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The Afghan Government's Relationship with the Pashtun Community and Its Effect on Stability; a Comparative Approach

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The Afghan Government's Relationship with the Pashtun Community and Its Effect on Stability; a Comparative Approach American University in Cairo AUC Knowledge Fountain Theses and Dissertations 6-1-2012 The Afghan government's relationship with the Pashtun community and its effect on stability; a comparative approach Alfred Jasins Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds Recommended Citation APA Citation Jasins, A. (2012).The Afghan government's relationship with the Pashtun community and its effect on stability; a comparative approach [Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1066 MLA Citation Jasins, Alfred. The Afghan government's relationship with the Pashtun community and its effect on stability; a comparative approach. 2012. American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/1066 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The American University in Cairo School of Humanities and Social Sciences The Afghan Government’s Relationship with the Pashtun Community and its effect on Stability; a Comparative Approach A Thesis Submitted to The Department of Political Science In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of Master of Arts By Alfred Jasins Under the supervision of Dr. Ivekovic May/ 2012 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 1 1. Research Topic 1 2. Research Questions 7 3. Hypothesis 7 4. Alternative Hypothesis 8 5. Conceptual Framework and Methodology 12 6. Literature Review 17 CHAPTER 2 – DEMOGRAPHICS/HISTROICAL BACKGROUND 21 1. Pashtuns 21 2. Minority Groups 29 3. Historical Background 30 CHAPTER 3 – THE MUSAHIBAN MONARCHY (1929-1963) AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PASHTUNS 34 Part 1 - Nadir Shah and Political Clientelism 35 1. Nadir Shah and Pashtun Tribes Take Back Afghanistan 35 2. Political Clientelism, the Monarchy, and the Tribal Communities 37 a. Local Government 41 3. Political Clientelism and the Pashtun Religious Community 47 4. Conclusion 51 Part 2 - The Role of Development in the Pashtun Patronage Relationship 52 1. Economic Reform and a New Source of Revenue 54 2. Government Funded Development and the Helmand Valley Project 57 3. Conclusion 62 Part 3 - A Developing National Conscience; a Shifting Social Dynamic 63 1. Aid and Military Development 64 2. Progressive Educational Reform 67 3. Declining Religious Influence 70 4. The Government’s Accelerated Reforms, a New Social Dynamic 71 5. Conclusion 74 CHAPTER 4 – HISTORICAL INTERLUDE 77 1. New Democracy Era (1963-1973) 77 2. The Second Era of Daoud (1973- 1978) and the Saur Revolution 77 3. Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and the Mujahedin 78 4. Post Soviet Withdrawal and the Civil War (1989-1996) 80 2 5. Taliban Government (1996-2001) 81 CHAPTER 5 – THE KARZAI GOVERNMENT; AN ERA OF INSTABILITY 87 Part 1 - The US Invasion and the Emergence of a New Government 88 1. Initial Invasion, Reemergence of the Northern Alliance 89 2. Bonn Process 91 3. Elections 96 a. Presidential Elections; 2004, 2009 98 4. Conclusion 100 Part 2 - Warlordism and Society 100 1. Pashtun Warlords of the South and East 103 2. Afghan National Police 110 3. Afghan National Army 112 4. Warlords of the North and West Pay Retribution 115 5. Conclusion 116 Part 3 - The Insurgency: Who They Are and Why They Fight 116 1. The Insurgency 119 a. The Taliban 119 b. Haqqani Network 122 c. Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin 124 d. The Influence of Pakistan; The Patron of Insurgency 124 2. Why They Join: The Disenfranchisement of the Pashtun Populace 126 a. US and International Military Involvement 126 b. Development 130 c. Opium 133 d. The Tribal Nature of Warlordism and the Insurgency 136 e. The Role of Religion 140 f. Conclusion 147 CHAPTER 6 – SUMMARY AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 148 1. Patronage, Pashtun Tribes, and Warlordism 149 2. Development and National Allegiance 154 3. Comparative Relations with the Religious Community 156 4. Comparing Stability 159 5. A Comparative Approach: Applying Musahiban Methods to the Current Conflict in Afghanistan 162 6. Afterword 170 Bibliography 173 3 Figures Figure 1 – Breakdown of Pashtun Tribal Communities 23 Figure 2 – Description of Government Supported Financing and the Helmand Valley Project 61 Figure 3 – Bonn Process Timeline 92 Figure 4 – Transitional Authority Cabinet Composition 95 Figure 5 – Voting Ballot 98 Figure 6 – Insurgent Attacks by Week 118 Figure 7 – Risk Assessment Map 119 Figure 8 – NATO-ISAF Troop Distribution 127 Figure 9 – US Military Combat Flights Distribution 129 Figure 10 – Poppy Cultivation by Year 134 Figure 11 – Poppy Cultivation Map 