The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground in Uncommon Places
By
Paul G. Paterson, BSc.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
In
CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT
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______Hrach Gregorian, PhD Faculty Supervisor
______Fred Oster, PhD Program Head, MACAM Program
______Alex Morrison, MSC, MA Director, School of Peace and Conflict Management
ROYAL ROADS UNIVERSITY June 23, 2011
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ABSTRACT
The tribes of Pakistan have endured for thousands of years despite the best efforts of a succession of unwelcome guests. I attempt to illustrate that whatever holds people together through social, political and theological upheaval, continues to hold the tribes of the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas together. There is value located in understanding the glue that holds communities together and developing this falls to examining theories on social cohesion and sources of governance legitimacy. These surface questions related to the form and content of ungoverned spaces and suggest engagement strategies with the tribes that incorporate a perspective on legitimacy that includes hybridized expressions of governance. Key to this is the assumption that a stable and predictable border with Afghanistan is an interest of the Pakistani government. Based on the literature and field interviews, I suggest that this is not certain. If it is, then a re-imagined governance relationship between the tribes and Islamabad may produce significant political and social dividends. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have renewed appreciation for the phrase, “Standing on the shoulders of giants.”
During the writing of my paper there was no shortage of feelings rooted in the isolating aspect of a work of this sort, but even then I recognized the fiction in this feeling. This paper is comprised of the thoughts and ambitions of literally hundreds of people who stand tall by virtue of their work, their intellectual engagement with the world and the quality and character of their lives.
To the people I met and shared ideas with in Pakistan, my thanks for your hospitality and my deep respect for your commitment to realizing your Nation’s grandest visions for itself.
Among so many other things, you all showed me how the hard work of Nation-building happens in classrooms and coffee shops, on street corners and in all the places where people come together to turn big ideas into the thousand small acts that comprise courageous change. I want especially to thank our good friend Hussain Ali Sina who exemplifies the twin Pakhtunwali virtues of tura and aql; thank you Hussain for being a good friend and gracious host.
To Hrach Gregorian; what to say? Your brand of tough love characterizes some of my best friendships: honest, courageous in the pursuit and support of truth, tolerant without being indulgent and pointed without being barbed. Thank you for all I’ve learned through our collaboration on this paper and the coursework which preceded it.
Rumi offers the following guidance to my last acknowledgement: “Load the ship and set out. No one knows for certain whether the vessel will sink or reach the harbour. Cautious people say: I'll do nothing until I can be sure". It is with the kind of abundant gratitude that embarrasses The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson iv people when said out loud that I say to my best friend and wife, Kimberly: Thank you for risking the ocean with me. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson v
Table of Contents
Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgement ...... iii Table of Contents ...... v
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION ...... 1
CHAPTER 2 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...... 8 General Methodology ...... 8 Key Informant Interviews ...... 9 Ethical Considerations and Implications ...... 12 Assumptions and Limitations ...... 12 Personal Observations ...... 14
CHAPTER 3 – THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN ...... 16 In the Beginning ...... 16 Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA)...... 22 The Tribes of FATA and Governance Under Britain ...... 24 FATA: The People, the Politics and the Land ...... 28 Contextualizing Pakistan ...... 29
CHAPTER 4 – PAKISTAN, FATA AND THE PAKHTUN ...... 31 Pakhtunwali: Social Code as Social Glue ...... 33 The Tribes of FATA and Traditional Governance Norms and Forms ...... 36 Traditional Governance and the Impact of Externalities ...... 40 The Maliks ...... 45 The Ascendancy of the Mullahs ...... 47
CHAPTER 5 – SOCIAL COHESION ...... 50 Governing Ungoverned Space and Tribal Cohesion ...... 56 Social Cohesion and Legitimacy ...... 64 The Abiding Presence of Islam ...... 65 The Erosion of Tribal Cohesion and Contributing Elements...... 66 Social Cohesion and Stability ...... 68
CHAPTER 6 – GOVERNANCE AT THE EDGES...... 71 Pakistan’s View on a Post-Coalition Afghanistan ...... 74 The Struggle Within and Conflict Imported ...... 75 Possibilities for Change ...... 76
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION ...... 85 References ...... 93 Appendix 1 – Guided Interview Questions ...... 100 Appendix 2 – Field Research Interviews ...... 102 Appendix 3 – Thematic Breakout of Field Research Interviews ...... 126
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 1
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
“The question is not what you look at, but what you see”
Henry D. Thoreau (1817 - 1862)
It seems there are very few easy, or simple, conversations to be had about Pakistan. It is likely that, since its inception in 1947, this has always been the case. There’s certainly nothing easy or simple about a protracted national conversation, conducted in a dozen languages, and carried out across a canvas as immense as the nature and scale of the project of nation-building.
To illustrate Pakistan’s challenge, over the course of my field interviews there I was told several times that Pakistan has spent the last six decades as a state in pursuit of a nationhood which continues to elude and defy its best efforts. In the words of one of the academics interviewed for this paper, “[Pakistan has] failed to unite around a common or well-developed idea of itself”1.
Surrounded by neighbours who are generally uneasy with its presence and long-term aspirations as both an emergent geopolitical player and the second largest Islamic Nation on the planet, Pakistan’s future is, and always has been, as much a product of tensions from within as from without. Pakistan has had to contend with a difficult birth whose political DNA is considered by its detractors to be at best, moderately suspect and, at its worst, seemingly meant to maintain the region as the unstable nexus of the east, the west and Central Asia. Disentangling its future from the detritus of its colonial past has produced a back drop that shapes many of the governance structures and processes that, paradoxically, have served to both define while still managing to constrain, its forward momentum towards national self-realization.
1 Hoodbhoy, P. Interviewed March/April 2010. See Appendix 2 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 2
Included in the mix is Pakistan’s complex history, a non-secular though not quite theocratic governance structure and an unwieldy population comprised of at least 6 major ethnic groups and 8 minor groups, nine religions and 4 Provinces, a capital territory and a grouping of federally administered tribal areas. Governing this pastiche of ethnicities, ideologies, religions, territorial ambitions, competing political aspirants and extra-territorial pressures is no mean feat; having said that, these have long been the challenges that have confronted nascent nations throughout history.
The region now known as Pakistan has never been too long between foreign invaders and the disruptions to the resident social fabric that generally accompanies these sorts of large-scale regime changes. Having been overcome if not conquered by the likes of Genghis Khan,
Alexander the Great, Tamerlane, Saladin and the British, the tribal people of Pakistan and surrounding regions have continued to endure despite the best efforts of a succession of aggressive and unwelcome guests. A central premise of this paper then is that to some extent, whatever we call that which holds people together through these sorts of massive shifts in social, political and theological contexts, continues to hold the people and tribes of the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) together now.
With reference to the tribes of FATA, it is my view that indigenous legal norms, access to traditional mechanisms for recourse and restitution as well as traditional systems of conflict resolution are all attributes of the existing tribal governance systems. As well, when these are considered in tandem with traditional social frameworks, kinship ties and a well defined identity, all serve as critical reference points for the communities of FATA, even in the midst of chaos and conflict. Through extension, the history of FATA’s tribes and the fact of their continued presence, appear to present an exemplar for community resiliency and stability and suggest that The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 3 there is value to be accessed when, for example, considering stabilization and reconstruction approaches for the region.
My research finds specific focus in trying to better understand how these tribal governance structures and systems serve to hold communities and people together and confer the capacity necessary to carry communities through violent upheaval to a more stable post-conflict condition. I then attempt to draw together ideas relating to social cohesion, community resiliency and nation-building in contemplating the nature of the relationship between the central government of Pakistan and these tribal entities. As part of this investigation, it is my intention to illustrate the current relationship and to draw attention to the possibility that a re-imagined governance relationship could produce significant political and social dividends for Islamabad.
It is not my intention here to promote all aspects of Pakistan’s tribal systems as being useful features of a re-envisioned relationship with the central government. Nor do I reduce the complex social contract that comes with formalizing a “working” relationship with the tribes down to a simple formulaic approach to reconciliation between Islamabad and the tribes. I do however support the view that advancing the objective of nation-building has to account for those elements of tribal governments that have sustained communities through hundreds of years of violent social and political upheaval. On the same note, failure to access social capital opportunities, in whatever form they are found, serves to undermine the efforts of governments, non-governmental organizations and counter-insurgency strategists in searching out approaches for stabilizing the region and facilitating reconstruction and other development efforts.
A central tenet of my paper is that in terms of lost opportunity or un-accessed value, there are real costs to ignoring the stability resident in other such forms of governance, wherever they The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 4
are found. To be clear, I do not labour under a fantasy that simply restoring and expanding on the
past pre-eminence of tribal governments is, in and of itself, a political panacea for either FATA
or for Pakistan writ large. In the context of modern public administration and the principles of
democracy, Pakistan’s tribal governments are freighted with archaic practices, systemic gender
inequity and present an awkward fit with, for example, a pluralistic, secular democracy such as is found in Canada. It’s impossible to sidestep the fact that most tribal governments in Pakistan are deeply imbued with an entrenched and anachronistic perspective on the relationships between politics, theology, human rights and self-determination. Further, choosing a path that relies on a romanticized characterization of the tribes invites the same sorts of legitimacy questions in the
Pakistan of 2011 as does an imported model of market democracy; or for that matter, extreme expressions of Islam. When put to the test of community acceptance on the basis of legitimacy, neither of these models may fare particularly well. Though they may only have regional cachet and may not enjoy the same pre-eminence they once held, the tribes of FATA might well be the only form of governance having any truly legitimate stature in the border regions shared by
Pakistan and Afghanistan. I view the challenge of legitimacy as one of the circles that need to be squared in the pursuit of a National identity.
With specific reference to FATA, it’s interesting to consider whether communities would
choose a familiar face – e.g. the Taliban, however illegitimate - over an unfamiliar face with an
unfamiliar solution – e.g. western democracies, no matter how potentially legitimate? Over-
reliance on a western model of democracy places current American foreign policy and Pakistan’s
domestic policies squarely in line with this sort of question. Taken on balance, trading one brand
of illegitimate government in favour of another may ultimately represent a no net gain strategy The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 5
towards reaching objectives of regional stability and nation-building; my suggestion being that the Taliban, though constituting a familiar face, may also struggle with questions of legitimacy.
FATA has been described by many strategists and analysts from around the world as being an ungoverned space (Bromley, 2007). Ungoverned spaces are currently a pre-occupation for many analysts and, according to Piombo (2007), are defined generally as being geographic areas where governments do not exercise effective control. It is believed that terrorist groups, narcotics traffickers and other criminal elements use these areas as sanctuaries to train, plan and organize; all relatively free from interference. There are a number of environments around the world which have been described as being ungoverned; Jacoby (2004) includes urban centres, the countryside and the internet.
In this paper I support an emergent perspective that contends that truly ungoverned spaces either do not exist or don’t exist for very long. This perspective incorporates the idea that someone or some organization quickly fills these sorts of space and, Mampilly (2007) suggests, maintains at least at a rudimentary level a form of governance for such areas. This raises interesting questions as to the limitations that come with too fixed a view on what constitutes governance and potential opportunities that might be found in hybrid forms of governance that incorporate aspects of different modes of governing. Taking this further still, miscasting FATA as being simply and irresolutely an ungoverned space and failing to recognize a place for the tribes in the Pakistani federation in Bromley’s (2007) and Vogel’s (2010) opinion presents the potential for contributing to increased instability and erosion of community integrity. These risk promoting the conditions that will, perversely, actually promote a truer expression of an ungoverned space rather than act to counter that possibility. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 6
If there is merit in the above, then my paper invites the reader to consider reframing their
perspectives as these relate to the content and application of the phrase, “ungoverned space” in
FATA. Assuming that the phrase is meant to be descriptive rather than prescriptive – e.g. an
attempt to distinguish expectations of what constitutes governance (democratic), from what is actually found (tribal), then where it is applied this may be as simple as opening the definition up to allow for a more complex reality; one that can accommodate more complex constructs of governance. Alternative terminology might include: “other-governed spaces”, “hybrid governments” or “syncretic governance”; where Merriam-Webster defines syncretic to mean
“the combination of different forms of belief or practice; or, the fusion of two or more originally
different inflectional forms.” Developing sustainable, effective and meaningful relationships
between national and tribal governments may well call on dealmakers to incorporate this sort of
added complexity into those relationships.
My overarching premise: There is value in understanding the glue that holds people
together as communities despite the stressors of economic, social and political change.
Developing a deeper understanding of this falls to an examination of theories related to social
cohesion and where this resides within communities. An examination of the sources of
legitimacy is woven into the discussion and surfaces questions related to current understandings
of ungoverned spaces. This in turn raises the possibility that engagement with the tribes of FATA
can be facilitated by broadening perspectives on what constitutes legitimate governance to
include hybridized or syncretic expressions of governance.
Key to all of these is the assumption that stability along the border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan is, in fact, an objective of the Pakistani government. Based on both my review of the literature and my field interviews, I suggest that this is by no means a certainty and I provide The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 7 some evidence of this throughout the paper. If furthering the objective of a stable and predictable economic, social and political environment in FATA is an interest of the Pakistani government then there are aspects of the current relationship which run counter to this. With this context there are specific questions of interest and these include:
1. What evidence supports the hypothesis that the Federally Administered Tribal Area’s
(FATA) traditional governance systems can provide a stabilizing influence on
communities?
2. Can Pakistan’s central government further the goal of legitimacy in FATA and foster
regional stability by drawing tribal governments, at the sub-national level, into a
meaningful engagement around governance in FATA?
3. Does FATA satisfy what are commonly considered to be the conditions of an
ungoverned space?
From Khaldun to Durkheim to Gellner, increased clarity into what it is that holds people together in communities holds promise for harnessing that resiliency in advancing the prospects for better outcomes across a number of the relationships in FATA. With sustainable, predictable relationships as the centre point for a revised relationship between Islamabad and the tribes of
FATA, the related objectives of security, economic development, self-determination, education and governance stand a better chance of gaining traction where they have, to date, struggled to gain real ground. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 8
CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
General Methodology
The research approach for this paper was comprised of two elements. The first involved a literature review of the salient aspects of the discussion and included sources related to
Pakistan’s history, geo-politics of the region, tribal governance, social cohesion, legitimacy, ungoverned spaces, failed and failing states and hybrid/syncretic governance. Each of the research threads provided both a broad understanding of the context of indigenous or traditional governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan as well as setting a framework for the paper. This “desk research” provided the theoretical underpinning to a consideration of the relationship between the tribes of FATA, Pakistan’s central government and
FATA, the Pakhtun people specifically, and theories related to social cohesion and ungoverned space. These were then considered against the proposition that there is value yet to be gained in drawing on pre-existing (for the purposes of this paper, tribal) governance systems and structures and the inherent resiliency of the tribes; thus providing a perspective in support of the potential for re-configuring the relationships between the Pakhtun, the state government of Pakistan and other actors in the region. The literature review also supported my preparations for conducting and interpreting the findings from the second part of the research methodology: key informant interviews.
The second part of my research involved a two week field study in Pakistan to conduct interviews with academics, politicians, governmental representatives, students, journalists and residents/citizens. Interviews were conducted in a variety of cities in Pakistan including Lahore,
Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and Peshawar with the interviews supported by a guide (see Appendix
1). The interview guide provided “landmark” questions to assist me in providing some structure The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 9 to the interviews without, hopefully, constraining the natural conversational or narrative flow.
More often than not though, the interview guide served more as a starting point to the interviews and was, at best, a flexible frame for conversations on Pakistan’s domestic and foreign politics, its’ history and future and to provide for deeper background on the people of FATA than could be obtained through the literature. As well, the field component allowed me to see the country, meet and talk with people from all walks of life and generally to place myself within the context
I intended to discuss. This part of the research provided for inestimable added value to my thesis.
Key Informant Interviews
In more specific terms, my field research relied primarily on key informant interviews.
This approach is qualitative in nature and is comprised of what Kumar (1989) describes as loosely structured interviews which serve to draw respondents into sharing their first-hand knowledge or experience of the topic or topics under study.
The key consideration for me in choosing this particular approach centred on identifying my objective(s) for this part of the research. According to Kumar (1989), key informant interviews are an appropriate instrument for gathering qualitative data when:
1. General, descriptive information is sufficient for decision-making; 2. Understanding of the underlying motivations and attitudes of a target population is required; 3. Quantitative data collected through other methods need to be interpreted; 4. The primary purpose of the study is to generate suggestions and recommendations; or, 5. Preliminary studies are needed for the design of a comprehensive quantitative study. Numbers 1, 2, 4 and 5 are all, to some extent, relevant to my choice but it is 2 which speaks most directly to my objective in this case.
In practical terms, the interviews were a series of conversations and, as such, ranged freely over a variety of topic areas that fell within the framework described above; specifically: The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 10
Pakistan’s history, geo-politics of the region, tribal governance, social cohesion, legitimacy,
ungoverned spaces, failed and failing states and hybrid/syncretic governance. Palys (2003)
suggests that this sort of semi-structured interview approach works best when there is a clear
view on the topics to be discussed and the purpose behind doing so. In keeping with this
perspective, developing the interview guide represented an opportunity to both refine my guiding
questions but also to develop clarity as to the intent behind each.
In total, 7 full interviews were conducted and there was an additional 6 interviewees
whose information was not captured in any formal way. This was either because the interviews
were so informal as to defy my ability to capture their information or because they chose to
remain anonymous and to not have their comments noted. The interviewees were selected
without any particular regard to any considerations other than 1) their willingness to discuss what
can be a difficult topic in Pakistan; and, 2) that as broad a range of perspectives as possible would be surveyed. Apart from 2 or 3 key contacts that were established prior to making the trip to Pakistan, most of the subsequent contacts were based on referrals from in-country.
Responses and comments gathered through the interview process have been gathered together in Appendix 2. This appendix captures what is essentially the raw data except where I have added text to account for breaks in grammar, syntax or continuity resulting from the fact that all of the respondents spoke English as a second language. Where this was done brackets -
[text ] – were used to indicate as such.
Appendix 3 presents the interview data after having been categorized according to broad, or in some cases, not so broad themes. The approach to managing the data in this way nominally adheres to a content analysis approach as this is understood from Neuendorf (2000). The data The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 11 which appears in Appendix 3 was treated as follows. Interview notes were reviewed and comments were coded according to the following key:
F Comment applies to FATA specifically C Relates to a Constitutional relationship TH Pertains to the history of the Pakhtun or tribes generally TC Pertains to the contemporary “condition” of the Pakhtun or tribes generally P Pertains to Pakistan generally PF Relates to some aspect of a policy based relationship attribute between the central government (Islamabad) and FATA FO Relates to Pakistan foreign policy (This is considered broadly to include relationships with the U.S., Afghanistan and others) US Broadly relates to theories and concepts associated with ungoverned spaces NR Not considered relevant
Coded phrases were then further grouped according to a number of themes that emerged from review of the data in the first step. A listing of these themes follows:
1. Political, economic, social realities of the relationship between Islamabad and FATA;
2. Other political motivations for Islamabad’s orientation towards FATA;
3. Afghanistan, Pakistan, FATA and cross-border policy implications;
4. Evidence of the presence and impact of tribal governance systems and social cohesion;
5. Evidence of the impact of Islamabad’s policies on tribal governance systems and social cohesion;
6. General commentary related to FATA, traditional systems and relationship to Islamabad;
7. Vision for the future of the Pakhtun and other tribes of FATA;
8. Current status of relationship (Constitutional, legislative and policy) between Islamabad and FATA – Impacts; and,
9. General comments regarding the concept of “ungoverned space”.
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 12
Appendix 3 represents a summary of the comments/responses received as they relate to these themes. These general themes find expression throughout the paper in addition to more specific information drawn from the literature.
Ethical Considerations and Implications
The research methodology, findings and behaviour of the researcher were consistent with the ethical review approved by the Royal Roads Research Ethics Board. Of specific note, all potential interview subjects were informed of the intent of the research, the ways in which their information would be handled, their right to anonymity and confidentiality and their right to withdraw at any point during the interview. The right to anonymity and confidentiality was waived by all the participants whose information is compiled in the appendices to this paper. All expressed, in one way or another, their comfort with standing by their comments as these were all perspectives they had and would continue to share publically. Of particular note is Dr. Pervez
Hoodbhoy who is an outspoken critic of a number of the Pakistani government’s policies regarding foreign relations, nuclear power and the military.
Assumptions and Limitations
There are both strengths and weaknesses associated with qualitative research and with key informant interviews in particular. One of these, sample size, manages to represent both a strength and a weakness of key informant interviews as generally only a small number of informants are interviewed. A key strength of a smaller sample size is that this serves to address limitations that come with conducting field research in a non-permissive environment with few contacts and difficult travel conditions. As well, given the tight timeframe of 2 weeks, it would have proven difficult to carry out more than a small number of interviews in any case. Finally, The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 13 because each of the interviews took approximately 2 hours plus an hour or two of travel, it was often too difficult to travel to and from an interview, conduct the interview and summarize my notes more than twice in a day.
An inherent weakness of the approach is that with a small number of interviewees it is more difficult to identify bias, or to develop a broad enough view across differing perspectives as to allow for a representative sample. Another core weakness of qualitative research generally, and one which Cho and Trent (2006) have identified this particular methodology as being especially susceptible to, is that related to validity. The fact that much qualitative research tends not to conform to quantitative analyses requirement to be rigorous, systematic and objective or be able to account for process elements like replicability, hypothesis testing and objective procedures sets up the validity arguments for its critics. Nevertheless, the methodology enjoys a number of supporters (Cho and Trent, 2006; Palys, 2003 and Weingand, 1993).
There are a number of elements of the field research that can now benefit from the clarity that only comes with hindsight. Some of the changes suggested through my reflections are within my power to manage for, while others are not. As an example of the former, given the chance to do further work in Pakistan I will, where possible, produce both an audio and video record of the interviews. This is not going to be a possibility in all cases obviously as there will always be people who for a variety of reasons, not the least being personal safety, will not agree to a recording of any sort. The notes taken from each interview, though in the main very good, were not verbatim and I have no doubt that valuable commentary was lost on that basis.
