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Counterinsurgency in Pakistan THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY institution that helps improve policy and POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY decisionmaking through research and SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY analysis. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND Support RAND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Security Research Division View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION Project supported by a RAND Investment in People and Ideas This monograph results from the RAND Corporation’s Investment in People and Ideas program. Support for this program is provided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and development provisions of RAND’s contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jones, Seth G., 1972– Counterinsurgency in Pakistan / Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-4976-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Pakistan—Politics and government—1988- 2. Counterinsurgency —Pakistan. I. Fair, C. Christine. II. Title. DS389.J66 2010 954.9105'3—dc22 2010015059 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2010 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2010 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This document examines the evolution of militancy in Pakistan, assesses Pakistan’s efforts to counter militants, and offers a range of policy recommendations. It is based on detailed research in Pakistan and an examination of the quantitative and qualitative literatures on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. This document results from the RAND Corporation’s Invest- ment in People and Ideas program. Support for this program is pro- vided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and devel- opment provisions of RAND’s contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers. This research was conducted within the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD) of the RAND Corporation. NSRD conducts research and analysis for the Office of the Secre- tary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, the defense agencies, the Navy, the U.S. Intelligence Community, allied foreign governments, and foundations. For more information on the RAND National Security Research Division, contact the Director of Opera- tions, Nurith Berstein. She can be reached by email at Nurith_Ber [email protected]; by phone at 703-413-1100, extension 5469; or by mail at RAND, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington VA 22202- 5050. More information about the RAND Corporation is available at www.rand.org. iii Contents Preface . ............................................................................ iii Figures . ............................................................................vii Tables . ............................................................................. ix Executive Summary . ............................................................ xi Acknowledgments . ............................................................. xix Abbreviations . ................................................................... xxi ChAPTER OnE Introduction . ...................................................................... 1 ChAPTER TwO The Militant Challenge . ......................................................... 5 ChAPTER ThREE Pakistani Operations Against Militants . ...................................33 ChAPTER FOuR Counterinsurgency and Persuasion . .........................................85 ChAPTER FIvE A Population-Centric Strategy . ............................................. 119 About the Authors . ............................................................ 143 Bibliography . ................................................................... 145 Index . ............................................................................ 167 v Figures S.1. Example of Militant Networks in FATA and the North West Frontier Province . ....................................xiii 1.1. Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, 2006–2009 . ........................ 1 2.1. Example of Militant Networks in FATA and NWFP . ......... 26 3.1. Examples of Pakistani Operations, 2001–2010 . .................35 3.2. Pakistani Deployments to FATA, 2002 . ......................... 42 3.3. Map of Operation Kalosha II, 2004 . ............................. 48 3.4. Operation Sher Dil, 2008 . ..........................................63 3.5. Pakistani Operations, 2008–2009 . ................................69 3.6. Map of Operation Rah-e-Nijat, 2009–2010 . .....................71 3.7. Pakistani Views of Military Approaches Against Militant Groups . .............................................................. 80 4.1. Key Actors in Insurgencies . .........................................89 4.2. Government Popularity and Success . ............................ 92 4.3. Government Effectiveness in Pakistan and Neighboring States . ................................................................ 94 4.4. Competency of Security Forces and Success . ................... 96 4.5. Rule of Law in Pakistan and Neighboring States . .............. 99 4.6. Pakistani Views of the United States ............................ 107 5.1. Example of Predator and Reaper Strikes . ....................... 126 5.2. Northern LOCs into Afghanistan . .............................. 132 vii Tables 3.1. Corps and Locations . .............................................. 38 3.2. Summary of Key Operations . ......................................76 3.3. Pakistani Support for Government Policies . .....................78 4.1. Menu of Carrots and Sticks . ..................................... 104 5.1. Example of Carrots and Sticks for Pakistan . ................... 134 ix Executive Summary Beginning in 2001, Pakistan conducted a range of operations against militant groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and other parts of Pakistan. Because of Pakistan’s nuclear status and the presence of international terrorist organizations, such as al Qa’ida, Pakistan’s counterinsurgency campaign significantly affects the secu- rity of countries across North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East—including the United States. U.S. President Barack Obama argued that Pakistan’s border region is “the most dangerous place in the world” for the United States. The head of U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus, noted that “it is the headquarters of the al Qa’ida senior leadership,” which is planning attacks in the West.1 U.S. intelligence agencies have linked several terrorist plots in the United States to networks in Pakistan, including Faisal Shahzad’s May 2010 attempt to bomb Times Square in New York. Another notable threat was the al Qa’ida plot to detonate a bomb in the New York City subway that involved Najibullah Zazi. According to U.S. government documents, Zazi’s travels to Pakistan and his contacts with individuals there were pivotal in helping him build an improvised explosive device using triacetone triperoxide, the same explosive used effectively in the 2005 London subway bombings.2 Similarly,
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