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The Significance of Qari Zain's Assassination in Pakistan

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The Significance of Qari Zain's Assassination in Pakistan JULY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 7 The Significance of Qari responsibility for the assassination. group became obvious when a military Waliur Rahman, a deputy to Baitullah, helicopter flew his body to Abbottabad, Zain’s Assassination in and leading TTP commander Hakimullah where his displaced family, including Pakistan Mehsud phoned reporters to claim that his wife, had moved to escape Baitullah’s they had plotted Qari Zain’s murder reach.7 The body was kept overnight By Rahimullah Yusufzai on Baitullah’s orders after he turned at the Combined Military Hospital against their group. Waliur Rahman in Abbottabad before being flown to on june 23, 2009, prominent tribal militant described Qari Zain as a miscreant and Dera Ismail Khan for burial held under commander Qari Zainuddin Mehsud was warned that “anyone who works against the supervision of security forces.8 A assassinated, reportedly on the orders of us will face the same fate.”3 spokesman for the Qari Zain group also Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) leader Baitullah admitted that they had received modest Mehsud.1 His death came only a week By ordering Qari Zain’s killing, government funding in the shape of a after formally announcing a rebellion Baitullah has demonstrated that he will religious donation, or zakat.9 against Baitullah and his militia in not tolerate any opponent, particularly primetime interviews on a number one from his own tribe and with links to History of Qari Zain’s Split from Baitullah of independent television stations in Pakistan’s security forces. The killing Qari Zain split from Baitullah Mehsud’s Pakistan. The assassination of the was similar to the 2008 assassination group after the death of his cousin 29-year-old commander, commonly of Haji Namdar, the leader of the non- Abdullah Mehsud in 2007. Abdullah was known as Qari Zain, occurred in the Taliban Islamic militant group Amr a Pakistani Taliban commander and one southern city of Dera Ismail Khan in the bil Maroof wa Nahi Anil Munkar of the most wanted militants during the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of rule of General Pervez Musharraf. Before not far from the Mehsud tribe’s Vice) operating in Bara area of Khyber becoming a leading Pakistani Taliban native South Waziristan tribal agency Agency. He too was killed by one of commander, Abdullah was captured by bordering Afghanistan. his guards, who later confessed that U.S. forces in Afghanistan in December he was tasked by Baitullah’s close aide 2001 and later transferred to the U.S. Qari Zain’s death demonstrates Hakimullah Mehsud to kill Namdar.4 detention facility at Guantanamo Bay that Baitullah Mehsud will attempt In Namdar’s case, Baitullah decided to along with other al-Qa`ida and Taliban to eliminate any tribal leader that kill him after he stopped supporting commanders. After spending 25 months challenges his authority. It also deals the Taliban and began working with at Guantanamo Bay, he was released in a significant setback to the Pakistani Pakistani authorities by expelling March 2004 due to insufficient evidence government, which was reportedly TTP militants from his area of control. that he belonged to al-Qa`ida or that he providing Qari Zain with funds and Rivals have also accused Baitullah was a top Taliban commander.10 Upon weapons to combat Baitullah Mehsud of sponsoring the murder of around his return home, he became an instant and his TTP forces. This article will 283 tribal elders in his native South hero, gave speeches preaching jihad discuss the significance of Qari Zain’s Waziristan.5 Qari Zain’s assassination and assembled a band of fighters. He assassination, explain why the Qari reinforced Baitullah’s reputation as the was under the command of Baitullah Zain and Baitullah Mehsud factions most powerful and dangerous Pakistani Mehsud, however, who at the time was have been at war with one another, Taliban commander. almost unknown and preferred to work identify Qari Zain’s successor, and in the background unlike the younger briefly outline Pakistan’s three-pronged Most importantly, the assassination was Abdullah.11 It was Abdullah’s death on strategy for moving forward. a setback for Pakistan’s government July 24, 2007—when he blew himself and military, which were reportedly up following a shootout with Pakistan’s The Assassination supporting him and his ally, Turkistan security forces in Zhob in Baluchistan— On June 23, Qari Zain was shot to Bhittani, against Baitullah’s faction. that sparked the fierce rivalry between death by Gulbuddin Mehsud, one of his Although Pakistan Army spokesman his family and Baitullah Mehsud.12 trusted guards. The guard also injured Major General Athar Abbas maintained Qari Zain’s aide, Baz Mohammad, that the military had not helped any of before escaping. The assassin was once the anti-Baitullah Taliban forces, he loyal to Baitullah Mehsud, but opted to conceded that the government might 7 “Baitullah Mehsud’s Rival Commander Qari Zainud- join the pro-government splinter group be engaging with them at a political din Killed,” Daily Aaj [Peshawar], June 24, 2009. 