KISSINGER AND BRZEZINSKI Also by Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos WES1ERN EUROPE IN KISSINGER 'S GLOBAL STRA1EGY Kissinger and Brzezinski The NSC and the Struggle for Control of US National Security Policy

Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos

Palgrave Macmillan ISBN 978-1-349-21743-4 ISBN 978-1-349-21741-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-21741-0

© Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos 1991 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1991 All rights reserved. For information, write: Scholarly and Reference Division, St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 First published in the United States of America in 1991 ISBN 978-0-312-05743-5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Andrianopoulos, Gerry Argyris, 1954- Kissinger and Brzezinski : the NSC and the struggle for the control of US national security policy / Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-312-05743-5 1. United States-Foreign relations-1969-1974. 2. United States­ Foreign relations-1974-1977. 3. United States-Foreign relations-1977-1981. 4. Kissinger, Henry, 1923- -Philosophy. 5. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 1928- -Philosophy. 6. National Security Council (U.S.). 7. United States-National security. I. Title. E855.A85 1991 327.73-dc20 90-9133 CIP To Marti Contents

Preface x Acknowledgements xi

Glossary Xlll

1 Introduction 1 Overview 1 Why Kissinger and Brzezinski? 4 Sources for the Study 9 Limitations of the Study 10 Organization of Chapters 11

2 The Philosophical Beliefs of Henry Kissinger 13 Introduction: The Content of Philosophical Beliefs 13 The Nature of Politics 13 Image of Adversaries: The USSR and the PRC 17 Image of Alliances 21 Image of the New States 25 Eventual Realization of Fundamental Political Values: OptimismjPessimism 28 Predictability of the Political Future 30 Control of Historical Development 32 Chance (and Tragedy) in Human Affairs 34 Conclusion 35

3 The Philosophical Beliefs of Zbigniew Brzezinski 38 Introduction: The Content of Philosophical Beliefs 38 The Nature of Politics 39 Image of Adversaries: The USSR and the PRC 43 Image of Alliances 55 Image of the New States 61 Eventual Realization of Fundamental Political Values: OptimismjPessimism 64 Predictability of the Political Future 66 Control of Historical Development 69

vii viii Contents

Chance (and Tragedy) in Human Affairs 71 Conclusion 72

4 The Instrumental Beliefs of Henry Kissinger 76 Introduction: Notions of Correct Strategy and Tactics 76 Best Approach for Selecting Goals for Political Action 76 Most Effective Pursuit of Goals 81 Calculation, Control, and Acceptance of Risks 85 The Best" Timing" of Action 89 Utility of Different Means for Advancing One's Interests 90 Conclusion 97

5 The Instrumental Beliefs of Zbigniew Brzezinski 100 Introduction: Notions of Correct Strategy and Tactics 100 Best Approach for Selecting Goals for Political Action 101 Most Effective Pursuit of Goals 106 Calculation, Control, and Acceptance of Risks 112 The Best" Timing" of Action 113 Utility of Different Means for Advancing One's Interests 115 Conclusion 119

6 Kissinger Organizing Power for Decision-Making 122 Nixon/Ford and Kissinger: A Shared Perspective 122 The Question of Roles: The Adviser and the Secretaries of State and Defense 125 The National Security Council System 127 Informal Structures: The "Backchannel" System 130 Conclusion 131

7 Brzezinski Organizing Power for Decision-Making 133 Carter and Brzezinski: A Shared Perspective 133 The Question of Roles: The Adviser and the Secretaries of State and Defense 138 The National Security Council System 139 Informal Structures: "Friday Presidential Breakfast" and the "V-B-B" 143 Conclusion 144 Contents IX

8 Kissinger and the Adversaries: The USSR and the PRC 147 The Need for Strategy 147 A Triangular Balance: The Opening to the PRC 150 US-Soviet Relations: From Confrontation to Detente 155 Force and Diplomacy: Detente Tested 170 Conclusion 174

