret WikiLeaks cable made public in 2010, the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt cautiously reported upon the 2009

Egyptian parliamentary election. He alarmed the U.S. administration about ―the five-fold increase in the number of seats held by independent candidates representing the outlawed

744 Greg Noakes, ―Heritage Foundation Conference Assesses Islamist Threat,‖ Washington Report on the Middle East (Sept/oct 1994): 21-43-44. 745 Ibid. 292 Muslim Brotherhood‖746. This increase was highlighted because of the increasing influence and popularity of the Islamic politicians during the parliamentary election despite the fraud and suppression of votes by the Mubarak regime. This message explicitly states, however, that the U.S. refusal of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian parliament, even a very few number of MPs. So what would be the attitude of Washington toward an Egyptian

President who is the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood and when three fourths of the

Parliament comes from Islamic parties?

A glance at recent history demonstrates the U.S. rejection of Islamic-based governments and politicians from the Cold War until the War on Terror, including the agitation in the MENA in the 2010s. President Obama pledged in June 2009 at Cairo

University that the United States would advance democracy and people‘s freedom to choose their governments regardless of their ideological and religious backgrounds, vowing a new era of American relationship with the Islamic world and notably the Middle

East.747. On June, 20, 2005, at the same location -the American University in Cairo-

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had auttred the same promise on democratization of the MENA.

―We should all look to a future when every government respects the will of its citizens -- because the ideal of democracy is universal. For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people‖748.

The forthcoming era - after this speech - had not changed at all and the United

States continued its support of undemocratic regimes and crushing any political aspirations

746 ―US embassy cables: Egypt's choice not just between Islam and dictatorship, says US: WikLeaks cable dated 2006-019-2 ‖, The Guardian Feb. 7, 2011, Online, internet, Mar.26, 2015. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/51001.

748 Condoleezza Rice, ―Remarks at the American University in Cair June 20, 2005,‖ US State of Depratment Archive, Online, internet, May 10, 2019. Available: https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005. 293 of Middle Eastern and Northern African peoples. The triumph of Islamic-led governments was the main concern of the United States and the spread of political Islam in the Arab

Spring countries was to be prevented in Tunisia, Egypt and even Libya.

In the same thread, the American president Barack Obama at the same location and almost in the same month, June, articulated nearly the same vows to the Muslim

World:

―I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles – principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings‖749.

From this speech, it is vital to first analyze the continuity of the same rhetoric of democracy and the advocacy of the aspirations of peoples in the MENA. Obama‘s speech reiterates the same arguments and promises of Secretary of Sates Condoleezza Rice‘s speech of 2005.

Secondly it is an admission of the U.S. classical image of Islam, and mainly political Islam. The third point is that like Mrs Rice, president Obama did not fulfill his promises in the short term; that is, after his speech. In other words, his government did not take any concerted steps to enhance democracy in the MENA by putting pressure on the

Egyptian, Tunisian or other regimes in the region to implement democratic reforms and accept all political tendencies; including the Islamic parties, in the political scene. This policy has been adopted over and over since the Iranian revolution of 1979. The Arab

Spring was thought to be ―the new chapter of U.S. policy diplomacy‖750 and ―a new engagement‖, according to Obama‘s words. Yet, actions did not follow along the various

749 Barack Obama, ―Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 6-049-0 ‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary June 5, 2009, online, internet May, 10, 2019. Available: obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/. 750 US Presidential Doctrines Handbook - Volume 1 President Barack Obama Doctrine - Strategic Information and Materials (Washington Dc: International Business publication, 2017) 60. 294 phases of the Arab Spring and American presidents (Obama, Bushes, Clinton and Regan) consistently pursued the same anti-democratic policy in the form of opposing Islamic parties. At this level, Condoleezza Rice and, later on, President Obama and before them

Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton sided with the undemocratic regimes to distance

Islamic parties from power.

5.5.2 Egypt

The U.S. rejection of political Islam, however, was manifested openly in Egypt since the early Cold War. The Muslim brotherhood - the manifestation of political Islam in

Egypt and the Muslim world – had faced brutal crackdowns several times, notably in 1948,

1954, 1965 and 2013. Despite being outlawed and despite the regime‘s fraudulent practices in election, and the systematic oppression of their members, the Muslim Brotherhood won

88 seats in the parliamentary elections of 2005, which equated 20% of the total seats – a fact that alarmed the American administration.

Just after the step down of Mubarak, Ilean Ros-Lehtinen, a Republican congresswoman stated that the United States ―must also urge the unequivocal rejection of any involvement by the Muslim Brotherhood and other extremists who may seek to exploit and hijack these events to gain power, oppress the Egyptian people, and do great harm to

Egypt‘s relationship with the United States, Israel, and other free nations,‖751 This was a clear expression of the U.S. anti-political Islam doctrine followed, ultimately, by governments led by members of both political parties.

751 Susan Cornwell, ―Lawmakers fret about Islamist rise in Egypt,‖ Reuters, Feb. 11, 2011, online, internet Nov. 5, 2017. Available: www.reuters.com. 295 5.5.3 Tunisia

In Tunisia, Tunisian presidents Habib Bourguiba, who ruled from 1956 to 1987, and his successor and Zine El Abedine Ben Ali from 1987 to 2011 were involved in the attempts to uproot Islamic-based party and to crush any politician from any opposition.

The Islamic Party, Ennahda Party, was banned in the 1980s, yet its members ran independently in 1989 legislative elections. Ben Ali promised to start a new era of democracy by allowing the Islamists to be candidate in the 1989 parliamentary election but as it appeared they would win landslide majority, Ben Ali falsified the elections and imposed a heavy repression. As a result: ―During Ben Ali‘s political crackdown after the

1989 elections, Ennahda party members suffered repression‖752. He tortured, jailed and executed thousands of Islamsists753. The government arrested more than 8,000 members and sympathizers of the Ennahda party between 1990 and 1991754.

This repression was approved by the Bush administration. ―The Tunisian government obtained support from the U.S. and France for its policy of eradication of

Islamists‖755. It is argued also that by the end of the Cold War, the George W. Bush administration maintained contact with the leader of the Ennahda Party who was considered as a moderate politician. Yet, upon the request of Ben Ali, and during the Civil

War in neighboring Algeria, ―the United States abandoned Tunisians‘ Islamists and stopped contact with Rachid Ghannouchi‖756. It could be argued that the U.S. policymakers, pursuing a Grand Strategy of primacy, preferred alignment with Ben Ali and

752 Ahmed E Souaiaia and Sarah R. Louden, ―Political Islamism in Tunisia: A History of Repression and a Complex Forum for Potential Change,‖ Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Multidisciplinary Studie: Mathal. 4 (2015). 753 Yahya H Zoubir, The U.S. and Tunisia Model of Stable Relations,‖ Robert Looney ed, Handbook of US- Middle East Relations (Routledge, 2014) 250. 754 Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring (New York: Columbia UP, 2012) 168. 755 John P Entelis, ―Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non-Violent Dimension‖ John P Entelis, ed, Islam Democary and the State in North Africa (Indiana University Press, 1997) 49. 756 Yahya H Zoubir, ―The U.S. and Tunisia Model of Stable Relations‖ Robert Looney ed, Handbook of US- Middle East Relations (Routledge, 2014) 250. 296 turning a blind-eye on his repression. This is a reasonable realist approach that focuses on the acting president who was considered to be a vital ally. Another key fact is that Algeria was a Soviet ally during the Cold War and the success of Islamic movements in the two neighboring countries, Tunisia and Algeria, could jeopardize U.S. alliance system and its leadership in North Africa.

5.5.4 Algeria

Another remarkable case of U.S. opposition to Islamic parties was the Algerian election of 1991. While Ben Ali was cracking down on the Islamic-based politicians, the

Algerian military was opposing the victory of the Islamists in the parliamentary election.

This hypothesis was emphasized by the U.S. attitudes toward the victory of the Islamic

Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria in 1991. The FIS won the first round in the parliamentary elections on December 26, 1991 with 118 while its opponent the FLN won only 16 seats757. As the FIS was likely to achieve a landslide majority in the second round, the

Algerian military intervened on January 11, 1992 to cancel the election result and to ban the Islamic party FIS on March 4, 1992.

The intervention in the Algerian elections and the cancellation of the election results that had brought an Islamic political movement was recommended and ordered by the United States officers who had a tight connection with the Algerian military officers.

As a result, Algeria entered more than a decade of violence and civil war. James A. Baker, former Secretary of State, openly declared the U.S. opposition to a democracy that brings

―Islamists‖ to power. Commenting upon the U.S. support of the military to cancel the victory of the FIS, he stated that ―When I was at the Department of State, we pursued a policy of excluding the radical fundamentalists in Algeria, even as we recognized that this

757 Peter A. Samuelson, ―Pluralism Betrayed: the Battle between Secularism and Islam in Algeria's Quest for Democracy,‖ The Yale Journal of International Law. 20.2 (1995): 309-358. 297 was somewhat at odds with our support of democracy…because we felt that the radical fundamentalists‘ views were so adverse to what we believe in and what we support, and to what we understood the national interests of the United States to be‖758. At this level, one can notice the similarity of the Algerian case of 1991 and the Egyptian democratic process in 2013. In Egypt, as I dealt with in detail, there was the overthrow of an elected president and the banning of the FJP party. The United States was to a great extent a supporter of this overthrow, even if the events were at odds with Obama claims of defending democracy.

The United States‘ intervention in the Algerian election to distance the Islamic- based party FIS from holding power demonstrates the longstanding U.S. rejection of any

Islamic-based movements or party in the MENA in the 1990s, fearing the domino effect of the Iranian Revolution in North Africa.

5.5.5 Palestine

The Palestinian Election of 2006 brought to power the Islamic Resistance

Movement in the Palestine Authority Hamas which achieved an unprecedented landslide victory with 76 seats while the Fateh Movement only got 43. Such an electoral outcome brought to light Washington‘s rejection of political parties with Islamic background and ideology as the U.S. worked to distance them from power in all MENA countries. The

United States poured $500 million to empower Fateh over Hamas in the 2006 election and to prevent Hamas from ascending power. President Bush, Jr., Condoleezza Rice and top

U.S. officers did not recognize the Palestinian election outcome. President Bush stated that: ―The United States does not support political parties that want to destroy our ally

758Daniel Pipes, ―Interview with James A. Baker III: Looking Back on the Middle East,‖ Middle East Quarterly (September 1994). 298 Israel‖759. Secretary Rice ensured the rejection stating that ―As we have said, you cannot have one foot in politics and the other in terror‖760.