Regarding those things which are either difficult or impossible to control for, most relate to the non-permissive nature of Pakistan and to issues related to the rigours of travel. Under the heading of the non-permissive nature of Pakistan, most limitations are specific to the political The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 14 and security climate of the region; personal safety and the safety of interview subjects being paramount. Many of the interview subjects are high profile, both nationally and internationally, and this sort of exposure seems to bring both a measure of safety by virtue of their profile as well as a need to avoid “over flying” the tolerance of Pakistan’s powerful elites. Pakistan is a tenuous place to live and to continue to be effective as a political activist. The charged political climate forms a persistent backdrop against which people tend to measure the implications of both their actions and their words. Two of the greatest concerns flowing from my interviews were that I might somehow inadvertently compromise either someone’s personal safety or their ability to be effective in contributing to the changes many of them hope for.
Language, though not really an issue amongst the people interviewed for this paper could become an issue had I interviewed people in the more remote communities of FATA or Khyber-
Pakhtunhwa. English is prevalent among academia and the professional class but less so in the marketplaces, restaurants, smaller hotels and villages of the region. Finding a good translator should be considered a necessity should further research be pursued in these areas.
Personal Observations
I came to describe the interviews as coffee shop research as either coffee or tea played a significant role in the context of these discussions. This is an aspect of Pakistani hospitality that was a mainstay of every interaction, whether social or business. Interviews took place everywhere from restaurants and coffee shops to some of Pakistan’s and South Asia’s leading
Universities. The range of people I met and/or interviewed constituted an amazing cross-section of activist academics to Peshawar police captain. Each person I met, no matter their station, The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 15
showed us a great degree of hospitality, respect and patience as I blundered through some of the
most sensitive terrain of Pakistan’s political and social landscape.
There is no question that much of Pakistan should be considered as a non-permissive environment. Pakistan is very much a country with an air of readiness resembling something like a coiled spring. Pakistan has its guns trained both inwards and outwards and, as such, carries the same sort of charged feeling as I have felt in places like Berlin during the squatters riots of the early ‘80’s and as a witness to the Israeli offensive into Lebanon in 1982. Having said that, even in Peshawar where some of the most damaging insurgent attacks in the country have taken place, life continues apace. People still fill the markets and mosques, the street stalls continue to hawk biryani and tikka and the auto-rickshaws continue to fill the streets with their noise and diesel fumes.
A particularly vivid memory of Pakistan took place while standing with my wife on the rooftop of our hotel in Peshawar. To the west we could see the Hindu Khush and hear the sounds of a running gun battle, in the near distance to the north of us, the arc of fireworks marking a celebration of some sort and to the east the skies were torn by ragged slashes of lightning and the low rumble of distant thunder. We were speechless at what would otherwise be a nonsensical combination of events and sensory inputs but, in that context and at that time, offered a bizarre lesson into something fundamental to human character: we persist. There is a brand of tenacity and a resiliency in people that defies logic. In a country that has been described as and is generally accepted as being one of the world’s most dangerous places, people still haggle over the price of halal goat meat and Pakistan’s prospects in the cricket World Cup in 2011. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 16
CHAPTER 3 - THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
In the Beginning
Since it’s founding in 1947, Pakistan has tended towards a national identity that is as much about what it isn’t as what it is. Despite best efforts to distinguish itself strictly on its own terms, Pakistan’s national identity still tends to reflect a perspective that has India as its reference point. As such, the national psyche is formed of raw materials which are comprised of both a reaction to and a reflection of Mother India. The resulting tension, arguably, underpins much of
Pakistan’s orientation to itself and to the region it occupies; whether explicitly, by virtue of territory and territorial aspirations, or implicitly, as embedded in both foreign and domestic policy.
A snapshot of Pakistan’s 63 year history as a Nation State reveals the heart and sinew of the relationships between Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, the U.S. and with itself which reside in and give shape to Pakistan’s creation story.
As is true for all such stories, Pakistan’s is part myth and part fact. It is clear though that with the rise to power of Muslims and Hindus as the two dominant religious and cultural players in the late 19th and early 20th century India, there was an increasing divergence along theological lines that engaged political, economic, educational and many other key areas of India’s life2. In the service of self-interest, and as a by-product of mutual suspicion and fear and the demands of identity formation and maintenance, the distance between the two soon became a national fixation. It’s less certain though whether the divide between them was such that a concentration of political will couldn’t have promoted the sort of social capital necessary to have bridged the
2 Pakistan-History. Encyclopedia of the Nations. Downloaded September 28, 2009 from http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Pakistan-HISTORY.html The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 17
divide. Given the complex social mélange that constitutes India, it is fair to say that India has
shown itself to possess the social and political capital to manage this sort of complexity.
It is a fascinating piece of geo-political trivia that it took a poet to consolidate the social
dissonance of India in the mid-20th century into the “Two Nation” theory which provided the
intellectual fuel in the drive for the creation of a separate Islamic nation. It was the Muslim poet,
Muhammad Iqbal, also known as the “Thinker of Pakistan”, who served as the inspiration to
Muhammad Ali Jinnah. It was Jinnah however who took the “Two Nation” theory beyond a life
as an academic exercise and converted the political momentum it had already garnered into a
full-blown expression of an Islamic Nation separate from India3.
Both time and tide moved in Jinnah’s favour following the end of World War II. With the end of the war, Britain looked to consolidate and rationalize its remaining interests across the globe. The process of ending empire for Britain provided an opportunity for many of Britain’s colonial acquisitions to move forward towards their own objectives for independence. In the closing days of Empire on the Indian sub-continent and, as a consequence of Jinnah’s hard lobbying, Pakistan was annexed from India’s northern flank as East (primarily Bengali) and
West (primarily Punjabi) Pakistan in August of 19474. As was the case with many such acts of
colonial leave-taking, the effect of this rug being pulled out from under the feet of everyone
involved: Muslims, Hindus, Pakistanis and Indians alike proved to be destabilizing both in the
immediate and long-term.
In the final days of Britain’s ability to make decisions regarding the future of the region it made some of the most significant and potentially far-reaching of its stay. Key amongst these were the unresolved disposition of Jammu Kashmir; the separation of West Pakistan from East
3 Pakistan-History. Encyclopedia of the Nations. Downloaded September 28, 2009 from http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Pakistan-HISTORY.html 4 Ibid The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 18
Pakistan; and, confirmation of the Durand Line as Pakistan’s north-western boundary with
Afghanistan. Each of these has, in their way, served to jaundice many of the regional
relationships as well as serving as strategically significant distractions to Pakistan’s evolution as
a modern state. It is worth noting here that Pakistan’s current orientation towards India, China,
Afghanistan, the U.S., Saudi Arabia and militant groups on both sides of the Af/Pak border and
in Jammu Kashmir has been shaped as a reflection of these three key political decisions.
East and West Pakistan were separated by approximately 2000 kilometres of primarily
Hindu India and the two Pakistans were distinguishable mainly along linguistic lines; Punjabi and Bengali. The creation of Pakistan resulted in a demographic re-distribution that forced the migration of up to 20 million people to reflect the new international borders: Indian Muslims into
Pakistan, Hindus from the new Pakistans into India, Punjabi speaking to West Pakistan and
Bengali to East Pakistan. As a consequence of this dislocation, it is believed that as many as 3 million people died or were killed in the ensuing chaos5. Contributing to the overall confusion was the death of Jinnah in 1948 - without his having been able to fully communicate his vision for Pakistan except through only a few speeches and writings - and the assassination of
Pakistan’s first Prime Minister (Liaquat Ali Khan) in 1951. The eruption of open conflict between India and Pakistan over Jammu Kashmir further confounded matters and served to convince Pakistan that India sought to destroy Jinnah’s dream.
As well, Pakistan became increasingly convinced that political and military imbalances between the two countries could only be offset through her choices of friends and allies. With
Islam informing her philosophical perspective and her regional neighbours including Russia and
5 Ibid
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 19
China, it was the U.S. and Saudi Arabia that jumped queue as leading supports to Pakistan6; the
former as a powerful friend and intimidating ally should strained regional relations degrade to
full blown conflict and the latter as co-religionists and for their intellectual alignment, at least
nominally, around the idea of global Islam7. And finally, the ethnic and political separation
between West and East Pakistan which was evident from the first days of Pakistan, began to boil
over and, in 1971, with India’s previously covert support to East Pakistan’s separation surfacing
as direct confrontation, Bangladesh was born at a cost of what is estimated to be in the millions
of lives. The other casualty of the Bangladeshi conflict being the possibility of any sort of
reconciliation in the relationship between India and Pakistan anytime soon.
Pakistan’s domestic governance since 1947 has been characterized by a cycling between
military and civilian control of the machinery of government. It may be more accurate to say that
this cycle has been more one of optics than a deeper, systemic shifting of the political geology of
Pakistani governance. The real power behind government, whether in uniform or not, has
consistently been seen by Haleem (2003) as being that wielded by the military, through a
succession of powerful and autocratic generals, and Pakistan’s intelligence community, primarily
the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Having said that, Cohen (2007) points out
that even while under military rule, Pakistan has for much of its history been described as being moderately Muslim with a democratic orientation. Cohen (2007), points to this apparent paradox as highlighting Pakistan’s long struggle to find a governance model which is both appropriate and balanced with respect to its military and civil elements.
Arguably the projects of governance and Nation-building are more a pre-occupation of
Pakistan’s academic, business and political elites than of the average citizen in the marketplaces
6 Ibid 7 Ibid The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 20 of Peshawar and Lahore. Nevertheless, questions relating to political representation, legal redress, equitable access to state resources – programs and services, equality under the law and equal access to economic, educational and social opportunity were woven throughout many of the conversations I had as I travelled throughout Pakistan. Of interest are comments made during at least one interview in regard to the Political Parties Act and Islamabad’s failure to implement recent amendments permitting its application in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunhwa. To illustrate:
“The Political Parties Act (PPA) is not functional on the ground”; and,
“The PPA was extended to FATA but why is government so reluctant to enact the PPA?”8
It is worth recalling that the region which eventually became present-day Pakistan has been shaped and reshaped by successive waves of migration and conquest. Cultures and civilizations which have either transited or stayed in the Pakistan region have included Greeks,
Arabs, Afghans, Turks, Persians, Mughals, and, of course, Europeans9. Mirroring this reality is the melange of ethnic groupings in Pakistan which, according to the CIA’s 2010 “World
Factbook”, includes the following: Punjab (Punjabi 44.68% of the population); Pakhtun =
15.42%; Sindh (Sindhi, Gujarati, Memoni Kutchi = 14.1%); Baluchistan (Baluchi = 3.57%); and,
Mohariji = 7.57%. This mixture of cultures, ethnicities and languages has both enriched Pakistan and, says the CIA (2010), exacerbated its efforts towards National cohesion by spawning a proliferation of ethnic political parties which identify their political legitimacy with their ethnicity. The result is a political context that is comprised in large measure by Parties intent on furthering the objectives of their specific ethnic constituencies and consequently, the extent to
8 Pers com. See Appendices 2 and 3 9 Pakistan-History. Encyclopedia of the Nations. Downloaded September 28, 2009 from http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Asia-and-Oceania/Pakistan-HISTORY.html The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 21
which this advances a national interest or not is purely as a by-product of serving self-interest.
Further complicating the situation is a mistrust of the Punjabi and Pakhtun dominated military
complex by the under-represented minorities. The CIA’s Factbook (2010) describes Pakistan’s minority groups as viewing the military as openly hostile to their well-being and to the realization of their interests where these run contrary to National interests as determined by the military.
Finally, in order to round out this quick 360 degree perspective on Pakistan’s domestic environment, it’s necessary to develop some measure of understanding of Islam’s political expression in the country. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan does not, in its intent, waver from a clear and certain sense of itself as a key player in global Islam. From its very beginnings, Islam has been both alpha and omega and the centering point for Pakistan’s trajectory towards the global geo-political position it believes is its’ birthright. However, the difference between intention and implementation has since 1947 continued to trouble that trajectory. Stephen Cohen
(2002) has stated that the biggest conflict in Pakistan is not a civilizational clash but one between different concepts of Islam with the result that too much time and effort has been devoted to making Pakistan fit an abstract and shifting model of Islam.
The Sunnis have always been the dominant sect of Islam in Pakistan making up between
75% and 85% of all Muslims and with Shias making up the difference at between 15% and 25%.
Across these two groups is a wide divergence of views from ultra-conservative to ultra-liberal, however it is the face of radical Islam that has most captured the world’s attention. Interestingly,
Cohen (2002) indicates that radical Islamic groups, though well capable of creating the sort of chaos that provides them with media coverage, do not actually enjoy broad political support within the country. Given that the most radical expression of Islam in the region tends to find its The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 22 roots in Saudi Wahhabism, it seems possible if not likely, that legitimacy lies at the centre of this mixed political support. The theme of legitimacy will be re-visited later in the paper.
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA)
The specific context for my work in Pakistan is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA). This area of Pakistan, located in the Northwestern part of the country, is spread over 27,220 square kilometers and runs in a generally northeast to southwest direction along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (See Map 1). The area contains an estimated population of 5.6 million people, the majority of whom are Muslims of Pakhtun origin, which represent the single biggest tribal grouping in Pakistan, though as seen earlier, not the largest ethnic group. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 23
Map 1 – Pakistan and FATA
From Shinwari, N.A. 2010. Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Volume IV. Reprinted with Permission
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 24
FATA is characterized by a harsh geography, extremes of both heat and cold, very little infrastructure outside a few main cities, poverty and low levels of education. Markey (2008) describes many of the tribes as being geographically isolated as a consequence of terrain and other conditions of travel which complicates access to health care, education and the other limited services provided by the state. Many of the conditions described above have been the reality of the tribal people of FATA for hundreds of years and according to Markey (2008) have produced a people that have been characterized as being fiercely independent and intimidating and fully committed warriors. A difficult geography to govern populated by a people that do not bend willingly or easily to any form of external authority. These two abiding constants have, and continue to, set the terms of engagement between the tribal people of FATA and generations of
British, Indian and Pakistani bureaucrats and politicians.
The Tribes of FATA and Governance Under Britain
For administrative purposes, FATA is divided into 7 political units: Bajaur, Mohamand,
Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North and South Waziristan Agencies and six Frontier Regions:
Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. This arrangement dates generally back to the time of British rule in around 1849, however three of the agencies -
Mohmand, Orakzai and Bajaur - and the Frontier Regions were established after Pakistan’s
Independence in 1947 (Khan, 2009). With the ink barely dry on the agreements confirming
Pakistan’s independence in 1947, the autonomous status of FATA was accepted by Quaid-i-
Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948. This event cemented a long-standing and largely dysfunctional relationship between a central governing authority in first, British India, and then, The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 25
Pakistan, and the tribal areas at the margins of both territory and of state control; the origins of
which go back to the mid 19th century.
Under this arrangement, colonial administrators acted primarily in an oversight role but never fully controlled the region. Control, to the extent that it existed at all, was exercised through a combination of British-appointed agents and local tribal elders10. The division of
authorities in the region ostensibly provided the communities and their leadership with the ability
to govern internal affairs according to pre-existing tribal codes. At the same time, the colonial
administration held sole authority for anything that pertained to the security of British India in
areas described as being ‘protected’ and ‘administered’11. Tribal leadership and many of the
decisions they took was held in close alignment with Britain’s interests in FATA, for example to
frustrate Russia’s expansionist interest, through a variety of coercive tools; the primary one being the giving or withholding of power and money12.
Despite best efforts however, the region and its people continued to represent an
inelegant and acutely problematic instrument of Britain’s policies as they related to constraining
Russia’s designs for India. Ongoing revolts and the ever increasing fractiousness of many of the
tribes finally forced Britain’s hand and new instruments of control were created to address this
reality. The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) represent Britain’s legislative response to the
problem and were created in the latter half of the 1800’s and further refined in 1901 (Hunter,
1881). The FCR and their implications for the people, politics, economy and social integrity of
FATA will be discussed later in the paper.
10 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 1998. Downloaded October 4, 2010 from http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=84 11 Ibid 12 Abbas, 2006 – As cited in: Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 1998. Downloaded October 4, 2010 from http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=92 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 26
Table 1, “The Agencies and Tribes of FATA”, identifies the 7 Political Units (Agencies) and 6 Frontier Regions and the tribal groupings that occupy each. A shortcoming in my research, due primarily to the limited scope of my paper, relates to the brevity of my overview of the tribes. That said, for my purposes it is likely sufficient to bring a sense of definition to the
Pakhtun and the specific areas they occupy as a prelude to discussing general governance, political and judicial structures for the Pakhtuns. In this context, it is possible to avoid undertaking a deep sociological or anthropological analysis of the tribes and sub-tribes. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 27
Table 1 – The Agencies and Tribes of FATA13
Khyber Agency First established in 1879 and covers an area of 2576 sq. km. It has an estimated population of 546,730 and is comprised of people from Afridis, Shinwaris, Mulagooris and Shalmanis tribes. Kurram Agency This Agency was created in 1892, a year before the demarcation of the Durand Line. It covers an area of 2296 sq. km and has a population of 448,310. It is inhabited by several tribes, the major tribal composition being the Turi, Bangash, Parachinari and Masozai - both Sunni and Shia sects. South Waziristan Agency Two agencies were created along the Pak-Afghan border in 1895 through the division of what became known as Waziristan. South Waziristan, the largest of all tribal agencies at 6,620 sq. km, is inhabited by a population of around 429,841 persons. The major tribal composition is derived from the Mehsud and Ahmadzai Wazir tribes. North Waziristan Agency Created in 1895 along with South Waziristan, the North Waziristan Agency is the second largest agency in size, covering an area of 4,707 sq. km. It has a population of 361,246 people mainly from the Utmanzai Wazir, Dawar, Saidgai, Kharasin and Gurbaz tribes. Mohmand Agency The Mohmand Agency was created in 1951, four years after the creation of Pakistan as sovereign state in 1947. It covers an area of 2,296 sq. km. and its population is estimated to be around 334,453. The major tribes inhabiting the area are the Mohmand, Safi and Uthmankhel tribes. Bajaur Agency Bajaur Agency, the smallest in size at 1290 sq. km, was created in 1973. It has a population of 595,227 persons with tribal composition drawing from the Uthmankhel and Tarkani tribes. Aurakzai Agency The Aurakzai Agency is the only tribal agency that does not share a border with Afghanistan. Created in 1973, it covers an area of 1538 sq. km and has a population of 225,441 persons. The major tribal groups are the Aurakzai and the Bangash – both Shia and Sunni sects. FR Peshawar (Tribal Area FR Peshawar covers a total area of 261 sq. km, with a population of Adjoining Peshawar around 53,841. The Afridi tribe is the only major tribe inhabiting FR District) Peshawar. FR Kohat (Tribal Area FR Kohat covers a total area of is 446 sq. km and has a population of Adjoining Kohat District) around 88,456. The Afridi tribe is the only major tribe inhabiting FR Kohat. FR Bannu (Tribal Area FR Bannu covers a total area of 745 sq. km and has a population of around Adjoining Bannu District 19593. The Wazir tribe is the only major tribe inhabiting FR Bannu. FR Lakki Marwat (Tribal FR Lakki Marwat covers a total area of 132 sq. km and has a population of Area Adjoining Lakki around 6987. The Bhittani tribe is the only major tribe inhabiting FR Marwat District) Lakki Marwat. FR Tank (Tribal Area FR Tank coves an area of 1,221 square kilometres and has a population of Adjoining Tank District around 27,212. The Bhittani tribe is the only major tribe inhabiting FR Tank. FR D.I. Khan (Tribal Area FR D.I. Khan covers a total area of 2,008 sq. km and has a population of Adjoining Dera Ismail around 38,990. The Ustran and Sherani are the major tribes inhabiting FR Khan District D.I. Khan.
13 Adapted from, “Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas”. Downloaded November 21, 2010 from http://www.understandingfata.org/about-u-fata.php The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 28
FATA: The People, the Politics and the Land
The contested border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, known as the Durand Line, represents a colonial decision borne of the same sort of mixed motives found throughout the former colonies and protectorates of the British Empire. According to Hunter (1881), on realizing the strategic importance of the region early in their tenure there, the British demarcated this area as the buffer zone between British India and Russia, specifically against the threat of
Tsarist expansion. As has so often been the case, the motives flowing from a need to perpetuate and maintain an empire are not generally those that have the preservation of cultures and communities at heart. Perhaps what is more salient to my research is that the Pakhtun people view the current border between Afghanistan and Pakistan as being consequential only to the extent that it acts as an irritant to free travel to families and communities which have, for hundreds of years occupied both sides of the Hindu Kush. “After this, freedom of movement [for the tribal people] became an issue…became the issue” was one comment received during the interviews which highlights the continued frustration experienced by the Pakhtun of FATA and
K-P and illustrates the long arc of these sorts of decisions made during another time and in another context14.
Parthasarathy (2010) points to the entrenchment of the colonial policies which produced the Durand Line in the first place as guaranteeing exactly the sort of territorial uncertainty that continues to exacerbate relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan to this day. This uncertainty along the border has also contributed directly to problems associated with U.S./Afghan;
U.S./Pakistan; Pakistan/Pakhtun; India/Pakistan and India/Afghan relations. In fact, there are virtually no relationships in the entire region, and many that lie beyond, that have not been affected by the confusion of security objectives, jurisdictions, governance functions and
14 Pers com. See Appendices 2 and 3 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 29
Constitutional relationships that produced the Durand Line in the first place. This is particularly true in those areas defined as Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (the former North-West Frontier Province) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Finally, the implications of this contrived division of the Pakhtun and others tribes in the region, have served to confound and confuse the issue of western aid and other forms of intervention in the region; including, but certainly not limited to, stabilization and reconstruction initiatives.
Contextualizing Pakistan
In order to understand the importance of Pakistan’s tribal areas it’s necessary to place
Pakistan in the much broader geo-political context of which it is a part. This requires a consideration of Afghanistan, India, China, the hotly contested Jammu and Kashmir and Iran.
Tibet and Burma also merit attention as being additional hotspots in the regional constellation.
This small body of countries accounts for two of central Asia’s giants, India and China, both in terms of population and economies, and at least three of the world’s nuclear powers, Pakistan,
India and China with Iran emerging as a probable fourth before too long. With this context, many military strategists and analysts, including Rubin and Rashid (2008), view the region as being the world’s most likely arena for a nuclear conflict. Potential participants in such a conflict include
Pakistan and India and India and China. In addition, any perceived threats to Iran’s security, which may originate from just about anyone who: a) seeks access and/or control of their oil reserves, currently ranked as third worldwide (Iran Energy Data, Statistics and Analysis. 2010); or, b) are in need of a warm-water, all season port – with Rubin and Rashid (2008) identifying
Russia as the strong front runner in this category – represents yet another possible nuclear flashpoint in the region. At this point, it is a matter of guesswork as to how a nuclear-armed Iran The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 30
would respond to such threats. Finally, the destabilizing effect of the Afghanistan conflict serves
to exacerbate already strained regional relationships and this, in turn, reduces the prospects for an
elegant resolution to the Afghanistan conflict which also results in reducing regional tensions to
somewhere between unlikely and impossible.