9 Brzezinski and the Adversaries: The USSR and the PRC 178 The Need for Architecture 178 US-Soviet Relations: From Detente to Contestation 182 Force and Diplomacy: Detente Tested 194 A Triangular Balance: Normalization of US-PRC Relations 201 Conclusion 212

10 Kissinger and the Allies: Seeking a Common Policy 215 The Nixon Doctrine: Genuine Partners hip 215 The Dilemmas of Common Defense: Maintaining the Power Equilibrium 218 European Unity: Paying the Economic Price for It 227 "Selective Detente": Ostpolitik, Berlin, and the CSCE 232 The Year of Europe: Secking AtIantic Unity 240 Conclusion 245

11 Brzezinski and Alliances: Trilateral Cooperation 248 Introduction: The Challenge of Collective Leadership 248 The Need for Architecture 248 The Common Defense: The European Military Balance 250 The Threat of Selective Detente: Afghanistan and Poland 260 Conclusion 271

12 Conclusions 274

Notes 286 Select Bibliography 360 Primary Sources 360 Secondary Sources 366 Index 376 Preface

This study examines the impact of Kissinger's and Brzezinski's beliefs on US national security policy by comparing their views on world politics and strategy and tactics for achieving national goals, and then analyzing the consistency of those beliefs with their recommendations and/or actions while serving as National Security Advisers. They were selected for this study because: (a) a major purpose of their academic writings was to influence policy; and (b) they were appointed by Nixon and Carter, respectively, on the basis of policy beliefs shared with the two presi­ dents. Despite apparent divergences, this study found that Kissinger and Brzezinski both believed that the greatest threat to peace is Moscow' sand Peking's commitment to world-wide communist expansion, that divergent national interests undermine cooperation even among allies, and that the exploitation of Third World conflicts by Moscow and Peking would eventually undermine peace. They also believed that, within limits, man can shape history. For them, national goals should be selected on the basis of power-realist, non-ideological, and strategic approaches, and could be effectively pursued through power, leadership, the linkage of issues, the use of force and diplomacy, and the rapid application of power in the protracted conflict with the East. However, they disagreed about the neces­ sity of injecting morality into policymaking and had different conceptions of leadership. This study found that, while in office, Kissinger's and Brzezinski's recommendations and/or actions were especially consistent with their beliefs about Moscow's and Peking's negative impact on global stability and their conceptions of power, diplomacy, linkage, and leader­ ship. Indeed, those conceptions were clearly evident in their organization of the National Security Council system and more informal policymaking structures and their handling of relations with allies, the USSR, and the PRC. Moreover, since leaving office they have been making proposals consistent with their beliefs. The fact that the consistency is encountered repeatedly in a sequence of interrelated recommendations and/or actions by Kissinger and Brzezinski while in and out of office, permits the conclusion that their policymaking behavior was, indeed, strongly influenced by their conceptions and beliefs.

x Acknowledgments

The author and publisher wish to acknowledge with thanks the following text sources and to state that in any case where they may have failed they will be pleased to make the necessary arrangements at the first opportunity. I am indebted to several individuals and organizations who were particu­ larly helpful in the preparation of this study. For their patience in reading through the entire manuscript I am most grateful to Professors Burton M. Sapin, William H. Lewis, Michael J. Sodaro, Linda P. Brady, Charles F. Elliott, and Carl A. Linden. Their help was of great value in many ways, from reassuring me that what began to appear patently persuasive had not been said before, to offering incisive critiques that led to my rethinking some basic concepts and arguments. I am also indebted to the Department of Political Science, its chairman, Professor Bemard Reich, and its former chairman, Hugh L. LeBlanc, and to The Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, its acting director, Carl A. Linden, and former director, Gaston J. Sigur. My wife, Martha L. Melzow, was a source of unwavering encour­ agement and support. My friend, Thanos Tsimberdonis, facilitated its completion by teaching me the latest computer research skills. Dr Susan K. Mahoney and Philip Valahu assisted with the editing of the manuscript. Ms Wendy Kolker of the Department of Political Science, Ms Suzanne Stephenson of The Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, and Ms Kay K. Beach of the Computer Information and Resource Center provided their administrative assistance. Finally, I owe a very special debt to my parents Sotirios and Katina, to my uncle Kimon, to my si ster Dimitra, to my brothers Lambros and George, and to the younger members of my family Peter and Tiffany. Their understanding, assistance, and patience made this study possible. Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made to Dr. Henry A. Kissinger for the use of quotations from the following works: "The Meaning of History" (Henry A. Kissinger undergraduate thesis (Copyright © 1990 Henry A. Kissinger); A World Restored (Copyright © 1964 Henry A. Kissinger); "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck", Daedalus, Sum­ mer 1968 (Copyright © 1968 Henry A. Kissinger); Nuclear ·Weapons and Foreign Policy (Copyright © 1957 Henry A. Kissinger); American Foreign Policy (Copyright © 1969 Henry A. Kissinger); The Necessity Jor