The U.S. policy makers‘ attitudes towards the Islamic Parties in the MENA vary from country to another. They maintain close relationship with the Justice and

Development Party (JDP) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan whereas continuously showing their hostility to, and rejection of, other parties such as

Hamas Movement and Hisbollah. The distinction between the two types lies – for the

United States – essentially in the fact that some parties such as the Palestine Hamas and

Hisbollah are confrontationally hostile to the U.S. and its close ally Israel. They enjoy uncontrollable power that is far from being contained and/or restricted. Moreover, unlike the moderate parties in the Islamic world, they oppose the U.S. policy in the Middle East.

It is worth underlining that the Justice and Development Party (JDP) of Morocco and the Jordanian Islamic Action Front (IAF) are under the control of the governments which are traditionally U.S. allies. Moroccan and Jordon‘s Kings, to name few examples, have been close allies to the United States and had no say in the Middle East affairs whereas the Hamas Movement and Hezbollah Party are independent military factions of their government. They run counter U.S.intersts in the Middle East.

5.5.6 The Arab Spring: neo-containment of Islamic governments The triumph of the Ennahdh Party in Tunisia and Freedom and the Justice Party in

Egypt could be perceived as a real threat to the U.S. ―War on Terror‖ and a challenge to the U.S. policy of containment – we are postulating about the possibility of developing the notion of ―neo-containment‖ – in the region.

759George W. Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush (Waghinton Dc G.P.O, 2002) 130. 760Warren P. Strobel, ―Hamas landslide shocks U.S.. and creates problems for Bush,” Philly.com Jan.27, 2006, online, internet, June 5, 2019. Available: http://articles.philly.com/2006-01 -27/news. 299 The U.S. administration had relied on the ousted regimes to fight potential terrorists, as it is stated in the WikiLeaks leaked documents that ―the Tunisian government is a close ally in the war on terrorism‖761. It advocated anti-Islam policies in the Islamic world as Islamists were perceived as terrorists, or at least either potential terrorists or sympathizers. But, if Islamic Parties were freely elected by the people, can the people then also be classified as ―terrorists‖? Then answer is not stated directly or officially but entailed in the tight control and often the constrictions of the local governments.

Significantly, both Islamic Parties in Egypt and Tunisia have been disassociating themselves from extremism and radicalism, emphasizing that their main objective is to govern democratically far from fundamentalism and abuse of power. In this context, members of Ennahda Party in Tunisia and Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt had been ensuring the international community of the peaceful objective of their parties and of the fact that there is no inherent antagonism between their political activities and democracy.

As a response to the association of Islamic Parties with Taliban and other factions, the leader of the Ennahda Party Rached Ghannouchi rejected the allegation: ―Why are we put in the same place as a model that is far from our thought, like the Taliban or the Saudi model, while there are other successful Islamic models that are close to U.S., like the

Turkish, the Malaysian, and the Indonesian models; models that combine Islam and modernity?... we are Muslim democrats and not Islamists762‖. The term Islamism is negatively associated with Islamic radicalism and Jihadism, two terms echoe the terrorist threats that the United States was fighting since the 9/11.

761 ―US embassy cables: Egypt's choice not just between Islam and dictatorship, says US,‖ The Guardian Feb. 7, 2011, online, internet, Dec. 2, 2018. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy- cables. 762Anthony Shadid and David Kirkpatrick, ―Activists in Arab World Vie to Define Islamic State,‖ New York Times Sept. 29, 2011. 300 The real dilemma is whether the rejection of political Islam and any democratic process including Islamic parties in the MENA was due to the opposition of political Islam as ideology that may lead to security menace to the United States and the West or because such Islamic parties were perceived as anti-American political powers that could no thing but oppose the U.S. geostrategic interests in the Islamic world.

The U.S. support of the military coup in Egypt and the loss of the Islamic and nationalist parties in Tunisia to more pro-western policy makers could be perceived as a success of the United States policy of containment to restore the working alliance system.

It also recuperated its vital interests through bringing down of seemingly anti-American leaders in the Middle East. In this line of thought, it should be noted that the U.S‘s turning a blind-eye to military intervention in Egypt in July 2013 against an elected President, to dissolving the Parliament and to the crackdown of civil rights activists enhances the continuity hypothesis of the U.S. foreign policy. The United States foreign policy in the

MENA is unchangeable and prioritizing interests over value is the long-standing tradition of the successive American presidents from the Cold War to the Arab Spring.

The spread of the uprisings in the MENA and the Islamic world was of a geopolitical interest for the United States as the long entrenched rulers were in jeopardy and hence the United States‘ interests. Amid the protests, Secretary of State Clinton admitted that the abandonment of Mubarak could scare the other autocratic allies in the region. ―Her feeling was that Mubarak has been a friend for 30 years, and if you walk away from your friends, every other ally in the region is going to doubt your word‖763.

Even Ross, a hard-headed realist, thought that Clinton was putting too much stock in her

763 ―Hillary Clinton Doctrine,‖ Foreign Policy FP (Nov. 10, 2015) online, interne, Jan. 10, 2019. Available:www.foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/06/hillary-clinton-doctrine-obama-interventionist-tough-minded. 301 old friends. Mubarak, he told her, ―is blind to what's going on, and it's going to get worse‖764.

The uprisings spread to neighboring countries, resulting in dramatic events in

Libya, Yemen, and Syria whereas they were contained and repressed in other countries such as Algeria, Jordan and Bahrain. The waves of the Arab uprisings jeopardized autocratic regimes, on the one hand, and western interests, on the other hand. The United

States has been the main ally of the major MENA autocracies that were facing fierce protests and likely to fall one after the other. In this context, how would the United States react to cover her allies? And, if lost, how would the newly elected government be contained and maintained in the American orbit? What would be the appropriate policy to balance interests and values in the region?

The second wave of uprisings in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria highlighted the intersection and overlapping of interests of different regional world powers. The question, then, became: how did the United States respond in order to fight and to protect its sphere of influence in the region. The last part will be an examination of U.S. policy of containment through a comparative paradigm between Arab Spring, the War on Terror period, and Latin American countries, like Chile, during the Cold War period, to check the level of continuity in the U.S. foreign policy of containment: Did history repeat itself?

The U.S. foreign policy in the Arab spring turned to be welcome opportunity to get rid of some rogue states such as Syria and Libya and concurrently shield others in the

MENA.

The role of the United States in the Arab Spring countries and notably the two main countries under study Tunisia and Egypt is manifest in several aspects from the outburst of the protest until the return of the old regimes. The policy of containment and

764 Ibid. 302 often neo-containment is implemented to tighten its control and impose boundaries on post-revolution newly-elected governments. They were perceived as or likely to be challenging actors to the United States; therefore, suitable policies targeted each of them until the total disappearance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the weakening of the

Islamic associate Party in Tunisia.

Conclusion

An in-depth investigation of the U.S. strategy of containment in Tunisia and

Egypt, then to a lesser extent in Yemen and Syria, supports the continuum hypothesis. The priority of interests over values remained a consistent policy since the Cold War. The Arab spring events unveiled the gap between words and actions in the American official discourses. Defending democracy in the MENA was selective according to the United

States geostrategic interests.

The topple of Morsi‘ government and his arrest, on the one hand, and the weakening of Ennahda Party in Tunisia from 2013onwards, on the other, could be perceived as a success of U.S. foreign policy of containment to bring down perceived unaligned Islamic leaders. Presidents such as Al-Sissi of Egypt, a military officer and

Essebssi of Tunisia, a strap of the two autocratic regimes of Ben Ali and Bourguiba were a sign of the Arab Spring failure to meet the peoples‘ aspiration for democracy and more importantly. More importantly it reflects the incapabilty to depart from the American orbit.

Dictators had been the preferred agents to ascertain U.S. interests. ―America allies itself with dictatorship because it is easy to deal with despots; while it is difficult to work with democratic states. America spends years negotiating with democracies, while it can reach an agreement with an autocrat in just few minutes‖765. This statement can best explain the reason behind considering the Arab Spring as a dilemma and the promised democracy as

765 Jason Brownlee, Democracy Prevention: the Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) vii. 303 unwelcome opportunity in Tunisia, Egypt and the GCC countries. Preferring autocrats was

the Cold War strategy that guarantees the preservation of U.S. alliance system and

therefore interests in the MENA.

Along the major phases of the Arab Spring, the United States attempted to

reconstruct the system of alliances that had been erected to uphold U.S. primacy in the

region. Despite a moment of shock and uncertainty, Obama administration coped with

every new situation for the sake of long-established spheres of influences that had

previously been ensured by regimes governed by the close allies: ―When the uprisings

threatened pro-American autocracies, the White House preferred a ‗wait and see‘

approach, reserving strong support until after the opposition had bested and despot‖766.

What mattered at the desperate moment of saving allies was working with other internal

allies from the old regimes to maintain U.S. interests through the installation of interim

governments. U.S. policymakers follow the transition phases to advocate pro-American

politicians even via undemocratic measures. Then democracy rhetorics were for public

consumption and rationalization of pressuring governments and assisting others. All

agreed (U.S. top policy makers) that what mattered most was the defense of American

interests that the issue of democracy was not a priority‖767.

The regime changes in the MENA could have been seen an opportunity for

Obama according to his young advisers but the primicists, like his Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton and some entrenched advisers and thank tanks who were faithful to

―primacy‖ resisted any departure to a new apparocah that translats Obama wilsonian

speeches.

766Jason Brownlee et al, Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform (Oxford University Press, 201 ) 70. 767 Barack Obama, ―Lackey of Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood‖, Orient XXI (March 2019), online, internet, Feb. 20, 2019. Available: https://orientxxi.info3. 304 The enactment of Cold War containment generated U.S. commitments that it couldn‘t unwind, and thus, it led to policies in the Arab Spring that ran contrary to its democratic values. The U.S. aimed mainly to contain regional rivals to U.S. hegemony, especially Iran, but for that matter, also Russia in addition to the need to maintain its regional alliance system. Losing Egypt to a religious regime would undermine those objectives. Morsi's rise to power threatened that overall objective, and when it became clear that he couldn‘t maintain stability and keep the support of the military, the U.S. was willing to let him go. In other words, the U.S. did not explicitly oppose Morsi and the

Muslim Brotherhood in the same way that it explicitly opposed communism during the

Cold War. The United States was therefore carrying out containment of U.S. regional rivals more than Egypt and Tunisia. These two countries lack the necessary economic and military independence to threaten the United States hegemony but they could have damaged its alliance system in the MENA that was established since the Cold War.

