The Network Politics of International Statebuilding: Intervention and Statehood in Post-2001 Afghanistan

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The Network Politics of International Statebuilding: Intervention and Statehood in Post-2001 Afghanistan The Network Politics of International Statebuilding: Intervention and Statehood in Post-2001 Afghanistan Submitted by Timor Sharan to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics In October 2013 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 1 ABSTRACT This thesis focuses on international intervention and statebuilding in post- 2001 Afghanistan. It offers an alternative lens, a network lens, to understand the complexity of internationally sponsored state re-building and transformation. It therefore analyses how political power is assembled and flows through political networks in statebuilding, with an eye to the hitherto ignored endogenous political networks. The empirical chapters investigate the role and power dynamics of Afghan political network in re-assembling and transforming the post-2001 state once a political settlement is reached; how everyday political network practices shape the nature of statehood and governance; and subsequently how these power dynamics and practices contribute towards political order/violence and stability/instability. This thesis challenges the dominant wisdom that peacebuilding is a process of democratisation or institutionalisation, showing how intervention has unintentionally produced the democratic façade of a state, underpinning by informal power structures of Afghan politics. The post-2001 intervention has fashioned a ‘network state’ where the state and political networks have become indistinguishable from one another: the empowered network masquerade as the state. This study suggests that a new political order is emerging in post-2001 Afghanistan where political stability is a function of patron-client relations, opportunistic practices of bargaining and expropriation of public resources for political network gain as well as the instrumentalisation of identities. In light of this analysis, it concludes with the implications of the research findings for the future of Afghanistan. It posits that a successful international military exit from Afghanistan and post-2014 state survival may depend primarily on the political stability of the empowered political networks. This research is based on extensive fieldwork, including participatory observation and interviews (more than 130 interviews) with key informants over 16 months in Afghanistan. 2 Contents Tables and Figures…………………………………………………………………………4 Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………5 Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………….……….7 Chapter 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………………9 Chapter 2: Peacebuilding Paradigms and Practices: The Network Politics of Peacebuilding………………………………………………………………..40 Chapter 3: Political Networks and the Post-Conflict State…………………………...61 Chapter 4: The Process of State Formation and Statehood in Afghanistan: A Political Network Perspective……………………………………………...86 Chapter 5: The Post-2001 State, Re-Assembling and Transformation…….……...116 Chapter 6: The Power Dynamics of Political Networks during the 2009 Presidential Elections………………………………………………………155 Chapter 7: The Power Dynamics of Political Networks in the Wolesi Jirga: A Case Study of the 2010-2011 Special Court Crisis……………………..186 Chapter 8: Post-2014, the International Military Exit, Political Stability and State Survival………………………………………………………………..214 Appendix..................................................................................................................232 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….241 3 Tables and Figure Tables 3.1 Distinctions Between Political Networks and Political Organisations 65 5.1 Power-Sharing at Ministerial Level Among the 4 Main Invited 122 Groups at the 2001 Bonn Conference 7.1 The Timetable of Events 191 9.1 The List of the Main Political Networks Since the 1990s 232 9.2 List of Interviews 235 Figures 3.1 Levels of Analysis 68 3.2 Political Networks and Post-Conflict Political Stability Framework 82 5.1 Ethnic Composition of Government Bureaucracy at Grade 3-1 (%) 125 5.2 Ethnic Composition of 4 Top Ministries at Grade 3-1 (%) 125 5.3 Afghanistan National Army by Ethnic Groups 126 5.4 The Political Networks and Their Clientele 134 6.1 The 2009 Presidential Election Result 160 6.2 The Ethno-Regional Voting Map at District Level 168 4 Acknowledgements I am grateful to many people for their assistance, advice and hospitality, who have made this research possible. The idea for this research was inspired by the stories and sufferings of many poor villagers like Baba Kohisaaf, whom I visited in the summer of 2008. During the fieldwork, I benefited from the assistance of many people, only some of whom I can name here. In Kabul, Reza Kateb put me in touch with key informants; Qayoom Soroush helped me gain access to the Lower House; and Abbas Aryanzai assisted me during the 2009 Presidential election fieldwork. In Mazar-e-Sharif I enjoyed the help and hospitality of Halim Frotan and Yasser Wares. Several research and policy organisations in the UK and Afghanistan provided support for my research. The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funded my PhD study. In Afghanistan, I received organisational support from Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) where I worked in 2008 on the ‘mutual accountability and aid effectiveness’ project, the Department for International Development (DfID), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Gawharshad Institute of Higher Education where I taught International Studies. At DfID, Lou Perrotta was supportive of my work and I enjoyed our conversations on my research. In the US, I am indebted to Professor Nazif Shahrani for supporting my application to receive the Vincent & Elinor Ostrom Visiting Fellowship to attend the Political Theory and Policy Analysis Workshop at Indiana University. He also kindly arranged my honorarium lecture at the university. At the Workshop, I benefited greatly from the fellow participants’ comments and advice on my work. In particular, my discussions with Robert Agranoff, Michael McGuire, Abdulbaker Sinno, Jennifer Brass and Burnell Fischer formed my thesis’s main analytical framework. Several people deserve a special note of appreciation for taking interest in my research and for our lengthy discussions on my work, including Enayatullah Shahrani, Davoud Moradian, Sayed Asker Mousavi, Yahia Baiza and Magnus Marsden. Ustad Dolatabadi’s astute knowledge of Afghanistan’s history advanced my understanding of the process of state formation in Afghanistan. At Exeter University, my highest gratitude goes to my supervisor, John Heathershaw, for his invaluable comments, suggestions and constructive criticism of my work. His guidance and direction was key to the completion of this thesis. I am also thankful for his contribution in the publication of my first peer-reviewed journal article. Bice Maiguashca and Claire Dunlop provided useful comments on the introduction. I am indebted to Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra for their numerous comments and suggestions for a forthcoming article I submitted to the Central Asian Survey for publication, which they edited. I also thank the Central Asian Survey’s anonymous reviewers for their detailed comments on this paper, which greatly aided the reworking of the text in improving the article. This article shaped the basis for chapter 7. 5 This research would not have been possible without the help and emotional support of my family and friends. In particular, my appreciation goes to my eldest brother, who dedicated his youth to ensure that I pursue my education, and my elder brother for believing in me when I needed him the most. The one person who deserves the most special acknowledgment throughout this thesis is Astrid Noren-Nilsson for her kindness, support, advice, and constructive comments. She was always there when I needed her support. This acknowledgment would not be complete without thanking Alison Taylor for her continuous encouragement throughout my career. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my mother and father, whom I owe everything to for giving me exceptional love and affection throughout my life. 6 Abbreviations ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief ACSF Afghanistan Civil Society Forum AGO Attorney General Office ANSF Afghanistan National Security Force APAP Afghanistan Parliamentary Assistant Project AREU Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit AWN Afghanistan Women Network DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration DfID Department for International Development DI Democracy International FES Friedrich Ebert Stiftung HRW Human Right’s Watch IAEC Interim Afghan Electoral Commission ICG International Crisis Group IDLG Independent Directorate for Local Governance IECC Independent Electoral Complaints Commission IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems IGO Inter-Governmental Organisations IRI International Republican Institute ISAF International Security Assistance Force JEMB Joint Electoral Management Body NA Northern Alliance NATO the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDI National Democratic Institute NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations OAA Office of Administrative Affairs OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation
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