xi xü Acknowledgments

Choice (Copyright © 1961 Henry A. Kissinger); The Troubled Partnership (Copyright © 1965 Henry A. Kissinger); White House Years (Copyright © 1979 Henry A. Kissinger); Years 0/ Upheaval (Copyright © 1982 Henry A. Kissinger); For the Record (Copyright © 1981 Henry A. Kissinger); Observations (Copyright © 1985 Henry A. Kissinger); Newsweek, March 2, 1987, "How to Deal with Gorbachev" (Copyright © 1987 Henry A. Kissinger); Ibid., December 21, 1990, "The Dangers Ahead" (Copyright © 1990 Henry A. Kissinger); The Washington Post, January 19, 1988, "Arms Control Fever" (Copyright © 1988 Henry A. Kissinger); Ibid., February 7, 1989 "Dealing with Moscow: A New Balance" (Copyright © 1989 Henry A. Kissinger). I would also like to express grateful acknowledgment for permission to quote from Power and Principle by Zbigniew Brzezinski (Copyright © 1983, 1985 by Zbigniew Brzezinski), reprinted by permission of Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Inc.; Praeger Publishers for Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics; Foreign Policy for "America in a Hostile World", "Recognizing the Crisis", and "The Deceptive Structure of Peace"; the Council on Foreign Relations for Alternative to Partition; Foreign Affairs for "US Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus"; Viking Penguin Inc. for Between Two Ages.

GERRY A. ANDRIANOPOULOS Glossary

ABM Anti-ballistic missile APNW Agreement on Prevention of Nuc1ear War CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CEMA Council of Economic Mutual Assistance CIA Central Intelligence Agency COCOM Co-ordinating Committee on Export Controls DEFCON Defense Condition DPRC Defence Program Review Committee EAG Energy Action Group EDIP European Defence Improvement Program EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association ERW Enhanced Radiation Weapon FBS Forward Based Systems FRG Federal Republic of Germany GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile GDR German Democratic Republic IG Interdepartmental Group ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile INF Intermediate Nuc1ear Forces JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff LTDP Lang-term Defense Program MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions MIR V Multiple Independently Re-entry Vehic1es NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEP New Economic Policy NPG Nuc1ear Planning Group (NATO) NSC National Security Council NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum NSSM National Security Study Memorandum PD Presidential Directive RDF Rapid Deployment Force PRM Presidential Review Memorandum PRC Peoples Republic of China

xiii xiv Glossary

SALT Strategie Arms Limitation Talks SCC Special Coordination Committee sm Strategie Defense Initiative SLBM Submarine Launehed Ballistie Missile SRG Senior Review Group START Strategie Arms Reduetion Talks lNF Theater Nuclear Force USC Under Secretaries Committee V-B-B Vanee-Brown-Brzezinski luncheon VSSG Vietnam Special Studies Group WSAG Washington Special Aetions Group WTO Warsaw Paet Treaty Organization