The revolutions made it difficult to contain Iran and maintain the existing alliance system which emerged out of the Cold War. Thus, the U.S. would abandon Morsi when supporting him proved too costly and an alternative emerged, with the advent of the Sissi regime that could restore the status quo and serve U.S. interests in the MENA.

This whole argument of the Arab Spring as a case study is consistent with a historical institutionalist analysis involving path dependence. It was too costly for the

United States to deviate from its policy of keeping allies developed during the Cold War.

Thus, there were increasing returns to Washington for doing so. Now, those costs and benefits do not have to be entirely material. They can also be ideational, something like a habit that builds up over time that the U.S. cannot break. That is, policymakers cannot incur the major costs which would be involved in shifting policy. It was just easier to

305 revert to the status quo, and that is eventually what the U.S. did here when the costs of supporting Mohammad Morssi added up.

The question then is where those costs come from? On the one hand, they were external. For the U.S. to support Morsi was costly over time because US allies are opposed to this movement, especially Israel and the Saudis. The Muslim Brotherhood was not a threat to the U.S., but really a threat to those two regimes, and this caused tensions in the alliance system that could more easily be resolved by the U.S. abandoning Morsi. The costs were also internal. There are many U.S. relations with Egypt that could be more easily maintained if Sissi came to power, and, if the U.S. didn‘t challenge the Sissi regime for brutally repressing the MB. The U.S. military aid, which is provided to Egyptian military, was made by the U.S. industry, thus, the U.S.-Egypt alliance provided domestic benefits to U.S. arms manufacturers. Changing the dynamics of the alliance by letting the

Egyptian military's role get downgraded could thus be a problem - it could be costly to the

U.S., and these costs are ―built in‖ to the relationship, so the U.S. didn‘t want to change them.

The development of relationships during the Cold War between the U.S. and the actors in the region led to the persistence of this one set of policies despite changing circumstances and President Obama's desire to change the relationship. Ultimately, historical U.S. commitments make this possible, because then it became too costly for the

U.S. The primary need was to prevent the emergence of an adversary to the new liberal order being reconstructed by the United States in terms of increasing returns.

306 6. Conclusion

On June 1, 2002 President George Walker Bush purported in his Commencement

Address to the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York, that ―for much of the last century, America‘s defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment. In some cases, those strategies still apply. But new threats also require new thinking‖768. This declaration of departure from the Cold War containment policy, towards a new policy meant to cope with a new adversary has repeatedly been articulated with every successive post-Cold War president – namely, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton,

George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. Each president signaled the implementation of a new grand strategy beyond Containment. The 41st American president, George H. W. Bush, stated in 1989 that ―our review indicates that 40 years of preservance have brought us a precious opportunity, and now it is time to move beyond containment to a new policy of the 1990s‖769. Despite this express claim to cease its implementation, we argue that post-

Cold War presidents have remained faithful to the Cold War containment policy, adapting it to the new challenges faced to impose U.S. primacy.

President Clinton, from instance, ushered in a move ―from containment to enlargement‖. This strategy was designed and articulated by Clinton‘s first National

Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, who argued that ―the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement - enlargement of the world‘s free community‖770. Clinton strategy of the mid 1990s was labled as neo-containment rather than innovative grand strategy. Same for President Obama who showed a determination to

768 George W.Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush: 2001-2009 (Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2003) 919. 769 George H W Bush, ―Beyond containment: a new basis for U.S.-Soviet Union Relation,‖ American Foreign Policy Current Documents (U.S. Department of State, 1990) 363. 770 Anthony Lake, From Containment to Enlargement: Remarks of Anthony Lake (Washington, D.C.?: Executive Office of the President, 1993) . 307 move beyond George W. Bush‘s War on Terror towards more engagement. Like his predecessors, President Obama worked to ―secure continued American hegemony through a combination of cooperative engagement and restraint‖771, thereby implementing a new version of containment based mainly on Wilsonian discourse but Hamiltonian practice that prioritized interests.

The 1990s was an era of leadership crisis and, we argue, a lost decade for the

United States in its search for a post-containment stature. The demise of the Soviet Union as an adversary and the lack of competitors for a sphere of influence left the United States without an enemy around which it could frame its foreign policy. Both President George H

W. Bush and Bill Clinton attempted to substitute the Soviet Union rivalry with a new adversary to be targeted by the U.S grand strategy, which would thus be designed around it. At the same time, the search for a new George Kennan to articulate a new policy to substitute the Cold War containment policy, we argue, has been doomed to failure.

Anthony Lake, assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, of President

Clinton, attempted to propose ―democratic enlargement‖ as a replacement to containment.

This policy was a recycling of one of the traditional containment policy mechanisms such as defending democracy. Clinton‘s dual containment policies along with mini-series of foreign policies were seen as a neo-containment policy that complemented his predecessor‘s New World Order grand strategy, with a particular focus on the MENA and the Persian Gulf.

Although the Middle East was of great significance to the United States since the early Cold War, the immediate post-Cold War era, and specially the 1990s, was a period of total shift in this area. Foreign policy machines were oriented to the MENA region and notably the Persian Gulf, which was perceived as an area of trouble and threat to the

771 L�fflmann, Georg, ―The Pivot between Containment, Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama‘s Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia,‖ Asian Security. 12.2 (2016): 92-110. 308 United States‘ interests. On October 2, 1989, President Bush senior noted in National

Security Directive 26 that ―access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friends in the areas are vital to U.S. National security‖772, a declaration of the major reason behind the importance of this region and how oil was the driving guide of the U.S. foreign policy in the area. He went on to threaten any world or regional adversary that ―the United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of U.S. military force against …. any other regional power with interests inimical to our own‖773, a statement that became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

This region has been of great interest to the U.S. since the early Cold War and this relevance was bolstered in the post-Cold war era. The MENA and its stakes were at the heart The Eisenhower, Kennedy, Reagan, Carter, Clinton, and Bush and Obama Doctrines.

Eisenhower focalized on the Middle East as a key area for the United States. His New

Look and ―containment on the cheap‖ through the implementation of CIA military coups and regime change remained the thread of U.S. grand strategy until 2014 in the MENA. On

January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower vowed ―to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations (Middle East countries), requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism‖774. This commitment was extended by successive presidents from Kennedy to Obama. President Carter declared explicitly that: ―An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means

772 ―U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf,‖ National Security Directive 26 , The White House Washington, Oct. 2, 1989. Online, internet Nov.10, 2019. Available: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf. 773 Ibid. 774 US Presidential Doctrines Handbook - Volume 1 President Barack Obama Doctrine - Strategic Information and Materials (Washington DC: International Business Publication) 9. 309 necessary, including military force‖775. President Reagan enhanced the Carter Doctrine by stating that ―there is no way that we could stand by and see (the Persian Gulf including

Saudi Arabia) taken over by anyone that would shut off the oil‖776. The Bush Doctrine, in the aftermath of 9/11, was mainly a Middle East-oriented strategy to control the region through a militarized containment policy.

The demise of communism as the Soviet ideology was replaced by new threats related to Islam as religion. Islam, Islamism, political Islam, and radical Islam were different names for a new menace that was related to Islam as the political religion of the greater Middle East. Il would be more or less assimilated with the perception of terrorism, depending on the circumstance, and the political opportunity, as a threat to U.S. national security starting in the immediate Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979 when the pro-

American government, which had been installed after the 1953 military coup and backed by the United States, was overthrown.

It was President Carter that first framed terrorism as a threat to the United States national security and interests – ―international terrorism‖ and ―terrorists‖ – in relation to the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis of the Americans at the U.S embassy.

―American nationals, citizens have been captured by international terrorists‖777. Ronald

Reagan expanded the notion when talking about the War on Terror in the 1980s, and so did

President George H. W. Bush in the 1990s when he designated Saddam Hussein as an

―international terrorist‖. Saddam Hussein invasion of Kuwait was labeled by George H.W

Bush as an ―act of terror‖. He specified that the mission of the United States was ―an international battle against the scourge of terrorism‖. Iraq and some MENA countries were

775 U.S. Interests In, and Policies Towards, the Persian Gulf, 1980: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, March 24 ; April 2 ; May 5 ; July 1,28 ; and September 3, 1980 (Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 1980 ) 64. 776 Ronald Reagan, Ronald Reagan: 1981 (Washington, DC: U.S. Governmt. Print. Office, 1982) 873. 777 Joseph H. Campos, The State and Terrorism: National Security and the Mobilization of Power (Routledge, 2016) 44. 310 designated as ―rogue states‖ and then connected to terrorism. President Clinton argued that

―fighting terrorism is a big part of our national security today, and it will be well into the

21st century‖778. The area of concern remained the Middle East and notably Iran and Iraq.

It was President Clinton who linked terrorism to weapons of mass destruction, an argument that would be exploited by President Bush in his Iraq War in 2003.

President George W. Bush‘s War on Terror became the main feature of the U.S. grand strategy in the 2000s. Bush warned ―either with us or with the terrorists,‖ which signaled a unique strategic renewal and assertion of the War on Terror in addition to massive military use. President Obama maintained the War on Terror practically but distanced himself from it rhetorically. This is our contribution, regarding the area dealt with here, to depicting what has been perceived as a furtive, if not ambiguous, ―Obama

Doctrine‖. President Obama major advisors were in both President Bill Clinton and George

W Bush administration. Obama‘s chief counter-terrorism adviser was John Brennan who served as an intelligence briefer for President Bill Clinton and George W Bush. His administration was perceived as ―a hybrid Bush-Clinton third term‖779. Others called him

―Bush lite‖780. Therefore Obama admisntration did not depart from the War on Terror policy as promised; Morover its engagement overseas increased compared to Bush‘s.

Guantanamo bay was not shut down as he had promised during his presidential electoral campaigns. His vow to advocate democray in the MENA and prioritize it was nothing but a myth by the end of his second term. Democracy level remained at bottom in the Middle

East according to the Economist Intelligence Unit781. The major federal agencies including

778 Bill Clinton, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, William J. Clinton (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 1994) 768. 779 Inderjeet Parmar, ―Plus ça Change? American Foreign Policy Under Obama,‖ Political Insight, 1/1 (April 2010): 15. 780 Justin A Frank, Obama on the couch: inside the mind of the president (New York: Free Press, 2012) 212. 781 ―The Dynamics of Democracy in the Middle East,‖ Economist Intelligence Unit (March 2005), Online, internet, Oct. 18, 2019. Available : http://graphics.eiu.com/files/ad_pdfs/MidEast_special.pdf. 311 the USAID continued to play a vital role in containing adverseries and maintaining the longstanding functional alliance system.