Having developed some insight into the genesis of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the
cultural and political genetic material of which it’s formed and of FATA and the critical interface it represents, the following chapter allows for a deeper view into the socio-political machinery that governs the affairs of FATA and its citizenry. This more attenuated focus will allow for a better understanding of the flaws located in a view of FATA as being ungoverned and of the ways in which engagement with the tribes of FATA may be improved by capitalizing on the social glue which they embody. The intent and effect of the FCR is also examined as a tool for constraining the aspirations of the tribes, enforcing controls necessary to meet other political objectives and the social perturbations that have resulted from the ways in which the FCR has been applied. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 31
CHAPTER 4 - PAKISTAN, FATA AND THE PAKHTUN
I will restrict my review of the history of the Pakhtun people to a brief overview and a snapshot of the territories they currently occupy and of the various tribal sub-groups that make up the Pakhtun tribes.
According to James W. Spain and Sher Muhammad Mohmand, there are essentially two contested views on the origins of the Pakhtun: One that follows an essentially religious orientation and another that follows a genealogical/anthropologic pathway. The former suggests that the Pakhtun originated with Qais Abdur Rashid, “the thirty-seventh lineal descendant of Saul of Israel”. Qais was said to have lived in what is now Afghanistan in the 7th century, converted to Islam, was personally blessed by the Holy Prophet Mohammad and that the three major families of the Pakhtuns are said to have descended from Qais’ three sons. The Pakhtun themselves tend to support this theory of their origin and are said to refer to themselves as “Bani
Israel” which means, “Children of Israel” in Arabic.
A slight variation on this theme proposed by Johnson and Mason (2008) identifies the members of the Pakhtun hill Tribes of FATA as descendents of Karlan, an orphan who was adopted as the fourth son of Qais Abdur Rashid and not one of the blood-related three sons. The latter theory takes the perspective that the Pakhtun are descended from the Aryan race and formed their specific branch in about 1500 BCE. The Aryan branch that was destined to become the Pakhtun displaced the Dravidians in a region known as Bakhtar. The Dravidians fled to several parts of India and are still found throughout India.
Whichever theory of the origin of the Pakhtun one chooses to follow, there were certainly tribal people in this region of Pakistan there to meet Alexander when he arrived with his armies The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 32
in about 327 BCE. That said, as has been mentioned the region currently known as Pakistan, and
more specifically FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunhwa, has seen its fair share of conquerors, explorers, carpet-baggers, colonizers and guests. The resultant cultural and theological DNA that runs through Pakistan’s blood has produced a people that, as evidenced from their continued presence in the region, are both resilient and accustomed to meeting or outlasting the challenges that must have, at times, produced enormous social upheaval.
The Pakhtun people and their tribes comprise the single biggest constituency of FATA and dominate the political, economic and social landscape of the region. In terms of their geographic reach, the Pakhtun are found throughout both Pakistan and Afghanistan and, as such, this must factor as a key consideration in virtually any sort of strategic initiative in either country. Nawaz (2009) suggests that this fact tends, at times, to be either lost or under-valued in favour of more compelling theories related to Islam’s global aspirations. In addition, Johnson and Mason (2008) identify the Taliban on either side of the Durand line as being comprised primarily of Durrani Pakhtun, the vast majority of which are Muslims of the Hanafi Sunni tradition. There is a strong current of nationalism which runs deeply within the cultural DNA of the Pakhtun people and this transcends the Afghan-Pakistan border, in fact, this transcends all borders15. These realities, says the International Crisis Group (2003), should stand paramount in
any analysis of the road forward to stabilizing the border regions between Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Although it is tempting to view the Pakhtun as a homogenous body there remains a high
degree of difference across the tribes. Johnson and Mason (2008) identify the total number of
Pakhtun people worldwide as being approximately 25 million with an estimated 350 major tribes
distributed amongst the five major tribal groupings: Durrani tribes, the Ghilzai (or Ghalji) tribes,
15 Pers comm. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 33 the Sarbani or Eastern tribes, the Ghurghusht tribes, and the Karlanri (or Karlani), sometimes referred to as the Hill Tribes.
Pakhtunwali and a Social Code as a Social Glue
Despite the reality of difference, on the basis of a shared history of resistance and sustained conflict and the pervasive influence of Pakhtunwali, a powerfully persuasive code of social conduct, there is much which serves to bind the Pakhtun to each other; particularly in the face of a common threat. The following from Tanner (as cited in Johnson and Mason, 2008) bears simple testimony to the character of the Pakhtun: an elderly Pakhtun tribesman, in conversation with Mountstuart Elphinstone, a British official visiting Afghanistan in 1809, is quoted as saying, “We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood . . . we will never be content with a master.” A long history of resistance to aggressors and
Pakhtunwali’s core tenets of honour, self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, forgiveness, and tolerance, implies a formidable element of social cohesion worthy of consideration.
According to Globalsecurity.org, Pakhtunwali is said to have originated with the
Pakhtun’s nomadic origins, when individuals and families depended on each other, not on some external set of laws, for security and sustenance; in this context, refusing to provide hospitality to a stranger often equated to a death sentence. Overlooking the importance of Pakhtunwali to the
Pakhtun people and its implications when considering any sort of intervention efforts in FATA, whether the focus is counter-insurgency, development or otherwise, will almost certainly result in a flawed approach. Pakhtunwali is emblematic of not only the hearts and minds but also the sinew and bone of the Pakhtun people. Table 2 – Pakhtunwali Codes of Conduct, adapted from The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 34
Global Security’s, Pakhtunwali / Pakhtunwaali, sets out several of the codified elements of
Pakhtunwali and attempts to illustrate their application.
TABLE 2 – THE PAKHTUNWALI CODES OF CONDUCT
Nang - honour / bravery Is foremost in Pakhtunwali and is articulated in a starkly black-and-white, all-or-nothing manner. Without honour, life for a Pakhtun is not worth living. For instance, according to Pakhtunwali, it is the absolute duty of men to protect the respectability of women and to protect the integrity of the homeland.
Badal - revenge Closely related to the notion of honour, Badal revolves around zan (women), zar (wealth), and zameen / zamin (land). Offenses to one's honour must be avenged or there is no honour. It is said that the responsibility to address certain wrongs may extend out across future generations. One Pakhtun proverb goes, “I took my revenge after a hundred years, and I only regret that I acted in haste.”
Merana / Mairrana - bravery and Ghairat / Speaks to the need to maintain one's pride as zeal well as that of his tribe's. Ghairat and Mairrana are synonyms. Merana means an act of zealousness.
Tura - sword Tura requires all Pakhtuns to answer a plea for help even if it involves risking their own life. Turzan is courageous action. Possessing Tura means being courageous and a true warrior. Tura is considered sacred.
Nanawati /nanawatey / nanawaty / Refers to the remedy of feuds. The word Nanawate - refuge / reconciliation / literally means "going in" or entering into repentance / sanctuary someone's house or Hujra. This is to let both parties fight till the same number are killed on each side, then their neighbours step in and effect a reconciliation called "Nanawati” or “Nannawatt”. The party who first draws blood is looked on as the aggressor, whatever the provocation, and he must pay the expense of a feast and provide some sheep, cloth or, potentially, unmarried women as atonement to The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 35
the others. These young women are not viewed in a lesser light but are married and well treated. With a marriage being so expensive, to receive a bride or brides for the young men in marriage, without expense, represents high value compensation.
Teega - truce A temporary truce in a feud arranged by a tribal jirga or the jirga arranged by the government which is symbolized by the setting out of a Teega. “Teega'” literally means a stone which is fixed at a certain place between the parties and symbolizes the sanctity of the truce until such time as resolution is complete.
Mashar - elderly, leader The origin of the word “Mashar” is said to come from moshe or, Moses and refers to respect for elders.
Melmastia / melmasthia / melmastiya - Another key element of Pakhtunwali and is a hospitality means of showing respect, friendship, and alliance. A complex etiquette associated with the requirement to give refuge to anyone, even one's enemy, for as long as the person is within one's home. These codes are related to the concept of honour, as the host gains honour by serving his guest, while the person who places himself under another's protection is considered weaker. Refuge must extend to the point of being willing to sacrifice one's own life to defend one's guest.
Panah - protection Related to Melmastia and means to take someone into personal protection, even if that person is a criminal or outlaw. It is not unusual for a murderer to ask for and receive panah from the family of their victim. During panah he enjoys equal rights and status but when he leaves their house, he can be killed in revenge and the murderer’s family cannot claim any recompense under the custom of badal (revenge). The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 36
The Tribes of FATA and Traditional Governance Norms and Forms
Just as it seems there are very few simple conversations to be had about Pakistan, there are few, if any, simple answers. That said, understanding the complexity of a problem often begins with first making the attempt to understand that which may be easiest to access. In this case, that part of the social framework which is located in tribal governance structures may represent such an access point.
The traditional systems of governance among FATA’s tribes form both the material which has served to hold communities together through incredible social upheaval while at the same time presenting Britain with the levers necessary to manipulate and control those same communities. One aspect of the genius of Britain’s colonial policies has been their ability to divine and then exploit the fracture lines within cultures and communities. In the case of FATA’s tribes, these were determined to be located within the very structures which gave form and functionality to the communities.
I have found it difficult to discuss governance forms and norms in FATA using just a single voice - either past or present tense – as these structural elements reach into a past that pre- dates Britain’s influences while at the same time reflecting the ways in which the traditional structures have more recently been manipulated to serve social re-engineering objectives. That said, I will begin with an overview of some of the traditional elements in place and then move to a discussion of the ways in which colonial policies have capitalized on these to achieve their own ends.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, FATA is governed at the “local government” level through tribal representatives known as Maliks (representatives of the tribes) and Lungi Holders The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 37
(representatives of sub-tribes or clans). Traditionally a Malik/Lungi Holder was recognised as a
person commanding the most authority and influence in his tribe, and was responsible for all aspects of stewardship of his respective area. In this way the Malik’s authority extended over a specific land base of varying size and resource value16. The Khassadars (local police) have
responsibility for maintaining law and order in the tribal area. Khassadars nominally report to the
Political Agent – discussed later - for direction and to confirm the delegated authority ostensibly
conferred on them. For more serious offence requiring a larger response, either in terms of
enforcement or remedy, a lashkar or local militia force might be called into play.
The jirga represented the foundation on which the tribal system of governance was built.
Among other things it was the jirga that chose the Maliks and which provided them with their
mandate to manage common community problems. Consequently, the Malik’s tenure was
dependent on first obtaining and then retaining the support of the jirga. This provided for a check
on the Malik’s authority by virtue of the community-based, consensual model represented by the
jirga. Of course, the Malik is also bound by the codes of Pakhtunwali.
The following section relies heavily on the work of Johnson and Mason (2008) which
provides for a clear and concise description of Pakhtunwali and its interface with systems of
tribal justice.
Pakhtunwali or “The way of the Pakhtun” is a set of values and norms for behaviour that
define the Pakhtun culture and guide the actions of individuals, communities and, in fact, all
Pakhtun people. This incredibly robust set of values and norms places the salah-mashwarah, or
“discussion,” as the main forum within which important community issues are discussed and
resolved. Resolution is predicated on consensus of the group. By extension, it is the group
16 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 1998. Downloaded October 4, 2010 from http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=87 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 38
process and the consensus decisions reached which invest the process with the power to compel
resolution and the persuasive capacity to engender support for decisions across families and
communities.
It is the jirga where issues of a higher order are resolved, for example, murders or issues
related to territorial encroachment. The literature provides for two explanations of how a jirga is
constituted. Depending on the author, a jirga is either a gathering of all the male members of the
tribe or tribes (Johnson and Mason, 2008) or it is a group of a few selected elders who gather
together to hear, discuss and resolve issues17. The difference appears to turn on the related but distinct roles of a larger group which hears the “case” of the aggrieved parties and renders a
judgement and a gathering of elders which is called to bring closure to the process through a sort
of ritual “ratification”.
The jirga is comprised of a series of ritualized steps: selection of an elders committee,
numerous meetings, investigation and, of course, salah-mashwarah (discussion), deliberation and
finally a consensus-based judgement. To initiate the jirga’s work, the elders place a rock between
the homes of the disputants to signify a period of truce which must be strictly adhered to. It is
under the protection of this codified truce that the jirga conducts its business. Key amongst the
ensuing series of steps to be undertaken is the commitment by the parties to both the process and
its outcome(s). As a reflection of the code of nang and Pakhtunwali, this commitment binds the
disputant’s entire family. Once started, the investigation, salah-mashwarah and deliberations may
go on for weeks. Determining outcome alone, including any forms of compensation, may go on
for days. As mentioned, a decision is not deemed to have been reached until it is one that is
supported by all. This includes meeting with the families to obtain their support for the decision
17 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 1998. Downloaded October 4, 2010 from http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=92 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 39
and any related penalties or compensation prior to the final, solemnifying, meeting of the elders where the decision is announced. According to the dictates of tradition, the judgment will fall
within Pakhtun norms for appropriate compensation that may include the transfer of land,
money, or a female family member to the offended family. The members of the two families
never appear in the same room at the same time.
By virtue of the processes of the jirga, and the way in which decisions are reached,
rejection of the terms of settlement by either family is rare. In those rare instances where a family
chooses not to act according to the judgement of the jirga, the remedy may include expelling an
individual or a family from the area, and confiscating, destroying or setting fire to homes and
property. In these cases, the male members of the tribe band together as a lashkar or local militia
to enforce the decision.
As well, in contrast to the situation found throughout much of the rest of Pakistan, the
jirga operated under the principle that justice must follow quickly on the heels of the injustice
giving rise to the complaint18. As a result, cases were resolved locally and quickly and the
objective, rather than being to ascribe responsibility and mete out justice was to ensure a process
that was seen by all to be both fair and just. The comment: “The Jirga is the heart and soul of legitimacy”, and, “provides recognition and acceptance,” is reflective of this belief19.
Unfortunately, the opinion that the poor and more vulnerable segments of society cannot
afford to convene a jirga is being increasingly expressed by tribal people in FATA. There are a number of obligations for the convenor(s) of a jirga, including providing hospitality, which are increasingly beyond the reach of most ordinary people. Even where the financial means test has been met by a Party to a grievance there is the belief that, in most cases, jirga decisions favour
18 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 1998. Downloaded October 4, 2010 from http://fata.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=56&Itemid=87 19 Pers comm.. See Appendices 2 and 3 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 40 richer or more influential parties. As well, apparently more and more people feel that: “9 out of
10 Jirgas will find in favour of the more powerful”, that, “the Jirgas are subject to corruption”, and, that, “it is understood that the most powerful will always win and justice will not be served.20” As I will explain, this in part reflects the effects of British colonial policies and the ways in which these displaced or co-opted traditional systems.
Traditional Governance and the Impact of Externalities
As discussed in chapter 2, ongoing skirmishes, localized revolts and an increased need to control the overt resistance of many of the tribes finally resulted in Britain’s introduction of the
Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) in the latter half of the 1800’s. Hunter (1881) makes note of the final amending touches to the FCR in 1901 and it has been virtually unchanged since then.
The regulations were used in such a way as to exploit existing or potential fault lines in communities and between tribes and to promote inequalities across FATA. Patronage and favouritism and meting out rewards or punishment on the basis of favour rather than justice were common practices then and now (Hunter, 1881). When read in concert with Pakistan’s
Constitution, the primarily Pakhtun people of FATA were and continue to be relegated to a category of sub-class Pakistani citizens. One of the effects of which has been to make it easy for the Pakhtun to view themselves first as Pakhtun and, only as a distant second, Pakistani21.
Another consequence of this policy approach has been to generate an acute resentment and mistrust of government in FATA and Islamabad that has served to sustain a deep sense of injustice in the Pakhtun people22.
20 Pers comm.. See Appendices 2 and 3 21 Pers comm.. 22 Pers comm. See Appendices 2 and 3 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 41
With this as backdrop, I look now at the way in which the FCR has manipulated indigenous governance systems in FATA to continue to advance outdated, anachronistic policy objectives that find their origins in British India.
The FCR represent a hybridization of colonial policies extant through the area at the time coupled with traditional tribal governance and juridical structures and practices. The resulting system manages to take some of the legitimizing aspects of the latter and the command and control objectives of the former to create a highly manipulative and, except as viewed through the narrowest of lenses, only marginally effective system of frontier governance.
It was on the basis of experience with its application from the time it was created until
1901 that the FCR was amended in that year. However, while the people of FATA have endured large shifts in political and other contexts, requiring radical adjustments in order simply to maintain and sustain themselves, the FCR has remained essentially unchanged since 1901.
Markey (2008) notes that many people, including Pakistan’s Prime Minister Gilani, identify repeal of the FCR entirely as being one of the key elements of a renewed and re-invigorated relationship between Pakistan’s central government and the people and tribes of FATA.
As has been discussed, the FCR had a relatively narrow set of principles guiding its creation and implementation. A key structural attribute of the regulations reflected an ongoing debate within Britain’s colonial office as to the correct and appropriate “distance” between the governed and the governor. In essence, the dispute revolved around the question of whether a more or less direct relationship should exist between Britain’s colonial representatives and the people and resources they controlled. In the case of FATA, the prevailing argument was that governance would be given effect through pre-existing structures while still serving to further the objectives of King and country; less direct control through the use of local intermediaries. As is The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 42 usually the case with these sorts of social policies, there was no singularity of purpose or objective to the FCR. Running in parallel to the need to increase control exerted in FATA through the use of proxies, the approach also reflected Britain’s need for a buffer between India and Russia’s territorial ambitions. With that as an intellectual aside, a more meaningful perspective in the context of this paper is what operationalizing FCR has meant to FATA and the tribes.
The FCR were created to “control and suppress crimes” but, according to Ali (1999), the provision or promotion of justice did not feature in its design. This depiction of the FCR is benign as compared to the view of others who have commented on the FCR. For instance, Iqbal
(2009) on behalf of the Centre for Public Policy Research, describes the FCR as an “instrument to subjugate tribal people” and who’s purpose, in serving the needs of British rule, was to
“impose inhumane conditions on the tribal people”.
In short, the Frontier Crimes Regulations prescribed special procedures for the tribal areas which were distinct from the criminal and civil laws that were in force elsewhere in British
India. Given the history of the FCR in FATA and an analysis of the explicit and implicit goals of the regulations, it isn’t difficult to see why this was/is so. One of the nested objectives behind the regulations was to create the conditions for promoting social divisions within the Pakhtun tribes and, in doing so, impede their ability to mount a cohesive reaction to colonial rule in the border regions. Another was to foster a sort of general instability throughout the region that would serve to maintain the area as a place rich with uncertainties for travellers of all kinds; whether legitimate or otherwise. In this way, a measure of chaos and confusion was maintained in order to impede the flow of people and goods and, in the worst case scenario, Russia’s ability to easily access India from the north. Unfortunately, many of the side effects of this particular border The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 43
management prescription often referred to as “strategic depth”, actually served to promote the
illegal movement of contraband and people by creating significant economic incentives for doing
so.
With reference to the earlier description of the various traditional structures of
governance and social justice, the effect of the FCR on the indigenous governance systems and
the people of FATA will now be examined.
Under the current FCR system it is the Political Agent (PA) who wields penultimate control over virtually all aspects of governance and justice in the areas over which he is assigned.
Through the FCR, the PA has discretionary authority over both police and the courts and is invested with executive powers (International Crisis Group, 2006). In turn, the political agent, as a reflection of the Constitutional relationship between the federal government of Pakistan and
FATA, acts by virtue of direct delegation from the President of Pakistan, who ultimately controls
FATA through a variety of legislative tools available through the Constitution and through the
FCR.
One of the most insidious of the Federal Crimes Regulations, and the one most often
cited in the context of human rights abuses, is 21, the collective responsibility clause. Through the application of clause 21 collective punishments can extend across a whole tribe because of the actions of an individual tribe member. Khoso (2010) illustrates this in referencing section 23
of the FCR, in which all the members of a village are considered responsible for a murder if a
dead body is found in their village while under sections 22 and 23, fines may be imposed on an entire community for the crimes of a single person. Note that more serious crimes may call for remedies that may include expelling an individual or a family from the area, and confiscating, destroying or setting fire to homes and property. The notion of collective punishment is contrary The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 44 to international law, yet it is the most-widely applied regulation in the FATA, and the one that produces the most outrage from citizens. For example, in 2004 more than seventy children were jailed for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives (Khoso 2010). In fact, if even suspected of contemplating a crime such as murder, under section 40 of the FCR, the PA can jail a person for up to 3 years in order to prevent the possibility of the murder taking place (International
Crisis Group, 2006). International Crisis Group (2006) also points to the absence of due process under the FCR and which further compounds an injustice such as this in that there is no right to legal representation and no right to either present evidence or cross-examine witnesses.
It is fascinating to learn in Ali (1999) that in 1957, a year which pre-dates the
Birmingham Campaign in the southern U.S. by 6 years, Justice Kayani rendered a decision
(Khan Abdul Akbar Khan vs. Deputy Commissioner Peshawar) regarding the application of some of the FCR provisions to only Pakhtuns and Baluchis as amounting to, “racial discrimination and is as open to criticism as discrimination between a Negro and a white man.”
Ali identifies another challenge of the FCR in 1979, before the Shariat Bench of the Baluchistan
High Court, where the FCR was described as being, “found [to be] repugnant to Islam”. These make it all the more difficult to understand the nature of the delays to FCR reform that have held this process static for years.
Whatever else can be said about the history of the FCR in FATA and the policies and strategies these served, Johnson and Mason (2008) provide insights into how the Pakistani policy of subverting Pakhtun tribal structures became quite concerted in the early 1970s. It was after the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 that this took on a new and highly attenuated focus. At this point the need to maintain strategic depth took on some very well defined dimensions for the
Pakistanis and crystallized a number of their worst fears regarding the Afghan-Pakistan border The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 45 and Pakistan’s relations with at least 4 of the world’s giants: the U.S.A., the former U.S.S.R.,
China and India.
