A Case Study of Mahsud Tribe in South Waziristan Agency

Home , Abdullah Mehsud, FATA University, Jandola, Karlani, Khattak, Mahsud

RELIGIOUS MILITANCY AND TRIBAL TRANSFORMATION IN PAKISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF MAHSUD TRIBE IN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY

By MUHAMMAD IRFAN MAHSUD Ph.D. Scholar

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR (SESSION 2011 – 2012) RELIGIOUS MILITANCY AND TRIBAL TRANSFORMATION IN PAKISTAN: A CASE STUDY OF MAHSUD TRIBE IN SOUTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY

Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

(December, 2018)

DDeeddiiccaattiioonn

I Dedicated this humble effort to my loving and the most caring Mother

ABSTRACT

The beginning of the 21st Century witnessed the rise of religious militancy in a more severe form exemplified by the traumatic incident of 9/11. While the phenomenon has troubled a significant part of the world, Pakistan is no exception in this regard.

This research explores the role of the Mahsud tribe in the rise of the religious militancy in South Waziristan Agency (SWA). It further investigates the impact of militancy on the socio-cultural and political transformation of the Mahsuds. The study undertakes this research based on theories of religious militancy, borderland dynamics, ungoverned spaces and transformation. The findings suggest that the rise of religious militancy in SWA among the Mahsud tribes can be viewed as transformation of tribal revenge into an ideological conflict, triggered by flawed state policies. These policies included, disregard of local culture and traditions in perpetrating military intervention, banning of different militant groups from SWA and FATA simultaneously, which gave them the raison d‘etre to unite against the state and intensify violence and the issues resulting from poor state governance and control. The study explores the unique tribal characteristics of the Mahsuds, such as asylum provision, autonomy and lack of centralized leadership, which had historically facilitated the rise of religious militancy during the colonial times, replicating itself in the post 9/11 period. The flawed state policies encouraged autonomy of the young tribesmen from local institutions of Jirga and Malikship, thereby facilitating them to join the militant movement in SWA. Moreover, such state policies, coupled with military operations caused confusion among the

Mahsud tribes and forced them to neither support the military directly, nor halt the activities of the militants. The findings also contradict the widely held narrative that

Mahsuds as a tribe participated in the fight against the state in SWA in post 2001 period. As the findings suggest, the religious elite, including the local Imams,

Madrassa dropouts and the Afghan war militants had a strong role in directly inciting violence and insurgency and influencing young tribesmen. The pre-mature military intervention further pushed the war affected tribesmen, especially the family members of injured/killed/disappeared, into militancy. However, due to several reasons, including the integration of the Mahsuds in the mainstream community of Pakistan, the larger majority of the tribesmen did not participate in the insurgency against the state. The research further explores the impacts of displacement on the socio-cultural and political institutions of the Mahsud tribe as a result of militancy and subsequent military operations. The migration/displacements severely impacted the tribesmen, including their socio-cultural and political institutions of Malikship and Jirga, thereby impacting their tribal identities. Other political implications include a progressive decline in levels of support to religious political parties by local tribesmen. There is a further impact evident through a general tendency to support non-violent ethnicity based social movements against state excesses. The study has primarily employed ethnographic based data collection tools for research, such as semi-structured interviews, informal discussions and personal observations to reach its findings.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

S. No. Topic Page No. Abstract i-ii Acknowledgement v List of Acronyms vi-vii Chapter – 1 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Literature Review 4 1.3 Theoretical Framework 11 1.4 Statement of the Problem 18 1.5 Objectives of the Study 19 1.6 Research Questions 19 1.7 Significance of the Study 19 1.8 Methodology 20 1.9 Plan of the Thesis 22 Chapter – 2 2. HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN 24 2.1 Introduction 24 2.2 Militancy: A Historical Perspective 26 2.3 Post 1947 Era: The Fusion of Radical Notions 28 2.4 Post 1947 Era and Strengthening of Radicalization 30 2.5 The Post 9/11 Period and the Rise of Militant Groups in FATA 38 2.6 Conclusion 42 Chapter – 3 3. HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS MILITANCY AMONG THE MAHSUDS IN SWA 3.1 Introduction 44 3.2 South Waziristan Agency: Physical Settings and The Location of 44 Mahsud Tribe 3.3 Pashtuns among Pashtuns: The Mahsud tribe 46 3.4 Sections and subsections of the Mahsud tribe 48 3.4.1 The Alizaii Branch 50 3.4.2 The Bahlolzai Branch 51 3.4.3 The Shaman Khel Branch 52 3.4.4 The Burki/Oremur and Syeds 52 3.5 History of the Mahsuds with the Colonial Rulers 53 3.6 The Tribal Character of the Mahsuds and Rivalries 67 3.7 The Mahsud Tribe and Pakistan 72 3.8 Conclusion 75

S.No. Topic Page No. Chapter – 4 4. SOUTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY: RELIGIOUS MILITANCY IN THE POST 9/11 PERIOD 4.1 Introduction 77 4.2 Militancy in SWA and the Transformation of Legal System 77 4.3 The Penetration of Military in SWA: Militant Organizations and the 80 Mahsud Tribe 4.4 Militant Organizations and their Leadership in SWA 91 4.5 Conclusion 98 Chapter – 5 5. SOCIO-CULTURAL AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE MAHSUD TRIBE 5.1 Introduction 99 5.2 The Concept of Social Transformation and the Mahsud Tribe 99 5.3 The Mahsud Tribe: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the 101 Socio-Cultural Transformation 5.4 Leadership Institution of the Mahsud Tribe 122 5.5 Institution of Malikship and Tribal Transformation 123 5.6 Institution of Jirga among Mahsuds: Past and Present 131 5.7 Political Arena and Mahsud Tribe 138 5.8 Mahsud Women: Social and Political Life 145 5.9 Education System in Mahsud Area: Issues, Hurdles and Way 149 Forward 5.10 Conclusion 158 6. CONCLUSION 160 7. BIBLIOGRAPHY 170 8. APPENDIX-I 208 9. APPENDIX-II 214

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

In pursuit of work like this, many individuals have to play a role in achieving the desired goal. The time consumed in this pursuit would not mean much without collateral learning outcomes. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my research supervisor Dr. Shahida Aman, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, for her enormous support, knowledge, guidance and encouragement throughout this study. Her skills and erudition made it possible for me to disentangle many knots. I also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of my Co-supervisor Dr. Muhammad Ayub Jan, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, who extended me all- out support and help -- from proposal to the completion of this dissertation.

I am grateful beyond words to Professor Dr. Abdul Rauf, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar, for his guidance and cooperation. I am indebted to my close relative and friend, Dr. Saad Salman, for providing me logistic support during my field research in South Waziristan Agency and Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

I also thank friends and colleagues for reading chapters or the entire manuscripts and giving valuable, critical and encouraging advice that was often accepted and appreciated but rarely declined. I thank you all for allowing me to encroach on your time. The list of these colleagues and friends is very long but their critical judgement I always value. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Dr. Taj Muharram Khan, Ex-Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Peshawar, Dr. Wajid Khattak, Dr. Naved-ul-Hassan, Mr. Sajjad Hussain and Mr. Ibrar Hussain.

I am deeply indebted to my late father whose generosity, emotional support and pride have been unflagging.

Finally, I thank my mother for her love and patience and putting up with scarce attention from me over the last five years, also I am very thankful to my younger sister Marina Mehsud for her love, confidence and moral support in the walk of my life.

Muhammad Irfan Mahsud

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACS Additional Chief Secretary

AEOs Agency Education Officers

ANP Awami National Party

APA Assistant Political Agent

APS Army Public School

FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan

FC Frontier Corps

FCR Frontier Crimes Regulations

FIDA Foundation of Integrated Development Action

GDC Government Degree College

ICG International Crisis Group

IDPs Internally Displaced Persons

IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISPR Inter Services Public Relations

JI Jamat-e-Islami

JUD Jama‘at-ud-Da‘wah

JUI-F Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazal-ur-Rehman

KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

MTM Mahsud Tahafuz Movement

MWA Mahsud Welfare Association

NAP National Action Plan

NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations

NWA North Waziristan Agency

NWD North Waziristan District

PA Political Agent

PC Peace Committee

PHC Peshawar High Court

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz

PPPP Pakistan People‘s Party Parliamentarians

PTI Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf

PTM Pashtun Tahafuz Movement

SMP Sipah-e-Mohammad Pakistan

SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan

SWA South Waziristan Agency

SWD South Waziristan District

TDPs Temporarily Displaced Persons

TTF Teman Tehreek Force

TTP Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan

UCHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN United Nations WAWA Wana Welfare Association

WoT War on Terror

CHAPTER – 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 INTRODUCTION Religious militancy may be defined as violent resistance by one section of the society to confront varied challenges to its sense of self or identity. Such violent response to the set of socio-cultural, political or economic challenges is considered as religiously mandated and sanctioned (Global Connections, 2014). The history of Islamist militancy in the sub-Continent Indo-Pak can be traced back to early reformist and revivalist movements of 17th and 18th centuries. The reformist and Jihadist movements of Mujaddid Alf Sani, Shah Waliliullah and that of Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly (1786–1831) and Shah Ismail (1779–1831) are some of the examples. The Islamist ideology explaining the origin of Pakistan is rooted in pre-colonial and colonial times. The use of religion, since 1947, to achieve national integration resulted into widening the gap between different sects of Islam consequently giving rise to religious extremism. It was, the participation in the Afghan War of 1980s and Zia‘s steps for Islamization of the socio-political institutions of the state nurtured militant mindset and ensured the proliferation of religious extremist groups (Ahmed, 2013). Terrorism and violence are profound threat to the very sovereignty of Pakistan in the 21st century. The Global Terrorism Index has ranked Pakistan third in the list in 2014 of most radicalized states (Global Terrorism Index, 2014). The Country Report on Terrorism (2013) generated by the US Department of State highlights that US government is concerned about the widespread terrorism in Pakistan. Staff Report (July 20th, 2018) has highlighted that after the constitutional 25th amendment act 2018 name of South Waziristan Agency (SWA) has been changed to South Waziristan District (SWD) and became under the jurisdiction of Dera Ismail Khan Division. The thesis will use the term SWA which should be understood to mean SWD. The SWA is about 3,936 square miles in area and is the largest and southernmost agency among the different tribal agencies of Pakistan (Mahsud, 2010). The South Waziristan Agency shares its borders with North Waziristan to its North, Afghanistan to the West, Dera Ismail Khan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in the East and Baluchistan in the South (Ahmed, 2013, p 48; USAID, 2012). This diverse landscape and sensitive geo- strategic position has historically provided sufficient escape routes for outlaws and makes it a safe haven for non-state actors. The rise of Taliban movement inside Pakistan is believed to have originated in South Waziristan with the support of Mahsud tribe (Burki, 2009, p.

1). This role of the Mahsuds in militant movement uprising has invited multiple military interventions in SWA since 2003. The latest operation by Pakistan Army, named ‗Zarb-e- Azb‘, means sharp and cutting strike, was launched in 2014, primarily in North Waziristan Agency (NWA), as a result of Taliban infiltration from SWA.

Tribal Distribution in South Waziristan Source: Population Census 1998 Mehsud Tribe 56.8%

Wazir Tribe 23.1% Other Tribes 20.1%

Source: (Moghal, 2012, p. 13).

SWA has a population of 429,841 (1998 census), socially organized into more than 10 tribes (USAID, 2012, p. 84; Govt. of Pakistan, 2014). The two most prominent of them are the Mahsuds and the Wazirs. Mahsuds have the larger share in SWA population, standing at 56.8% and Wazirs are second with 23% share (USAID, 2012). According to earlier estimates (1972 census), the population of Mahsud and Wazir stood at 250,000 and 50,000 respectively (Ahmed, 1983, p. 75-78). The population census of 2017 has estimated the total population of SWA approximately 679,185 (South Waziristan Population, 2017; Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Another source from the 2017 census suggests the total population of SWA to be 674,065. The detailed report has shown dramatic increase in the population ratio of the Wazir tribe in comparison to Mahsud tribe, which is 227,397 and 366, 287 respectively (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 2017). The Wazir population ratio in SWA in the census of 2017 is 33.73 percent which was previously 23.1 percent in 1998. There has been not significant displacement of the Wazir tribe in the wake of militancy which is a primary reason for the increase in the population. After the death of notorious militant commander Nek Muhammad in 2004 the Wazir tribe expelled anti-government militants (Mahsud, 2010, p. 3). It kept their area from any major military offensive. The Mahsud tribe population ratio in SWA which was 56.8 in

1998 decreased to 54.34 in the census of 2017. Major reason for the decrease in the population ratio of the Mahsud tribe in comparison to Wazirs in SWA is the displacement of the Mahsuds due to military action, Operation Rah-e-Nijat, path to salvation, initiated in 2009 mainly in the Mahsud area (Mehsud, October 18th, 2009). More than 400,000 natives were displaced from SWA in 2009 as a military offensive, Operation Rah-i-Nijat (OCHA, November 2009). The number of IDPs suggested by Khan (2012, p. 137) by the end of 2009 in SWA is 428,000. At least thirty to forty percent of Mahsud IDPs are reluctant to settle back in SWA (Mehsud &Mehsud, March 24th, 2017). Ali (2018) believes that migration due to conflict in the Pashtun belt has complicated the census count of 2017. The South Waziristan Agency has eight tehsils administered in three administrative sub-divisions, which include Wana populated by Waziris and Ladha and Sarwekai inhabited by Mahsuds (Raza, 1990; Pakistan, 2014; USAID, 2012).1 Sarwekai was administered, prior to 25th amendment, by Assistant Political Officer whereas Ladhaa and Wana Sub-Divisions are administered by Assistant Political Agents (APA). Each tehsil is headed by a Political Naib Tehsildar. The Political Agent (PA) and APA were administering the Agency with the help of Khasadars and Maliks (Yazdani, 2009, p. 4-6). 2 The PA occupied the seat of the administration, like elsewhere in FATA, and was directly answerable to the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. As an intermediary between the government and the locals, the Maliks perform certain functions, for which they receive Muajib (stipend) from the political administration of the Agency. These functions include, maintenance of order, keeping roads open, return of criminals and such other functions as the state may require from them (Aman, 2013). The approval of FATA reforms bill in 2018 under 31st amendment has changed the separate status of FATA and administrative system, FATA has been made a part of the KP province thereby extending the new legal and administrative setups (Abbasi, May 31st, 2018). The people of the tribal area are given equal rights as citizens under the constitution of the country for the first time. The jurisdiction of the judiciary and superior courts has been extended to the tribal belt, representatives of FATA can make law for their land which was previously prerogative of the president of Pakistan. The FCR and the traditional administrative structures have been revised; Major portions of the previous system are being revised to include the administrative and judicial system prevailing in the settled areas. The new system has ended the outstanding authority of the President of Pakistan and

1 The Wana sub-division comprises Wana, Birmal and Toi Khullah.The Sarwekai sub-division contains Sarwekai and Tiarza tehsils and the Ladha sub-division consists of the Ladha, Sararogha and Makin tehsils. 2 Khasadars are appointed by the Political Agent on tribal basis and they use their own arms under the command of the PA.

the Governor of KP over the region of FATA (Haq, May 24th, 2018). The titles of the PA and the APAs are redesignated as Deputy Commissioner and Assistant Commissioners respectively (Dagia & Firdous, May 31st, 2018). Dagia and Firdous asserts that magistracy powers are still in the hands of the administrators, it is believed that mere change of titles is less likely to bring change/development in SWA. This thesis explores the nature of religious militancy in South Waziristan with special reference to the role of Mahsud tribes. The emphasis is on militancy growth in SWA in the wake of 9\11. It investigates the role played by the Mahsud tribe in the rise of Taliban Movement in Pakistan. Although predominated by Mahsuds, tribes like Wazir, Bhittanis and some segments of Panjabi Taliban coupled with foreign elements also played their part in the rise of Taliban (J. Amjid personal communication, September 8, 2016). The research further analyzes the impacts of militancy on the socio-cultural and political features of the South Waziristan Agency, in general, and Mahsud tribe, in particular.

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW Abulafia (2001, p. xi) has noted that issues emerging from ideological systems of beliefs are as consistent as to the contemporary world in the 21st century as they were in the Middle ages. In his work he argues that religion is the primary motivation behind most of the terrorist acts from the last few decades of the 20th century including Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and Christian. In 1980, the US state department has listed hardly a single religious violent organization. After 18 years in 1998, the same department listed thirty most dangerous groups, more than half of which were religious organizations (Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1998). In the same period, Bruce (1998, p. 91) has noted dramatic increase in the numbers of faith-based terrorist groups as twenty-six. Just before the incident of 9/11, the former Secretary of State of the US Warren Christopher (1998, p. 446) stated that terrorism in the name of religion is a huge security issue we are facing in the aftermath of Cold War. There are various socio-political reasons for the increase in faith- based violence in the world. Major factor in the increase in the Islamist militancy is discrimination by the major powers (Vertigans, 2008). Al-Rasheed & Shterin (2009, p. xviii) explained that militant Islamic groups are political motivated in the 21st century which have become central issues in the ‗war on terror‘. Social scientists have described terrorism as a violence by a group for political motives (Laqueur, 1987, p. 72; Wieviorka, 1995, p. 599-600; Bruce, 1998, pp. 33-44). Religious discourses are not capable of trigging mass movement or mobilizing people on its own but is mere tool political and economic struggles (Al-Rasheed & Shterin, 2009, p. xx). Juergensmeyer (2000) has argued that in the contemporary world the term ‗terrorism‘

is frequently associated with the disenfranchised groups who commits violence to have power and influence, their intense dedication to cause and the dangerous unpredictability gives them vast influence as compared to their meager resources. In Pakistan‘s tribal belt political vacuum and systematic discrimination of the natives by the administrative setup provided space for the non-state actors to nurture. In the 21st century most violent terrorist groups have been emerged in the marginalized communities of Pakistan. The terrorist groups such as TTP hailed from Mahsud area of SWA, with its meager resources had enormous influence area. The most violent methods of TTP includes suicide attacks and beheadings because of which this organization gained enormous influence in Pakistan‘s tribal belt. Pape (2005, p. 22-3) has noted that the basic logic of suicide sort of religious terrorism includes political motives. There are a number of interesting studies on militancy in FATA and the role of tribes in it. These studies have mostly focused on militancy and how the militant organizations strengthened their foothold in tribal areas by using tribal structures. The available literature is deficient in highlighting the impacts of militancy on socio-cultural and political institutions of the Mahsud tribes. In historical context, the British colonial accounts are explicit in identifying unique characteristics of the Mahsud tribesmen (Johnson, 1934b; Beattie, 2011). Punjab Government Press (1901) documented that the dealings with the Mahsud tribe cost the British in huge number of men and material. Howell (1979, p. 67, 83) described single event, happened in 1920, of violent clash between the British and the Mahsuds in which more than 1600 were wounded, 400 soldiers killed including 43 British officers, approximately 250 missing including British officers. Barton (1939, p. 214) explains that in order to restore peace in SWA the British offered enormous privileges to the Mahsuds and their Maliks, in terms of allowances, jobs and land in British territory but the tribes never gave up. The British carried out more than five expeditions in to Mahsud area of SWA but the tribes never submitted (Williams, 2005, p. 47). The Mahsuds considered the British penetration into their stronghold and the subsequent search operation in their homes as a humiliation to their honor (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). It was considered a violation of local traditions to apprehend a tribesman or a guest/asylum-seeker in Mahsud territory (M. Hashim, personal communication, December 08, 2016). In defense to their honor, the Mahsud tribes got into fight with the British and others (M. A. Masood, personal communication, December 18, 2016). The way of life of the Mahsuds upholds unique democratic principles based on unity, equality, individual freedom and consensual

decisions in Jirga where the weak usually do not suffers due to the fate of the powerful and because of their dealings with other tribes, to Howell (1979), these values are incomparable to any other tribes along the frontier. In the preface of the book written on the Mahsud tribe, Mizh, Howell argued that such a system, democratic environment, is capable of producing fine type of men the world has ever seen. Sir Olaf Caroe (1965, p. 395) shares same opinion in this context and believes that Mizh written by Allen Howell as a masterpiece and the most penetrating work on the tribal studies. The asylum seeker, the weak, in the Mahsud territory were safety and, in some cases, private properties were also given in the form of land. The Qureshi families, settled in the Mahsud area, migrated for safety, the natives gave them land to settle (M. Hashim, personal communication, December 08, 2016). The Mahsud tribe accommodated the Burki tribe belonging to different genealogical linage to settle the issue of their rights and due share in the privileges and allowances offered by the British (M. Akber, personal communication, December 02, 2016). Most of the literature on South Waziristan and Mahsuds dates back to colonial times (Beattie, 2013; De Watteville, 1925; Howell, 1979; Roe, 2010). The Mahsud tribes concentrated in the rough, isolated geographic center of South Waziristan were extensively studied on account of insurgent activities against the British colonial government and rival tribes (Spain, 1972). Spain has observed that Mahsud tribe is an influential community in SWA in comparison to other tribes and gave tough time to foreign invaders. Rashid (2009, p. 268) while describing the Mahsud tribe argues that the inaccessible terrain contributed in the successful attacks and ambushes of Mahsuds against the British forces which best sets in the framework of guerrilla warfare. The Mahsud tribe is a peace-loving tribe in normal times. The tribe has provided safe passages to the foreigners and outlanders. However, in the face of threat/danger or intrusion in the tribal life, the Mahsud tribe get united and demonstrated extreme violence. The Mahsuds considered expansionist policies of the British to be a real challenge for the independent way of life. Therefore, the tribe took internal/external support to limit the British influence in the region. During the British Afghan Wars and the Waziristan Campaign of 1919-20, the Mahsud Tribe gained a reputation as ―probably the most formidable fighting men on the Frontier… fiercely independent, their fighting skills honed by centuries of raiding‖ (Robson, 2007, p. 149). General Staff (1921) has praised the superior tactical skills of the Mahsud tribe during the military operations in Waziristan. In 1937 an entire British brigade was wiped out in Mahsud territory (Ahmed, 2004, p. 33). Williams (2012, p. 14) argues that the Mahsud tribe gave huge trouble to the state and was

center of attention in any British policy for Waziristan. The Mahsud tribesmen have been documented to be internally integrated especially in the face of external threats. The Mahsuds were also allegedly involved in the killings of British colonial officers. The political agent of SWA in the British times, Major A. J. During in 1940-1942, praised the superior fighting skills of the Mahsud tribe in an expedition in response to the continuous attacks on government assets, resulted in huge losses of men and material, in which an entire British regiment came literary running in to the encampment from the battlefield (Allen, 1977, p. 5-6 & 203-205). Hart (1985, 399) has noted that the Mahsuds have murdered five top British officers including Political Agents in the South Waziristan Agency between the period 1895-6 to 1947. It shows that Mahsuds have historically given tough time to foreign or external designs. Surrounded by Wazirs and some other tribes, the areas within South Waziristan Agency where the Mahsud tribes are settled do not touch the boundary of Afghanistan which puts them literally in the center of the Agency (Hart, 1985, p 399). The cultural influences of defending one‘s interest vis a vis the rivals even by forceful means is a trait taught to Mahsud children by the elders (Ahmed, 1983, p. 28). This is especially true in relation to their tribal rivalry with the Wazirs. Historical accounts have also emphasized the tribal contestation between the Wazirs and the Mahsuds. The Mahsud-Wazir rivalry had reached a high point of the former driving the latter out of their stronghold Wana (administrative capital of South Waziristan Agency) during the British period which of course, was averted through the British Indian government‘s intervention (Ahmed, 2004). Similarly, Wazirs have been expelled from their villages along Baddar Valley by the Dre Mahsud (Ahmed, 2004).3 The successful expansionist policies of land acquisition from the surrounding tribes in Waziristan highlights dominant role of Mahsuds in Waziristan, coupled with their history of never submitting to the British power unlike their rival Wazirs. Literature also terms the Mahsud tribe as hegemonic community within the region of Waziristan, especially in its relation to the Wazirs (Lindholm, 1993, p. 825-826). Some of the more recent literature relates South Waziristan and particularly the Mahsud tribes to militancy and the ongoing conflict. Mahsud (2010, p. 8) has noted that the Mahsud Taliban, which are approximately 10,000 in numbers, have been the bedrock of the TTP. Another source mentioned the number of the TTP fighter who basically belong to Mahsud tribe are approximately 20,000 under the command of Baitullah Mahsud (BBC News Report, 26 March 2009). Ahmed (2013, p. 72) has discussed the Mahsud tribe‘s role in providing men and material support to the TTP to strengthen its foothold in South

3 Dre Mahsud including three major sub-tribes of Mahsuds, namely Manzai, Balazai and Shaman Kheil.

Waziristan Agency. Other scholars have also highlighted militant‘s training camps (157 in number) operating in the Mahsud areas (Roggio 2009). Taj (2011, p. 89, 99) has mentioned the presence of terrorist suicide training camps operating in SWA in 2005. Taj and Roggio have highlighted the expansion of Taliban influence from South Waziristan Agency to other parts of FATA and settled areas of Pakistan. The reasons for the expansion of the Taliban in SWA lies in the initiation of major military operations against the militants across FATA and the increasing resentment in the local quarters. Additionally, the Mahsud tribe‘s role in confronting the state is well recorded especially in the post 9/11 period when the Pakistan military intervened for the first time in the SWA (Mahsud, 2010, p. 2-15; Syed, 2009, p. 7-9). Baitullah‘s men have reported to have captured a seventeen-vehicle army Covey and 260 soldiers, including an army Colonel and nine other officers in an ambush without firing a single shot (Ahmed, 2013, p. 72). The report of Australian Refugee Review Tribunal (2013) on Pakistan Taliban noted that the nexus of the militants from FATA and the militant/sectarian urban based groups have extended the influence of Taliban from tribal areas to the metropolitan spaces of the state. The state has banned the militant/sectarian outfits in the settled districts of Pakistan (Haqqani, 2004, p. 351-353). The subsequent initiation of military operations in the tribal belt pushed the militant groups from FATA and sectarian violent groups in the settled areas to make an alliance. Religious violence in the contemporary Pakistan is more dangerous than ever, it upholds the theory of the survival of the fittest (Hilali, 2010, p. 26). It attempts to purify the ideas and beliefs of Islam through violent means thereby affecting other sects/versions. The violence committed by the militant groups such as TTP against other sects of Islam in Pakistan are best example in this context (Siddique, 2010). Siddique (2010, p. 20) has argued that some of the common targets of TTP are Shiite, Barelvi and Sufi sects of Islam. The Taliban group among the Mahsuds is also said to be responsible for the invention of suicide bombings in Pakistan in post 9\11 period (Sheikh, 2016; Abbas, 2008). Recent suicidal attacks particularly on Pakistani troops and army bases, recall the suicidal attacks by individual Mahsuds on the British administrators and troops before 1914 (Beattie, 2012). The intervention (operation) by the Pakistan Army in South Waziristan against the militants has raised its own nature of dynamics. In the initial stages of confrontation, tribal feature of agnatic rivalry is said to be reinterpreted in the wake of militant uprising and the intervention by the Pakistan military (Ahmed, 2013, p. 90, 80). The unannounced penetration of Pakistan army in SWA and the subsequent operations against militants resulted in indiscriminate killing and capture of militants and natives

which led to the resentment among the natives against the state (Siddique, 2010). The search operations in the area was understood as a disregard of native culture, traditions and independence/freedom. The military uniform gradually became unpopular in SWA which benefited militant organizations the most. The penetration of Pakistan Army in to SWA in the post 9/11 period, immediately after joining the camps of the Western Powers, gave an invaluable opportunity to the militant groups to capitalize on it thereby framing the state as sponsor of secular ideology (Shad, M. R., & Ahmed, S. (2018, p. 120-126). The local Mullahs and militant leaders added religious sentiments to the tribal rivalry by framing the state as ally of the US and the West. The popular slogan of the radical groups was ‗Islam is in danger‘ but the struggle was to attain territorial power, political influence and to establish parallel governance system (International Crisis Group, 2009, p. 18-15). The tribal resentment soon transformed in to an ideological war. It is highly important to study the Mahsuds and their contribution in the rise of religious militancy especially in the shape of TTP. Religious militancy has profoundly affected the social and cultural patterns of life among the Mahsuds. Yousufzai (as quoted in Taj, 2011, p. 86) and Hussain (2010, p. 86) argues about the alteration in the local power structures and attributes it to the various deals signed between the military and the militants in South Waziristan Agency in post 2001 period. The deals by acknowledging the militants as equal power brokers gave them a position of strength vis a vis the local Maliks and elders (Taj, 2011). There are reports of a large number of tribal Maliks and elders killed and injured by the militants. Some estimates cite it to be around 300 tribal elders in South Waziristan Agency alone (Kakakhel, 2013). Malik Gulsa Khan, an influential and anti-Taliban Mahsud leader, including Muhammad Nawaz and Zarwali Mahsud were gunned down soon after the militant infiltration into SWA (S. Salman, personal communication, December 15, 2016). In 2005 alone, the TTP targeted tribesmen opposed to the Taliban, killing more than 60 tribal elders (Conflict Studies, 2010). Siddique (2010, p. 58) argues that approximately 600 tribal elders have been killed in the in the tribal belt by the militants to usurp power and authority. The widespread killings of the elders and Maliks who acted as government intermediaries created a power vacuum in the tribal agencies which was, in turn, filled in by younger militant leaders raising their stature and power among the local tribesmen (Williams, 2012, p. 40-46). Besides, institution of Jirga and Malikship, the education sector has been greatly impacted in SWA. The already fragile education system became victim of terrorist attacks, the Taliban banned the female education. The military operations and the subsequent

displacement of the tribe led to the closure of the educational institutions in the Mahsud area. Pakistan‘s negotiations with the Taliban leadership raised their status and gave them a new lease of life. The peace treaties signed between the government and the militants is said to have left tribal elders at the mercy of militants as these militants were indirectly affirmed by the military establishment to be politically legitimate in overriding the authority of the tribal leaders (Taj, 2011). It is believed that the Government of Pakistan, while dealing with the militants, ignored local culture, traditions and demands of the Mehsud tribes. Alternatively, Pakhtun code for providing asylum and support to guests (Cheema, 2008, p. 24) created variety of doubts between the natives and the state officials. For instance, in the initial stages of rising militancy, the foreign militants wanted by the government, were given protection by the Mahsuds under the code of cultural honor as Hamsaya.4 The existing literature is deficient on how FATA emerged as the hub of militant insurgency and what impacts it has on the local customs, culture and power structures. Missing specifically is analyzes of the role of Mahsud tribes in the rise of the Taliban movement and the circumstances under which militancy strengthen its foothold in the Mahsud area. The military operations in SWA and the subsequent displacement has severely affected socio-cultural and political institutions of Mahsuds, already written literature has little to offer on the subject of forced migration and the resultant transformational processes. There is a need to understand in a comprehensive manner the impact militant activism has had on the socio-cultural and political institutions of the Mahsud tribesmen in SWA. There are variety of authors who have written extensively on social and political transformation in various countries/communities/nationalities. However, the factors which trigger the social change or social transformation incudes political and economic development, education, modernization, globalization, industrialization and urbanization (Guthrie, 2012; Fairclough, 1992; Sztompka, 1993; Centre canadien de gestion & Drucker, 1995; Stanely, 1997; Taylor, 1998; Castles, 1999; Groenewald, 2000; Castle, 2001). Schuerkens (2005) has described social transformation as a result of migration based on economic improvement. Castles (2010) has explained social transformation processes due to global migration in the search of better employment opportunities. Portes (2010) highlighted social change in a systematic and theoretical oriented approach. Portes has focused the impact of migration on the countries where migrants are settling down.

4Hamsaya is the concept of giving asylum (to needy) popular in Mahsud culture. 10

Machonin (1994) has written interesting article on the social and political transformation in the Czech Republic related to class structure based on economic/materialistic processes. His findings suggest that the economic and political development has played positive role in the transformational processes. Fang (2016) has analyzed the socio-political transformation in China on the bases of economic development, accelerated modernization and institutional restructuring. Fangs work highlights that the social and political transformation in China has increase the demand of liberalization the fulfilment of which can be observed in the transformation of communist economy into capitalistic and increasingly accommodative approach of the state. Erasmus (2007) work has explored religion as a significant factor in the acceleration of social transformation in South Africa. He argues that the religion has played positive role in bridging gaps among different communities in South Africa. Khondker & Schuerkens (2014) have presented Eurocentric ideas of social transformation in relation to various theories such as dependency, modernism and globalization. In Pakistan social transformation is understood as a resistance between traditionalism and feudalism (Ali & Naz, 2016). Ali & Naz believes that elements of capitalistic development have triggered transformation in feudalistic system in Pakistan. Their findings assert that the transformation of the elite class from feudal to capitalistic class has transformed other classes of society including middle and lower classes. Qadeer (2006) in his scholastic work titled, ‗Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformation in Muslim Nation‘ offers insightful views by exploring and analyzing the role of modernization, economic development, urbanization and religion in the transformation of social institutions of the society. His work presents an analysis of positive contribution of economic development and industrial development in the transformational processes. To Qadeer the preservation of ideological elements and the cultural values has has positively impacted the transformation of the society in Pakistan.

1.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK This research intends to examine, why religious militancy is generally, linked with tribes living in Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Special emphasis is given to the Mahsud tribe of SWA in this relation. There are variety of reasons for the militant proliferation in SWA. Broadly speaking, militancy in FATA and SWA are credited by some scholars to lack of formal governance in the area termed by them after as ungoverned spaces. Lake, (2009, p. 272) argues that the ungoverned areas might be conveniently controlled by the non-state actors such as warlords, religious organizations, rebel groups or traditional elites. Ungoverned areas might mean that these areas are governed differently

(Stanislawski, 2008). It means that non-state entities such as militant groups might govern the ungoverned areas. Callen et al (2015) have highlighted that FATA is an ungoverned territory in Pakistan. Rumi (2012, p. 4) has noted that South Waziristan can be categorized as un-governed area in Pakistan where one of the largest terrorist group with the broadest territorial scope has emerged in the shape of TTP under the shadow of Mahsud tribe. Keister (2014) argues that Taliban ruling from ungoverned spaces of Pakistan are threatening the very sovereignty of the country. It is important to understand the role of ungoverned spaces in the proliferation of militancy through the perspective of political science. The thesis explores the propagation of militancy as a result of weak writ of the state in SWA. The perspectives of failed/fragile states and ungoverned spaces particularly in the borderland dynamics to provided theoretical framework to integrate analysis and findings in the other sections of the dissertation. ―A failed state is a state that is unable to control its territory and uphold its monopoly of violence‖ (Eriksen, 2011, p. 232). The fragile/failed states cannot deliver good governance and incapable to provide other facilities of life particularly in the peripheral areas and therefore become illegitimate and lose popular support (Rotberg, 2003). The Pakistani government/state failed to deliver better governance in the remote areas particularly in the tribal belt. The situation is worse in the tribal areas where mainstream judicial and accountability institutions are not extended until recently. The constitution of Pakistan is not comprehensively extended to the tribal belt, for more than a century FCR was the law. FCR is a black law under which fundamental human rights are violated (Human Rights, 2005). Moreover, there was absence of mainstream law enforcement agencies in the tribal areas which created vacuum in the power/administrative structure. The PA had the judicial, executive and administrative powers in the agency (Ahmed, 2013, p. 60). The concentration of power and authority in one single administrator without any system of checks and balances created weak law enforcement in SWA and FATA. The thesis analyses the weak administrative structure in SWA as one reason for the militants to flourish in SWA. Lack of law enforcement/implementation and prosecution are major causes of terrorism in Pakistan, in SWA in specific. The state‘s law enforcement organizations have failed to provide security to citizens, uphold law and order, combating crimes and terrorism (Abbas, 2011). Ensuring respect and obedience to law and societal formal consent and compliance with the established statutes, acts, rules, regulations and laws is known as law enforcement (Conser et al, 2011). According to Chapman et al (2002) terrorism and law

enforcement are interrelated, it can be a counter-terrorism/insurgency tool, whereas, ineffective law enforcement can be a major cause for terrorist acts in a given state. The Rule of Law Index Report of (2014) has stated that Pakistani administrative agencies are ineffective and inefficient particularly in law execution and implementation processes. The report further highlighted that law violation is common in Pakistan the institution of judiciary is weak, ineffective and expensive in terms of time to resolve ordinary cases. The borderland dynamics explicitly explains the militant infiltration into SWA from Afghanistan especially in the post 9/11 period. According to Seniora & Poitevin (2010) border provide an invaluable opportunity to a nation-state to ensure the internal security thereby preventing external elements/threats. The primary function of a border is of a barrier, to protect an insider from an outsider (Oommen, 1995; Sibley, 1995). Manger (2015) believes that management of national and international boundaries is a difficult and complex task. He argues that unstoppable interaction of the native communities on the border creates problems for nation-states and affects the decision making at the top levels. Osimen, Goddy et al. (2017) have noted that international boundary lines are security and law and order issue for all the states. Seniora & Poitevin (2010) believes that weak borders are risk specifically in the context of international terrorism. ―In contrast to strong states, weak states cannot control their borders‖ (Rotberg, 2003). The thesis explained that borderland perspective explains the issue of pores borders which provided sufficient escape routes for the non-state actors in SWA. The military operations of US and Allied forces in Afghanistan compelled thousands of Al-Qaeeda and Taliban militants to flee to the Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Orakzi, 2009). Ghauri (2009, p. 7) has stated that Pakistan military was sent to SWA in 2002 to protect the border against militant infiltration and built 185 military check posts. The thesis explored the role of pores borders of SWA with Afghanistan and Baluchistan province which facilitated unchecked militant movement. Shor et al (2014) study provide an interesting framework of state repression of human rights and the resultant terrorism/militancy. The repressive state policies in the British times and in the post 9/11 period created hatred and tribal resentment in SWA. Moreover, the inhumane laws of the state in 1980s can be translated into the perspective of state repression and the subsequent violent and law and order situation in Pakistan. In the case of Pakistan, the state policies have been criticized for sponsoring terrorism. Wolf (2017) believes that ―Pakistan has gained the international reputation of being the world‘s foremost exporter of Jihadism”. The state sponsored terrorism typically includes the provision of direct and indirect support to terrorist/militant group in terms of finance, safe

haven, leadership, weapons, information and propaganda and media (Byman, 2008). The perspective of state sponsor terrorism can be applied to Pakistan‘s situation of militancy in the country in general and its relation to the Mahsud tribe in specific. However, the patterns of militancy can be examined in the perspective of the repercussions of the state sponsored terrorism especially in 1980s and onward period. The study of culture and value system of a group or community is important in the emergence and prediction of terrorism. The work of Kruglanski and colleagues‘ (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009) asserts that a group ideology of heroic past and shared reality can play a significant role in violence against other groups/communities. The Mahsuds are proud of their historical rivalries with other tribes in SWA. The thesis explores the history of violence of the Mahsuds against the colonial power and traces its relationship with the militancy in the 21st century. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008); Sageman (2004) and Sageman (2011) have highlighted the importance of social networks, blood ties, kinship, friends circle and relatives in the recruitment and development of terrorist organizations. Many scholars have highlighted scared or shared values and believes of a community as a central force of motivating violence, extremism and even terrorist acts (Atran et al, 2007; Ginges & Atran, 2009; Gelfand et al, 2013). The fighting force of the TTP was predominantly composed of the Mahsud tribesmen which led them to support their own kinsmen at the leadership level (Khattak, 2018). The core reason for the organization of TTP to become weak and fragile lies in the fact that the leadership role was shifted to other Pashtun tribes after the deaths of Baitullah Mahsud, Hakimullah Mahsud and other Mashud leaders (Siddique, 2010; M. Mehmood, personal communication, December 11, 2016). In the same line, several cultural traits of the Pashtuns encourage violence and brutality. The ingredients of Pashtunwali such as Badal and Ghairat, for instance, are some examples which promote brutality and intolerance in the community. The concepts of Badal and Ghairat in extreme cases approve and demand killing of an individual to uphold honor and family pride. The communities living in FATA and SWA observe the Pashtun code in more strict manner. The thesis explains that values and believes which encourages brutality is prone to violence and terrorism. To Serafim (2005) and Sen (2008) there is a cultural perspective to contemporary terrorism. Serafim believes that all form of religiously motivated terrorism including ethnic violence and even Global terrorism all have cultural perspective, even terrorists are the product of culture. She understands religion as an integral and central component of culture. To Serafim terrorism in the contemporary world has its roots in the misinterpretation of Islam by own faith holders, Muslim terrorist. The inalienable and blind

devotion of the tribesmen to Islam as a central part of their culture, misuse of which, is a major reason for the natives to fell a prey to militancy since British times. Many scholars have highlighted religion to be the root cause of terrorism in the World (Jones, 2006; Henne, 2013; Kingsley, 2010). Faith based violence is closely related to historical narrative building and legacies of the past in Pakistan. Narratives are stories and narrative building/explanation presents a number of events linked together which leads to processed outcomes one seeks to explain is unquestioned (Bruner, 1991; Roth, 1988). The reformist/revivalist movements of Shah Waliullah, Sheikh Ahmed Sir Hindi and other such personalities in the 17th, 18th, and early 19th centuries have greatly impacted Pakistan since 1947. The emergence of Pakistan thereby distancing from other religion is picture- perfect examples in this regard. The narrative of the state that the basis of the creation of Pakistan is ideological, if one question basis of the state questions Islam inevitably. The history of Pakistan up to 21st century is infused with radical notions in the social, political and legal framework. The historical narratives building in the early stages of development of the state led many regimes to pursue radical policies. The Afghan Jihad in the 1980s and the establishment of thousands of Madrassas, in FATA and the adjacent areas, to promote Jihadist culture was a trendsetter in this context. The local history of the Mahsud tribe also highlights historical basis of Islamist violence. Numerous fights of the Mahsuds and radical movements against the British government have demonstrated the historical contexts of religious violence in SWA. The emergence of the most notorious militant groups in the Mahsud area of SWA and the subsequent fight against the Pakistani-army/security-forces in many ways demonstrates historical context of faith-based violence. The work of Hamelin et al (2010), Caruso & Schneider (2011) and Piazza (2011) have highlighted root causes of terrorism as economic imbalance, unemployment, poverty, deprivation and inequality. To Feldman (2009) root cause of terrorism include social injustice, discrimination, poverty, unemployment, economic imbalance and illiteracy. About 60% of the population lives below the poverty line in Pakistan (Dar, 2014). The situation in FATA is worse. Ahmad (2013, p. 15) has noted that FATA is the most backward area in the country. Goldstein (2005) has noted that unemployment is closely related to terrorism. Weak economies are in no position to provide sound employment opportunities thereby creating grievances among unemployed which provides fertile ground for militancy. The work of Becker (1999) and Grossman (1991) have supported the above argument by highlighting that a society with sufficient employment opportunities is less likely to supply labor to militant organizations. A report indicates high ratio of underemployment in Pakistan, the situation is worse in many areas like FATA (CIA World

Fact Book, 2013). The area of South Waziristan offers little economic opportunities (Williams, 2005, p. 5). Report of the USAID on SWA explores that major chunk of the labor force in SWA is unskilled, around 43% of the household are dependent on local remittance and 14% of the families depends on the foreign remittance (Moghal. S. Y. at el, 2012, p. 8). It is noted that Pakistan‘s economy is fragile and is unable to facilitate major bulk of youth with employment opportunities which has provided huge labor force for militant organizations to recruit (Haider et al, 2015, p. 229-230). Moreover, a community where literacy rate is high is less likely to fell a prey to terrorism and vice versa. According to the report of USAID literacy rate of SWA is 20.3% (Moghal, 2012, p. 13). The female education in specific shows grim picture in the report which is 5.5% against male literacy rate of 31.9%. Kundi (May 3rd, 2018) has noted that Pakistan has one of the largest youth bulge, 64 percent of the population is under 30 years of age. SWA is also reported to have a huge youth bulge population (M. Ishtiaq, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Ali and Hafeez (June 25th, 2017) assert that youth participation in the violent and negative activities cannot be ignored in Pakistan and consider youth bulge as a ticking time bomb in a country like Pakistan where economic and job opportunity are scarce. Majority of the tribal youth is dissatisfied with the existing socio-political structures due to corruption, favoritism and lack of employment opportunities (Shad & Ahmed, 2018, p. 130). Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal (January 2013, p. 8) reports the Taliban in the Pashtun belt of Pakistan have recruited hundreds of young men. Tajik (2010, p. 10-13) emphases that most of the suicide bomber are very young and comes from the Mahsud dominated areas in SWA. He further asserts that 70 percent suicide bombers belong to the Mahsud tribe. Another source reports that Taliban in Pakistan have been recruiting unemployed youngster and offering salaries many have been made to carried out suicide attacks Qazi, 2011, p. 591-595). The youth in SWA are prone to indulge in unfavorable activities such as militant outfits because of unemployment in the tribal belt which is very high as compared to the rest of the country (Shah & Areas, 2018, p. 9). The thesis has explored that the socio-cultural and political institutions of the Mahsud tribe are transforming. Many scholars and writers have identified industrialization, globalization, urbanization, scientific and technological advancement as causes of social transformation (Stanely, 1997; Taylor, 1998; Castle, 1999; Groenewald, 2000; Castle, 2001). The socio-cultural and political institutions of the Mahsud tribe are transforming in the wake of conflict and the subsequent migration. Exploring literature on social and political transformation reveals that there is lack of academic and investigative based

research on the communities that are directly affected by war/conflict. The study has adopted the theoretical perspective of Castles (2003) which speculates that the conflict and forced migration severely affects economic infrastructure, social and cultural settings, weakens social bonds and break up communities which leads to social transformation. In the post 9/11, to suppress militancy, military operations were lunched by the government due to which various tribes in the tribal belt were forced to migrate. The thesis tries to identify the patterns of social and political transformation on the Mahsud tribe of SWA in the wake of conflict and the subsequent displacement of the tribe from their villages. The rapid sequence of social and political transformation has noted due to sudden exposure to urban way of life which sets unique research background. The transformation processes among the Mahsuds has given rise to challenges/issues and identity formation by transformation in the tradition way of life. The Mahsud tribe belong to a conflict-ridden area in Pakistan has been taken as a case study. The transformational processes in this community are unique and interesting to study. The social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter have made easy the flow of information for media organizations and the general public (Aveseh, 2012). According to Udanor et al (2016) ―In recent times the social media has been playing significant role in dictating the political tempo of many developing nations. With real time mobile Internet, every youth now has in his hands the power to determine his future. This was demonstrated during the Arab countries uprising in the last five years across different Arab nations. Monarchs, dictators and ‗life-presidents‘, who were hitherto unchallengeable were unseated through the power of the social media‖. As quoted in (Udanor et al, 2016) Ali (2011) argued that in 2011, Facebook and Twitter mobilized 5 Million people in Egypt to attend the protest against the then government. The masses are using modern communication and media channels to form large sharing networks with unprecedented fast pace (Howard & Hussain, 2011). The information collected from media sharply spread in the society within hours. To Olorunnisola (2013) modern media is a major source of socio-political and cultural change in the contemporary nations. The social media in particular has brought about enormous changes in the society Siddiqui & Singh, 2016). The emergence of Mahsud Tahafuz Movement (MTM) and Pashtun Tahafuz Movement among the Mahsud tribesmen of SWA happened only on the bedrock of social media. The state/government cannot control social media as it does control electronic or print media. Therefore, it is important to study the concept of media and most importantly that of social media in the paradigm of ethnic

pursing among the Mahsuds. Moreover, the contribution of media/social-media in the socio-cultural transformation of the Mahsud tribe. The work of McDowell (1991) and Bhasin (2006, p. 3) have been taken into consideration to study masculinity and patriarchy. The theoretical models of James & Saville-Smith (1995) and Cornwall & Lindisfarne (1995) were adopted to define deprivation/subordination of women due to cultural and religious taboos. The systematic state subordination of women through legal, social reforms and policies is major hurdle in the improvement of the status of women and provision of equal rights (Swaminathan, 1987). The transformation of socio-political and legal institutions on Islamist lines in Pakistan has stripped women of their rights in the country. Anita (2004) described communities in Pakistan predominantly masculine. Her research has highlighted that indigenous people have made religion and native culture as a bedrock to deny equal rights to women. It is very true about the tribal societies of Pakistan, where the identity of women is considered inferior to men particularly in the decision-making context. Gul et al (2016) have argued that the social setting, cultural and traditional background are major hurdles to guarantee of equal rights for women among the Mahsuds in particular and in the tribal societies in general. The continuous denial of equal rights in civil, political, social and cultural life has led to the deprivation, unawareness, illiteracy and poverty of the women among the Mahsuds. Therefore, after the displacement it has created many problems for them to tackle issues in the security situation, in the IDP camps, in availing health, education and other facilities and became victim of social evils.