The dissertation therefore traces a continuity of the exploitation of terrorism: we argue that terrorism as a threat was constructed to continue the containment policy in vital areas like the greater Middle East and that all presidents from Carter to Obama exploited the terrorist threat for geopolitical interests in the region. The policy was aimed at promoting the U.S. grand strategy of primacy but also marked continuity of the foreign policy machine in terms of historical institutionalism‘s path dependency. It is the ―force of habit, in combination with power, produces continuity‖ in U.S foreign policy. Habit is a type of path-dependency, the process whereby decisions are limited by prior developments in an historical path, reproducing behaviour even in the absence of the conditions where it began‖782.

The common finding is that terrorism, as a threat, always concerns the areas of particular significance to the United States such as Iran, Iraq, etc., a fact around which the successive post-Cold War administrations framed their foreign policy. In order to oppose this threat, various kinds of containment mechanisms were implemented. Embargoes and economic and military sanctions were imposed on countries that grew hostile to the United

States which were seen as either sponsoring terrorism or likely to provide terrorists with

WMD. The second type is bolstering the alliance system in the region through military partnerships, economic aids, installing American military bases, etc. U.S grand strategies in the MENA in the post-Cold War were, as this dissertation demonstrates, a recycling of the previous Cold War containment policy.

782 Zeki Sarigil, ―Showing the path to path dependence,‖ European Political Science Review,Vol.7, No.2 (2015): 221-242. 312 The global War on Terror of post 9/11 attacks, we argue, was a ―pretext of convenience‖ to protect American strategic interests in countries of special concern to the

United States. Although he adopted an interventionist policy, President George W. Bush‘s grand strategy was in continuity with his predecessors‘ for American leadership. President

Clinton stated in 1998 that ―Americans are targets of terrorism, in part, because we have unique leadership responsibilities in the world, because we act to advance peace and democracy, and because we stand united against terrorism.‖ Leading the world was not new to both Presidents Clinton and Bush junior. It was the main Cold War grand strategy that was subsequently pursued by the post-Cold War presidents from Bush senior to

Obama and appeared likely to remain the main U.S. grand strategy in the forthcoming decades, until the advent of ‘s policy world view that, for the moment, some have called ―principled realism‖. The National Security Plans were conceived to ―remake the world,‖ ―exterminate the evil-doers,‖ and forge ―the Second American Empire.‖783

Reordering the world according to American norms in the post-Cold War era was a main objective of President Bush Senior but neither he nor President Clinton managed to depart from containment policy in their attempt to secure U.S. primacy. The military actions were themselves an enforcement of containing some North African and Middle Eastern countries. Although 9/11 was seen as a turning point, we argue that there is a high degree of continuation, between the end-Cold War and the immediate post-Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since then, the dissertation demonstrates that the United States maintained continuity in foreign policy which alternates between containment and, sometimes, to save the monopolarity and its position as a superpower. This was asserted by President Bush senior in late 1988 when he stated that ―even if there are no

Soviet Union, America has set in motion the major changes under way in the world today‖

783 Richard Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of From Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) 218-20. 313 he warned that ―no other nation, or group of nations, will step forward to assume leadership‖784. This warning and the commitment to maintain U.S. leadership necessitated the construction of a threat that can serve to rationalize foreign policy at home and abroad.

I argue that terrorism is the new communism and that some MENA countries were the new

Soviet Union while other states were perceived much like the ex-allies of the Soviet Union in Europe and Africa. The War on Terror was by all means a new Cold war in which the major mechanisms of containment such as economic, military and democararization were exploited during Presidents Bush and Obam‘a administration.

The dissertation tests the main hypothesis that containment remained the main if not the sole grand strategy in the post-Cold War. The U.S. response to the Arab Spring in the early 2010s was the research case study. It unveiled the gap between an idealistic discourse and a realistic practice that always prioritizes interests over values. In 2009,

President Obama pledged an attempt to depart from his predecessor‘s War on Terror foreign policy, to initiate a new policy based on advocating human rights, engagement, and especially democracy in the Arab Muslim world. He also promised to put an end to the war in Iraq and initiate a new phase with Iraq that is based on mutual respect. These promises and rhetoric, the dissertation shows, were nothing but an expression of naiveté, if not a myth; in his first December 2010 and January 2011. President Obama and his secretary of

State Mrs. Hillary Clinton fiercely stood with President Ben Ali in Tunisia and especially

Mubarek in Egypt in the attempt to maintain the working alliance system in the MENA.

Then-President Obama, who had enthusiastically and forcefully pledged to support the aspirations of peoples longing for democracy showed the opposite in the Tunisian and

Egyptian cases. As the uprisings spread all over the MENA, he stood with U.S. allies in the

784 Andrew Rosenthal, ―Differing Views of America‘s Global Role,‖ New York Times Nov. 2, 1988. Hal Brands, ―Choosing Primacy: U.S. Strategy and Global Order at the Dawn of the Post-Cold War Era,‖ Texas National Security Review: Volume 1, Issue 2 (March 2018). 314 Persian Gulf such as Bahrain, Emirates and Saudi Arabia, while inspiring revolts in Libya,

Syria and Iran. This selective policy implementation showed that geostrategic interests and especially the maintenance of the alliance system, regardless of its nature – meaning even the most repressive regimes – was prioritized and advocated. Obama attempted to exploit the uprisings to overthrow states such as Iran which had been perceived as hostile to the

United States interests.

The determined attempt to contain democratic movements in Tunisia and Egypt that threatened U.S. primacy in these two initial Arab Spring countries, with the idea of warding off a potential post-Cold War ―Domino Effect‖, was the focus of the American administrations attempt to restore the status quoi in this area. This was manifested in containing political Islam which has been associated with nationalism and, often, terrorism in the area.

Although Egypt witnessed the first reportedly fair election in its history, a military coup was orchestrated in July 2013 to overthrow Moahmmad Morsi, whose election threatened not only U.S. interests and the security of Israel but also the American allies in the MENA. Thus, the United States abandoned Morsi and cooperated with the military generals to reestoring the alliance system. In Tunisia the satraps of the old regime regained power in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2014 and likely to regain power in the major governmental institutions.

The War on Terror was waged under the threat of radical Islam as a national security threat. Political Islam also was implictely associated with radicalism and therefore has been perceived by U.S. policymakers as an anti-American trend. It was thought that the

Muslim world consider themselves as an independent states till the the election of

Islamically-oriented parties that reflect the identity and values of the people would finally

315 mark the country‘s true independence from colonization‖785. The Iranian Islamic

Revolution of 1979 best exemplifies how political Islam led Iran to depart from the

American sphere of influence. Since then Iran was labled as a terrorist state and the United

States pursued anti-political Islam policy in the MENA. The Tunisian and Algerian elections of 1989 and 1991 and the 2006 Palestinian election in addition the to the Arab

Spring political outcome enhanced U.S rejection of political Islam in power.

Our contribution is that The United Stated contained political Islam within Egypt and Tunisia, we are, a containing of regional powers especially Iran and to less degree an emerging Turkey. The Rise of Islamic parties and especially an Islamic President in one key region in the MENA threatens that overall objective, and when it becomes clear that he can't maintain stability and keep the support of the military, then the US is willing to let him go. Revolutions therefore and potential rise of independent Islamic governments in

Lybia, Algeria and Yamen could make it difficult to contain Iran and maintain the existing alliance system which emerged out of the Cold War. Thus, the US would abandon Morsi and was likely to completely abandon Ennahda Party unless the latter showed lenience.

U.S. presidents and policymakers acted within the neo-containment policy framework in the post-Cold War era and notably War on Terror with a very slight difference in means but to the same ends. They ―behave as a ―unified actor‘‖786 in foreign policy according to J. Philip Rosenberg, who affirms the continuity hypothesis of U.S. foreign policy from the Cold War to the War on Terror when stating that ―all presidents

785 Juergensmeyer, Mark. Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2009) 10. 786 Victor Blulmer- Thomas and James Dunkerly, ed, The United States and the Latin America: The New Agenda (Harvard University, 1999) 34. 316 believed that American foreign policy, like domestic one, should be played to moral rules‘‖787. That is good vs. evil.

The War on Terror was approached from good vs. evil perspectives much like the

Cold War. The idealist rhetoric of democracy and human rights vs. totalitarianism and dictatorship has been rearticulated to rationalize the never-ending interventionist foreign policy of the U.S. President Obama‘s presidency was thought to be a departure towards a new policy based on engagement and negotiation rather than on the conflicts and military interventionist policy that characterized his predecessor President Bush. But in 2014, in his remarks at Commencement Ceremony at U.S. Military Academy-West Point, President

Obama noted that the ―United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it‖788. This traditional interventionist policy to protect U.S. interests remained consistent in Obama‘s presidency and even when his claim to move beyond his predecessor‘s policy was doomed to failure.

The United States containment policy has been and, we argue, will most likely remain the main foreign policy along with primacy as the main guiding line of policymakers in Washington. To support this claim, one can cite, contrarily to its foreign policy of retreat in other areas, the Trump administrations neo-containment policy of Iran in the Middle-East, whose strategic nature is not yet known – roll-back or regime change – marks continuity with previous post-Cold War presidents. Meanwhile he maintained a strong alliance system with the traditional allies and notably Saudi Arabia and Isreal.

Unlike Bush and Obama, President Trump expressed more explicitly the realist foreign

787 J. Philipp Rosenberg, ―Presidential beliefs and foreign policy decision-making: Continuity during the Cold War era,‖ Political psychology (1986): 733-751. 788 BarackObama, ―Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony U.S. Military Academy-West Point West Point, New York,‖ May 28, 2014 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, online, internet Sept. 10, 2019. Available: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/28/remarks-president.

317 policy agenda in the MENA which is based on U.S. interests rather than values. Balancing

GCC countries against others in addition to advocating proxy wars in Yamen and Syria and imposing more sanctions on Iran characterized President Trump first years in the White

House.

The dissertation argues that new enemies will ceaselessly be detected, if not constructed, and the containment policy and primacy as grand strategies will be re- implemented as means of reinforcing the pro-U.S. alliance system in this key are of U.S economic and geopolitical strategic interests.

318 Works cited

Books  Achar, Gilbert. The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising. University of California Press, 2013. Print

 Gillon, Steven M. The American Paradox: A History of the United States since 1945. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2003. Print.