The International Crisis Group (2006) notes that the FCR borrows against the legitimacy of the traditional tribal structures to provide the illusion that the tribes enjoy an un-extinguished expression of self-determination and self-government through their own systems of governance and justice. Under the FCR however, the local Maliks are selected under a process which ultimately requires the endorsement of the federal government through the authority delegated to the PA. The comments, “The political agent is next to God”, “His power needs to be restricted”, heard during the field interviews, speak directly to the sense of the loss of power invested in this traditional seat of tribal authority. On this basis, Iqbal (2009) repositions the Malik’s role relative to the PA when he says that the Maliks are designated primarily as intermediaries between the members of individual tribes and the colonial authorities, and assist in the implementation of government policies. However, by capitalizing on their traditional leadership role the Maliks are also key to providing a measure of legitimacy to government’s actions as implemented through their proxies.
The Maliks
Recall that traditionally the Malik’s tenure and authority flowed through the designation and support of the jirga. In this way the authorities that came with the role were fluid, depending on the specific demands on the role, and the Malik was accountable to the community as represented by the male members of the tribe through the jirga. Should a Malik act against the interests of the community they could easily be replaced by another community member based on merit as determined by the jirga members. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 46
In the system created by the British and perpetuated by Pakistani leadership post-
independence, Maliks are conferred with official status and, in the absence of a catastrophic
failure to perform says Marten (2009), the position is hereditary and passed along patrilineal
lines. Maliks and Lungi Holders are provided with an allowance to act in their roles as political
intermediaries. In this way says Ali (1999), the allowances also serve to bind the Maliks and
Lungi Holders to the state government by developing both a sense of dependency and of
obligation. It is common practice to withhold or reduce payments to the Maliks if they do not act
according to dictate. Marten (2009) then goes on to tell us that by undercutting the system of checks and balances inherent in the jirgas, the British and Pakistanis have put the “new” Maliks in strong positions of power which is then further supported by their ability to attract external supports from other sources. This effectively weakens the hold over the Maliks by reducing their dependency on the allowance and puts the Maliks in a power position within FATA that they would not otherwise have had. As well, suggests Marten (2009), by virtue of their relationship with the state as represented by the PA, FATA’s citizens have to look to the Malik for his favourable distribution of food rations, local building contracts, foreign travel visas, educational support, general employment and other opportunities. The net result is an intrusive and manipulative relationship between the central government and the tribal systems.
“[There is a] possibility to adapt the Jirga system, but it is too often manipulated by [government] officials” and, “There are people serving [now] as Maliks who would not otherwise be eligible for the role without the changes brought through central government policies.23”
It isn’t difficult to see that simply being able to identify the strings doesn’t easily lend
itself to any certainty as to who the puppeteer is at any given point. What can be determined
23 Pers. Comm. See Appendices 2 and 3 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 47 however is that the ordinary people of FATA do not occupy a position that commands much control under the current arrangements. This is an important consideration when trying to understand the precursors for a population that, at times, seems well primed for the stability and predictability offered by external agents such as the Taliban. It becomes easier to contemplate the possibility that even another illegitimate actor, under the conditions described, might seem preferable to a system that offers little except the requirement to capitulate.
The relationship between the PA and Malik may be a lot of things but, in the final analysis what it isn’t is equitable. When shove transcends push, the PA carries the weight of the
President at his shoulder. On the other hand, the Malik puts himself in a position to make demands for more funding by simply doing nothing, or instructing those who benefit from his patronage to frustrate Islamabad’s objectives. It’s an awkward system that seems purpose-built to promote a number of potential abuses, not the least of which is corruption and patronage.
The Ascendancy of the Mullahs
Although there has been a long-standing affection for powerful and charismatic Mullahs by the Pakhtun, the rise of the Mullah in present day Pakistan is the outcome of some very contemporary political manoeuvring. All the usual suspects, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, the intelligence services of both these countries and the Pakhtun, are said to be connected to one of the many back stories as to why things are as they are in the border region.
Afghanistan, under the guidance and support of one or the other intelligence service of either India and/or Pakistan, began to quietly promote the Pakhtun ideal of a Nation state of
Pakhtunistan. Because this emergent threat was coming at a time which was uncomfortably soon after Bangladesh’s secession from Pakistan, according to Johnson and Mason (2008) it became The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 48 intolerable not to act to countervail the possibility that the Pakhtun might secede from Northern
Pakistan. As a reflection of these conditions, in the early 1970s the Pakistani government began to aggressively build conservative Madrassas in Pashtun areas. These numbered in the thousands and were largely funded by private Saudi sources.
The Saudi funding came primarily from elements within the Wahhabi sect of Sunni
Islam, which represents a very conservative expression of Islam. Haleem (2003) tells us that
Islam is seen by the Wahhabis as having primacy over all matters, including ethnic identity, and was seen by the Pakistani government as being a sufficiently compelling counter to dreams of
Pakhtunistan to either deflect or silence the ethnic aspirations of the Pakhtun.
The proliferation of conservative Madrassas began to produce large numbers of Mullahs of a particular conservative Islamic political persuasion and, with the support of the Pakistani government, they began a sort of political ascendancy at both the local and national level
(Johnson and Mason, 2008). The Mullah’s rise to greater power came at the expense of the
Maliks and the elders and further eroded the relevancy of the traditional systems of governance in Pakhtun communities (Johnson and Mason, 2008). The process of de-laminating the social fabric of Pakhtun traditional structures of government was further accelerated by the invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 and by just about everything that has followed by way of reactions and repercussions to that singular event.
By way of closing this chapter, FATA is over represented in the bottom tiers of virtually all of the social indices of health and community well-being. The following are illustrative: Per capita income is half that of the national per capita income of $500; 60% of the population live below the national poverty line; per capita public development expenditures are 1/3 the national average; the literacy rate is 17.42% as compared to 56% nationally (female literacy is 3% as The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 49 compared to 32% nationally); there are 41 hospitals serving 3.1 million residents which equates to a per Dr. rate of 1:6,762 as compared to the national ratio of 1:1,359. A May 2006 interview with Latif Afridi, a FATA national parliamentarian, is quoted by the International Crisis Group
(2006) as saying that, “FATA has been kept deliberately backward”, “By raising the bogus threat of Pakhtun separatism, the central government has denied Pakhtuns their basic economic and political rights and kept a natural part of NWFP under federal control.”
Despite the dismal social conditions described above it is difficult to describe these as being the product of a concerted effort at self-destruction. The many hundreds, arguably thousands, of years of Pakhtun presence in the region speak to a much different perspective on self-determination and the inherent right to simply be. The interplay between a Constitution which serves to constrain access to even the most basic of opportunities by the people of FATA and the oppressive instrument for ensuring this, in the guise of the FCR, has done nothing to promote the objectives of nation building in Pakistan. In spite of the best efforts of dozens of conquerors, the British Government and Pakistani government’s wholesale adoption of what arguably are the deeply flawed policies of colonial Britain, the Pakhtun remain viable as families, tribes and communities. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 50
CHAPTER 5 - SOCIAL COHESION
“A realist like St. Augustine, in hisCity of God, understood that tribes, based on
the narrow bonds of kinship and ethnicity rather than on any Universalist longing, may
not constitute the highest good; but by contributing to social cohesion, tribes nevertheless
constitute a good in and of themselves. Quelling anarchy means starting with clans and
tribes, and building upwards from those granular elements.” (Kaplan, 2007)
Having laid down the groundwork around some of the history of the tribes of FATA and of some of the structures that continue to shape and guide their societies, it’s at this point that I turn to theories related to social cohesion.
Why does social cohesion matter? I have attempted to make the case that there continues to be real strength resident within the social fabric of the tribes of FATA and that this attribute has kept the communities, tribes, clans and families together through hundreds of years and several hostile foreign occupations. Whatever the appropriate descriptor, it is the constituent elements of this social “glue” which have held these communities together and are, I believe, the base elements of social cohesion; both my field research and the literature say as much. The analysis turns now to developing an understanding and appreciation of the nature and characteristics of tribal cohesion. An analysis of the specifics of any lost opportunity costs associated with not harnessing pre-existing mechanisms for community stability and coherency falls to another paper. It is enough at this point to direct attention to this notion and then, in the next chapter, set this against an attempt to surface Pakistan’s interests as they relate to the tribes of FATA. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 51
In the final analysis, whether stabilization and reconstruction, or any other developmental initiatives of significance, take social cohesion into account or not, the inherent strength and resiliency in the tribes of FATA will continue to be felt. Zartman (2009) speaks to this notion directly when he points to the need for understanding the potential to serve both positive and destructive ends that is embodied in adherence to group loyalty. Zartman (2009) goes on to suggest that program design and implementation that are able to account for positive models and ideals, both from the cultural history of the Pakhtun and from Islam, can support efforts to reduce conflict, corruption and radical ideology.
The salient question then becomes whether that community strength will manifest itself in support of development efforts or act to resist these efforts. The choice to support or frustrate stabilization, reconstruction, development or any other initiatives turns directly on the nature of engagement between the tribes and NGOs, external governments and the government of
Pakistan. I propose that the quality of this engagement reflects the extent to which pre-existing structures for decision-making, traditional leadership, community consensus, systems of justice, indigenous dispute resolution processes and shared accountability are accounted for. All of these have a place in considering the nature of a relationship with the tribes of FATA that reflects some form of reconciliation of these two worldviews. In short, there is logic in capitalizing on what has made these communities as resilient as they are in advancing the interests of meaningful and sustainable working relationships in FATA.
One of the challenges in considering the characteristics of social cohesion through the literature is identifying a useful working definition in the context of the Pakhtun and other tribes.
In determining what I call useful, I draw on Chan (2006) in that the definition should be practical, workable and easily understood. Based on my research, most definitions for social The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 52 cohesion draw on the relationship between an in-group and an out-group in order to make sense of social cohesion in one group through reference to another. There seems to be a scarcity of literature which speaks directly to the attributes of a group that can be said to be those which hold that group together within a particular social frame without having to rely on reference to an
“other”.
To illustrate this gap in the literature, Steve Vertovec (1998) has noted that the question of social cohesion often arises in discussions "among those who sense an absence of some sort".
Vertovec adds that, “…while we are rarely presented with views of what a high degree of social cohesion might look like, we are bombarded with descriptions of the lack of social cohesion in contemporary society.” Vertovec’s observations directly reflect my own examination of the literature on social cohesion. It is apparently easier for researchers to say what it isn’t or, conversely, say what it is only relative to some other superordinate organization or structure.
This amounts to describing a doughnut hole by describing the doughnut itself; the apparent objective of which is to construct an understanding of what it is on the basis of what it is not. As mentioned, although there’s no shortage of discussion in the literature on the various concepts of social cohesion, the search for a generally useful working definition of the phrase continues to elude (Chan et al, 2006).
The Oxford online dictionary defines cohesive to mean, “the action or fact of forming a united whole”, while Merriam-Webster defines the word as meaning, “the act or state of sticking together tightly.” Based on my personal experiences with Pakhtun Pakistanis and on the basis of my review of the literature, I am drawn to the conclusion that the tribes of FATA and the
Pakhtun display a high degree of unity and manifest the state that Merriam-Webster describes as
“sticking together tightly.” The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 53
For example, on seeing a Pakhtun friend embrace a journalist we were both meeting with in Peshawar, I asked whether they knew each other well, to which he responded that they were meeting for the first time that day. I asked whether it was common in Pakistan for people to embrace on first meeting to which he replied that because each could tell that the other was
Pakhtun this was entirely normal and expected. Also, on exchanging just a few words they were able to determine what area and tribal grouping they belonged to, their families and any potential kinship connections between them. He also implied that this very brief exchange solidified the relationship in terms of receiving the journalist’s help as it pertained to my interviewing him. My interpretation of that exchange and others I witnessed is rooted in what I now know about
Pakhtunwali, tribal solidarity and the strong connections that flow across the Pakhtun as a reflection of these.
My observation: there is a reciprocal bond that extends between Pakhtun individuals and the Pakhtun collective that is shaped and defined through:
• the common experience of being Pakhtun; • a shared Pakhtun history; • a shared code of conduct that serves to define in-group and out-group relations; • a relationship principle that elevates trust beyond the level of the individual to a type of collective responsibility; and, • an innate sense of its own resiliency, as can only be seen in people and groups that have truly had that social resiliency tested. Nothing I have experienced or read since that day has suggested that I might be wrong about this.
The work of Chan et al (2006) serves to expand the search for a practical working definition of social cohesion. The authors suggest that a community is said to be "sticking" together if all three of the following tests for cohesion are met:
1. they can trust, help and cooperate with their fellow members of society; The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 54
2. they share a common identity or a sense of belonging to their society; and,
3. the subjective feelings in (1) and (2) are manifested in objective behaviour.
In this case “society” in 1 and 2 includes the concepts of tribe and, more broadly, ethnic group; specifically the Pakhtun tribes that occupy both Pakistan and Afghanistan. In considering a definition for social cohesion I have elected to be guided by these three tests. Chan et al (2006) acknowledge that the first two of these are something of a tautology but make no apology for this in that without these two elements the definition lacks its own internal cohesion. According to
Chan et al (2006) the third criterion is meant to move the definition beyond merely describing a range of possible emotional or psychological responses to an understanding that these must also come with a range of observable supporting behaviours and actions. The premise being that it isn’t enough for members to simply feel the relative presence or absence of these qualities but that there has to be ongoing, active investments in renewing these aspects of a social covenant through actions and behaviours that are cooperative, helpful, engender trust and support a shared sense of belonging.
Returning to the ideas of practicality and workability as backdrops to an operational definition for social cohesion, Kearns and Forrest (2000) advise that it is necessary to ground our perspective in the context of daily routines and the demands and transactions that these are comprised of. At street-level Peshawar it’s almost certain that the general perspective on social cohesion is rooted more directly in the practices of getting by and getting along rather than serving esoteric principles relating to social values, social capital, social inclusion or organic versus mechanical solidarity. Turner (as cited in Kearns and Forrest) suggests that individuals and families want to feel that they have a place and a stake in the social system that they are a part of; that there is interdependence between members; and, that they are all part of a social The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 55
project from which there will be shared benefit. These all have practical expressions at street
level Peshawar and Lahore.
All that said, drawing from the work of Friedkin (2004), Kearns and Forest (2000) and
Chan et al (2006), for the purposes of this paper I propose the following working definition for
social cohesion:
Social cohesion describes a state characterized by a range of social transactions that, over time and taken on balance, promote continued membership and predictable, if not trusting, relationships. Membership value is assessed against relative measures of fair and balanced participation; inter-dependence; equitable benefit sharing; and, a generally accepted set of attitudes and norms that frame the group’s network of obligations, duties, claims and expectations of its members.
It is for others to decide whether this definition has a life beyond that which I intend for it
here but this definition, among other things, accurately reflects my personal experience of
Pakhtun people during my time in Pakistan. The definition also serves to draw together elements
that I believe characterize the daily business of people generally, while adding in some specific
normative elements. As well, this definition of social cohesion serves to address the central
question of why people choose to belong to any particular group in the first place: because, on
whatever level they choose to measure this, it’s worth it.
To the extent possible the definition, and the paper, attempt to avoid value judgements about the various expressions of Pakhtun tribalism or the range of value sets that individual tribes adhere to. Neither is it my intention to apportion judgement as to whether all the manifestations of Pakhtun culture or related social mores are good or bad relative to my own moral or ethical compass. My primary objective is to make the case that there is an inherent resiliency within Pakhtun communities that, even if not poorly understood, seems to be under- utilized by Islamabad in its relationship with the tribes. I also take the view that this particular The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 56 form of social capital, built as it is from traditional systems of governance and codified norms respecting obligations, duties, claims and expectations of its members can provide the basis for predictable and stable relationships. But, as mentioned in the introduction, this assumes that predictability and stability are both in Pakistan’s interests. It is not by any means a fait accompli that Pakistan views stability with, or amongst, the Pakhtun as being a policy objective for their shared border with Afghanistan. For instance, Weinbaum and Harder (2008) have described one of Pakistan’s main policy objectives in Afghanistan as being the frustration of any Afghani administration’s efforts towards supporting the creation of an independent Pakhtun state. On the same theme, it is certainly possible that Pakhtun nationalists in either Pakistan or Afghanistan believe that instability throughout the border region serves their aspirations for an independent
Pakhtunistan. It is possible too that India, Pakistan and China may all view a destabilized and collapsing Afghanistan as fair game for any expansionist ambitions they may have in the region.
In White’s (2008) opinion, there can be no question that Pakistan must have considered the implications of India’s having a presence in both Jammu Kashmir and Afghanistan.
In short, the multiplicity of motives which pervades the regional game board is resistant to oversimplification and adds several confounding layers to the analysts work. Credible analysis needs to be able to account for complexity while not compounding this further by falling victim to the reduction necessary to make FATA’s realities into an easier fit for a model originating in the west. Starting with what’s there constitutes a simple first step into complexity.
Governing Ungoverned Space and Tribal Cohesion
As mentioned in the introduction, concepts and theories related to ungoverned spaces will only be briefly discussed here. Although this aspect of the paper represents a fascinating facet to The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 57
a consideration of FATA and similar environments, there is more that falls outside the scope of
this paper than will fit easily here and as such will have to wait for another paper.
Jacoby (2004) refers to ungoverned spaces as being geographic areas where governments
do not, whether by choice or circumstance, exercise effective control. It is believed that terrorist
groups, narcotics traffickers and other criminal elements use these areas as sanctuaries to train,
plan and organize; all relatively free from interference. Jacoby (2004) identifies several
ungoverned spaces around the world, including portions of the southern Philippines, Indonesian
islands, Chechnya, rural areas in Burma, several areas in Africa, parts of South America and
Pakistan’s western border areas. Ungoverned spaces are not restricted to remote, rural or poorly accessible areas and can also include densely populated cities which offer up their own brand of anonymity and relaxed sovereignty (Jacoby, 2004). Cyberspace has also been identified as being or harbouring, ungoverned spaces and as having many of the same attributes as the geographically defined examples set out above.
In this paper I support an emergent perspective (Mampilly, 2007; Clunan and Trinkunas,
2007; and, Piombo, 2007) that the notion of ungoverned space is more a literary convenience than either a naturally occurring or sustainable state. Those who subscribe to the concept seem to do so on the basis that ungoverned spaces lack easily recognizable systems and structures of governance and are, therefore, without governance. I neither support the assumptions that underpin this view nor the conclusions which follow. If the only criteria for the presence or absence of the guiding hand of governance is whether it fits a specific model, then otherwise legitimate forms of government all around the world would be discounted out of hand. In how many of the failed or failing states where the West has intervened has this perspective been applied to systems and structures of governance which do not readily conform to expectations The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 58 originating in a western democratic model? What sort of strategic policy missteps have resulted from this sort of narrowed analytical aperture?
There is a rich research landscape to be explored in the area of ungoverned spaces. Of particular interest would be a deeper look into the nature of the relationships and arrangements between aid and development organizations and non-state actors, including those described as
“Warlords”. Other research possibilities include an analysis of the relative costs and benefits of such relationships; the evolution from non-state to state as a product of successful, practical and predictable arrangements with non-state actors; the nature and scale of syncretic governance models that draw on the strengths of both of the recombinant systems; and, informal arrangements to supplement other forms of acute intervention as buffers against state failure after the collapse of powerful autocracies. Developing predictable, accountable, sustainable, effective and meaningful relationships between national and tribal governments may well call on the architects of such an arrangement to incorporate this sort of added complexity into those relationships. If the aperture of the observer’s lens is narrowed to the point where it becomes possible to discount what isn’t easily recognized, then the potential opportunities located in a more complex reality risk being lost. It is not beyond the pale to extend the argument to suggest that a model as robust as democracy must certainly be able to allow for a range of possible expressions and, in doing so, allow for more complex expressions of legitimate governance.
As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, the tribes of FATA have been resident throughout the region for perhaps thousands of years. Their tenure there has been characterized by a high degree of organization, both administrative and judicial, and in-group relationships are conducted according to a generally shared set of values, attitudes and expectations. The tribes were in place well before a coherent state presence existed in the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 59 and, even when state control may have been extended to the region, it either wasn’t or was only nominally present. The comment provided by one of the interview subjects, “Civilization in the area is over 5,000 years old [while] Islam is only 1,500 years [old]” sets an interesting juxtaposition between the lifespan of the tribes against the duration of Islam. The message seemed clear in the interview that the tribes had certainly developed some competency in managing themselves in the time frame.
In this context, the tribes themselves served, in all the ways this mattered to them, in the role of state (Nieuwenhuis as cited in Kabiri, 2005). Jabar (as cited in Kabiri, 2005) describes these “miniature states” as being a natural response to de-centralized authority with defining characteristics that include group norms (e.g. Pakhtunwali), systems of government, presumably including those serving the rule of law (e.g. Jirga, Malik and Mullah) and having their own armies (e.g. Lashkars). Given what’s been set out in the discussion thus far, it seems at the very least to be an oversimplification to describe FATA as being ungoverned.
To date Islamabad has made only minor efforts to extend its reach into FATA and where it has, the limited engagement afforded by British India’s colonial grasp has done little or nothing to advance the possibility of a modernized relationship between the two. The result has been a stunting of the evolution of tribal systems of governance in the region which in turn leaves a significant proportion of Pakistan’s land base largely beyond all but the bluntest of
Pakistan’s tools of governance. Military intervention and coercion coupled with a paucity of incentives to national participation such as access to education, health care and economic opportunity are key amongst these tools. If Islamabad seeks real change to the social and security climate on the border they have to turn their minds to implementing real change to the ways in which they either promote or exacerbate the conditions that create that climate. Choosing not to The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 60
do so is evidence that Islamabad either doesn’t know how to move those relationships forward or
doesn’t want to.