1.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM Pakistan‘s tribal agencies (FATA) have emerged as the hub of militancy and extremism in the country. The rise of religious militancy in post 9\11 period has been devastating to the country not only in terms of the cost to human security but also the damage to its political and social environment. This thesis attempts to investigate the rise of religious militancy in South Waziristan Agency with special reference to the role of the Mahsuds. The study focuses the role of the Mahsud in two dimensions: involvement of this tribe in militancy which resulted in the rise of Taliban in Pakistan; and consequently, the impacts which the tribe had to endure on its socio-cultural and political institutions under Talibanization. An analysis of leadership transformations has been complemented by exploring the changes in indigenous conflict resolution bodies, including the Jirga. Cultural practices including Athan, Pardah, Gham and Khadi concepts are greatly damaged due to the extremist influences. A further emphasis is on explaining how identity of

Mahsud tribe is being challenged by the alleged preference to religious bonding instead of blood ties among the tribesmen.

1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  To highlight the origin of religious militancy in South Waziristan Agency in the post 9/11 period.  To explore the effects of religious militancy particularly on the Mahsud tribe of South Waziristan Agency.

1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS The main question underlying the research is: Why religious militancy is generally, linked with tribes living in Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas? This study revolves around the following questions:  What are the reasons for the relatively greater involvement of Mahsuds in post 2001 religious militancy in Pakistan‘s tribal areas?  What impacts religious militancy has had on the socio-cultural and political institutions of the Mahsuds?

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY Religious militancy has emerged as one of the most significant problems threatening the very security, stability and sovereignty of Pakistan. The rise of the Taliban movement in Pakistan‘s tribal belt (FATA) is one manifestation of the spread of faith- based violence in the country. Religious extremism has heightened in the country especially in the wake of 9/11 developments, when Pakistan was made to play the part of so called ‗frontline state‘ in the ‗War on Terror.‘ Such militancy has impacted severely the socio-economic and political fabric of the society and poses serious challenges to the writ of the state itself (Mufti, 2012). The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has emerged as the breeding ground of militancy in the country. Burki (2009, 1) discusses that militant organization such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has been drawing both its leadership and manpower, most significantly from the South Waziristan Agency (SWA), which is mainly populated by the Mahsud and Wazir tribes. More than 50,000 people have fallen prey to the menace of extremism in the last few years in Pakistan. Burki, (2009) and Yazdani, (2009, p. 4-6) reported more than 200,000 tribesmen mostly belonging to Mahsud tribes displaced into internal migration since 2009. Approximately, 70,000 families of the Mahsud tribe are living as IDPs in different parts of the country since June 2009 because of Operation Rah-i-Nijat against

TTP (Mehsud, March 9th, 2015). Many these are still displaced. The current religious militancy in Waziristan has multifarious consequences for Pakistan, in general, and for the FATA region, in particular. However, the most significant impacts of this conflict are on the tribes living in Waziristan especially the Mahsud tribes. The available literature is deficient in explaining the post 2004 development in South Waziristan especially in the wake of military intervention. The available literature on Mahsud tribes and the ongoing militancy is scattered and less focused on transformation dynamics. Therefore, the research focuses religious militancy as contributed by the Mahsuds of South Waziristan Agency. Further, governmental misunderstandings with the Mahsud tribes, to be explored through this research, can open avenues of resolving militancy issues in the South Waziristan Agency. Additionally, the examination of Talibanization and its impact on the tribal culture and political practices have emphasized the deep-rooted transformation of the tribal region.

1.8 METHODOLOGY The methodology of the research is qualitative. Both secondary and primary data sources have been used to inquire into the research questions. Primary data was collected through interviews based on semi-structured questions that was complemented secondary data sources. The interview respondents only included Mahsud tribal elders, professionals, businessman and ordinary tribesmen, government officers‘ serving and retired in the Agency. Other respondents included journalists, and FATA members of the parliament. For secondary data sources, research papers, books, journals, published and unpublished PhD and MPhil dissertations, newspaper reports and those compiled by the FATA Research Centre and Government departments have been analyzed. The interview questions were semi-structured. Interviewees were divided into four groups, separate questionnaires were prepared for each group. Group one included general tribesmen such as local Mahsuds, IDPs, businessmen, teachers, doctors, professionals and students. The interview question for this group were related to the nature and rise of religious militancy in SWA, factors responsible for it and the tribal role in it. In the second group political, tribal and religious leadership were interviewed. The questions were related to; the history, origin and leadership of the Mahsud tribe, famous/notorious personalities and specific sections and subsections of the tribe who actively participated in the militancy against the British and Pakistani government in SWA, the invasion of Afghanistan by USSR and USA and its impacts on FATA and SWA in terms of militancy, the potential reasons for the terrorism in FATA, the relation of the Mahsud tribe or some of its tribesmen in the formation and rise of TTP in SWA, the socio-

cultural and political transformation of Mahsud tribe in the wake of terrorism, role of Jirga in the present and how it is different from past practices. The FCR and its future. The interviewee were asked questions related to; the concept of Mullah in Waziristan its share in militancy and the meaning of Jihad and its applicability in the times of Great Britain, USSR and in the post 9/11 period. In the third civil and military bureaucrats and affiliated officials were asked questions related to the issues of IDPs and their rehabilitation processes, the responsible actors in the rise of militancy in SWA, strengthen and weaknesses of Jirga and the institution of Malikship, which administrative constitutional status suits SWA and FATA region the best, suggestion for peaceful tribal region, the invasion of Afghan War and its impacted FATA and SWA and potential reasons for the terrorism in FATA. The fourth group comprised of intellectual and experts such as Journalists, lawyers, intellectuals and NGO forum. The questions included the challenges faced by tribal unity and identity of the Mahsuds, the patterns of social, cultural and political transformation after the displacement, the current situation of IDPs, the future of Mahsud tribe in SWA and steps towards peaceful prospects in SWA. The areas chosen for field work were SWA, the stronghold of Mahsuds for centuries, districts of Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. The towns of Serwakai, Makin, Ladha, Kotkai, Spin, Shahur and Chagmali were visited for field work. These areas remained the stronghold of TTP. I chose district Tank and Dera Ismail Khan because huge number of IDPs belonging to Mahsud tribe are present in this area. Moreover, these areas are adjacent to SWA therefore huge number of businessmen, officers and already settled families of the Mahsud tribe are living for decades. In six visits, the duration of time period comprised of seven months from June 2016 to December 2016, to SWA, Dera Ismail Khan and Tank, interviews were conducted from the tribal elders, Maliks, common tribesmen, IDPs, professionals, journalists, politicians, businessman, Mullahs, militants, students, formal and semiformal government officers. Interviews were conducted in Peshawar from time to time because this place is my current residence and hosts a number of renowned Mahsud families. There were major hurdles in conducting interviews in district Tank and SWA. Due to security reasons the Interviewees in these areas were reluctant to answer the questions especially related to militants and military. In both these areas the atmosphere was tense and activities were limited, the presence of huge number of security personnel was one major reason. However, the environment in Dera Ismail Khan was friendly and more

encouraging during interviews. Local businessman and even ordinary citizens were more open to questions. Another hurdle was to build trust with the respondents, in many cases I tried very hard to convince the respondents that the interviews are for academic reasons. Due to my local connections to an extent I was successful to have their trust. In any case, major number of the respondents preferred their identities to be kept secret, including politicians, Maliks, government and military officers for security reasons. However, lawyers, journalists and especially student of universities were more open during interviews. Interviewees belonged to these groups were straight forward and very clear in their answers which provided in-depth insight of the related issues. In SWA, state officials stopped me from interviewing the natives despite showing official departmental letter of permission. Once, the military personnel told me to leave the area of SWA instantly. During interviews in SWA and Tank, the local administrators told me to show positive image of the state institutions and their role for peaceful and developmental processes in SWA. The personnel of political administration were found very reluctant to give a brief interview. The political agent himself was not willing to give a formal interview. The thesis used secondary data resources to fill up the gaps and vacuums left behind by the primary data which include unpublished research work, books, periodicals, journals, newspapers, internet sources, reports, monographs, commentaries and articles. The secondary data resources very indispensable in providing theoretical framework to the thesis and to analyze and explore historical and descriptive parts. However, there are severe limitation to access the secondary data such as research articles, journals and books. The HEC digital libraries helped to some extent. The visit to foreign university under HEC IRSIP program was helpful to access secondary resources on the topic. I was unsuccessful in my endeavors to locate a manograph ‗Mizh‘ written by Alen Howell on the Mahsud tribe. Interestingly, library in UCLA made the book available in two days. 1.9 PLAN OF THE THESIS The thesis is comprised of total 5 chapters. The first chapter titled ‗Introduction‘, explains research questions, provides literature review analysis, objectives of the research, highlights justification of the work, discussing and exploring theoretical framework, methodological approaches and outlines plan of the thesis. Chapter II ‗History of Religious Militancy in Pakistan‘ explores the growth of religious violence in an historical context. The aims are to decipher the genesis of religious violence in the tribal areas and impactful connection in the post 1947 period in Pakistan. Chapter III titled, ‗History of Religious

Militancy in SWA‘, explore the origin and history of the Mahsud tribe and their violent relationship with Colonial power. This part of the dissertation aims to understand history of religious militancy in colonial times in SWA and the role of the Mahsud tribe in it. Chapter IV, ‗Religious Militancy in SWA in Post 9/11 Period‘ analyses the impact of historical contexts of militancy on the contemporary rise of Taliban in Mahsud area. The counter militancy strategies of the state are explored. Chapter V, ‗Socio-Cultural and Political transformation of the Mahsud tribe‘, analyses the impact of militancy on the culture, identity, way of life and traditions of the Mahsud tribe. It debates and analyses the institution of Malikship, Jirga and the apparatus of traditional administrative structure in SWA in the wake of contemporary dynamics of change.

CHAPTER – 2

HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN

2.1 INTRODUCTION This chapter details the historical context of religious militancy in Pakistan. The chapter is divided in to four stages based on the growth of religious militancy in the specific time. The first stage explores the pre-1947 era of religious violence in the historical context which can be traced back to the 18th and 19th century Islamic reformist/revivalist movements in India. Efforts to preserve Islamic identity in the sub- continent predominantly after the decline of the Mughal rule led to the reformist movements within the Muslim community in the India. The recent radical activities in Pakistan are in one way an outgrowth of the reformist movements of the past. The second part discusses and analyzes post-1947 period, the involvement of state institutions and various governments in fostering religious militancy in Pakistan. The state strategy of using ideology as a foreign and domestic policy tool can be reflected in its support to the Jihadist in Kashmir. In the post-1979 period, the third part of the chapter, socio-political policies of Zia and legal transformation on Islamist lines are examined and presents an analysis of the emergence of militant/sectarian radical groups. In the same period, the incorporation of the religious injunctions in the structural, institutional and constitutional framework of the state are investigated to understand the growth of militant mindset in Pakistan. The fourth part of the chapter emphases on the post 9/11 period and the growth of religious militancy in Pakistan which includes the rise of militant/Taliban groups in FATA. The religious fanaticism possesses a profound threat to the state of Pakistan today. It has affected all facets of public/private life. Pakistan has inherited a variety of ethnic, sectarian and linguistic communities, divided not only in urban-rural categories but also into two territorial halves. The only common apparatus was thought to be an ideology to unite these diverse communities. The ideology of Islam proved instrumental in the creation of Pakistan. Same ideological tools were used to administer state affairs. The Islamization process started with the declaration of the Objective Resolution as an integral part of the constitution. The idea was to achieve national integration and avoid the resentment of the clerks. However, the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 proved to exploit Islam ineffective. The use of religion by the state at national levels had severe impacts on the security of the state. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamization policies of Zia played

primary role in this context. In huge quantity, arms and ammunition were transferred through FATA into Afghanistan for fighting the Soviet invasion. It contributed in the establishment of militant organizations in 1980s on the Pak-Afghan borderland. The Afghan Jihad empowered clergy in terms of finance and gunpower. After the Afghan Jihad thousands of trained Jihadist were cut loose by the state; which resulted in the emergence of numerous militant groups in Pakistan.5 After the incident of 9/11 international scenario coupled with state sponsored Jihad altogether altered the future shape of extremism in the region. Juergensmeyer, M. (2000, p. 5) has argued that in the contemporary world the term ‗terrorism‘ is frequently associated with the disenfranchised groups who commits violence to have power and influence, their intense dedication to cause and the dangerous unpredictability given them vast influence as compared to their meager resources. Abulafia (2001, p. xi) has noted that issues emerging from ideological systems of beliefs are as consistent as to the contemporary world in the 21st century as they were in the Middle ages. Religion is the primary motivation behind most of the terrorist acts from the last few decades of the 20th century including Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist and Christian. Social scientists have described terrorism as a violence by a group for political motives (Laqueur, 1987, p. 72; Wieviorka, 1995, p. 599-600; Bruce, 1998, pp. 33-44). In 1980, the US state department has listed hardly a single religious violent organization. After 18 years in 1998, the same department listed thirty most dangerous groups, more than half of them were religious organizations (Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1998). Bruce (1998, p. 91) has noted dramatic increase of religious motivated terrorist groups in the same period up to twenty-six. The former Secretary of State of the US Warren Christopher (1998, p. 446) believed that terrorism in the name of religion is a huge security issue we face in during the Cold War. Al-Rasheed & Shterin (2009, p. xviii) explained that militant Islamic groups are political motivated in the 21st century which have become central issues in the ‗war on terror‘. Pape (2005, p. 22-3) has noted that the basic logic of suicide sort of religious terrorism involves political, social and individual levels. Religious discourses are not capable of trigging mass movement or mobilizing people on its own but is mere tool political and economic struggles (Al-Rasheed & Shterin, 2009, p. xx). The wave of suicide bombing in Pakistan originated from SWA in 21st century was a direct reaction to the penetration of the secular ideologies. The arrival of Pakistan Army into SWA immediately after joining the camps of the Western Powers made it easy for the native militant

5 Mullah is a term usually used in the sub-continent for a Muslim who leads in prayers and must be learned in the basic principles of the religion. He might have knowledge of Islamic theology and Muslim law. 25

organization to frame the state as preacher of secular nationalistic ideology. The popular perspective was ‗Islam is in danger‘ but the struggle was to attain territorial occupation, political power and promulgate parallel governance system. Religious violence in the contemporary Pakistan is more dangerous than ever because it upholds the theory of the survival of the fittest. It attempts to purify the ideas and beliefs of Islam through violent means thereby affecting others, violence committed by the militant groups against the other sects of Islam are best example in this context.

2.2 MILITANCY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE The roots of the crisis of Islamic militancy can be traced back to the pre-Colonial period in South Asian history. Two of the prominent Muslim reformist/revivalist Sheikh Ahmed Sirhindi and Shah Walliullah attempted to preserve the Islamic model of life in 17th and 18th century respectively. These religious clerics were concerned about the amalgamation of the socio-cultural institutions of Hinduism and Islam. The former successfully tried to preserve the early Islamic model by discarding the adopted notions within the spiritual activities which is reflected in his popularly given name as Mujadid Alf Saani, the reviver of the second Millennium (Ashraf Zahid, 2009). The later carried out the mission of his predecessor with more vigor and enthusiasm. The Muslim theologians looked towards kingship and nobility to preserve the glory and grandeur of Islam. In the time of Shah Walliullah, the Islamic Empire was scattered and lost its power and prestige in the sub-Continent (Hardy, 1972. p. 29-30). Consequently, he devised an association where scholars can be prepared to propagate the definition and reformist agendas of Islam in India (Robinson, 1998, P. 108). His writings on reformist agendas, formation of Madrassas coupled with sermons in the mosques and public spaces influenced students. These institutions produced many Muslim leaders who started the mission of glorification of Islam in the region. Some of these leaders travelled to Hijaz, former name of Saudi Arabia, which brought drastic changes in their individual character and understanding of religion. These leaders included Haji Sharaitullah, Syed Ahmed Shaheed and Shah Ismail Shaheed who indulged in the radical undertakings focused on the ideological origins (Mehmood, Nasiruddin & Rizwan 2014. P. 1: Tahir 2010). There is limited literature available on the subject, it is still perplexing what elements or conditions in Hijaz led to the transformation in their individual characters. The emergence of the two most prominent Islamic schools of thoughts in the early 20th century, Wahhabism and Deobandi, have a historical relationship.

There are various versions of Islamic divisions in Pakistan such as Shia, Barelvi, Ahle-Hadis, Ismaili. The Deobandi group is one of the dominant groups in many parts of the state. This sect is a more rigid; fundamentalist in views draws its principles from the Islam of 7th century and upholds the idea of Jihad as an indispensable principle of Islam.6 It disapproves all the modern schools of thoughts of Islam which brings it closer to Wahhabism concept of Islam, dominant in Saudi Arabia (Monte Palmer & Princess Palmer, 2008, p. 126; Niblock, 2006, p. 157). The Wahhabism defines purist Muslim in terms of extreme fundamentalist and pan-Islamist political outline (Kotia, 2010, p. 7). Most of the militant groups in Pakistan are affiliated in some form with the Deobandi sect (Ali, 2008. P. 125). The Saudi Arabian interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan is only possible due to the close resemblance of the Wahhabism and Deobandi versions. These two school of thoughts shares identical ideas with insignificant variations. There is no other school of thought in the sub-continent which has close connection with the Wahhabism. The Saudi Arabia provides funding to the militants, helps in the proliferation of Deobandi Madrassas and extremist literature, stimulating sectarian violence in Pakistan. 7 There were strong historical connections between the Islamic versions professed in Hijaz and in United India. The former version was/is considered superior generally. Islam groomed and expanded in Hijaz, the center of the ancient Islamic Empire and of course, the impression of Arabic language gives it superiority over others. The Muslims of the sub- continent harbored radical ideas from the land of the origin of Islam. It can also be asserted that Islam in Arabia and in the sub-continent, before the emergence of the two most prominent Islamic schools of thoughts of Islam in the early 20th century, Wahabism and Deobandi, have a dominant historical relationship. As Islam is practiced in today‘s Saudi Arabia, upholds radical and primitive ideas, other sects are condemned, practices of primitive Islamic punishments are still underway.

Some of the travelers of the Hijaz were involved in militant fighting at leadership level in the Battle of Balakot, currently a part of Mansehra District of KP province, in 1831, which was in fact a trendsetter for the forthcoming progression of religious aggression in the region (Jalal, 2008, p. 276). 8 The battle and its aftermath scenario provide ideology of Jihad for the future Islamist movements in the region. The fight at Balakot gave the Muslims of the sub-continent memorials of inspirations in the form of

6 Jihad simply means to struggle, it might be a fight against the enemies of Muslims/Islam. 7 Madrassa, an Arabic term means an educational institution, e.g. school, college or university. Madrassa in the contemporary world is more often associated with Islamic religious education only. 8 Balakot is a small city in district Mansehra, KP province. 27

most known freedom fighter in South Asia, Sayyid Ahmad of Rai Bareilly (1786–1831) and Shah Ismail (1779–1831). The graves of these freedom fighters are in district Mansehra. Many Jihadist camps were established in 1990s during the Kashmir struggle in the same region (ICG N°46, 2006). 9 The freedom fighters in post 9\11 were mobilized in the inspiration of Jihad of the battle of Balakot and its martyrs (Jalal, 2008, p. 2). The suggested influence of the battle on the Jihad in Kashmir demonstrates the historical perspective of religious militancy. Moreover, the Jihad of Balakot and the violence of today aim at establishing Islamic Sharia. 10 2.3 POST 1947 ERA: THE FUSION OF RADICAL NOTIONS Attempts of the redemption of Islamic ideology in the first half of the 18th century gradually transformed in to obsessive actions. Chengappa (2001) argues that the struggle eventually rendered in to distancing from the Hindus in the shape of distinct homeland, Pakistan. The founder of the nation, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah gave emphasis on the narrative of separate identity for Muslims based on religious differences (Behera & Joseph, 2004, p.180). Interestingly Mr. Jinnah, a progressive leader and Western educated, used religion as a device to accomplish his goals before the partition. After the partition, Jinnah made it clear in his speeches that Pakistan is not supposed to be a theocratic state (Ahmed, 2007, p. 22). This was significant because most of the forthcoming leaders followed the footprints of the founding father particularly in explaining and incorporating religious notions in the state policy at national level, however, they overlooked a vital piece in this background. The use of ideology in achieving Pakistan was exclusively a different issue compared to manage the state affairs in ideological scheme. The unexpected demise of the founder, a challenging situation arose for the then politicians. The secular leaders demanded a non-theocratic state, on one hand, the people affiliated with religious clergy emphasized on the Sharia in the state, on the other hand. The then Prime Minister intervened to handle the situation and presented Objectives Resolution in 1949 which resulted in the institutionalization of the Islamic concepts in the constitutional framework of the state. In 1953, violent riots broke out in the city of Lahore over the issue of the religious status of Qadianis, the violence resulted in the imposition of first Martial Law in the

9 Jihadist is an individual or a group involved in Jihad, Islamic Holy war. In the Modern literature, such a person/group can be known as Islamic/Muslim militant. 10 Sharia is an Islamic law composed of the documentations of the Holy Quran and the teachings (Hadith) of the Holy Prophet (SWA). Its application in the Modern nation-state system is a matter of dispute among various Islamic school of thoughts, specifically between the Muslim traditionalists and the reformists 28

history of Pakistan (Irfani, 2004). 11 The Ullema primarily from Deobandi school of thought and the affiliated groups formed an alliance against the religious heterogeneity, their victory was eventually illustrated through a later provision in the constitution of 1973 by the proclamation of Qadianis as non-Muslims (Ahmed, 2007, p.44). In 1962, muscle of the clergy was demonstrated in the streets when Ayub‘s constitution retitled the name of the state by omitting the word ‗Islamic‘. The dictator was at the crown of his power, yet he was forced to rethink his constitutional proposal. The triumph boosted the cadre of the Deobandi groups and reinforced their confidence in attaining religious objectives through official state channels. ZA Bhutto, representing one of the so called secular political parties the leader and the then head of the state, made the decision which proclaimed Qadianis as non-Muslims. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto contributed in the radicalization of the state machinery and the general discourse has diverse impacts on the socio-political institutions in Pakistan. To counter Dawood‘s clandestine efforts for Pashtunistan Bhutto regime wholeheartedly supported Islamist Jihadist like Gulbadin Hikmatyar, Rasool Sayyaf and Gillani to intensify miltant activities in Afghanistan in 1975 (Javeed & Fatima, 2013, p .63).12 Bhutto‘s administration supported leaders like Burhanudin Rabbani, Ahmed Shah Masood to disrupt already fragile law and order situation in Afghanistan (Rahman, 2012, p.33). The impassionate study of history highlights that it was Bhutto reign which was responsible for initiating Jihadist endeavors in Afghanistan. Such efforts inspired dictators like Zia to support Islamist Jihadist against the Soviets which promoted radicalization.

11 The term Qadiani originates from Qadian, located in India and Paksitan, a birth place of the founder of Ahmadiyya movement, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani. The term refers for a version of Islam from South Asia. Other terms refer to the same versions are Ahmedi/Lahori/Mirzai. The sect is the most excluded one among the Muslims. Many schools of thought of Islam such as Deobandi consider the Qadiani as non-Muslims. 12 Pashtunistan is an idea of separate homeland for Pashtuns living in Pakistan and Afghanistan coined Pashtun nationalist/separatist movements. 29

Source; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/cia-maps-publications/map-downloads/Pakistan_Admin.pdf 2.4 POST 1947 ERA AND STRENGTHENING OF RADICALIZATION The issue of Islamic nature of the state was resolved to some degree by the declaration of objective resolution as an integral part of the constitution. The title of the state in the constitution of 1956, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, gave symbolic representation as demanded by the clergy. However, conflicts emerged among various religious groups on the question of explanation of Islam in the legal structure. In the first three decades, after the inception of Pakistan, the religious elite of various sects of Islam struggled to dominate each other. Ultimately, Zia regime advocated Deobandi Islam at the state level, which gave rise to religious fanaticism and created gap between various sects (Behuria, 2008). The Shia sect in particular was strapped to the corner. In response Shia community drew its support from Iran and established defensive Shia militant wings (Irfani, 2004; Haleem, 2003; Chandran, 2003). Shah (2014) and Rana (2011, p. 5) argues that the Iranian Islamist revolution in 1979 invigorated Shia community in Pakistan. In 1980s religious extremism reached at its peak. The Islamization process in Pakistan coupled with radicalization in the neighboring countries resulted in the emergence of violent sectarian/militant groups such as Lashkar-i-Jangvi (LJ), Sunni Tehreek Barelvi groups (ST), Jamath-i-Ahl-e-Sunath, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Sipa-i- Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) (Jones, 2002). The Deobandi groups including SSP and LJ pursued sectarian violence activities chiefly in the areas of Sothern-Central Panjab and various parts of KP and Sindh province. In Pakistan, sectarian violence has external reasons as well. The two states represent Sunni and Shia schools i.e. Saudi Arabia and Iran are involved in the sectarian violence directly or indirectly in the Muslim World particularly after the period of 1979 (Shah, 2014). The hostility of Saudi Arabia and Iran has intensified sectarian violence in the Muslim World and invited the academia from around the world to write on the subject. Most of the literature on sectarianism in Pakistan

and the neighboring region is written in the post 1979 period (Irfani, 2004; Stern, 2000; Nasr, 2000; Nasr, 2002). After 1979, the number of religious groups dramatically increased in Pakistan. In 2002, as many as 239 ideological groups were identified as operational at national, provincial and local quarters (Rana, 2011, p. 5). However, state registered religious political groups were 58 and militant organization at least 24 which are active in FATA and other parts of Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2002, p. 133). Majority of these groups were created in 1980s. Rana (2002) available literature suggests that most of the religious factions at present are break-away or sub-groups of the five parent religious groups that emerged in the 1950s. He believes that the religious political parties have been a part of main-stream political parties with fundamental objective of Islamization of the state through democratic processes. Abbas (2005) believes that the main stream political parties have militant wings or indirectly associated with militant groups and religious violence. The radical groups tend to implement Islam through forceful/violent means. They seek to eliminate other sects of Islam that do not share their version and enforce Shariah purely of primitive times first at the national level and ultimately to transform the entire world (Iqbal, 2010). To some scholars, religious extremism at the global level did not spread after the fall of the Soviet Union or after the incident of 9\11, in the case of Pakistan and its neighboring region. To them Islamist extremism at the transnational level was in progress even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Hashmi (2009, p. 13), for example, stresses that the foreign policy of Pakistan emphasizing brotherhood with the Islamic states, particularly with Saudi Arabia and Iran, is responsible for the evolution of religious extremism in the country. He argues that the notion in Pakistan foreign policy of brotherhood with Muslim nations, invited Saudi Arabia to indulge in the internal affairs of Pakistan. Hashmi, however, does not explain the regional setting and internal picture of the state in the context of security and ideological conditions before and after 1979.

Source: Spearhead Research. Harnessing intellectual resources for innovative solutions. Retrieved from http://spearheadresearch.org/index.php/maps_graphs/map-of-religious-distribution-in-pakistan

The year of 1979 is noted for its significance in the history of Pakistan for the unforeseen swings in the regional security and political transformations. The events followed in the post 1979 period include the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Zia‘s Islamization policies and the Iranian ideological revolution. These events had great impacts on the region and played significant role in the intensification of extremism in the region in general. The fight to counter the Communism for political motives on the transnational quarters was fused with the Islamic notion of Jihad, which resulted in the radicalization and destabilization of Pakistan (Ahmer, 2011, p. 48). Consequently, it led in the proliferation of arms smuggling and radical/sectarian groups in the Pak-Afghan borderland (Ashraf, 2010). The Iranian revolution of 1979 gave rise to excitement amongst Shia sect in Pakistan. The influx of Afghan refugees predominately Deobandi Muslims troubled the security settings in terms of sectarian context within the state. Some of the sectarian violent groups professing the Deobandi school of thought trained in the Afghan war, had affiliations with terrorist groups operating at international levels (Malik, 2008: Shah, 2014, p. 443). In the late 1980s Sipa Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Laskar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) were allegedly involved in the sectarian violence largely against the Shia sect (CGAR, 2009, p. 4). Initially these groups focused their activities in South and Central Punjab and some parts of KP province but with the passage of time their network feasted nationwide. Some

of these militant groups served the state particularly in the Zia regime. Laskar-e-Taiba focused its activities in the Indian occupied Kashmir to serve state interest (ICG, 2009, p. 11). A violent Shia group known as Sipa-e-Muhmmad rose as a reaction to protecting interests of its sect from the domination of the Deobandi offshoots. The SSP and LJ are offensive, intended to attack assets of Shia community, the Sipa-e-Mohammad is largely a defensive, to protect Shia community from the radical Deobandi groups by attacking their personnel, radical group (M. Aslam, personal communication, January 11, 2015). The categorization is included based on the operational outlooks of these sectarian groups. The ideological revolution of Iran in 1979 influenced the activities of the Shia community in Pakistan to have more rights and share in power structure. The strength of Shia community was demonstrated in the huge appearance in public against the Zakat ordinance alarmed the Deobandi school which led to the emergence of anti-Shia units in the state (M. Adnan, personal communication, January 12, 2015). The Deobandi syndicate already grew powerful on the bedrock of Jihadist activities coupled with the Madrassas support with sponsorship of Saudi Arabia. There were number of sects and varied versions of Islam, however, Deobandi school was embraced for the theoretical and practical explanations of Islamization processes in the state (ICG, 2005, p. 12). The Saudi government invested enormous sums in the establishment of Madrassas in FATA to ensure expansion of Wahabi Islam in the region. Ideological political parties in Pakistan wholeheartedly supported the new network of Madrassas and got involved directly to make it a success. Most of the Taliban from Pakistan emerged from these Madrassas. The Taliban ended fighting among various Jihadi groups in Afghanistan and installed small establishments of extreme Islamic nature in 1994 (Gasper, 2001, p. 7). Zia‘s Islamization process and enormous support to Jihadist ensured the emergence of militant movements. The Afghan war trained more than one hundred thousand freedom fighters from around the world (Rashid, 1999, p. 78). The war produced a unique extremist movement in the appellation of global Jihad. Thousands of Madrassas were established with the financial support of Saudi Arabia and the United States to provide muscular support to the Jihadist (Gasper, 2001, p. 7-8; Online Journal, 2014). After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and even after the incident of 9\11 in the borderland of Pak- Afghan, the Jihadi activities were continued unimpeded. Resolute training and prolong tactical experience turned the Jihadists into huge liability. Despite array of warnings from the experts, as these groups might become a threat even for the assets of the United States itself in the future. The US desperate to counter Communism, disregarded the consequences, wholeheartedly supported religious groups in the Afghan war (Haqqani,

2004, p. 93). Bulks of the militants fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan are now fighting the US, the allied forces and the Pakistani military in the post 9\11. General Zia used Islamic slogan for anti-Bhutto campaign appeared dedicated to the Islamization of the state (Abbas, 2005, p. 97). For this, Islamist political parties passionately supported Zia‘s regime. Usually, an unconstitutional government, military regime needs legitimization within the state. The support of religious parties was of utmost prominence; including Jamat-i-Islami which supported Zia‘s Islamization process. Islamization in the 1980s in Pakistan was based on the theoretical framework of Deobandi version of Islam. One of the purposes behind the proliferation of Madrassas was to garner public support to Zia‘s Islamization schemes. The constituency of religious political parties increased dramatically due to the increased numbers of the Madrassas and the students (ICG, 2011, p. 2). Zia was keen to introduce a program of change that would affect all segments of the society. The inclusive radical enterprise was not limited to crafting a Jihadist or fundamentalist approach. The incorporation of harsh laws in the legal system ensured the rise of religious extremism. These laws are responsible for the increase in violence against marginalized communities in Pakistan especially women, denying liberty thereby imposing legal penalties. In 1980, a circular was issued stipulating that Women will have a proper dress code in the work and in education institution (Ahmed, 2013, p. 238-239). The word ‗Proper‘ defined the clothes of women not just in terms of appearance but in terms of fitting and stitching, allowing the already male dominated society to seize feminine liberties. Zia‘s implementation of doctrines was tricky and effective in shaping practical flavor to religious schemes. A unique way was adopted in the implementation procedures, fundamentalist Mulvis, religious clerics, were given tasks on local/national television and other communication channels to justify Islamic laws for women (Ahmed, 2013). Such policies promoted radicalism and provided opportunities to the fanatic mindset to nurture. It gave birth to a narrow-minded and intolerant society, violence and extremism is the ultimate way of expression. The introduction of Hadood ordinance and its scrutiny by the Shariat courts deprived women of their basic rights (Ahmed, 2013). Moreover, protection of a girl less than fourteen years of age in the sexual and rape cases is not included in the Zina ordinance (Mehdi, 1994, p. 123). The implications of such regulations are related to the current religious extremism in the state. It is difficult to raise the voice of reason, the appreciation of the cold-blooded murder of former Governor of Punjab has been celebrated in various quarters of the society. It has demonstrated the impact of extremist values on the social

fabrics of life in Pakistan. In the wake of such laws rights of the non-Muslims were violated frequently and environment was made unfriendly/hostile. The education system was introduced to inculcate unquestionable devotion to Islam, Pakistan and the concept of Islamic Umma which created narrowminded and biased individuals who hated other religion and different opinion (Rahman, 2004, p. 17). K. K. Aziz as quoted in Ahmed (2013, p. 243), ‗examined sixty-six text books from elementary up to university level, which revealed that the state narratives distorted facts and concepts. The primary idea was focused on the glorification of Islam and the degradation of Hindu religion. The constructions of such ideas created irrational individuals who were indolent towards different thoughts about their religion and cultivated hatred for the other communities including other sects of Islam. Pakistan gradually became a theocratic state under the Zia plans of ideological transformation of socio-political institutions.‘ Juergensmeyer (2000, p. 10) believes that religion alone does not lead to violence but when violent expressions of faith are fused in socio-political patterns for aspiration, pride and for political change. In the political arena, the voting representation of the religious parties is low; interestingly they influence the decision-making process at the national and provincial levels (Crisis Group Reports: 73, 49, 36, 95, 178, 125, 2003-2009). The mainstream political parties in Pakistan are usually in some sort of political alliance with religious factions. The Talibs, students, of Madrassas vote for the religious political parties and are standby for the call of public demonstration. The religious political parties promote their agendas in a form of pressure groups and resist any change in the Islamic law in the constitution. The Mutihida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) (composed of the Jamat-i-Islami, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam Fazlur Rehman, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam- Samiul Haq, Jamiat-e- Ulema Pakistan, the Markazi Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith and the Islami Tehreek Pakistan) a combined alliance of religious political parties formed government in 2002 in the KP and Baluchistan provinces (Abass, 2005). The rule of MMA averted major military maneuver or decision to handle law and order situation in FATA in the post 9/11 which obviously gave time and space to the militant groups to consolidate power and authority (Rashid, 2008; ICG, 2009, pp 4-5). Besides political and social sectors, Zia‘s policies affected the organization of military which maintained colonial legacy and was an agent of Modernization in the state. The process of Islamization of army started in the wake of several wars with India when slogan of Jihad was raised by framing Indian attack as Hindus ideological expansion (Ahmed, 2013). Cohen (1998) believes that the Pakistan army as an institution considered

itself an Islamic force as soon as Pakistan came into being. The policies of Zia regime were more practical in the incorporation of religious notions in the military establishment. He instigated a program of change that upgraded the unit of Maulvis to the rank of Junior Commissioned Officer in Pakistan Army (Ahmed, 2013, p. 235). Quranic verses were written on the entrance and the checkpoints of the military cantonments. Understanding of fundamental tenants of Islam was made pre-requisite for the recruitment in the army as an officer (Abbas, 2005, p.101). The notion of Jihad and conservative approaches were encouraged in the Armed forces (Ahmed, 2013, pp. 245,46,47,48). The active participation in Afghan Jihad promoted radicalization in the military organization. Individual officers like Colonel Imam and General Hamid Gul were given tasks to manage the Jihadist groups. These individuals were in direct contact with the Jihadist for years. The prolonged interactions somehow made them think differently. General retired Hamid Gul stated on live television program that some of the militants such as, Baitullah Mahsud and Mangal Bagh, are good people (News One channel, 2012, program Capital Update). Notwithstanding, the militants mentioned by Gul were the leaders of the most notorious terrorist groups in Pakistan. To scholars, such as Hussain (2008) Tahreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is responsible for the widespread militancy in Pakistan. Obviously, the statement of Gul has no institutional recognition but such notion specifies the impact of interaction with militant groups on the mindset of a top ranked security personnel. The arrest of Navy officer in connection to attack of Pakistan Navy fleet in Baluchistan illustrates how the Jihadist notions influenced the ranks of Pakistan armed forces (N. Javed, personal communication, November 24, 2016). The discussion highlights that the radicalization in Pakistan is not limited to socio-political institutions but it has breached the most liberal organization of the country military is no exception. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the policy of strategic depth was adopted by the military in Pakistan. The pioneer of this strategy was General Aslam Baig, former Chief of Pakistan Army (Barnett & Rubin, 1990, p. 164). The narrow structure of Pakistan‘s territory, obvious from the official map, has no depth in times of war for the military to retreat and fight back especially against traditional rival India. Notwithstanding, India has three times strategic depth advantage over Pakistan. The strategic depth policy is based on the theory that the Afghan terrain can provide suitable depth for Pakistan‘s narrow territorial structure. The pro-Pakistan government can be helpful in putting an end to the issue of Pashtunistan stunt. Moreover, pro-Indian elements can be undermined in Afghanistan and the land can be used as a safe haven for pro-Pakistan non-state entities (Johnson and Mason, 2007). However, the nuclear capability attained in 1998 made

probability of a full fledge war almost impossible between India and Pakistan. Though the strategic depth policy is lifeless but its application has severe impacts on the region. The strategic depth policy encouraged Pakistan to interfere more in Afghanistan. In the same time period Pakistan encouraged the creation of Islamist militant groups. In 1990‘s the volume and influence of the Jihadist increased across Pak-Afghan borderland. The Jihadist used to cross the border without any impediment, the tribal areas were safe haven for militant groups (Rafique, 2014, p. 124). The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR resulted in the admiration of the Jihadist in Pakistan. The clergy and general public understood the victory as a miracle of Jihad. It was believed that if the Jihadist can defeat mighty USSR, they can defeat enemy any capability. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces Afghanistan soon descended in to chaos. The fighting between the Northern Alliance and the Jihadist at the expense of innocent destroyed the already fragile state structure of governance. There were smaller groups who fought for power on ethnic bases. The civil war was at its peak when a Pakistani assisted Mujahideen group took control of Kabul in 1992 (Johnson, 2007). Perlez & Shah (2009) and Behuria (2007) have highlighted that the Pakistani members of the Taliban were generally recruitment from the Pashtun belt and the South Punjab areas. In the leadership of Mullah Omer the Taliban became popular in 1990s. Officially the power of the Taliban was witnessed in the post 1994 in Afghanistan (Human Rights, 1998). Many important areas were occupied by the Taliban forces in Afghanistan. The Taliban established government in Kabul in 1990s. The Taliban government was acknowledged/recognized legitimate by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In the official quarters of Pakistan victory of the Taliban was considered a success in installing pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan as a part of strategic depth policy. A major incident took place during the Taliban rule when an Indian commercial airplane was hijacked by one of the Mujaheedin group, active in Indian occupied Kashmir, and brought the plane to Afghanistan (Dugger, 2000). The cooperation of the Taliban government resulted in the peaceful resolution of the issue but on the condition of hijackers it led in the release of one of the most wanted terrorists from Indian prison, Maulana Masood Azher, an active Jihadist leader in Pakistan (ICG, 2009, p. 4). The successful results of the hijack mission and the subsequent release of militant leaders from state authorities led to the treatment of Mujahideen as heroes, in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The fame and glory of the Jihadist was at its peak in 1990s and attracted a huge number of people not limited to religious clergy to join the ranks of the militants.

In the same period, Pakistan was facing severe political crisis. The general elections were held four times from 1988 to 1996. None of the elected regime completed its constitutionally recommended tenure. Resultantly, the militant Jihadi network nurtured without hindrance. The struggle of Kashmir to attain self-determination was considerably in common with the Afghan Jihad. The notion of the non-Muslim occupiers of Kashmir attracted Jihadist the most. Apparently, the Indian government was alleged involved in anti-Muslim activities in Kashmir. The militants from Afghan war were soon indulged to expand Jihadist activities in Kashmir (Abbas, 2005). The Jihadist were popular supported by the government and among the masses, armed militants could easily move in the public places in Pakistan. The Jihadist were considered a symbol of dignity and inspiration for a common man. Any opposition to Jihadist activities, whatsoever, was framed against Islam and Pakistan (Ahmed, 2013, 281). It was difficult for other sects of Islam including the Shia community to oppose the Jihadist activities publicly. In 1999, Musharaf came into power and supported militant activities in Kashmir and Afghanistan.

2.5 THE POST 9/11 PERIOD AND THE RISE OF MILITANT GROUPS IN FATA The incident of 9/11 altered the nature of global politics and changed the regional security settings in South Asia. In the initiation of the so-called Global War on Terror (WoT), Pakistan became the frontline state and center of stage in the US policy to hunt down Taliban/Jihadist and Al-Qaeeda (Haider et al, 2015, p. 228-229). Fair (2004) has noted that Pakistan supported the US and Allied force by providing logistics, air bases, sea routes and intelligence support. The US led forces invaded Afghanistan on 7th October 2001 in the name of ‗Operation Enduring Freedom‘ (Ahmed, 2013, p. 317). After the intensification of fight in Afghanistan militants crossed international border and infiltrated into the tribal belt of Pakistan. The militants included Al-Qaeeda and the Taliban fighters. Therefore, government-initiated chain of military operations in FATA. Most of the militant groups operating in Pakistan were banned including those which enjoyed government support and fighting in the Indian occupied Kashmir (Dawn, 2002). This was a U-turn from the previous policy towards the militant groups. Consequently, militant groups started targeting state assets in Pakistan. The public opinion in Pakistan was against the US invasion of Afghanistan which was demonstrated in huge public protests in the major and small cities of the country (The Guardian, 21st September 2001). The Guardian highlighted anti-Pakistan and anti-America protest which included slogans of ‗Crush America and Bush‘. Ahmad (2013, p. 12) and Zafar (2006) have argued that Pakistani government was pressurized by the Western

powers to act against the Taliban and the affiliated militant groups. The masses held the government responsible for joining the camps of the West instead of Muslim regime in Afghanistan. The restrictions of government against the militant organizations active in Afghanistan, Kashmir and other parts of the country caused in the rise of faith-based violence within Pakistan. The counter-terrorism policies of the government resulted in the resentment of the militant groups and attack on state assets (Fair, 2012; Fair, 2007; Firdous, 2011). Khan (2013, p. 47) and Orakzi (2009, p. 29-35) argued that the anti-Taliban/militant policies of the government gradually became unpopular and created gap between the general masses and the state in FATA in particular and in the state in general. In the remote areas such as FATA these gaps were in turn filled by the militant groups (Ahmad, 2013, p. 12-13). The militant groups established parallel governments based on the fundamentalist Islamist approach thereby providing cheap justice and efficient decision making. The Imams of Mosques have played important role in fostering religious extremism in Pakistan. It is obligatory to offer Friday prayers in the Mosque therefore millions of individuals come to Mosque. Friday sermon is also compulsory which is supposed to delivered by the Imam. Most of the Friday sermons delivered by the Imams of Mosques in Pakistan are based on religious violence, intolerance towards non-Muslims and other sects of Islam (M. Akber, personal communication, December 02, 2016). Especially, in the post 9/11 period, the government policies were criticized in those sermons to be against the basic tenants of Islamic. Jihad against the US and Allied forces in Afghanistan was claimed to be indispensable. Many religious leaders declared Jihad compulsory against Pakistan‘s security personnel for joining the camps of the West. The state acted against the hate speeches of the leader of the Mosque. Imam of mosque was prohibited from delivering political and controversial speeches. It was an important step taken by the government but its implementation is a real challenge especially in the far flung and underdeveloped areas such as FATA and Baluchistan. The state took steps to end the contribution of Madrassas in the militant activities, it includes check on Madrassas; foreign students‘ enrollment, financial accounts, moderation of teachings, curriculum change and religious biased extremism-oriented literature (Hilali, 2009). The implementation processes to check Madrassas is a real challenge. Most of the Madrassas enjoy the support of religious elite who are directly and indirectly affiliated with the government and state institutions. The location of many Madrassas is remote and difficult to access. The Madrassas provided men and material support to the militant groups that were established on the Pak-Afghan borderland in the

1980s to fight the communism. These Madrassas provided radical Jihadist, in the post 9/11 period, to fight Pakistani armed forces and the US. Many militant groups emerged especially in FATA in response to anti-Jihadist policies and the military operations. The ‗Lal Masjid Operation‘ in 2007 intensified faith- based violence and resulted in the chain of suicide bombings and attacks on government assets including public/private places in the country (Siddique, 2008). Rehmanullah (personal communication, October 28, 2016) argues that Lal Masjid Operation turned Musharaf from ‗Hero to Zero‘. The ‗Lal Masjid‘ issue led to the annulment of the peace treaty between the government and the Pakistani Taliban based in SWA (Siddique, 2010, p. 7-10). In reaction, one of the most powerful militant organization emerged in SWA in the shape of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Baitullah Mahsud (Siddique, 2010, p. 9). Mishandling of Lal Masjid Operation is one among core reasons for the propagation of widespread militancy in the state (ICG, 2009. P. 11). The episode of Lal Masjid operation demonstrates inefficient state policies to handle militancy which have ensured radicalization. Religious militancy cost the state in terms of economy by U.S. 10 billion Dollars (Khan, 2008). According to Usmani as quoted in Khan (2010, p. 10), state witnessed more than 250 suicide blasts after 9\11. The militant targeted Pakistan military, police, other government assets and civilians (Fair, 2012).

Source: Terrorism in Pakistan: Changing Incident Patterns. Syed Ejaz Hussain Deputy Inspector General of Pakistan Police University of Pennsylvania (PhD Thesis, 2010).

To counter militancy, Musharaf regime initiated various policies, many of which were flawed and contributed in the rise of radicalization. In 2002, the government banned sectarian violent groups and militant organization simultaneously (Haqqani, 2004, p. 351- 353). Many of the banned groups were in close cooperation with the state which could have been managed tactfully. These groups redefined their objectives and goals. Many of the

banned groups changed their names or amalgamated in recognized religious groups of same school of thought in Pakistan (Keating, 2010). Some of the sectarian violent organizations affiliated with Deobandi/Sunni school of thought joined the militant organization based in FATA (Mustafa & Brown, 2010, p. 502; Rafiq, 2014, p. 1-3). The TTP and sectarian groups such as SSP and LJ were having strong connection since 1980s. The renewed bonding between Taliban and sectarian groups affiliated to Deobandi Islam lunched most vicious attacks on other sects especially the Shia community. The Tahreek-i- Jafriah represents Shia community, its violent wing known as SMP. Sipa-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) is an anti-Sunni-Deobandi violent group sponsored by Iran (Rafiq, 2014, p. 1-2). SMP is allegedly involved in the killing of various Deobandi leaders such as Azam Tariq (Ahmer, 2008). The architect of suicide bombing in Pakistan, Qari Hussain a top brass anti-Shia TTP commander, before joining Taliban in FATA, was a former member of SSP (Mahsud, 2010, p. 5). Mahsud has highlighted that former TTP leader HakiMullah Mahsud hated Shias and wholeheartedly supported attacks against them. The SSP and LJ in collaboration with Taliban viciously attacked Shia community and its affiliated groups in Pakistan (Mustafa & Brown, 2010, p. 502; ICG, 2009). The Shia community was outnumbered in the fight which included target killing and suicide attacks (Mahsud, 2010, p. 4-9). Rafiq (2014, p. 1) has noted that sectarian violence between Sunni/Deobandi and Shia sects has costed approximately 3800 lives from 2007 to 2013, among which at least 1500 were killed in Kurram agency alone. In many parts of the country members of Shia community migrated from their hometowns where anti-Shaite elements were impactful (Hussain, personal communication, 2015). For instance, the population of district Dera Ismail Khan comprises at least 30 percent Shia community, the vicious attacks of TTP and SSP led to their dislocation/migration to safer places including Bakker, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Islamabad (Zaidi, personal communication, 2015). The Panjabi Taliban, already affiliated with urban based Deobandi/Sunni sectarian violent groups, played significant role in the increase of sectarian violence in Pakistan (Mahsud, 2010, p. 15). Their close connection with Al-Qaeeda and Taliban groups in FATA and Afghanistan resulted in the intensification of sectarian violence in Pakistan. The report of International Crisis Group (2003, p. 3) has suggested that in Zia regime Mullah-military alliance got strengthen and expanded in true sense. The report emphasized that in Zia‘s era, Mullah and military joined hands against one common domestic enemy and that was mainstream secular groups, especially political parties. Ahmed (2013) argues that it was, ultimately, Zia‘s regime that went many steps further in

Islamization of Pakistan‘s education, legal systems and political arena. The regional security conditions in the neighboring countries of Pakistan had direct impact on the bonding between military and Mullah. The Islamist Ideological revolution in Iran and the Afghan War of 1980s brought closer the religious elite and the army. The Afghan Jihad created and empowered many Deobandi based militant groups. These religious violent groups were working in close connection and cooperation of Pakistan military. Interestingly, in the 21st century Mullah and Military alliance became fragile and weak. In the wake of changing security conditions, US invasion of Afghanistan, the alliance of military-Mullah became fragile and ineffective (Sattar, 2013; Akhtar, et al. 2006). The Musharaf regime joined the camp of ‗Global War on Terror‘ as a frontline state and banned religious militant groups in the country. The conflict raised form the state policies which were against the interests of various Islamist groups in Pakistan. The attacks of militant groups on the state assets invited military operations in various parts of the country. The Madrassas once enjoyed the protection of the military were raided and clerics who were protected were sent to jail and punished in connection to militancy and for hate speeches against the military and the state. The religious political parties tried to reconcile between the military and the militant groups but failed. It was ultimately, Peshawar school massacre in December 2014, which brought the related stakeholders and the entire nation on one page. The National Action Plan (NAP) was approved unanimously by all the political parties including the religious parties in which military courts were established and ban on death penalty was revised. The network of military operations was widened. Raids on Madrassas, Mosques and houses of people affiliated to religious elite became routine (Sattar, 2013). People with long beard were specifically checked on the security checkpoints (A. Khalid, personal communication, October 21, 2016). The behavior of the security personnel became significant discriminative and rude towards the Mullahs (K. Qureshi, personal communication, December 22, 2016).

