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EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation October 2018 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Pakistan Security Situation October 2018 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN: 978-92-9476-319-8 doi: 10.2847/639900 © European Asylum Support Office 2018 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: FATA Faces FATA Voices, © FATA Reforms, url, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO COI REPORT PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 3 Acknowledgements EASO would like to acknowledge the Belgian Center for Documentation and Research (Cedoca) in the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, as the drafter of this report. Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed by reviewing the report: The Netherlands, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis Hungary, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Office Documentation Centre Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation Sweden, Migration Agency, Lifos – Centre for Country of Origin Information and Analysis Reference is made to the Disclaimer regarding the responsibility of reviewers. 4 — EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION Contents Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... 3 Contents ................................................................................................................................ 4 Disclaimer .............................................................................................................................. 5 Glossary and Abbreviations .................................................................................................. 6 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 11 Map ..................................................................................................................................... 14 1. General description of the security situation in Pakistan ................................................... 15 1.1. Overview of recent conflicts in Pakistan ...................................................................... 15 1.1.1. Militant violence and government response ........................................................ 15 1.1.2. Ethnic and sectarian violence ............................................................................... 17 1.1.3. Recent political developments ............................................................................. 17 1.1.4. International context ............................................................................................ 19 1.2. Actors in the conflict .................................................................................................... 20 1.2.1. State armed forces ................................................................................................ 20 1.2.2. Armed Groups ....................................................................................................... 22 1.3. Recent security trends and armed confrontations ...................................................... 32 1.3.1. Security operations and armed clashes ................................................................ 33 1.3.2. Attacks by militant groups .................................................................................... 35 1.3.3. Sectarian-related violence .................................................................................... 37 1.3.4. Ethnic and political violence ................................................................................. 37 1.3.5. Border attacks ....................................................................................................... 37 1.3.6. Drone strikes ......................................................................................................... 38 1.3.7. Violence in the run-up to the general elections ................................................... 39 1.4. Impact of the violence on the civilian population ....................................................... 40 1.4.1. Figures on civilian casualties ................................................................................. 40 1.4.2. Children ................................................................................................................. 45 1.4.3. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees ................................................ 46 1.5. State ability to secure law and order ........................................................................... 47 1.5.1. State protection, security forces and justice ........................................................ 48 1.5.2. Anti-Terrorism Acts ............................................................................................... 50 1.5.3. Detention and death penalty ................................................................................ 51 2.1. Geographical overview of the violence 2017 – first half of 2018 ................................ 53 2.1.1. Trends in regional violence ................................................................................... 53 2.1.2. Regional comparison of violence-related fatalities .............................................. 55 2.2. Security trends per geographic subdivision ................................................................. 57 2.2.1. Punjab ................................................................................................................... 57 2.2.2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ............................................................................................ 61 2.2.3. Balochistan ............................................................................................................ 65 2.2.4. Sindh ..................................................................................................................... 70 2.2.5. Federally Administered Tribal Areas ..................................................................... 74 2.2.6. Islamabad Capital Territory .................................................................................. 84 2.2.7. Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan ......................................................................... 86 Annex I: Bibliography .......................................................................................................... 89 Annex II: Terms of Reference ............................................................................................ 120 EASO COI REPORT PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION — 5 Disclaimer This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2012) (1). The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. To the extent possible and unless otherwise stated, all information presented, except for undisputed or obvious facts, has been cross-checked. The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position. ‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as a generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report. The target users are asylum caseworkers, COI researchers, policymakers, and decision-making authorities. The drafting of this report was finalised in August 2018. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the introduction. It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments, experts or organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. (1) The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: https://www.easo.europa.eu/information-analysis/country-origin-information/coi-methodology-and-guides 6 — EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN REPORT PAKISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION Glossary and Abbreviations ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project Ah-le Sunnat Wal Jama’at Political Sunni Deobandi organisation,
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