As is alluded to throughout the paper, one of the key challenges facing FATA’s tribes is
unravelling a complicated legislative and Constitutional relationship with Islamabad that has
essentially held them in stasis since the time of British India. Comments like:
“The Pakistani government prefers to keep FATA tribal [and] don’t want them as part of the Constitutional framework. If they do [acquire equal representation under the Constitution] the government would have to actually provide the tribes with [at least] basic services;”
“Yes, [it] is true [that Islamabad has not done very much to promote a modern relationship with the Pakhtun or other tribes of FATA];” and,
“The [political] status [of FATA] is insufficient to meet modern needs; there must be real franchise.”24
capture some of the ways in which current policies originating with the central
government serve to entrench a diminished presence for the tribes in the socio-political fabric of their own country. It’s legitimate to question the value of engagement with tribal governance systems that appear not to have adapted to an evolving context. But when the masters of that new context have entrenched a system of checks and balances that is meant to relegate them to second-class citizenry, it becomes difficult to maintain a hold on any of the available moral or ethical high ground.
Tribal structures and adherence to the norms that flow from these are not the only social constructs around which the people of FATA orient themselves, they are however the most obvious. The proven ability of the Pakhtun to successfully occupy complex environments provides ample evidence to avoid developing a flawed perspective of “tribals” that is overly- simplistic. For example, in Glatzer’s “The Pashtun Tribal System” (2002, In Pfeffer and Behra,
24 Pers comm. See Appendices 2 and 3 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 61
eds.) the Pakhtun are as well represented throughout Pakistan’s military, governmental and
judicial hallways as they are in the village lashkars, jirgas and fields. It would be intellectually
hobbling to move into an analysis of the Pakhtun people by reducing them to an anachronistic
cultural caricature with simple hopes, dreams, aspirations and worst of all, simple capacities. The
Pakhtun, and members of other tribes, are a part of Pakistan’s social, political and economic
fabric and inhabit as complex a socio-political network of relations and interactions as can be
found anywhere.
Recall that the British set up and entrenched a governmental relationship with the region
and the tribes of FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunhwa (K-P) that was and continues to be predicated
on indirect rule through proxies. Kabiri (2005) identifies this as an approach to colonial
governance that extended across the British Empire and satisfied the need to manage people,
lands and resources spread across a far flung empire in an expedient, cost-effective way. In this
way Britain, and then following secession, Pakistan’s central government, left the tribes to fend
for themselves; either through intent or neglect. This often meant that the tribes were left to fill in
many of the governance blanks that this oblique management style tends to result in. In some
respects, this is as it has always been. The tribes continue to fend for themselves and continue to
act as a stabilizing force across the region. According to Glatzer (2002), “Legal” predictability, security and a resilient, reliable social order was maintained despite the chaos and uncertainty that history and changing circumstances have delivered over the generations. All this to say, the
Pakhtun have clearly had the experience of managing their affairs, even when others have purported to do this for them.
These are the conditions which compel people to draw together in the first place and are reflected in the decisions and consequences that result. These in turn are the material from which The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 62
identities are formed. Zartman’s (2009) work in Afghanistan illustrates why and how families
and tribes respond to a prevailing condition of chaos and its consequences. Decades of exposure
to persistent poverty, inequitable access to opportunity, the collapse of state structures, conflict
entrepreneurs and other opportunists and the violent clash of ideologies all serve to draw people
together for both physical survival and for the preservation of identity (Zartman, 2009). FATA
was and is such an environment. Recall the working definition for social cohesion; specifically
the following elements of the definition:
Membership value is assessed against relative measures of fair and balanced participation; inter-dependence; equitable benefit sharing; and, a generally accepted set of attitudes and norms that frame the group’s network of obligations, duties, claims and expectations of its members.
In terms of Pakhtun identity formation, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the various
social tensions described have served, from Korostelina’s (2007) perspective, to produce a
Pakhtun identity that is well defined in relation to others. Distinguishing in-group as distinct
from out-group is further codified through instruments such as Pakhtunwali and, perversely, by
the Pakistani Constitution (Ali, 1999). The social mechanisms that support the distinction between in-group and out-group, in turn, loop back to reinforce this distinction by promoting group specific behaviours relative to each other. This is nowhere clearer than when the in-group members perceive an external threat to the group. In this situation, in-group conflicts are suspended in the face of the threat and the group readily unites to meet the test of the out-group threat (Korostelina, 2007). Survival and identity inter-connected.
In the context of FATA, the Pakhtun and Pakhtunwali, survival and identity have
compelled a drawing close of those who share a history, experiences, kinship ties and socio-
economic inter-dependencies. By virtue of all that they share, it seems inevitable that they would The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 63 also develop a framework to hold and manage legal orders, attitudes and social norms; if only to create some order to the complex array of social transactions that constitute the simple business of living as a community. It is this which holds and sustains communities and provides them with a kind of coherency that is, as I’ve said above, predicated on a group’s network of obligations, duties, claims and expectations for its members.
In describing the nature and character of the Taliban, Ruttig (2010) draws together ideas related to religion, ideology and tribalism to assess the relative organizational strengths and weaknesses of the Taliban. Ruttig identifies the inter-play of these as conferring the Taliban with a high degree of cohesion while still being able to accommodate shifting operational realities.
Given that the Taliban are primarily Pakhtun and that FATA is also largely comprised of
Pakhtun people, I have assumed that Ruttig’s observations also have currency in this paper.
Ruttig looks to the tribal structures and the nature of the Pakhtun as being responsible for the flexibility, elasticity in his words, necessary to account for changing circumstances and evolving strategic imperatives. He goes on to say that the balance achieved across these three characteristics of the Taliban has resulted in an organization that has not, to date, experienced any significant structural fractures.
I believe that the relationship between cohesion and elasticity, as is described by Ruttig, is the hallmark of the Pakhtun/tribal characteristic that I describe earlier as being resiliency. In this context, resiliency speaks directly to a community’s ability to experience and adapt to the demands of conflict and social upheaval while maintaining an intact sense of identity. Shared values, the integrity of family, clan, community and tribe and the ability to keep communities working are tied directly to the long-term coherence of identity coupled with the stabilizing code of conduct represented by Pakhtunwali. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 64
As mentioned in the introduction, understanding, accounting for and accessing social capital, in whatever form it is found, may help to avoid undermining the efforts of governments, non-governmental organizations and counter-intelligence strategists in stabilizing the region and to implement reconstruction and other development initiatives. If we accept these as objectives for the region, analysis of the bonds that draw and hold people together appears as a logical early process step in promoting meaningful engagement with the tribes of FATA. Where this happens, overlooking or undervaluing the innate legitimacy, resiliency, social capital and governance capacity nested in tribal systems, simply because doing so adds complexity to the relationship, seems impractical to say the least. Assuming an overlap in objectives related to security, economic development, education and others, efforts to improve the quality of the relationships and the resulting predictability of arrangements that support meeting these objectives holds promise for better returns on investment.
Social Cohesion and Legitimacy
Finally, in any consideration of Pakistan’s history, its struggle for nationhood and the political landscape of both FATA and Pakistan, questions related to legitimacy are unavoidable.
Lamb (2005) proposes that illegitimacy can be seen as both a cause and a consequence of state failure. Conversely, legitimacy can be seen as being both a cause and a consequence of a viable state or local government. Lamb (2005) further states that unless the community’s tests for legitimacy are met, whatever these are, state and nation-building projects, stability operations, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts will all fail to some extent.
With a focus on stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, Lamb suggests that the test for legitimacy entails three key considerations: Who offers or withholds The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 65 support; what or whom they are supporting or opposing; and, why they support or oppose it
(Lamb, 2005). I propose that if “what” and “why” are closely aligned with the interests and needs of communities then the question of “who” chooses to support or oppose an initiative becomes a product of the relationships engaged and how. In turn, accurately determining a community’s interests and needs also reflects meaningful community engagement at all levels.
Taken as a whole, the quality and character of the relationships, where these include respect, predictability, transparency, accountability, honesty and equitability, when coupled with development and other initiatives that reflect community needs and interests have greater potential for success.
The Abiding Presence of Islam
It is useful at this point to briefly return to Islam and what it offers to our consideration of cohesion in FATA. Islam and the Qur’an provide for a number of positive models and ideals which serve to promote unity among Muslims as well as across other cultures and ethnicities
(Zartman, 2009). Further to this, Zartman calls attention to the fact that justice, good governance and social stability are all a part of Islamic traditions and that their interdependence provides the basis for stable, sustainable communities. Zartman goes on to suggest that drawing on the legitimacy of long-standing traditions and practices, in this case as they reflect Islamic concepts, does not ask that the “West” separate itself from values that lie at the heart of Western democratic traditions. Having said that, neither should processes which serve to put more control back into the hands of people, through what Durrani describes as a “people centric evolution” in
Pakistan, be seen as “negating a political role for Islam in Pakistan.25.”
25 Durrani, A. 2006. “It is not a tiger”. The Nation. August 16, 2006. Downloaded July 12, 2009 from http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/august-2006/16/columns3.php The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 66
The Erosion of Tribal Cohesion and Contributing Elements
The tribal systems described here have not been unaffected by the challenges of time, conquest and other forces both from within and beyond their control. Most recently, general neglect by Islamabad coupled with ambiguous policy intrusions with even more uncertain objectives has arguably caused the highest toll to FATA and the Pakhtun. For instance, Durrani states that whether by design or oversight, Islamabad appears committed to policies that serve to bypass local political parties and which promote a divide and rule effect26. In the case of FATA, the long-standing decision not to extend application of the Political Parties Act to the region has been a direct insult to promoting the possibility of legitimate regional representation and self- determination. The combined weight of colonialism and more recently, 30 years of regional conflict and state fragility or failure in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has done much to undermine the structural integrity of tribal systems of governance and cohesion (Ruttig, 2010). Gregory and
Revill (2008) have stated that successive military regimes in Pakistan have contributed to or been responsible for leading Pakistan into a cycle of crises and, as one of the consequences, these have served to create stress fractures in the cohesion and stability of Pakistan as a whole. While
Gregory and Fair (2008) have said that the Pakistan military has invested heavily in serving an agenda that seems, on the basis of who has benefited most directly from their actions, to have displaced the interests of the Pakistani people in favour of the privileged classes. The policy orientation necessary to serve this particular interest has done little to promote a broader goal of national cohesion or, by extension, the objective of stabilizing the Nation (Gregory and Fair,
2008).
26 Ibid The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 67
A confused sense of purpose is not solely the domain of the Pakistani government. The
messaging from the U.S. is sometimes so mixed that Pakistanis generally find little comfort in
placing their faith in the U.S.’s ability to contribute meaningfully to the Nation’s stability27.
In his now famous 2009 speech in Cairo, Barack Obama is quoted as saying:
“I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed…the freedom to live as you choose. Those are not just American ideas, they are human rights, and that is why we will support them everywhere."28
Given the way in which American foreign policy has played out in the border region
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is not surprising that many Pakistani Pakhtun find this
statement to run contrary to their experience29. The sense of mixed messaging can best be felt when this statement is coupled with comments made by then Presidential hopeful Obama in challenging al-Qaeda to a fight in the parking lot of their choosing when he said,
“[America] would use military force if necessary against al-Qaeda in Pakistan, even without Pakistan’s consent.”30
and, in saying so, effectively trampled all over Pakistani sovereignty. The divergence of
perspective, captured on one hand with explicit support for a human right to freely live as they
choose and on the other with what reads as an entirely off-handed dismissal of state sovereignty in order to tell people how they should live, is, if nothing else, jarring. In FATA and Khyber-
Pakhtunhwa, the U.S.’s aggressive prosecution of policies to restrict the Taliban’s freedom of
movement in these areas through the use of Predator drones, and the collateral damage they too
27 Pers comm.. 28 Obama, B. 2009. In a speech co-hosted by Cairo University and Al-Hazar University in Cairo, Egypt. June 4, 2009. Downloaded January 22, 2011 from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/04/obama-egypt-speech- video_n_211216.html 29 Pers comm.. 30 Obama, B. August 1, 2007. Downloaded April 17, 2009 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6926663.stm The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 68 often cause, has according to Akhtar (2009) exacerbated any efforts to win over their hearts and minds.
“The tribes supported Pakistan and the US in the war in Afghanistan with the expectation that this support would translate into greater representation.” “The “Great Game” continues.” “The international games come with political reasons for maintaining the tribal areas just as they have always been.”31
Each of these comments serves to illustrate the perception that the interests of the people of FATA are not always foremost on the agendas of others with business in Afghanistan,
Pakistan and the border between.
Social Cohesion and Stability
Zartman (2009) identifies three factors which he feels are requisite to long-term stability, or durable peace; one of which is “policies to support social cohesion based on shared indigenous values, which [in turn] provide a foundation for institutions and legitimacy for leaders.” If one of the objectives in FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunhwa is in fact long-term stability, then the West may well be called on to resist the urge to intervene in ways that are over-reliant on the ideas and principles that work in the context of a western democratic tradition but will enjoy very little legitimacy in the socio-political realities of FATA. Many of the assumptions built into current approaches ignore the profound differences between Pakistan and the U.S. and as Zartman has stated, the fact that the ideas and institutions that have served the West so well do not have the same resonance in Islamabad where ideas and institutions rooted in Islam must also be accounted for. Having said that, recalibrating policy approaches away from being strongly influenced by a narrowed field of vision with regard to Islam is only one of the challenges that lay ahead. I take it as a given that there are a multitude of hurdles to overcome in realizing the
31 Pers. Comm. – See Appendices 2 and 3 The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 69 potential value located in the tribal people, communities and governments of FATA. I also accept the possibility that, depending on how the hand is played, leveraging off the “glue” that holds the Pakhtun together may be used to either counter any progress in nation-building by
Pakistan or to advance that objective.
In this chapter I have attempted to make the case that:
• there is a high degree of social cohesion across the Pakhtun people; and, • this property confers the Pakhtun with a resiliency that has sustained their integrity as communities within a community through both times of conflict and insecurity; and, • on the basis of the community’s tests of legitimacy, the strength that is integral to this social resiliency, may serve to support or frustrate development efforts in FATA; and, • meaningful engagement with communities, in a way that respects and harnesses pre- existing community systems for delivering governance and justice, will assist in advancing the potential for successful outcomes.
The list of key socio-political considerations that Durrani has described as salient to moving Pakistan forward in its pursuit of nationhood through his idea of a “people centric evolution” include:
• Curbing traditions of vested interest and centralist politics; • Focussing on the basic needs of the people (health care, education, basic rights, equitable distribution of wealth); • A “…recalibration of [the relationship between the] interests of the Pakistani state and the interests of Pakistani society”; and, • The, “…sustained enrichment of civil society, entrenching participative democracy” and moving beyond reliance on a strong centre.32
Arguably, each of these supports a reconsideration of the relative governance orientation in Pakistan. In the case of the tribes of FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunhwa and the government in
Islamabad, this suggests a re-alignment of the current relationships in the direction of a model
32 Durrani, A. 2006. “It is not a tiger”. The Nation. August 16, 2006. Downloaded July 12, 2009 from http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/august-2006/16/columns3.php The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 70 that relies less on governance from the centre and confers more authority to local governments.
In supporting this general theme, White (2008) suggests that moving into a process of engagement that supports the sorts of shifts contemplated in this paper should be done in a way that is mindful of the pre-existing, legitimate forms of governance already in place.
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 71
CHAPTER 6 – GOVERNANCE AT THE EDGES
Governance at the margins of territory is seldom an easy proposition and under even the best of circumstances, simply managing around the logistical challenges that come with governing a distant rural environment comes with a whole set of challenges not found in an urban landscape. In governing FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunhwa, many of the decisions taken by colonial Britain, and subsequently independent Pakistan, reflect a variety of motives; some political, some logistical and some are both. The various relationships between Islamabad and the tribes of FATA represent the outcome of what happens when mixed motives are carelessly combined in large doses with politics and logistics. The ways in which these have been blended have, for reasons of expediency and exigent circumstances, changed with changing conditions and the border region with Afghanistan is nothing if not changeable.
Some analysis of Pakistan’s political interests in Afghanistan and in FATA and K-P is important to developing an understanding of the pushing and pulling for power and position that generates much of the tension in the regional system. As such, the following is offered as a brief glimpse into some of the interests that motivate Islamabad and others with respect to the region.
The impacts of the strategic policy positions taken by Islamabad in FATA and K-P and the effect of these on the stability and general socio-political environment of the region are both relevant and timely.
A striking example of the sorts of lessons learned from the “Great Game” between
Britain and Russia can be found in Pakistan’s orientation to the Pakhtun on both sides of the Af-
Pak border. This relationship with the Pakhtun represents only one of the many discontinuities in
Pakistan’s political positioning as they advance their interests on both sides of the border. On the
Pakistani side of the Durand line, Islamabad invests a great deal of time, energy and money in The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 72 promoting an agenda that serves to constrain the ambitions of Pakhtun nationalists. Conversely, on the Afghan side of the line, Pakistan, through the agency of their Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI), has been a long-standing source of support to Pakhtun Islamic rule, even though this comes at the risk of the Pakhtun gaining traction towards the goal of their own Nation-state
(International Crisis Group, 2003). Why the pole positions? The calculus that makes sense of these seemingly divergent objectives is grounded in what is referred to earlier in the paper as strategic depth. Strategic depth follows a logic which originated in the minds of British military strategists of the late 1800’s and made a kind of sense for the state of warfare at that time.
The strategy, simply put, was to maintain an expanse of land separating Afghanistan from
British India which was both difficult to traverse and difficult to pacify. The objective was to stall or shut down expansionist Russia’s designs on Britain’s colonial jewel, India. In the
Pakistan of today, and given the evolution of military strategy and the equipment for making war, strategic depth simply makes no real sense. Based on a rationale that I have been unable to determine the source of, Pakistan continues to maintain a policy of strategic depth. But in this case and, depending on who you ask, the intention is either to serve as a rearguard to fall back to in the case of what would have to be a highly successful Indian invasion or to provide a safe place, far from the Indian border, to maintain armouries, a central command and reserve troops.
Illogical as it seems given the rapid deployments possible in this day and age and the heavy favour enjoyed by India’s air force, the grip that strategic depth has on the psyche of Pakistan’s military is seemingly unshaken by any brand of persuasive argument against the idea.
The policy of strategic depth is a direct reflection of the sustained levels of anxiety that
Pakistan holds for India. The ways in which this anxiety manifests itself through foreign policy and other related political orientations has produced some seemingly divergent paths. As a brief The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 73
illustration, the Taliban, composed primarily of Pakhtun, represent a political beachhead for
Pakistan into Afghanistan. Although the Taliban’s ability to affect overt political control in
Afghanistan is not great at this point, their support to the Taliban continues to reflect Pakistan’s
long term interest in maintaining a power base within Afghanistan. It is telling that both India
and Pakistan each have an embassy and 4 consulates in Afghanistan, all of which are located in
the same 5 cities33. As well, says Bajoria (2009), India is known to be the largest regional donor to reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. No other country in the world has a formal diplomatic presence even approaching that of either India or Pakistan; not even China which has billions invested in the region.
Bajoria (2009) describes Pakistan’s underlying objectives as securing Pakistan’s access to
central Asian markets and to energy supplies in Central Asian states like Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan and to counter what Pakistan sees as an encircling strategy that has long been in play
by India. Considering the history of military engagement between India and Pakistan, it is likely
that the military strategists of India do see a strong presence in Afghanistan as completing the
circle that Pakistan fears it to be. With Jammu-Kashmir to the north-east, Afghanistan to the
north-west and India itself on the southwest and southeast this completes a map that leaves
Pakistan with only the Arabian Sea as an unbounded flank. When seen in this light Markey
(2008) believes the fear of encirclement to be a realistic perspective for Pakistan to take. The strategic value of accomplishing a manoeuvre like this could prove inestimable with the passage of time and a shifting geopolitical context.
33 Foreign Embassies and Consulates in Afghanistan. Downloaded March 19, 2011 from http://embassy.goabroad.com/embassies-in/afghanistan The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 74
Pakistan’s View on a Post-Coalition Afghanistan
Maintaining a presence in Afghanistan is also a response to a longer term perspective held by Pakistan on the future of that country that extends beyond the tenure of NATO’s coalition forces. There is little doubt that the US will not stay in Afghanistan indefinitely. It is increasingly obvious that, due in large part to pressure being applied by the American public, there will be an eventual withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. That being the case, senior Pakistani military strategists would be remiss in not working to a trajectory that sees withdrawal as having an extremely high probability and planning for what life in Afghanistan will look like after the American troops are gone. The result is a strategic posture that has
Pakistan presenting two faces to the world: one to the West which reflects compliance with efforts to oust the Taliban, whichever side of the Durand Line they are found; and another, towards Afghanistan which has Pakistan covertly backing the Taliban as the strong favourite to win the struggle for power in Afghanistan once the dust from America’s departing boots has settled. Markey (2008) sees the complex set of Pakistani objectives being served in Afghanistan as including: the strategic gamble that continued support to the Taliban will pay dividends if/when they re-assume control of Afghanistan; provides support to the possibility of Pakhtun nationalism finding a home in Afghanistan, and not in Pakistan; and, strategic value with respect to other key players in the region, including not just India but Iran as well. Again, the effect of this sort of multiplicity of policy objectives on FATA is continued instability, lack of trust and an uncertain view of itself as being a part of Pakistan or simply a part of Pakistan’s regional machinations.
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 75
The Struggle Within and Conflict Imported
As mentioned earlier in the paper, one of Pakistan’s single greatest struggles is that between duelling concepts of Islam. While being essentially true, this statement falls short in accounting for a number of the other elements that have confused and exacerbated Pakistan’s geopolitical realities. The complexities which are interwoven throughout Pakistan’s social, ethnic, religious, economic and political fabric extend well beyond a struggle between the various ideas about Islam and statehood.
For instance, the U.S.’s response to the increasing Communist presence in Afghanistan and subsequently the fatally flawed military occupation by the Soviets in the late 1970’s, did much to promote the difficult political struggle that Pakistan is currently embroiled in. Having said that, the US couldn’t have done it alone and the Pakistani military, intelligence community and political structure was complicit in the response to the Soviet takeover and shares a significant burden of responsibility for the internal and external difficulties that have resulted.
The series of moves which were put into play after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 constituted an almost perfect storm in terms of promoting the very situation that the world is now contending with in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Parthasarathy (2010) identifies the following as key elements:
• the rise to leadership of ultra-conservative Islamist, Pakistani President General Zia- ul-Haq; • the flow of several billion dollars of military aid to the mujahideen in both Pakistan and Afghanistan under the control of the ISI; • the Saudi response to the call for global jihad against the Soviets and, as a result, the proliferation of Wahhabi (a form of extreme Sunni Islam predominant in Saudi Arabia) madrassas in Pakistan; and, • the promotion of militant Islam as a tool of foreign policy throughout the region.