2.6 CONCLUSION The idea of purifying Islam turned into the movement of preserving Muslim identity resulted in the creation of Muslim state in 1947. Since the inception of Pakistan, religious groups struggled to influence other version of Islamic sects. It created gaps among various sects of Islam in-turn filled by the non-state actors and resulted in religious violence. The use of religion by various regime has predominantly negative impact. The government of Zia promoted radicalism in Pakistan, his transformative policies on Islamist lines affected all sectors of the society. The adventure of Afghan Jihad created number of militant groups across borders which are affiliated with mainstream religious political

parties. The Islamist policies at state levels resulted in the proliferation of religious groups which were half a dozen in 1950s but in 2002 the number increased up to 200. The US invasion of Afghanistan after the incident of 9/11, altered the security settings in in the Pak-Afghan borderland. The militants infiltered into Pakistan‘s tribal belt which invited military operations. The strategies of the state resulted in the unification of militant and sectarian groups based in FATA and urban areas of Pakistan which intensified violence. Moreover, the relationship between the military and religious elite is fragile and weak in the wake of militancy and counterterrorism policies in the 21st century. The fragile relationship between military and clergy might prove a silver lining for the future of the country. The tradition of the excessive use of religion at national level might come to an end.

CHAPTER – 3

HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS MILITANCY AMONG THE MAHSUDS IN SWA

3.1 INTRODUCTION It is always difficult to trace back the genealogical origin of a race or tribe. The chapter explores the origin, geographical setting and socio-cultural traits of the Mahsud tribe. There are many sections and subsections of the Mahsud tribe which are studied to understand their importance and role in the insurgent activities. It further traces the history of Mahsuds in relation to their struggle against the British imperialists and their war against major tribes in SWA. There have been various socio-political, economic, external/internal and religious factors responsible for the violent relationship between the Mahsuds and the British. The two most prominent militant movements led by religious fanatics sets historical context of faith-based militancy in the Waziristan in which the Mahsud tribe played an active role. The patterns of militancy in the post 9/11 in the Mahsuds areas has its traces in the insurgent activities in the colonial times. The chapter attempts to examine the relationship of the Mahsud tribe with Pakistan after 1947. The newly born Muslim country ended the idea of Jihad against the state. The Islamist policies and the integration of the Mahsud tribe in the mainstream sowed the seeds of better relations between the state and tribal communities.

3.2 SOUTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY: PHYSICAL SETTINGS AND THE LOCATION OF MAHSUD TRIBE

This section describes the physical setting of SWA and the location of the Mahsud tribe in it. There were seven different tribal agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The tribal areas are recently merged in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Amongst them, South Waziristan Agency (SWA) is the largest one followed by North Waziristan Agency (NWA) in terms of territory, 6,619 and 4,707 square kilometers respectively (Williams, 2012, p, 5). South Waziristan is chiefly populated by the tribes including Mahsuds and Ahmedzai Wazirs. Other small tribes inhibit in SWA which includes Burki, Syeds, Suliman Khel, Dotannis, Bhittanis and Miann (Ahmed, 2004, p. 11). SWA is divided into three administrative sub-division, Wana, Sarvekai and Ladha. Wana is the administrative capital of the agency located in the Ahmedzai Wazir area. The Mahsud tribe occupies Ladha and Sarwekai sub-divisions. Smaller segments of the Wazir

and Mahsud tribes inhibits across the Durand line in Afghanistan. The Dre-Mahsud occupies an extensive land in SWA which comprises the areas including Ladha, Makin, Baddar valley, Shaktu, Shahur, Gomal, Sarwekai, Khuisura, Spinkai Raghzai and Shawal valley. Most of the land belong to Mahsuds was seized from other tribes (Ahmed, 2004, p. 21). The primary occupation of the Mahsuds was agriculture, pastoralism, mining, forestry and raiding (Beattie, 2001, p. 6). The land of the Mahsud is generally inhospitable for agriculture purposes. The Wazir occupied the fertile land of administrative capital Wana which is famous for fruits and vegetables with thick forests in Birmal (Ahmed, 2004, p.16). The landscape of the agency is mountainous comprises of narrow valleys and tall mountains, Preghal is the highest peak with 11,556 feet. The Gomal is only major river in SWA (Ahmed, 1969, p. 172). The climate of this region is extreme. The area of SWA adjacent to Tank district is very hot in summers, such as the village of Dozakh Tangi ‗the gorge of the hell‘ (Ahmed, 2004. p. 16). The British army experienced extreme hot in summer weather in this area (General Staff, 1921, p. 44). In winter season the temperature goes below freezing points and makes the weather unbearable. The temperature is much colder in the central part of SWA and the territory adjacent to the Durand line. The unfriendly weather conditions have severe impacts on the administrative setup. There are two administrative capitals of the agency, in summers Wana and in winter season Tank district (Spain, 1972, p. 137). The months of December, January and February are the coldest, the temperature recorded in 2008-2009 ranges from -5 C (Celsius) in winters and 45 C in summers (Moghal, 2012, p. 83).

Source: (Calhoun, 2016, p. 2)

3.3 PASHTUNS AMONG PASHTUNS: THE MAHSUD TRIBE This part highlights various terms associated with the language and name of Pashtuns and Mahsuds. It debates the classification and origin of the Pashtun community and the genealogy of Mahsud tribe in it. The Mahsuds are essentially Pashtuns, it is important to describe the linage of Pashtun community and the setting of Mahsud tribe in it. Spain (1963, p. 17 & 41) termed Pashtuns to be the largest tribal society. There are different terms associated with ‗Pashtun‘. Sir Olaf Caroe (1965) and Barfield (2010) noted variety of terms associated with Pashtuns. It includes Pashtuns, Pathans, Pakhtuns, Pukhtuns, Pakhtanah/Pukhtana, and Pashteen some of which are coined by the native communities and others coined by the foreigners. For instance, Pathan is British assigned and the Pakhtanah/Pukhtana are Indian version of the Pashtuns. The term Pashteen is widely used by the natives in the locality of Waziristan. Pakhtun is used by the natives in Peshawar and surrounding region. The term Pashtun will be used in this research for convenience. Pashtun term is used in media, administrative work in the colonial and post- colonial times. The term Pashtun is exclusively used in scholarly and ethnographic work on Swat valley, Waziristan and other parts of tribal belt of Pakistan (Rzehak, 2011; Anwar-ul- Haq Ahady, 1995; Ghani, 1978; Punjab Government Press, 1901; Roe, 2010; Lindholm, 2003; Nichols, 2008). Similarly, the language the Pashtun speaks is also pronounced differently such as Pakhtu, Pukhtu, Pashto (Morgenstierne, 1927; Edwards, 1986; Rome, 2006). The term Pashto will be used in this work for own convenience. Tribe as a social and political unit has been used by various indigenous and foreign authors (Glatzer, 2002, p. 267-268). Tribe is usually analyzed as a political unit or a group in the Pashtun tribal system (Tapper, 1983, p, 5-50). Though most of the Pashtun tribes are not political entities, the tribal system serves as a political alliance (Glatzer, 2002, p. 271). Tribe is used in this research as a unit to identify a group with one specific social structure having a unique genealogical lineage. There is no economic and political base attach to the term. It is to differentiate between different groups among Pashtuns and might be helpful in identifying unique characteristics of specific ancestral linage. It is difficult to trace back the exact origin of any race, ethnicity or community. Same is the case with the origin of the Pashtuns. There are different theories about the origin of the Pashtuns (Sahlins, 1961, p. 322-345). Wylly (2003, p. 14) argues that Pashtuns proclaim to be direct descendent of the first King Saul of the Jewish community. He explains that the Pashtun community emphasis to be the missing family of the ―Beni Israel‖, the children of Israel, and ultimately traces back to Hazrat Ibrahim (A.S) and Hazrat Yaqoob (A.S). Major tribes of the Pashtun line traces back their origin to Qais

Abdur Rashid (Barth, 1959; Caroe, 1962). Qais had four sons including Ghusghusht, Sarban, Bitan (alias Batni) and Karran (Glatzer, 2002, p. 267-268). The local Pashtun linage including thousands of tribes and sub-tribes are said to have originated from the sons and grandsons of Qais Abdur Rashid (Al-Harawī & Imām-ad-Dīn, 1960). The tribes including Durrani, Shinwari, Yusufzai, and Mohmands, claim to be descent from Sarban, one of Qais three sons. These tribes are generally known as Sarbani Pashtuns. The Suleiman Khel and Aka Khel are known as Ghilzai Pashtuns and are the descendants of Baitan, through his daughter and a Persian prince. The Khattaks, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Daurs, Turis, and Bangash are descendants of Ghurghusht. Dorn (1965, p. 47) has emphasized on heterogenous character of the Pashtuns and argues that the Ghilzai tribe basically originates form the Khalaj which is a Persian and Turkish combination. The level of freedom and independence varies greatly within different Pashtun tribes. The autonomy enjoyed by the mountainous region Pashtuns, tribal belt, is not cherished by the Pashtun tribes living in Swat and other areas (Barth, 1965; Jahanzeb & Barth, 1985). The Pashtun community may be divided in to two categories, Nang and Qalang. Honor is the chief symbol of the former and taxes/rents is of the latter (Ahmed, 2004, p. 7). Edwards (1998, p. 713-718) has analyzed that the Nang Pashtuns inhibits in the highlands specifically the mountainous area. The Mahsud tribe can be classified as a part of Nang Pashtun community (Ahmed, 2004). The Mahsuds are known by various names including Mehsud, Masseed, Dre- Masseed/Mahsud. Some of the names associated with the Mahsuds are of local nature and others are assigned by the outsiders. The colonial accounts have introduced the term spelled as Mahsud (Howell, 1979; Caroe, 1965). The term Masseed is pronounced differently and is popular in Waziristan which means elder (M. Hashim, personal communication, December 08, 2016). The name Mehsud is recently introduced by the electronic, print media followed by scholarly work in Pakistan and elsewhere (Mehsud, December 1st, 2017; Perry, March 30th, 2016; Mujeeb, October 9th, 2013). In the post 9/11, the region of Waziristan and its tribes made the headlines of the news in the local and international media. The terms introduced by the outsiders, Mahsud and Mehsud, are pronounced the same. Most of the scholarly, colonial and local administrative work has been done in the name of Mahsud (Ahmed, 1983; Close, Jacob, Wilson-Johnston, Good, & Ronaldshay, 1928; Bruce, 1929; Afridi, 1980; Young, 1882; Iliff, 1955). Therefore, in this research the name Mahsud will be used. The origin of Mahsuds is disputed among writers and in the oral history of the natives. Major portion of the literature suggests that the Wazir and Mahsud tribes are

descendants from same forefathers (Beattie, 2011, p. 573; Roe, 2010; Caroe, 1965). Wylly (2003, p. 276-278) has discussed that Wazir and Mahsud tribes proclaim to be the descendent of Suliman. Suliman is the direct descendent of Ghurghusht, one of Qais Abdur Rashid sons. Wazir and Mahsuds are usually described to be as Ghurghusht Pashtuns. To Ahmed (2004, p. 17-18) Mahsud-Wazir are Karlani Pashtuns. The grandson of Karlan was Suliman from whom the ancestral background of the two tribes is derived. Punjab Government Press (1901, p. 1) in the document known as ‗Report on Waziristan and its Tribes‘, describes the origin of the Mahsuds and Wazirs which can be traced back to Suliman, an influential personality in the Afghan history. Suliman had two sons, Lalli and Khizrii. Khizrii had three sons Mubarak, Musa and Mahmud; due to religious character, Musa was known as Darwesh an ancestor of the Darwesh Khel clan so Ahmed and Utmaan were the sons of Musa, to whom Ahmaadzai and Utmaanzai Wazir tribes are associated living in SWA and NWA respectively, whereas, Mahmud had a son Mahsud, ancestor of Mahsud tribe, Mubarak‘s son was Gurbaz, descended the Gurbaz Wazir tribe (Ul Haq, Khan & Nuri, 2005; Punjab Government Press,1901).

3.4 SECTIONS AND SUBSECTIONS OF THE MAHSUD TRIBE This part of the research describes various sections and subsections of the Mahsud tribe and the associated clans. It analyzes various subsections of the tribe and their share in militancy in colonial and post-colonial periods. Mahsuds are also known as Dre-Mahsud. Dre-Mahsud means three significant branches/Khels of Mahsuds that are Alizai, Bahlolzai and Shaman Khel; each branch is further divided in sections and subsections (General Staff, 1921, p. 3). The culture, language, customs, way of life of the three branches of the tribe are same with insignificant variations. For instance, there is a slight difference in the dialect/pronunciation of Alizai and Bahlolzai. In 1934 total population of the Mahsud tribe was approximately 68,000 (Johnson, 1934b). Curtis (1946, p. 8) has estimated the population in 1945-46 around 88,000. In 1972, the population of this tribe exploded up to 247,000 (Ahmed, 2004, 14). The population census of 2017 has estimated the total population of SWA, including Mahsud and Wazir tribes, is approximately 68,0000 (Census Report, 2017; Province wise census results, 2017). The population of the Mahsud tribe is estimated 366, 287 approximately (SWA Blockwise Population Census, 2017). However, total strengthen of the Mahsud tribe estimated by Mahsud (2010, p. 18) is 650,000 to 700,000. This shows huge difference between the population ratios of the two sources. The government population census in SWA did not cover the Mahsuds already settled in the urban areas. Moreover, exact population census of female is a challenge in Pashtun tribal society.

Before the British arrival the gangs comprised of Mahsud tribesmen participated in raiding in the areas adjacent to Waziristan. Sometimes these gangs were comprised of more than three hundred strong men (Howell, 1979). To Hashim Khan (personal communication, December 08, 2016) the gangs of raiders from Mahsud area were predominantly comprised of criminals only, the common Mahsuds have nothing to do with them. The problem of raiding became in the limelight when the British occupied the territory near to Waziristan. Major reasons during the British time for raiding were political rather than financial or material (Williams, 2012). Some of the Mahsud subtribes have larger share in militancy and violence. Beattie (2013, p. 7) explored that majority of the subtribes of the Mahsuds remained peaceful and rarely took part in raiding or offenses in British times. While few clans had record of offenses and militancy, many of which have relatively greater share in militancy in the post 9/11 as well. Ahmed (2013) has described the Shobi Khel section to be the most violent amongst the Mahsuds and has major share in militancy in SWA in colonial and post- colonial periods. Ahmed asserted that the infamous militant leaders such as Mullah Powindah, Baitullah Mahsud, HakiMullah Mahsud and Qari Hussain belong to Shobi Khel section. However, Mahsud (2010) and the information gathered through primary data in the field has suggested that HakiMullah and Qari Hussain belonged to Ishangai section rather than Shobi Khel section. Therefore, the findings of Ahmed (2013) are somehow based on false/incorrect information in this regard. Notwithstanding, Ishangai section including Malikdinai were considered to be comparatively peaceful in British times. Interestingly, many subsections of the Mahsud tribe who remained peaceful in the British times became violent in the post 9/11 period. Major reasons for these sections and subsections to become violent in the post 9/11 is the direct penetration of Pakistan security forces in the area. British never carried out direct police duties in the Mahsud area which helped in keeping peace with many Mahsud subsections (M. A. Masood, personal communication, December 18, 2016; Beattie, 2012).

Source: (Calhoun, 2016)

3.4.1 The Alizaii Branch Alizai is the most populous and an important branch among the three main branches of Mahsud tribe (Mahsud, 2010). Alizai are divided into two sections, Manzai and Shobi Khel. The Manzai are further divided in three clans Malak Dini, Pali Khel and Gidi Khel. Alizai were wealthy and principle traders in the Mahsud tribe (Beattie, 2013, p. 6-7). Ahmed (2013) has identified the Shobi Khel clan of the Alzai branch as the troublesome and most courageous tribe among different clans of the Mahsuds. Mullah Powindah belongs to Shobi Khel clan. The ambush of British Delimitation Escort at Wana in November 1894 is one of his infamous and most violent acts (Williams, 2012, p. 22). After the inception of Pakistan in 1947 the local administration in SWA faced defiance from Shobi Khels. Gow Khan, an infamous outlaw in 1980s and early 1990s was a Shobi Khel Mahsud (Mehsud & Khan, 2013, p. 5-6). He attacked and plundered government assets in SWA and distribute it among the poor. He was well celebrated among the Mahsud

tribesmen because of his courage and of his kind attitude with the poor. In the post 9/11 period, the infamous TTP commander Baithullah Mahsud along with dozens of militant leaders such as Noor Saeed and Sheryar Mahsud, belonged from Shobi Khel clan (M. Iqbal, personal communication, December 24, 2016). The US government placed 5 million dollars bounty on the head of the Baitullah Mahsud (Syed, 2009, p. 7-9). Mahsud (2010, p. 5) argues that in the initial stages of militancy, in the post 9/11 period, hundreds of foreign militants were protected by the Shobi Khel clan. There are various subsections of the Manzai clan which became increasingly violent in the post 9/11 period which includes Malikdinai and Ishangai. These clans remained peaceful in British times. Due to the penetration of the armed forces of Pakistan in their territory many of the members of these clans joined militant organization. The very first attack on the military convoy in 2004 happened in Serwakai, a stronghold of Malikdinai in SWA, in which heavy state faced heavy losses in terms of men and material.

3.4.2 The Bahlolzai Branch The Bahlolzai clan is an important subdivision of the Mahsud tribe. Major subtribes of Bahlolzais are divided into four key sections Nana Khel, Aimal Khels, Shingis and Band Khel majority of which were infamous for killing, looting, plundering and kidnapping for ransom in the British accounts (Punjab Government Press, 1901). The colonial accounts recognize Abdur Rahman Khel clan of Nana Khel Bahlolzai and Abdulai clan of Aimal Khel Bahlozai branch as notorious sections of the Mahsuds (General Staff, 1921, p. 30-33). In Zhob, Mr. Kelley, an official of frontier works department, was murdered in 1895 by the tribesmen of Abdurahman clan (Howell, 1979, p. 14). Other subtribes such as Shingis (also known as Ishangis) and Malakshai of the Bahlolzai were peaceful. The Shingi clan was the very first among Mahsuds who came into relationship with the Colonial administration (Punjab Government Press, 1901). One reason for the amicable relation was the continuous contact with the British because of their locality adjacent to the main roads in SWA (T. Alam, personal communication, December 25, 2016). Interestingly, in the post 9/11, the Shingis have actively participated in the militant activities. The top brass commanders of TTP, Hakeemullah Mehsud and Qari Hussaain, inventor of suicide bombers in Pakistan, belong to the Shingi clan of Bahlolzai branch (Mahsud, 2010, p. 18). The Kotkai area in which the Shingis inhibit predominantly was the stronghold of the Tekreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Mahsud, 2010). One reason for this clan to indulge in militant activities was the penetration of Pakistan security personnel directly into the area.

3.4.3 The Shaman Khel Branch The Shaman Khels are numerically smaller in numbers as compared to other two branches of the Dre-Mahsuds. This clan is divided into two branches on the basis of their locality, Hill or Tak-Shaman Khel and Shahur or Maidan Shaman Khel, Maidan means plain area and Tak means hill area (Punjab Government Press, 1901). Generally, the Shaman Khels enjoyed amicable relationship with the British. The Shaman Khels had better access to British territory, they paid heavy fines when they commit offenses because of their settlements in British territory (Beattie, 2013).

3.4.4 The Burki/Oremur and Syeds The existing literature on Waziristan is deficient when it comes to mention the Burki and Syed community (Grau, 2010; Capshaw, 2011; Roe, 2010; Tripodi, 2016; Marshall, 2011; Spain, 1995; Government Press, 1947; Hopkins, 2015; Jacob, 1927; Skeen, 1943; McLeish, 1984). Most of the scholarly, historical and administrative writings on Waziristan mentions the tribes of Mahsud and Waziri tribes (Nichols, 2013; Britain, 1902; Ahmed, 1980; Afridi, 1980; Gordon, 1953; Robson, 2004; Young, 1882; Warren, 2000; Leake, 2016). Bellew (1891, p. 50-55) has noted that Burkis are from Greek descendants. Burkis do not belong to the same dependents of Wazirs and Mahsuds by origin. They do not share Pashtun ethnicity; their language unique/unspoken and exclusively concentrated. The Burki language is not even understood to the Pashtuns. Burki (2001, p. 5) has mentioned that Burki language is separate from Pashto. The Burki clan and its unusual language is mentioned in many scholarly work (Beveridge, 2002, p. 206-208; Leech, 1938, p. 327). Burkis are also called Oremurs which is a small clan living in South Waziristan with concentration of population in Kaniguram. Small segments of Burki community inhabit in the Logar region of Afghanistan. The Mahsud normally calls the Burkis as Oremur which carries the notion of poverty (T. A, personal communication, December 25, 2016). In the native language ‗Ore-mur‘ means ‗dead fire‘ which means the people who have no fire. It suggests lack food and related necessities of life unavailable. The Burkis were dependent on Mahsuds at least in issues related to sustenance and security (T. Alam, personal communication, December 25, 2016). With the passage of time the Burki clan has been amalgamated into the Mahsud tribe (Ahmed, 2004, p. 22). Shaman Khel are important when it comes to mentioning Urmars/Burkis. After mutual understanding between Burkis and Mahsuds, the former was made a part of the Shaman Khel branch to address the issue of distribution of allowances in the Colonial times (Ahmed, 2004, p. 19-21). Burkis are therefore described as Mahsuds. However, there is disagreement among the Mahsuds on

the question of Burki as a sub-tribe of the Mahsuds. The Syeds resumed their distinct identity and did not associate itself with any other tribe. This is commonly cited in oral history that Burkis came to SWA as helpers/workers of the Syeds. As noted in Islam & Khan (2013, p. 75) Bayazid Ansari also known as Pir Roshan, after whom the famous Roshaniya Movement is named, belonged to Syed family of Kaniguram. The Burkis and Syeds have limited or no share in militancy in SWA (M. Mehmood, personal communication, December 11, 2016). Interestingly, in the colonial times Burkis and Syeds provided information to the British regarding the activities of the Mahsuds (Punjab Government Press, 1901). In return these clans were compensated with huge privileges including lands in British territory in Tank/Dera Ismail Khan and allowances in cash. Many families of Burkis and Syeds are settled in these cities up till now. Burkis and Syeds were important for the British administration because they were they only sources/assets who could spy on the activities of the Mahsuds in the heart of Waziristan. 3.5 HISTORY OF THE MAHSUDS WITH THE COLONIAL RULERS This part of the chapter analyses the reasons for violent relationship between the British and the Mahsud tribe. There were socio-cultural, political, religious and nationalistic/external factors responsible for the pessimistic and violent relationship between the British and the Mahsuds (Watteville, 1925; Howell, 1979; Caroe, 1965). The role of the Mahsud tribe has been analyzed in the three Anglo-Afghan Wars. The Third Anglo-Afghan War followed by well-known militant uprising in 1919-1920 in which Mahsud tribe played leading role and invited chain of military operations popularly known as Waziristan campaign. It investigates two important militant uprising in Waziristan which demonstrates historical context of religious militancy. It analyses the patterns of religious militant movements led by Mullah Powindah and Faqir of Ipi in special reference to the Mahsud tribe of SWA. It highlights highly violent episodes and events that took place during the attacks of Mahsuds on British. In response extremely repressive techniques used by the British to suppress the rebellious/uprising of the Mahsud tribesmen are analyzed. The events, especially, from Anglo-Afghan Wars, Waziristan Campaign of 1919-1920 and the militant movements based on faith based violence led by Mullah Powindah and Faqir of Ipi demonstrates the guerrilla warfare techniques used by the natives. Moreover, the role of religious leaders to mobilizes natives against the British are studied. The religious violence in the Mahsud territory is explained in the perspective of Juergensmeyer (2000). Generally, the Mahsuds have remained peaceful. They have provided safe passage to outlanders/foreigners. However, in the face of interference or external aggression or fear of attack, many writers have termed the Mahsuds as the most violent and troublesome tribe

in the tribal belt (Howell, 1979; Mahdi, 1986; Tripodi, 2016). The expansionist policies of the Colonial oppressors were the primary concern of the Mahsuds and a major cause of enmity (Matthews, 2010). The occupation of Punjab, by expelling Sikh rule in 1848 and the subsequent annexation of the frontier region guaranteed the expansionist designs of the Imperial power in the region (Howell, 1979, p, 1). The Mahsud tribe was an influential community in comparison to other tribes and stakeholders in SWA, they have occupied extensive land from other tribes in Waziristan (Ahmed, 2004). To limit the British expansion/influence in the area, the Mahsud tribesmen raided British territory plunder assets and killed state officials. Before the arrival of the British, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and other adjacent area were raided but only by few gangs comprised of Mahsud tribesmen (Beattie, 2011, p. 571). After the British advent in the neighboring region of Waziristan, common tribesmen joined the raiding parties including the Maliks (Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). Malik Muhammad Hashim Khan (personal communication, December 08, 2016), an influential elder of the Mahsuds, argued that many times during raids tribals were rallied on the basis of slogan of Jihad. The British government faced stiff resistance after 1849 along the tribal belt, the Mahsud tribe in particular gave record of trouble (Williams, 2012, p. 14). Therefore, many British writers have mentioned that Mahsud is the only tribe which has never submitted the British might in Waziristan (Howell, 1979; Matthews, 2010; General Staff, 1931). The relationship of the Mahsud tribe with the British were bitter, grim and violent. Hundreds and thousands of men died from both sides in various wars, battles and ambushes. Brigadier-General Chamberlain in 1860s described the character of the Mahsuds, as quoted in Punjab Government Press (1901, p. 21), ―they were celebrated as the earliest, the most inveterate and the most incorrigible of all the robbers of the border. It was their boast that while kingdoms and dynasties had passed away they alone of all the Afghan tribes had remained free, and that the armies of kings had never penetrated their strongholds, that in their intercourse with the rest of mankind they knew no law or will lent their own, and lastly that from generation to generation the Damaan (the plains) within a night‘s run of the hills had been their hunting ground from which to enrich themselves‖. The North-Western frontier occupied an important and sensitive geo-strategic location. This route give opportunity to the invaders from Western and Central Asia to access the Indian sub-Continent (Johnson, 2003, p. 697-743). The Russian endeavors to gain influence in Central Asia created distress for the British empire in the North-West boundary (Miller, 1977, p. xv). The first Anglo-Afghan war started in 1838 to avoid Russian interference in the region currently constitutes tribal belt. The British failed to

achieve desired results in Afghanistan. The colonial rulers were, however, successful in creating buffer zone, the tribal belt, between the two empires (Hopkirk, 2001). Before the first Anglo-Afghan War, the region that constituted tribal belt was in indirect control of Afghan regime (Omrani, & Ledwidge, 2009, p. 50-54). The British fought three wars with the Afghans in which Mahsud tribe played an important role, specifically in the 3rd Anglo- Afghan War. The assistance of Mahsuds in the War led to amicable relationship with the Afghan government. Many Mahsud tribesmen occupied prestigious positions in the Afghan administration including the position of Naib-Salar, second in command, of the Afghan forces, in the time of Nadir Shah Durrani reign (K. Kaka, personal communication, November 28, 2016). The Naib-Salar was personally appointed by the King himself. Sir Olaf Caroe (1965, p. 405-408) has argued that the tribes of Waziristan had great influence in Afghanistan and its government. He emphases that Mahsuds have played the role of King makers of the day in Kabul more than couple of times. J. W. Spain (1972, p. 133-139) has noted that the role of Mahsuds was instrumental in restoring various regimes on the throne of Afghanistan. Ul-Haq et al (2005, p. 12) has highlighted that the Mahsuds have played leading role in the placing of Nadir Shah on the throne of Afghanistan. In the initial stages of rule in the frontier, the British avoided penetration into Waziristan and tried to settle issues with negotiation through indirect representatives such as Nawab of Tank (Howell, 1979). According to Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India August 1920, as quoted in Matthews (2010, p. 29), ―for many years we followed the policy of non-interference with the inhabitants. We hoped that if we left them alone, they would leave us alone‖. The tribesmen disturbed the law and order in the border areas by plundering, killing and kidnaping (Paget & Mason, 1984, p. 10). In 1860, Mahsud Lashker, comprised of 3,000 men, sacked and burnt the town of Tank which gave reason to British to penetrate Waziristan (Williams, 2012, p. 19). In response, British force of 5,000 men penetrated into Mahsud territory up to Makin and Kaniguram and destroy their crops and settlements (Nevill, 1977, p. 46). It was the first time in the history when the British showed physical presence in the Mahsud area, the event resulted in the establishment of the permanent check posts of the Imperial garrisons in Waziristan. Caroe (1965, p. 392) argued that the British penetrated into every valley of Mahsuds many times, built forts, roads and cantonments, but none of these frightened the common men or disarm or administer the area directly or to impose taxation successfully. The British penetrated Mahsud territory many times but stayed temporarily due to security and other financial reasons. Ahmed

(2004) has mentioned that the Scouts in Waziristan used steel in windows instead of glass as a shield from sniping from the surrounding mountains. The Punjab Government praised the fighting skills of the Mahsud tribe in 1881, as quoted in Punjab Government Press (1901, p. 22), as ‗the most courageous, boldest and worthy of admire especially in sword fighting, hand to hand combat and in war-tactics. Right from the beginning of the British rule in the Punjab few tribes have given continuous trouble. None of those tribes have been more daring and persistent in disturbance peace in the British territory such as the Mahsud tribesmen‘. From 1850s up to 1880s Mahsuds frequently attacked the British assets in Waziristan and the surrounding area, all the British settlements during that period ensured peace for only short-term (Punjab Government Press, 1901). Abdur Rahman, who later in 1880s became the ruler of Afghanistan, took refuge with Nabi Khan, a Mahsud tribesmen in Waziristan in late 1870s (Howell, 1979, p. 2-5). He was interested to support Mahsuds against the British and provided financial and material support. It was the Afghan encroachment which created law and order situation in Waziristan thereby destabilizing British administration. The second Anglo-Afghan War, 1878-1881, was the outcome of British concern of growing foreign influences in Afghanistan and its impact on the tribal belt. According to telegram from Sir N. Chamberlain to lord Lytton (17th September 1878, p. 241) the Amir of Afghanistan was indifferent to British concerns and threats and continued interference in the tribal areas. In response, Great Britain invaded Afghanistan on November 21st, 1878 (Kárník, 2014, p. 72). Before the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War, the ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Sher Ali, distributed huge money among the Mahsuds to revolt against the British in 1877-78 (Howell,1979, p. 6). The ordinary Mahsuds were poor, so the point that they might have taken the Afghan money might not be overlooked (Curtis, 1946, p. 182-183). To handle the situation, British paid the Mahsuds handsomely and gave enormous privileges and lands in the British territory. Barton (1939, p. 214) argues that the Mahsud tribe, in specific, proved very expensive on the British treasury. The Mahsud tribal insurgency costed British government millions of pounds (Mohabbat, 1979, p. 85). In any case, the administration failed to achieve the obedience of the tribe. The Mahsud attacked Tank in 1979, burnt the bazar to the ground, the British administration in the town completely collapsed (Beattie, 2011, p. 580). Instead of using force, the British imposed blockade on the Mahsuds which did not affected the tribe conspicuously (Memorandum, 1939, p. 4). Interestingly, the relationship between British and Mahsuds were relatively less violent after the end of 2nd Anglo Afghan War. The humiliated defeat to Afghan army forced the tribesmen to think

more pragmatic regarding their affiliations and became less supportive towards the Afghan regime. The major outcome of the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War was the complete expulsion of Afghan government from the tribal belt including Kurram (Spain, 1963, p. 143). In 1890, the forward policy presented by Sir Robert Sandeman achieved satisfactory results in Baluchistan, therefore, it was applied in Waziristan (Bruce, 1900, p. 170-205). The forward policy was aimed to establish a permanent defense line against the Russian interference (Caroe, 1965, p. 370). The policy envisioned to push forward the first defense line of the British Empire into the cities of Afghanistan thereby directly controlling the tribal belt (Omrani, 2009, p. 183). The policy failed to achieve desired results in Waziristan (Rahman, 2004, p. 180). Instead, the policy resulted resentment of the tribesmen and created law and order situation. After 1894, writ of the state was challenged in Waziristan, attacks on British assets became more frequent. In 1894, the Mahsuds attacked the British encampment in Wana with at least 2000 men and seriously challenged British administration (Beattie, 2011, p. 581). In response, the colonial rulers-initiated chain of military operations. The British forces occupied Wana completely, Wazir area, and the region of Tochi in North Waziristan, these areas were brought under the direct supervision political Agents in South and North Waziristan under the direct authority of the Commissioner of Dera Ismail khan (Punjab Government Press, 1901). The tribes of Waziristan attacked colonial forces frequently which has diverse implications on the law and order situation especially during the World War I (WWI). The Afghan forces considered the British losses in WWI as an advantage and penetrated in to the tribal areas in May 1919 to acquire the support of the independent tribes against the British (Poullada, 1973; Fremont-Barnes, 2014; Heathcote, 1980). Moreman (1998, p. 104) mentioned that the tribes such as Afridis supported the Afghan offensive and fought the British in the hills near to Khyber Pass. Robson (2007, p. 83) has argued that majority of the Afridis and Mohmands did not join the Afghan forces. Robson has noted that the defeat of the Afghan forces by the British in the initial stages of War discouraged various Pashtun tribes to join the ranks of Afghan. However, the situation was different in Waziristan. In the third Anglo-Afghan War, 6th of May 1919 to 3rd of June 1919, Mahsud tribesmen wholeheartedly supported the arrival of Afghan regular army against the British (Matthews, 2010, 32-35). The British forces penetrated in to SWA to suppress the rebellion but faced stiff resistance. The stiff resistance forced the British forces to retreat in SWA (Moreman,1998, p. 104). Moreman further argued that the major reason for the formidable resistance in SWA was the mutinied native officers and soldiers who seized huge number of arms and ammunition. Warren (2000, p. 37) has mentioned that the Mahsud tribesmen

had advanced weapons in huge numbers. Some of these weapons were snatched from the British soldiers during combats. Sir Andrew Skeen (1932, 11-15), the sitting general of Imperial forces participated in the military operations in Waziristan before, during and after the 3rd Anglo-Afghan War, argued that ‗the deserted tribesmen from the British military were skilled and well versed in modern techniques added supplementary support to tribal tactics in warfare. In the same line, the stolen high velocity rifles, huge number of rounds and other sophisticated weapons added anxiety and distress in the British ranks. The imperial army defeated the Afghan army in the conventional warfare, but it triggered tribal insurgency in the aftermath of the War. The Mahsud tribe especially, disturbed the British administration in the long run‘. Fremont-Barnes (2014, p. 80) argued that the Mahsuds have rebelled against the British, in 1915, even before the initiation of 3rd Anglo-Afghan War. The British negotiated with the Mahsuds but never compelled them to submit to their terms. The Wazirs submitted to the British terms and conditions, the Mahsuds were the only tribe to fight with the British in Waziristan in the aftermath of the 3rd Anglo-Afghan War (Warren, 2000, p. 45). From 1857 up to 1945, revolts in Waziristan and the subsequent military operations are important events in the history of British India (Warren, 2000, p. xxv; Talbot, 2001). The superior fighting abilities of the tribes of Waziristan was acknowledged by the British Viceroy Lord Chelmsford who ordered to assemble unprecedented huge force to fight the Mahsuds in the fall of 1919 (Moreman, 1998, p. 106-107). Cole (2009, p. 232) noted that insurgency of 1919-1920, forced the British to send 80,000 troops to fight the Mahsuds and spent more than two times combine of what the regime had to spend on the 3rd Anglo- Afghan War. Howell (1979, p. 22) described irritation and anxiety of colonial power from Mahsuds by highlighting that on some occasions the British attacked Mahsuds with as many as sixty thousand men. He emphasized that the mighty force and heavy military machinery failed to scare Mahsuds to submit. The words of Lord Curzon, Britain‘s Viceroy of India expresses powerlessness to settle the Waziristan problem, as quoted in Howell (1979, p. 36), he states that ―No patchwork scheme—and all our present recent schemes...are mere patchwork—will settle the Waziristan problem. Not until the military steam-roller has passed over the country from end to end, will there be peace. But I do not want to be the person to start that machine‖. The Mahsuds became British migraine in the campaign of Waziristan in 1919- 1920, the size of the force and the amount of the arms, ammunition and sophisticated weapons used by the government was unprecedented. Ul-Haq et al (2005, p. 10-13) have highlighted that sophisticated weapons of the Great War, First World War 1914-1918,

accompanied by huge force was used in the Waziristan campaign of 1919-1920. Matthews (2010, p. 35-37) has mentioned that six infantry brigades, comprised of thousands of troops, participated in the expedition with heavy arms, ammunition and technical support, the British forces had help of the Royal Air Force (RAF) which bombarded the Mahsud territory inhumanely with 10,000 pounds a day for nine days continuously before the penetration of the British ground forces in the area. Despite the aerial bombardment and the use of heavy artillery fire, the Mahsuds pushed back the various battalions and left thousands wounded and dead including the British officers (Moreman, 1998, p. 109; Watteville, 1925, p. 104-105). Watteville (1925, p. 4-6) highlighted that the enemy in Waziristan expedition of 1919-1920 fought with courage and determination which has been rarely witnessed in the operations of similar caliber by our troops. Watteville (1925, p. 82) has argued that British military operations had little or no effect on the native resistance in Waziristan. In some cases, external interference/support led to the most violent fight in Waziristan. In the Waziristan Campaign of 1919-1920 the hostility and enormous use of force by the British led to the transformation of war for political reasons into tribal revenge. Watteville (1925, p. 82) has argued that penetration of huge British force in to Mahsud area and the use of heavy arms/weapons stimulated the cultural code of revenge. The resistance of the Mahsud tribe in Waziristan campaign scared the British forces. Stephens (1953, p. 128-130) described Mahsud tribesmen as savages. Stephens has mentioned the savage nature of the Mahsuds because of their marked bravery and courage in the battlefield. To Matthews (2010, p. 42) the defeat was quite dreadful that the British General even requested for the use of poison gas against the Mahsuds. Roe (2014, p. 37) has mentioned that the British government in Waziristan considered to use poison gas against the Mahsuds. Moreman (1998, p. 111) has noted that the request to use poison gas was rejected by the central command. In the Waziristan campaign of 1919-1920 British relied on three strategies which includes the use of air support, artillery and permanent piquet system (Matthews, 2010). On 30th December 1919, British commanding officer in South Waziristan submitted an interesting report which stated that the British army has a training against a civilized and organized enemy which is not a good training against the savage enemy of Waziristan (Moreman, 1998, p. 112). The campaign of Waziristan resulted in thousands; dead, wounded and missing. Moreman (1998, p. 120) called the conquest, a success after paying highest Butcher‘s bill in the history of the sub-continent. Similarly, Miller (1977) argues that a military operation in Waziristan always seemed to exceed its predecessor in carnage.

Howell (1979, p. 67, 83) ‗praising the superior tactical skills of the Mahsud tribe when the British military lunched an offensive against them. Howell claimed that such vicious fight has never been seen along the frontier. On 16th February 1920, the fighting ended in huge losses for the British in the Mahsud territory during the Waziristan campaign. Approximately, 400 soldiers were killed including 28 British and 15 Indian officers, 237 missing including 1 British officer, 1,683 wounded. Keeping in view the history of British relations with the Mahsuds. It is impossible to predict that what any Mahsud is going to do next. The enlisted Mahsuds gained decorations for act of gallantry in the field, outrageous military misdemeanor of many resulted in the exclusion from the army‘. Many writers and resident officers including Caroe, believes Howell‘s monograph, Mizh, to be the most authentic and ―the most penetrating of all tribal studies‖ (Caroe, 1965, p. 395). During the British Afghan Wars and the British expedition popularly known as Waziristan Campaign of 1919-20, Mahsud Tribe gained the reputation of ―probably the most formidable fighting men along the Frontier fiercely independent, their fighting skills honed by centuries of raiding‖ (Robson, 2007, p. 149). Beattie (2011, p. 572) argues that during the Colonial administration numbers of troops and police to civilian ratio was much higher in Waziristan than elsewhere in the entire British India. The tactical superiority of the tribes of Waziristan was acknowledge by the then Commander-in-Chief of the army. ‗The tribesmen fought with courage and determination. The toughest battle troops would be hesitant to fight in such an impregnable terrain and severe climate conditions‘ (Ul Haq, Khan & Nuri, 2005, p. 20). In 1937 an entire British brigade was wiped out in the Mahsud area of SWA (Ahmed, 2004, p. 31). It shows that the Mahsuds have historically given tough time to foreign or external intruders. Countless British soldiers and officers have lost their lives in Waziristan, at least five British Political Agents have been killed by the tribesmen (Ahmed, 2004, p. 31-33). The Mahsud tribesmen have killed more British officer as compared to any other tribe along the frontier. The very first commandant of SWA, R. H. Harman, was killed by a Mahsud tribesman in 1905 (Sammon, 2008, p. 16). Allen (1977, p. 5-6 & 203- 205) has explained an event/story from the personal notes of Major A. J. During the then political agent of SWA, 1940-1942, on an outcome of a punitive expedition against the Mahsud tribe resulted in complete disaster. According to him, the native fighters got above military pickets and opened fired at once, subsequently, an entire British regiment came literally running from the battle ground in to the encampment. They cut all the wires and supplies from the British garrison in Razmak which was only seven miles away. I spent not less than four and a half weak in a hole underground. We suffered 82 killed including one

Colonel and other officers‘. The Mahsud are the most difficult people to deal with and impossible to persuade (Afridi, 1980, p. 1-2). It was difficult for the British to uphold the honor of Mahsuds and bring them to terms simultaneously. There were two reasons for good relationship of the Afghan government with the Mahsuds. Firstly, many Mahsud leaders occupied key positions in various Afghan regimes and enjoyed direct correspondence with the monarch. Secondly and most importantly, the Islamic character of Afghan government was always attractive in comparison to the non- Muslim occupiers of the sub-continent. In many cases, the Afghan help empowered the religious elite in Waziristan to capitalized on the religious character of the British and launch Jihad which has of course given rise to religious militancy in the region. Mullah in Waziristan usually took advantage of fragile socio-political setting. In the end of 19th and the first half of 20th century there were two issues that transformed socio-political landscape and troubled law and order conditions in the Tribal Areas. Firstly, the Afghan interference in the internal affairs of the frontier region and, secondly, the proliferation of Deobandi Version of Islam (Haroon, 2011). The Deobandi spiritual idealism regarding Pashtun tribal societies provided Mullahs in Waziristan an opportunity to gain power and autonomy by launching Holy wars regardless against Muslims or non-Muslim invaders (Ahmed, 2004, p 50). The nationalistic designs of Afghan regimes intended to merge the tribal and frontier region in Afghanistan. In the circumstances when nationalistic/ethnic designs were not an issue, religion was made bases of conformity. When Islam is endangered the tribesmen would not hesitate to sacrifice their lives. The financial support of the Afghan governments to Mullahs against the British has given rise to faith-based violence in the region (Haroon, 2011, p. 119-122). There were two major revolts in Waziristan instigated on Islamist lines which demonstrates religious militancy in the historical contexts. The first religious movement was lunched by Mullah Powindah, a Mahsud tribesman, in the late 19th and early 20th century by challenged the writ of the state in Waziristan. The pioneer of the second violent movement was Faqir of Ipi which continued from 1930s up to 1960. The raiding and plundering were pronounced as religious act, the non-Muslim character of the Colonial power was highlighted to encourage the common men to participate in such endeavors. Mullah Powindah. belonged from Shobi Khel subsection in Alizai branch of the Dre-Mahsud. He is an influential character in the history of religious militancy in Waziristan. His given name was Mohiuddin. The title of Mullah Powindah is not mere a name. It carries socio-cultural and religious significance. The word Mullah highlights the religious character. Though he was not a trained religious scholar but well experienced in

the principal tenants of Islamic teachings. The name ―Powindah‖ conveys socio-cultural connotation. Powindahs are Pashtun nomad merchants spread over the entire belt of the Pashtun region in Afghanistan and the then British India (Bruce, 1929; Robinson, 1935; Balland, 1991). The very name was able to gain backing of the entire Pashtun community, irrespective of tribes/clans, to support his religious cause against the colonial rulers. Elliott (1968) has highlighted that because of his perfect and unique methods in war and tactics Lord Curzon called Mullah Powindah a ―first class scoundrel‖. Mullah Powindah was given the title of Badshah-i-Taliban, King of Taliban, when he killed a local jailor in the British territory (India, 1908, p. 417; Beattie, 2012, p. 581). The British military accounts described Mullah Powindah as a person who collects alms, charity and donation in the name of religion in the day time and commit crimes against the administration in the night (Simla, 1908, p. 417). Mullah Powindah was supported and encouraged by the Afghan Monarchy in his adventures against the British government in Waziristan (Olesen, 2013, p. 109). Mullah took refuge in Kabul when things went sour in Waziristan. Mullah and his followers were given huge number of arms and ammunition for the insurgent activities in Waziristan, the Afghan government offered him financial support, related privileges and valuable land in Afghanistan (Howell, 1931, p. 45-60). The fierce attack, in the leadership of Mullah, of the Mahsud tribesmen on the Durand Delimitation Commission in the 1894 and its escort at Wana was a trendsetter (Tribal Analysis Center, 2012). Followed by the Mullah‘s attack supported by native followers, on the British garrisons in Mirranshah and four other places in 1895 (Beattie, 2002, p. 154-157). The situation was capable to trigger tribal warfare along the boundary. However, the British responded swiftly and mobilized 100,000 British and Indian troops who conducted seven different military operations against the tribes involved and costed the administration millions of pounds (Mohabbat, 1979, p. 83-86). The British lunched military operations in 1894-1895 to capture Mullah dead or alive but he escaped to Afghanistan and went into hiding (Howell, 1979, p. 19-22). The British administration negotiated with Mullah Powindah and offered privileges including land in the British territory and allowances (Beattie, 2012, p. 582). The British administration paid Mullah Powindah allowances, on his wishes these payments were given in secret (Caroe, 1965, p. 401). Mullah was granted monthly allowance of Rs. 100 in 1900 and a grant of land was sanctioned in 1906 but due to continued hostility the British cancelled his allowances and other privileges in 1907 (General Staff, 1921, p. 9). Howell (1979, p. 42) argued that Mullah Powindah was responsible for the killing of the Mahsud Maliks who did not support him and cooperated with the British. He mentioned (1979, p.