 ---. The American Paradox: A History of the United States since 1945. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2012. Print

 Gleijeses, Piero. Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1991. Print.

 Goshgarian, G M. The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising. London: Saqi Books, 2013. Print.

 Goshgarian, G M. The People Want: A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising. London: Saqi Books, 2013. Print.

 Green, David. The Containment of Latin America: A History of the Myths and Realities of the . Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971. Print.

 Gregory, Ross. Cold War America, 1946 to 1990. New York: Info Base, 2003. Print.

 Grose, Peter. Operation Rollback. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000. Print.

 Haberski, Raymond J. God and War: American Civil Religion since 1945. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 2012. Print.

 Hagger, Nicholas. Secret American Dream: The Creation of a New World Order with the Power to Abolish War, Poverty and Disease. London: Watkins Publishing, 2011. Print.

 Haines, Gerald K and Samuel Walker. Eds,. American Foreign Relations, A Historiographical Review. Greenwood Press, 1886.Web.

 Haines and Gerald K. J. Samuel Walker.Eds, American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review. Westport: Connecticut. 1981. Print. 319  Halper, Stefan A, and Jonathan Clarke. America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Print

 Ham, Anthony. Middle East. Footscray, Vic: Lonely Planet, 2009. Print

 Hanhimäki, Jussi M. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Print.

 ---and Odd Arne. Westad. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.

 Harris, Richard A, and Daniel J. Tichenor. A History of the U.s. Political System: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2010. Print.

 Hassan, Oz. Constructing America's Freedom Agenda for the Middle East: Democracy and Domination.London: Taylor& Francis LTD , 2014. Print.

 Hixson, Walter L. George F. Kennan. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. Print.

 Hodge, Carl C and Cathal J. Nolan. U.S. Presidents and Foreign Policy: From 1789 to the Present. Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO, 2007. Web.

 n Hoga , Michael J. America in the World: The Historiography of US Foreign Relations since 1941. Cambridge University Press, 1995. Print.

 Hogan, Michael J. The End Of The Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Print.

 --- and Thomas G. Paterson. Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2004. Print.

 Holland, Matthew F. America and Egypt: From Roosevelt to Eisenhower. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1996. Print.

 Holly, Susan and David S Patterson. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952- 1954: Guatemala. Washington, DC: G.P.O., 2003. Print.

 Holmes, Dave and Norm Dixon. Behind the US War on Afghanistan. Chippendale, N.S.W.: Resistance, 2001. Print.

 Hook, Steven and John W. Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II.

Washington DC : CQ Press, 2016. Print.

320  Hunter, Allen. Rethinking the Cold War. Philadelphia: Temple UP, 1998. Print.

 Hurst, Steven US Foreign Policy: Key Perspectives. Edinburg University Press, 2005. Print

 Hyland, William G. Mortal Rivals. New York: Random House, 1987. Print.

 Immerman, Richard H. and the Diplomacy of the Cold War.

New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1992. Print.

 Inbar, Efraim. The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic and International Ramifications London: Routledge, 2014. Print.

 Jackson, Richard. Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism. Manchester University Press, 2005. Print.

 Jackson, Henry F. From The Congo to Soweto. New York: W. Morrow, 1982. Print.

 Jackson, Richard et al. Terrorism: A Critical Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print.

 James, W Fiscus and Bill Scheplern. Iraqi Insurgents: Resisting America's Nation-building in Iraq. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2005. Print.

 James, W Martin. A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990. New Brunswick, NJ, U.S.A.: Transaction, 1992. Print.

 ---. Historical Dictionary of Angola. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2011. Print.

 Jongman, Albeet J. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1988. Print.

 Joseph G. Peschek. The Politics of Empire: War, Terror and Hegemony. Florence: Taylor & Francis, 2006. Print

 Joyce, Kolko and Kolko Gabriel. The Limits of Powers: The World and United States: 1945 1954. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Print.

 Juergensmeyer, Mark. Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to Al Qaeda. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 2009. Print.

321  Kahin, Audrey and George McTurnan. Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: New, 1995. Print.

 Kalinovsky, Artemy M and Sergey Radchenko. The End of the Cold War and the Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict. London: Routledge, 2011. Print.

 Karber, Phil. Fear and Faith in Paradise: Exploring Conflict and Religion in the Middle East. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Print.

 Kennan, George F. Memoirs. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967. Print.

 ---. Realities of American Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954. Print.

 ---. Russia. The Atom and the West. New York: Harper, 1958. Print.

 Kim, Young C. Major Powers and Korea: [papers]. Silver Spring, Md: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1973. Print.

 Kolko, Gabriel. Anatomy of a War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. Print.

 ---. Confronting the Third World. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988. Print.

 Krueger, Alan B. What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism. Princeton, NJ Princeton University Press, 2018. Print.

 Kuniholm, Bruce Robellet. The Origins of The Cold War In The Near East. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980. Print.

 Lacey, Michael James. The Truman Presidency. Washington: Woodrow Wilson international Center for Scholars, 1989. Print.

 LaFeber, Walter. Inevitable Resolutions. New York: n.p., 1983. Print.

 ---. The Clash. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997. Print.

 Lake, Anthony. From Containment to Enlargement: Remarks of Anthony Lake. Washington, D.C: Executive Office of the President, 1993. Print.

 Larson, Deborah Welch. Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1989. Print.

322  Lawrence, Mark Atwood. The Vietnam War: A Concise International History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print.

 Layne, Christopher. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006. Print.

 Lee, Bong. The Unfinished War: Korea. New York: Algora Pub., 2003. Print.

 Leffler, Melvyn P. For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. New York: Hill and Wang, 2007. Print.

 ---. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1992. Print.

 --- and Odd Arne Westad. The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print.

 Lewis, Adrian R. The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom. London: Taylor & Francis, 2006. Print

 ---. The American Culture of War: A History of US Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom. London: Routledge, 2014. Web

 Lippmann, Walter. The Cold War, a Study in U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1947. Print.

 Malkasian, Carter. The Korean War. New York: Rosen Pub., 2009. Print.

 Mastny, Vojtech. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Print.

 Matza, Mitchell Newton. Disasters and Tragic Events: An Encyclopedia of Catastrophes in American History. Santa Barbra: ABC-CLIO. 2014 .Web.

 May, Ernest R. American Cold War Strategy. Boston: Bedford Books of St.Martin's Press, 1993. Print.

 Mayers, David Allan. George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford UP, 1988. Print.

 Maynard, Christopher. Out of the Shadow: George H.W. Bush and the End of the Cold War. College Station: Texas A & M UP, 2008. Print.

323  McCauley, Martin. The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949. Pearson Education, 2008. Print.

 ---. The Origins of the Cold War. London: Longman, 1983. Print.

 McMahon, Robert J. The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.

 McNeil, William Harly. America, Britain and Russia: Their Cooperation and Conflicts. NY: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970. Print.

 Mearsheimer, John J. Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics. Cary: Oxford University Press, USA, 2014. Print

 Melanson, Richard A. and David Mayers, eds. Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950s. Illinois Books Edition, 1989. Web.

 Mendler, Edward C .Policies for a President: A Manifesto for 2008 and Beyond. Xlibris Corporation, Dec 26, 2007. Print.

 Mieczkowski, Yanek. Eisenhower's Sputnik Moment: The Race for Space and World Prestige. Cornell University Press, 2016. Print.

 ---. and the Challenges of the 1970s. Lexington, KY: U of Kentucky, 2005. Print.

 Miscamble, Wilson D. George F. Kennan and the Making of American foreign policy, 1947-1950. Princeton University Press, 1993. Print.

 Mitrovich, Gregory. Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2000. Print.

 Nashel, Jonathan. ―Cold War (1945–91): Changing Interpretations.‖ The Oxford Companion to American Military History. John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed.Oxford University Press, NY, 1999. Web.

 Nissenson, Allen R. and Edgar V. Lerma. Nephrology Secrets. Philadelphia, PA : Elsevi , 2019.  Njølstad, Olav. The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict Escalation to Conflict Transformation. London: Routledge, 2004. Print.

 Nohlen, Dieter. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. New York: Oxford UP, 2005. Print.

324  Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: PublicAffairs, 2012. Print.

 Oberdorfer, Don. From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983-1991. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins UP, 1998. Print.

 Odd Arne, Westad. Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory. London: Routledge, 2013. Print

 Paine, Sidney. Common Sense (or lack of it) In The 21st Century. Lulu. com.

 Papp, Daniel S, Loch K. Johnson and John E. Endicott. American Foreign Policy: History, Politics and Policy. New York: Pearson Longman, 2005. Print.

 Paterson, Thomas G. Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1973. Print.

 ---, John Garry Clifford and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Relations: A history since 1895. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999. Print.

 Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2001. Print.

 Patti, Archimedes L. A. Why Viet Nam? Prelude to America's Albatross. Berkeley: U of California, 1982. Print.

 Peschek, Joseph G. The Politics of Empire: War, Terror and Hegemony. London: Taylor & Francis, 2006. Print.

 Pri Davis, John. The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy. London: Taylor and Francis, 2016. Print.  Qureshi, Lubna Z. Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2009. Print.

 Randall, Stephen J. United States Foreign Oil Policy Since World War I: For Profits and Security. McGill-Queen's University Press. 2005. Web.

 Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: McMillan Press, 1964. Print.

 Rosenau, William. US Internal Security Assistance to South Vietnam: Insurgency, Subversion, and Public Order. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. Print.

325  R�land, J�rgen, Theodor Hanf, and Eva Manske. U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Third World: A Post-Cold War Assessment. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006. Print.

 Samii, Kuross A. Involvement by Invitation: American Strategies of Containment in Iran. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987. Print.

 Sargent, Lyman Tower. Political Thought in the United States: A Documentary History. Press 1997. Print.

 Scheppler, Bill. Iraqi Insurgents: Resisting America's Nation-building in Iraq. New York: Rosen Pub. Group, 2005. Print.

 Schlesinger, Arthur M. The Cycles of American History. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1999. Web.

 ---. The Vital Center. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1949. Print.

 Schlesinger, Jr, Arthur M. Origins of The Cold War in Foreign Affairs. New York: Inc., 1967. Print

 Schmid, Alex Peter., A. J. Jongman, and Michael Stohl. Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature. New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK): New York Transaction, 1988. Print.

 Selim, Gamal M. The International Dimensions of Democratization in Egypt: The

Limits of Externally-Induced Change. Cham: Springer International Publishing,

2015. Print.

 Shanbreen. Connecting the Dots to the Caliphate: A Primer for the Thinking Person. P. P not identified. Strategic Book Publishing, 2017. Print.