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 76
As mentioned previously, the Taliban are composed primarily of Pakistani Pakhtun many or most of whom have been educated in the madrassas and armed and trained by the ISI.
Generally speaking, the presence of the madrassas and the conservative Muslim graduates have both promoted Pakistan’s shift from being described in the past as a moderate Islamist state to one that has moved ever closer to a very conservative brand of Islam. The effect must at times feel to the military and ISI, who are solely responsible for developing and prosecuting policy in
FATA and Afghanistan, as though the strings they once pulled are now pulling back in ways they didn’t anticipate. In serving domestic and foreign policy interests that have been overly reactive to Afghanistan, to the exclusion of those more central to domestic interests, Islamabad stands in danger of shooting Pakistan’s foot. The following statement, though not verified for accuracy, highlights the possibility of this last statement being true:
“More than 53% of [Pakistan’s] budget goes to the military and this goes up [to almost] 70% if you include administrative costs”
As a consequence, the mishmash of influences in Pakistani society and politics has called everything into question in regards to where legitimacy can be located in government, politics, religion and the economy. This is no truer than in FATA and K-P where high levels of uncertainty and instability, compounded with the political manoeuvring and systemic disregard for people in favour of policy, are central to the government’s impotency in striking sustainable working arrangements with the Pakhtun and the other tribes.
Possibilities for Change
Given the discussion to this point around the history of the region and the tribes, the concept of social cohesion, my contention that the Pakhtun tribal people possess this attribute The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 77
and ideas related to instability on the border, I turn now to considering some of the relational
elements between FATA and Islamabad that might be shifted to access missed value in the
current relationship.
I consider it unlikely that the standard western model for governance will lend itself well
to FATA. If we accept that there is inherent strength still resident in the traditional tribal
structures of FATA, a model for governance that does not draw on the source(s) of that strength
will likely meet with limited success. Arguably, this is the situation as it now stands in FATA. It isn’t enough for Islamabad to acknowledge the presence of tribal governance structures and social systems, the resiliency and strength they lend the people of FATA, the legitimacy they enjoy in the region and then not capitalize on these. The evidence does not seem to support that
Islamabad has moved much past the point of acknowledging that some sort of working, sustainable relationship with the tribes is possible.
Robert Kaplan (2007) speaks to the idea that no one “size” fits all in terms of governance and that tests of legitimacy must be met, in situ, in conceiving and implementing stabilization and reconstruction interventions. He goes on to say that in contexts where democratic governance doesn’t exist it is necessary to start with what is on hand. All societies have inherited a set of culturally specific values and principles of governance; to presume that other people, originating in other places and steeped in a very different historical context, posses the same set
of values and principles as those located in, for instance, the U.S. is to overlook the truth of our
own evolution. Current practices for either post-conflict or other sorts of inter-state interventions
tend to rely on what Paris (1997) describes as an “enormous experiment in social engineering – an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict.” Paris (1997) and The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 78
Rondinelli and Montgomery (2005) argue that imposing a model for governance in places where there isn’t a natural fit results in, at best, producing a number of potentially unforeseen results and, at worst, has the effect of making the situation worse by acting to destabilize rather than stabilize communities. Best intentions aside, this sort of response has tended to produce some very poor results wherever it has been applied. Setting aside the value in the debate over the moral or legal justification to intervene or not in the intra-state affairs of another country, there is ample work to be done in determining whether current and past practices have produced the sorts of dividends that were expected.
In Pei and Kasper’s (2003) review of the U.S.’s record for nation-building around the world, of the 16 major examples since 1900, after 10 years, only 4 – West Germany, Japan,
Panama and Grenada - still continued to practice the sort of model for democratic governance the
U.S. had promoted. Of the remainder, only 5 were able to sustain the model longer than 3 years after the Americans had left; 5 saw dictatorships come into power shortly after the U.S. military left; and, both Lebanon and Somalia ejected the U.S. after democracy-building failed there. Any policy approach worth the weight of the paper it’s written on has to take note of the fact that even the best elections do not, in Cordesman’s (2008) view, create effective governance or make governments legitimate.
Brinkerhoff (2005) posits that where states find that their legitimacy is compromised or absent, their ability to govern effectively is similarly compromised and in turn, this loss of legitimacy constitutes a condition precedent for state failure. Conversely, I suggest that where supports to legitimacy-building are implemented, or where the local or regional systems of governance are already viewed as legitimate, state-building or state-recovery has a better chance of succeeding. Certainly, past practices that have promoted cronyism and other forms of The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 79
patronage and corruption have served neither Islamabad nor the people of FATA very well and
need to be reconsidered. To illustrate, in a culture that has codified the perspective of “first
amongst equals”, appointing Provincial governors and local administrators to FATA and K-P by
the central government in Islamabad does not meet the test of legitimacy on the basis of local
political acceptability, the spirit and intent of the Jirga or even necessarily competency
(Weinbaum and Harder, 2008).
A number of findings in the Asia Foundation’s 2008 survey of public attitudes in
Afghanistan provides what I think is credible insight into the Pakistani side of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border. Overall, the respondents give higher marks to the` traditional institutions of
justice—jirga and shura—than to the administrations of the Government’s system of justice.
Local representative bodies, both formal and informal, including the shura and jirga, retained the confidence of around two-thirds (69%), of respondents. Respondents continued to have a higher level of trust and confidence in more traditional forms of dispute resolution than they did in the modern state justice system. In attempting to draw a parallel with FATA, this was apparently particularly true in rural areas. Generally, satisfaction with the shura and jirga as justice mechanisms was higher than that for state courts across a number of key indices including: accessibility (76% vs. 68%); fairness and trustworthiness (70% vs. 50%); effectiveness in following local norms and values (69% vs. 50%); and, in terms of delivering justice (69% vs.
52%). Taken as a whole, the survey seems to tell a fairly convincing story in terms of where people seem to place their confidence when traditional governance and justice mechanisms were assessed against their view of modern state structures. Remember that this comes after fully 4 decades of conflict and extreme social disruption in Afghanistan. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 80
It seems inconceivable to contemplate an appropriate response to a failed or failing state
that doesn’t include a full consideration of the various possible ways in which this will stand up
in the face of tests for, among other things, legitimacy and appropriate fit. Whether it is the
strategist or policy-maker for another government, an NGO or some other organization, in the
context of FATA, a failure to engage a calculus of the relative legitimacy of a proposed initiative
is to invite an intolerable degree of vulnerability into the plan.
On the same note, anchoring relationships to the core of a community’s strength and
inherent resiliency, wherever this is located, seems both practical and sensible. The Pakhtun have
proven over hundreds of years that they are equally capable of acting as either fierce enemies or
allies. Engagement with the tribal people of the region in ways that run contrary to their
traditional practices and legal norms has proven to produce very poor results overall and this
further suggest a shift in the orientation towards the people of FATA.
For the purposes of this paper, I’ll sidestep a direct analysis of the question of the relative
status of Pakistan as a faltering, failing or failed state. Failed states and ungoverned spaces have taken centre stage as being an environment in which extremists operate, shelter or are generally supported. This view is consistent with what can be found in FATA. That said, the literature is not unanimous in supporting the contention that terrorists or other criminals find such spaces as being supportive to their objectives (Piombo, 2007). As I have suggested in the introduction and elsewhere in the paper, it is my view that just as with nature, politics and people also abhor a vacuum and as such, the possibility of a truly ungoverned space is at best remote. With this in mind, I identified the continuing role of the indigenous governance systems vested in the tribes of FATA and the ways in which these traditional systems continue to hold people and communities together; albeit imperfectly. Lister and Wilder (2005) offer a useful perspective in The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 81 distinguishing between “de jure” and “de facto” states. They describe de jure states as being,
“those that exist by fiat of the international community which recognizes them as sovereign entities, whether or not they…effectively control or administer the territory” and de facto states as, “those that actually administer a territory.”
Islamabad, as for Kabul in Afghanistan, has an uneasy co-existence with its unruly traditional peoples on the edge of its governance reach. Having said that, it is my opinion that how the state chooses to engage with the source of its own uneasiness around specifically these relationships constitutes the mark of a mature Nation. There is no question that difficult relationships call for more from people than do easy ones. Choosing to ignore or avoid what is difficult about the state’s relationship with its own people is both counter-productive and counter-intuitive as this relates to virtually any level of engagement between the state and non- state actors of FATA. Conversely, as has been proven true for Afghanistan, Weinbaum and
Harder (2008) posit that policies and approaches that serve to undermine or fundamentally alter traditional socio-political systems and structures will likely contribute to instability rather than promote stability. This outcome runs counter to the objectives of any forward thinking counter- insurgency efforts in the region.
Ex-President Musharraf, under the guise of the Local Governance Act, made what looked like moves in the direction of increased local governance. However White (2008) suggests that this may have been simply a tactical manoeuvre and came across to many as an attempt to be seen to be building democratic structures and legitimacy without actually doing anything significant about power-sharing. False starts, an over-abundance of often conflicting policy objectives and the weight of a politically loaded relationship with the U.S. only serve to hamper the development of predictable arrangements with the Pakhtun and FATA. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 82
I have proposed and discussed the idea that there is unrealized potential in the social capital of the tribes and that there is added value to be accessed through developing meaningful relationships and working arrangements with tribal communities. It is in this context that
International Crisis Group (2008) believes that the specific set of problems extant in ungoverned or minimally governed spaces is likely best managed through an “indirect approach, building up and working with and through partners”. In terms of capitalizing on legitimacy and social resiliency where it is found, pre-existing governance structures offer the sort of framework for collaborative engagement that presents opportunities for more nuanced approaches to interventions with minimal disruption to social cohesion. It follows that with less disruption to the social bonds that hold communities intact and intervention strategies that work in concert with these rather than oblivious to them, better results can be expected. Put simply, Robert
Kaplan (2007) and others, myself included, believe that keeping societies stable in many parts of the world will depend largely on tribes and the deals they are able to cut with one another.
I would propose that not only are there deals to be cut between tribes but also workable arrangements to be made between tribal governments, vested with greater authority to manage more like local governments within a federalist framework, and NGOs, international aid and development agencies and with domestic and foreign governments as well. A perspective confirmed in conversation with Pervez Hoodbhoy, who envisions the framework for just such a future as being one where Pakistan is reorganised as a federation in which provinces and local governments hold the critical economic and social powers, while defence and foreign affairs are held in common by a central governing authority34.
Building on this, Paris (1997) has concluded that the pre-eminent model for post-conflict peacebuilding, which he describes as liberal internationalism, has not produced the sorts of
34 Pers comm. See Appendices 2 and 3. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 83
dividends that have been hoped for. He goes on to say that in many instances, this western
market democracy approach has been perversely destabilizing and acted towards undermining
the tenuous peace they were meant to advance. So, if this is what engagement doesn’t look like
what might it look like instead?
Rondinelli and Montgomery (2005) point to experience in China and Taiwan which
indicates that improved governance outcomes can be attributed to interventions which support
initiatives originating with the indigenous governance structures there. This, taken in
combination with much of what I have set out in this chapter, suggests possibilities for a
hybridized form of government in FATA. In this way, the tribes could potentially be pulled
towards good ideas for governing the tribal belt rather than pushed towards ones that bear too
little resemblance to their realities and that fall short of tests of legitimacy. Even when Islamabad
has reached towards the idea of greater involvement of FATA leaders in governing the affairs of
the region, structural constraints built into the Constitution, such as found under Article 247,
entirely emasculate the ability of FATA members of the National Assembly to do anything
unless the initiative also aligns with the interests of the President35.
Ultimately, it isn’t the objective of this paper to write the prescription for a new
relationship between Islamabad and FATA but to try and make the case for the possibility of real
dividends to be achieved as a result. I have also presented some thinking that suggests that at the
heart of any consideration of the nature of engagement with the tribes of FATA are questions
related to the various motives at play, legitimacy and whether Islamabad is capable of either
35 No Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the President so directs, and no Act of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] or a Provincial Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Tribal Area, or to any part thereof, unless the Governor of the Province in which the Tribal Area is situate, with the approval of the President, so directs; and in giving such a direction with respect to any law, the President or, as the case may be, the Governor, may direct that the law shall, in its application to a Tribal Area, or to a specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the direction.
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 84 extending its fiat to FATA and K-P or, better still, whether the central government is able to conceive of a relationship that is predicated on strengthening and then delegating a greater share of control to local governance systems. Finally, I have attempted to give some shape to the possibility that the systems and structures for governance that still exist in FATA provide a reasonable and logical place to start in terms of a new governance relationship between FATA and the state. I do not however believe that this constitutes a quick or easy “fix” for what is problematic about the relationships now. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 85
CHAPTER 7 - CONCLUSION
“Throughout the Arab world, old monarchical and authoritarian orders are now
weakening. Keeping societies stable will depend largely on tribes, and the deals they are
able to cut with one another. In the Middle East, an age of pathetic, fledgling democracies
is also an age of tribes.” (Kaplan, 2007)
Writing in The Atlantic, this Robert Kaplan quote seems prophetic given recent events in
North Africa and the Middle East. The chaos which has gripped the region has roots which run into and through a history replete with factional fighting, historic grievance, power disparities, economic and other social injustices and just plain bad blood. Running throughout this toxic melange are the tribes and tribal politics.
It’s difficult to determine the extent or role of tribal politics at this early stage in the
Middle East’s radical political re-configuring; that it will have a role is becoming more evident with each passing day. It is interesting though to consider that the ruling Saudi class is based on kinship ties and seem to be directly in the line of political fire while in other countries – Tunisia for example – tribal affiliation is a major cohesive factor in the political rebellions. Will what seems to be an almost inevitable Saudi rebellion be fuelled by the resentment of disenfranchised
“lower caste” tribes? What was old is new again.
Added to these sorts of historical grievances is the more contemporary power-based tension produced when nations seek a political and economic future more firmly rooted in modernized governance systems and structures. In many countries this involves reconciling not just old grievances and relationships but also reformation of the structures of government and the working relationships they are meant to support. Whether this involves simple delegation of The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 86
authorities to subordinate levels of government or the sort of constitutional reform necessary to
allow for sub-national governments where they don’t already exist, there is no avoiding the
reality that not all interests will align well with this sort of national engagement project.
As well, regarding the current political environment in Pakistan, Gregory and Revill
(2008) say that it can be said to evidence an all too common symptomology in political economy theory that originates in tensions between a central and peripheral governments. With Islamabad at the centre and FATA, Baluchistan, Khyber-Pakhtunhwa and Waziristan on the “edge of governance”, these tensions threaten to lead to irrevocable harm to the integrity of an already frayed National fabric. Although there appears to be disagreement around whether Pakistan qualifies as a failing state or not, it is probably not an overstatement to describe it as being fragile. Certainly some of the comments drawn from the interviews provide some insight into some of the fracture lines that run, not just through FATA, but through the heart of Islamabad as well. For example:
“Jinnah made a Nation for Muslims but no efforts were expended on actually building a Nation”;
“Jinnah is responsible for militancy in Pakistan by melding religion with military objectives”;
“The Pakhtun feel more connected to Afghanistan. This is because of the Punjabi majority in power and how this results in discrimination against the Pakhtun and the tribal people and areas”;
“Musharraf [chose] to join [George W.] Bush in the fight [and] this resulted in a split amongst members of the armed forces as many of the [military] leadership had directly [and continued] to support the Taliban. This was seen as traitorous;” and,
“With regard to the Pakistan government, this is viewed as illegitimate in Pakhtunhwa and this stems back to partition in 1947/48.” What may be lost on Islamabad however is that a failure of government on the periphery may well contribute to the collapse of government at the centre. That being the case, policies The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 87
originating from the time of British India and springing from an array of motives that may or may not have had currency at that time may serve to be the complete undoing of any sort of reconciliation between FATA and the central government.
FATA, and any hope for a greater level of governmental engagement with Islamabad, is hobbled by the continued existence of the Federal Crimes Regulations (FCR) and a Constitution which restricts FATA to an anachronistic place in the socio-political make up of Pakistan. Even if allowance is made for the possibility that the FCR was ever meant to promote or preserve a fiduciary relationship with Pakistan’s indigenous people, there is much about this piece of legislation which can only be seen as being about cultural containment and legislated inequity.
And finally, the combined action of Pakistan’s Constitution and the FCR, coupled with the effect of a confusing multiplicity of strategic interests and the lack of a significant or meaningful governmental presence generally, has resulted in over-representation by FATA and its people in the lowest percentile of virtually all key social indices36. This is not a state of affairs which lends itself to an easy transition for Pakistan in its relationship with its marginalized citizens to the
Northwest.
FATA’s reality is that life there either reflects military policies for suppression and control of the porous border with Afghanistan or an extension of the state’s paranoia of India.
The laws governing FATA, many of which do not apply anywhere else in the country, not only violate human rights, deny other basic rights under the Constitution and political freedoms to its residents, but they also serve to undermine state building and economic development (Schneider,
2009). None of this either engenders trust in Islamabad or supports development of the legitimate institutional capacity necessary for local delivery of government programs and services. Both of
36 “Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion and Society in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas”. Downloaded November 21, 2010 from http://www.understandingfata.org/about-u- fata.php The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 88 which, on the face of it, seem to be fundamental precursors to any significant shift in the security, stability or developmental environment of the region.
Simply put, I believe that targeted investment in meaningful reconciliation between
Islamabad and the tribes of FATA will produce benefits in a number of areas of the relationship.
Through extension, improvements in the quality and content of these relationships will serve to stabilize the environment within which investment decisions of all kinds will be considered. As a reflection of the character of the relationships in the region there will be a proportional improvement on the return on investment from both short and long-term engagement of all sorts, including counterintelligence efforts.
This approach is not meant to displace current counterinsurgency practices but I suggest that an invigorated tribal governance structure, and a real place for tribal governments as part of the Pakistani republic, may well produce a less permissive environment for the Taliban, Al-
Qaeda and other groups whose legitimacy in the region is seen as tenuous (Markey, 2009). In the context of Afghanistan, Zartman (2009) observes that “Ultimately, escaping the vicious cycle of insecurity and lack of development will require an active positive form of national Afghan culture that can compete with and displace militant ideology.” In FATA, I would argue that the
Pakhtun represent that sort of opportunity.
In conversations with many of the people I met in Pakistan, it appears as though the people of FATA and K-P are looking for credible, predictable sources for some fairly basic needs. These include access to quality education, healthcare, security of both people and property, equitable and timely access to justice and reliable basic service delivery37. Under most conditions, it is my perspective that people assess credibility and predictability on some fairly simple, subjective criteria. Whether it’s FATA or New York, when it comes down to the average
37 Pers comm. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 89 person’s assessment of governance, I would argue that their analysis doesn’t extend much past whether things work or not. My premise being that government’s presence or absence, legitimacy or illegitimacy, credibility or not, is measured by the delivery level of some fairly basic services to its citizens. This is particularly true under extreme conditions such as is found in the context of stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The operational mechanisms for delivering many of the basic government services lacking in much of FATA are present, I propose, within the tribal structures and the Pakhtun people.
As mentioned in my introduction, I am not advocating that simply finding the ways and means for restoring tribal governments to power is a panacea for either FATA or for Pakistan as a whole. I accept as fact that many tribal governments in Pakistan struggle with an entrenched and anachronistic perspective on the relationships between politics, religion, justice, human rights and self-determination. The choices made and how they are made with respect to re- profiling the governmental relationships invite questions pertaining to legitimacy, efficacy and capacity. Choices grounded in a romanticized view of the tribes as opposed to their contemporary reality will serve none of these interests. Of the three, perhaps the most pressing relates to meeting the tests of legitimacy. Arguably, in FATA, being effective and capable without also being viewed as legitimate represents a significant strategic vulnerability.
The reality is that not all aspects of Pakistan’s tribal systems are useful features of a re- envisioned relationship with the State government. The complex and difficult work associated with determining a new social contract that will lend shape to a “working” relationship with the tribes will be neither easy nor simple. The business of nation-building asks not that people avoid complex or difficult relationships but that they build a social framework together that can hold both with tolerance and respect and with a sense of shared purpose. Just as there is strength and The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 90 capacity resident in the dominant Punjabi members of the Pakistani community so too is there strength and capacity to be found in the tribal people of FATA. Having said that, the Pakhtun are not, as Acharya et al (2009) have said, a homogenous group with just one set of culturally based motivations and interests at stake; they are a highly complex network of distinct tribes with an entrenched sense of independence. But they are also a network of distinct tribes with a deep sense of interdependence and aligned interests.
At the very least, revisiting analytical approaches to incorporate a focus on the bonds that draw and hold people together seems a logical step in moving towards meaningful engagement with the tribes of FATA This paper is an attempt to describe and better understand the value in the socially cohesive “glue” that holds people together as communities despite the sometimes difficult tests of large scale economic, social and political change. This may have specific application in the analysis of ongoing or post-conflict environments where deeper insight into what it is that holds people together as communities may hold promise for harnessing the resiliency within that bond for meeting the challenges that come with stabilization and reconstruction efforts. With sustainable, predictable relationships as the centre point for a revised relationship between Islamabad and the tribes of FATA, the related objectives of security, economic development and education stand a better chance of gaining traction where they have, to date, struggled to gain real ground.
Though simply managing risk on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan may be all that Pakistan can handle at this point, other governments, governmental organizations and
NGO’s, with their very different objectives, have the flexibility to try to try on different kinds of operational relationships with the tribes. It is fair to say that resolving what is problematic about
Pakistan’s policies in Afghanistan, India and the border region are not all matters which lay The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 91 within their direct control. It is also accurate to reflect that nothing, whether this is foreign policy, government to government relations, regional economics or domestic social policy, happens in a vacuum or in isolation from virtually everything else.
To the extent that I take a position on Pakistan’s prescription for what it views as difficult about its relationship with FATA and K-P, it is this: the current constitutional arrangement, taken in concert with a number of its current policies including the FCR, does not serve the interests of a secular, pluralistic democracy in pursuit of Nationhood38. Stepping away from this particular description of itself as a Nation, neither do these arrangements serve the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan or the people of FATA or K-P irrespective of the specific model of governance. In any case, there is no single point in the relationship between the tribes and Islamabad which, when
“fixed” will lead to broad based reform, reconciliation or revitalization. Rondinelli and
Montgomery (2005) have determined through experience that, “in order to succeed, nation- building programmes to restore governance also have to focus on the long-term goals of developing human capital, reducing poverty, promoting social equity and alleviating social problems while at the same time strengthening the economy and rebuilding the state.” These sorts of outcomes can’t be expected to occur simply through Constitutional amendment or an exercise in revamping policies but this is certainly a good place to start.