22) that Maliks complained to the British that they cannot confront or control the Mullah as he has the indigenous support. Beattie (2012, p. 581) has noted that in 1893 three Mahsud Maliks were killed by own tribesmen because they cooperated with the British government by providing natives outlaws to the British. General Staff (1921, p. 9 & 20) has highlighted that Mullah Powindah was hostile towards Maliks and on number of occasions he tried to prevent Mahsud Jirga to meet the British. The report has mentioned that the force of Mullah was comprised of youth and termed his group as Mahsud youth party. Jihad as a slogan was used by Mullah Powindah to rally tribesmen for attacking and raiding British (A. Naveed, personal communication, December 23, 2016). Bruce (1888) has mentioned that our policy of ignoring tribal Maliks in Waziristan and working through go-between has weakened the institution. It has resulted in the emergence of alternate leadership of religious fanatics such as Mullah Powindah. East India report (1902, p. 212) on Waziristan has explained that by 1902 there were two factions in the Mahsud tribe, Maliks and Mullahs, both were competing to have the support of the entire tribe. Many Maliks gave Mullah Powindah recognition for his leadership qualities. To M. Iqbal (personal communication, December 24, 2016), an influential elder, Mullah Powindah was nothing without the support of the Maliks and Mashers. However, an influential elder form Bahlolzai branch of the Mahsuds, Malik M. Hashim (personal communication, December 08, 2016) has mentioned that Maliks never supported Mullah Powindah which was realized by the British in several Jirgas with Mahsud elders and canceled the privileges of Mullah. Mullah Powindah died due to natural cause in 1913 (General Staff, 1921, p. 9). An influential Mahsud Malik of Abdullai clan, K. Kaka (personal communication, November 28, 2016) has mentioned that Mullah Powindah died in Merabi, SWA, in 1913. The same year was mentioned by great grandson of Mullah Powindah (M. Aslam, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Mullah Powindah is hailed as a hero in Waziristan. Mahsud tribesmen in specific mention Mullah as a hero. Mullah Powindah was equally popular among the Wazir tribesmen in his time. He was considered the leader of the revolt of the Wazir tribe against the British administration in NWA. In the revolt British military was attacked in Mirnashah and four other places (Beattie, 2001, p. 155). The second uprising in Waziristan which promoted faith-based violence in the region was instigated in NWA just before the World War II. Faqir of Ipi followed the footsteps of his processor Mullah Powindah to combine the tribes of Waziristan on religious lines against the British government. In 1936-37, the emergence of Faqir of Ipi, a religious firebrand led the revolt against the British on Islamist lines which was

wholeheartedly supported by the Mahsuds (Ul-Haq, Khan & Nuri, 2005, p. 10-15). In 1936, an incident occurred in which a Hindu girl was kidnapped by a Waziri-Muslim and fled to Waziristan. The British recovered the girl and arrested the offender which enraged the local Pashtun tribes. The incident gave an opportunity to Faqir of Ipi to capitalize Pashtun resentment on Islamist lines. The Faqir of Ipi alleged that the girl converted to Islam on own will and accused the British of interfering in the religion, therefore, he assembled tribal army in the slogan of Jihad and raided British administrated areas approximately 30 times and damaged state assets (Baqai, 1999, p. 24; His Majesty‘s Stationery Office, 1937, p. 4-5). According to intelligence reports as quoted in (Baqai, 1999, p. 24), Faqir of Ipi was a civil servant in British government. Baqai argues that Faqir considered British regulations contrary to Islam such as property tax and post mortem examination which gained him popularity and soon became champion of Islam. He was Murid of Chaharbagh, a prominent sufi who recognized Faqir‘s leadership capabilities and titled him Khalifah (Warren, 2000, 82-86; Tareen, 1984, p. 64-67). His father was a religious figure, Faqir of Ipi perused his religious studies in district Bannu, he was a Tori Khel Wazir named Haji Mirza Ali Khan (Warren, 2000). The tribal Lashkers were formed in the village of Ipi in 1936 which was the hometown of Mirza Ali Khan and therefore he was popularly known as Faqir of Ipi (Hauner, 1981). The notion of Faqir carries a socio-religious significance in Waziristan and other Pashtun areas. An important sort of religious leader in Waziristan in the colonial times, Faqir was supposedly a God inspired holy man who cared nothing for material gains or power/authority (Summons, 20008, p. 10). To Beattie (2002, p. 9) such individuals usually collect alms and lives near to or with the precinct of a holy man‘s tomb to attract the masses. Like other Islamist violent leaders, Faqir of Ipi relied on Quranic verses to mobilize tribesmen against the British (M. Khan, personal communication, December 26, 2016). In response to the militant activities of Faqir of Ipi, His Majesty records (His Majesty‘s Stationery Office, 1937, p. 4-5) mentioned that 32,000-regular military and 5,000 irregular troops entered South and North Waziristan with the support of Royal Air Force. Hundreds of individuals including military personnel and local tribesmen lost their lives in the operation. Behuria (2002) argues, to suppress the insurgent activities of Faqir of Ipi the British government dispatched 50,000 troops to the tribal belt supported by the air force and the artillery (Behuria, 2002). In 1937, British dispatched four additional Brigades to Razamak to capture the Faqir of IPI, the expedition failed miserably (Williams, 2012, p. 28). The genius and tactics of Faqir of Ipi in war and tactics got him a reputation, the

colonial writings termed him ―The Scarlet Pimpernel of Waziristan‖ (Sammon, 2008, p. 35). The Afghan prime minister refused to cooperate on Faqir of Ipi issue due to political and religious reasons (Baqai, 1999, p. 29). Hauner (1981, p. 191) believes that Faqir of Ipi was also assistance by Italy. Faqir of Ipi killed Maliks who opposed him (M. Ajmal, personal communication, December 29, 2016). Just like is he professor Mullah Powindah, Faqir of Ipi carried out attacks by highlighting non-Muslim character of the British with the help of tribal youth. As a result of military operations in the Tochi valley the Wazir tribe reached an agreement with government Faqir of Ipi fled to SWA. Faqir of Ipi was welcomed in SWA by where he took asylum under the protection of the Mahsuds (Baqai, 1999, p. 26). Faqir of Ipi was accompanied by Mahsud youngsters and carried out attacks in SWA. During the period, the British convoy going to Wana was attacked in which more than ninety-two soldiers were killed, captured or wounded (Williams, 2012, p. 28). In February 1937 a British officer of South Waziristan Scouts was killed by the Mahsuds following day a British Political officer was killed (Baqai, 1999, p. 26). Baqai has highlighted that the fame of Mahsuds gave Faqir reputation along the entire tribal belt. Moreover, the rough terrain of Mahsud area gave Faqir of Ipi territorial support to establish safe headquarters for operations. The Mahsud tribesmen joined hands with Faqir of Ipi and initiated series of tribal raids in Waziristan and British territory. Baqai (1999) has noted that due to series of tribal raids besides British Hindus suffered heavy losses in the settled districts including more than sixty houses burnt more than 30 kidnapped and many killed. On April 9th, 1937, a British convoy coming down from Wana was ambushed at Shahur Tangai by the Mahsud tribesmen in which many British officers were killed (Spain, 1963, p. 290). Faqir of Ipi was an anti-British rebel, never caught or killed. He challenged colonial government and frequently attacked Imperial military (Williams, 2012, p. 10). Faqir of Ipi died his natural death in 1960 (Munir, 15th November 2010). He combined tribal anger and triggered holy war against the rulers. Faqir of Ipi continued his holy war after the birth of Pakistan until his death in 1960 near the Durand line (Tribal Analysis Center, 2008). The Afghan regime continued interference in the sub-continent after the creation of Pakistan and declared Faqir of Ipi as the President of Southern Pashtunistan (Ul Haq, Khan & Nuri, 2005, p. 11-14). Consequently, Pakistan started to invest in the tribal belt more to improve the socio-economic status (Burke & Ziring, 1973, p. 75). The total cost of the state in the tribal belt was approximately 50 million rupees a year in subsidies only, exactly like they tribesmen did in British days (The Times London, 29th June 1949). of However, the endeavors of the Faqir of Ipi against Pakistan became less attractive for the natives. Major

reason was the Islamic character of the state which made the question of Jihad irrelevant. The Taliban leader, emerged in the 21st century, Hafiz Gul Bahadar in the NWA claimed to be the direct descended of the Faqir of Ipi (T. Alam, personal communication, December 25, 2016). This claim is a fundamental source of his popularity and the support to his militant activities. It gives legitimacy to Hafiz Gul Bahadar‘s leadership and strategies. To be a Grandchild of a religious pious character who was hailed by many as a true tribal hero and the champion of Islam by the inhabitants in Waziristan. The terrain of Waziristan and the Pashtun customs and traditions of supporting each other and guests has protected number of outlaws. Islamist insurgents enjoyed the support of the independent tribes in the tribal belt. The natives gathered efficient local intelligence and made it available that helped the insurgents such as Mullah Powindah and Faqir of Ipi in escaping ambushes of the British (Roe. 2011). The British government in Waziristan despite enormous resources and the availability of huge ground forces, intelligence network and the support of Royal Air Force failed in the manhunt of Mullah Powindah and Fakir of Ipi. The British led frustrating chase along the tribal belt to capture Mullah Powindah for approximately 25 years. Dupree (1980, p. 480-492) has noted that the British and Pakistani government made unsuccessful attempts to capture Faqir of Ipi dead or alive for more than 30 years. Beattie (2012, p. 580-582) and Ahmed (2004) believes that the militant movements led by Mullah Powindah in some respects anticipates the present Tehreek-i- Taliban (TTP). Mullah Powindah build up teams of followers who then dispersed in the entire tribal belt and were ready for the call of Jihad against the British. Mullah Powindah called his deputies Taliban and himself entitled Badshah (king) of the Taliban. In the 21st century the most wanted man on earth was allegedly taking refuge in Waziristan/tribal belt. It is believed that Osama Bin Laden had the support of independent tribes of FATA (Time, 2007). Harding (2001) believes that Osama followed the footsteps of the Faqir of Ipi. Just like Faqir of Ipi Osama bin Laden moved around in the tribal belt and changed his residence frequently which made it difficult to trace his location for the security agencies. The US forces and the allied security agencies despite enormous resources failed in the manhunt to capture the militant leader in Waziristan. In the same line, wanted militant leaders such as Baitullah Mahsud, HakiMullah Mahsud and Qari Hussain were supported by the rough terrain and the tribal traditions of protection both in South and North Waziristan. The militant leaders were never captured dead or alive in the offensives of Pakistan military. The killing of these leaders was only possible with the help of drone technology, a breakthrough in technology. However, the then president and Chief of Army Staff, General Pervaiz Musharaf (2006, p. 220) has acknowledged that in the

Modern technological world, the most developed states find it difficult to handle or get rid of Al-Qaeeda and Taliban. 3.6 THE TRIBAL CHARACTER OF THE MAHSUDS AND RIVALRIES This part analyses unique cultural values of Mahsuds and its role in the violent behavior. It discusses the tribal rivalry of the Mahsuds with other tribes of Waziristan especially the Wazir of SWA. It also highlights the role of religious elite in the transformation of social and political resentment into religious militancy. The primary concern of the Mahsud was defense and security in the presence of numerically larger Wazir tribe. Surrounded by the Wazir tribes, the Mahsuds inhabit literary in the center of SWA, their territory does not touch a single inch with the boundary of Afghanistan (Hart, 1985, p. 399). The cultural influences of defending one‘s interest vis a vis the rivals even through violent means is a trait taught to Mahsud children by the elders. This is especially true in relation to their tribal rivalry with the Wazirs. The continuous struggle to survive contributed in the proficiency of the fighting skills of Mahsuds. The tribal feuds with Wazirs and the danger of external invader created internal solidarity among different branches of the Mahsud tribe. The settlements of sections and subsections are greatly intermixed which makes it impossible identifying of the localities of various branches of the Mahsud tribe (General Staff, 1921, p. 3-4). As as a result of this intermingling, sectional and sub-sectional feuds among Mahsuds are almost unknown (Calhoun, 2016, p. 4). Therefore, the possibility of unification of all sections and sub-sections of the tribe against one single enemy is always a great probability (General Staff, 1921, p. 3). The unity of Mahsuds to counter threats in the surrounding area has often led to militancy which is especially correct in tribal rivalry against the Wazir and the fight with the British. There is a sense of strong bonding among the Mahsuds. The role of values such as tribal honor, internal unity, protecting own member, democratic character and lack of centralized or strong leadership resulted in the lesser external control and discouraged internal feuds. Indian confidential report, General Staff (1921, p. 3-4), on Mahsuds have highlighted the internal feuds among the tribesmen are very less as compared to other Pashtun tribes living in the frontier who carryout blood feuds to the very bitter end. In the case of Mahsuds feud can be settled by killing the assassin or by compensation. The tribesmen stick to cultural code of honor in the face of imminent danger disregarding the might and strength of the enemy. On many occasions in the colonial times tribal honor of Mahsuds has costed them a lot in terms of men and material. In the face of mighty enemy, other tribes in Waziristan have submitted to authority, except the Mahsud tribe who stick to cultural code of honor and never submitted (Matthews, 2010, p. 35-37;

Warren, 2000, p. 45). The sense of honor is an important tool which encourages militancy among Mahsuds. To M. Mashal Khan (personal communication, December 30, 2016), one of the eldest Mahsud Malik alive, aged 100 years plus, explained that in response to dishonorable remarks, enlisted Mahsud tribesmen have slapped and even killed their superior officers. The value of honor is dear to Mahsuds. He argued that the military behavior of abusing inferior and civilians in Mahsud area has negative impact in the post 9/11 period in SWA. A Mahsud can stand a bullet but he cannot endure humiliation. Mashal explained that a Mahsud never forgets. His accounts predict that Mahsuds will avenge the damages done by the state in their area. It might take decades but Mahsuds will settle the score, they always do. According to the accounts of Mahsud Malik, Taj Alam Abdurahman Khel (personal communication, December 25, 2016) regarding unique cultural features among the Mahsuds by highlighting example from local practice in dealing with a defamed woman. It is a very difficult for a woman whose honor is challenged to get married in the same Pashtun clans in the frontier. Among the Wazirs, once a woman found guilty of dishonorable act, she is blamed her entire life and not accepted back in the tribe again. However, there are number of examples among the Mahsuds when a defamed woman got married in own tribe. This means Mahsuds do not gave up on own tribesmen even the less privileged/represented individual in community. The trait of defending own member from other tribes and foreign invader encourages conflict/enmity. In other words, the strong tribal bonding of Mahsuds leads to militancy and violence in extreme cases. Malik Hashim khan (personal communication, December 08, 2016) while trying to distinguish cultural traits of Mahsuds from Wazirs explained that the customs, traditions and habits of Mahsuds are significantly different from Wazirs and other tribe in the area. 13 Wylly (2003, p. 278) has argued that practically the Wazir and Mahsud are different tribes from each other, their habits, customs, traditions and characteristics are different. M. Hashim (personal communication, December 08, 2016) believes that the Mahsuds are more hospitable and never break promises, sacrifice own life to protect guests and asylum seekers. The Waziris are famous for changing loyalties/sides. ―If wazir is your right hand, cut it‖, a famous proverb in the locality of Waziristan and surrounding areas. Hashim highlighted the story of Aimal Kansi, a wanted international fugitive to the US, was safe in the protection of Mahsuds. It was until he went in the protection of Wazir tribe when his identity was compromised and handed over the information to the state.

13 Malik Hashim Khan is a leading Malik and an influential elder of the Abdurahman Khel Bahlolzai, Mahsud tribe. 68

Robson (2007, p. 147) has argued that unification under one single leadership among Mahsud is a real challenge, every Mahsud consider himself an equal to other Mahsud and will not submit to any authority within or outside. In the decision-making processes, a common man has a right to raise his voice which is unfamiliar in any other Pashtun tribe. The confidential report of General Staff (1921, p. 3-4) has described that the character, unity and organization of the Mahsuds have contributed greatly in their democratic and independent way of life as much as, that even their own elders/Maliks have very little influence over them. The report has mentioned that Maliks among Mahsuds who tried to accumulate undue authority have been assassinated by the common men. Williams (2012, p. 12) believes that all the other Pashtun tribes have designated chiefs but leaders among Mahsuds have some influence and not much power or authority. He has asserted that there is no centralized leadership among the Mahsuds. Ahmed (1980, p. 19) argues that egalitarian ethos among Mahsud tribesmen ensure personal independence and freedom form authority. Howell (1979, p. 96) while discussing institution of leadership among Mahsuds has noted that an influential Mahsud Malik Jaggar, from Abdur Rahman Khel section, suggested to the British to make us all Maliks or kill us all at once with the canons so there is no one left to lead. Jaggar presented his views when the British were trying to appoint Maliks. According to Robson (2007, p. 147), an ordinary man can be raised to a status of tribal elder which is a rare commodity in other tribes. Spain, J. W. (1972, p. 136) describing democratic character among the Mahsuds elders/Maliks have less authority compared to any other Pashtun tribe. He explained that among Mahsuds number of Maliks was surprisingly high and no Malik or a group of Maliks are sole representatives of the entire tribe. There is little horizontal organization among clans and families. Spain has noted that on one occasion while trying to device a system to deal with the tribe by the British, a huge Mahsud Jirga appeared that consisted of nearly 20,000 men. The lack of powerful leadership ensured years of conflict between the British and the Mahsuds because the British found it difficult to negotiate and maintain an agreement with a tribe where Maliks could not enforce a decision. The colonial administration did not exercise direct control in the Mahsud area because of its geographical isolation and rough terrain difficult to approach coupled with the absence of influential Maliks/elders or centralized leadership. They never carried out police duties in the Mahsud areas directly like elsewhere in the Pashtun belt (T. Alam, personal communication, December 25, 2016). Such responsibilities were delegated to the Mahsud Maliks. The Maliks had to perform their duties as tribal representatives and had the privilege to make enquiries, bring the offenders or the sections concerned to account

and prove the charge. In the case of other tribes living in the tribal belt and in Waziristan such as Dawar, Ahmadzais and Utmanzai Wazir, Imperial power exercised direct internal control (Malik Hashim khan, personal communication, December 08, 2016). The Colonial forces could visit the villages at any time they desired and arrest men (Howell, 1979). Historical accounts have highlighted agnatic tribal feuds between the Wazirs and the Mahsuds (Yusufzai, 1922; Sammon, 2008; Abbas, 2010). The Mahsud-Wazir rivalry had reached a high point of the former driving the later out from their stronghold at Wana which was averted by British intervention (Ahmed, 2004, p. 29-31). Ahmed explained that Wazirs have been expelled from their villages along the Baddar Valley by Mahsuds. Existing literature has termed the Mahsud tribe as influential community within the region of Waziristan, especially in its relation to the Wazir tribe (Lindholm, 1996). The tribal rivalry between Wazirs and Mahsuds provided valuable opportunities for the British to strengthen their rule in Waziristan. The Wazir-Mahsud tribes usually kept a side their feuds in the face of external enemy. The unity if both tribes in this context have given tough time to the colonial power. Especially during the Waziristan Campaign of 1919-1920, the tribes of Waziristan got united against the British military operations. However, the Wazir tribe reached a settlement with the British on many occasions and left the Mahsud tribe in the fight alone, particularly in the Waziristan Campaign (Matthews, 2010). This usual act of Wazir tribe was sometime major reason for tribal rivalry with Mahsuds. Therefore, in the oral history Wazirs both in SWA and NWA are known as untrustworthy which is best illustrated in the local saying ―if Wazir is your right hand, cut it‖. In 1970s a militant movement led by a local Mullah resulted in the confrontation of Wazir of Wana with the local administration and the Mahsud tribe. At one-point Wazir- Mahsud rivalry led to the declaration of the later as Kafirs by Molvi Noor Muhammad who drew his authority from the Wazir tribe in SWA (Ahmed, 2004). The Mahsud tribe rejected the offer of Molvi to settle the feud on Islamic terms. It was a major reason for Molvi to pronounce Mahsuds as non-Muslims. Molvi Noor Muhammad appealed the Wazir tribe to wage Jihad against Mahsud (Ahmed, 2004, p. 50). The tribal feuds between Wazirs and Mahsuds became more violent using religion. However, the Mahsuds were indifferent to Molvi‘s allegation because it was known locally that the use of religion is to settle social score. To Ahmed (1983, p. 4-5) the response of people to Mullahs call for Jihad was more a social requirement instead of religious cause. The decades long tribal rivalry between two subsections of Wazir tribe costed dozens of lives. The intervention of Molvi Noor

Muhammad in late 1960s averted the hostility and resolved the feud permanently (Ahmed, 2004). Such interventions gave Molvi recognition, respect and authority at local level. Molvi Noor Muhammad was an Imam, lead in prayers, of local mosque in Wana, he was not a Wazir or Mahsud tribesman and basically belonged to Bizan Khel tribe of Bannu (Ali Wazir, personal communication, December 27, 2016). The family of Molvi Noor Muhammad first settled in Bannu district and from their Mullah migrated to SWA. Molvi Noor Muhammad after continuous struggles successfully built a Mosque adjacent to the biggest market of the Agency, the Wana Adda (market area). It was convenient to collect funds, alms and charity from the businessmen in the market. The connection with local businessmen and professional provided Mullah with huge financial resources. The enormous financial support helped Mullah to build a huge Madrassa adjacent to the Mosque. Molvi Noor Muhammad used his Madrassa to get public strength against the government (Ahmed, 2004, p. 49-58). Ahmed (2004, p. 54) acknowledged the personal character of Molvi Noor Muhammad recognizing his leadership. To get the public support, Molvi Noor Mohammad indulged in the local issues of public importance against the political administration. The very first conflict of the Mullah emerged with the South Waziristan Scouts (paramilitary force) on the issue of the expansion of Wana market. The expansion of the market, in terms of territory, was the violation of the government rules which does not allow construction near Scouts check posts (Ahmed, 2004, p. 50). Several meetings took place to resolve the issue which failed. In the leadership of Molvi Noor Muhammad the market kept expanding. To counter the actions of the political administration against the persecution of local businessmen, Molvi Noor Muhammad assembled Chelwashtai, tribal army consisting of indigenous tribesmen gathered in times of war or aggression. In response government did not take any action against the expansion and Molvi. It increased the popularity of the Molvi as a leader of the Wazir clan in SWA and the defender of the poor. Molvi invited influential religious political figures from the settled districts of Pakistan to deliver public speeches, government was severely criticized in the public for un-Islamic laws in the country. In 1970s, Molvi Noor Muhammad stood against Bhutto‘s arrival to the administrative capital of SWA, Wana. The visit of Bhutto was arranged in the Frontier Corps (FC) camp by the local administration, Molvi led followers climbed tall trees around the FC camp and opened fire (Ali Wazir, personal communication, December 27, 2016). Bhutto‘s warnings did not affect the anti-government plans of Molvi. Eventually, on the request of political administration of SWA, the federal government took action and

initiated operation in which Pakistan‘s fighter jets bombing resulted in the complete destruction of the main market of Wana. The Molvi Noor Muhammad was arrested by the state. The continuous endeavors of Mufti Mehmood, the then leader of an influential religious political party JUI, were ineffective in protecting the Molvi Noor Muhammad from arrest. The Molvi spent at least 10 years in prison and set free by Zia‘s government after a deal. According to the deal Molvi Noor Muhammad was supposed to support the Afghan Jihad in his area without questions (Ali Wazir, personal communication, December 27, 2016). Besides Wazirs of SWA and NWA, other tribes of Waziristan also faced enmity of the Mahsuds (Calhoun, 2016, p. 3-5; Khan, 2015). The Bhittanni tribe was expelled from their territories along Spinkai upto the fort of Jandola, where again British interference halted the expedition of the Mahsud (Taj Alam Abdurahman Khel, personal communication, December 25, 2016). The Bhittani tribe predominantly inhabits in the frontier region of SWA adjacent to the settled districts (Matthews, 2010, 13). The expansionist designs persuaded scholars like Spain (1972, p. 141) to call the Dre-Mahsud the land hungry tribe. In the early 21st century, violent conflict emerged between the Mahsuds and Bhittanis when the later denied right to passage to the former due to which a pregnant woman died who belonged to the Mahsud tribe. The confrontation resulted in the deaths of dozens of natives. The Bhittani tribesmen left their villages for safer places and moved to tank and the adjacent areas. The government interference led to the ceasefire at the point when several personnel of the Frontier Corps were killed in the crossfire.

3.7 THE MAHSUD TRIBE AND PAKISTAN In the Pashtun belt the National Awami Party (NAP) was affiliated with All India Congress. The leader of NAP Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan was already against the creation of Pakistan. It encouraged the top leadership of Congress to start a campaign in the entire Pashtun belt. However, the people of tribal areas were in favor to join Pakistan, therefore, Jawahar Lal Nehru had an unwelcomed and hostile response in Waziristan. In 1946, Mehardil Kaka, an influential Mahsud elder, attacked Jawahar Lal Nehru on his arrival to Razmak (Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, 2010). The event resulted in the end of Congress campaign in the entire tribal belt at once. The relationship of rise and fall between the Mahsud tribe and the state ended with the departure of the British administration in 1947 (Ul Haq et al, 2005, p. 10-13). As soon as state‘s responsibility was assumed by the Muslims, the question of Jihad became irrelevant. The Islamist regime of Pakistan was major reason for the tribesmen to abandon their affiliation with Afghanistan. The Pakistani government signed agreements with the

tribes of FATA to guarantee their independence status and limit state interference in the indigenous life in return for allegiance (Beattie, 2002, p. 211). The assurance of the federal government to continue the autonomous status of the tribal area was accommodative and welcomed. The state implemented the governance system of the British with minute changes (Hart, 1985, 108). Unlike other Pashtun tribes along the frontier, Mahsuds rejected the Pashtunistan stunt and supported the cause of Pakistan (M. Mashal Khan, personal communication, December 30, 2016). In the initial stages of independence tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalated on the Pashtunistan stunt. The Pashtunistan issue was major reason for the Kabul to oppose Pakistan recognition as a state in the United Nations. In 1949, the Afridi tribesmen in Khyber Agency declared independent Pashtunistan and pledged the United Nations to recognize it (Marwat et al, 1993). Afghanistan extended its support and declared Pashtunistan day a national holiday (Hussain, 2005, p. 65). Such events resulted in protests in Kabul, the mob sacked Pakistani embassy and replaced Pakistani flag with the Pashtunistan flag (Marwat et al, 1993). Soon after the event, a tribal Jirga of Mahsud and Wazir tribesmen form SWA and NWA which claimed to represent a tribal Lashker comprised of more than 10,000 men, asked the Pakistani government for permission to march on Kabul to restore national honor (Marwat et al, 1993, p. 261-262). Soon after the independence of Pakistan the Kashmir Jihad and the participation of the Mahsud tribe sowed the seed of amicable relations of the Mahsuds with the state (Spain, 1972, p. 16). The government invited the tribesmen to participate in Jihad because the then British chief of Pakistan military refused to act in Kashmir (Ahmad, 24th March 2010). Spain (1972, p. 16) believes that a tribal Lashker of more than 10,000 individuals fought fearlessly in Kashmir for the government of Pakistan. The Mahsud tribesmen wholeheartedly supported and participated in the Kashmir Jihad (Hilali, 2010, 40-41). Ul Hassan (2015, p. 5) argues that Mahsuds in particular were appreciated for their courage in Kashmir Jihad, the government also decided to construct houses for the Mashuds. The state sponsored Jihad created a sense of bonding between the state and the tribesmen which was never witnessed in the history of Waziristan. The government presented awards and gave titles to Mahsud leaders for courage and bravery in Kashmir. Mahsud elder and former Minister of National Assembly (MNA), Sakhi Jan Baba was awarded a title of Sher-e- Kashmir (lion of Kashmir) and Malik Lala Zar Jan Khan Mahsud Mujahid of Kashmir Jihad, it boosted the spirit and encouraged tribesmen to participate in the activities of the state (Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias, 2010).

Notwithstanding, static political administrative structure of FATA, after 1947 the tribes were proficiently integrated into mainstream society due to acceleration in social and economic changes and Islamist policies at the national level. Unlike British administration whose prime objective was to manage peace in their territory and pay off the Mahsuds with possibly less investment. The state of Pakistan provided ample job and business opportunity to the Mahsuds and other tribes of FATA. Quota system for the tribesmen was introduced in the federal, provincial civil services commissions, in the military establishment and other platforms to occupy prestigious positions at national, provincial and district levels. The Mahsud tribe has undergone gradual socio-economic and political transformation. The state of things which prevailed in the British times is the thing of the past. The cooperation of the Mahsuds and the government has increased mutual dependence on each other. The Mahsuds who fought the British administration for generations, however, their new generation have become increasingly integrated in the state power structure, for instance many Mahsuds are now officers in the civil and military bureaucracy and representatives in the parliament of Pakistan (Sammon, 2008, p. 49; Ahmed, 1993, p. 184-213) In civil and military bureaucracy, they have occupied positions up to highest ranks. General Alam Jan Mahsud remained in command in Pakistan military as a lieutenant general (Butt, 2013). The Current police chief of KP province IGP (Inspector General of Police) Salahuddin Mahsud sets relevant example in this context (Akber, 2017). The Mahsud tribesmen are working in various professional fields in the country such as health, education, law, security and in economic enterprises at national and provincial levels. The Mahsud are living in small and major urban centers of the state including Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi. Some of the tribesmen are settled in the Western developed nations. The Mahsud tribe has actively participated in the socio- economic and political life in the country. They have transformed and integrated in the Pakistani community. Ahmed (1993, p. 209) has estimated that by 1979 from SWA alone approximately 20,000-30,000 tribesmen have moved to urban areas and Gulf states and send back home remittances to their families. The Mahsuds are well connected in government networks as compared to any other tribe in SWA (Ahmed, 2004). The government connections are helpful for the Mahsuds working abroad to obtain visas and get through other legal complications (Marwat et al, 1993, p. 262). Marwat et al have mentioned that Mahsuds have opened business in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar and are sending their children to school, colleges and universities. The access to prestigious education

institutions is indeed a special opportunity keeping in view the low literacy ratio of the tribal areas. The Mahsud tribe abandoned the previous adventures of uprising and committing violence against the state after the departure of the British which temporarily covered loopholes and pitfalls of the traditional colonial administrative structure in SWA. The lack of political alternatives that could empower tribesmen to address dissatisfaction in the tribal belt helped in the creation of conditions for radical/fanatical elements to form (Sammon, 2008, p. 53). In the post 1979, the state institutions got involved in in the Afghan War thereby creating space for Mullahs, Jihadist and expanding the network of Deobandi Madrassas in the tribal belt (Younus, 2014; Johnson & Mason, 2008; Norell, 2010). The Afghan Jihad empowered the institution of clergy in Waziristan. Before 1979, the socio- political stature of the religious elites in FATA was weak (Ahmed, 2013, p. 51). The Mullahs was dependent on the Maliks/elders for sustenance including financial, communal and safety matters among the Mahsuds. The basic duties of Mullahs in Waziristan were organizing village Mosque, Islamic rites and rituals (Sammon, 2008, p. 54). Mullah had no say in Jirga or socio-political life among the Dre-Mahsud (Ahmed, 2004, p. 92). It was the Afghan Jihad which provided religious elite access to armaments, ammunition and direct financial access. The emergence of the new power brokers in Waziristan affected the tradition system of administration, especially the authority of tribal elders/Maliks. The establishment of Taliban government in Afghanistan further strengthen the ranks of Mullahs in SWA. The Afghan Jihad and the aftermath infighting created militants such as Abdullah Mahsud and Baitullah Mahsud who became huge liability in the 21st century for Pakistan. The tribal Maliks used to vote for the members parliament of Pakistan on behalf of tribal people which gave them immense influence and power in political arena. In 1990s the extension of adult franchise to tribal region empowered ordinary masses and the deprived segment of the society especially women. However, adult franchise, technically, striped off Maliks of their political power and influence which in turn strengthen Mullahs in SWA (Sammon, 2008, p. 56). The religious political parties became more influential and authoritative at national and provincial levels. It enhanced the influence of affiliated religious elite in SWA and extended their approach to the official state network.

3.8 CONCLUSION The Mahsud-Wazir tribes are descended from the same fore father. The Mahsud tribe has given the colonial rulers tough time in the last half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, particularly in the three Anglo-Afghan Wars. The British accounts

described the bravery and courage of this tribe a source of anxiety for the administration. The attacks on British convoys and raiding British territory annoyed the empirical power the most. This tribe inhabit literary in the center of SWA, having expansionist designs. Therefore, the Mahsuds have accumulated extensive landscape by occupying land of the surrounding tribes. The Mahsuds enjoyed good relationship with the state of Pakistan. The state sponsor Jihad in Kashmir and the tribal participation in it sowed the seeds of friendly relations. The Islamist policies of the state weakened the tribal affiliation with Afghanistan. However, in the 21st century, state policies created misunderstandings and resulted in the confrontation during the military operation in the Mahsud territory. The militant groups got benefited from the gap between the natives and the state. In any case, majority of the Mahsuds moved to the settle districts as IDPs and did not confront the state.

CHAPTER – 4

SOUTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY: RELIGIOUS MILITANCY IN THE POST 9/11 PERIOD

4.1 INTRODUCTION The chapter intends to analyze various reasons for the widespread militancy in SWA in the post 2002 period. The legal system is notorious for human rights violations which prevailed for more than a century in the tribal belt has provided encouraging environment for the militants to flourish. It examines the state policies to counter militancy in SWA. In the initial stages of militancy, the state strategies to curb violence failed to gain desire results and rather nurtured militancy. This part of the research investigates the role of the Mahsud tribe in the emergence of militant groups in SWA. As a tribe the Mahsuds are victim of terrorism and did not participated in the militant organization. It highlights different factions of militant organizations and the nature of their operation. It analyses the most notorious Taliban group hailing from Mahsud territory of SWA, the Tehreek-i- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the role of its leadership in the increase of violence in the state.

4.2 MILITANCY IN SWA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL SYSTEM

For almost 69 years after the creation of Pakistan, FATA has been managed through special legal system under Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) which has severe impacts on the socio-political institutions. The loopholes in the legal system and the absence of state efficient institutions indicates state failure in SWA which also created ungoverned spaces which provided opportunities to the militants to strengthen their foothold in the region. The continuation FCR is a major factor in the emergence of militant groups in SWA. In SWA, Baitullah Mahsud established his own judicial system which provided cheap justice in terms of time and money and soon became popular among the natives (Kronstadt, 2009). The Taliban rooted the seeds of better reliance upon them by providing efficient justice system in the light of Sharia to the local people (M. Mehmood, personal communication, December 11, 2016). The local Taliban in SWA put pressure on the professionals to perform duties with efficiency which includes doctors, teachers and other jobholders and imposed ban on taking bribes even officials of the political administration were warned (Mahsud, 2010, p. 18). Mahsud has highlighted that Taliban killed many criminals/offenders to stabilize law and order in the area and to achieve the local support.

The misuse of FCR by the political administration in SWA as a weapon to contain fragile security situations became administrative convention. In many cases the guilty and the innocent were simultaneously punished without consideration. Those conventions were used even in the normal times which affected the system based on FCR adversely. It cultivated the seed of hatred on the grass root level in the tribal communities. The militants were better acquainted with the religious sentiments of the inhabitants of SWA. The militant leaders highlighted the sacrifices for Jihad and Islam of Taliban/Jiahdist in Afghanistan. The weaknesses of FCR provided valuable opportunities to local Mullahs and militant leaders to manipulate power structure in SWA. Existing literature recalls many instances when Mullah Powindah and Faqir of Ipi launched Jihad against the state administration (Farrell, 1972; Ahmed, 1984; Beattie, 2015; Warren, 1997; Jeffreys, 2016; Hopkins, 2009). Kronstadt & Katzman (2008) have argued that in the post-2002 period, the militants used religious principles to establish parallel government in the tribal belt of Pakistan. FCR was a procedural law which was introduced by the British in an agreement with the tribes. The tribes did not like the British law which prevailed in the sub-continent of India and Pakistan. The British law was too complicated for the independent tribes of the frontier to understand. The British Law was suppressive and granted insignificant rights to the people of sub-continent. The people of FATA, in order to preserve their carefree lifestyle, rejected the regulations which prevailed in the British India (M. Iqbal, personal communication, December 24, 2016). FCR was basically composed form of the tribal culture and traditions. It was framed and promulgated with native consent in British times. However, the existence of some acts which were in violation with human rights and not compatible with modern society was of serious concern. After the creation of Pakistan, the region of FATA was ruled under the oppressive colonial law (Akins, 2017, p. 9). The legal system of FATA was comprised of matchless constitutional document known as Frontier Crimes Regulation dated back to 1848 by the British government. The law was reformed and reinforced in 1873 and 1876 respectively and ultimately in 1901 FCR was promulgated (Hussain, 2005, p. 36; Nichols, 2013, p. 10- 11). Under the FCR, the President of Pakistan enjoys discretionary powers over the territory of FATA. His authority is delegated to the Governor of KP in his name (Articles 247 of FCR). According to FCR, no decree of the legislature can be extended to FATA despite the presence of the popularly elected parliamentary representatives from the tribal region in the national legislature. In fact, representatives of FATA can vote in the law- making processes for the rest of the country, but they have no jurisdiction in FATA for

such matters. In any case political development in FATA is still an issue due to FCR. The members of the parliament can contribute in the legislation process in the entire state except FATA (Parveen, Dasti & Khan, 2016, p. 90). The existing political structure prohibit the central legislature from making law for the tribal belt (Khan, 2016, p. 24). The Political Agent (PA) is the administrative head of district/agency in FATA. The PA is delegated extensive judicial, executive, legislative, revenue and administrative powers. In short, he is known as the Badshah (king) of the Agency under the FCR (Ahmed, 2004). There are APAs and Tehsildars who assists the PA in the daily administrative work. Similarly, indigenous law enforcements are under PA‘s command which includes Khasadars and paramilitary forces. The PA leads in the Jirga (council of elders) under FCR, usually through this council various matters regarding law and order are resolved peacefully. Jirga is a democratic gathering where everyone has the right to say. This tradition is the continuation of solving tribal disputes for hundreds of years the essence of which was hijacked through unilateral decisions of PA. The Jirga was the institution of Pashtuns, its essence was hijacked by the British (K. Kaka, personal communication, November 28, 2016). According to FCR, the decision of Jirga is recommendatory, actual decision is taken by the administrator (Spain, 1963, p. 145-146). Since the partition in 1947, the FCR is being misused by the civil bureaucracy. It is a difficult task to administer an agency by a PA. According to Lord Curzon as noted in Tripodi (2011, p. 26), number of troops does not matter in Waziristan but the competency of PA does. The FCR provided PA with immense executive, judicial and administrative powers (Ahmed, 2013, p. 60). The PA had enormous magistracy powers including to convene Jirga of Mailks anytime he deems necessary (Sammon, 2008, p. 33). The poor performance of PA has led to instability and law and order situation. The Political Agents lacks personal abilities involved in corruption cannot uphold injustice (N. Javed, personal communication, November 24, 2016). The FCR upholds collective punishment (Spain, 1972, p. 56). Brigadier Retired Qayyum Sher Mahsud (personal communication, November 12, 2016) believes that we have lived like ‗Red Indians‘ under FCR which upholds inhumane regulations. Majority of the natives and civil society wanted the law of mainstream Pakistan extended to FATA. The colonial law is not compatible with the contemporary world (Human Rights, 2005, p. 3). Therefore, after long struggles, FATA has been made a part of KP province by abolishing Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) and the traditional structure of indirect governance after the approval of FATA reforms bill in 2018 under 31st amendment (Mahsud, 2018, p. 4; Abbasi, May 31st, 2018). The law of mainstream Pakistan has been

extended to the tribal belt. There are real challenges and opportunities in the wake of new administrative and legal system. Majority of the tribesmen of FATA are unaware and uneducated so there are possibilities that the natives are not able to understand the reform package in its essence. N. Javed (personal communication, November 24, 2016), a retired political agent who served in SWA, believes that the government should initiate various awareness programs in the tribal belt through governmental and non-governmental forums so that the fruits of FATA reforms can be grasped. Major chunk of the youth in FATA is still unemployed which is a ticking bomb. The government can initiate programs where these youngsters can be skilled and employ them by establishing new firms and industries in FATA.

4.3 THE PENETRATION OF MILITARY IN SWA: MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MAHSUD TRIBE

FATA/SWA was peaceful area before 2004, it is a trigging question that what happened that it all went wrong and resulted in widespread violence. There were some governance issues but the conflicts were of local nature which never troubled the security conditions with in FATA and other parts of the region. Though FATA hosted outlaws who committed offenses in the settled areas but the writ of the state was always intact. The Afghan insurgency, the invasion of USSR and the subsequent internal fighting, had not troubled the law and order condition in the tribal belt. The state was at peace even after the influx of Afghan refugees and their settlements. After the US invasion of Afghanistan up till 2002-2003, FATA was at peace. R. S. Mohmand (personal communication, 2016), a bureaucrat who served in FATA and KP at top level, argued that the crime rate in the area of Gulbahar police station, a police station covering a small part of the city of Peshawar, was much higher in comparison with the crime rate in entire Khyber Agency (district in FATA). It was, ultimately, the penetration of Pakistan Army that disturbed the law and order situation in FATA (R. S. Mohmand, personal communication, 2016). The inhabitant recognized political administration as a resilient state organization. The head of the political administration, the PA, had the power to punish the natives for tiny offense. The tribesmen would fight and kill among themselves but offending/killing a state official or member of political administration was out of question. The political administration needed federal assistance in SWA when things went out of control in 1970‘s, the federal forces arrived and rescued (Ahmed, 2004). The federal help included heavy aerial bombing which destroyed main market of Wana and other targets which instigated militant uprising. The tribesmen learnt the lesson that they cannot fight the might of the government and remained obedient in the aftermath period. In 2004, the militant infiltration from

Afghanistan troubled state writ in SWA but this time the intervention of federal government resulted in great losses. It included failure of military operations against the militants in SWA in the initial stages of militancy (Bergen & Tiedemann, 2012). This time natives were impressed with the fighting skills of the militants coupled with the use of Islam as an ideal. The neutrality of the natives gave opportunity to the militants to organize and regroup. In the post 9/11 period, the rise of militancy persuaded scholars such as Akber, S. Ahmed (2013, p. 43) to declare SWA as the most dangerous place in the World. Soon the local-international authors and media termed FATA as the most dangerous place on earth (Gul, 2010; Nawaz, 2009; Kinder, 2010). The international intervention in Afghanistan, after the incident of 9/11, has immediately affected the security conditions in the tribal belt of Pakistan (Sammon, 2008, p. 2-3). The inefficient strategies of Pakistani government coupled with international intervention in the region are responsible for widespread militancy in SWA and FATA. Taj (2011, p. 3) argues that the very sovereignty of the state was challenged in the post 9/11 period by the militants in SWA. The failure of the very first military action Operation Kaloosha by Pakistan army in 2004 demonstrated the fragile writ of the state specifically in the tribal region of SWA (Shukla, 2015). After US invasion of Afghanistan huge number of Taliban and Al-Qaeeda militant infiltration into Pakistan and based themselves in FATA/SWA. Qazi (2011, p. 3-4) has highlighted that most of the foreign militants entered SWA enjoyed good relationship with the inhabitants of SWA since 1980s which provided them space to settle down in the new land quickly. Akhtar (2016, p. 84) argues that the militant insurgency first started in SWA before elsewhere in FATA. The Taliban first strengthened their foothold in SWA before establishing their bases in other parts of the tribal belt and settled areas of Pakistan (Taj, 2011, p. 37). The military operation in Kaloosha, SWA/Wana, in 2004 represented the largest military action of Pakistan army since 1947 (Williams, 2015, p. 43; Risen & Rohde, 2004). This operation was critical for two reasons. Firstly, it was believed that the top ranked Al-Qaeeda leader, Amin Al Zawahrir, is supposedly trapped by the Pakistan military (Bokhari, 2006, p. 10). Secondly, the reputation of the military was at stake, for this was the very first military action in that part of Pakistan. Williams (2015, p. 43-45) noted limitations of operation in difficult terrain despite the army‘s claims of success. In the aftermath of the military operation, the militants acted violently. The militants captured many military personnel and attacked government conveys thereby killing two political Tehsildars. On March 22nd, 2004 militants killed dozens and took many military personnel as hostage in an attack on armored convoy (Ali, 2004).

After the successive failure of military operations, the government came up with a strategy to impose proscriptions on indigenous tribes most of which were economic in nature (N. Javed, personal communication, November 24, 2016). The state-imposed embargo on the Wazir tribe of Wana for their collusion with the militants (Ali Wazir, personal communication, December 27, 2016). Wana has huge plain areas of fertile land which provides fruits, vegetables, and related raw material. These items are transported to urban markets of Pakistan, such as Lahore, Peshawar and Karachi, and provides backbone of the economy in SWA. The economic blockade affected the trade and financial resources in SWA (Sammon, 2008). It resulted in public demonstrations against the foreign militants and their friends in Wana (Ali Wazir, personal communication, December 27, 2016). The foreign militants in SWA belonged from four different nationalities including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Chinese and Chechnya (Williams, 2012, p, 44). The Wazir tribe successfully forced these groups to leave their area. Most of the anti-state militant groups including foreign radicals and their friends moved to Mahsud area in SWA and took refuge. The government used same tactic of economic proscription against the Mahsud tribe in 2006-2007 but it miserably failed (M. Iqbal, personal communication, December 24, 2016). The blockade on Mahsuds did not affect their economy conspicuously. The reason besides others was that Mahsud had relatively lesser dependence on state economic networks. The proscriptions against the tribe increased tribal resentment towards the state and in turn encouraged the militant support. The tribal character is complicated by age-old traditions and inflexible traditions. Similarly, complex terrain, poverty, martial ethos and string affiliation with religious injunctions provided militant organizations to find safe haven in this part of the world (Williams, 2012). The local militant organizations took advantage of the religious sentiments of the natives to fight the military. The knowledge of the landscape enhanced their strategic superiority over the outside forces. The Pakistan army penetrated SWA in the pattern of British imperialist forces by disregarding local culture and traditions which encouraged tribal resentment. Burki (2010, p. 207) believes that flawed strategies of the state resulted in the rise of Taliban in SWA. It led to the inefficiency of the already damaged traditional administrative structure. The military ignored the experience and knowledge of the local administration which was a huge strategic failure (Retired military officer M. Raheel, personal communication, November 07, 2016). Khalid Aziz, former chief secretary of KP province, believes that the local political administration would have performed better if given chance to negotiate with the local tribes in the conflict situation in SWA in the post 9/11 period as compared to military strategies which rather intensified

violence (Aziz, 7th August 2004). Garrett (2008, p. 14) thinks that tribal Lashker is an effective raiding party. Motlogh (2008) analyzes that tribal Lashker would have supported the government‘s cause of eradicating militancy in SWA. The tribal Lashker would have been effective if assembled in the initial stages of militancy instead state preferred military operations to be the solution. Many writers, believes that, Malikship institution was affective and strong before the arrival of militants and military in SWA (Malik, 2013; Taj, 2009). Nawaz & de Borchgrave (2009, p. 24-25) and Khan (2009, p. 11) believes that the institution of elders became weak due to state‘s policies in the post 9/11 and gave opportunity to the militant leaders to take control. The then government signed peace treaty with militant leaders such as Naik Muhammad and Baitullah Mahsud which demonstrated weak writ of the state. To, Taj (2009), the signing of peace deals with the militants made them legal which resulted in the proliferation in the militant organization in SWA. The peace treaties signed between the government and the militants indirectly affirmed by the military establishment to be politically legitimate in overriding the authority of the tribal leaders (Hussain, 2010, p. 86). The Taliban fighter in turn started killing Maliks, to counter the threat of anti-Taliban Lashkar (tribal army headed by a Maliks). The militants killed more than 800 tribal elders in the tribal belt by 2012 (Aziz, 2012). Most of the influential elders were either killed or fled SWA. The militants killed tribal elders by framing them as agents of the West and therefore enemy of Islam. The use of faith in encouraging natives to commit violence against stat and non-state entities remined a lethal weapon of the militants in SWA. It is interesting to witness that the tribal leaders of the Mahsuds fled the area when their tribe needed them in the fragile time which further accommodated militant infiltration. In comparison, the leadership of the Wazir tribe remained in their areas notwithstanding the security threats and led their tribe in difficult times. In the post 2002 period, common men in SWA witnessed the emergence of new powerbrokers in the shape of militant groups. The peace accords and the meetings of top brass military commanders with the militant leaders led the local to believe that militants are victorious (Khalil Kaka, personal communication, November 28, 2016). The conflict and violent actions were followed by the peace deals, the militants celebrated their victory openly with aerial firing which invited dozens of tribesmen to join the militant groups. State was successful in buying time, but it made the opposing side more formidable. The peace deals gave time to the militant groups to regroup/reassemble, strengthen their foothold in the region, to integrate and to fill the gap between the state and the people. Many tribesmen, especially the youngsters, joined militant camps while majority of the

natives remained neutral. Such state strategies minimized government support in the local quarters. Moreover, the security forces attacked the militant groups in SWA during the time of peace deals which highlighted the double standards of the government. Bokhari (2006, p. 12) has argued that military operations were contained during talks/negotiation with the tribesmen in the initial stages of militancy. The regular troops of the military never stepped in SWA before 2003-2004 (Khalil Kaka, personal communication, November 28, 2016). The institution was less acquainted with the culture, traditions, values and customs. The army is an organization with strict hierarchical structure, the way of dealings and procedures are quite different from the indirect traditional system of governance. The arrival of military and the procedure of imposing decisions challenged the democratic and self-governance setting which cultivated hostility in SWA. The military commanders with absolute authority have curtailed the power of the PA (Ali, 2018). The army commanders considered the political administration to be crippled and of no use. The then civil administrator posted in SWA in 2004-2005, M. Aslam (personal communication, December 20, 2016) has explained that ‗during the initial period of insurgency military commander disregarded concerns of the political administration. He quoted military commanders as, you needed us, so we are here, when we need you, we will inform you‘. The traditional colonial administrative structure became fragile by out setting PA and Malik, thereby replacing the former with military commander and later with militant leader (Taj, 2011). The pillar of tribal elder as an intermediate was no more, state of confusion prevailed between the native and the government. Some of the misperceptions were due to the lack of due consideration of the military to the native way of life. The drone attacks and its continuation was a major issue for which militants and the natives held state responsible for its collusion with the US. There were enormous drone attacks in FATA and Waziristan in particular (Gunaratna & Iqbal, 2012). These unmanned aircrafts controlled by the American intelligence agencies would hit any place at any time (Benjamin, 2013). Especially the local people were having no knowledge of such attacks. The drone attacks were carried out from less populated areas to highly dense populated towns. The thought of such attacks was a sense of worry, anxiety and fear for the natives. The drone attacks are aimed to killed high valued targets but there are reports of killing innocent people in such attacks (Rashid, 2012). To Gram (2012, p.1) the ratio of terrorist to innocent individuals killed in drone attacks is 1:49. It shows collateral damages caused by the drone attacks which is one reason for the large-scale protests on the issue of drone attacks in Pakistan. Notwithstanding, the drone attacks have killed the influential/important

leadership of the TTP and other militant organization such as Baitullah Mahsud, Hakimullah Mahsud and Nek Muhammad. The drone attacks occurred in the Mahsud territory when the area was under the control of the militants. The attacks killed hundreds of innocent men, women and children (M. A. Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016). However, the IDPs returning home might not face drone attacks in SWA. The sound of the drone keeps people thinking, which place will it hit. The local people were in continuous tension in SWA. The US drone caused a lot of unease among the local population, particularly the hefty sound of the unmanned and other aircrafts. It was a matter of question, wait and fate that the drone will hit who, what and where (A. Afaq, personal communication, November 17, 2016). The feeling of helplessness about own life and the lives of the family is a strange situation (Gulsalam Mahsud, personal communication, November 28, 2016). The tribal people in general faced such issues in their homeland even in the absence of the drone attacks.