 Shapiro, Ian. Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. Print.

 Sherry, Michael S. Preparing for the next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45. New Haven: Yale UP, 1977. Print.

 Shultz, George Pratt. Turmoil and Triumph. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993. Print.

326  Sigmund, Paul E. The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile, 1964-1976. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh, 1977. Print.

 Simons, Thomas W. The End of the Cold War. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. Print.

 Siracusa, Joseph M. New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists. Claremont, CA: Regina, 1972. Print..

 Sirimarco, Elizabeth. American Voices from The Cold War. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2005. Print.

 Smith, Gaddis. American Diplomacy during the Second World War. 1941-1945 New York: Widely, 1965. Print.

 Soto, Ayber De Jose M. Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemalan in 1954. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1978. Print.

 Spanier, John W, and Steven W Hook. American Foreign Policy Since World War II.

 Stallenhain, Petter et al,. Military Expenditure, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.

 Star, Alexander. Open Secrets: Wikileaks, War and American Diplomacy. New York, N.Y: Grove Press, 2011. Print.

 Steans et al. An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes. London Routledge, 2013. Web.

 Tellis, Ashley J. Assessing America's War on Terror: Confronting Insurgency, Cementing Primacy. Seattle, Wash: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004. Print.

 Tillema, Herbert K. Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment. New York: T.Y. Crowell, 1973. Print.

 Torricelli, Robert G and Andrew Carroll. In Our Own Words: Extraordinary Speeches of the American Century. New York: Kodansha International, 1999. Print.

327  Trager, Eric. Arab Fall: How the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017.Print.

 Trubowitz, Peter. Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998. Print.

 Tucker, Spencer Coakley. The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011. Print.

 Tunisia: Continuing Abuses in the Name of Security. London, England: Amnesty International Publications, 2009. Web.

 Wallensteen, Peter and Carina Staibano. International Sanctions: Between Wars and Words. London: Frank Cass, 2005. Print.

 Welch Larson, Deborah. Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation. Princeton University Press, 1989. Print.

 Westad, Odd Arne. Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory. London: Routledge, 2013. Web.

 Wiest, Andrew A. Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited. Oxford: Osprey, 2013. Print.

 Williams et al. International History and International Relations. London: Routledge, 2012. Print.

 Williams, William A, and Henry W. Berger. A William Appleman Williams Reader: Selections from His Major Historical Writings. Chicago, IL: I.R. Dee, Inc, 1992. Print.

 ---. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1959. Print.

 Winik, Jay. On the Brink: The Dramatic, Behind-the-scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. Print.

 Wishnick, Elizabeth. Russia, China, and the United States in Central Asia: Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009. Print.

328  Woodhouse, C M. A Short History of Modern Greece. New York: Praeger, 1968. Print.

 Wright, Robin B. The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and US Policy. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011. Print.

 Yeadon, Glen, and John Hawkins. The Nazi Hydra in America: Suppressed History of a Century, Wall Street and the Rise of the Fourth Reich. Joshua Tree, CA: Progressive, 2008. Print.

 Yergin, Daniel. Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. Print.

 Zelikow, Philip and Condoleezza Rice. Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard UP, 1996. Print.

 Zoubir, Yahia and Gregory White. North African Politics: Change and Continuity. Taylor and Francis, 2015. Print.

 Smith, Gaddis. American Diplomacy during the Second World War 1941-1945. New York : Wiley 1965. Web.

Articles/papers

 Aaon Miller, David Aaon. ―For America, an Arab Winter‖. Wilson Quarterly. 35.3 (2011): 36-42.

 Aftandilian, Gregory. ―United States Foreign Policy towards the Arab Spring, Middle East Center for Peace‖. Development and Culture University of Massachusetts Lowell (2012).

 Alonso , Nathalie. ―The Threat of Communism during the Cold War, Demand Media‖. Web.

 Anthony N, Celso. ―Obama and the Arab Spring: the Strategic Confusion of a Realist-Idealist.‖ Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs. 2.2 (2013).

 Atlas, Pierre M. ―U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab Spring: Balancing Values and Interests.‖Digest of Middle East Studies. 21.2 (2012): 353-385.

 B Rejeb, Lotfi. ―United States Policy Towards Tunisia: What New Engagement After an Expendable Friendship.‖ in Nouri Gana, The making of the

329 Tunisianrevolution: Contexts, architects, prospects. Edinburgh University Press, 2013.

 Banton, Caroline.―Path Dependency‖. Investopidia, online, internet, Feb. 20, 2019. Available: www.investopedia.com/terms/p/path-dependency.asp.

 Bunyavejchewin. ―T he Orthodox and the critical approach toward terrorism: An overview‖. Ritsumeikan Center for Asia Pacific Studies (RCAPS). Web Jan. 2, 2013.

 Chinkin, Christine and Mary Kaldor. ―Self-defence As a Justification for War: the Geo-Political and War on Terror Models.‖ Cambridge University Press (2017): 129-174. Print.

 Clark, John L. ―A summary of William Appleman Williams' The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. ‖ web. Ap 24. 2013.

 D'Agostino, J. Giorgio, Paul Dunne and Luca Pieroni. ―Does Military Spending Matter for Long-run Growth?. ‖ Defence and Peace Economics. Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28 (2017):429-436

. ―Interview with James A. Baker III: Looking Back on the Middle East.‖ Middle East Quarterly (September 1994).

 Elig�r, Banu. ―The ‗Arab Spring‘: Implications for Us-Israeli Relations.‖ Israel Affairs. 20.3 (2014): 281-301.

 Gaddis, John Lewis and Terry L. Deibel. ―The Em Ea2mFyzKerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War.‖ Diplomatic History, Vol.7, no 3 1983. Web 15 May. 2013.

 Gamal, M S. ―Egypt under SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood: the Triangle of Counter-Revolution.‖ Arab Studies Quarterly. 37.2 (2015): 177-199.

 Geoff Dyer and Hiba Saleh.―Clinton and Obama: An American Rift over an Egyptian Despot.‖ Financial Times Oct. 26, 2016. Online, internet, Oct.20, 2017. Available at www.ft.com.

 Greg Noakes. ―Heritage Foundation Conference Assesses Islamist Threat.‖ Washington Report on the Middle East (Sept-Oct 1994): 21-43-44.

330  Gregory Aftandilian. ―United States Policy Towards the Arab Middle East. ‖ Center for Peace, Development and Culture (University of Massachusetts Lowell, 2012)

 Gresh, Alian. ―Barack Obama, ‗lackey‘ of Egypt‘s Muslim Brotherhood.‖ Orient XXI (Sept. 13,2018) Online, internet, Mar, 27, 2019. Available: https://orientxxi.info/magazine/barack-obama-lackey-of-egypt-s-muslim- brotherhood,2623.

 Gudrun Krämer. ―Liberalization and Democracy in the Arab World.‖ Middle East. Research (January-Feb.1992).

 Heo, Uk. ―The Relationship between Defense Spending and Economic Growth in the United States.‖ Political Research Quarterly. 63.4 (2010):760. Print

 ―Hillary Clinton Doctrine‖, Foreign Policy FP, Nov. 10, 2015, online, internet, Jan. 10, 2019. Available at: www.foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/06/hillary-clinton- doctrine-obama-interventionist-tough-minded-president/.

 Hounshell, Blake. ―Biden on Mubarak: ‗I would not refer to him as a dictator.‖ Foreign Policy (Jan. 28, 2011) online internet Oct. 20, 2017. Available: https://foreignpolicy.com

 I.A Gwin. ―Toward a Critical Historiography‖. Diss, U of Birmingham, 2009.

 Ikenberry, G John. ―Power and Liberal Order: America's Postwar World Order in Transition.‖ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. 5.2 (2005): 133-152.

 Ikenberry, G John. ―Power and Liberal Order: America's Postwar World Order in Transition.‖ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. 5.2 (2005): 133-152. Print.

 Inderjeet Parmar. ―Plus ça Change? American Foreign Policy Under Obama.‖ Political Insight, 1/1 (April 2010): 15.

 Indyk, Martin. ―Assessing Obama‘s Middle East Policies.‖ Brookings (Nov. 21, 2011) Available: www.brookings.edu.

 James M. Goldgeier. ―The Fall of the Wall and American Grand Strategy.‖ Council on Foreign Relation‖ Council on Foreign Relation, (Nov. 2009) Web 15 Dec.2014

 John Hudson. ―Obama Administration Won‘t Call Egypt‘s Coup a Coup. ‖ Foreign Policy. July 8, 2013, Online, internet (Aug. 19, 2018) Available at

331 https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/07/08/obama-administration-wont-call-egypts- coup-a-coup/

 John P Entelis. ―Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non-Violent Dimension. ‖ in John P Entelis, ed Islam Democary and the State in North Africa. Indiana University Press, 1997.

 Joshen Rogin. ―Clinton Waives restrictions on U.S aids to Egypt.‖ Foreign Policy (March 22, 2012) Web.

 Jowitt, Ken. ―Rage, Hubris, and Regime Change - the Urge to Speed History Along.‖ Policy Review (2003) Print.

 Juan Cole and Amy Frykhom. ―Obama and the Arab Spring.‖ The Christian Century (June 7, 2011) Web.

 Julian, Pecquet. ―Congress blocked Kerry from offering more aid to Egypt.‖ The Hill (March 3, 2013) web.

 Kahl, Colin H and Marc Lynch. ―U.S Strategy After the Arab Uprisings: Toward Progressive Engagement‖. The Washington Quarterly. 36.2 (2013): 39-60.

 Kiras, James D. ―Terrorism and Globalization.‖ The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. J.Baylis, Smith and P Owens. Eds. Oxford University Press, 2008. Web.

 Lake, Anthony. ― From Containment to Enlargement: Remarks of Anthony Lake.‖ Washington, D.C: Executive Office of the President (1993) Print.

 Harper, Lecture. ―American Foreign Policy.‖ School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University (20 Oct. 2010) Bologna Campus.

 Lee, Heojeong. ―The Bush Doctrine: a Critical Appraisal.‖ The Korean Journal of International Studies. (2003). Print.

 Lee, James. ―Economic Aid and the Strategy of Containment.‖ International Political Economy Society (Nov. 2017) Web.

 Leffler, Melvyn P. ―The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48.‖ The American Historical Review (1984): 346-381.

332  Lloyd C., Gardner and Thomas J. McCormickan. ―Walter La Feber: the Making of a Wisconsin School Revisionist.‖ Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 5 ‗Nov. 2004. Print.

