Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East an Analysis of Public Perceptions from 2002-2011

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Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East an Analysis of Public Perceptions from 2002-2011 Wright State University CORE Scholar Browse all Theses and Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2012 Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East An Analysis of Public Perceptions from 2002-2011 Joshua I. Cummins Wright State University Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all Part of the International Relations Commons Repository Citation Cummins, Joshua I., "Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East An Analysis of Public Perceptions from 2002-2011" (2012). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 699. https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/699 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HEARTS AND MINDS: US FOREIGN POLICY AND ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS FROM 2002-2011 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts By JOSHUA ISAAC CUMMINS B.A. History, Wright State University, 2010 2012 Wright State University WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES December 4, 2012 I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Joshua Cummins ENTITLED Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts. ______________________________ Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Thesis Director ______________________________ Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D. Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics Committee on Final Examination: ___________________________________ Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. Department of Political Science ___________________________________ Donna Schlagheck, Ph.D. Department of Political Science ___________________________________ Awad Halabi, Ph.D. Department of History ______________________________ Andrew T. Hsu, Ph.D. Dean, School of Graduate Studies ABSTRACT Cummins, Joshua Isaac. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2012. “Hearts and Minds: US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East, An analysis of Public Perceptions from 2002-2011”. The literature on anti-Americanism in the Middle East suggests that there is a strong relationship between US foreign policy and public attitudes of the United States in the region. This study analyzes Middle Eastern public opinion of the United States from 2002 until 2011, while using quantitative and qualitative analysis to determine whether US foreign policy in the Middle East correlates with approval levels of the United States. The purpose of this study was to determine if US foreign policy measures such as US support for oppressive regimes, US support for Israel, and US intervention in domestic affairs affects the way in which the average Middle Eastern publics view the United States. The study finds that there were quantitative and qualitative correlations between the three independent variables and anti-Americanism levels in the Middle East with the largest drop in approval of the US coming in 2003 after the US invasion of Iraq. The case of Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution also shows an effective policy that can be applied to the regime changes caused by the “Arab Spring”. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION ……………… . 1 The Research Questions. .3 Literature Review. .4 The “Their Fault” Argument . .9 The “Our Fault” Argument . .12 Case Selection . .22 Variables and Operationalization. .23 Research Design. .26 II. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR OPPRESSIVE REGIMES . .31 History of US Support . 32 Which Middle Eastern Regimes are Oppressive? . .45 Analysis of US Support from 2002-2011 . .46 Analysis of Anti-Americanism from 2002-2011 . 52 Analysis of Arab Spring and Possible Policy Shifts. 67 III. UNITES STATES SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. .72 History of US Support . 73 Analysis of US Support from 2002-2011 . .92 Analysis of Diplomatic Statements form 2002-2011. 96 IV. UNITES STATES INTEVENTION IN THE MIDDL EAST . .105 History of US Intervention . 108 Analysis of US Intervention from 2002-2011 . 126 iv V. CONCLUSION . 134 Analyzing the Hypotheses . .135 US Foreign Policy and Anti-Americanism Theory . 141 US Foreign Policy Implications . 142 Suggestions for Future Research . 146 APPENDIX . .150 BIBLIOGRAPHY . .182 v LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1.1: Independent Variables and Operationalization . 26 2.1: Oppressive Regimes in the Middle East 2002-2011 . 46 2.2: Total Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in Millions. .47 2.3: Total Foreign Economic Aid (ESF) in Millions . .. .49 2.4a: Total International Trade Exports in Millions . .50 2.4b: Total International Trade Imports in Millions . .51 2.5: Yearly Totals of Anti-Americanism Levels in the Middle East . 53 2.6: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data . .61 2.7: United States’ Support for Lebanon, 2002-2011 . .66 2.8: United States’ Support for Lebanon, Mean Totals . 