135 Figure 12 – Tribalism and the Tribal Communities, Under Musahiban Leadership, Summary 151 Figure 13 – Patronage Flow Chart 152 Figure 14 – Clientelism and the Religious Community under Musahiban Leadership 157 4 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Research Topic Afghanistan today is a continuation of nearly four decades of uninterrupted conflict and instability. The turmoil in the country has been exacerbated by international interference and influence, and by complexities of the Pashtun tribal society as well as multi ethnic, linguistic, and religious dimensions. In the past decade the country has become the focus of American intervention and its ‘war on terror’ against Islamist extremism. As the American 2014 military withdrawal looms, the Karzai government and its international backers have yet to create an atmosphere of stability and peace, which the country so desperately needs. The insurgents refuse to accept the legitimacy of the Karzai government and continue to garner support among various Pashtun tribal and religious communities (which make up roughly 40% of the population). Prior to the decades of turmoil, these same Pashtun communities were the backbone of government support. This era, known as the Musahiban dynasty (1929-1963), was an era of peace and stability, a rarity in modern Afghan history. The focus of this analysis is centered on this era and the current Karzai government. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how the Afghan government’s relationship with the Pashtun communities affects the group’s acquiescence and support, thereby creating a less belligerent and more stable environment. The emphasis on the Pashtun communities is especially relevant due to their historical role as king maker, as well as the leaderships primary threat of delegitimization and conflict. To fully understand how the current Karzai government’s relationship with the Pashtun communities has failed to create conditions amenable to stability and has generally fostered an environment of discord and conflict, this analysis will utilize a 5 comparative approach. The comparison under question will examine the central government’s relationship with the Pashtun communities during a period of stability and strong government – tribal relations, that of the Musahiban monarchy (1929 – 1963). The examination of this period will provide distinctions in the relationship under analysis, in an effort to draw attention to aspects of the current relationship under Karzai (and his US backers) that hinder stability and support continued conflict and turmoil. The most obvious difference between the two eras is the existence of foreign occupation, specifically the United States and to a lesser extent other NATO countries. Historically Pashtuns have summarily rejected foreign occupiers, evident in the three Anglo Afghan wars in the19th and 20th centuries, and the Soviet intervention in the 1980s; both wars witnessed massive bloodshed that again has reemerged today. Although the rejection of foreign occupiers plays a primary role in why Pashtuns have joined the insurgency, this analysis will examine the specific policies and actions by Karzai and his US benefactors that have pushed Pashtuns to reject the central government. A comparison between the Karzai government and the Musahiban monarchy holds particular relevance as it stresses the importance of the Pashtun’s role in creating a stable environment. Today the Pashtun tribal and religious groups make up the vast majority of those fighting and supporting (with the additional support from Pakistan, specifically the ISI) the insurgency against the Karzai government and his patrons the United States and NATO. In contrast, the Musahiban monarchy recognized the importance of the Pashtun tribal and religious communities, by absorbing them into government, creating strong patronage relationships, and implementing policies agreeable to the group. This in turn, contributed to the stable and prosperous nature of the era. Other Afghan governments in modern history chose to alienate the Pashtun communities, who were often deemed backwards. These governments imposed 6 economic and social reforms, with little support outside the urban educated elite, which offended Pashtun religious and tribal beliefs or were deemed threatening to their independence. Pashtun’s tend to be independent minded (a cultural attribute) and skeptical of central government involvement in their communities. This makes the central government and the tribal communities relatively independent of each other. There are of course differing degrees of independence. Generally speaking, Afghan central governments haven’t survived without Pashtun tribal support. Central governments in modern Afghan history have continually attempted to implement social
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