Source: http://liberalconspiracy.org/2011/07/20/the-full-extent-of-us-drone-attacks-in-pakistan-revealed/.

The state strategies to handle militant groups in SWA were ambiguous and unclear. The policies at the top level were kept off limits. It intended to eliminate the militant groups who were resisting the security forces and to accommodate the ones who are friendly to preserve as an asset in the fight in Afghanistan (Abbasi et al, 2018; Jones, S. G., & Fair, 2010). The confidentiality of such policies created confusion at the lowest levels in the hierarchy. The military personnel of Pakistan are trained specifically to fight the non-

Muslims, especially the Hindus (Ahmed, 2013). Ahmed has highlighted that the idea of hatred towards non-Muslim in the battlefield is cultivated in the recruits during prolong training by framing them as enemy of Islam, Muslims and therefore enemies of Pakistan. They are trained to uplift the cause of Islam in Pakistan and in the entire world. It was applicable in the case of war against non-Muslims such as Hindu Indian army. Therefore, in SWA, the slogan of Jihad from both sides in the battlefield shuttered the confidence and moral of the security forces of Pakistan (N. Javed, personal communication, November 24, 2016),). It was widespread belief that military entered the tribal belt and started fighting due to immense pressure of the US (Akins, 2017, p. 12). Fighting own faith holders for the Americans/Western powers confused the already doubleminded Pakistan soldiers. It gave invaluable opportunity to frame the entire state and government under the indirect control of the Western powers thereby invigorating religious based violence first in SWA. A. A. Ismail (personal communication, September 14, 2016), a non-commissioned officer in the security forces of Pakistan, was confused that whether he is fighting for the right cause/side. He considered the penetration of military in the tribal land and the subsequent military operations against Islam. Akmal Shah (personal communication, September 16, 2016), a soldier in the paramilitary force in FATA deserted from his position/check-post, argued that the state policy to fight the Islamic groups in SWA are against Islam. He stated that he did not want to die for the wrong cause, so he left the force. According to Akmal many soldiers have deserted from the security forces whose information is kept secret by the government to avoid panic in the ranks of the state security establishments. Many soldiers and members of the security forces especially from Pashtun origin deserted to avoid fighting own people (Kanwal, 2008). Q. A. Jamal (personal communication, December 12, 2016) a Major ranked officer in the military posted in SWA in 2004, explained that during military operations slogans from both the sides were the same. We were trained to fight the non-Muslim aggressors. The Islamic slogans used to raise the moral of soldiers in the fight with non-Muslims. Ishtiaq Mehsud (personal communication, December 20, 2016) a renowned journalist based in SWA, found out that Taliban leaders and the military personnel avoided direct confrontation at all costs. The military preferred to give safe passage to the militants across the border. In the post 9/11, writers such as, Akhtar (2016, p. 84) oversimplified the causes of the emergence of militant organization in SWA by claiming that the entire Mahsud tribe has played an active role in the armed conflict against Pakistan military. BBC (17th January 2008) highlighted that the tribal Lashker comprised of Mahsud tribesmen attacked military convoys in SWA. In contrast, if the Mahsuds as a tribe supported the militants, why more

than hundreds and thousands of tribesmen have left their villages and displaced in to other areas or settled districts before the initiation of major military offensive in SWA. Approximately, 70,000 families of the Mahsud tribe are living as IDPs in different parts of the country since June 2009 as a result of Operation Rah-i-Nijat against TTP (Mehsud, March 9th, 2015). The Mahsuds fought as a tribe against the British forces/government and never left their stronghold or displaced to other areas (Howell, 1979). In the post 9/11, the tribe did not participate in the fight against state and its security forces. There are many reasons for it which includes greater integration of the Mahsud community in public/private life in Pakistan. The same faith holders at the government level and the awareness on the part of the Mahsud tribesmen due to continuous connection in the official government network are important reasons for the tribe not to join militant ventures. The following section will highlight four types of members in Mahsud community who have actively participated in the militancy in the post 2002 period. It includes criminals/outlaws, Jihadist groups, natives who affiliated to clergy including local Mullahs, Imams, and whose family members were targeted by the security forces and reckless youth (Mehmud, Masood & Iqbal, personal communication, 2016). Another category of Mahsud tribesmen who participated in war against Pakistan military were the ones whose relatives were killed, defamed or injured by the military (Siddique, 2010, p. 57). Many of the Taliban leaders from Mahsud tribe in SWA were already affiliated with Jihadist/radical- organizations. The top brass leaders of the militant/Taliban groups belonged to the Mahsud tribe such as Abdullah Mahsud, Baitullah Mahsud, Hakimullah Mahsud, Waliur Rehman, Qari Hussain and Shehryar Mahsud (Mahsud, 2010). Some of the member of Mahsuds were criminals and outlaws who joined the Taliban ranks in Pakistan (Feyyaz, 2016). The bulk of the force of the Taliban which belonged from the Mahsud tribe were comprised of youngsters (Afsar et al, 2008). It would be unjust to claim that the entire Mahsud tribe went rogue. Mahsud as a tribe is a victim of terrorism and did not give refuge to the militants. The militants came into SWA. Bergen et al (2010) and Taj (2011, p. 406) blamed military and militants for the sufferings of the Mahsud tribesmen in SWA. The militant proliferation in the Mahsud territory happened only because of the flawed state strategies. The state used immense force, disregarded traditional way of conflict resolution and treated guilty/innocent all the same which caused tribal resentment. The military initiated operations in SWA without consulting local administration and disregarding traditional way of handling situations (Taj, 2011, p. 87). Caroe (1965, p. 398) has noted that if you want to get done anything in the tribal areas, use the indirect traditional administrative tribal structure to achieve objectives

by producing tribal leaders what they need. The state disregarded tribal traditions and attacked the militant in the Mahsud stronghold and made more enemies. The local militants energized the sentiments of the already annoyed natives. As a result, in the initial stages of militancy, few hundred tribesmen joined the militant ranks majority of whom were already affiliated with Jihadist groups or criminal syndicates (Qureshi, personal communication, December 22, 2016). Many scholars have highlighted that the Taliban from the tribal belt fighting Pakistani security forces are also comprised of criminals and outlaws (Acharya, 2009; Stern, 2000; Qazi, 2011; Abbas, 2014). A huge military convoy was ambushed in on March 22nd, 2004 in the Mahsud area of Sarwekai by the native friends of the foreign militants (Zulfiqar, 29th May 2004). The incident happened when the military operations were underway in Wana and its surroundings and attracted state interest in the Mahsud areas. The attack on the government assets apparently reminded the tribal skirmish with British administration. Williams (2012, p. 44) argues that the incident of Sarwekai shocked the state and lost at least 45 security personnel including military officers, despite huge number of personnel and firepower advantages, the government losses were enormous. Local accounts have highlighted at least hundred-armored military vehicle convoy carrying heavy arms and ammunition, food supplies and other items which were ambushed at Sarwekai killed and captured military personnel who were slaughtered, none of the soldier/officer survived the incident (M. Hameed & S. Salman, personal communication, October 11, 2016). The case study of the ambush of Sarwekai highlights confusion at local level which led to the misjudgment of the state at policy formulation level. The decades long policies of proxy war in Afghanistan created strong bonding with the Jihadist especially among the inhabitants in the tribal belt. Thousands of tribesmen from SWA participated in the fight against the USSR and the US forces in Afghanistan (Burki, 2010). The US and the Pakistani government supported Jihad against the USSR in 1980s and encouraged tribal participation in it which proved a huge liability rather than an asset (Hassan, 2009, p. 31; Benard et al, 2008, p. 14; Butt & Siddqi, 2016, p. 734). The support to the Taliban and militant organization in FATA was used as a tool in the national security policy by Pakistan (Roy, 2004, p. 149-159). Why militants were cut lose in the tribal areas? Abdullah Mahsud freely roamed around in the country after completing his sentence in the infamous prison of Guantanamo Bay (Mahsud, 2010, p. 12). The state had no such strategy to arrest/detain militants of national and international reputation. Such militants rose up to the leadership level and created of notorious militant groups. The case

study of Abdullah Mahsud proves lack of efficient or proactive security policies of the state. The local leadership, Maliks and elders, knew about the attack, their silence reveals the weakness of the leadership institution (S. Salman, personal communication, October 11, 2016). The weak leadership was understood as the collusion of the entire tribe with the militants in the government quarters. The ambush of Sarwakai apparently demonstrated tribal unity between Wazir and Mahsud tribes of SWA and their support for militants in the wake of military penetration in to SWA. The incident inflicted heavy losses which shocked military and forced them to revise the policy of using immense force substituting with negotiations and peace accords. Beattie (2011, p. 577-579) argues that tribes in Wazir and Mahsud get united in the times of eminent external threat/aggressor. The attack of Sarwakai was one example in which few Mahsud tribesmen in support of the Wazir of Wana attacked military convoy in Sarwakai. A well-known Mahsud Malik from Abdullai clan, Iqbal (personal communication, December 24, 2016) highlighted that in the attack of Sarwekai local militants used the emotions of tribesmen in the perspective of tribal tradition of solidarity in the face of external enemy, though the call was rejected by the Mahsud Maliks and most of the tribesmen but some of the youngsters participated in the plot. The militant infiltration from Afghanistan in to SWA first tried to fortify their foothold in Wazir area, Wana and the surroundings. It is because the Wazir area of SWA shares border with Afghanistan, whereas, the Mahsuds territory is in the center of Waziristan. The militants were successful in gaining the local support in the initial stages of militancy. The Chief of Wana Malik Mirza Alam including other influential tribal elders were not in favor of militants and believed that the support to militants will cost the natives in the long run (Taj, 2010, p. 88). Taj has further highlighted that Malik Mirza Alam in a meeting with governor in 2004-2005 told that they can assemble tribal Lashker against the militants but military should end supporting them. The elders/natives who opposed militants were condemned in the public. Ali Wazir (personal communication, December 27, 2016), son of Mirza Alam, expressed that ―it felt strange and terrible when people used to stare in my own area. They called us non-Muslims, deserters, American agents. The nearest relatives were against us. In the quest of opposing militant organizations, Malik Mirza Alam was eventually killed in July 2005 along with his son, two brothers and two nephews in Wana (Taj, 2010, p. 88-89). Ali emphasized that I am not sure whether my family members were killed by the state institutions/agencies or the militants but if the militants killed them it would not be possible without the cooperation of the state. I did not

change my opinion regarding the Taliban. The existence of the Taliban and other militant groups are continuous threat to the people of our areas‖. The interview of Ali Wazir highlights that the people who opposed the militants in SWA suffered a lot. Majority of the people in SWA who were against militant organization remained silent not just because of the threats of the militants but the people fear more the state institutions. The militants infiltered into Mahsud area through Wazir land in SWA. As a result of collusion with the militants the Wazir of Wana payed heavy prices because of government sanctions on their area and other restriction. The tribal leadership of Wazir played an important role to get rid of the militants after the death of the militant leader Nek Muhammad near Wana. After the banishment from Wazir areas of Wana in 2006-2007, the foreign militant moved into Mahsud area (Mahsud, 2010, p. 13). The foreign militants were treated as guests in the Mahsud area. In the Mahsud tradition you will give respect to the guests. There is no room for criticism. It is therefore not a crime. The Mahsuds have always given preference to their cultural code of honor. The concept of Hamsaya, giving asylum, to the weak is more popular among the Mahsuds as compared to any other tribe along the frontier (M. Hashim, personal communication, December 08, 2016). Apparently, the militants needed protection in the Mahsud territory in the initial stages of militancy. The militant in the Mahsud area had twofold objectives. Firstly, to strengthen their network in the new territory with the help of local support. Secondly and notably, to terrorize and make example out of Wazir tribe for banishing the militants from their area. The Wazir tribe feared the danger of attack because of the tribal rivalry of Mahsuds and militant vengeance. The militants who already became stanch enemy of the Wazir tribe provided opportunity to the Mahsud tribe to have more influence in the area. Geographically, major routes which connects the Wazir of Wana with the rest of Pakistan are through Mahsud areas. The militants in the Mahsud area continuously robbed vehicles of Wazirs on route. The robbed items were pronounced to be Mal-e-Ghanimath. The son of an influential Malik, Mirza Alam, the Chief of Wana, Ali Wazir (personal communication, December 27, 2016) explained, ‗our own trucks were plundered because we were against the militant groups therefore we payed heavy prices‘. In the post 9/11 period, the territory of the Mahsuds became breeding ground for militant activity. The Mahsuds have never united under one single leadership unlike the Wazirs of Wana. The Wazir of Wana expelled foreign militants from their area in 2007 with the help of sincere leadership (Mahsud, 2010, p. 13). Competent leadership is needed for rapid decision making. The difference of opinion in times of crisis is a risky. The vacuum of leadership was significant reason for the militants to flourish in the Mahsud‘s

territory. In the post 2004 period, militants killed many influential elders of the Mahsud tribe (Mehsud, December 1st, 2017). Many Maliks fled SWA to Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Peshawar and other areas to save their lives (Malik, 2013). The elder/Maliks of the Mahsuds played no role in the times of crisis/instability (M. Hashim, personal communication, December 08, 2016). They left their tribe leaderless when they were needed the most. The departure of influential people of Mahsud tribe from SWA left common man on the mercy of the militants. Some natives joined the militant establishment others remain neutral and majority remained helpless and have no choice but to either leave their villages or to remain quiet.

4.4 MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR LEADERSHIP IN SWA In 2002, an alliance of Islamist political parties, Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), formed government in NWFP and Baluchistan and had a reputable show in the National Assembly of Pakistan (Schmidle, 2008). Though the political parties were not allowed to contest election in FATA by law but the victorious members from the tribal belt in 2002 elections were indirectly affiliated with MMA (Ali, 2018, p. 6). The anti-American slogan of MMA helped in gaining massive public support especially in KP and Baluchistan provinces (Khan, 2014). In the post 9/11 period, the alliance of religious political parties in power halted state intervention/actions in the tribal belt (M. Akber, personal communication, December 02, 2016). It gave time and space to the militant organization to organize, integrate and consolidate power. After 9\11 and initiation of the Global War on Terror, the government of Pakistan banned militant groups at least overtly. In the wake of US invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan as an ally; goals, objectives and organizational cohesion of the Taliban and other banned militant groups were compromised. At present, there are number of Taliban groups across Pak-Afghan border with perplexed ideological agendas (Afsar et al, 2008; Siddique, 2010; Rana, 2009; Bajoria; 2010). A novice facet of the Taliban emerged in the shape of Pakistani Taliban originated in FATA and give cover to their violent acts by using religion. The Taliban in Pakistan are the breakaway faction of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan are fighting the US and Allied forces while those in Pakistan are predominantly fighting Pakistan security forces (Raheel, 2016; khan, 2011). The TTP was allegedly responsible for the militant attacks in European states, 7\7 London Bombing (Hussain, 2009). The claim of the Baitullah Mahsud of the London bombing and intentions to have attacks on the American soil got the militants of FATA an international reputation (Umer, 2008).

The Taliban groups in Pakistan can be divided into two categories, Good Taliban and Bad Taliban. The Pakistani perspective defines Good Taliban which serves the purpose of the state and the Bad Taliban are the ones involved in anti-state activities (Burki, 2010, p. 190). Taj (2011, p. 62) has also used the terms of Good and Bad Taliban in similar context. Mohanty (2010) argued that the Good Taliban are the strategic asset of the government of Pakistan specially to preserve its dominance in Afghanistan. In any case, many groups who were known as Good Taliban went rogue and appeared to be huge liability for the Pakistani government. Sulaiman (2008) and Roggio (2011) have highlighted that Mullah Nazir faction were supported by the state and signed peace accord with the government in 2007. Shahzad (2011) has emphasized that Mullah Nazir group attacked Pakistan security forces in Wana in 2011. The inefficient state policies have nurtured militancy instead of curbing it. There are number of militant organizations in Pakistan, some of them still exists including TTP which is now divided into various factions (Pakistan Security Report, 2015, p. 10). There are key ideological and conceptual differences between Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban pursue nationalistic form of ideology in accordance with Islamic Shariah. The chief goal is to drive foreign forces out of Afghanistan particularly the US led allied forces and establish Islamic political system (Official statement of Afghan Taliban, January 28th, 2010). While the Pakistani Taliban shares more or less identical ideology to that of Al-Qaeeda and Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (ISIS). The methodology of Pakistani Taliban is to establish Islamic Shariah first in Pakistan and then at transnational quarters (US Official, 2008; Rahman, 2008; Roggio, 2007). To achieve their objectives, Pakistani Taliban use Islam wholeheartedly, indiscriminately target Muslims, non-Muslims and attack anyone who disapproves their doctrine. To provide supplementary strength to the organization, Pakistani Taliban announced its affiliation with the Afghan Taliban (Siddique, 2010). The Afghan Taliban have the popularity among the masses and of course the figure of Mullah Omer as a supreme Jihadi leader was indispensable for the Pakistani militants to affiliate with. The Afghan Taliban, however, formally announced in 2008 that Pakistani Taliban are not affiliated with them in any form (Siddique, 2010). Furthermore, they condemned killing of Muslims, the fight against Pakistan security forces and declared it as un-Islamic and irrelevant (Asia Times, 2008). The indications to the Ameer, leader, was not to attack Pakistani assets and focus their Jihad in Afghanistan. Instead, the Pakistani Taliban groups continued militant activities all over the state. In post 2007 period, the TTP has targeted tribal elders, civilians and even research scholars who opposed militants (Rashid, 2009, p.

93, 275). The insurgency was at its peak during 2008-9 when the state witnessed more than 140 suicide blasts across the country (Khuram, 2009). Pakistani Taliban financial resources include drug money, kidnapping for ransom and assistance from foreign states including Afghanistan and India (Jamal, & Ahsan, 2015, p. 3; Siddiqa, 2011; Sajjad, 2010; Dotani, 2011, p. 6-7; Scahill, 2009). The TTP gave religious cover to their questionable funding from the non-Muslim states such as India. It was claimed that Pakistani state is ally of Western/non-Muslim powers. Moreover, first religious threats within the ranks of Muslims should be eliminated to uphold Islam in which the state of Pakistan is prime target and then to conquer other communities/nationalities (A. K. Yasir, personal communication, December 01, 2016). The Taliban factions in FATA and parts of KP province are predominately of Pashtun ethnicity (Siddique, 2010). However, there are large numbers of Taliban popularly known as Panjabi Taliban fighting across the border. Most of them belong to the SSP and LJ. When these sectarian/militant groups were banned in 2002-3 by the government it was difficult for them to survive in the urban places of Pakistan (Siddique, 2010, p. 9). Lashkar- i-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-i-Muhammad are still dynamic and engage in attacking US led troops in Afghanistan and Pakistani forces in FATA (Siddique, 2009; Babar, 2008). Approximately 5000 to 9000 Panjabi Mujaheedin from central Pakistan (Punjab) are fighting in Afghanistan and Waziristan (Siddique, 2010). Punjabi Taliban is a violent religious group that originated primarily in Punjab and other parts of Pakistan excluding KP, Baluchistan and FATA. The notion of the Punjabi Taliban is not new. During the fight with the Soviets in 1980s, fighters from the mainland of Pakistan were referred as Panjabi Taliban (Rana, 2011). These fighters could not speak native language in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Pashtun fighters are considered to be natives because of shared geography, skin color, language, tradition, culture and value system. The militant uprising in British times paved way for the future generation to follow the footsteps of those heroes who professed religious militancy (Beattie, 2012, p. 581). Mullah Powindah and Faqir of Ipi successfully mobilized tribesmen in Waziristan against the British forces and given rise to faith-based violence in the area. In the 21st century, roots of the most dangerous militant organizations such as TTP and their leadership have been emerged in the same ungoverned spaces. The current militant movements are associated with the tribes living in Waziristan. The terrorist organization in SWA in the post 9/11 period have instigated violence on the bases of religion. There are a few thousands of Mahsud tribesmen who have actively participated in the Pakistani Taliban movement originated in SWA. In the Mahsud area, Abdullah Mahsud was the first militant

leader who organized a militant group after his name. Abdullah Mahsud belonged from the SlemiKhel clan of the Mahsud tribe in SWA. He got fame from guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan and hailed as a champion when he became active after his release from Guantanamo Bay in March 2003 (Burki, 2010, p. 196). His original name was Noor Alam, the state put bounty on his head 5 million Pakistan rupees dead or alive (Daily times, 2004). His dual nationality, Pakistan and Afghanistan, gave his activities more legitimacy in the local quarters across borders (Hussain, 2007). Abdullah Mahsud got reputation in national and international media when in October 2004 he kidnapped Chinese engineers from Gomal Zam Dam project (Metz & Ingram, 2008, p. 13). Roggio (2007), Ahmad (2013) and Shahid (2007) have noted that Abdullah Mahsud group is responsible for attacks on security forces and political leaders in the country. He was against Pakistan military actions in the tribal belt and US forces in Afghanistan, his uncompromising principles of Jihad and Islam led in the emergence of alternate Taliban leadership in the Mahsud area in the shape of Baitullah Mahsud (A. K. Yasir, personal communication, December 01, 2016). Abdullah Mahsud was killed in a crossfire with Pakistan security personnel in District Zhob, Baluchistan, in July 2007 (Frontier Post, 2007). In December 2007, one of the most notorious militant organization emerged in the Mahsud area in the shape of TTP under the leadership of Baitullah Mahsud (Semple, 2014, p. 2-5). TTP was comprised of at least 40 militant groups based in KP, FATA and Punjab (Burki, 2010, p. 189). The TTP gained men, material and leadership support in the Mahsud area. There are many Taliban leaders, belonged to Mahsud tribe, who played key role in the rise of militancy in SWA, FATA and Pakistan in the 21st century. The BBC report (2009) has mentioned that majority of the fighters of TTP belonged to the Mahsud tribe which can be estimated up to 20,000 fighters. The influx of foreign fighters including Al-Qaeeda members and Taliban from Tora Bora into Mahsud area resulted in the of 157 terrorist camps in the area (Roggio, 2009). Roggio (2009) in another article has claimed that Baitullah Mahsud was directly connected with Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omer. A Talib and member of Jihadi group trained in Afghanistan rose to the rank of commander of terrorist organization was Baitullah Mahsud from SWA, he was hailed by many as a true leader of the most dangerous militant organizations in the world such as TTP (Sheikh, 2009, p. 2). Military operation was underway in the surroundings of Wana against Ahmedzai Wazir tribe when huge army convoy was attacked and cut into pieces in the Mahsud area, near Serwakai, by few dozen militants under the leadership of Baitullah Mahsud (Ahmed, 2013). Ultimately, it was the Sararogh accord which provided him status of powerful Taliban commander in national and international media (Burki, 2010, p. 197).

According to Burki Baithullah Mahsud was born in the Nergosa village of SWA, his father was an Imam of local mosque. Baitullah Mahsud belong to Shabi Khel clan of Mahsud tribe (Ahmed, 2013). He got his early religious education from a town Landi Dok, near district Bannu, and in a Madrassa in North Waziristan Agency (Mehsud, 2014). He met the Jihadist and joined the Taliban in Afghanistan (FATA Timeline, 2004). To achieve the confidence of the people, Baitullah Mahsud punished thieves, kidnappers, thugs and other criminals (Burki, 2010). He banned music centers, forbade barbers to shave beard and maintained his own judicial system which was just and cheap in terms of time and money (Kronstadt, 2009). Female education was banned and the corrupt were punished. Baitullah proficiently exploited indigenous socio-cultural patterns in his own favor. The red mosque incident turned views regarding the fight against the security forces of Pakistan (Abbas, 2009; Ahmad, 2010; Zaidi, 2008; Rassler, 2009). Just like Mullah Powindah and the Faqir of Ipi none of the military operations of the state ever succeeded in his leadership. Baitullah Mahsud was the first Taliban commander in the history of Pakistan who approved harsh methods like beheading and suicide attacks, he was believed to be in command of 10,000 men (Khattak, 2018). Moreover, the second biggest surrender of Pakistan army was by the hands of Baitullah Mahsud and a few dozen men who captured military convoy of seventeen vehicles, 260 soldiers, together with military Colonel and nine (9) more officers in a trap without any harm done or a single shot fired (Ahmed, 2013, p. 72). Eventually Baitullah Mahsud was killed in a drone attack in August 2009 (Dogar, 2009, p. 27). His place was then taken by his kinsman, Hakimullah Mahsud. Hakimullah Mehsud is known as one of the most dangerous militant leaders in Pakistan. He was the master mind of the attacks on the NATO supplies to Afghanistan (Jamal & Ahsan, 2015, p. 6). During his command public/private places in FATA and other parts of the country were attacked frequently. He fought the US and Allied forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani forces in Pakistan. He got severely injured during his fights (Taj, 2011, p. 116). He belonged to the Ishangai subsection in Kotkai village of the Mahsud tribes in SWA and joined the Pakistani Taliban in 2003 (Khan, 2009). The Shia community in Pakistan largely suffered from suicide bombings in his reign. Hakimullah through his cousin, Qari Hussain who was an anti-Shia extremist, was connected to sectarian violent groups and had affiliation with the LeJ (Lashker-e-Jhangvi) and SSP (Sipa-e-Shaba Pakistan) (Khan, 2009). Hakimullah was close relative of Qari Hussain, head of the ‗Suicide Brigade‘ of TTP (Hamidullah, 2014). He provided shelter to the members of Al- Qaeeda and Afghan Taliban in SWA (Mehsud, 2010, p.9; ISAS, 2009). Hakimullah

Mehsud was killed in the US drone attack in NWA on 1 November 2013 (Jamal & Ahsan, 2015, p. 6). Qari Hussain studied Islam and graduated from an internationally reputed religious education institution known as Madrassa Jamia Binoria in Karachi in 1994 (M. Ishtiaq, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Qari Hussain was infamous for his ruthlessness anti-Shiat character (Khan, 2009). He was an influential orator which was a perfect tool in the creation of suicide bombers (Hussain, 2009). Qari Hussain was the head of the notorious ―suicide brigade‖ in the TTP. He introduced the lethal weapon of suicide bombers in Pakistan (Mahsud, 2010, p. 6). In fact, Qari made the TTP one of the deadliest terrorist organizations on the globe (Khan, 2009). He was declared enemy of the state, Pakistan government put a bounty of 50 lac PKR alive or dead on his head (Mir, 2009). Qari Hussain maintained an international reputation, United Nations reports specified that more than 80 percent of the suicide attacks in Afghanistan are executed from Pakistani Taliban‘s suicide camps (Johnson, 2007). Qari Hussain‘s commitment with the TTP can be illustrated from the fact of sending his own brother as a suicide bomber who bombed Peshawar in November 2009 (Salab Mahsud, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Qari himself beheaded various captives, he trained a ―Beheading Squad‖ to slaughter captives and enemy (M. Ismail, personal communication, December 20, 2016). Ismail arged that Qari Hussain, unlike his cousin Hakimullah Mahsud, was not interested in the leadership of TTP. To him leadership role can divert from real objectives. The TTP was more influential when its command was with the leaders who belonged to the Mahsud tribe. The TTP lost its integration and influence as soon as its leadership role was assumed by commanders who did not belong to the Mahsud tribe (Khattak, 2018). Mir (2007) believed that Baitullah Mahsud had the command of approximately 5000 trained militants, majority of which were his kinsmen loyal to him. Mir highlighted that Mahsud kinsmen under the command of Baitullah lunched most violent attacks and brutal ambushes against the superior military of the state equipped the sophisticated weaponry and modern technology. Siddique (2010, p. 31) noted that Baitullah Mahsud commanded huge number militants belonged to Mahsud tribe and thousands of foreign militants in Waziristan. Acharya et al (2009, p. 97-107) argues that every tribe has its own militant group. Semple (2014) believes that the Mahsud militants hails from SWA formed the TTP were the strongest force among all Pakistani Taliban groups. He argued that in 2009 Pakistan military made its top priority to eliminate the Mahsud militants of SWA. Interestingly, when the TTP lost its Mahsud leaders, the number of ambushes and suicide attacks in Pakistan reduced (Salab Mahsud, personal communication, December 20,

2016). The TTP lost its influence and integration after the death of charismatic leader Hakimullah Mahsud in 2014, it resulted in the conflict among various commanders on the question of new leadership (Semple, 2014, p. 73-77). The huge tactical expertise and personal qualities of the militant leaders such as Baitullah Mahsud, Hakimullah Mahsud and Qari Hussain led to the emergence of alternate leadership in SWA. The militant leaders took advantage from the power vacuum left behind by the colonial traditional administrative structure in SWA and established most violent militant organizations. The connections with urban areas militant organizations affiliated with Deobandi school, such as LeJ and SSP ensured the spread of militant insurgency nation-wide (Hussain, 2012). The militant groups established in the urban areas provided the TTP with information and access to approach the targets in the major cities of the state. The TTP provided suicide bombers to the sectarian/militant groups (Qazi, 2011, p. 595). The research offers similarities and differences of militant mobilization and the leadership role involved in the pre/post 9/11 eras that emerged in the region of SWA. The existing literature lacks focus and in-depth analysis on the issue. Mullah has played key role in the emergence of militant mobilization in the region. The leadership capabilities of the militant-leaders/Mullahs are the basis of these violent movements. Regional instability gave invaluable opportunities to the militants to challenge the writ of the state. In the present times, Quranic verses were used for mass mobilization on religious bases by Baitullah and Hakimullah on the same patterns as religion was used in colonial times by Mullah Powindah and Faqir of IPI. These militants were funded by the outside/foreign actors in the colonial times and in the present. There are, however, differences between the colonial and contemporary versions of militant movements. In the past, militant groups hunted down non-Muslim. While, in the 21st century Islamist violent militant groups are fighting the Muslim regimes. The militant leaders have framed the state as an ally of the Western powers and therefore infidels and enemy of Islam and Muslims. (Aisha Younis, p.12). The research offers close relationship between the militant organization originated in the tribal and in the urban areas. Some of the accomplishments of the militant commanders in the Modern times are more penetrating and impactful as compared to their predecessors. The concept to wage war against sects of Islam was not encouraged by the Taliban groups before 2003-2004. The Jihadist in FATA focused their activities in Afghanistan. However, due to many reasons the militant groups in FATA in collaboration with the sectarian groups in settled areas started targeting the non-Deobandi sects such as Shia community. Many leaders of the militant groups in FATA were already affiliated with the

Sunni/Deobandi extremist organizations such as LeJ and SSP. Qari Hussain was the top brass leader of TTP who was a trained anti-Shiate extremist before joining the ranks of the militants in SWA in 2003-2004 (Salab Mahsud, personal communication, December 20, 2016). There were 146 suicide bombings reported across Pakistan in 2008-2009 alone, more than 2,000 were dead and many a thousand wounded including members of Shia community, army, police and law enforcement personnel and ordinary citizens (Mir, 2009). Religious militancy of today is different from the past, Jihad was lunched against the non- Muslims in the past. However, currently it is focused against Muslims, especially against the Shia community and state institutions representing same faith.

4.5 CONCLUSION The gaps and flaws left behind by the legal system in SWA was in turn filled by the militant groups. The state policies to counter militancy were flawed and inefficient, therefore, it increased violence which led to the collateral damages and net total loss to the society. The state institutions disregarded traditional structure of administration, the use of force resulted in the rise of tribal resentment which was used by militant organization in their benefit. Moreover, the anti-Taliban policies of the state led the locals and militant groups to frame the state in collusion with the US. It made easy for the militant groups in SWA to convince public to turn against Pakistan. There are many militant organizations in SWA. The most prominent and lethal militant organization known as TTP drew its leadership and territorial support from the Mahsud tribe. The nature of violence and objectives of the TTP is different from the other Taliban groups in the region. It has sectarian designs and target Muslims based on survival of the fittest, just like the ISIS. In any case, Mahsud as a tribe did not participate in the militant movement is SWA. Major portion of the Mahsuds have been living in the settled areas as displaced people.

CHAPTER – 5

SOCIO-CULTURAL AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE MAHSUD TRIBE

5.1 INTRODUCTION The emergence of militant groups and the subsequent military operations in the Mahsud area of SWA resulted in the displacement of more than 400,000 tribesmen from their area. The research highlights the issues/hurdles faced by the IDPs and the impact of the displacement on the life of the Mahsuds. This part of the dissertation emphasizes on the transformation of the socio-cultural and political institution of the Mahsud tribe. It focuses the gradual change of the tribal bonding, identity, concept of traditional rivalry, language and the way of dealing public/private issues. It explores the nature of political change in the wake of new settings; the transformation of traditional political arena, the emergence of new political parties and the nature of political development in the area. The role and status of religious political parties and their collusion with militant groups is studied. The research highlights the impact of violence and the migration on the nature, function and influence of traditional institutions such as Jirga and Malikship. The role of Mahsud women in the socio-cultural and political life and the difference between past and present practices are examined. The education system in SWA have witnessed ups and downs. The government policies in the education sector are critically examined.

5.2 THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE MAHSUD TRIBE

There are several reasons, why the topic of social transformation of the Mahsud tribe is important and relevant. Firstly, the Mahsud tribe have lived in the homogeneous settings and never left their stronghold in SWA, their culture, customs and traditions remained unspoiled and uninfluenced by the other cultures. Due to military operations in the post 9/11 period, the forced migration from SWA brought about significant socio- cultural and political transformation. These changes have transformed the tribal way of life and given rise to new concepts which are important to study. The available literature on the social and political transformation processes in the tribal areas is limited. The physical access to SWA and its nearby region is difficult for the researchers because of law and order situation and security reasons which makes is difficult to collect primary data on the subject.

The available literature is limited as far as primary data is concerned in relation to social transformation because of forced migration and its impact on the socio-cultural and political institutions at the grass root level. Moreover, there is a need to create a theoretical oriented approach to study socio-political transformation in the tribal belt in the wake of militant uprisings and subsequent displacements of various tribal communities. Stephen Castles (2003, p. 2) in his research paper titled, ―Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation‖, has clearly mentioned the scarcity of research work and its importance on the processes of forced migration and the resultant social transformation. In his paper, Castles has focused forced migration in the context of global transformation. The study of Castle (2001. p. 15) and Drucker (1994) examined the economic and political bases of social transformation. Groenewald (2000, p. 18) has noted that globalization, industrialization, rationalization, urbanization and bureaucratization are the main factors in the process social transformation. Khondker & Schuerkens (2014) have presented Eurocentric ideas of social transformation in relation to various theories such as dependency, modernism and globalization. Social transformation refers to a process of change in the living conditions of people, human relationships, communities and a qualitative shift in the nature and character of human societies (Groenewald, 2016, p. 18). The processes of social transformation may have transnational reasons (Castles, 1999. P. 5). The notion of social transformation is explained by the afore mentioned writers in terms of urbanization and economic growth. The globalization is explained in the existing literature in the contexts of economic development, advancement in technology and communication and migration for financial means. The initiation of ‗Global War on Terror‘ in the 21st century has instigated a course of change influenced national and local communities. The existing literature is deficient in explaining war/conflict at the global level and its implications on the native societies. In the 21st century, War on Terror (WoT) has direct impacts on the communities living in the tribal belt of Pakistan especially the Mahsud tribe in SWA. The resultant militancy and migration effected the socio-political institutions of the Mahsud tribe. Castles (2003, p. 19) believes that militancy/violence and forced migration destroys economic resources, undermine traditional way of life, weakens social bonds and break up communities and causes social transformation. The Mahsud tribe was excluded socially, politically and economically in the state structures. The legal system deprived them from the basic human rights for ages. They have given right to vote in the late 1990s. The state provided these people with limited health and education facilities. The limited administrative structures in SWA served the purpose of the state only.

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The massive migration of the Mahsud tribe to urban areas of Pakistan in the wake of conflict has boosted social transformation processes. The tribesmen are struggling to uphold their cultural/traditional values equip their new generation in the new settings. The cultural values of Mahsuds are damaged due to conflict and the emergence of new power brokers (militants) through religious interventions. Athan, Dhol, Tang Takor, cultural dance and indigenous musical instruments were the sources of promotion of peace which disappeared during the Taliban rule in the Mahsud area.

5.3 THE MAHSUD TRIBE: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPS) AND THE SOCIO-CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION

The people/community who are forced to leave their villages/area/residence/town to avoid armed battle, insurgency, acts of violence related to human rights it includes man made or natural disasters and most importantly have not crossed international boundary are known as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Cohen & Deng, 1998). The UNHCR defines the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as people who force to flee same dangers as do the refugees but they do not cross international boundary. The IDPs and refugees are known as forced migrants (Melander, Öberg, 2004, p. 1-2). The notion of Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs), formerly known as IDPs, is well-known in Pakistan in the 21st century (Ali, 2015). The executive order issued by the federal government changed the nomenclature of IDPs to TDPs which has no impact on the living conditions of the displaced communities (Ali, 2015). This research will use the term IDPs for own convenience. The proliferation of violent militant organization in FATA led to massive military operations. The natives were forced to leave their areas. To accommodate the affected people in the adjacent and urban areas the state with the help of governmental and non-governmental organizations established IDP camps. According to the report, there are 1.8 million affected by natural, manmade disasters, military operations, and insurgency (IDMC, 2015). The figures of displaced people found out by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies due to military operations in FATA and PATA is much higher and estimated 2.7 to 3.5 million. The exact figure is difficult to estimate as most of the women and children of these area do not have identity cards. More than 400,000 Mahsud tribesmen have been displaced from SWA in 2009 because of major military offensive, Operation Rah-i-Nijat (OCHA, November 2009). The number of IDPs noted by Khan (2012, p. 137) by the end of 2009 in SWA were 428,000. The Mahsud tribesmen who primary lived in SWA were generally poor and unacquainted with the urban lifestyles. Most of them have never left their villages before their

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displacement in 2009. Therefore, the forced migration to the settled areas of the state has triggered socio-cultural and political transformation of the tribe on a large scale. It was stressing situation for the natives when state ordered them to vacate their areas. The IDPs of SWA left their homes in hassle. It took moments for them to leave their property, homes, belongings and in many case dearest relatives for unknown period. Such an environment resulted in anxiety, depression, suicidal tendencies and other psychological issues (Human Rights, 2010, p. 22-23). The women and children suffered the most due to the displacement and the conflict. The fight between military and militants have severe impacts on life of the natives (Khalid and Roy, 2016, p. 250). The Mahsud tribesmen are enslaved morally, mentally and physically (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). In personal communication with Hayat Preghal, a renowned human rights activist from SWA and a fellow tribesman among the IDPs describes his story by highlighting the difficulties people faced soon after the displacement, as ‗there is unique affiliation with the house where a person grows up and spend his/her entire childhood. The bed has a matchless fragrance and the feelings attach to a house cannot be expressed which you built with your own hands. In any case, the local authorities immediately announce to vacate the area with no prior notification. The inhabitants left their homes full of belongings and luggage without even closing doors. The tribesmen had no idea whether they will be able to see their cherished homes/land again or not. The natives embark upon a journey bare foot which was more than couple of weeks. Number of pets and other household animals were left behind free, the ones taken by the families on the journey towards unknown destination got injured and expired. I was with my uncle and aunt including other family members and children. We departed from Ladha-Tangi in SWA to Mirali in NWA which is a journey of approximately four hours but it took more than three days for us to get there because of elders, women, children and pet ammonals. We had ten animals, three died when we reached Mirali. A pregnant cow expired on the way. The fight between the security forces and the militants started after we left our homes. There was massive noise of guns and bombs. The sound of bombs affected women and children specifically. The sound of the heavy artillery and other weapons shook the earth continuously just like an earthquake. We were walking in the middle of mountain ranges where huge and small stones were rolling down in us. It was dangerous to continue journey in such a situation. Due to extreme pressure and terrifying situation the children urinated in their clothes. It became very dangerous to travel so we took refuge for at least two nights in the mountain caves because the noise of the bombardment/shelling felt so close. It was a strange time. I never felt in

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such terrifying way in my entire life. In the night we were afraid of wild animals and criminals. We did not have any weapons to protect our self. On our arrival to Mirali, we had an opportunity to travel by vehicle to Tank and Gomal area where our relatives were already settled. However, the transporters raised their prices unexpectedly high, we payed huge amount of 35000 Pakistan rupees, in normal time the rent would have been seven to eight thousand approximately, and continued journey. We sold or animals on very low prices get money for transportation. I and my family members were psychologically exhausted and physically paralyzed when we reached Tank after 7 hours. I started voluntary work in Tank and Gomal area for three months to solve the issues faced by the IDPs. Afterwards, NGOs offered me a paid job. Foundation of Integrated Development Action (FIDA) organization supported our cause and appreciated us in various forms. FIDA works for the socio-economic uplift of the people living in the region of Dera Ismail khan, SWA and other parts. The displaced families were confused about their placement, food, security and health. They lived in SWA within their areas, most of them never left their areas. Everything in the settled areas were new and complicated for them. We tried our best to accommodate them in difficult situation. It was winter some of the natives were seriously injured. They walked bared foot hundreds of miles. For instance, on the arrival of a family to IDP camp in Tank, one member was seriously injured. We provided them available facilities. We made fire to provided warmth particularly to the injured one. The injured one got his foot on fire and come to know when the foot started smell and smoke. Instantly we brought medical facilities and we came to know that his lower body is completely paralyzed. His feet were cut off eventually. This case scenario was not just a physical and mental torture for the injured individual, it was shocking, terrible and psychologically depressive news for the all of us in the IDP camp including his family. There are hundreds of alike and worse stories which happened to IDPs in the camps and during their travels which I cannot share because of some of them happened to women and children‘. Manzoor Ahmed Pashteen (personal communication, November 17, 2016) was a member of displaced family, his struggles to facilitate fellow tribesmen (IDPs) to tackle public/private issues and active participation in the social and political activities got him an international reputation in the early period of 2018. Manzoor is a renowned human rights activist from the Mahsud tribe and stated that the young generation like him helped the displaced people in daily life. He argues that the government support was very limited. He proclaimed that active youngsters helped the natives to find their missing sub-clan/group or family as there was no government or nongovernmental agency to handle them at that

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point. The stories/activities of Hayat and Manzoor highlights the social activism of the young generation of the Mahsud tribe. Notwithstanding, the youth, Kasher, in tribal societies like Mahsuds had limited share in the tradition administrative structure, the issues were handled by the elders and Maliks from the native‘s end. The youth like Hayat and Manzoor played an important role in the encouragement of the participation of youth of the Mahsud tribe in the socio-political life. The activism of the Mahsud youth has brought about many social, cultural and political changes.