 L�fflmann, Georg. ―The Pivot between Containment, Engagement, and Restraint: President Obama‘s Conflicted Grand Strategy in Asia.‖ Asian Security. 12.2 (2016): 92-110.

 Fam, Mariam and Abdel Latif Wahba. ―Egypt Postpones Elections, Purges Police Following Protests.‖ Bloomberg ( July 13, 2011) Web

 Matray, James I. ―Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea.‖ The Journal of American History 66.2 (1979): 314. Web.

 Miller, Aaron David. ―For America, an Arab Winter‖. Wilson Quarterly. 35.3 (2011): 36-42.

 Souaiaia, Ahmed E and Sarah R. Louden.―Political Islamism in Tunisia: A History of Repression and a Complex Forum for Potential Change.‖ Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Multidisciplinary Studies: Mathal. 4 (2015).

 Murphy, Dan. ―Joe Biden says Egypt's Mubarak no dictator, he shouldn't step down.‖The Christian Society Monitor (Jan. 2011) Web.

 N, Celso Anthony. ―Obama and the Arab Spring: the Strategic Confusion of a Realist-Idealist.‖ Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs. 2.2 (2013). Print.

 Noakes, Greg. ―Heritage Foundation Conference Assesses Islamist Threat.‖ Washington Report on the Middle East Sept/oct 1994):21-43-44.

 Painter, David S. ―Explaining US Relations with the Third World.‖Diplomatic History 19.3 (1995): 525-548.

 Pash, Sidney. ―Containment, Rollback, and the Onset of the Pacific War, 1933– 1941.‖ The United States and the Second World War (2010): 38-61.

 Pompeo, Michael R. ―Confronting Iran: The Trump Administration‘s Strategy.‖ Foreign Affairs (Nov/Dec. 2018).

 Porter, Patrick. ―Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment.‖ International Security. 42.4.

333  Rosenberg, Emily S. ―Commentary: The Cold War and the Discourse of National Security.‖ Diplomatic History Vol.17, no 2, (1993): 283. Web.

 Rosenberg, J. Philipp. ―Presidential beliefs and foreign policy decision-making: Continuity during the Cold War era.‖ Political psychology (1986): 733-751.

 Sarigil, Zeki. ―Showing the path to path dependence,‖ European Political Science Review, Vol.7, No.2 (2015): 221-242. Print.

 Schoon, Simon. ―Cold War Containment: the Role of the Military.”E-international Relations Student (26 July 2011) Web.

 Shamoo ,Adil E and Bonnie Bricker, ―No Moral Consistency in Obama‘s Middle East Policy.‖ Foreign Policy In Focus (April 8, 2011) Web.

 Shughart, William F. ―An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000. ‖ The Political Economy of Terrorism (Jul.2006) Web.

 Simon School. ―Cold War Containment: the Role of the Military.‖ E-International Relations Studies (July 26 2011) Web.

 Smith, Joseph. ―Origins and Ending: The Historical Debate.‖ Global Dialogue 3.4 (2001) Web.

 Sniegoski, Stephen J. ―September 11 And The Origins Of The ‗War On Terrorism‘: A Revisionist Account.‖ Information Cleaning House (22 Mar. 2002) Web.

 Souaiaia, Ahmed E, and Sarah R. Louden. ―Political Islamism in Tunisia: A History of Repression and a Complex Forum for Potential Change.‖ Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Multidisciplinary Studies: Mathal. 4 (2015).

 Stein, Aaron. ―A U.S. Containment Strategy for Syria: To Beat the Russians, Let Them Win.‖ Foreign Policy (March, 2018).

 Tau, Byron. ―White House congratulates Egypt's Morsi.‖ Politico (Jun 24, 2012) Web.

 Toaldo, Mattia. ―The Reagan Administration and the Origins of the War on Terror: Lebanon and Libya as Case Studies.‖ New Middle Eastern Studies, 2 (2012). Web.

334  Whitaker, Beth E. ―Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the 'war on Terror' in the Third World.‖ Third World Quarterly 28.5 (2007): 1017-1032.

 Whitaker, Beth E. "Exporting the Patriot Act? Democracy and the 'war on Terror' in the Third World." Third World Quarterly. 28.5 (2007): 1017-1032.

 Zeidan, S. ―Desperately Seeking Definition: the International Community's Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism.‖ Cornell International Law Journal. 36.3 (2004): 491-496.

 ―Civil War and Its Legacy.‖ Britannica. 15th ed. 2005. Web

 ―Identifying The Specter Of Terrorism‖, Cornell International Law Journal. Issue 3. 2001 Vol.3 . Web.

 ―Iraq‘s oil production has nearly doubled over the past decade,‖ U.S. Energy Information Administration (January,11,2019) Web.

 ―Readout of the President‘s Call with President-Elect Morsi of Egypt,‖ The White House ( June 24, 2012) Web.

 ―The Dynamics of Democracy in the Middle East.‖ Economist Intelligence Unit (March 2005).

 ―Tunisian Muslim Brotherhood Leader Meets With US State Department.‖ The Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch ( April 13, 2015) Web.

 X, . The Sources of Soviet Conduct. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1947. Print.

Speeches

 Barack Obama, ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa,‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary, May 19, 2011. Online, internet June, 20,2016. Available at: www. obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/

 ---, ―Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony U.S. Military Academy-West Point West Point, New York,‖ May 28, 2014 The White House

 ---, ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa‖, May 19, 2011

335  ---. Remarks by the President on a New Beginning. Washington, DC: The White House, 2009. Internet resource.

 Bush, George W, ―Address to the United Nations General Assembly President‖ September 21, 1992, U.S Department of State Diplomatic in Action. Web

 ---. ―Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States‖, George W. Bush: 2002. Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 2004. Print.

 ---. ― Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States‖: George W. Bush: 2001-2009. Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2003, Print.

 ---. ―Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people." Harv. JL & Pub. Pol'y 25 (2001): xviii.

 ---. ―George Walker Bush to a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001.‖ Web 8 Dec. 2012

o ---. ―Remarks at United Nations General Assembly in New York.‖ New York, September 12 (2002): 20020912-1.

 Bush, George W. President George W. Bush State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002. , 2002.

 ---. ―Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States‖, George W. Bush: 2002. Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 2004. Print.

 ---. Speaking of Freedom: ―The Collected Speeches‖. New York: Scribner, 2009. Print.

 ---. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, George Bush: 1989-. Washington, D.C: U.S. G.P.O, 1990. Print

 Clinton, Bill. ― Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States‖, William J. Clinton. Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 1994.

 Clinton, Hilary. ―Keynote Address at the National Democratic Institute's 2011 Democracy Awards Dinner, Nov. 7, 2011 ‖ U.S. Department of State, Archived Content. 2011) Web.

336  Rice, Condoleezza. ―Remarks at the American University in Cairo.‖Cairo, Egypt June 20, 2005. US State of Department Archive. Web.

 Eisenhower, Dwight D. ―First Inaugural Address.‖ January 20, 1953. Washington Dc. Web

 ---. Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1957. Washington D.C.

 ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa.‖ (2013).

 Kennedy, John. F. ―First inaugural address.‖ John F. Kennedy, Transcript of Official (196. 3)

 ---. ―Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961.‖ Yale Law School Website. Web.

 Obama, Barack. ―Remarks by the President at Cairo University‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary. 4 June 2009. Web.

 ---. ―Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States‖, Government Printing Office. Web

 ---. ―Remarks by the President at Cairo University, 6-04-09.‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary (June 04, 2009) Web.

 ---. ―Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa.‖ The White House Press Office May 19. 2011. Web.

 ---. ―Statement by President Barack Obama on Egypt,‖ The White House Office of the Press Secretary July 3, 2013. Web.

 ---. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Barack Obama. 2011. Book 1 (Washington, D.C: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, 2014) 56.

 ---. Remarks by the President on a New Beginning. Washington, DC: The White House, 2009. Web.

 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Government Printing Office. Web

 Rice, Condoleezza. ―Remarks at the American University in Cairo. ―June 20, 2005. US State of Department Archive. Online, internet May 10, 2019. Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm

337  Truman, Harry S. ―Address before a joint session of congress.‖ March 12 (1947).

 Woolley, John T. and Gerhard Peters. ―The American presidency project.‖Santa Barbara, CA. Available from World Wide Web: http://www. Presidency.ucsb. edu/ws (2008)

Congressional records

 ―Granger Holds Cash Transfer to Egypt.‖ Press Release of U.S. Congress woman Kay Granger, 12th District of Texas, Sept 28, 2012, Online, internet Feb 20, 2016. Available at: https://kaygranger.house.gov/press-release/granger-holds-cash- transfer-egypt.

 Overview of U.S. Economic Assistance to Tunisia. Fact Sheet Office of the Spokesperson Washington, DC Archived Content, Feb. 25, 2012. Available: https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184649.htm.

 U.S. Policy toward the Persian Gulf, National Security Directive 26, The White House Washington, Oct. 2, 1989. Online, internet Nov.10, 2019. Available: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd26.pdf

 Arieff, Alexis and Carla E. Humud. ―Political Transition in Tunisia‖. Congressional Research Service, 2014. Available: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/

 W Bush, George ―Beyond containment: a new basis for U.S.-Soviet Union Relation. ‖ American Foreign Policy Current Documents. U.S. Department of State, 1990.

 Jeremy, M. Sharp, ―Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations.‖ Congressional Research Service February 8, 2012. Online, internet June, 20, 2016. Available: https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f842ccb2.pdf.

 Jones, Elizabeth. ―Next Steps on Egypt Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, October 29, 2013. Washington, G.P.O, 2014. Print.

 Popular Uprising in the Middle East: The Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 17, 2011. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2011. Print.

338  State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2012: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 2011. Print.

 U.S. Interests In and Policies Towards the Persian Gulf, 1980: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Second Session, March 24 ; April 2 ; May 5 ; July 1,28 ; and September 3, 1980. Washington: U.S. G.P.O, 1980. Print.

Press

 David E Sanger. ―As Mubarak Digs In, U.S. Policy in Egypt Is Complicated. ‖ The New York Times February 5, 201. Online, internet Aug.25, 2014.Aavailable: http://www.nytimes.com

 ―Army Council: Egypt is committed to all treaties,‖ BBC News Feb, 12, 2011. Online, internet Dec 02, 2017. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-12440138.

 ―Clinton supports ‗full transition‘ in Egypt.‖ Al-Jazeera July 14, 2012. Online, internet, May 16, 2018.