Finally, I do not as yet believe that Islamabad has a clear view yet on what it sees as the future for FATA. It is clear though that FATA can do little more than work with what Islamabad is prepared or able to give up in the way of tools and that this decision relates directly to what it sees as its interests in FATA and for FATA. As long as Islamabad remains bogged down in a perspective that is occluded by a set of outdated colonial policies and legislation that is rooted in a past that should bear little resemblance to a forward-thinking future, FATA will stay right
38 Hoodbhoy. 2010. Pers Comm. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 92 where it is. The possibility exists that Pakistan does not actually think it has a problem in FATA and, depending on what lens is applied, this may or may not appear to be true. If maintaining instability along the border serves an over-riding national purpose then the challenges of FATA and K-P deliver on that objective admirably. Conversely, addressing an objective of regional stability and, in doing so, promoting the conditions for initiating and maintaining progress across a number of key social, political and economic measures is also within Pakistan’s capacity. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 93
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APPENDIX 1
GUIDED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
My objective in spending this time with you is so that I can develop a deeper understanding of Pakistan, to get some insight into the relationship between the people of FATA and the tribal governments and the relationship between the government in Islamabad and the people and tribal governments of FATA.
The questions which follow are not meant to limit or unnecessarily direct conversation but to provide some guidance to what will otherwise be an open discussion. You don’t have to answer any questions you don’t want to. I’ll also remind you that your privacy will be respected, anything you share with me will be confidential and that you are free to end this conversation whenever you want.
1. What part of Pakistan is your family from?
2. In what part of Pakistan do you currently live?
3. Are you or any of your immediate family involved in Pakistani politics?
4. Are you or any of your immediate family employed by the state government?
5. Do you identify as belonging to a specific ethnic group in Pakistan?
6. Have you spent any time in either the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or the Northwest Frontier Provinces (NWFP)?
7. Do you have any friends or family living in either of these places?
8. Would you say you know nothing, a little or a lot about the tribes of FATA or NWFP? (If the answer is “nothing”, go to question # 19; or, if the answer is “a little” or “a lot”, go to question # 9)
9. If the state government had no presence at all in FATA, who would perform the functions of government?
10. How are community decisions made?
11. What sorts of decisions do tribal leaders make on behalf of their community?
12. What sorts of programs or services do tribal leaders administer on behalf of their community? The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 101
13. In your opinion do the tribal governments perform a relevant role in the communities of FATA? Why do you believe this?
14. In your opinion does the state government perform a relevant role in the communities of FATA? Why do you believe this?
15. Faced with an issue that they can’t resolve on their own, who do community members turn to for support in finding a solution?
16. In your opinion, what percentage of the functions of government is carried out by tribal governments?
17. How much do you know about the Frontier Crimes Act (FCA)? (If the answer is “nothing”, go to question # 19; or, if the answer is “a little” or “a lot”, go to question # 18)
18. In your opinion, has the FCA promoted traditional forms of government or worked to the disadvantage of traditional governance systems?
19. In your opinion, does Pakistan’s Constitution contain effective mechanisms for the relationship between the state government and FATA/NWFP?
20. What do you envision the future holds for Pakistan?
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APPENDIX 2
FIELD RESEARCH INTERVIEWS
Dr. Massarrat Abid Director, Pakistan Study Centre University of the Punjab Quaid-i-Azam Campus Lahore, Pakistan
The Pakistan Study Centre at the University of the Punjab was established in 1981 and has been functioning as an independent unit since March 2003. The main objective of the Centre is to promote and undertake research on themes relating to history, politics, foreign affairs, economy, culture and languages of Pakistan. The interview with Dr. Abid was conducted at her office at the University and very loosely followed the interview questions as set out in Appendix
X. In attendance during this interview were 3 of Dr. Abid’s PhD students and Dr. Abid’s husband, Dr. S. Qalb-i-Abid, all of whom participated generally in the conversation held between Dr. Abid and me. It was this interview that highlighted the lost value in not having made audio and/or video recordings of the interviews. Unfortunately, by this point it was already too late to correct this.
• In reference to FATA generally:
o The (political) status is insufficient to meet modern needs o There must be real franchise • The Political Parties Act is not functional on the ground
o Not possible for political parties to organize . The traditional governments are present . The “Jitka” runs things (Note: I took this to mean the Jirga and have been unable to determine otherwise) The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 103
• The tribal governments have been intact for centuries • Currently the Chiefs (Maliks) use the support of the Mullahs in terms of a judicial role in communities • The tribes supported Pakistan and the U.S. in the war in Afghanistan with the expectation that this support would translate into greater representation • From 1947 – 1960s the (Pakistani) army stayed clear of the western border
o Concentrated on the eastern border with India • After this, freedom of movement (for the tribal people) became an issue…became the issue • (The tribal people) only became aggressive when forced to act against their traditions
o Tribal culture is strongest in the villages and less so in the cities
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 104
Dr. Mehdi Hassan Dean, School of Mass Communication Beaconhouse National University Lahore, Pakistan
Beaconhouse National University (BNU) is the first Liberal Arts University of Pakistan chartered by the Government of Punjab and established in 2003 for the purpose of imparting education with modern and rational course content while ensuring that the history and culture of
Pakistani society are respected.
As well as being Dean of School of Media and Communication at BNU, Dr. Hasan is the vice chairperson (Punjab) of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and is one of Pakistan’s more prominent communication experts with a specialization in political analysis. Dr. Hasan holds a Ph.D. in mass communication, an M.A. in journalism and was a Fulbright Scholar (1990) at the University of Colorado at Boulder, where he conducted research on ‘Coverage of Third
World Countries in the American Mass Media’. He has published papers in America and
Pakistan.
As a journalist, he was sub-editor, reporter and news bureau chief at Pakistan Press
International (PPI) between 1961–67; elected office-bearer of Pakistan Federation of Union of
Journalists (PFUJ) five times during this period. He also has been a news commentator and analyst for television since 1964 and for radio since 1962, including with Voice of America,
BBC, Radio Germany, Reuters and APA. He is also a regular contributor for all the major newspapers in Pakistan and a columnist with the English daily The News International and the
Urdu daily Waqt.
• Pakistan can be described as a “safe haven” because of U.S. policies during the Russian occupation [of Afghanistan] The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 105
• Pakistan’s interests in FATA [relate to] maintaining strategic depth along the Afghan border • The Pakistani government prefers to keep FATA “tribal”
o Don’t want “them” as part of the Constitutional framework . If they do [acquire equal representation as other Pakistani citizens under the Constitution] the government would have to actually provide the tribes with [at least] basic services • The collapse of the Soviet Union left Afghanistan devoid of the fist of Russia
o The Mujahadeed came to believe that it was they who dealt the death blow to Russia • Re: Maliks vs Mullahs
o Post 9-11, Pakistan reversed its support of the Taliban . At least ostensibly . Petitioned the Taliban to send Osama out of Afghanistan in order to avoid a clash with the U.S. . Musharraf elected to join (George W.) Bush in the fight • This resulted in a split amongst members of the armed forces as many of the leadership had directly [and continued] to support the Taliban
o This position was seen as traitorous (Note: I took this to mean that both the Taliban and the Pakistani government viewed the divergent actions of the army’s leadership as traitorous) • FATA is directly under the control of the army as part of the policies related to maintaining strategic depth • Peace [and stability] in FATA and Afghanistan can’t be achieved without cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan • Dr. Hasan identifies the following key sources of funding to the Taliban:
o Saudi o Extortion o Diaspora The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 106
Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy Professor, Department of Physics Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan
Dr. Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy is a Pakistani nuclear physicist, essayist and political-defence analyst. He is the professor of nuclear and high-energy physics, the head of the Physics
Department at the Quaid-e-Azam University (Qau), and also a senior academic scientist at the
National Center for Nuclear Physics at the Islamabad. He graduated and also received his PhD from MIT and continues to do research in Particle physics. He received the Baker Award for
Electronics in 1968 and the Abdus Salam Prize for Mathematics in 1984. He has authored various scientific research papers in peer-reviewed journals.
Dr. Hoodbhoy is also a prominent environmental and social activist and regularly writes on a wide range of social, cultural and environmental issues. He is the chairman of Mashal, a non-profit organization which publishes Urdu books on feminism, education, environmental issues, philosophy, and modern thought. Dr. Hoodbhoy is a strong and avid supporter for peaceful use of nuclear technology in Pakistan, non-nuclear proliferation, and nuclear disarmament; and well known and respected critic of the United States, Israeli, Pakistan's and
India's nuclear program in many national and international forums.
• [Pakistan] represents a complex problem • Pakistan has been a state for 63 years and still has not achieved nationhood
o Failed to unite around a common or well developed idea of Pakistan o Urdu was an awkward choice as a national language . Made many of the people of Pakistan virtual “illiterates” overnight by virtue of that choice • The tribes have both good and bad attributes:
o A strong sense of identity The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 107
o Very protective of culture and each other o Very insular o “Tough” on women o Reject modernity o Tendency towards violence and prone to Talibanization . It [seems] easier for the Pakhtun to turn towards the Taliban [for support] • (In response to my observation that the state seems not to have done very much to promote a modern relationship with the Pakhtun and other tribes of FATA)
o Yes, that is very true • Note: The very poor notes I have of my interview with Dr. Hoodbhoy represents a real loss in value. This conversation went on for almost 2 hours and was so rich with context, experience and wisdom that I was unable to take notes and absorb what Dr. Hoodbhoy had to offer. The best I can say is that his reflections have shaped this paper throughout and in this way that value has not been entirely lost.
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 108
Dr. Tariq Rahman Director, National Institute of Pakistan Studies Quad-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan
In 1990 Dr. Rahman joined the National Institute of Pakistan Studies. In 2004 he was given the title of National Distinguished Professor by the Higher Education Commission of
Pakistan and in the same year he was awarded the Pride of Performance for research. He was also the first incumbent of the Pakistan Chair at the University of California, Berkeley in 2004-5.
In 2007 he was appointed the Director of the National Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-
Azam University, Islamabad, and in 2010 he was made professor emeritus.
His published work is mostly on sociolinguistic history, language and politics and educational linguistics with focus on the Muslims of north India and Pakistan. He has over 94 articles in scholarly journals; 11 books; 6 encyclopedia articles; 28 contributions to books and several book reviews. His books, including “Language and Politics in Pakistan”, “Language,
Ideology and Power” and “An Introduction to Linguistics”, have been published by both Oxford
(Karachi) and by Orient Blackswan in India. In addition to his academic career he is also an important literary critic who has commented extensively on Pakistani literature in English.
• There are officially 76 languages spoken in Pakistan
o The 5 main languages are Punjabi, Sindhi, Pakhtun, Balochi and Bharadari • Organized in order of kinship, extended joint family, villages and “Nation” • Urdu is the favoured language • English schools are very expensive and many schools are crooked • English is the language of choice (Where that choice is available and accessible) for education • Punjabi, elites and military use Urdu
o Urdu is the language of literature, television etc o Ushtu and Devaki are dead or dying languages • Urdu elitism has resulted in tribal resentments and loss of identity The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 109
• Officials think the activists are using this as a plea for self-government or something else that is indirect • Regional languages are officially prohibited
Question: What can you tell me about the integrity of tribal communities in FATA and NWFP?
o Tribes maintain their languages; Pakhtun specifically o [The tribes still] exhibit traits of hospitality, revenge, seeking forgiveness . Seeking forgiveness can include the offering of goods, money, daughters etc
o Not all aspects of tribal culture should be retained . Eg treatment of women
o In Punjab, Panchait (sp) there are traditional chaudries and judges (like Jirga) to decide matters . Secular institutions may or may not refer to the Qu’uran although Mullahs are not necessarily consulted • Mullahs traditionally did not have the same power as they do now
o Jirgas were recognized by Pakistan and overseen by the head of the civil service o In the time of British India the tribal areas were more strictly governed with reference to tribal rule
o Pakhtunwali culture does not support the concept of tribal collective punishment (as set out in the FCR)
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 110
Question: Who is governing in the so called “Ungoverned Spaces”?
o The young Taliban Mullahs or others who have arms and ammunition . Some of the leadership emerged from the Lashkars . A vacuum [of governance] created this environment
Question: Does it serve Islamabad’s interests to have a strong, stable FATA?
o Islamabad uses FATA for illegal activities, harbouring groups etc . This is now backfiring on them as [some of these agents] have become autonomous . Islamabad now needs them to find stability
Question: In your opinion, is Pakistan a Nation or a State?
o It is a Nation but not in a western sense o Multilingual
Question: Can Pakistan exist without its very large military structures?
o Certainly . If the army had not created the groups that nibble away at States . They need not play any role
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 111
Question: Does the 18th amendment39 pose a threat to the status quo in FATA?
o Not really o The military keeps the President and the Prime Minister divided o The President used to be more amenable towards the military o The military controls the real levers of power . Does not serve Pakistan people’s interests . The military is focussed on security against India • This is most harmful now as it is a distraction . Civil powers and defence of the Nation should be the military’s role
Question: Is it a surprise to hear that many strategists believe that the region occupied by Pakistan is the likely place for the first limited, strategic nuclear battle/war?
o No
Question: Does Pakistan need the U.S.?
o If the U.S.’s reputation was better they would be more welcome. o On the whole, America has been a bad partner o [A continuing relationship with the U.S. is likely] not in the best interests of Pakistan
Question: Are Pakistan’s foreign policies effective?
39 Amendment XVIII (the Eighteenth Amendment) of the Constitution of Pakistan, was passed by the National Assembly of Pakistan in April 2010. The amendment removed the power of the President of Pakistan to dissolve the Parliament unilaterally, turned Pakistan from a semi- presidential to a parliamentary republic and renamed North-West Frontier Province to Khyber- Pakhtunkhwa. The amendment is expected to counter the sweeping powers amassed by the Presidency under former Presidents General Pervez Musharraf and General Muhammad Zia-ul- Haq and to ease political instability in Pakistan. The 'historic' bill reverses many infringements on the Constitution of Pakistan over several decades by its various military rulers. The amendment was passed by the Senate of Pakistan on April 15, 2010 and became an act of parliament under President Asif Ali Zardari on April 19, 2010. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan that a president relinquished a significant part of his powers willingly and transferred them to parliament and the office of the prime minister.
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 112
o It is not effective due to a preoccupation with defending things/actions that it can not (Note: On reflection, this answer leaves a great deal to be imagined)
Question: Did Musharraf give the right answer for Pakistan when asked by G.W. Bush, post 9-11, if Pakistan was for or against the U.S.? (The answer having been, yes)
o In my humble opinion, yes o [Having said that] Soviet involvement was not our business o Pakistan was not wanting to fight but was willing to provide other supports o [In hindsight] Should have said that they would provide humanitarian roles but would deny Taliban and [strived for] real neutrality
General notes • President Zardari was described as Mr. 10% in reference to the widely held belief that any sort of state activity that involved money or goods resulted in 10% of this ending up in Mr. Zardari’s hands.
o Musharraf has a different reputation and, generally, Pakistan’s military leaders enjoy a better reputation than does its civilian political leaders. . (Note: This is supported by a couple of papers I read that summarized surveys of public opinions.)
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 113
Ijaz Ahmad Senior Superintendent Police Service of Pakistan Peshawar, Pakistan
Notes: This interview was conducted in the presence of approximately 4 other men who were not introduced or identified but who I assumed to be members of the police/security apparatus in Peshawar.
• In roughly 2009 some Lashkars were mobilized to assist in the fight on terrorism in their communities [within Pakistan’s borders] (There are several accounts of this to be found in media reports from that time)
o They “used” tribal methods to eradicate the radical elements . Burning houses, confiscating property etc
o No militancy has resumed in these areas (unconfirmed) o The formal system does not effectively address the issues o They want to live with honour • [Have received] training in cross-border conflict by U.S. trainers
Question: What sort of role can the military play?
o The government are weak negotiators and they use too much force . Goes in heavy to eradicate militants • Kills non-militants [with the result that] those not supporting such actions join the militants
• Community in negotiation • A diversion process to provide non-formal access to dispute resolution
o Government tried to negotiate but only made things more complicated • The army does not support all processes of dispute resolution • [There is a] possibility to adapt the Jirga system
o But it is too often manipulated by [government] officials
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 114
Question: How would you legitimize a relationship and a system that accounts for the tribes?
o [Look at ways of providing] rehabilitation and compensation . There are no mechanisms for these
o The Jirgas are no longer playing this sort of role . No accountability . The “system” is forcing people to use a formal system . The Political Agent has ultimate control even over the Jirgas . Some Jirgas are only a product of the political agent . Common tribesmen do not respect Jirga members [any longer] • Do not hold a legitimate place any longer
o Some Maliks benefit under the FCR (Note: This is borne out in the literature)
Question: What about the FCR and the tribes?
o [There is a] common consensus that adapting [rather than eliminating] the FCR [is the correct approach]
o Academia is against the FCR o [FCR] Not benefiting the communities
Question: What holds communities and the tribes together?
o Similarities in the tribal systems o There is a need for a negotiator(s) that understands the tribal systems and tribal people
o Most FATA communities have no healthcare and no schools o Community Basic Health Units are not functioning
Question: So why do you believe militancy has taken hold in FATA?
o Poverty and politics o 10 million people in the region (Note: I am not sure where this figure came from or, with any confidence, the region being referred to)
o A decade ago poverty was worse but crime was less The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 115
o U.S. response to Afghanistan has resulted in terror in peaceful communities o No faith in political governments due to all the corruption
Question: What do you know about tribal culture in FATA?
o Mostly Sunni Muslims and there are some real problems in this group o Intermarried tribals o Language is the “Gold Card” . Note: I heard this to mean that fluency in Urdu and/or English was a ticket to accessing opportunity
o The Malik system is inherited . Note: I suggest that this is only partly correct. The literature indicates that the role of Malik has been in existence for a long time but that the role is more representative of British policies of rule by proxies than the traditional role and system for appointing Maliks by the Jirga. . (Note: Ahmad did comment that there are people serving as Maliks who would not otherwise be eligible for the role without the changes wrought by governmental policies.)
Question: What are your thoughts on the idea of threats to identity?
o 9 out of 10 Jirgas will find in favour of the more powerful [party] o The Jirgas are subject to corruption . It is understood that the most powerful will always win and justice will not be served • (Note: This is consistent with the literature and runs true to characterizations of the ways in which British colonial policies have perverted the traditional systems) . If you don’t abide by the findings of the Jirga, your money, land etc will be taken away • (Note: It also sounds as though, if you do abide by the Jirga you will lose your money and/or land) The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 116
• An out of context comment by Ahmad: If there was a centralized water control system this would eliminate disputes over water resources
Question: What are your thoughts on the power dynamic between Maliks and Mullahs in current versus traditional context?
o Confirmed that there is an ongoing power game between the two o The Maliks are often in direct conflict with militant interests
Question: What are your thoughts on the way in which counter-intelligence/counter- insurgency policies have played out in FATA?
o Despite US funded projects they are not necessarily very effective o The government (Pakistani) is not particularly supportive o USAID is not directly involved, they contract out o Note: Mr Ahmad seemed to want to downplay his response to this question
Question: Does anyone ask the communities what they want or need?
o Yes o NGOs work with the communities on infrastructure, agriculture scholarships etc o Education in FATA often leads to people looking for opportunities away from their homes in FATA
Question: What, if anything, is the missing link in all of this?
o The involvement of local communities is insufficient o If the hearts and minds [of the people] are not there then it will not work o People should be involved . Only then can you expect ownership and success
o FATA communities have been displaced . Life-long injuries have been sustained . The communities are in trauma
o Workers in the communities need to be loyal to the communities they work with and have the best interests of the communities and the soil [at heart] The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 117
. This isn’t based on having a PhD or technical skill but on sincerity of their commitment to betterment
o The relationships between people – culture – place is critical . Important to hire people from the region • Honour and loyalty and are accountable to the people they work with
o Pakhtun saying: . The Pakhtun word for Bread and Butter is Rizk. Without Risk, you don’t earn Rizk
Question: Who is killing the Maliks?
o The militants are…they are ruthless o Maliks who lead Lashkars represent a threat to militant power o In some cases, a situation is taken advantage of in the atmosphere of militancy (under the guise of militancy???)
• Relationship-building [with the tribes] is key The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 118
Safiullah Gul Bureau Chief, Dunya TV Peshawar, Pakistan
• Civilization in the area is over 5,000 years old
o Islam only 1,500 years • In their own Pakhtun villages women are not veiled
o When they go out of their village they wear a burkha • Inter-family marriages and strong family ties • There has been several decades of impact on their culture
o Education, TV and access to outsiders • NGOs exploit the idea of women as being brutalized
o Not true o Elders and women have [are given] respect • Militancy stems back to USSR/Afghan history
o Pakhtun culture close to Islam so it can be manipulated and exploited o The threat of a Russian invasion of Pakistan was used to gain support for action in Afghanistan
o Ages 10-20 seem the most vulnerable o Policies [may] change but mindsets do not o Freedom fighters have been idealized o [Much] collateral damage in Afghanistan and border area . Civilian deaths . The outcome has been resentment that further mobilized militants against the Pakistan military . In Shumali [in central Pakistan] the Northern Alliance was paid $28 million to carry out attacks (Note: There are news reports of drone strikes in this region that have claimed civilian lives) . The Taliban capitalized on these [sorts] of attacks to gain support for retaliation . Destruction of infrastructure The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 119
Question: Is there a distinction between the objectives of the Pakistani military and U.S. foreign policies in the region?
o Before all the collateral deaths yes but not since o The British system (The FCR) kept them (Pakhtun and FATA) submissive o The Pakhtun traditionally carried guns and knives o A century under the FCR created a great deal of pressure . The militants provided some relief from this . Created the possibility of more freedom
o The civilian population started to suffer though under the militants rule . Repressive . Mr. Gul commented on having interviewed a refugee from the heavy military action by the Pakistani army in Swat • An educated woman • Said this was the first time other people have seen her face and that she had been disgraced and was concerned about what would happen to her when the army left.