66 3.1: United States’ Support for Israel, 2002-2011 . 93 3.2: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data . .95 4.1: Operational Indicators from 2002-2011 . .126 4.2: Regional and Country by Country Correlation Data . .129 4.3: US Intervention and Anti-Americanism Levels . 131 vi LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 2.1: Yearly Totals of US Favorability Levels in the Middle East . 54 2.2 Regional Mean of US Favorability, 2002-2011 . 55 2.3: Level of approval for the US in Egypt, 2002-2011 . .56 2.3: Level of approval for the US in Jordan, 2002-2011 . 57 2.5: Level of approval for the US in Morocco, 2002-2011 . 58 2.6 Level of approval for the US in Saudi Arabia, 2002-2011 . 59 2.7 Level of approval for the US in Turkey, 2002-2011 . 60 2.8 Level of approval for the US in Lebanon, 2002-2011 . 63 vii LIST OF ACRONYMS AIOC: Anglo Iranian Oil Company ARAMCO: Arab American Oil Company AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System BP: British Petroleum CIA: Central Intelligence Agency CPA: Coalition Provisional Authority ESF: Economic Support Funds FMS: Foreign Military Sales JSAP: Joint Security Assistance Planning Group NGO: Non-Governmental Organization OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PA: Palestinian Authority PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization PNC: Palestinian National Council SAVAK: Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar SOCAL: Californian Oil Company TEXACO: Texas Oil Company UN: United Nations UNESCO: United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization UNSCOP: United Nations Special Committee on Palestine US: United States of America USAID: United States Agency for International Development viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Completing this thesis has been the most challenging and rewarding aspect of my academic career. First, I would like to thank my thesis committee, especially my thesis director, Dr. Vaughn Shannon, whose knowledge and guidance was essential during the writing process. I would also like to thank Dr. Donna Schlagheck. Your advice and guidance set me on this path when I started Model United Nations as an undergraduate, and without that experience I would not be where I am today. I would like to show my appreciation to Dr. Laura Luehrmann for believing in me and giving me the chance to accomplish this. I would also like to thank all of my history professors including Dr. Awad Halabi, Dr. Edward Haas, and Dr. David Dorn. Without their advice and support throughout my college career, I would not have made it this far. Finally, I would like to express the deepest gratitude to my family and friends, especially my parents, Doug and Rebecca Cummins and my sister, Alex Cummins. Their love and support never faltered during this long process, and for that, I am forever grateful. ix 1. Why Do “They” Hate “Us”?: How did the United States Lose the Middle East? “Policy differences, not cultural differences, are the basis for Muslim anti- Americanism.” Stephen Brooks1 1.1 Introduction Do perceptions matter? This question is intrinsically significant when addressing the United States’ relationship with the Middle East. Mark Tessler and Michael Robbins argue that negative public perceptions of the United States in the Middle East can be a significant factor contributing to an increase in terrorism. “Societal support, whether implicit or explicit,” Tessler and Robbins write, “is often a critical facilitator for terrorist organizations, allowing them to conduct operations more frequently and more easily.”2 Those who harbor negative perceptions of the United States might not necessarily become terrorists themselves, but they would more likely support acts of terrorism against the United States. Steven Kull contends that societal support for terrorism in the Middle East is directly linked with public perception. “Hostility toward the United States in the broader society plays a critical role in sustaining terrorist groups,” Kull writes, “even if most disapprove of those groups’ tactics. The essential ‘problem,’ then, is one of America’s relationship with Muslim societies as a whole.”3 Shibley Telhami agrees that the threat of terrorism remains a huge concern and makes Middle Eastern public opinion much more important than it may have been in the past. Telhami also claims that public perception in the Middle East matters because public opinion does have an effect on state 1 Stephen Brooks, As Others See Us: The Causes and Consequences of Foreign Perceptions of America, (Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006) 132. 2 Mark Tessler, Michael D.H. Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 (April, 2007), 305. 3 Steven Kull, Feeling Betrayed: The Roots of Muslim Anger at America, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2011), 8. 1 policy. With the expansion of information technology and social networks, states no longer have the ability to withhold information from their publics.4 This popular support of terrorism is a necessary condition for terrorist organizations to achieve if they wish to sustain their agenda.
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