Source: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0ahUKEwjonq257 cPYAhXRJwKHV8gChIQFggxMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fstrategiskanalyse.no%2FPublikasjone r%25202014%2F20140402_SISA%252021_SWaziristan_Tipu2.pdf&usg=AOvVaw2f476E6gl701 TnMIQe9vVf

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The displacement of huge population needed comprehensive socio-economic preparedness. Unfortunately, the displaced people from SWA encounter number of problems. The SWA is far from the major cities of the country including federal and provincial capitals. The cellphone network, internet and other communication channels are in bad condition. Therefore, the IDPs of the Mahsud tribe did not get the desired media or social media coverage. The international community, state institutions, civil society and international organization had poor access to the IDP camps/areas and got little attention. The IDPs of Sawt and NWA attracted more help comparatively and were facilitated efficiently in comparison to the IDPs of SWA. The area which comprises of NWA and the IDP camps got better communication channels and cellular network and was near to major cities such as Peshawar. The media, civil society, international community and NGOs have better access to the IDP camps. The IDPs of NWA predominantly lived in the IDP camps (M. Iqbal, personal communication, December 24, 2016). The IDPs of NWA have not dispersed in the urban areas and therefore were willing to settle back home conveniently. It is a fundamental duty of the state to ensure safety and other humanitarian assistance to IDPs within their territorial boundaries (Kalin, 2008, p. 18). The government has struggled to facilitate the displaced people of SWA in camps. Said (2008) has argued that majority of the IDPs are living outside government camps. One reason was the poor living conditions of the camps. The political and traditional leaders of the tribe did not want their tribe to live in the camps. The IDP camps had no boundary wall, women and children lived under open sky which was considered in contradiction to the tribal traditions and

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honor. Mulana Marijudin a political and traditional leader of the Mahsud tribe suggested for the IDPs to disperse in the cities and adjacent towns (K. Qureshi, personal communication, December 22, 2016). The suggestion was welcomed by most of the affected people. It led to disperse of the IDPs in the region including Tank and Dera Isamil Khan. Major portion of the Mahsud tribe were already settled in these areas who helped the IDPs in getting settle. The integration of the IDPs in the local area outside IDP camps provided opportunity to get acquainted with the way of living of settled areas which brought many changes in the socio-cultural and political institutions of the Mahsud tribesmen. The IDPs from SWA, stood on their own feet in the cities without the help of the state (Din, 2010, p. 15). Majority of the IDPs are reluctant to go back to home due to variety of reasons (Bureau Report, 2017; Ali, 2015). The tribesmen have engaged in small business enterprise and manual labor such as driving public/private vehicles, shop keeping and participating in social activities. The natives of SWA are becoming more hard-working (K. Qureshi, personal communication, December 22, 2016). Saifullah Mahsud (personal communication, 2016) an IDP of Mahsud tribe is working as a manual labor (Mistri) in Multan and not willing to settle back home. He argued that ‗in the city his daily wage is more than one thousand rupees which was only three hundred in his village. It was difficult to find work on daily basis in SWA which affected household sustenance. I earn at least 22000 rupees per month and my son is earning the same amount. All my family is in one place. There are jobs which pay us comparatively good. My children are getting educated, male and female. My brothers are working, now we do not sit for one person to earn as we did in SWA. I have bought a residential-plot in Multan. I am hopeful that I will built my own house soon‘. The settlements of the tribe as IDPs in the urban areas have great impact on the tribal language. The native language of Mahsuds is getting flavors of other languages such as Urdu, Saraeki (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). In the urban areas such as Peshawar, Pashtuns are living such as Yousafzai, Marwat and Banochi. Their language is different as compared to the tribal languages. Mahsuds language is harboring various words from non-Pashto other Pashto languages. The appearance, the way of living, culture and traditions are transformed considerably. The cultural dresses have changed, for instance, the tribesmen used to wear certain kind of cap to cover head which highlighted a combination of religious and tribal symbol in homeland. It was uncommon to educate females in SWA, currently girls are getting education at high ratios. The tribesmen are now acquainted with the rapid communication and infrastructure

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facilities it has transformed their slow routine life with fast pace urban way of living. The concept of hospitality is disappearing among the natives. The Mahsuds are completely cut off from their land and culture, it will be a matter of interesting discourse as soon they settle down back home. Pashtun tribes in Pakistan and Afghanistan have social norms with major to minor variations. Pashto and Pashtunwali are two words with similar meanings. Among the Mahsuds Pashtunwali is termed as Pashtho. The Pashto/Pashtunwali is a way of life of the Pashtuns rather than just a code of life. Just like the constitution of Great Britain Pashto/Pashtunwali is in an unwritten form but observed strictly. The British constitution is unwritten emerged from the native culture and conventions and obeyed firmly by the state and society. The Pashto/Pashtunwali encompasses basic customs of Pashtun behavior including upholding honor, Tarboorwali, stick to own words, treatment (hospitality) and protection of the guests, the use of Badal (revenge) as a reaction to death, injury or insult (Sammon, 2008, p. 17). Tarboorwali is a concept of Pashtunwali related to cousin rivalry for scarce parental resources. The principle of Badal has its roots in the tribal society in cousin-to-cousin enmity (Ahmed, 1981, p. 164). Interestingly in the wake of external danger/rivalry cousin-to-cousin contentions are given second priority (Ahmed, 2004, p. 24). Especially to the Mahsud tribe upholding honor is an indispensable value. At some instances the value of honor costed invaluable lives. Spain (1972, p. 129) deliberates that a sense of trifling offence directed to the assassination of the British Political Agent by the hands of his trusted guard in Waziristan. The cultural code of honor of the tribesmen has impressed foreigners in a unique way. A British Political Agent shot himself in his official residence in SWA because the government, his superiors, did not acknowledge the promises he made with natives (Spain, 1972, p. 129). The Mahsud tribesmen were left alone in the battle against the colonial administration. At the arrival of huge military force, all the other tribes of South and North Waziristan submitted to the British might except the Mahsud tribe which costed enormous in terms of life and resources to the former (General Staff, 1931). The only thing which kept the Mahsud from submitting was the cultural code of honor (personal communications, Hashim, 2016; Iqbal; 2016; Alam; 2016). In the wake of the invasion of USSR on Afghanistan in 1979, the militants were supported and sponsored by the US and Pakistan through tribal areas (Coll, 2004; Johnson, 2007, p. 102-110). The tribesmen of FATA were encouraged to support militants and participate in the fight in Afghanistan. Therefore, and for many other reasons including the indispensable love for Islam and Jihad, many tribes such as Mahsuds enjoyed good relationship with the militants. The US invasion of Afghanistan after the incident of 9/11

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had dire impacts on the neighboring region including the tribal belt. In the initial stages, the government was indifferent on the question of participation of Pakistani citizens in fight against the US and allied forces in Afghanistan in the 21st century. To many, the state policy was supportive to the militants in SWA (Taj, 2011, p. 36-37). The then government was not serious in abandoning proxy wars. It was believed that if Afghanistan can defeat the mighty USSR, the US is no exception. The intensification of fight in 2003-2004 resulted in the influx of the Pakistani fighter and their comrades from Afghanistan into the tribal belt. The state was aware but again indifferent of the militant infiltration. After intensification of the fight in Afghanistan in the post 9/11, the US believed that the Taliban and other militants has deserted to FATA (Curtis, 2006, p. 3-7). Therefore, the US pursued Pakistani government to act against the militant sanctuaries in Waziristan (Mahsud, 2010, p. 3). Consequently, Pakistan military entered SWA and initiated offensives against the militants and their supporters. The military was not welcomed in SWA and the popular support was already against their penetration. In the very first military operations, direct attacks on the homes of natives in the search of militants meant disrespect in the local culture and traditions. In the Mahsud area the indigenous administration never attacked or approached the household unannounced. The British administration struggled to manage the area and the natives from outdoor and refrained to enter the stronghold of the Mahsuds directly (Williams, 2012, p. 16). In such cases, after the creation of Pakistan, the political administration gave priority to rounds of prior negotiation and the consent of tribal elders to enter an inhabitant area in the times when needed. An estimated 80 percent of the people are against the military operations in FATA (Rana, 2009, p. 31-35). In the initial stages of the violence, the foreign militants were given protection under the code of cultural honor (Hilali, 2010, p. 26). The situation could be dealt efficiently if the political administrative structure was given a chance to handle. Ahmed (2013, p. 43-47) has mentioned that using traditional tribal institution and culture in SWA can help capture notorious personalities already Hamsaya, under asylum, of a tribe. Instead state machinery used force, which resulted in the breakdown of law and order and administrative mechanisms without having achieved goals. The disregard of tribal code of cultural honor was one important reason for the initial military operations to fail (Williams, 2012, p. 10). The people of the tribal belt including the Mahsuds were friends of the state for a very long time. There were Afghan refugees, foreigners, Jihadist, Taliban, smuggling, huge number of arms and ammunition available in Waziristan. While, before 2003-2004, the writ of the state was intact and never challenged in SWA. The military initiated fight

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against the Mahsuds and their guests. The tribal culture of tit for tat was a response (Kakakhel, 1964,20-50). That was the point of initiation of tribal rivalry between the state and the tribe on the grass root level. The government demanded ‗terrorists‘ who were under the protection of the cultural code of honor Mahsud. In the meantime, militant elements within the ranks of the Mahsuds created doubts in the minds of natives against the state. The Jihadist/militants were proclaimed to be heroes by the government of Pakistan in the past. Therefore, it was getting more confusing for the tribesmen and created gaps with the state and the tribesmen. It was widespread belief that the state has change its strategy about the Jihadists due to the pressure of the US. In any case, the tribal honor was at stake when the state demanded to hand over the tribal guests. The tribesmen hold dear their culture and religion. The military elite was ignorant of the underlying issues in this case. The gap was in turn filled by the non-state actors by using the value system of the tribesmen in their favor (Nawaz, 2009, p. 27). The militant leaders belonged to the same tribe, were well acquainted with the local culture and traditions and used the local sentiment in best of their favor. Therefore, some of the tribesmen join the ranks of emerging militant groups but majority remained neutral/confused. This was the initiation of tribal revenge which soon transformed in to an ideological war. The militant organization proficiently used the tribal culture to achieve their objectives. The militants used Islamic laws and established Islamist Shariat system in SWA. Interestingly, whenever contradiction occurred between Islam and the Mahsuds culture, the militant organizations such as TTP gave priority to the native culture. A local Mullah announced to ban cultural dance, Athan, of the Mahsuds and the associated musical instruments, Doll. According to M. Ishtiaq (personal communication, December 20, 2016), Baitullah Mahsud instantly summoned the Mullah and refrained him from intruding with the native culture and traditions. Baitullah argued that the Mahsud tribesmen always give priority to their culture. It explains the tactics, prudence, understanding and the knowledge of the militant organizations and to know how to strengthen foothold in the tribal region (Hilali, 2010, p. 27). Moreover, the flawed state policies created major issues out of insignificant matters. After more than decade of military operations, wasting of resources and huge losses to the nation in general, military achieved control of the tribal areas and the Mahsud area in SWA in some form. It would have been a rather nonviolent, simpler and more economical job only if the military would have used the tribal culture to solve the problem of militant infiltration which led to the establishment of most notorious militant organization that part of world has ever seen.

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The social transformation of the Mahsud tribe has positive impacts in many views. It has discouraged the concept of internal tribal feuds. The cousin-to-cousin rivalry was a constant anxiety and a center of stage for the tribesmen (Beattie, 2002, p. 8). In the emergence of militant organizations and military establishment in SWA the local disputes were minimized. Both the organizations, military and militants, affected tribal way of life directly and indirectly. The tribesmen had to deal and think about the new developments. In the wake of new challenges tribal rivalry and kin enmity was of least concern for the tribesmen. The displacement of the tribe to cities has great impact on the internal tribal feuds/conflicts/enmities. In the settled areas, there are courts and laws which tends to resolve social/civil issues through legal means which is all different and complex from the tribal way of dealings. For instance, state is least concern with a crime of a murder amongst tribal feuds in FATA. While in the settled districts, individual faces dire consequences for the same crime. The justice system in towns is expensive in terms of time and money. The inefficient judicial system coupled with the police harassment and the administrative bottlenecks seemed undesirable and unfriendly for the tribesmen (T. Alam, personal communication, December 25, 2016). Such an environment was inhospitable for the continuation of personal feuds. In the past, internal tribal rivalries costed lives of dozens of individuals, in some case more than dozens of men fell a prey to such menace. There are countless examples of family feuds among Mahsuds. T. Alam (personal communication, December 25, 2016), an influential tribal elder claimed that ‗a feud between two families in Makeen area has resulted in the deaths of 21 individuals from both sides. The issue emerged due to land distribution, it‘s been 45 years and the issue is still unsettled. In the wake of the displacement both the rivals are living in continuous distress‘. The Mahsud tribesmen were fond of keeping guns like any other Pashtun tribe. Carrying rifles openly in a market place was a routine. It was a fashion and a sense of aspiration for an adult male to carry a rifle/gun. Jamil (personal communication, December 02, 2016), described his childhood hobbies/interests as ―since my childhood I saw my father, uncles, brothers, cousins and fellow tribesmen carrying pistols/rifles/guns. It was considered more a fashion rather than a sense of pride or strength. The Russian made AK- 47 was the most popular rifle in SWA and I always wanted to carry one since my childhood. It was prohibited for a child to carry a gun in our area. I secretly picked up a gun, when I was a child, while showing it to my friends I was caught by my elder brother. I was beaten badly, I did touch a gun for a long time‖. The story highlights the culture of dominancy, contention and danger with in the Mahsud tribe. Many individuals would always carry guns particularly the ones who had family feuds. The accidental confrontation

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of rival family members in a market or elsewhere in SWA usually resulted in an open gunfire. The gunfire at a market place would usually resulted in the life losses and injury of dozens of innocents. More feuds and rivalries were the consequences of the gunfire in a crowded place. The gun carrying culture was more a source of propagation of tribal rivalries instead of protection. Presently, the army has banned guns in SWA, strict instructions are issued to IDPs in this context, even the licensed weapons are banned in Mahsud area. This prohibition of weapons is in one-way a welcome step towards the discouragement of tribal rivalry. The decrease in the tribal feuds does not necessarily mean that the value/culture of tribal enmity has disappeared. In short term, the rivalries are suspended. The feuds are reemerging with the elimination of militants and the comparatively stable security conditions in SWA. The feuds, however, might be less violent and the approach can be more goal oriented due to the socialization in the heterogenous communities after displacement. According to the personnel of political administration and influential Maliks such as Iqbal, Shahid, and Alam (personal communication, 2016) there are clashes between and among sections and subsections of the Mahsuds on the issue of distribution of resources for IDPS schemes. The Gomal Zam project is an issue when it comes to the distribution of benefits procedures. Presently, the composition and structure of distribution of contracts, jobs, quota, tenders etc. are the emerging issues. New projects are underway in SWA such as building of roads, school and other developmental projects, the royalty and responsibilities of the construction contracts are source of conflict among various clans in the Mahsud area. The concept of tribal rivalry is transforming with the exposure to urban areas. In the past, the numerical strength of a household determined its influence in a community. The joint family system was supportive in the section and subsection or family to family disputes. The tradition of Mahsuds, alike other Pashtun communities, of a desire to have more male children resulted in a huge family at least numerically which is disappearing in the 21st century. This tradition was supportive to maintain rivalries with huge number of male members. More efficient and organized family structure has now taken its place. The numerical strength of a family is given less priority presently due to variety of reasons. In this context, the IDPs were under influence of the Mahsud families already settled in the metropolises. For convince, the Mahsud families who are settled in the cities for decades will be termed as urbanized Mahsuds. The families of the urbanized Mahsuds are smaller in numbers and many of the members enjoy prestigious/important positions in powerful institutions of the state. Some occupies prestigious positions in state departments at the

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highest levels. For instance, Salahuddin Khan Mehsud is the current chief of police department in the KP province. The families/members of urbanized Mahsuds cannot be harassed either by state or by own kinsmen conveniently. These families are living a peaceful and financially prosperous life. They cannot be harassed by the most powerful state institutions due to efficient official network in the state departments. Instead their trespassing is overlooked. The position of power and authority of the urbanized Mahsuds is a source of jealousy for the kinsmen and IDPs. The observation led to the encouragement of the IDPs to settle in the cities permanently and provide better education to the children. An influential tribal elder, M. M. Ajmal (personal communication, December 4, 2016) thinks that ―one family member occupying a prestigious position in an authoritative state institution can prove more effective in the tribal disputes than dozens of family members with guns and weapons with no education‖. The primary purpose of education is to accumulate power. The natives of SWA have established various platforms to help their own kinsmen in the recent decades. The establishment of welfare organizations such as Mahsud Welfare Association (MWA) and Wana Welfare Association (WAWA) are good example in this context. These organizations are engaged in the welfare of own tribes. MWA has focused its activities to promote education among the Mahsud tribesmen, for this purpose huge number of support schemes are initiated such as scholarship and the related guidelines. The members of civil and military bureaucracy mostly retired belonging form the Mahsud tribe are actively participating to make this organization a success. The Mahsud tribesmen in the urban spaces have also instigated movements against the government. Manzoor Pashteen was the pioneer of the Khath Teehrik, shirt movement, in the current decade which was a peaceful mass protest on the question of undermining native culture by the state institutions. The Khath Tehreek was aimed to highlight and avenge the issue of disrespect of the traditional women dress by the military men in SWA. The achievements of the Mahsud tribesmen against the military institution in the movement were enormous. The concerned institution took notice of the issue and apologize for the action. Mere apology is unacceptable in normal conditions. In the case of Pakistan and then conflict zone such as SWA and FATA, the power and authority of army is unlimited. In such an atmosphere an apology for wrongful act is first step towards accountability and responsibility. These movements indicate the transformation of violent tribal features such as revenge into peaceful mass movements which are more impactful. There have been numerous protests of harassment against state actors, some have successfully concluded in the favor of the tribesmen others are still underway. Interestingly some of the movements

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are against the most powerful institution in the country. Such movements hopefully will give birth to number of movements in the future which will play pivotal role in the efficient governance in the region. The successful tribal movement for Naqeebullah Mahsud has its roots in the Khath Teehrik which later transformed into Mahsud Tahafuz Movement (MTM) and then in Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM). The tribal protests are now more organized and community oriented. Organizations such as MTM which is an active body to host the tribal issues and provide a valuable platform for the affected people (Mohmand, March 2nd, 2018). Mahsud Tahafuz Movement was created by Mahsud activists including Manzoor Pashteen to protect the interests of the tribesmen. This movement‘s primary agenda was to get rid of IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) first in Mahsud area of SWA where huge number of the returned IDPs fallen a prey to this menace and then the campaign was extended to the entire tribal belt (Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016). The IEDs killed and wounded more the hundred women and children in SWA (Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016; Mehsud, 2016). An IED is an explosive device that is made in an improvised manner (Keeley, 2017, p. 1). There is huge network of IEDs landmines placed in Waziristan by the military and the Taliban in the time of conflict (Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016). The rehabilitation processes have affected due to the fear of landmines. One figure commonly quoted in anti-landmine advocacy literature is ‗$3 to make (Keeley, 2003. p. 3). According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), landmines are daily threat in the conflict zones in the third world states and the fourth world states. The IDPs returning home in SWA are facing the issue of land mines. It has become routine news that children are killed in landmines (Tribune, 2017). More than 70 individuals are direct victim of IEDs in SWA alone, most of the prey were women and children (Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016). The government has yet to take steps to deal with the issue. Interviews with various respondents such as Ismail (2016) revealed that the state has only displaced signboards on roadsides which shows signs of warning of landmines. The conflicts of the Mahsuds are not limited to SWA or FATA, the Mahsud tribesmen have taken up and highlighted the issues of importance to the urban areas with more vigor. The tribesmen are now handling the issues in more civilized and mature manner. The excessive interaction with the state institutions have given birth to new issues. The conflicts with the government and non-governmental organizations have emerged. The IDPs in urban areas are harassed by the security personnel including the police. The tribesmen are forced to provide bribe, refusal would result in dire consequences. At some

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point harassment has resulted in the killing of the innocent in fake encounter. Proclaiming the victim to be terrorist by the former. There is lack of accountability and transparency mechanism in the matters related to terrorism. In many case Mahsud tribesmen pay the bribe to avoid extreme consequences. Such situation triggered distress and anxiety among the natives. The cold-blooded murder of Naqeebullah Mahsud by Karachi police force in a fake encounter was a trendsetter in this context (Ali January 20th, 2018). Naqeebullah Mahsud moved to Karachi because of military operation in SWA. The murder of Naqeebullah has triggered nationwide protests. The protesters demanded justice for Naqeebullah and the release of the tribesmen taken away by the state institution unlawfully (Jamal, February 7th, 2018). These protests witnessed success. The supreme court took notice of the Naqeebullah murder and the case of missing persons which led to the release of many missing persons (Altaf, February 11th, 2018). The Mahsud tribesmen including activist, lawyers and students started a nation-wide campaign on social, electronic and print media to avenge the killing of the innocent. It generated debates in the national parliament. The subsequent police inquiry reported the encounter to be fake, the victim was announced to be innocent and the police party which participated in the encounter as accountable (Ali January 20th, 2018). There are two important aspects of this case study. The tribe approach to the legal system of the state making strong institution to think over their plans and procedures. This event created a sense of responsibility in the minds of the security personnel in dealing with the natives/innocent especially who belongs of FATA. The 21st century witnessed tremendous technological revolution. The communication channels are not limited to state agencies only. The fast pace internet and modern cellular inventions coupled with social media has added more efficiency to already established electronic and print media. To (Castells, 1996:13-22) modern society is transforming from industrial to informational societies. To Groenewald (2000:25-27) the flow of information is a superior power enable the social movements to promote change rapidly. The inhabitants of SWA are not ignorant to social and electronic media. The users of social media have increased tremendously. The electronic and print media forms are also exploited as a platform to address grievances. The Mahsud tribesmen have utilized social media to protest against basic rights violation in the settled areas. The use of media has linked the natives with the world outside which is transforming the way of life. Mahsud was a tribe with a lot of unity. In the face of external danger, this tribe suspended internal tribal and cousin-to-cousin enmity as one single unit (Ahmed, 2004, p. 24). The unity among the tribesmen was one reason for the successful expansion of their

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territory. The Mahsud tribe has accumulated extensive landscape from the surrounding tribes in tribal feuds and wars. For instance, the area of Sarwekai once belonged to the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe of SWA which was occupied by the Mahsud in the early 19th century (M. Hashim, personal communication, December 08, 2016). The Dre-Mahsud expelled the Wazirs even from their stronghold at Wana but the British forces averted the intervention (Ahmed, 2004, p. 33). The tribal bonding among the Mahsuds was always a priority, there were insignificant internal tribal feuds. The emergence of militant organizations such as TTP have weaken the tribal bonding and resulted in the internal strife (Calhoun, 2016, p. 3-5). To Mahsuds religion was a secondary matter if it is in contradiction with the native culture. The religious elite in SWA lived their lives subservient to the native leadership. Even after the Afghan War and the widespread militancy, the Maliks oversaw the tribal affairs. The Afghan War of course strengthen the ranks of the Mullahs but their role as a tribal leader was not recognized among the Mahsuds. The encroachment of the military in the tribal way of life altered the traditional administrative structure in SWA and increased the sympathy of the tribesmen towards the militant organizations in the post-2001 period. A small number of Mahsud tribesmen seemed to be sympathizers of the militants. It has created a sense of religious bonding which has damage the traditional tribal bonding. The Mahsud tribesmen view the military intervention as a threat to their identity and culture (Mazari, 2010). The radicalization in the 21st century dented the unity and tribal bonding (Hilali, 2010, p. 27). The participation of some of the Mahsud tribesmen in the fight against Pakistan army after 2003 has given birth to complex identity correlated crisis. The battle on religious lines, has significantly influenced the tribal identity. The priority to religious bonding instead of tribal ties are redefining identity foundations. The militant factions gave priority to religious principles by discarding tribal traditions. For instance, in 2005 and onward period the militant organizations have targeted own tribesmen who opposed Taliban, more than sixty Maliks and religious scholars were killed for being agents of the Americans (Rashid, 2009, p. 93, 275). The punishments were not limited to youngsters, in many cases senior citizens were humiliated. The respect of elders was an integral part of tribal traditions. The militant groups replaced the institution of Jirga with Islamic Shura (Taj, 2010, p. 97). The militant leaders and in some cases religious scholars were the members of the Shura. The decision-making arena of elders was replaced with the militant members who were young and traditional Mullahs who were never a part of the decision-making structure in the Mahsud country. In the Jirga system prolong discussions and deliberations would take place before getting into issuing a

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verdict. While decision making process in Shura was fast and instantly executed. The democratic tradition of arguments and negotiations over an issue was undermined. Hundreds of years ancient traditions and culture was ended with an introduction of religious judicial/administrative/social system. It severely impacted tribal way of life and damaged the unity of the natives. The participation of foreign militants introduced harsh methods. Currently, there are three types of groups comprised of Mahsud tribesmen which are directly and indirectly associated with militancy. The one is fighting the Pakistan security personnel in the state by lunching attacks in various areas. The second group is supportive to the state institutions and fighting anti-state violent groups including own kinsmen but within territorial boundaries (Kilkullen, 2009, p. 31; Taj, 2010, p. 67-71). The third one is involved in the militant activities in Afghanistan with safe heavens in Pakistan (Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016). Majority of the Mahsud tribesmen do not believe in the radical activities and uphold peaceful coexistence. Therefore, majority of the tribesmen have left their homes and are living as IDPs in various part of the country. Some of these tribesmen are already settled in the urban places. These includes hardworking men, businessmen, officers, doctors, teachers, lawyers and other professionals. Unfortunately, the IDPs settling back in SWA are treated worse. Therefore, most of the IDPs are not willing to go back. The journey from homogenous society to heterogenous societies affected the life of the Mahsuds in multiple ways. The urban life style has got an impression on the tribals‘ mind. Consequently, major segment of the Mahsud community are longing to lead an urbanized way of life. The prestige of the position of urban people cultivated a sense of development. Nevertheless, the constant interaction with the state institutions/departments and have facilitated in the settled districts, the tribal identity is overwhelmed by the nationalistic identity. Jahngir (December 2nd, 2016) argues that ―I always vouched for the tribal identity of Mahsud for himself and his family not because honor demanded it but for the protection provided by the community. In the current time, my tribe is not protecting me, and the tribal identity does not mean anything in the cities. Everyone is busy in own life whether Pashtun or non-Pashtun. I would like to be called Pakistani. The state has given me identity and it gives reward when it comes to hard work. In SWA, being unaware of the state privileges we did not know much about Pakistan. We want development and progress instead of tribal identity‖. The Islamist identity that reached the climax in the post 1979 era is on its decline now. Its place is now taken by the nationalistic identity of the state. A significant reason of

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this is the exposure of the tribesmen to war/conflict and the resultant collateral damages and suffering. The strategies of the religious elites by using Islam and tribal sentiments that already dispatched collateral damages to them socially, economically and politically. The nationalistic aspiration of the Mahsud tribesmen can be proved in their quest to have share in the power structure in the official state networks. The only tool to achieve such objectives is thought to be through getting education. The children of the IDPs are getting education in better schools in urban areas. It paved way for national character among the tribesmen instead of tribal bondage. The Cadet colleges, Army Public Schools (APS) and other education institutions established in SWA are focused on promoting patriotism and nationalism. The admission merit in cadet colleges in SWA, the students of these institutions predominantly aspire to join national army. The houses of the Mahsuds were just like small fortresses. The walls of the traditional houses of the Mahsuds were high which included guard tower. The concept of a guard tower and highwalls were a display of strength and proactive preparedness to fight. It also demonstrated the numerical and financial superiority of a family in a village. In times of tribal rivalry, crisis or enmity the guard tower was used as watch tower, patrol and for an offensive and defense gunfire. The tradition of having heighted walls of a house would serve as an impregnable fortress. The conflict between the military and the militants resulted in the collateral damages. Most of the houses in SWA have been damaged, guard towers destroyed. In the rehabilitation processes the military discourages to build guard towers in non-military establishments in SWA. The house with guard tower was a common phenomenon in the Mahsud areas which is disappearing. At present, the construction of houses in SWA lacks guard towers and heighted walls. The Mahsud tribe had never left their area before the displacement. The way of life in cities combined with the facilities such as health, education, transportation, banking and communication are completely different. The hundreds of years old system of joint family is disappearing. In the past, marriages took place based on family affiliation of the male member. The distinction, powerful background and respectable family had the advantage. The individual identity was always overshadowed by the family affiliation. Nowadays, the family of the supposed bride/girl are more interested in the identity/profession of the male individual. The individual capabilities, economic independency, educational qualifications and professional position of male counterpart is given preference in the marriages now. This has forced the youngsters to work hard for their professional careers which of course is transforming the tribal identity. In the past, the elders were not concerned with the activities of the children (Brigadier retired Qayyum Sher Mahsud, personal

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communication, November 12, 2016). Especially, their learning activities were never focused. The attendance in the school went unchecked. In general, the parents did never know the going-on and interests of the youngsters. The local life in cities enormously influenced the tribal life and way of thinking. The elders are taking more interest in the educational and other activities of the youth. The parents have enrolled their children in private sector institutions to have better education. The tribesmen believe that, they can better protect themselves and their families by providing quality education to the coming generation. It would facilitate them in getting better jobs and attaining peace and prosperity. Moreover, the quality education will open avenues of opportunities. The coming generation can ensure prosperous life for their families in particular and for their community in general. The military attire has affected tribal way of life the most. The discipline and the military culture to treat the civilians in the conflict zone has severely impacted tribal value system. The military personnel know no concept of respect to elder, Masher. In the past, the tribal culture influenced the dress code of the local administration and the security forces in FATA. The dressing of Kamez Shalwar was used as uniform by the security personnel. The personnel of the Frontier Corps (FC), Frontier Constabulary (FC) and the other forces operating in FATA had a uniform closely resembled to local dress unlike the rest of Pakistan. The head of the political administration such as PA and APAs usually wear Western dresses when posted in urban areas. In the tribal region these officers always wear local dress. In some case, the officers used to wear local caps. The military has a strict dress code, a Western style uniform. The pent and shirt is now the dress code of the FC in SWA just like the army with small variations in shade and design. In the off-duty hours, military officers/men often wear tracksuits and jeans. This has profound impact on the native cultural dresses. The uniforms of the children of schools and colleges in SWA are encouraged to be urbanized and Western style. It was quite unusual before the penetration of Pakistan army in SWA to wear anything urban or Western. Now, it is perceived to be normal to wear clothes of other cultures in SWA. The Mahsud tribesmen have slowly and gradually adopted the change. The children are wearing urban dresses. According to ISPR, military operations are finished and SWA is cleared form terrorists including area of Shawal valley (Syed, 2015). The state has achieved its goals and purpose to eliminate the militants and disarm the tribesmen. To populate an area, peace is pre-requisite. The natives are disarmed, the Taliban are finished bringing peace in SWA is the headache of the state (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). The development and rehabilitation processes should not be delayed (H. Preghal, personal

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communication, November 03, 2016). There is lack of efficient health, education, water and other facilities (Mehsud &Mehsud, 2017). In many semi-functional hospitals‘ doctors are unavailable. The displacement of the Mahsuds from their villages has predominantly negative impacts (Qureshi, personal communication, December 14th, 2016). It has contributed in huge loss in men and material. Most of the houses are damaged. Each family of the Mahsud tribe has suffered in some form. The damages are not limited to poor people, the wealthy suffered too. People with huge investments and business suffered a lot in terms of investment/finance. Among the IDPs only the poor people are returning to SWA who cannot afford living in the settled areas. The IDPs have demanded fair compensation from the government (Khattak, 2014). Qureshi (personal communication, December 14th, 2016), a religious leader and owner of religious institution in the Mahsud area, asserts that ‗our Madrassa was destroyed, garden wrecked, bricks, doors and iron gone. He held the government responsible for such loss. What good are iron and bricks to Taliban in our absence. Blankets and quilts might be taken away by the militants keeping in view the harsh climate of SWA. I have seen the newly constructed government/military buildings in SWA which are made up from old bricks and iron. This substantiates massive level of corruption on the part of the government in SWA. It also proves lack of mechanism of accountability and transparency. For the native, what difference does it make between the militants and the government, both took away their belongings whether some means by hook or by crook‘. An influential tribal elder of the Abdullai section of the Mahsud tribe, M. A. Masood (personal communication, September 18, 2016) explained his story of losses due to military operations as ‗I have seen all the Mahsud territory in SWA. I have seen the condition of my house which was built by my great grandfather (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). My father lived his entire life in that house. I got it in heritage. My house is demolished during the military actions. I had an emotional affiliation, that house was everything for me. Now who will rebuild it for me and my family. The state agreed on a very low amount for rebuilding a house or damaged property, I cannot build a single room with amount of 400,000 rupees (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). What will a poor person do, from where will he bring the money to rebuild his/her house‘. A leading Malik of Abdur Rahman Khel section of the Mahsud tribe, Malik Taj Alam Mahsud (personal communication, December 25, 2016) described the IDPs situation as, ‗the IDPs are entangled in sorrows, grief and uncertainties. Every moment a

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governmental vehicle passes by, strikes the IDPs expectation for help. The tribesmen are being addicted to free of cost items such as wheat and products related to food. The government made them rely on them. The state could have established firms to provide job opportunities. The natives are in continuous state of tension and anxiety. They have nothing to do, what will they do when the help of the state is stopped, no schedule no destiny at all. Due to the lack of developmental activities in SWA, IDPs are reluctant to return. They are worried about their livelihood after their return‘. The conflict has damaged the native culture in many ways. Values such as honor, courage, self-assurance and hard work are disappearing among tribesmen. There was no concept of begging among the Mahsuds, now there are many baggers. The state did not provide the natives with education, health and psychological facilities. An entire generation of the Mahsud tribe is suffered. A Malik and a tribal elder of Mahsud tribe, Malik M. Hashim (personal communication, December 08, 2016) suggests that ‘tribal people need development in their own land, where they can live their life honorably. The current developmental processes are inefficient and aimed at short term benefits. The tribal belt needs long term socio-economic and political development. The long-term development can help in fixing their problems/damages and stabilize. Moreover, the administrative system should be transformed slowly and gradually. The Holy Book was not revealed in one day, it took 23 years for its completion. The tribal people need to be acquainted with the new system first. The natives are in dire need of quality education which could guide them properly. Such system can inculcate innovative and research-oriented skills instead of feeding state narratives. The current education system is inefficient and biased. The education system should be aimed at better understanding of surrounding people. Notably, it should provide the understanding of rights and duties as a citizen in the state‘. The area of the Mahsuds in SWA remained vacant for almost a decade. The large portion of the area received little or no human activity. There was a fight between the military and the militants in some parts of the area, the entire area remained deserted. The absence of human activity nurtured wild life which is undoubtedly danger for people without weapons and homes without doors and broken walls. Palai, a former IDP, expired on the way to Wana hospital, he was attacked by a wild pig in the area of Khisura (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). In SWA, many women, children and men are being injured by wild animals including bears (Ali Wazir, personal communication, 2016). The domestic animals such as cow and sheep become wild in the absence of human population.

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Moreover, the anti-state Taliban are still at large in the Mahsud area, they move in and out in the military secure areas in SWA (Ali, 2012). They are supposed to be armed and dangerous. The IDPs who have returned have no weapons to protect themselves. The natives request of possession of weapons was denied by the state. In the rehabilitation process the military has banned all sorts of weapons for the folks. The licensed arms are also banned. The natives argue that how will they protect themselves in the far-flung areas where a military check post is miles away in the mountains. Son of Mashal, Ghanam Gul was killed in the Village Chagmalai in his home in March 2017 (S. Salman, personal communication, December 15, 2016). Interestingly, the nearest military check post was at 200 yards. The killing of Ghanam Gul and dozens like him is a dilemma. The local villagers are of the opinion that Ghanam Gul was killed by the anti-state Taliban because Ghanam Gul was the allay of the state. The story holds many mysteries one of which suggests that state might be losing control over its territory in SWA. It took almost a decade for the military to clear the area and to allow the return of the IDPs to SWA. There is fear among the IDPs due to lack of security and constant threat from the militants. In 2017, news published in the national newspaper about the militant infiltration in SWA after the military operations shocked the returned IDPs (Editorial, 2017). After the rehabilitation of some part of the IDPs, military operations are initiated in various parts of SWA (The Nation, 2017). The newly settled IDPs are facing difficulties to move in and out of the area. The security forces have banned IDPs to enter the areas under conflict and discourage unnecessary movement. The locals are advised to remain in their villages. The military proclaim that the SWA is cleared from the Taliban and claim that the military operations are presently focused to search arms/weapons and ammunition in the area (Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016). The state institutions in SWA have introduced new ways to punish thereby establishing their writ in the area. An individual in SWA is terrified not because of militants. The attack on military asset in any form is followed by the army crackdown of the area. The soldiers dishonor the locals and their families. There is lack of accountability and absence of procedure of separation of guilty from innocent in such events. In the Mahsud area of Ladha, in response to armed attack on the military the natives including ladies, children and gents were held in concentration camps (Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016). Pashteen argued that the entire families faced defamation, the adults and elderly men were torchered and punished publicly in front of their families. Such episodes have drastic impacts on elders, females, children and especially the young men. Such incidents are responsible for the hesitation of the IDPs to

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return home. The IDPs might visit their homes but only for a couple of days or so. For me, it will be a matter of luck if my visit timings coincided with a bomb blast in SWA (Mehmood, personal communication, 2016). Mehmood thinks that I am afraid that somebody might mess with the military and I or my family might become a scapegoat.

5.4 LEADERSHIP INSTITUTION OF THE MAHSUD TRIBE There were three forms of institutions of power/authority in SWA, the political administration, Malikship institution and the religious elite (Ahmed, 2004, p. 6). The political administration and the elders were the real power brokers in SWA, the clerics as an authority was not recognized, their power was subjected to the given law and order conditions of the area. The religious elite were more powerful in the time of crisis. In normal conditions, Mullah were restricted to Mosque only in Waziristan (Williams, 2015, p. 10). Many believe that the Mahsuds have Mashers (elders) and no leaders (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). The Mahsuds never had one single leader in onetime period (Brigadier retired Qayyum Sher Mahsud, personal communication, November 12, 2016). The Mahsuds are the most democratic as compared to any other tribes along the frontier (Beattie, 2011, p. 579). This tribe knows no Khans or Nawabs. The institution of leadership among the Mahsud is subject to evolution and transformation (Shah, personal communication, 2016). The government leader of the Mahsuds is PA. The tribal leadership of Mahsuds is always with the influential men. At an instance, it is very difficult to have a single leader among the Mahsuds. Gulab Khan Kaka and Malik Subhan Kaka were influential leaders in the recent past. Sehbzada Waziristan is a popular name in which Mahsud tribe recognized authoritative leadership (Shah, personal communication, 2016). However, consultation and deliberations took place in Jirga, Sehbzada respected the decisions of the elders, he was more of a Masher who was respected and not obeyed. The British were annoyed from the continuous raiding and attacks of the Mahsuds. The British desired to make minimum Maliks/leaders which could simplified business with the Mahsud tribe, an Abdur Rahman Khel Malik commented on an occasion that make us all leaders or kill us with canons (Ahmed, 1983, p. 23). Mullah Powindah was a person who gave much trouble to the British administration in the late 19th and early 20th century. He was hailed by many as a dominant leader of the Mahsud tribe of his time (Howell, 1931, p. 42). In fact, Mullah Powindah, was raised to the status of the leadership by the elders of the tribe to have a symbolic leader (Qayyum Sher Mahsud, personal communication, November 12, 2016). It was difficult for the Mahsud elders to agree on one single leader among themselves, so, they give the status to somebody else who was not

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a Malik or an elder (Qayyum Sher Mahsud, personal communication, November 12, 2016). However, Mullah Powindah besides his personal capabilities, was not a true leader or representative of the tribe. He was nothing if the elders did not support him. There can be many leaders among the Mahsuds at one-time period. It is important to consolidate a tribe in singular/centralized leadership. Lack of cohesive leadership is significant reason for the militants to infiltrate among the ranks of the Mahsud tribesmen in the post 9/11 period. Unified leader would have made aware the tribesmen about the destruction of wrong decisions. The Mahsud tribe cultural and other social and economic institutions have suffered due to lake of unity and awareness (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). The Mahsud leadership at that time was scattered and disintegrated. When chaos started openly, the leaders of the Mahsuds left the people on the mercy of the militants and escaped SWA for safer places in urban areas of Pakistan (Malik, 2013, p. 106). The Mahsud tribe suffered a lot in the absence of its leadership. The Wazir of Wana were led by efficient leadership. They obey their leaders generally. The militants penetrated in to their stronghold at Wana in the post 9/11. They were affected due to violence for a short period of time. The Wazir tribesmen begun to listen to their leaders promptly. Chandran (2004, p. 1) asserts that the Wazir tribe of SWA cooperated with the military and gave up the individuals who harbored militants in to SWA. This was one reason for the Wazir tribe to suffer less in comparison to the Mahsud tribe (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). The Jirga of Wazir tribe signed several peace deals with the state and kept their area out of Taliban‘s reach. Subsequently, the Wazir of Wana were not displaced and affected like that of Mahsuds. The leaders of the Wazir tribe guided their people in difficult times and did not leave their tribe leaderless. The Taliban grew stronger in Mahsud area and threatened the very existence of the Wazir tribe. However, the under-pressure leadership of the Wazir tribe did not lose their courage.

5.5 INSTITUTION OF MALIKSHIP AND TRIBAL TRANSFORMATION Malikship is an indispensable pillar of the traditional colonial administrative structure in FATA. The Maliks help the PA to govern agency of FATA (Rogers, 2010, p. 10). Malik is a leader of each clan, but he only negotiates terms unlike Khan in the urban Pashtun areas or Sardar of Baloch people who are obeyed. Malik is a leading person who possess an influence in a section or in an entire tribe. There can be more than one Malik in each clan depending on density of population and the number of influential men. In the tribal belt, heredity system of Malikship is recognized. In the past, men rose to the position of a Malik who differentiate in terms of bravery, wisdom and courage and thus obtained influence in their community. The British scheme of Malikship was based on the hereditary

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appointment of Malik. The Maliks in the British system were not necessarily influential in their clans. It is because the appointment of the Maliks was subjected to the judgment of the administrator who could dub an individual as a Malik. In any case, Maliks amongst Mahsud were less influential as compared to other tribe along the frontier (Iqbal, personal communication, 2016). There were huge number of Maliks in the Mahsud tribe. It created many problems including rapid decision making. Ultimately in 1895, the numbers of Maliks were reduced to minimum by the British government and divided into five different categories according to the influence (Bruce, 1900, p. 18). In the management of the tribal affairs, Maliks enjoyed the confidence of British officers. However, the advice of the first-class Malik sought frequently in private (Punjab Government Press, 2012). It encouraged them to look upon themselves as the assistants of political officers in their respective areas or representative of the local administration. Malik or Masher means a person of influence in the native language in SWA. However, there is a difference between tribal elder and a Malik. A tribal elder can be both a Malik and an elder at the same time but it is not necessary that a Malik must be a tribal elder. There are/were many examples of such influential elders who are not Maliks even though they have maintained more influence in their clan as compared to a Malik. The influence of an elder is due to his own capabilities, wisdom and intelligence (Salih Shah, personal communication, 2016). On the other hand, Malikship is a hereditary institution. Mere father‘s death makes the son Malik without being scrutinized. In the case of elders, if son is not capable he cannot be a tribal elder. Qayyum Sher Mahsud (personal communication, November 12, 2016) a retired military officer belongs to the Mahsud tribe, Mehmood (2016) an influential elder of the Mahsuds differentiated between Malik and an elder exquisitely. ‗A Malik can be a 19 years old boy. An elder is an elder in age and an elder in wisdom. An elder rise to the position of Malik due to own ability and influence. On various occasions, in tribal affairs, the position of Malik was overshadowed by an influence elder. An elder always works for the best benefit of his tribe while a Malik can have personal interests. An elder of Mahsud tribe never depends on the heredity method. It is his ability due to which his folks are dependent. Khair Memaud Kaka from Abdullai subsection of the Mahsud tribe was an influential elder. He was not a Malik. Kaka‘s influence in the tribal get-together was enormous as compared to Maliks’. The institution of Malikship can be traced back to the British times. Maliks were paid specific sum for their duties. The leadership role was played by the Nawabs and Khans in the settled districts. These institution of leadership was created by the British for

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obedience at the grass root level (Shah, personal communication, 2016). Nawabs were always in favor of British administration. A Nawab might work against the benefit of the people. In return, the administration would grant him huge lands and other financial and material privileges. Nawab of Tank, Khan of Kalat, Nawab of Bahawalpur and Nawab of Kharan are good examples in this context (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). To many, Nawabs were traitor to their communities (Amjid, 2016; Amir, 2016). The Maliks communicated the issues and wishes of his people to the administration (Shah, personal communication, 2016). However, on many instances Maliks have given preferences to personal interests over communal interests (T. Alam, personal communication, December 25, 2016). The Khans and Nawabs administer their area and were obeyed by the people because of their influence. The influence of such leadership is based on heredity, economic and political might. In many cases, the Khans and Nawabs maintained private forces to crush the opponents. Maliks are not dependent on economic or political influence. Many Maliks and tribal elders come from economically weak background. The Maliks have no gangs to cover their dirty work or to terrorize subjects/inhabitants. There might be number of Maliks in a given community or sub-clan. The institution of Malikship depends upon the heredity but the dynamics of genealogical power structure is different from those of Khan and Nawabs. In short, the Elders/Maliks are respected and not obeyed because of their political/economic/social influence in the tribal communities. The notion of Kasher, younger, and Masher is an integral part of Mahsuds and Pashtun culture. It explains the role of elders and youngster in a community. There is an element of enormous respect of the elders in the tribal societies. The Mahsud Kashers respect their Mashers. The concept is supportive to Malikship institution where elders of the community have decision making roles. The decisions of elders whether in Jirga or in homes received much respect. There was immense pride and honor for the youngster to uphold the decisions of their Mashers. The youngsters had autonomy in daily life, but the respect of Mashers compelled them to accept decision made for them by the elders. The concept of Kashar and Masher is disturbed in the post-9/11 period due to conflict. The concept was severely damaged with the proliferation of militant groups and the penetration of military into the tribal belt. The Mahsud tribesmen who have joined the militant groups mostly comprised of Mahsud youth. The militant groups/leaders replaced the Mashers in the traditional colonial administrative structures. The shift in power/authority and the emergence of new elements in the power structure seriously affected the concept of Kasher and Masher. The Masher received limited or no respect in the emergence of new

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powerbrokers in the area such as militant groups and military. In the 21st century, the youngsters are more vigor to control their lives. In the initial stages of violence, youngsters were successful in intimidating the elders. The threats were so certain and intimidating that the former left the area to protect their lives and the lives of their loved ones. The young generation took the overall decision-making powers from the elders and crippled the authority of the political administration. The respect and prestige Mashers once enjoyed in the Mahsud clan is a thing of the past. State did not provide the youngster with freedom and liberty. The local administrative structure was indifferent about the role of the youth in the governance system in SWA. The displacement of the Mahsud tribe brought about significant changes in the traditional life of the Mahsuds. In the urban areas the youth are more independent and active. Unlike in SWA, where the elders were the intermediary between the state and the society. The youngsters actively participate in the political and social life in the urban areas of Pakistan. The elders are not well acquainted with the modern complex systems and facilities in the cities. The youngsters are more interested to get familiar with the urban life. The attribute of youth of quick learning helps to understand the modern systems and appliance rapidly. The youth are helping the elders in all walks of life in the cities. The Kashers of Mahsud tribe are more active in mixing with different cultures in the urban centers making new friends and connections. It is helping the youth to learn and understand the local languages and the continuous interaction improves overall communication skills. It has given liberty and freedom to the young generation of the Mahsud tribe especially within their family and community. The political elite has affected the status of Maliks. Members of political parties are new stakeholders in the power structure in SWA (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). The growing political processes has positive impacts. It has created a platform for the emergence of new leadership. The political development has curtailed the unchecked bureaucratic authority in SWA. The power and authority of political administration is more divided in the emergence of new stakeholders. The proliferation of electronic and social media is playing pivotal role in the awareness and propagation of political process. The introduction of political party act in FATA is empowering the natives politically but undermining the prestige/authority of institution of Malikship. Moreover, the political development is creating awareness among the natives and is supportive to FATA reforms. The FATA reforms are more tilted to introduce of modern model of governance instead of traditional structure. The participation of the youth in the political processes in SWA has undermined the authority of the elders. In the past, in SWA, the elders were in

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charge to oversee decision making processes. They were responsible for the protection of their household and community. The elders were powerbrokers in the administrative system. The elders dealt the legal issues of the community. The Maliks served as contractors of government projects and get benefited financially (Ahmed, 1977, p. 49). The youngsters were not a part of administration and were dependent on the elders financially. This gave the elders prestige, privilege and authoritative position. After the displacement of the Mahsud tribe the power structure altered in favor of the youth. The elders are not acquainted with the urban way of lifestyle and the complex administrative apparatuses. The governance system in cities is different than the tribal region. The legal system in Pakistan does not provide an elder with the power or authority. The participation of youth of the Mahsud tribe in the political process has provided leverage over the elder. The platform of political parties is active to address the grievances of the tribesmen. In SWA, political arena has given voice to the requirements of the youngsters. In the case of traditional system of governance, the youth was deliberatively discouraged. The young generation is active in solving issues of their household and community. They solve the issues of the elders in routine life. Akber (2016) argues that modern technological world is no place for tribal elders. My son bought me a cellular phone and taught me its various function. Now, the young generation enjoys freedom and liberty. The independency of youth in any form has dire impacts on the notion of Malikship. The Thana-Kachari, police station and judicial system, culture is complex than the traditional colonial administrative structure. A small offense in FATA might be a heinous crime in the urban region of the state. A certain crime in SWA might have a solution through Jirga. In urban areas a minor offense can lead to huge mess which might entangle an individual for years in Kachari. The younger generation are more familiar with the new procedures, many are getting law degrees and huge numbers are getting recruited in the law enforcement departments. Presently, the youngsters help the elder. The youngsters are demanding changes in the legal system in the entire tribal belt. They are using the platforms provided by urban spaces, media and political arena extensively. Various peaceful protests have taken the debate to the provincial and national levels. The demand of the youth to extend the legal system of the state by removing FCR has led to the damaged the institution of Malikship. The political administration has used the institution of Malikship for personal gains after 1947. The bureaucracy has systematically contributed in the instability of Malikship institution. In the colonial times, political administration in collaboration with Maliks

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handled the local governance system. There was no third or fourth powerbroker in FATA. In times of crisis the third leadership emerged in the form of religious elite. After the creation of Pakistan, seats of the PA of a district/agency of FATA are sold to a highest bidder followed by the lower ranks in the hierarchy (Ghauri, 2016). The seat of the PA of Khyber agency is the most expensive because of the trade route which involves huge finance. Such administrators leave no stone unturned to achieve their objectives. Their decisions reflect their objectives which are based on personal interests. The appointment of Maliks are made not on efficiency or influence but on favoritism by the PA. The real tribal leaders working for the benefit of the society are discouraged on all costs. Keeping in view the unlimited powers of the PA, no one could dare stand in his way. The fragile condition of Malikship can be guessed by the proliferation of militant groups in FATA in the post 9/11 period in the tribal belt. The widespread militancy and the subsequent military intervention in the tribal areas of Pakistan has undermined the institution of Malikship. The military has disturbed the already established administrative structure. In the present time, military has influence over governance processes and ongoing developmental and non-developmental projects in SWA. The military enjoy the power to veto in any civilian decision-making structure/process. Interestingly, the military personnel have participated and even led in many tribal Jirgas. Their participation in Jirgas in any form has damaged the democratic environment of the institution. It has direct impacts on the institution of Maliks. Maliks were being bought and sold. Any policy or decision against the wishes of the military has not been approved in Jirga up till now (Iqbal, 2016). The Maliks are summoned to the offices of the military in routine just like they were summoned by the militant commanders (Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016). The difference is, the militant commanders were more acquainted with the native culture and traditions as compared to the military officers. The issue of Maliks being agent of state institutions have negative impacts in the local quarters. The Maliks are considered as government agents and known to serve the interests of the state. The Malikship institution is weakened by the continuous interference of state institutions. The opinion of the religious elite is divided on the question of Malikship. Ameer (personal communication, December 3rd, 2016) asserts that ‗the native culture of SWA is closely associated with the primitive Arabian culture. Both the cultures consist of traditional tribal leadership. The concept of honor in both traditions is all most alike. Elders are respected and in charge of the decision-making in their communities‘. Qureshi (personal communication, 2016) believes that the existence of tribal leadership is positive

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and beneficial for the natives. Qureshi argues that Maliks and other administrative leaders should have basic knowledge of Islam. Some groups affiliated to clergy are not in favor of the institution of Malikship in SWA. According to them this institution encourages corruption (Noor, 2016). Maliks are responsible for the establishment of the phenomena of ‗Ghost school‘ which were in fact sheep farms or guest houses. The Maliks have their share in the underdevelopment of the tribal region. The institution of Malikship has contributed in illiteracy, poverty, unemployment and poor management in SWA (Azmat, personal communication, 2016). It is the contribution of Maliks that the natives are giving priority to the urban areas living. The militant proliferation is one evidence of the inefficiency of Maliks. There are many dark/negative sides of the institution of Malikship. Many argues that the Malikship institution sowed seeds of corruption and inequality (Ahmed, 2011, p. 144). This system creates gap and misunderstanding between the natives and the government. The Maliks take advantage of this gap especially in the time of crisis. In the 21st century, majority of the tribesmen are not in favor of the Malikship, especially the youth. They think that every aspect of life has its rise and fall. They believe that Maliki system is outdate, and it has no place in the modern technological world (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). This system is responsible for the underdevelopment and backwardness of FATA in general (Nichols, 1995, p. 3). The Malik system is against human rights. There is no room for a lower caste to represent itself. Moreover, women are completely neglected. Women have no right to represent or participate in the Jirga (Khan & Afridi, 2010). The council of elder is limited to male part of the society only. It contributes to patriarchal structure of already male dominated society thereby suppressing the repressed segment of the society in FATA (Khan, 2012, p. 1-2). Gender discrimination encourages violence against women which has severe consequences in a community (Lecy, 2008, p. 59). SWA became breeding ground of violence because it has encouraged elements of violence which is embedded in the native culture and traditions. The honor killing is considered as a cultural value. The institution of Malikship is reluctant to bring change in their ranks. The peace treaties of military with the militant leaders in one way show the weakness and inefficiency of this institution in the time of crisis. The Maliks were involved in the peace accords and failed to keep the accords intact which points out the necessity of new system of administration (Boggs, 2012, p. 210). The Maliks are typically more traditional in their procedures and discourage people who challenge the status quo. The youngster cannot contribute in the administrative structure as far as the Malikship system is authoritative. Malikship organization has created

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many problems in the tribal life. The most significant issue is the distribution of resources (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). Indigenous state administration in collaboration with Maliks are earning fortune due to corruption in various social sector projects such as health, education and security. The distribution of royalties and resources are important sources of the manipulation of funds by Maliks and local political administration which could have been invested in the development of tribal communities (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). Currently, majority of the Maliks are chosen by the government who offer a blank check to state policies. The institution of Malikship was essential in the 20th century. The British wanted to keep FATA a buffer zone between the two empires. To contain the influence of Afghan government across the border, the preservation of Maliki system was indispensable for the British. The Maliks were given huge privileges by the Englishmen. The tribesmen were given jobs as Khasadars, local force, in the tribal belt. The then administration successfully protected their interests by refraining the tribesmen to collaborate with the Russian Empire and keep this area under control indirectly. The tribesmen needed the British and they had their needs. The British interests were over in the region and led to their departure. Pakistan came into being and nothing has changed. The same administrative system was adopted with insignificant changes. M. A. Masood (personal communication, September 18, 2016) a leading Malik of Mahsud tribe describes the institution of Malikship as ‗I am a Malik, there is a saying, do not spit where you eat. I joined Malikship as a hobby rather than a typical professional career. I left a job in government sector. I have completed my education up to master‘s level. I am a graduate of the prestigious Islamia College Peshawar. I was a President of the student union and an activist. I left all that, just to be a tribal leader and to work for the benefit of my people. Unfortunately, I cannot protect my rights in the contemporary security condition how would I protect the interests of my people‘. Ali Wazir (personal communication, December 27, 2016), a leading elder and a Malik belonged to Ahmedzai Wazir tribe of SWA explains Malikship as ‗institutions are setup for the benefits of the government and people. There is no good or bad institution. Sometimes institutions are formed in the need of time. The demand of certain institution is more in one time-space than the other. In the times of the British institution of Malikship was indispensable to govern and consolidate the scattered communities along the frontier. The idea was to integrate these small units under their own leadership. Since the independence of Pakistan up till 1990s the institution of Malikship proficiently managed

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governance system in tribal areas of Pakistan. Maliks bridged the gap between the state and the society. It is a matter of great misfortune that presently majority of the Maliks themselves have undermined the credibility of this institution. They have given personal interests priority at the cost of communal interests. However, there are a few Maliks in the 21st century who are role model for the natives. They are known for their integrity and famous for their decision which never undermined tribal benefits. Name an institution and it will have its pros and cons. In the present times, Malikship is better than many state institutions. The state is sole responsible for the weakness of the of the institution of Malikship. The government and the state agencies used this Maliks for own agendas. The Maliks who have opposed the state policies were either killed or intimidated. Maliks suffered a lot in the conflict period. Some of the Maliks fled from SWA due to intimidation by the militants. The lives of Maliks were not safe in FATA and in the urban areas‘. A Malik from FATA was killed while on the way to meet the Prime Minister in July 2008 (Khan, 2008). Malikship institution is important part of tribal culture. Before the British, there were leaders of the tribe, men who led the people. Just like the institution of Panchait in Punjab, where the elders of the community decide local cases. The Council of Elders should be established instead of Malikship. It can provide a platform to emerge new leadership. The Council of Elders must not be handled by the PA or other civil or military bureaucracy (Qayyum Sher Mahsud, personal communication, November 12, 2016). The interference of the bureaucracy must be limited. The heredity processes in relation to Malikship should be abolished. A judicial bench of supreme court of Pakistan must be extended to FATA. The council of elders in close cooperation with judicial setup should decide cases. It will ensure checks and balances on the executive power. This was long standing demand of the tribal people could be met with more efficient system of governance. It will ensure, much needed, responsible governance apparatus in FATA.