Available: www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/201271

 ―Clinton supports ‗full transition‘ in Egypt,‖ Al-Jazeera July 15, 2012. Online, internet Dec 11, 2018.

 Available:https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/07/20127148304248 811.htm1.

 ―Defense Minister Barak‘s discussions in Egypt focus on Shalit, Tahdiya, Anti- smuggling and Iran, 2008 August 29,‖ The Telegraph Feb 7, 2011. Available: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/egypt-wikileaks- cables/8309338.

 ―Deputy Secretary Antony Blinken Press Statement at U.S. Embassy Tunis.‖ Tunis April 10, 2015. Online, internet Nov 23, 2018 Available: https://tn.usembassy.gov/.

339  ―Egypt PM decries Israeli 'aggression' on Gaza.‖ Aljazeera Nov. 16, 2012. Online, internet Mar. 2, 2013. Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/201211166273719642.html

 ―Egypt supreme court calls for parliament to be dissolved.‖ BBC News 14 June 2012. Online, internet Nov 26, 2017.Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18439530.

 ―Egypt‘s Brotherhood Warns US over aid cut-off,‖ Aljazeera Feb16, 2012 online internet Oct.26, 2018.Available: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/2012216192619753593.htm l.

 ―Egypt's Mursi says Cairo ‗will not leave Gaza on its own‘.‖ Reuters Nov 16, 2012,online, internet Mar. 2 2013. Available at:

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-mursi/egypts-mursi-says- cairo-will-not-leave-gaza-on- its-own.

 ―Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood 'disappointed' by John Kerry's remarks.‖ The Guardian Aug. 2, 2013. Online, internet Aug. 19, 2018. Available: https://www.theguardian.com.

 ―Final Tunisian election results announced.‖ Aljazeera Nov. 14, 2011. Online internet Ap. 17, 2019. Available:

www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/20111114171420907168.html.

 ―Hillary Clinton arrives in Tunisia.‖ Al Jazeera Mar. 17, 2011. Online, internet Jan. 17, 2015. Available: www.aljazeera.com/new.

 ―Hillary Clinton meets Egypt leader Mohammed Mursi,‖ BBC News 14 July 2012. online, internet Dec, 10, 2018. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world- middle-east-18840168.

 ―Israel welcomes Egyptian treaty announcement.‖ Reuters Feb. 12, 2011. Online, internet Dec 5, 2017. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt- israel-netanyahu/israel-welcomes-egyptian-treaty.

 ―Obama pledges support for 'inspiring' Tunisia.” Aljazeera October 8, 2011, Online, internet May 6, 2016. Available:

340 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2011/10/2011107231659304991.html.

 ―Remarks on 'Zionists' taken out of context: Mursi.‖ Arab News Jan. 16, 2013. Online, internet Oct 25, 2018. Available: /https://www.arabnews.com/remarks-zionists-taken-out-context-mursi.

 Falk, Richard. ―Ben Ali Tunisia was model US client.‖ Aljazeera English Jan. 25, 2011. Online, internet Mar. 20, 2019. Available: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/01/201112314530411972.html.

 ―Final Tunisian election results announced,‖ Aljazeera Nov. 14, 2011 Web.

 ―US embassy cables: Egypt's choice not just between Islam and dictatorship, says US. ‖ The Guardian, Feb. 7, 2011. Online, internet Dec. 2, 2018. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/51001.

 ―US embassy cables: Egypt's strategic importance to the US.‖ The Guardian, Jan.28, 2011. Online, internet Dec 2, 2018. Available: www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables -documents/199866.

 Bull, Alister. ―Obama hails Tunisia as ‗inspiration‘ of Arab Spring. ‖ Reuters October 7, 2011. Online, internet May 6, 2016. Available: www.reuters.com

 Amara, Tarak.‖U.S. to triple its military aid to Tunisia.‖ Reutres April 10, 2015. Online, internet Oct 20, 2018. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us- tunisia-us/u-s- to-triple-military-aid-to-tunisia.

 Shadid, Anthony and David Kirkpatrick Activists in Arab World Vie to Define Islamic State New York Times Sept. 29, 2011.

 Anton, La Guardia. ―Israel and Palestine, "The Economist May 14, 2016.

 Arney, George. ―US 'planned attack on Taleban‘.‖ BBC News 18 Sept. 2011. Online, internet 20 Dec. 2016. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1550366.stm.

 Clark, Wesley. ―Why US Shouldn‘t Rush to War in Syria‖. CNN Mar. 9, 2012. Online, internet Apr. 02, 2018. Available: https://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/08/opinion/clark-syria-intervention/index.html

 ―Clinton 'deeply inspired' by Egyptian change.‖ CNN March 15, 2011. Online, internet Jan. 17, 2015.Available:

341 http://edition.cnn.com/2011/US/03/15/clinton.egypt.change/index.html.

 Cornwell, Susan. ―Lawmakers fret about Islamist rise in Egypt.‖ Reuters, Feb. 11, 2011. Online, internet Nov. 5, 2017. Available: www.reuters.com .

 Kirkpatrick, David D. and Steven Lee Myers. ―Overtures to Egypt‘s Islamists Reverse Longtime U.S. Policy.‖ The New York Times Jan. 3, 2012. Online, internet Mar. 28,2018. Available: www.nytimes.com/2012/01/

 ---. ―Egypt‘s New Leader Spells Out Terms for U.S.-Arab Ties.‖. New York Times Sept. 22, 2012. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/23/world/middleeast/egyptian-leader- mohamed-morsi-spells-out-terms.

 Usborne, David. ―U.S. Military Aid to Egypt suspended after Morsi Overthreow.‖ Independent Oct. 9, 2013. Online, internet. Available: www.independent.co.uk

 Jackson, Diehl. ―Obama lagging on the Arab Spring.‖ The Washington Post Dec. 11, 2011. Available: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/obama-lagging- on-the-arab-spring/2011/12/08/gIQApQzCoO_story.html.

 Fisk, Robert. ―The brutal truth about Tunisia.‖ Independent Jan. 17, 2011. Pnline, internet, Dec. 12, 2017. Available: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/the-brutal-truth-about- tunisia.

 Ghribi, Asma. ―Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas Leader Warmly Greeted in Tunis.‖ Tunisialive. Jan. 2012. Online, internet Mar. 2, 2013. Available: https://tn- news.com/v4_portal/article/view/802383?page=5.

 Gordon, Michael R and Kareem Fahim. ―Kerry Says Egypt‘s Military Was ‗Restoring Democracy‘ in Ousting Morsi.‖ New York Times Aug. 1,2013. Online, internet Mar. 28, 2018. Available: www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/.

 Clinton, Hillary. ―Interview with Taher Barake of Al Arabiya.‖ US Department of State archived Content. Dubai UAE, January 11, 2011. Available: https://2009- 2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton.

342  Josh Rogin, Josh. ―Kerry‘s Secret Gift to Egypt.‖ Daily Beast Jun. 6, 2013. Online, internet, Feb 20, 2016. Available: https://www.thedailybeast.com/kerrys- secret-gift-to-egypt.

 Fahim, Kareem. ―Egypt General Has Country Wondering About Aims.‖ The New York Times Aug. 2, 2013, online, internet Dec 25, 2018. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/03/world/middleeast/egypts-general-sisi.html.

 Kirkpatrick, David D. ―Islamists Win 70% of Seats in the Egyptian Parliament‖. The New York Times, Jan. 21, 2012. Online, internet, Sept 13, 2016. Available: www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/.

 Lizza, Ryan. ―The Consequentialist: How the Arab Spring Remade Obama‘s Foreign Policy.‖ The New Yorker May 2, 2011. Online, internet, Oct.25, 2017. Available http://www.newyorker.com/.

 Mungin, Lateef. ―Amnesty: Egypt far from justice over unrest that killed more than 800.‖ CNN May 19, 2011. Online, internet June 5, 2018. Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/world.

 Myers, Steven Lee. ―White House Move to Give Egypt $450 Millions in Aid Meets.‖ The New York Times Sep. 29, 2012. Online, internet, May 16, 2018. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/middleeast/white- house-move-to-give-egypt.

 Pfeiffer, Tom. ―Egypt foreign reserves see first gain since 2010.‖ Reuters May 6, 2012, online, internet Mar. 22, 2017. Available: www.reuters.com

 Robert Kubinec. ―How Foreign Aid could hurt Tunisia's Transition to Democracy.‖ Washington Post Dec. 19, 2016, online, internet Nov 22, 2018. Available: www.waghingtonpost.com .

 Shehata, Said. ―Profile: Egypt‘s Free Egyptians Party,‖ BBC News Nov.25, 2011. Online, internet Sept. 13, 2016. Available: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15899997

 Sheridan, Mary Beth and Joby Warrick. ―Mubarak resignation throws into question U.S Egyptian counterterrorism work.‖ The Washington Post February 13, 2011. Available : www.washingtonpost.com/national/joint-counterterrorism- efforts-could-face-public-opposition/2011/02/12/ABu2.

343  Small teacher, Richard. ―Egypt-U.S. intelligence collaboration with Omar Suleiman ‗most successful‘.‖ WikiLeaks Feb.1, 2011. Online, internet Nov 16, 2018. Available : http://wikileaks.softalogic.nl/U-S-intelligence- collaboration.html.

 Strobel, Warren P. ―Hamas landslide shocks U.S and creates problems for Bush.” Philly.com Jan.27, 2006. Online, internet, June 5, 2019. Available: http://articles.philly.com/2006-01 27/news.

 Thatcher, Margret. ―Islamism the New Bolshevism.‖ The Guardian Feb. 12, 2002 online internet Nov 16, 2017. Available: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/feb/12/afghanistan.politics.

 Zacharia, Janine. ―Israel's Netanyahu welcomes Egyptian Military's Pledge to Honor Peace Accord.‖ Washington Post Feb. 12, 201, online, internet Nov. 30, 2017. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com.

344 Annex

Maps and Figures

Figure 2: Map of the Greater Middle East

345

Figure 3: Countries scaled to the economic aid they receive from the United States

346

Figure 4: U.S. Defense Spendong from the Cold War to the Arab Spring (1947- 2020)

Figure 5: Foreign Aid: Miliray and economic Aid from 1962 to 2020

347

Figure 6: OPEC proven crude reserve by the end of 214 (Billion Barrrels) the MENA share

348

Figure 7: U.S. military expenditure from the War on Terror to the Arab Uprisinhs ( 2001-2014)

349

Figure 8: Miliray expenditure as a Percentage of GDP from 1941 to 2011

Figure 9: U.S. military spending Percent of the World

350