6 named after Qari Zain’s slain cousin, level. Evidence that the government 8 Syed Shoaib Hasan, “A Very Strange Taliban Burial,” Abdullah Mehsud. According to Baz and the army was helping Qari Zain’s BBC, June 25, 2009. Mohammad, the assailant rejoined Qari 9 Sabrina Tavernise and Pir Zubair Shah, “Pakistan to Zain’s forces after accepting the group’s 3 “TTP Claims Qari Zainuddin’s Killing,” Agence France- Strike at Leader of Taliban,” New York Times, June 15, general amnesty that was offered to Presse, June 25, 2009. 2009. fighters willing to abandon Baitullah’s 4 “Tense Calm in Bara After Namdar Killing,” The News 10 “Profile: Abdullah Mehsud,” BBC, July 24, 2007. Also 2 militia. As expected, the TTP claimed International, August 15, 2008. see, Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A Daredevil Militant with an 5 “Baitullah Mehsud Getting Tough Competition from Artificial Leg,”The News International, October 12, 2004. 1 M. Irfan Mughal, “Baitullah Rival Shot Dead,” Dawn, Tribal Rival,” Asian News International (ANI), May 11, 11 Personal interviews, Abdullah Mehsud and Baitullah June 24, 2009. 2009 Mehsud, South Waziristan Agency, October 9, 2004. 2 Qayum Nawaz Babar, “Baitullah Turns Tables on 6 Kathy Gannon, “Assassination in Pakistan Exposes 12 Salim Shahid, “Cornered Militant Blows Himself Up,” Govt,” The News International, June 24, 2009. Taliban Rifts,” Associated Press, June 23, 2009. Dawn, July 25, 2007. JULY 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 7 Qari Zain and his family accused claim that they had 3,000 fighters and and shelling Baitullah’s positions Baitullah of involvement in Abdullah’s that their strength was growing. In fact, to soften his fighters before sending murder.13 Qari Zain also suspected the group had hunted down Baitullah’s ground forces to occupy his strongholds Baitullah’s hand in the murder of his men in Tank and Dera Ismail Khan and block supplies. The government is father, Masoodur Rahman Mehsud, and districts, capturing a number of them rumored to have sought U.S. help in one of Abdullah’s successors, Saifullah allegedly with the help of Pakistan’s targeting Baitullah’s militia with UAV Mehsud.14 To avenge these losses, Qari intelligence agencies. Yet the Qari Zain attacks, and a number of these attacks Zain tried for almost two years to rally group does not have any presence in have occurred in the area recently. The the Mehsud tribe and Taliban fighters South Waziristan, from where it was Pakistan Army is releasing daily reports against Baitullah without much success. forced out by the stronger Baitullah about the bombing campaign, although He began gaining strength in the spring Mehsud group. Qari Zain himself had to there is no independent confirmation of 2009 when Pakistan’s government first shift from his village in Barwand about its claims. and its intelligence agencies supported in South Waziristan to the Shakai area him and another dissident Pakistani of the agency to take refuge with an The second segment of the strategy Taliban commander, Turkistan Bhittani, anti-Baitullah faction. Later, he took up is to neutralize Pakistani Taliban to weaken Baitullah’s faction. With Qari residence in Jandola under the protection commanders such as Maulvi Nazir in Zain’s death, this strategy has backfired, of his ally, Turkistan Bhittani. Finally, the Wana area in South Waziristan and at least for the time being. he moved to Dera Ismail Khan city in the Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan. NWFP to set up his organization with The government is arranging and Mantle Passed to Misbahuddin Mehsud assistance from the government. extending truces and peace accords Qari Zain’s brother, Misbahuddin with these leaders to prevent them from Mehsud, who is known by the alias Presently, Baitullah appears well- joining Baitullah Mehsud. Thus far, this Toofan Mehsud, replaced him as the entrenched on account of his army of goal has not yet materialized; in fact, commander of the Abdullah Mehsud committed fighters not only in South both commanders have scrapped their group.15 He is expected to continue the Waziristan, but also in other tribal areas peace deals with the government after vendetta against Baitullah in what has in FATA and districts in the NWFP. As accusing it of violating the accord’s become a blood feud. Pledging to avenge the founder and head of the TTP, he terms. Their main complaint is that the his brother’s murder, Misbahuddin commands several thousand fighters in Pakistan government was cooperating said he would not rest until Baitullah the province and also like-minded allies with the United States in carrying out was dead.
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