5.6 INSTITUTION OF JIRGA AMONG MAHSUDS: PAST AND PRESENT Jirga is one of the most influential institution of the Pashtun society (Barth, 1969, p. 120). Spain (1963, p. 143) describes Jirga as a perfect reflection of Athenian democracy where a council of influential men through mediation, arbitration and conciliation exercise various legislative, judicial and executive functions. A gathering of local elders and government administrators on an issue of importance constitutes Jirga. The British initiated the policy in the tribal belt to choose the local influential elders and termed them as Maliks. This policy is continued up till now. Maliks represents their respective clans/sub-clan in a Jirga. Jirga is hundreds of years old tradition. It was a cultural institution. In the past, Jirga

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was a source of inspiration and awareness for the tribesmen. Jirga is a fundamental component of Pashtun society, it resolves internal tribal conflicts (Wardak, 2003, p. 4). Some traits of the traditional form of Jirga exist today where mutual disputes are negotiated on the grass root level. Jirga was documented by the British in the FCR. Justice, administrative and political system in FATA revolves around the political administration, Jirga and FCR (Khan, 2008, p. 111). The people would get together according to the traditions of the tribe to decide on an issue. The rival parties may not or may agree to the decision of a Jirga. The Jirga, nevertheless, would give a decision according to the wiser council of the people and according to the tradition of the area. Jirga system in Waziristan gives complete independence to the individuals to speak freely (Ahmed, 1980, p. 91). There is no superior or a single leader in Jirga, the natives sit around in a circle during deliberations. In sheer compulsion of circumstances, Jirga can enforce its decision by assembling tribal Lashkar (Fair & Chalk, 2006, p. 11). To Garrett (2008, p. 14) Lashkar is a raiding party. Lashkar is more a tribal army which is organized with the democratic consent in Jirga. In any case, arms are usually not brought into Jirga, there are harsh debates, but Jirga rarely convert in to violent forum (Spain, 1963, p. 71). According to Johnston (Mehsud notes, p. 22) there are different levels of Jirgas among Mahsuds which can transform in to grand Jirga. Marrakah is the other name of Jirga which is purely a Mahsuds language word. Whereas Jirga and committee are used in state quarters for documentation and related procedures (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). The term Marrakah is used when the sections and subsections of the Mahsud tribe sits together and discuss disputes among themselves (M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016). The dispute among the Mahsud tribes are solved through Marrakah only. State representative or outside member is not allowed to participate in such deliberations. The word Jirga is used when tribal elders and Maliks meet the government officials such as Governor or PA. It means the presence and absence of government official changes the term. The term Jirga might be used to settle disputes with other tribes or with the state/government. The senator from Mahsud area of SWA, Shah (personal communication, 2016) proclaims that before 2003-2004, the decision of Jirga in SWA was observed equivalent to the verdict of supreme court. Jirga represented tribal people and culture. Ali (2016) asserts that Jirga was convened for the benefits of the tribesmen, on various occasions, decades of clashes and enmity would settle in a single meeting of elders. There was an atmosphere of respect between Kashar and Masher, youngster and elder. The tribal people respect and value Jirga more than the settled people value their parliament or justice structures. The

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military and militant adventures in the post 9/11 period in SWA completely damaged the Jirga system to its roots. Before that, the empowerment of the religious elite during Afghan Jihad in 1980s weakened this institution. Interestingly, the Jirga institution is getting strengthened again (Shah, personal communication, 2016). The area of SWA is cleared from the militants. Shah believes that the military has realized the value and importance of Jirga in the tribal belt. He argues that they need Jirga to maintain law and order in FATA. Moreover, the political administration cannot operate without the strong institution of Jirga. The institution of Jirga lost its credibility with the passage of time (Qadir, 2008, p. 43). The Jirga system was strong in the 20th century and it lost its prestige in the 21st century with the proliferation of military and militants in the region (Malik, 2013, p. 106- 107). M. Hashim Khan (personal communication, 2016), argues that ‗Jirga institution was weak even before 9/11. A strong institution of Jirga would have prevented the propagation of non-state actors in SWA. The weakness of this institution is one reason for the militant outfit to infiltrate and flourish in SWA‘. It took time for the militants to fortify their foothold in the Mahsud territory. The subsequent training, recruitment and the establishment of Taliban offices went unchecked. What was the institution of Jirga doing at that point? Was Jirga weak, ineffective and not obeyed at local levels? What were the reason for the fragile conditions of Jirga specifically in the Mahsud territory from where the most notorious terrorist organizations in the world emerged such as TTP? The Jirga system was slowly and gradually damaged by the law and order situation which emerged during the participation of Pakistan in the wake of the invasion of USSR of Afghanistan in 1979. There were various criminals and outlaws who damaged the name of Jirga in the late 20th century. A ‗Robin Hood‘ of the Mahsud tribe known as ‗Go Khan‘, essentially was a thief who robbed government assets. The people loved and respected him because he gave the money to the poor. He created much fear among the government personnel in his times. Once he got in and out in the administrative capital of SWA in Wana and challenged the then head of the political administration (S. Salman, personal communication, December 15, 2016). He was eventually killed by his own trusted cousin in the mid of 1990s (S. Salman, personal communication, December 15, 2016). Go Khan respected elders and Jirga system but his activities undermined the status and credibility of Jirga. The political administration was annoyed from his attacks on government assets. The administration demanded Go Khan dead or alive from the Mahsud tribe. Many Mahsud Jirgas were convened by the then PA to hand over Go Khan. The elders failed to deliver because Go khan grew popular and powerful in his area. The issue of Go Khan disturbed

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the relationship of the political administration and the institution of Jirga. After the death of Go Khan, his brother Raza Khan Mehsud established a group known as Teman-Tehreek Force (TTF). The group was established in the mid-1990s for the betterment of the Mahsud community in SWA (Mehsud & Khan, 2013, p. 5). TTF actively participated in the 1997 elections and established enormous vote bank. The TTF was an organization which become popular among the natives. TTF soon indulged in the solving issues of local nature and affected the popularity of the institution of Jirga. The abuse of power, corruption and flawed policies of the state institution and bureaucracy are few fundamental reasons for the weak writ of Jirga in SWA. The state institutions bent law for own benefit, in such environment non-state actors are more likely to be flourished. The political administration is solely dependent on the abilities and efficiency of the PA. An incompetent head of political administration is most likely mange is area in poorly. Taylor (1865, p. 120) explains that the colonial administration advised the PA of a district/agency of FATA to avoid rough or harsh bureaucratic language in the dealings with the tribesmen and Jirga meetings. The colonial administrators carefully adopted this suggestion to uphold the honor of elders and local traditions which was helpful in controlling the area. After the independence of Pakistan, PA used to consider Jirga as his subservient. It discouraged the influential elders to attend the meetings which has negative impact on this institution. Rustam Shah Mohmand (personal communication, 2016), a chief bureaucrat in KP and senior most officer who was involved in the appointment of political agents in FATA, revealed shocking news. He stated that ‗in most cases the appointment of a PA of an agency in FATA is dependent on huge sum of bribes. The most expensive appointment is the post of PA of Khyber Agency. In most cases the bribe in taken in the top tires of government and bureaucracy in advance, before the appointment. The bases of the appointment of an officer in FATA is not talent or efficiency, it is bribe and strong reference‘. In such scenario, how can one expect competency and efficiency from an officer. Subsequently, top priority of such officers is to accumulate wealth. A weak political administration directly effects institution of Jirga. Incompetent PA appoints incompetent Maliks to conceal his own weakness, corruption and inefficiency. Thereby discourage competent Maliks who are the core element of Jirga. The weak and inefficient political administration in FATA has resulted in the weakness of the institution of Jirga long before the penetration of state and non-state actors in SWA in the 21st century. The political administration has undermined the status of Jirga by establishing Peace Committees (PC). A very first PC was established in 1998 (Saad Salman, personal

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communication, 2016). Salman argues that Jirga gave up its power to the PC. The PC was led by Gul Saa Khan Mahsud who was in direct contact with the PA himself. The members of PC were offered huge privileges. For instance, Gul Saa Khan Mahsud was issued permits to drive non-custom paid vehicles in to the urban region. He approved incentives and various schemes from the administration. The aims and objectives of PC were to eliminate criminals, raised number of crimes and to help the administration and the Maliks to bring stability to the Mahsud territory (Mehsud & Khan, 2013, p. 6). The PC was successful in killing most notorious criminals like Battu, who killed dozens of innocents in the Mahsud country. The raising popularity of the group among the Mahsuds invite them in solving local issues of the tribe. Besides the positive impact of the PC, it hijacked the authority and role of Jirga. In any gathering, Gul Saa Khan was accompanied by at least fifty-two strong-armed men. This group grew intimidating with its popularity. According to Jamil (2016) Gul Saa Khan Mahsud grew so powerful that on many occasions he disregarded the decision of Jirga. There is a mature and civilized environment in Jirga, in such gathering Gul Saa Khan scolded elders during deliberations for maintaining different opinion. The PC damaged the writ and prestige of the institution of Jirga. During the militant infiltration into Wazir area in SWA, the PC was well organized. Interestingly, Gul Saa Khan Mahsud was not fond of the Jihadist particularly the foreign militants. He hated foreign militants based on their inferior racial background for example physical appearance of the Tajiks and Uzbeks militants. According to an influential elder and a Malik from Abdur Rahman Khel subsection of the Mahsud tribe, Hashim (personal communication, December 08, 2016) argues that during the reign of PC not a single foreign militant penetrated in to Mahsud area in SWA. Gul Saa Khan was also against the call for Jihad after the US invasion of Afghanistan (Munir, 2016). He believed that Afghan fight is not the worry or duty of the Mahsud tribesmen. The killing of Gul Saa Khan in 2002 by unknown broke the wall between the militants and the Mahsud area. The institution of Jirga was infective before the arrival of the militants in the Mahsud area. So, after the arrival of the militants in to Mahsud stronghold, the institution of Jirga was incapable of decision making in concrete and efficient manner to coup with new security settings. In the past, the role of celery as member of Jirga was not recognized. Activities of religious elite were limited to Mosque and religious ceremonies only (Nawaz & Borchgrave, 2009, p. 26-27). In the 21st century members of religious elite become important members of the Jirga. It altered the democratic configuration of Jirga in SWA. In certain cases, Mullahs decided to pass judgment in Jirgas. The Jirgas started to hold in closed/private spaces and in Madrassas. In the post-9/11 period, militants targeted the

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institution of Jirga. As quoted in Malik (2013, p. 106) Safdar Sial (2009) asserts, to avoid anti-Taliban Jirga, the militants have killed more than 600 Maliks since 2007. Some of these Maliks were influential and worked for the benefits of the people and raised voice against the militants and their sponsors. These elders struggled to refrain the tribesmen from participating in the militant activities by organizing Jirga (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). The militant‘s attacks and threats to attack on Jirga discouraged natives to assemble. The discontinuity of Jirga affected this institution immensely. Many influential tribal leaders fled to the cities to protect their lives and the lives of their families. The state policies were not supportive to protect Maliks. The Jirga system in SWA was discontinued, affected and the natives were left on the mercy of the militant organizations. The dismantlement of Jirga provided militant a space to grow and flourish. In SWA, political development has negative impacts on Jirga system. It was basically the introduction of right to vote through adult franchise which undermined the authority and prestige of the members of Jirga in SWA (Ghauri, 2006). The act of universal suffrage striped the Maliks of their political power. Before the year of 1997, the members of the national legislature were selected by the Maliks. The political developments negatively impacted the institution of Jirga as a sole forum of solving disputes for the tribesmen. Its place is taken by the political and more liberal forums and the tribesmen are now more connected with the political elite. The extension of political party‘s act to FATA in August 2011 which resulted in the growth of political activity (Ullah, 2013, p. 84). The state institutions were involved indirectly in the killing of the tribesmen including influential elders who opposed state policies which were supportive to militant groups and their lodging in SWA (Taj, 2011, p. 36). The state institutions were supportive to militants in the tribal belt (Nawaz & Borchgrave, 2009, p. 18). The remaining Maliks are on the payroll of the state (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). The state strategies were related to dismantle Maliks and the institution of Jirga to avoid any opposing decision. The natives consider state collusion with the militants and were terrified to raise voice (Taj, 2011, p. 408). Irshad (2011, p. 227-230) argues that the military is one of the biggest hurdles in the elimination of terrorism in the tribal belt. Ali Wazir (personal communication, December 27, 2016), believes that ‗in the present times, the decision of Jirga is not independent. The members of Jirgas are agents of the state institutions. The values of justice, transparency and respect are no more. The innocent is getting punished. The guilty and the people who are well connected with the state institutions are safe‘.

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The institution of Jirga is always effective to an extent. It has played an important role to keep the major portion of the native population peaceful and refrained the tribesmen from participating in violent activities (Qayyum Sher Mahsud, personal communication, November 12, 2016). The Mahsud tribe did not assembled tribal Lashkar against the military and the militants because of disregard of native traditions. Jirga and the related personnel played an important role to keep the tribe peaceful. To contain the militant propagation in SWA, the youngsters wanted to assemble tribal Lashkar. The intervention of tribal elders in the form of Jirga averted the situation (Akber, personal communication, 2016). Jirgas proposed peace which was endorsed by the tribesmen and welcomed by the militants in the Mahsud territory. The struggles of various political, religious and traditional leadership in the aversion of confrontation was crucial. The religious leadership played a pivotal role in such scenario. In the leadership of Mirajudin, a tribal leader and political figure of religious political party in SWA, the Mahsud tribe refrained from assembling a tribal Lashkar to counter Talibanization. It could have resulted in the tribal warfare and the collateral damage of the Mahsud tribe (Qureshi, personal communication, 2016). The confrontation would have resulted in the fight between militant groups and tribal Lashkar. It prevented penetration of violence/conflict from house to house on the grass root level in the Mahsud country. It is because some of the members of single family were in the Taliban and others were neutral or even effected by the activities of the Taliban groups. In the same line, there were different groups of Taliban. One family member was in one group and the other was in favor of another group and vice-versa (Iqbal 2016). Anti- militants tribal Lashkars known as local peace committees left hundreds killed and thousands injured in other parts of the tribal belt (Peters & Rassler, 2010, p. 54-55). In Bajaur Agency, Khyber Agency and Dara Adam Khel, state sponsored Jirgas were convened to form anti-Taliban Lashkars which faced suicide bombers and formidable resistance from the militants (Taj, 2011, 48-49). Such endeavors of assembling tribal Lashkars resulted in the killings of hundreds of innocent members. Anti-Taliban Lashkar failed to counter militancy in the tribal belt in general. Interestingly, various meetings were organized by the young members of the Mahsud tribe to act against the suspicious activities of the Pakistan army in SWA (Qureshi, personal communication, 2016). The Mahsuds were more concern about the door to door uncongenial military operation in the Wazir area. It was thought that Mahsud tribe will be the next target of the military. Therefore, it was decided to act against the Pakistan army. The efforts of influential individuals and dozens of meetings refrained the tribe from hostile activity against the state. Moreover, the Mahsud tribesmen were guided not to talk

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openly about the sensitive issues and covert state policies which might attract danger (Akber, personal communication, 2016). The institution of Jirga and its influential members saved lives of thousands of Mahsud tribesmen in the 21st century. The developed world has also the system of Jirga but in different form. There are Jirgas in the US which are known as out of court settlements (Bureau, 2004, p. 127-129). In such cases, judge does not decide a case, lawyers get to together with the rival parties then decide what should be done and then they go to the judge and let him know about their wishes (Qayyum Sher Mahsud, personal communication, November 12, 2016). Qayyum Sher believes that Jirga system is present in the legal system of Pakistan, you can have it endorsed by the courts. The justice system of the Western nations includes the jury which is comparable in some form to Jirga in FATA. The decision of the jury is final, sitting judge cannot alter its decision. Braithwaite and Gohar (2014, p. 547-548) assert that Thana- Kachari culture prevails in settled districts of Pakistan which discourages efficient justice especially for the poor and middle-class and is expensive in terms of time and money. According to M. L. King justice delayed is justice denied (King, 2013, p. 26-27). It takes many years to settle a simple case in Pakistan. Jirga, on the other hand, deliver cheap and efficient justice in terms of time and money (Faqir & Atta, 2013, p. 6-8). Jirga provides plans for short-term and long-term peace treaties (Ali Wazir, personal communication, 2016). The Jirga system has been subject to severe criticism in various quarters of the society for many reasons. Jirga system ensures patriarchal structure. It segregates the already underprivileged female gender. Jirga is becoming increasingly corrupt. In the past, the Jirga member performed their duties without any fee. Presently, the members take fee and bribes to favor a party in a Jirga (Faqir & Atta, 2013, p. 6). This institution has strengthened the political administration by giving up its powers and compromised on the issues of public importance. It is the institution of Jirga which failed to halt the way of militant proliferation in the tribal belt in the initial stages of militancy. The lack of efficient decision-making power of this institution is highlighted in this context.

5.7 POLITICAL ARENA AND MAHSUD TRIBE The inhabitants of SWA were generally deprived of their political rights. The British penetrated in to Waziristan, they have their needs to manage the area and to administer it, political development was least of their concern. The right to vote was granted to the natives of the tribal belt in the late 1990s through the extension of adult franchise act (Wazir & Khan, 2014, p. 29). Ironically, 50 years after the independence of the state. The political parties act was extended to the tribal territory during the regime of

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Pakistan People‘s Party (The News, July 5th, 2012). This act can prove fruitful in bringing FATA to peace by empowering them (Tribune, 2012). The first general election on political party bases were contested in SWA in 2013. The extension of the political party act to tribal territories has positive impact on the political development and awareness. Despite fragile security conditions in FATA the voting turnout was encouraging (Election Commission, 2013). Sajjad (2013, p. 87) asserts that the voter turnout in FATA increased from 31 to 35 percent in the general elections of 2008 and 2013 respectively. In the past, the political parties were not allowed to contest in the elections in the tribal areas. Interestingly, religious political parties such as Jamiath-e-Ulam-e-Islam (JUI) took part in the election under the banner of the party in SWA (Taj, 2011, p. 33). This is one reason for the JUI to be one of the most popular political party in the entire tribal belt. Members of the national legislature were elected by the electoral college of tribal elders. The influence of religious parties is not limited to FATA only. The religious parties are well-financed and armed and wield considerable influence in various institutions and government departments in the entire state (Hussain 2004, p. 88-89). The alliance of the religious political parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), won all seats of national assembly in the general elections of 2002. The wide-ranging success of religious political parties in FATA might substantiate the fact of inclination of the locals towards religious conservatism (Iqbal & Silva, 2013, p. 76-77; Akhtar, 2016, p. 75). In the past, inhabitants of FATA had no choice but to elect members of the religious political groups (Taj, 2011, p. 33). None of the political parties were given chance to flourish in the tribal belt. Naveed (2016) believes, lack of education, political processes and awareness are the reason for the natives to fall a prey for the slogans of the religious political groups. The members of the religious political groups coupled with the local Mullahs used propaganda tactics to discredit the opponents. The opponents were usually framed as secular and against Islam by the Mullahs. According to Naveed (January 5th, 2016), slogans of the religious groups mislead native people especially during the election campaigns. The slogans were carefully constructed to patronize the masses. Arshad ((December 10th, 2016)) argues, the indirect election favored the religious political elites. The Maliks were easy to buy and the campaigning was easy to manipulate a handful of individual. The method of direct election and the subsequent approval of political party act is having different results in SWA. This has given birth in the introduction of new voters and new political parties which were not acknowledged in the tribal belt in the past. In the past, religion was used to limit women participation in the political arena. The current senator of JUI (F) from SWA believes that his party is still the

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most influential political party in SWA (Rahman, 2016). He supported his statement by indicating the positive result of JUI (F) in the general election of 2013. The mainstream religious political parties are closely connected with the most notorious militant groups in Pakistan (Azam, 2014, p. 114). JUI (F) leaders and workers were in close relationship with the militants in SWA. To promote their interest, JUI (F) and JI have used their militant wings (Safi, 10th, February 2009). The militant groups were given protection by the religious political parties in the post 9/11 period. Many leaders of Al-Qaeeda group were detained from the homes of the officials of religious political parties in Pakistan (ICG, 2007, p. 10). A renowned militant leader from Wana, Molvi Nazir was a member and leader of JUI (F). The nexus of Mullahs and militants helped the religious political parties to manage their political campaigns (Iqbal & Saeed, 2014, 79-80). In the post 9/11 period, no other political party and independent candidate could campaign due to threats from the militants. Moreover, the religious political parties particularly JUI (F) protested and left the national government on the conditions of ending military operations and imposing Shariah in the tribal belt (Wasim, Dawn 16th, December 2010). Haq (2016) believed that head of the TTP, Baithullah Mahsud, was associated with the political party of Fazal Rehman. He asserts that Baitullah Mahsud accepted the decision of Maulana Fazl Rahman on many occasions and other notorious militant leaders such as Wali UR Rehaman and Azmathullah were related to JUI (F). Most infamous militant commander from NWA, Hafiz Gul Badar and Mulvi Sadiq were in close contact with JUI (F) (Wazir, personal communication, 2016). One of the significant factors for the JUI (F) to have military support was their close contact with the militants (ICG, 2011, p.12). The military bureaucracy was supportive to JUI (F) government because they facilitated talks between military and militants. Maulana Fazal Rehman usually preferred to keep out from the confrontation of the militants and military (Ali Wazir, personal communication, 2016). However, he interfered at the point when the deadlock could result in violence. As soon as the religious political groups realized that the popular sentiments are becoming against the militants in Waziristan. Particularly after the major military operations against the militants and their supporters the religious parties begun to support the establishment against the TTP in SWA (Daily Times, 7th, May 2009). Awami National Party (ANP) proclaims to be a representative political party of the Pashtun community (Mahmood, 2014, p. 4). Interestingly their vote bank is limited to Peshawar and the surroundings predominantly (Ajmal, personal communication, 2016). Many believes that the ANP has deviated from the cause of Pashtuns. The ANP representation is limited in the tribal belt. Ajmal Khan (personal communication,

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November 7th, 2016) stated that ‗I was a worker for the PSF. I upheld the ideas of ANP, I do not agree with the current leadership of ANP though. Pashtuns are facing countless challenges. They are humiliated, dishonored, displaced and their status as a community is undermined. The Pashtun community lives in this region but this land does not give a feeling of motherland. The military and the militants have destroyed everything we loved. Our community cannot claim this land as their heritage. Not a single political party, community, ethnicity or sect stood for the rights of the Pashtuns. We support the ideology and thoughts of Bacha Khan and Wali Khan. The ANP government did nothing for the Pashtuns in their five years tenure in the KP province from 2008 to 2013. The failure to deliver for Pashtuns is a major reason for the failure in the general elections of 2013. The current leadership has compromised the party ideals and principles‘. There is always difference between the old school and the new school. The youth usually thinks of the present while elder about the traditions, long term benefits and providence. A. Anwar (personal communication, January 4, 2016), retired major from the military and an active political leader in SWA, believes that ‗in the current decade, new political parties are introduced in the tribal belt. The people are still not keen in political parties. They have independent approach and thinking. The young generation of the tribe is involved in the political processes. Presently youngsters are affiliated with different political parties including, PTI, ANP, PPPP and JUI. In the past, JUI candidates frequently won in the elections. Presently, the young generation in specific condemns the religious political parties. They think that the religious political parties are responsible for the widespread militancy in their areas and the subsequent collateral damages. To elders, introduction of new political parties in the region will not change anything. They have witnessed empty promises from the previous regimes. The real challenge is the development of the area which is indispensable for the prosperity of their community‘. There is no future of religious political parties in the tribal belt. People of FATA fought various times in the name of religion (Ahmad, 2013, p. 15). Various stakeholders achieved power and authority by using religion as a tool. In the name of religion, huge business has been setup successfully. The only beneficiaries were the religious elite. It is beginning of the new world in SWA, there is no room for religious exploitation. The inhabitants have seen enough and suffered enough due to religious exploitation of the Mullahs and their sponsors. The transformation processes are usually slow, it involves prolong period to take place. In the case of Mahsud tribe, the processes of socio-political transformation are rapid in nature. The displacement of the tribe for prolong period of time into urban centers which

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are politically more active such as Tank and Dera Ismail khan brought about enormous social and political transformation. The tribal societies never left their stronghold in the times of crisis or peace. Presently, the political transformation of the Mahsud tribe has many aspects but the two prominent changes are noted. Majority of the tribesmen rejected the religious political parties and hold them responsible for the ongoing militancy and the sufferings of the natives (Khattak, 2011). Jamil (personal communication, 2016) believes that religious parties used us to achieve their selfish materialistic objectives and left us in the chaos. He explained that militants, army and drone attacks are damaging our society while our selected representatives are silent spectators, they have no courage to protest. The general elections of 2013 have witnessed remarkable political change in among the Mahsud tribesmen. The tribesmen participated actively by rallying in the election campaigns of various moderate and secular political parties such as Pakistan People‘s Party Parliamentarian (PPPP), Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan Tehreek- i-Insaf (PTI) (Iqbal & Khan, 2014, p. 75-76). The Talibanization and the subsequent military operations in SWA created political vacuum. ANP, MMA completed their tenure in the KP province with no positive results as far as miseries of the people of the tribal belt are concerned. The people of FATA and KP in general belong from same stock, felt ignored and marginalized during their regime (Ali, 2016). The masses of this region suffered from militancy and extreme law and order conditions. It halted the smooth conduct of daily life. The people of the Pashtun belt expressed themselves by voting to new political party and rejecting the old ones in the general elections of 2008 and 2013. Imran Khan, as a new leader, attracted the people of FATA and Pashtun belt by his slogan of ‗New Pakistan‘. For the tribesmen New Pakistan is a peaceful Pakistan. PTI party ideology asserted on the insurance of justice, economic prosperity, better education. The inhabitants of FATA hungry for peace, development and liberty joined the PTI, the tilt of the youngsters towards PTI is huge (H. Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016). In fact, PTI lost in the general elections of 2013 in SWA. However, the vote bank of Imran Khan‘s party is growing. Hayat Preghal (personal communication, November 03, 2016) deliberates that Imran khan is popular, but natives have supported religious political parties in SWA in the recent elections. The reason for the success of the religious political parties was the unity of various religious political groups by supporting only one candidate in the general election of 2013. Whereas, the support of Imran khan was divided. There were many candidates contesting election in the name of PTI. Some of the candidates contested elections independently but while doing so they showed inclination towards PTI.

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Imran Khan has led the peace march, from Islamabad to South Waziristan, to protest the drone strikes (Khan & Ali, October 6th, 2012, The Express Tribune). PTI has organized 31 huge gatherings in FATA during campaigns in the general elections of 2013 (Sajjad, 2013, p. 86). In early 2018, sudden appearance of Imran Khan won the tribal support in the protest of the Pashtun long march, predominantly organized by the natives of the tribal belt (Dawn, 4th, February 2018). The protest was aimed for the provision of justice of the extrajudicial killings of the tribesmen. Imran khan helped to convey the demands to the military chief. A huge number of the youth of the tribe have joined moderate political groups such as Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI). In interviews and focus group discussions in universities, colleges and other organizations, the Mahsud youth has claimed that the days of the JUI, are numbered in the tribal region. Iqbal (personal communication, 2016), a tribal elder. believes that Imran Khan should be given chance to govern the state because all other leaders ignored development in the tribal areas. PTI is the only political party which came forward and protested for the rights of the natives of the tribal belt (Anwar, personal communication, 2016). No doubt, the PTI has successfully awakened the youth to contribute in the political development of the state. The youth which has joined the PTI as a worker, member or leader are the deprived segment of the society. The Mahsud tribesmen are energetically participating in the political processes in the urban areas as well. Kamrani (personal communication, November 5th, 2016), argued that ‗I have joined PTI so that police and other state institution will stop harassing him. PTI has given me platform in urban center whenever problem emerges whether related to health or education, my contacts in the political party solve it. I want the same in SWA and believes when people will express themselves through political platforms the factor of harassment will be minimized. The political parties are positive alternatives for the youngster. It can refrain them from becoming a part of outlaws or militant groups.‘ In the same line, leaders/members of other political parties and organizations share the opinion that PTI is slowly losing its ground in SWA in particular and FATA in general due to variety of reasons. The Pashtun nationalists and members of religious political parties bitterly criticize the PTI. According to Shah (personal communication, 2016), the PTI youth is a danger to the social fabrics of our society. The slogan of ‗new Pakistan‘ is a tool of attraction for the followers. In the leadership of Imran Khan PTI is inconsistent in the matters of policies continuation. The inconsistency in policies has proved fatal for the party popularity (Mufti, 2015, p. 4). For example, PTI staged Dharna, protest, for more than three months with the support of thousands of individuals to achieve clearly stated four-point objectives (Mamoon, & Zamin Abbas, 2017, p. 5). They did not achieve their

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goal comprehensively and left the Dharna. It created anxiety for the followers who came out and stayed on roads for more than 100 days for Imran Khan. The PTI welcomed political leaders in to their party which were previously condemned by them. Due to alike issues and inconsistency in decision making, Imran Khan is popularly known as ‗U-Turn Khan‘ (Butt, 2016). Another important factor for the unpopularity of PTI in SWA is the establishment-tilt of Imran Khan. It is a general believe that PTI is having the support of state institutions. The inhabitants of FATA are unhappy with the state institutions. A large number of tribesmen consider state institutions responsible for the collateral damages in FATA (Ahmed, 2016). The combination of PTI and such institution can most probably endanger the popularity graph. The citizens were expecting the slogans of PTI to be true such as transparency, accountability, end of corruption and infrastructural development. Practically, the PTI government faced challenges to practicalize its objectives. There are serious allegations on the provincial Chief Minister (CM) of PTI by the anticorruption institution created by the same regime to eliminate corruption (Rahman, 2017). There are various legal and institutional hurdles which halts the way of political development in the tribal belt of Pakistan. It includes the FATA reform bill which is not yet final, the transitory stage of the constitutional status is taking too long. There are other legal impediments such as absence of comprehensive judicial structure and human rights and civil rights which are halting political development in FATA. The interference of the military in the civilian affairs is gigantic hurdle in the political development in the tribal belt. Basic human rights were snatched, and the political processes were undermined when the federal government authorized the institution of military to initiate operations as action in aid to civilian power in FATA (Ullah, 2015, p. 230). Ali (November 10th, 2016) argues that ―the encroachment of state institution in the political processes in SWA is negatively affecting the political processes. A political leader who contested general election for national assembly seat in SWA, Ali Wazir (personal communication, December 27, 2016) stated that ‗I was approximately 300 votes shy and lost in the elections. The basic reason for my defeat was that I have raised voice against the negative role of the state institutions in SWA. I was summoned by the military commander in SWA and asked for complete cooperation, I refused. They needed a puppet candidate to control the politicians and political arena in SWA. They couldn‘t buy me, so they bought somebody else and helped him won the election by rigging. I can‘t be sold. I condemn and criticize the state policies in Waziristan, in the tribal belt and in the entire Pashtun region. My Ideology is based on the provision of human rights, equal citizenship status and free speech‘.

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The political administration in FATA is against the political empowerment and in favor of status-quo which is another major hurdle in this context. The political development and awareness will limit the unlimited powers of bureaucracy in the tribal belt. The political activity can give birth to new leadership institution which will undermine the authority and prestige of traditional colonial administrative structure. The political empowerment will be followed by the extension of media, civil society, policing, anticorruption organs which will undoubtedly affect the prestigious local administrative privileges. The clan/Khel system is halting the political growth in SWA, particularly in the Mahsud areas. There is an interesting debate going on the voting community in SWA. Strangely, the voting behavior and priorities of the natives is different than that of the voters in urban areas. The political groups are limited to Khels/section/subsections. Moreover, the political development has negative impacts on the institution of Malikship. The already fragile institution of Malikship is being deprived of powers with the emergence of new leadership in the shape of political elite. The political empowerment is connecting people directly with the state/government and urban areas. This way the role of Maliks as an intermediary between natives and state is undermined. It will put an end to the indirect funds and privileges to Maliks by the government. Most of all corruption and manipulation of funds by Maliks will end. Therefore, the Maliks are halting the reform package in FATA.

5.8 MAHSUD WOMEN: SOCIAL AND POLLICAL LIFE The United Nations (UN) charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UCHR) ensures equal rights for men and women in all civil, social, political and cultural domains of life (Lauren, 1983). McDowell (1991) believes that women as citizens/individuals are excluded from social life due to cultural taboos myths in masculine and patriarchal structures/societies. Patriarchy is defined as a society where decision making powers are with male whereby women are deliberately kept subordinated in many ways (Bhasin, 2006, p. 3). Many scholars believe gendered culture and religion plays fundamental role in the subordination of females and the creation of patriarchal structures (James & Saville-Smith, 1995; Cornwall & Lindisfarne, 1995). In Pakistan, women/feminine rights are considered contrary to Islam and culture which is a major impediment in the protection of women rights (Anita, 2004). Gul et al (2016) argues that socio-cultural aspect of the Pashtun culture and traditions are major hurdle in empowering women and protection of equal rights. The Pashtuns are known as strict Muslims and staunch believers of Islam. However, when Pashto/Pashtunwali is in contradiction with

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Islam cultural code is given priority (Anderson, 1979, p. 76). For instance, Islam mandates women right to inheritance but the Pashtun culture denies it. The Pashtun women are denied various rights and privileges under the cultural code which are guaranteed by Islam. In the tribal culture women are provided with limited privileges/rights. Though the tribesmen observe Islamic teachings seriously, women in the tribal community are deprived of basic rights including the rights bestowed upon them by the religion. Regarding women rights, tribal societies are more conservative. Ghairat (honor) is one of the vital components of Pashtunwali in the tribal region. The concept has affected women in particular and the tribal community in general. This notion mostly revolves around women, land and gold, Zan, Zamin and Zar respectively which is a source of continuous feud among the natives (Rashid, 2008, p. 266). In the tribal community weight of Ghairat rest on the shoulders of the male member (Shukla, 2015, p. 49). Izzat is a concept associated with the code of tribal honor in SWA. Honor of a household is associated with the behavior of the female in the native society which must be protected at all costs. Izzat basically means honor but tribal women get the least of it in a given prejudice social structure (Orbala, 2011). Such notions have provided male with exclusive power and contributed in the patriarchal structure of society. The female gender has limited or no say in the socio- political and economic structure in the tribal society. The adventure of Afghan War has negative impacts on the tribal women. The militants in the Pak-Afghan borderland were having cardinal relationship. Many of the foreign militants married the local women with the family consent in FATA (Fair & Chalk, 2006, p, 12; Kilkullen, 2009, p. 34). Rakisits (2010, p. 6) explains that Al-Qaeeda and other foreign militants have established themselves in the tribal belt soon after the intensification if fight in Afghanistan after 2001 and have married local girls. The local women did not enjoy freedom in this matter. Such marriages affected the family life of women and pushed them to migrate with their husband to the conflict zones. It has in one way affected tribal culture and traditions of keeping marriages with in the community. Jalal (2009, p. 101-104) explains that in the 19th century religious radicals such as Syed Ahmed and his follower foreign militants tried to marry local women which resulted in to violent clashes with the Pashtun community. The Taliban rule in SWA has two-fold impact on tribal women. Firstly, it resulted in the sufferings of the women. The insurgency in FATA resulted in the killings of hundreds of tribesmen. The tribal women lost their sons, husbands, father and brothers. Such losses have negative impacts on the social and psychological status of women. The intense fighting in the tribal territory among different militant groups and with military

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have dire impacts on the lives of the women. The sound of weapons created fear, depression, anxiety and various psychological diseases. According to Bibi (personal communication, November 18, 2016), ‗gathering of huge number of militants, the subsequent shouting and loud slogans were terrifying‖. In the indigenous culture and traditions tribal women were not obligated to observe Pardah. They just used to wear piece of cloth to cover their selves while rooming around nearby. In the case of travel to other areas and villages women were supposed to observe Pardah properly. For instance, when a family traveled from their village to far flung area then Pardah was obligatory. The Mahsuds living in the center of Waziristan, the clans and sub-clans live independently within their territory. The sub-clans do not appreciate and expect surprise visit even from the other Mahsud clans. This was one reason for the freedom of tribal women in own areas. After the militant proliferation and the military adventures in the Mahsud territory, women were confined to their homes. The unrestricted movement of the militants from one town to another affected the territorial independency of the sub-clans. The fragile education system in the tribal areas was ruined, female education was banned, and their freedom undermined. Interestingly, the Taliban rule in SWA, is some form, improved status of women in comparison to traditional tribal system. Fareed (personal communication, November 26th, 2016) describes an event occurred during the time of militant commander Baitullah Mahsud, when the woman reported an indecent attitude of a man, on the call for help, the militants punished the man by shaving his head and making him sit on donkey and walked around the town. No wonder the act was brutal, but the women felt much safer. The violence against women was minimized. However, the right to inheritance of women remained unresolved. This tradition has been entrenched in the tribal value system was expected to worry tribesmen the most and remained untouched by the Taliban. The Taliban rule in SWA announced a ban on the outdoor activities of women. In civilized society the act is considered against basic human rights. Instead of causing distress, surprising the native women welcomed the ban. Marina Mahsud (personal communication, September 11, 2016) believed that this decision of the Taliban saved women from intense outdoor labor. The labor which was a norm in tribal society for women and continued for generation. The responsibilities of tribal women were routine household activities. They participated in the economic activities, but the labor was unpaid. Women performed important economic activities in SWA before the initiation of conflict. Many believe women used to do more work as compare to their male counterpart as manual labor in the fields. Most of the labor work was done by women in the field of agriculture and dairy

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farm. Women also used to bring water from the wells and nearby streams. However, the economic power remained in the hands of the male. The displacement of the Mahsud tribe increased the sufferings of the women. In many villages, people were asked to leave unexpectedly. Sudden preparation for prolonged journey, mostly by foot towards unknown destinations created environment of panic and fear. Women mostly lived in their houses and their activities were limited to their small villages. The tribal women lack exposure suffered the most due to displacement. The tribal women were socially inactive given entirely different tasks in urban areas and IDP camps. They were supposed to interact with men to avail government schemes such as ration cards, medical and other facilities. Most of the Mahsud women were not having National Identity Cards (NIC). It created issues in availing opportunities/allowances/facilities such as food, security, medical and clothes. Due to huge causalities and other reasons, some of tribal women were administering their household activities which they never did. The health of women was huge issue during displacement. There were limited facilities of medical care of pregnant and unwell women. Unfortunately, women had no voice in the tribal affairs. There is no seat for women in the council of elders, Jirga. Issues of women are decided in Jirgas without their consent. Low literacy ratio and lack of awareness of women are key reasons for gender discrimination and political backwardness of women in FATA. In the 21st century, tribal women face domestic violence, forced marriages, slavery, exploitation, mental and physical torture. The status of tribal women is bleak and political opportunities slim in general. However, various women forums gave enormous support to the affected women as IDPs. The already urbanized tribal women, urbanized tribal women refers to those females who belong from tribal areas but are settled in the urban areas of Pakistan from decades, provided enormous support to the affected IDP women. Marina Mahsud (personal communication, September 11, 2016), former President of Young Women Writer Forum (YWRF) of Pakistan, claimed that the forum was composed of variety of tribal girls including female members from Mahsud tribe like herself. She emphasized that the forum is a platform of awareness to equip young girls, both from KP and tribal region with awareness and knowledge. The forum provides them with opportunities to express their capabilities by hosting seminars, debate and poetry competitions, conferences and talks. There is another women organization formed by the tribal women at the provincial and national quarters in the name of Qabaili Khor, tribal sister. Noreen Nasser (2017) believes that it‘s time to fight for our tribal sisters who are living in poor socio-economic and political conditions. She blamed government for the ignorance regarding the status of

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women in the tribal societies. Furthermore, she claimed that her forum is becoming popular and our voices are being herd at the provincial and national level. The forum claimed that the former president of Pakistan and the Co-Chairman of PPPP, Aisf Ali Zardari assured us to provide any assistance needed in a meeting. The Qabaili Khor organization visited various tribal agencies and gathered women in different villages for the awareness about their social and political rights. Before 1996-1997, there was indirect system of election of the members if the parliament. Only handful of Maliks used to cast vote. The right to vote given to the tribal people under universal suffrage has positive impacts on the tribal society. The political rights of women were recognized for the first time in the history of the tribal region. Though women were not allowed to independently cast their vote, however, the recognition and the exposure of the voting site was positive. In Pakistan there are reserved seats for women in national legislature. This rule does not apply on the tribal areas of Pakistan. As quoted in Iqbal and Saeed (2014, p.72) the FATA committee comprised of major political parties of the state suggested in 2013 that the state must establish the system of reserved seats of MNA for the women and ensure separate polling stations to encourage the voting turnout in the tribal belt. Such steps are empowering women step by step. The decision of reserved seats is yet pending but current struggles of the tribal women are indispensable in this context. The participation of tribal women in the political processes is a slow process but despite the Taliban threats the enthusiasm observed of the tribal women in coming out to cast their votes in the recent election was remarkable. The participation of tribal women in the political arena is transforming the contour of history.

5.9 EDUCATION SYSTEM IN MAHSUD AREA: ISSUES, HURDLES AND WAY FORWARD

There are two types of education systems in FATA, Madrassa and school system. The Madrassa system focuses religious education primarily. This system flourished during the Afghan War when thousands of Madrassas were created to manufacture Jihadist to fight the Soviet (Tharoor, 2014; Edwards, 2000; Weaver, 2010; Schmidt, 2011). The school system provides education in the public and private sectors with focus on the promotion of Western models leaning. The private sector provides better education as compared to public sector schools. Unfortunately, the lack of higher education institutions is huge impediment in scientific innovation and research-oriented education in the tribal areas. Recently, FATA University is inaugurated in FR Kohat. The project is criticized for its distant location from the mainland of FATA. The literacy rate of entire FATA is as low as 17.4 percent, compared to the provinces and federal region which is 59.6 percent, the

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ratio of female education in FATA is only 3 percent (Fakir & Fakhr-ul-Islam, 2014, p. 217). The figure evidently suggests the low development ratio in the tribal region. To many, lack of education in FATA is one reason for the militant outfits to flourish (Shah, 2012). The already fragile conditions of education were damaged by the militancy in the 21st century. The militants destroyed almost 500 schools in FATA (Naqvi, Khan & Ahmad, 2012, p. 27). The literacy ratio in SWA is low which is approximately 20.3 percent in 2007 (USAID, 2012. p.13). An education expert from the Mahsud area formerly posted as an Agency Education Officer (AEO) in SWA, I. I. Khalil (personal communication, November 26, 2016) shares his opinion by highlighting status of education as ―the state ensured quality of education before 1980s in SWA. There were less schools which were far away from each other, students would travel long distances due to scarce transportation. There were schools in the areas of Kaniguram, Kotkai and Ladha. The distance between two schools was at least 18 kilometers in the Mahsud area. This is a huge distance in the mountainous area. The headmasters of a school had more independence and authority as compared to the AEO (Agency Education Officer) in the present times. The rules, regulations and code of conduct was strictly observed in schools. Everybody knew that there is no compromise on discipline in the education institutions. There was no compromise on attendance. Attending the assembly was compulsory in the morning both for teachers and students. The teachers performed their duties with honesty and dignity. Unlike present times where education institutions have become profitable business enterprise. In 1977, Bhutto was out seated from the government, Zia ul Haq came in to power. It adversely affected the educations organization in SWA. The Zia regime was not interested in the education sector at least in FATA. I was in class 7th and was promoted to 8th directly, examinations were never held in schools in Waziristan. Moreover, students used to prepare well for the board examination which would start from class 10th. The examination centers for board examinations were setup far away, in the settled areas such as, Tank and D. I. Khan. The examination halls in those areas were strict, cheating was not allowed, more than 50 percent of the student from SWA used to fail in the exams every year. First ever board examinations in SWA were held in 1980 at Ladha. The rules were followed as they were observed in the examination halls of settled districts. I was the only successful candidate among 48 students. Afterword that situation got worse, the education system was compromised. The use of cheating and unfair means went unchecked. This was the point from where the decline of education started‖.