Question: Describe traditional tribal governance in FATA?
o The Jirga is threatened by the militancy in the region o Traditionally the Jirga gave everyone equal representation and equal rights . The outcomes could be expected to be relatively equal, barring any favouritism . Have the right of appeal . “Under shadow of protection” and able to ask for help . Jurmad was the open space around a mosque where the Jirgas would often take place
Question: What can you say about the question of legitimacy and where that is at?
o It is the first victim of war o The Jirga is the heart and soul of legitimacy . Provides recognition and acceptance The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 120
o Traditions evolve but the Pakhtun feel as though their traditions are under threat o Between 2005-2007 over 250 tribal elders (Maliks) were killed . This reduces the traditional roles and influence as a reaction to fear and pressure . People know who is doing this but there is no security to act against the militants because the revenge will last for generations
Question: Is there any hope for a different relationship between the Pakhtun and Islamabad?
o In 1998 Islamabad tried to make amendments to the FCR but the changes were minute
o The collective responsibility clause [is the worst aspect of the FCR]
Question: Does Islamabad care about stability in FATA?
o Stability is not in favour o Some want instability o China wants stability o More than 53% of [Pakistan’s] budget goes to the military and this goes up to 70% if you include administrative costs. (Note: The inference I believed I was meant to draw was that there are large financial stakes in any consideration of stability versus instability generally)
o The provincial governments would be directly affected by stability (Note: my assumption was that this affect should be viewed as positive)
The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 121
Shaukat Khattak Bureau Chief Samaa TV Peshawar, Pakistan
Question: Please comment on your views regarding legitimacy and governance?
o With regard to the Pakistani government, this is viewed as illegitimate in Pakhtunhwa and stems back to partition in 1947/48
o The FCR runs directly counter to basic human rights o The Pakistani government chose to continue to support the FCR as inherited from the Brits
o FATA has long been used as a launching pad for conflict and illegal activities o In the 1990s FATA got the right to vote and this was the first real change there since 1947
o There is a FCR reform package in the works to at least ensure basic human rights o The Political Parties Act (PPA) was, ostensibly, extended to FATA but why is government so reluctant to enact the PPA? . Currently political parties are unable to actively campaign in tribal areas . The 18th amendment [of the Constitution] does not produce any changes for the tribal areas
o The “Great Game” continues . The international games come with political reasons for maintaining the tribal areas just as they have always been . The Pakhtun have been divided between 4 areas
Question: The idea of a military that is not accountable to government or people seems inconsistent to nation-building, could you comment on this?
o Jinnah made a nation for Muslims but no efforts were expended on actually building a nation
o Jinnah is responsible for militancy in Pakistan by melding religion with military objectives
o The Pakhtun feel more connected to Afghanistan The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 122
. This is because of the Punjabi majority in power and how this results in discrimination against the Pakhtun and the tribal people and areas
Question: Do you think the Pakistan of today is what Jinnah dreamed it would be?
o Yes, this is what he imagined o He introduced Islamic law into politics o We are currently experiencing the results of the seeds sewn by Jinnah
Question: Please comment on the U.S. action in Afghanistan?
o When the USSR left Afghanistan it was [kind of] given to Pakistan o The Taliban were created and came to power and became a Pakistani responsibility o The Pakhtun were treated like slaves in Afghanistan under the Taliban o I am hoping the USA will solve the militancy problem that Pakistan never seemed very interested in solving
o I have no objection to the USA presence in Afghanistan
Question: What was the Pakistan military trying to do in Swat?
o 3 operations there o After the first 2 the Taliban experienced their most powerful resurgence of all o The military and the militants are not perceived differently in Swat (Note: I heard this to mean that neither enjoyed any real legitimacy or support there)
o The military created a permissive environment for the militants and kidnappings etc o The military is not doing its job . There was a resolution in [National] Assembly to do a “real operation [but they didn’t] . Claim to have arrested militant leaders but these leaders were actually in Afghanistan at the time . The military seems to have spared the militants . E.G. there is a report of 5 or 6 militants being allowed to live in an area . The Army did nothing at all for at least 3 years The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 123
. The militants grew more organized and better armed while they were left alone . The Chief of NWFP is rumoured to have visited the militants and declared them as brothers . They moved on to Masoud territory . If left alone they will grow . Finally in 2007 the Pakistani military started military operations . [Although this has changed with the increasing quality of intelligence and the precision of the predator drone attack] another example is Haqqani, an Al Qaeda leader, living and operating openly in Pakistan • Haqqani has been connected with much of the bombing in eastern Afghanistan . Taliban leadership was living openly in such communities as Karachi, Peshawar and eastern NWFP and only fair recently arrested (No names were provided) • Khattak suggested that the only reason they were arrested is because they refused to cooperate with the military
o There has been some successes recently . Strategic operations in Waziristan have been much different
Question: Do the tribal governments in FATA offer a kind of glue to people and communities?
o Yes, without the political agents and the effects of the FCR, they do o Changes to the legal system are supported o People want access to a political process that includes them o Do not generally want the Pakistani legal system as it stands now except for regulation of formal legal (Note: This thought remained incomplete)
o [There needs to be a measured, incremental approach] to reforming the FCR o The political agent is “next to God” and as a result there is no real accountability . His power needs to be restricted The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 124
40 o Re: Malakand Division presents a good example for positive change [in the right direction]. (Note: He also used this example to illustrate the need for gradual change) . Development and political reforms more advanced and the division is more educated and aware . There was a problem that allowed militancy in as a result of a vacuum in the legal system and administration of justice • Shariah filled the void • Wahabis began to wrest control • Once Malakand was merged with Pakistan, the Jirga system was superceded • Change needs to be gradual, not all at once
Question: Can the Taliban’s strength be attributed to these sorts of vacuums?
o Yes o In the beginning they [the Taliban] did good things…provided hope for some sort of order
o In the tribal areas things were calm o Afghans were in Pakistan with Madrassas o As per political agents (??) o 3 groups were blamed for the problems . Mullahs (Religious Parties) . Military . Political agents
40 Until 1970, the area was a Tribal Area known as the Malakand Agency. In 1970, Malakand Division was formed from the princely states of Chitral, Dir and Swat and an area around the Malakand Fort known as the Malakand Protected Area. Malakand division includes the districts Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Swat, Bunir, Shangla, Malakand and Chitral. Malakand Division was an administrative division of the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, until the reforms of 2000 abolished the third tier of government. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 125
Question: Given all the problems it has created, why only slow change to the FCR?
o [If the change is too fast or too much all at once] this will produce a vacuum and instability in the region . (Note: As indicated above these have been precursors for trouble throughout the region before)
Question: So, what would be a best case outcome?
o All Pakhtuns come together o No borders o Would receive benefit from the resources in the area (oil and gas) o The “Great Game” should STOP o Abandon the policy of strategic depth
• There is a huge resurgence of Pakhtun culture
o Cultural events etc o People are hungry for peace o Pakhtuns fought without guns…non-violence movement o Pakhtuns are most liberal people of Pakistan . “We have been made this way by the madrassa system . People did not wear the burkha . Women used to sing and dance . Mixed dances in the villages [were common] . Gun culture was introduced by the Pakistani government
Question: What reforms do you envision?
o How do you reintroduce Talibanized children into their communities? . Rehabilitation of children/students and whole communities • Pakistan has no program for any of this The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 126
APPENDIX 3
THEMATIC BREAKOUT – FIELD RESEARCH INTERVIEWS
Themes Issue/Topic Responses Political, economic, social • The Political Parties Act (PPA) is not functional on the ground realities of the relationship • The PPA was, ostensibly, extended to FATA but why is government so between Islamabad and reluctant to enact the PPA? FATA o Currently, political parties are unable to actively [organize or] campaign in tribal areas th o The 18 amendment [of the Constitution] does not produce any changes for the tribal areas • The [political] status [of FATA] is insufficient to meet modern needs • There must be real franchise • From 1947 – 1960s the [Pakistani] army stayed clear of the western border o Concentrated on the eastern border with India o After this, freedom of movement [for the tribal people] became an issue…became the issue • Pakistan’s interests in FATA [relate to] maintaining strategic depth along the Afghan border • The Pakistani government prefers to keep FATA “tribal” o Don’t want “them” as part of the Constitutional framework o If they do [acquire equal representation as other Pakistani citizens under the Constitution] the government would have to actually provide the tribes with [at least] basic services • FATA is directly under the control of the army as part of the policies related to maintaining strategic depth (Author’s note: Pakistan’s Military/Defence Ministry is solely responsible for Afghan and FATA relations) • The government are weak negotiators and then they use too much force [when negotiation fails them] o [The army] goes in[to communities/region] heavy to eradicate militants o Kill non-militants [with the result that] those not supporting such actions join the militants • Yes, [it] is true [that Islamabad has not done very much to promote a modern relationship with the Pakhtun or other tribes of FATA]. • [The] Punjabis, elites and military use Urdu • Urdu is the language of literature, television etc • Urdu elitism has resulted in tribal resentments and loss of identity • In 1998 Islamabad tried to make amendments to the FCR but the changes were minute • The collective responsibility clause [is the worst aspect of the FCR] • With regard to the Pakistani government, they are viewed as illegitimate in Pakhtunhwa and [this] stems back to partition in 1947/48 • The tribes supported Pakistan and the US in the war in Afghanistan with the expectation that this support would translate into greater representation • Tribal culture is strongest in the villages and less so in the cities Other political motivations • Islamabad used FATA for illegal activities, harbouring [various] groups for Islamabad’s orientation etc The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 127 towards FATA o This is now backfiring on them as [some of these groups] have become autonomous o Islamabad now needs them to find stability • In roughly 2009 some Lashkars (tribal militias) were mobilized [by the army] to assist in the fight on terrorism in their communities • Stability [in FATA] is not in favour, some want instability • More than 53% of [Pakistan’s] budget goes to the military and this goes up [to almost] 70% if you include administrative costs (Author’s note: The inference that I believed I was meant to draw was that there are large financial stakes in any consideration of stability versus instability in the region) • The “Great Game” continues • The international games come with political reasons for maintaining the tribal areas just as they have always been Afghanistan, Pakistan, • The threat of a Russian invasion of Pakistan was used to gain support for FATA and cross-border action in Afghanistan policy implications • When the USSR left Afghanistan it was [kind of] given to Pakistan [to deal with] • Pakistan can be described as a “safe haven” because of US policies during the Russian occupation [of Afghanistan] • Pakistan’s interests in FATA [relate to] maintaining strategic depth along the Afghan border • Peace [and stability] in FATA and Afghanistan can’t be achieved without cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan • The Taliban were created and came to power and became a Pakistani responsibility • Post-9/11, Pakistan reversed its [previous] support [to] the Taliban o At least ostensibly • [Islamabad] petitioned the Taliban to send Osama bin Laden out of Afghanistan in order to avoid an imminent clash with the US • Musharraf [chose] to join [George W.] Bush in the fight o This resulted in a split amongst members of the armed forces as many of the [military] leadership had directly [and continued] to support the Taliban . This was seen as traitorous (Author’s note: I took this to mean that both the Taliban and the Pakistani government had reason to view one or the other side of this divergence as being traitorous . Pakhtun culture close to Islam so it can be manipulated and exploited • The Pakhtun were treated like slaves in Afghanistan under the Taliban • I am hoping the US will solve the militancy problem that Pakistan never seemed very interested in solving • I have no objection to the US presence in Afghanistan • US response to Afghanistan has resulted in terror in peaceful communities • [Much] collateral damage in Afghanistan and border area o Civilian deaths o The outcome has been resentment that [has] further mobilized militants against the Pakistan military o In Shumali (Waziristan) the Northern Alliance (Recall that Ahmad Shah Massoud was the military and political leader of the Northern Alliance) was paid $28 million to carry out attacks (This information was indirectly coupled with discussion related to collateral casualties) The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 128
. The Taliban capitalizes on these [sorts] of attacks to gain support for retaliation . 10-20 year olds seem the most vulnerable . Policies may change but mindsets do not (Author’s note: This was taken to indicate that the effects of such policy choices have a lifespan in the minds of people well beyond the term of shifting policies) o Destruction of infrastructure • Before all the collateral damage [there was a distinction between the objectives and the Pakistani military and US foreign policy in the region] but not since • Freedom fighters have been idealized • The military [has] created a permissive environment for the militants (kidnappings etc) • The military is not doing its job o There was a resolution in [the National] assembly to do a “real” operation [but they didn’t] o [They] claim to have arrested militant leaders but these leaders were actually in Afghanistan at the time o The military seems to have spared the militants . E.g. there is a report (Author’s note: rumour) of 5 or 6 militant [leaders] being allowed to live in an area . The army did nothing for 3 years . The militants grew more organized and better armed while they were left alone . The Chief of NWFP is rumoured to have visited the militants and called [declared] them [as being] brothers . They moved on to Massoud41 territory . If left alone they (the militants) will grow . Another example is Haqqani, an Al Qaeda leader, living and operating openly in Pakistan o Haqqani has been connected with much of the bombing in eastern Afghanistan o Taliban leadership was living openly in such communities as Karachi, Peshawar and eastern NWFP and only fairly recently arrested (Author’s note: no names were provided) . The interviewee suggested that the only reason they were arrested was because they refused to cooperate with the military • There have been some successes more recently o Strategic operations in Waziristan have been much different o Better intelligence and increased precision of the Predator drone targeting • [Islamabad] “used” tribal methods to eradicate the radical elements o [Lashkars] burning houses, confiscating property etc. o No militancy has resumed in these areas (Author’s note: This seems a bit broad and an unlikely outcome in the medium to long- term) • Re: US Counter-insurgency efforts in the region: o Despite the US [funding levels] they are not necessarily very effective
41 It was unclear in the conversation but I understood this to be a reference to Ahmad Shah Massoud (The Lion of Panjshir) the engineer/military leader who played a leading role in driving the Soviets from Afghanistan and went on to become the military commander and political leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 129
o The government (Pakistan) is not very supportive Evidence of the presence • Yes, [tribal governments in FATA offer a kind of glue to people and and impact of tribal communities] governance systems and o [At least] without the political agents and the effects of the FCR, social cohesion they do • There is a huge resurgence of Pakhtun culture o Cultural events o People are hungry for peace • The traditional governments are present • Civilization in the area is over 5,000 years old o Islam is only 1,500 years [old] • The Jirgas run things • [Legitimacy] is the first victim of war • The Jirga is the heart and soul of legitimacy o Provides recognition and acceptance • The tribal governments have been intact for centuries • Traditions evolve but the Pakhtun feel as though their traditions are under threat • Currently the Chiefs (Maliks) use the support of the Mullahs in terms of a judicial role in communities • Mullahs did not traditionally have as much power as they do now • The tribes have both good and bad attributes: o A strong sense of identity o Very protective of culture and each other o Very insular o “Tough” on women o Reject modernity • The tribes maintain their language; Pakhtun specifically • [The tribes still] exhibit traits of hospitality, revenge, seeking forgiveness o Which can include the offering of goods, money, daughters etc • Not all aspects of tribal culture should be retained o e.g. treatment of women • Jirgas were [are?] recognized by Pakistan and overseen by the head of the civil service • [There is a] possibility to adapt the Jirga system o But it is too often manipulated by [government] officials o The army does not support all processes of dispute resolution • Tribal culture does not support the concept of collective punishment [as set out in the FCR and discussed in the paper] • [The tribes and communities are held together] by similarities in the tribal systems • Mostly Sunni Muslims and there are some real problems in this group • Intermarriage [between] tribal [people] o Strong family ties • The Malik system is inherited (Author’s note: I suggest that this is only partly correct. The literature indicates that the role of Malik has been in existence for a long time but that the role is more representative of British policies of rule by proxies than the traditional role and system for appointing Maliks by the Jirga) • Question: Who is killing the Maliks? (This is a question related to the over 250 tribal elders/Maliks that were reportedly killed between 2005 and 2007) o The militants are…they are ruthless o Maliks who lead Lashkars are a threat to militant power The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 130
o In some cases the situation is taken advantage of in the atmosphere of militancy (Under the guise of militancy?) o This reduces the traditional roles and influence as a reaction to fear and pressure o People know who is doing this but there is no security to act against the militants because the revenge will last for generations Evidence of the impact of • Yes, this (The Islamic Republic of Pakistan) is what [Jinnah] imagined Islamabad’s policies on o He introduced Islamic law into politics tribal governance systems o We are currently experiencing the results of the seeds sewn by and social cohesion Jinnah • Jinnah made a Nation for Muslims but no efforts were expended on actually building a Nation • Jinnah is responsible for militancy in Pakistan by melding religion with military objectives • The Pakhtun feel more connected to Afghanistan o This is because of the Punjabi majority in power and how this results in discrimination against the Pakhtun and the tribal people and areas • With regard to the Pakistan government, this is viewed as illegitimate in Pakhtunhwa and this stems back to partition in 1947/48 • In the 1990s, FATA [men] got the right to vote and this was the first real change there since 1947 • [Government needs to look at ways of addressing] rehabilitation and compensation o The Jirgas no longer playing this sort of role . No accountability . The “system” is forcing people to use a formal system . The political agent has ultimate control; even over the Jirgas . Common tribesmen do no respect Jirga members [any longer] o Do not hold a legitimate place anymore . Some Maliks benefit under the FCR • The British system (the FCR) kept [the Pakhtun and FATA] submissive • The Pakistani government chose to continue to support the FCR as inherited from the Brits • The FCR runs counter to basic human rights • [There is a] common consensus that adapting [rather than eliminating] the FCR [is the correct approach] . Academia is against the FCR . [FCR] not benefitting the communities • There is a FCR reform package in the works to at least ensure basic human rights • Most FATA communities have no healthcare and schools • Community Basic Health Units are not functioning • US response to Afghanistan has resulted in terror in peaceful communities • The Malik system is inherited (Author’s note: I suggest that this is only partly correct. The literature indicates that the role of Malik has been in existence for a long time but that the role is more representative of British policies of rule by proxies than the traditional role and system for appointing Maliks by the Jirga) • There are people serving [now] as Maliks who would not otherwise be eligible for the role without the changes brought through central government policies • 9 out of 10 Jirgas will find in favour of the more powerful The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 131
• The Jirgas are subject to corruption o It is understood that the most powerful will always win and justice will not be served (Author’s Note: This is consistent with the literature and runs true to characterizations of the ways in which British colonial policies have perverted the traditional systems) o If you don’t abide by the findings of the Jirga, your money, land etc will be taken away (Author’s note: This is also true of traditional authority of the Jirga but there was a higher degree of accountability to peers and community members) • Traditionally the Jirga gave everyone equal representation and equal rights o The outcomes could be expected to be relatively equal, barring any favouritism o Have the right of appeal o [Community members in dispute were] “under the shadow of protection” and able to ask for help o “Jurmad” was the open space around a mosque where the Jirgas would often take place • The Jirgas are threatened by the militancy in the region • The involvement of local communities is insufficient • If the hearts and minds [of the people] are not there then it will not work • People should be involved o Only then can you expect ownership and success • FATA communities have been displaced o Life-long injuries have been sustained o The communities are in trauma • Workers in the communities need to be loyal to the communities they work with and have the best interests of the communities and the soil [at heart] o This isn’t based on having a PhD or technical skill but on sincerity of their commitment to betterment • The relationships between people – culture – place is critical o Important to hire people from the region . Honour and loyalty and are accountable to the people they work with • A century under the FCR created a great deal of pressure [on tribal communities] o The militants provided some relief from this o Created the possibility of more freedom o The civilian population started to suffer under the militants rule . Repressive • There has been several decades of impact on their culture o Education, TV and outsiders General commentary related • There is an ongoing power play between [Maliks and Mullahs] to FATA, traditional • The Maliks are often in direct confrontation with militant interests systems and relationship to • FATA has long been used as a launching pad for conflict and illegal Islamabad activities • [There needs to be a gradual, incremental approach] to reforming the FCR Vision for the future of the • [A best case outcome would be for] all Pakhtun [to] come together Pakhtun and other tribes of o No borders FATA o Would receive benefit from the resources in the area o The “Great Game” would stop o Abandon the policy of strategic depth • Peace [and stability] in FATA and Afghanistan can’t be achieved without The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 132
cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan • Relationship building [with the tribes] is key • Malakand Division represents a good model for positive change [in the right direction] o Development and political reforms are more advanced and the Division is more educated and aware o There was a problem that allowed militancy in as a result of a vacuum in the legal system and administration of justice . Shariah filled the void . Wahabbis filled the void . Once Malakand was merged with Pakistan, the Jirga system was superseded • Change needs to be gradual, not all at once Current status of • After the 1960s, freedom of movement [for the tribal people] became an relationship (Constitutional, issue…became the issue legislative and policy) • [The tribal people] only became aggressive when forced to act against between Islamabad and their traditions FATA - Impacts • Urdu was an awkward choice as the National language of Pakistan (Author’s note: to say the least) o Made many of the people [in the region that became] of Pakistan virtual illiterates overnight by virtue of that choice • Changes to the legal system are supported • People want access to a political system that includes them • Do not generally want the Pakistani legal system as it now stands except for the regulation of formal legal …(Thought not completed) • The political agent is next to God o His power needs to be restricted General comments • (Author’s note: The following comment was offered in response to the regarding the concept of question, “Who is governing in the so called ungoverned areas?) “ungoverned space” o The young Taliban Mullahs or others who have arms and ammunition o Some of the leadership emerged from the Lashkars (tribal militias) o [It was] a vacuum [of governance] that created this environment • In response to the question, “Why do you believe that militancy has taken hold in FATA?” o Poverty and politics o A decade ago [even though] poverty was worse, crime was less • No faith in political governments due to all the corruption • There was a problem that allowed militancy in as a result of a vacuum in the legal system and administration of justice o Shariah filled the void o Wahabbis filled the void o Once Malakand was merged with Pakistan, the Jirga system was supersceded • In response to the question, “Can the Taliban’s strength be attributed to these sorts of vacuums?” o Yes o In the beginning they (the Taliban) did good things…provided hope for some sort of order o In the tribal areas things were calm o Afghans were in Pakistan in the Madrassas o 3 groups [can be] blamed for the problems: . Mullahs (Religious parties) . Military . Political Agents The Tribes of Pakistan: Finding Common Ground, Paterson 133
• [If change to the FCR is too fast or too much all at once] this will produce a vacuum and instability in the region NOTE: Relate the bolded comments to my earlier comments that Pak’s policies in Afghanistan were meant to restrict/quell/crush Pakhtun Nationalism