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The directorate of FATA education devised a unique policy to improve quality of education in 1990s. Gulnar Bibi (personal communication, 2016) who served as a principal of Girls High School Wana (Camp) is SWA highlighted that ―the efficiency of teachers was subjected to the passing percentage of the students in that particular subject. The annual increment in the salary of the teachers depended on the result, if the percentage was good the increment was good and vice-versa. The education department of FATA introduced other bonuses for the teachers including best teacher‘s awards in this context. The performance of the students in the board examination of class 9th and 10th were considered as a baseline for the evaluation of the teachers. The more the passing percentage of the students the more the bonuses and vice-versa. Unfortunately, instead of ensuring quality education the policy encouraged the culture of favoritism and cheating in the examination halls. The failure of students meant poor teaching and no reward. Therefore, to achieve better results, teachers encouraged cheating. In the examinations students openly used unfair means and illegal written material without any hesitation. The students used to open related books while attempting paper. The entire generation got addicted to that menace. The honest and strict examiners and teachers were insulted and discouraged in the examination halls of SWA. The teachers, this way lost their respect and dignity in the society‖. An important reason for the poor quality of education in SWA is the establishment of enormous number of schools without efficient mechanism of checks and balances. The schools were sanctioned by the education department of FATA in collaboration with the local Maliks (Saeed, 2016). It gave birth to the idea of ‗Ghost Schools‘. The Ghost School means a school without a physical structure while the salaries are paid to the teachers and the supporting staff who are unavailable. In several cases, the building of Ghost Schools existed but in the shape of Hujra, guests house, or animal farm (I. I. Khalil, personal communication, November 26, 2016). The establishment of new school is a profitable business for the local Maliks. Interestingly, in FATA, there are two administrators of a one single school at the same time. One is the government appointed administrator known as the Headmaster or Principal and the second is the local in charge of the school a Maliks who provides physical infrastructure, guarantee of the security of teaching staff and provide supporting staff. A local in charge has the privilege to appoint his nearest relatives as supporting staff including gatekeeper, watchman and peons. The salaries of these posts go directly into the pocket of a Malik or the person in charge. The local in charge of a school can appoint himself on one of the posts of supporting staff. Many tribesmen already employed or studying in the settled areas occupy job in the ‗Ghost Schools‘ at the same

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time (Inam, personal communication, 2016). The concept of ‗Ghost Schools‘ still exits which is a major hurdle in the way of promoting education in SWA. Unfortunately, militant infiltration and the subsequent military operations in 2004 and onward period disrupted law and order situation in SWA. It has diverse impacts on the education system. Major number of schools and other education institutions in the Mahsud area were converted in to Taliban offices (Yasir, personal communication, 2016). The girl‘s schools especially were either bombed or transformed into Taliban headquarters. In the initial stages of militancy only a few schools operated but under the shadow of the militants which were later on closed due to the intensification of violence. The Taliban used to visit schools to check the absent teachers and educational activities. The Taliban formed various committees to check education in Mahsud area. The teachers were used to summoned by the Taliban to face the charges (Yasir, personal communication, 2016). The Taliban committees for education have negative impacts on the education system. Many teachers were punished by the Taliban for being absent without good reason. Majority of the teachers left their jobs and moved to safer places. It damaged the already fragile education system in SWA. The subsequent military operations led to the complete closer of the education institutions in the Mahsud area of SWA. The displacement of the Mahsud tribe from their stronghold into the cities created new issues. A team of education experts proposed to accommodate the displaced students in the institutions already in working conditions in the district of Tank, D. I. Khan and the adjacent areas (Waqar, personal communication, 2016). The proposal suggested the construction of temporary schools near IDP camps to accommodate the remaining IDP students. The leftover teaching staff from the closed schools in SWA were supposed to redeployed in the temporary schools (Mehmud, personal communication, 2016). The then Political administration was not interested in the proposal. The administration played delaying tactics with the entire education sector by claiming that their primary task is the law and order in the current situation. In the same time, other education proposal was accepted which were cheap and inefficient (I. I. Khalil, personal communication, November 26, 2016). The primary concern for the indigenous administration was to earn money instead of investing in the education sector (Shahab, personal communication, 2016). The place and time were perfect for corruption in the conflict-ridden conditions of the region. The political administration is responsible for the manipulation of funds and the inefficiency in the education department (Inam, personal communication, 2016). According to AEO (November 24th, 2016) SWA, ―UNICEF showed its interest in the investment in the education sector for the IDPs of SWA in 2009-2010. The education expert in the area

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advised to redeploy the teaching staff, who were already paid in full of the closed schools in SWA. The political administration of SWA was interested in the recruitment of new teachers. The UNICEF in collaboration with the local political administration agreed on recruiting new teachers. Most of the recruited teachers were undereducated‖. The buildings of local education institutions in Tank and nearby towns were occupied by the military. It was a major hurdle for the IDPs to get enrolled. The Tank degree college and major portion of Kulachi Degree college was occupied by the military for a long time. Later students and staff were allowed to continue their duties. The movements of students and teachers is strictly limited, nobody could move in or out without the permission of the military in those institutes. The IDP students have no choice but either to move to D. I. Khan or to abandon education. In fact, after displacement of the Mahsud tribe, the government ignored basic issues of the IDPs. The displaced people helped themselves as far as education is concerned. A few economically sound families facilitate their children in the local schools and colleges, the poor got in Madrassas or left education for good. In such scenario female education was almost over. Interestingly, after the military offensives, for a short period of time, positive results in the education sector were achieved. The student enrollment in various schools in the Mahsud region increased dramatically. The IDPs living in the settled districts better exploited the education facilities for both genders. After the partial return of IDPs to SWA, estimated strength in Spinkai Raghzae school was 300 and Chagmalae school was 800 and a primary school has 400 enrollments (Waqar, personal communication, 2016). The number of students increased in both male and female schools. The female schools were usually ghost schools. While after the return of the IDPs these schools have witnessed impressive enrollment numbers. The local education administration has successfully introduced co-education system (Mehmud, personal communication, 2016). Some of the female schools were far from population areas so it was difficult to adjust female students in their own buildings due to transportation, accommodation and security reasons. Above all, the huge military presence in the area where female schools were located was a source of discouragement for the parents to send their daughters far to get education (Ameer, personal communication, 2016). For this purpose, local education management is not focused on availability of male and female school separately, which ever institution is functional the administration tries to facilitate both genders. Most of the schools are functional at primary level except Chagmali high school. The female students are enrolled up to 9th and 10th classes with 800 plus enrollment and still counting in SWA (Waqar, personal communication, 2016). He highlighted that near to Chagmale there is another

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girl‘s high school with 400 plus students. Waqar argues that co-education system is devised up to primary level where both male and female teacher staff are performing their duties. Issue of poor education system in SWA is not because of limited economic resources. There is a lot of budget sufficient to have better education system. The poor management of those funds and bad administration is a real hurdle in the efficient education system. The administrative and policy making bodies regarding educations system comprise of the local political administration, the FATA secretariat and the directorate of education FATA. After the rehabilitation processes the undue interference of the military personnel in the education schemes and policies has negative impacts. The interference is in multiple ways such as military is a stakeholder in many developmental schemes related to the education department without their consent the education scheme cannot be initiated. The surprise visits of the military personnel to check status of education in the institutes whether girls or boys not only discourage education department but increase tribal anger. Akram (personal communication, 2016) stated that the security conditions in our area are not yet stable, I am not sending my children to SWA. The inefficient policies of the education department in the FATA secretariat is affecting the education system adversely in SWA. The policies of Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) FATA of rationalization has damaged the education system in FATA in general and SWA (Mehmud, personal communication, 2016). This policy substantiates the construction of schools subjected to the population ratio. Approximately, 561 regular schools were erased in FATA male and female in the plan prepared by FATA secretariat in November 2015 under the policy of rationalization (Zia, January 5th, 2017). The former policy in this context instructed that the distance must be minimum between two schools. Girls‘ schools are supposed to be 1 km away from each other and the boy‘s 1 to 1/2 km. The rules and regulations of the rationalization policy were unreasonable and unjust. In this policy, FATA was compared with Punjab/Lahore (Khan, 2016). The areas of Punjab and FATA cannot be compared logically because of different landscape, geography, literacy ratio, finance, development, culture-traditions, governance, population concentration and law and security conditions. Khan (August 11th, 2016) explained that the rationalization strategy states that a school should be cancelled if the student enrollment is less than 40, a primary school will be cancelled if that is within 2 kilometers in the case of middle school if it is situated within 5 kilometers the institute will be canceled. One teacher is allowed for plus 40 students and two teachers for plus 80 students and followed respectively. The surplus teaching or administrative staff was redeployed in the functional schools. The policy itself, however, did not explain how to encounter the issue of surplus

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staff (khan, 2016). There were certain issues in the schools of FATA that were unclear in the rationalization policy. For instance, in some schools there was enrollment in primary and high level while no registration in the middle sections (Waqar, personal communication, 2016). The Sararogha school is best example in this context. The region of SWA and FATA is a war-stricken area. It will obviously take time to increase student‘s enrollment ratio on one hand and fill the seats from primary up to high level on the other. SWA needs five to ten years‘ time to develop and rehabilitate its native population. In the same line, the return of IDPs is partial and not complete. The quantity level in the education should be focused, issue of quality is subjected to the long-term development which will be obviously slow and gradual (Ahmed, 2016). The natives of SWA faced hard time in the 1-1/2 decade. They are damaged psychologically, financial, culturally and humanly. In such condition‘s proliferation of schools and participation in educational activities must be encouraged. The criteria of the functional schools and the non-functional schools were justified by the local educationist for the administration in FATA secretariat (I. I. Khalil, personal communication, November 26, 2016). The SWA is 1/3rd of the total area of FATA. The number of regular schools are above 500. The AEO of SWA (November 24th, 2016) explained that the need in SWA cannot be fulfilled with more than 1000 schools. The government is taking away already approved schools through rationalization policy. There are various villages and towns in SWA which do not have a single girl‘s school. In the entire villages and towns of Kanzirai-Nanaghra near Karama, Shaktu, Shobi khel area known as Spin Mela, a girl school is yet to establish. The rationalization policy stands on the irrational paradigm. It is a matter of great misfortune that due to lack of research and understanding on the grass root level, the government compared SWA with Bajur Agency in the context of rationalization policy. The Bajur Agency is the most densely populated area in entire FATA with huge population concentration in small villages. The population distribution is less dense in SWA. Through the policy of rationalization government has deprived ordinary people from getting education, especially small towns that have 50 to 60 household. It is the responsibility of the government to provide education to small town. In a meeting with Sectary of Education FATA, Waqar, held on 1st January 2016, it was decided that the policy of rationalization will be executed at all costs. Therefore, all the former AEOs of districts of FATA were replaced with the new ones. The Secretary of Education FATA transferred all the previous officers and given the positions to yes men. In the meantime, Peshawar High Court (PHC) suspended the notification of FATA secretariat regarding the termination of education institutions in FATA on May 4th, 2016 (TNN, 2016). In any case, the policy of

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rationalization failed. The Governor of KP province abolished the policy of rationalization finally in January 2017 (Zia, January 5th, 2017). However, the policy damaged the education system and created much confusion for years. One of the major hurdles for the educationist is to execute a policy without the consent of political administration. The political administration of FATA exercise exclusive powers over any schemes in their district, education department is no exception. The PA is not an education expert, yet he has unlimited powers to modify any education scheme. Mehmud (personal communication, 2016) was given a task to execute a project, ‗the duration was two years, from 2006 to 2008, in SWA. The exclusive power over the project was, as usual, given to the PA. It was a developmental package in the IDPs scheme, Mehmud advised the PA to build 45 houses for the IDPs. It is because shelter must be provided on priority bases instead giving priority to any other project in a conflict-ridden area such as FATA. The PA recommended a proposal to invest in education department. New teachers were recruited for the project. In SWA, there were already huge number of surplus teachers. Violence and military operations led to the closure of majority of the education institutions. In such conditions recruiting new teachers or building new schools was pointless (Inam, personal communication, 2016). In any case, schools were built, teachers were recruited; 20 in Toai khulo area, 17 in Shakai and 8 schools in Shaktui. Teachers got their salaries till 2009. Those teachers included both male and female. It was an umbrella scheme which means it was approved for a short period of time and it was supposed to be dissolved automatically. The teachers soon started demonstrations in SWA, Tank, D. I. Khan and in Peshawar in front of FATA secretariat. They humiliated the administration in the electronic and print media. Eventually, the administration regularized the staff in 2012. This was one example of lack of expertise and mismanagement of local administration in FATA. A local education expert Amjid Khan (November 22nd, 2016) criticize the investment in the construction of temporary schools in SWA. He explains that ‗approximately 25 shelters less school have been established. He termed these institutions as dummy schools because the project was supposed to be dissolved after providing education to the adults for 6 months. Amjid argues that the investment could have better supported ongoing long and medium-term projects in SWA. For instance, these funds should be spent on students directly or to facilitate teachers or to extend already established institutions to fetch far sighted interests of the society‘. In the same line Army Public Schools (APS) system have negative impacts on the overall education system in SWA (I. I.

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Khalil, personal communication, November 26, 2016). The military has established APS in Sararogha by occupying building of a civilian school. The lack of interest and mismanagement of the personnel in FATA secretariat in the education proficiency in SWA can be best demonstrated from the example of the establishment of Girls College Jandolla in an isolated area. This institution is built far away from the population of the town of Jandolla. This institution is situated in the no man‘s land which covered area is approximately 45 kanals and the construction costed approximately 60 million PKR (Pakistani currency) on the government purse. The college building is enormous but student enrollment is very low. There is only one house near to the college and that is the house of politically influential Malik. The nearby houses are at more than 1- hour walking distance from the college. It takes huge time with limited resources of modern transportation to reach the college for the students from the main town of Jandolla by crossing at least three military check-posts. There are issues of transportation, security and concern of parents to send their daughters that far. There is huge land available in the town where college could have been constructed. Notwithstanding, there are many hurdles in the development and efficiency of education sector in SWA and in FATA. The state has initiated several policies related to education system which can prove fruitful in the long run in the tribal belt. The establishment of Cadet colleges can prove real asset in this context. There are two cadet colleges in SWA, one is in Wana and the other one is in Spinkai Raghzai (Mahsud territory). The standard of education and learning environment in these institutions is satisfactory (Anwar, personal communication, 2016). The Government Boy‘s Degree College (GDC) Ladah, Mahsud area, was established in 1973. After the military operation in SWA, the government build another college with the help of United Arab Emirates (UAE). The institution was constructed for male, after struggles of the local education experts/officers and tribal elders the college was finally approved for girls. The institution is first ever girl‘s college establish in the Mahsud area. There is a university campus approved of Gomal university in SWA. The indigenous people think that the university campus must be established literary in the center in SWA. So, it can be feasible for the students, teachers and the related staff to reach. Spinkai Raghzai area can be an option or a suggestion in this context. Spinkai Raghzai is accessible from all over SWA. FATA university is a new project currently under construction in FR Kohat and functional in temporary form in the rented building in FR Peshawar. The approval of FATA university is no less than a miracle for the natives because it will be the first ever university for FATA. However, the institution can serve its purpose better if it is established in the center of the

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tribal belt. It takes at least 5 hours from SWA to reach FR Kohat via efficient transport. While Gomal university is 2 to 3 hours away from SWA. Same is the case with majority of districts in tribal belt where the institutions of urban centers are near as compared to FATA university. Madrassas are an important source of education system in SWA. In many remote areas such as FATA, Baluchistan and KP where there are no government or private education institutions Madrassas are providing education. Of course, there are flaws and loopholes in this system which must be fixed. The state has initiated various reforms in Madrassa education to improve. It includes revision of syllabus, elimination of biased and prejudice literature, registration of Madrassa with government is made mandatory and inclusion of modern syllabus. More reforms are needed to improve this system. A serious challenge is the execution and implementation of reforms. Rizawnullah Quraishi belong from Machi Khel subsection of the Mahsud tribe. He is a businessman and basically an active member of clergy and has a Madrassa in SWA. Quraishi (personal communication, December 14th, 2016) explained that ―our Madrassa was established in 1984, in Tyarza, SWA. There were hostel facilities for students. Students from Kala Dhaka and other areas of FATA were enrolled. The teachers belonged from all over Pakistan. We established school alongside Madrassa. There were facilities for the student of the Madrassa to get Modern education. My father was a Malik, a Mullah and a tribal leader he was a leader of a Mosque and led in the prayers. The students of our Madrassa did not participate in the Afghan War. The fight in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the US invasion is no exception. The Madrassa education upholds peace and equality and is an important part of education. Some individuals might have participated in the terrorist activities from religious institution but blaming the entire Madrassa establishment for militancy is not logical/reasonable. Attacks on the GHQ, air bases, Peshawar and Manawa police station were executed by the members of terrorist organizations based in urban areas. In many cases students of mainstream universities of Pakistan participated in terrorist activities‖.

5.10 CONCLUSION In normal times, the social transformation takes huge time but in the case of Mahsud community the process was quick. The experiences of war coupled with the displacement of the tribe from homogenous to heterogenous society have profound socio- political and cultural impacts on traditional and tribal way of life. The pace of political development among the Mahsud tribesmen is rapid, new political parties are becoming popular. Majority of the natives held responsible the religious political parties for their collusion with the militants in SWA. The tribesmen are politically more aware and active,

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their way of dealing with the state and the other communities has witnessed significant change. The Mahsuds are now protesting in more civilized and urbanized manner which exerts huge pressure on the opponent parties including state institutions. In the wake of new challenges, the institution of Jirga, Malikship, the concept of tribal revenge and the tribal identity of the Mahsuds in specific are transformed considerably. The institutions of Jirga and Malikship are increasingly becoming unpopular due to corruption and nepotism. The institutions of Jirga and Malikship are increasingly becoming unpopular due to corruption, nepotism and other weaknesses. Many IDPs families are well settled in the urban areas and exploiting health, education and other facilities. The state is facing tough time in the rehabilitation processes because most of the natives are not willing to settle back in SWA due to variety of hurdles/problems. The future of Mahsud women is positive but there is still a lot to be done. The tribal women are more active in various facets of life. The exposure of the urban societies has created a s need of education. Now Mahsud women are getting enrolled in education institutions. The state has established number of new education institution in SWA from elementary-secondary up to higher education levels. The government policies in this sector will be critically examined. However, the government education strategies in SWA are questionable.

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CONCLUSION

The thesis identifies the origin and types of the Pashtuns community with emphasis on the Mahsud family tree. The origin, genealogical linage, various sections/subsections and the history of the Mahsud tribe have been studied. There are many tribes living in Waziristan including Wazir, Mahsud, Dawars and Bhittanis. The former two comes from same ancestral lines and are known as Darwesh Khels. However, the Mahsuds have evolved quite an independent tribe and do not associate themselves with the Wazirs. The thesis analyzed that the hegemonic Mahsud tribe has given tough time to foreign forces and the surrounding tribes. Most of the territory in which the Mahsud tribe inhabit once belonged to either Wazirs and Bhittanis or other surrounding tribes. The reason of the territorial expansion lies in the increase in population, tribal customs of domination and internal tribal rivalry. The thesis analyzed the role of the Mahsud tribe in the militancy in the colonial times and tribal rivalry with other tribes. It has emphasized the two most prominent violent movements in Waziristan which set the context of religious militancy in the area and the role of Mahsud tribe in it. The research has investigated the reasons for the emergence of most violent militant organizations in the Mahsud territory in the 21st century. The incompetent state strategies to handle militancy led to the tribal resentment which has nurtured militancy in SWA. Due to inefficient state policies majority of the Mahsud tribesmen remained neutral/indifferent/confused regarding the militant organizations in their area. Some of the Mahsud tribesmen participated in the militancy at the leadership level. The social and cultural institutions have been investigated in the light of historical background of the Mahsud tribe in SWA. The Talibanization has greatly impacted socio- cultural and political foundations of the tribe including identity, literacy, leadership, concept of tribal rivalries and cultural and traditional institutions such as Jirga and Malikship. The proposed methodology was to analyze data obtained through primary and secondary resources. The unique geographic position of SWA has made it difficult for the administration to block the escape routes in and out for centuries. The massive territorial landscape of SWA coupled with porous international border with Afghanistan, Baluchistan and KP provinces have provided sufficient escape routes for the non-state actors. It has encouraged the non-state actors and wanted criminals to stay in this territory. Since ages such an impregnatable terrain of SWA has worried foreign forces to penetrate. The tough landscape of SWA has contributed to a unique character and physical building of the natives. The

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inhabitant Mahsud tribe has a unique character which drove it in conflict situations from time to time. The reason for the success of the tactical skills of the Mahsuds lies in their unity in the face of external danger, lack of resources, tough physic due to living in tough physical and weather conditions and continuous practice of fighting including raiding in the British territory in the past. The British accounts have abundantly praised the Mahsud tribe for their love of independence and tactical skills in warfare coupled with values of freedom, equality and democracy ingrained in their culture and traditions. The colonial rulers acknowledged the Mahsuds to be the only tribe in the North Western region which gave enormous trouble to their administration. The participation of the Mahsud tribesmen in the Anglo-Afghan Wars have been highlighted which was supportive to Muslim regime of Afghanistan. Moreover, the British expansionist policies annoyed Mahsuds the most who considered it a threat to their independence thereby causing them to rebel. In the wake of conflict, the tribesmen‘s indispensable love for Islam was used by the clergy. The tribe enjoyed amicable relations with the newly born state of Pakistan in 1947. The call for Kashmir Jihad by the state soon after its independence was welcomed by the Mahsud tribeMany from the tribe took part in the Kashmir war with bravery and hence rewards from the state. The Mahsuds have actively participated in the routine life in Pakistan. The tribesmen own considerable amount of business in the urban centers, and major chunk of the Mahsud tribesmen have occupied prestigious government positions holding various jobs. The thesis traced back the roots of religious militancy in the sub-continent in the early 17th and 18th century. It became a reality in 1947 by drawing permanent borders between Muslims and Hindus. It has discussed that the inception of Pakistan on Islamist lines has driven various regimes to use religion in domestic, foreign and national security policies which affected all socio-political and public/private sectors of the society. It was ultimately Zia‘s policies in 1980s which transformed the social and political institutions of the state on Islamist lines. The Afghan Jihad and the subsequent support to the clergy and non-state actors resulted in the religious fanaticism not limited to the tribal belt. The proliferation of religious militant groups in the state caused much trouble. Zia regime advocated mostly Deobandi groups thereby disregarding other sects which resulted in the establishment of violent sectarian groups that damaged the already fragile law and order system in Pakistan. The research has explained that Afghan Jihad and Islamist policies of the state directly affect the tribal areas of Pakistan especially SWA where awareness level was low and Jihadist activities were frequent.

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In 1990s the economic and political conditions of Pakistan were fragile. In the meantime, the Jihadist activities went unhindered. The Jihadist groups celebrated victory in Afghanistan and were soon indulged in the Kashmir struggle. The militant groups grew in size and in volume across the border. After the defeat of USSR in Afghanistan, civil war broke out which led to the establishment of the Taliban regime supported by Pakistan. The Taliban have been divided in various groups in the 21st century such as Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban are further divided into ‗Good‘ and ‗Bad‘ Taliban. The Good served state‘s purpose, agenda and are state sponsored, the ‗Bad‘ ones are against state‘s policies, attacked assets of Pakistan and are foreign funded. The ideology of Bad Taliban is more similar to that of ISIS and Al-Qaeeda: they indiscriminately target Muslims and non-Muslims by giving preferences to their own version of Shariah, pronouncing all other sects of Islam null and void. The proliferation of Pakistani Taliban has its origin in SWA. The aggressive policies of the government to handle the conflict resulted in violence. The Taliban took advantage of the fragile writ of the state in SWA and had the confidence of the natives, at least in the initial stages of militancy, to successfully strengthen their foothold in the region. The short-term policy of banning the militant and sectarian organization altogether, operating in various parts of Pakistan, unified the terrorist groups. Many of those militant and sectarian outfits joined hands with the Taliban operating in SWA such as TTP. The Jihadist and militant groups who were endorsed by the state as heroes and friends were proclaimed to be terrorists and enemy of the state at once. The confused state policies confused the ordinary men the most. The militant groups benefited themselves in such a situation by manipulating the Mahsud tribesmen at the time of military penetration into SWA. Overwhelming majority of natives in SWA were unaware, uneducated and unemployed. Some were attracted by the militant outfits and joined their ranks. Majority of the Mahsud community for the purpose of safety fled the area and became IDPs. The ordinary tribesmen suffered the most due to inhumane rules and punishments of the Taliban and the Pakistan military. The penetration of Pakistan military in the 2003-2004 into SWA had predominantly negative effects. The tribesmen considered this penetration because the US demanded it which was proved soon when Pakistan joined the camps of the West in the so-called WoT (War on Terror). It made easy to frame Pakistani government friends of the non-Muslim oppressors and therefore enemy of Islam. The penetration of Pakistan military and the initiation of operations in SWA damaged the local culture/traditions and the independent tribal lifestyle of th natives which increased tribal resentment. In the post 9/11, the Pakistan

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military faced stiff resistance in actions against the militant groups because of non- cooperation of the local people. The research has focused on the concept of religious militancy in Pakistan with special reference to the Mahsud tribe of SWA. The involvement of the tribesmen in the conflict in the post 9/11 period and the subsequent engagement with the military has greatly impacted socio-political configuration of the natives. The conflict resulted in the dispersion of the entire Mahsud tribe from their stronghold in SWA into urban centers of the state. The Mahsud tribesmen have been living in IDPs and non-IDPs conditions for more than a decade in the major towns of Pakistan such as Karachi, Dera Ismail Khan, Peshawar, Tank etc. The migration and the continuous exposure with urban environment have caused socio-political and cultural transformations in the Mahsud tribe. The transformation processes have witnessed more positive than negative trends. Chapter five explained the theories of social change/transformation in relation to the socio-cultural and political transformation of the Mahsud tribe in SWA. The social change usually takes huge time in a given community. The research has examined that in many cases social transformation has been the outcome of religious movements, urbanization, industrialization, social upheaval and globalization. In the case of Mahsud tribe, the forced migration as a result of violent conflict is a major source of social transformation. The IDPs settled in the urban areas rapidly became acquainted with the urban culture and the way of life. The research has noted positive indicators of transformational processes such as the enrollment of the IDP children in schools has increased both among the boys and girls in SWA and urban areas. The increasing contact with urban facilities decreased the probability of their settling back in SWA. The rehabilitation process of IDPs is a dilemma for the state. For many reasons IDPs are not willing to go back home. Moreover, after the partial rehabilitation, the remaining IDPs are not willing to go to SWA. The families who got settled are coming back to urban areas. The research noted variety of issues which has created a lot of problems. The damaged infrastructure, destroyed houses, poor compensation and the security conditions were unfriendly which discourage the IDPs to go back to SWA. Attacks on military establishment resulted in the punishment of entire villages including men, women and children. The military has not yet cleared the mines from the Mahsud areas which has caused deaths of dozens of civilians. The thesis has explored that natives are afraid of re-operations of some part of the Mahsud areas, and at the same time other issues such as the news of re-emergence of the Taliban. These are among the major causes that

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leave the natives in hesitation to settle back in SWA. The IDPs have better facilities of life and abundant job opportunities in the urban areas. The research has analyzed that the tribal revenge has transformed in to an ideological war. The culture of tooth for tooth and eye for an eye prevails in Waziristan. The military penetrated into Mahsud stronghold unannounced and started violating local culture and traditions. The response became more violent and supportive, in the initial period of insurgency, to the militant groups who take better advantage of the situation by respecting and exploiting the native culture. The work has explored that the Mahsud tribe is facing severe identity crisis in the present times. Religion was always a secondary matter, preference was always given to the tribal bonding among the Mahsuds. In the 21st century many tribesmen have joined the militant ranks which resulted in the infighting and killing of own tribesmen in the name of religion. In the Mahsud area religious punishments were executed and the elders were humiliated. For the first time the youngster assumed power. The tribesmen gave preference to the religious bonding instead of tribal bonding which has dire impacts on the identity of the tribesmen. The influence of the conflict and the urban/heterogenous society has altered the native culture and traditions, the language, the way of life, dress code, and the concept of Gham and Khadi has been significantly transformed. The tribal rivalries caused huge human losses in the 18th and 19th centuries, some of the Mahsud sub-tribes got into dangerous feuds with other clans such as Ahmedzai Wazir of Wana and Shakai. The thesis has explored that the emergence of militants and military in SWA in the 1st decade of the 21st century has put an end to these feuds at least for the time being. The concept of tribal rivalry has been transformed: it is becoming less violent. The militancy operations have given birth to new problems, the natives had to abandon personal feuds. State policy to keep Mahsud territory weapon free zone has played an important role in this context. In many cases, the Mahsud tribesmen are more communicative and deal conflicts with civility and peacefully. Especially their grievances against state were expressed in the shape of public demonstrations. The PTM (Pashtun Tahafooz Movement) which is widely commended in the Pashtun belt has its origin in the movements of MTM (Mahsud Tahafooz Movment) of Mahsud tribe. The PTM primary agenda is to put an end to the human rights violation in the Pashtun belt. The tribesmen are using modern technology to advertise and record their protests/movements including social media more actively. The exposure in urban areas and interaction with the urban communities has significantly transformed the attitude of the natives towards conflict resolution.

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There are three forms of leaders recognized in SWA, the government representative, the Malik/elder and Mullah representing the clergy. The religious elite have always taken the opportunity of fragile security conditions to strengthen their ranks. Mullahs/religious-elite have been connected directly to religious militancy in SWA especially in the early 19th and early 21st century. The research has highlighted the inhumane laws and the governance structure of FATA and its contribution to the encouragement of violent activities in the region. Various powerbrokers have used the FCR for narrow interests instead of public interests. Natives of SWA including professionals, elders and youngsters wanted FCR to be abolished. The Mahsuds do not recognize single leadership; there were influential personalities, however, preference was always given to the decision of the council of elders. History shows that the British attempted to negotiate with one leader or small group of leaders, nevertheless, 20,000 Mahsuds came to visit and asserted to make all of them Maliks. The number was almost equal to about every adult male in the area. Lack of single leadership has its pros and cons, democratic tendencies among the Mahsuds led to fragile leadership institution. Mahsud leaders were not obeyed as the Wazir were in Wana. Consequently, in the wake of militancy in the post 9/11 period, the Mahsud Maliks/leaders dispersed and left the tribesmen leaderless. On the contrary, efficient leadership of Wazir of Wana played significant role to unite and guide their tribe thereby protecting them from displacement and other suffering which costed the Mahsuds. The institution of Jirga and Malikship are interdependent which have been suffered the most due to conflict. The decision of Jirga is no more affective. The institutions of Jirga and Malikship were damaged even before the arrival of the Taliban into SWA due to several reasons which, predominantly, include negative role of the local administration/bureaucracy. The Taliban rule, interference of state institutions and the socio-cultural and political transformation of the tribe led to the decline of Jirga and Malikships in the long run. Many interviews in the work has highlighted that there is a need to establish modern administrative, legal and political system which is already operational in other parts of the state. Majority of the influential Maliks were killed by the militants and other stakeholders Due to life threats the remaining Maliks went into hiding. In such an environment Jirga was led by the incapable men. At the cost of public interests, Maliks accumulated huge wealth and pursed narrow interests. The infectiveness of Malikship led to the penetration of militants and military in the first place. The institution of Malikship bridged the gap between the government and the people in SWA This institution played a significant role in protecting the interests of the tribesmen. The Maliks were respected and not obeyed. Minor to no class/status difference

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has been noted between tribal leaders and tribesmen. Despite criticized for corruption and mismanagement the institution of Malikship has been an important pillar of tribal community. With the passage of time this institution went through significant change. The available literature suggested that the Malikship model has been severely damaged ultimately in the post 9/11 period. However, the thesis argued, in the case of Mahsud tribe the institution of Malikship was in fragile condition in the 1990s which was one reason for the militants to penetrate the stronghold of the Mahsuds. The Malikship institution rested on the concept of Kasher-Masher. The militancy and the subsequent displacement of the tribe altered the concept of Kasher-Masher: the youngsters became the new powerbrokers in the shape of militants. The arrival of military and its encroachment in the tribal affairs further influenced Maliks negatively. Any decision on part of the Maliks against the wishes of the military has not been materialized. Moreover, the participation of the natives in the political processes has undermined the authority of the Maliks. The role of tribal elders as mediators between the natives and the state is no more effective. The political administration has its share in the fragile condition of the Malikship structure. The bureaucratic corruption in SWA led to the appointment of the puppet Maliks by the PA which was an important reason for the unpopularity of this institution. The research has highlighted the institution of Jirga as foundation of traditional colonial administration in SWA. It was defined as a reflection of democracy where elders/Maliks and in some cases government representatives sit together to solve an issue of conflict or importance. The research has emphasized that during and after the military operations Jirga played key role to keep the natives peaceful and avoid assembling anti- state Lashker. In any case, the conflict in the post 9/11 and the emergence of militants along with military operations in SWA have damaged Jirga. The killings of influential elders by the militants and the undue interference of military in the proceedings and decisions of Jirga seriously endangered the very existence of this institution. To reiterate, the existing literature substantiated that Jirga became weak after the 9/11 period. However, this study noted that the said institution was in a fragile condition even before the conflict: corruption, nepotism and self-interests of PA and Maliks coupled with the establishment of independent groups in late 1980s and early 1990s such as TTF (Teman Tehreek Force) damaged the institution of Jirga and its relationship with the state. The Peace Committee (PC) of Gul Saa Khan Mahsud was established in 1998 which was a major setback to the democratic conventions of the institution of Jirga. He was dubbed as a leader of the Mahsuds by the Maliks and the political administration to eliminate increasing ratio of

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crimes in the area. In short, the PC of Gul Saa Khan hijacked the role of Jirga. The political developments in SWA have severely impacted the pillar of Jirga. Previously the Jirga and the Maliks were the mediators between the state and the tribesmen, nonetheless, recent political developments and the extension of political parties‘ act to FATA has encouraged the participation ratio of the natives in the political processes. The research has analyzed that in the past, religious political parties were more powerful in the land of the Mahsuds. The collusion of the religious parties with the militants and the subsequent damages have sowed the seed of hatred towards the religious parties amongst the tribesmen. The elders, youngster and other members of the community do not approve religious political parties in the present times. The work suggests that tribesmen are more outward thinkers as far as political preferences are concerned. Due to political processes in FATA, the Mahsuds have been more attracted towards the slogan of ‗New Pakistan‘ of PTI: especially the youth has joined PTI in Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. The introduction of Political Parties Act in SWA has undermined the previously powerful bureaucratic apparatus and the related administrative structures. As a result, the harassment of the tribesmen at the hands of the state institutions has been decreased considerably. The Mahsud tribesman are more aware politically They have got more acquainted with their rights and duties as citizens. The participation in the public demonstrations and other platforms is one example. The thesis suggests various impediments in the way of political development including interference of military in the political arena. The traditional Maliks view the political development as resulting in the emergence of new elite in SWA and therefore threat to their very existence. The voting community has been limited to tribes and sub-tribes, influential men among various sub-tribes of Mahsuds have been playing the cards. It will take huge time to empower the natives of SWA. The women had no say in tribal traditions. They had no role in the decision-making bodies and women as an elder was a subject out of question. The notion of tribal honor has affected the life of women the most. After 1979, the tribal women were forced to marry foreign fighters. They must continuously have migrated with their husbands to the conflict zones which severely impacted the women. The Taliban rule suppressed this already repressed segment of the tribal society. Surprisingly, the thesis has explained that in many cases, during the Taliban rule, the tribal women felt relieved: for instance, the Taliban banned outdoor activities of the women which was a source of happiness for many. It is because tribal women performed unpaid forced labor in the fields and other such activities. However, the conflict resulted in heavy fighting which resulted in some cases in

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deaths/injuries of brothers, fathers and husbands which in turn had severe socio- psychological impacts on women. Further, the thesis has analyzed that the political processes in SWA have positive impacts on the tribal women in general. The displacement of the Mahsud tribe helped the Mahsud women to interact with the urban women, their participation in casting vote and campaigning for their candidates have liberated them to some extent. There are governmental and non-governmental forums which have been playing key role in empowering tribal women. Besides, the displacement had predominantly negative effects on women as well., The unaware and illiterate tribal women became victim of social evils in the IDP camps, issues of security, health and basic necessities of life were limited. In the same line, the Mahsud women have become more acquainted with the complex urban way of life. In the field of education, the Mahsuds have been sending their children, male and female, to education institutions indiscriminately. The education system of entire FATA is a concern for its low literacy ratio, SWA is no exception. The research has deliberated that in the past, strict examination halls in settled districts were one reason for quality education. However, as soon as the examination centers were established in SWA, the quality of education was compromised. The culture of cheating, nepotism and corruption were given birth. It has also explored that the establishment of government schools were profitable business for Maliks and related stakeholders which gave birth to the concept of ‗Ghost School‘. Unfortunately, the emergence of militant outfits damaged the already poor education institutions in SWA, the female education was almost brought to a halt. The military operations and the displacement of the natives led to the complete closure of the education institutions in Mahsud territory. The research has examined that the IDPs faced a lot of problems to get enrolled in the urban sector education institutions: the role of government in this context was discouraging except the struggle of some NGOs and international donors. The research has analyzed that in the initial stages of the rehabilitation process of the IDPs, the educations institutions have witnessed encouraging enrollment numbers. The exposure of urban areas has positively impacted the parents who have become supportive to female education. Due to lack of availability of schools, coeducation system has been established in the Mahsud area. At the same time, there were various hurdles in the development of education sector in the Mahsud areas, the local experts of education held responsible defective policies of education department of FATA secretariat. For instance, the rationalization policy was implemented which was aimed to eliminate a major number of schools from FATA and negatively affected the education sector. The policy was later

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on abolished by the Governor of KP. Notwithstanding, education sector has been facing various hurdles. The government has initiated various schemes in the present decade to develop the education sector. The first ever Girls college has been established in the Mahsud area with the help of UAE funds, cadet colleges for boys have been established. A campus of Gomal university has been approved in SWA. The Madrassa sector education institutions need special attention which must be fixed with checks and balances, adequate resources and revision of the syllabus.

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APPENDICES APPENDIX – I

Interview Questions Common Tribesmen

 What are the issues of Tribal people with FCR? Do you want it to be abolished? Is FCR contributing to militancy? Should FATA be made a part of mainstream Pakistan? Do you think peace is possible if special status of FATA is removed? Present law has not made the difference in urban areas like Karachi, how do you think it is a way forward for peaceful FATA?  Which political party is more popular among people? Is there any difference between the choice of youth and elders?  What is Maseedo and how is it different from Pashtunwali of other tribes living in FATA and KP? How is Pashtunwali or Massedo affected by the conflict?  What role is Jirga playing in the present and how it is different from past practices? Is its role effective is solving tribal issues? Tribesmen are now more aware and have access to information and communication channels. Do you think the traditional setup will work in SWA?  How militancy has affected the institution of Jirga? How is Maliki institution transforming?  Are you in favor of Maliki system? Who is a Mahsud leader? What is the role of Maliks, Mullahs and Militants?  Who is a Mullah among the Mahsuds? Has the institution of Mullah undergone transformation in the post 9/11? How? Are there any forms of Mullah? Has Mullah become a militant? Is there any difference between Mullah and Militant? Was Mullah Influential in SWA as compared to Malik and the Political Agent? Is Mullah responsible for the ongoing militancy in the area?  Was it Jihad against USSR and the British? Can you recall famous Mullahs of colonial times?  Can you call struggle of TTP as Jihad? What is Jihad? Can Jihad be waged against Islamic state?  SWA was peaceful until 2003. What went wrong in the aftermath that it resulted in widespread violence? Who can be held responsible for the violence in SWA?

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 What are the potential reasons for the terrorism in FATA? Has socio-economic deprivation contributed to the ongoing militancy? What are your suggestions to counter terrorism in SWA?  What are the positive and negative implications of military operations in SWA and FATA?  What are the socio-cultural impacts of terrorism in FATA and SWA in the present times? Some people think that tribal identity is affected from terrorism. Do you agree?  Which political party is more popular among people? Is there any difference between the choice of youth and elders?  Do you think that militancy in Pakistan which started after 9/11 has its roots in SWA? Do you think tribal people are responsible for the militancy in Pakistan? Who is responsible for militancy in SWA, FATA and Pakistan?  What role Mahsud tribe played in TTP formation and in the rise of militancy in Pakistan?  How peace is possible in FATA?

Maliks/Journalists/Teachers/Lawyers/Professionals

 Can you tell me about the origin of the Mahsud Tribe? Some people relate Mahsud to Wazir tribe. What do you think? Are Mahsuds related to any tribe genealogically?  Do you think that Mahsud tribe has migrated from some other state or region? Do you think that some fractions of Mahsud Tribe inhabit outside SWA or Pakistan permanently?  How many braches or sub-clans are there in Mahsud tribe. What do you know about the relation among the different tribes of Mahsud, is there some superior\inferior tribes?  What is Maseedo and how is it different from Pashtunwali of other tribes living in FATA and KP? How is Pashtunwali or Massedo affected by the conflict?  Do you think Tribal unity among Dre-Mahsud is stronger than any other tribe? Why? Some people think that tribal identity is affected from terrorism. Do you agree?  Is there any difference between Jirga and Marakah? How militancy has effected the institution of Jirga? What role is Jirga playing in the present and how it is different from past practices?

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 What do you know about Malikship institution among Mahsuds? How a malik is selected, is this a heredity process? Are you in favor of this system? Is status and organization of Malikship system of colonial times different after 1947? How the Maliki institution undergone change in the post 9/11? How is Maliki institution transforming?  Which political party is more popular among people? Is there any difference between the choice of youth and elders?  Tribesmen are now more aware and have access to information and communication channels. Do you think the traditional setup of administration will work in SWA?  Do you think administrative setup has been altered in the wake of 9/11 developments in SWA and FATA? Which administrative constitutional status do you think suits our region the best?  What are the issues of Tribal people with FCR? Do you want it to be abolished? Is FCR contributing to militancy? Should FATA be made a part of mainstream Pakistan? Do you think peace is possible if special status of FATA is removed? Present law has not made the difference in urban areas like Karachi, how do you think it is a way forward for peaceful FATA?  In what manner tribal institutions have undergone change in post 9/11 period?  Who is a Mahsud leader? What is the role of Maliks, Mullahs and Militants?  Who is a Mullah among the Mahsuds? Has the institution of Mullah undergone transformation in the post 9/11? How? Are there any forms of Mullah? Has Mullah become a militant? Is there any difference between Mullah and Militant? Was Mullah Influential in SWA as compared to Malik and the Political Agent? Is Mullah responsible for the ongoing militancy in the area?  Can you name the personalities and the sub-clans within SWA who had fought British exclusively?  What is Jihad? Was it Jihad against USSR and the British? What do you know about the Jihad after 1947 in SWA and Pakistan? How the invasion of Afghan War impacted FATA and SWA in terms of militancy?  SWA was peaceful until 2003. What went wrong in the aftermath that it resulted in widespread violence? Do you think that militancy in Pakistan which started after 9/11 has its roots in SWA? Who can be held responsible for the violence in SWA? How socio-economic deprivation contributed to the ongoing militancy?

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What are the potential reasons for the terrorism in FATA? What are your suggestions to counter militancy in SWA?  Do you think that Mahsud tribe or some of its tribesmen can be held responsible for terrorism in SWA, FATA? Do you think without the support of Mahsuds TTP would have prevailed like it did and contributed in the collateral damage in the state in general and in FATA and SWA in particular?  What are the positive and negative implications of military operations in SWA and FATA?  What are the socio-cultural impacts of terrorism in FATA and SWA in the present times?  How peace is possible in FATA?

Religious Elite/Mullahs/Jihadist/militnats

 Who is Mullah? Are there any forms of Mullah? Is there any difference between Mullah and Militant? Was Mullah Influential in SWA as compared to Malik and the Political Agent? Is Mullah responsible for the ongoing militancy in the area?  What is Jihad? Was it Jihad against USSR and the British? What do you know about the Jihad after 1947 in SWA and Pakistan? How the invasion of Afghan War impacted FATA and SWA in terms of militancy?  SWA was peaceful until 2003. What went wrong in the aftermath that it resulted in widespread violence? Who can be held responsible for the violence in SWA?  How socio-economic deprivation contributed to the ongoing militancy?  What do you think are the potential reasons for the terrorism in FATA? What are your suggestions?  What are the positive and negative implications of military operations in SWA and FATA?  What are the issues of Tribal people with FCR? Do you want it to be abolished? Is FCR contributing to militancy? Should FATA be made a part of mainstream Pakistan? Do you think peace is possible if special status of FATA is removed? Present law has not made the difference in urban areas like Karachi, how do you think it is a way forward for peaceful FATA?  What are the socio-cultural impacts of terrorism in FATA and SWA in the present times?  Do you think that Mahsud tribe or some of its tribesmen can be held responsible for terrorism in SWA, FATA and Pakistan? Do you think without the support of

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Mahsuds TTP would have prevailed like it did and contributed in the collateral damage in the state in general and in FATA and SWA in particular? What role Mahsud tribes played in TTP formation and in the rise of militancy in Pakistan?

Administrators/Bureaucrats Civil-Military

 How administrative setup has been altered in the wake of 9/11 developments?  Which administrative constitutional status do you think suits our region the best?  Who is Mullah? Are there any forms of Mullah? Is Mullah responsible for the ongoing militancy in FATA?  Is there any difference between Mullah and Militant?  Is/was Mullah Influential in SWA as compared to Malik and the Political Agent?  SWA was peaceful until 2003. What went wrong in the aftermath that it resulted in widespread violence?  Who can be held responsible for the violence in SWA?  Has socio-economic deprivation contributed to the ongoing militancy?  What do you think are the potential reasons for the terrorism in FATA? What are your suggestions to counter militancy in SWA?  Is FCR contributing to militancy?  Should FATA be made a part of mainstream Pakistan?  How peace is possible in FATA?  How socio-economic deprivation contributed to the ongoing militancy?  What are the socio-cultural impacts of terrorism in FATA and SWA in the present times?  What role is Jirga playing in the present and how it is different from past practices?  Do you think that Mahsud tribe or some of its tribesmen can be held responsible for terrorism in SWA, FATA and Pakistan? Do you think without the support of Mahsuds TTP would have prevailed like it did and contributed in the collateral damage in the state in general and in FATA and SWA in particular? What role Mahsud tribes played in TTP formation and in the rise of militancy in Pakistan?  How the invasion of Afghan War impacted FATA and SWA in terms of militancy?  Who can be held responsible for the violence in SWA?

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 What are the potential reasons for the terrorism in FATA? What are the remedies?  What are the positive and negative implications of military operations in SWA and FATA?  Do you think that militancy in Pakistan which started after 9/11 has its roots in SWA?  How peace can be restored in FATA?

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APPENDIX – II

INTERVIEWS  A. Afaq, personal communication, November 17, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 A. Khalid, personal communication, October 21, 2016. Tank.

 A. Naveed, personal communication, December 23, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 Ali Wazir, personal communication, December 27, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 Brigadier retired Qayyum Sher Mahsud, personal communication, November 12, 2016. Peshawar.

 G. Bibi, personal communication, October 16, 2016. Peshawar.

 Gulsalam Mahsud, personal communication, November 28, 2016. Rawalpindi.

 Hayat Preghal, personal communication, November 03, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 Hussain, personal communication, January 12, 2015. Dera Ismail Khan.

 K. Kaka, personal communication, November 28, 2016. South Waziristan Agency.

 K. Qureshi, personal communication, December 22, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 K. Yasir, personal communication, December 01, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. A. Masood, personal communication, September 18, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. A. Pashteen, personal communication, November 17, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. Adnan, personal communication, January 12, 2015. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. Ajmal, personal communication, December 29, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. Akber, personal communication, December 02, 2016. South Waziristan Agency.

 M. Aslam, personal communication, December 20, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. Aslam, personal communication, January 11, 2015. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. Hameed, personal communication, December 27, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. Hashim, personal communication, December 08, 2016. Peshawar & Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. Iqbal, personal communication, December 24, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. Ishtiaq, personal communication, December 20, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 M. K. Fareed, personal communication, November 26, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

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 M. Khan, personal communication, December 26, 2016. Tank.

 M. Mashal Khan, personal communication, December 30, 2016. South Waziristan.

 M. Roshan, personal communication, October 16, 2016. Peshawar.

 Marina Mehsud, personal communication, September 11, 2016. Peshawar.

 N. Bibi, personal communication, November 18, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 N. Javed, personal communication, November 24, 2016. Tank.

 Rehman-Ullah, personal communication, October 28, 2016. Peshawar.

 Retired military officer M. Raheel, personal communication, November 07, 2016. Rawalpindi.

 Rustam Shah Mohmand, personal communication, 2016. Peshawar.

 S. Salman, personal communication, December 15, 2016. Rawalpindi.

 Sailab Mahsud, personal communication, December 20, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 T. Alam, personal communication, December 25, 2016. Dera Ismail Khan.

 Zaidi, personal communication, January 14, 2015. Dera Ismail Khan.

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