Uruzgan: 18 Months After the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover

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Uruzgan: 18 Months After the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover April 2012 Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover Goat Herder in Tirin Kot Bazaar / Picture: Casey Johnson TLO Annual Report Uruzgan: 18 months after the Dutch/Australian Leadership Handover A TLO Provincial Profile April 2012 © 2012, The Liaison Office. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, The Liaison Office. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] 2010/11 Uruzgan 18 Months Assessment Acknowledgements This report is financed by the Royal Netherlands’s Embassy in Afghanistan and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). TLO reports are independent surveys and analyses of local perceptions and attitudes. While TLO makes all efforts to review and verify field data prior to publication, some factual inaccuracies may still remain. Data collection for this report was completed by 31 December 2011 and information presented may have changed since that time. TLO is solely responsible for possible inaccuracies in the information presented. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of AusAID, the Australian Government, or the Government of the Netherlands. The report authors would like to thank all individuals who spent time with the research team to contribute to this report as well as TLO colleagues whose comments and contributions helped to improve the clarity of the report and the correctness of its facts. About The Liaison Office (TLO) The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups. TLO’s mission is to facilitate the formal integration of communities and their traditional governance structures within Afghanistan’s newly emerging peace, governance and reconstruction framework. TLO main areas of activity are Research/Analysis using the do-no harm approach; Dialogue facilitation and participatory peacebuilding, access to justice and livelihoods. In addition to the TLO headquarter in Kabul, the organization has a total of three (3) regional (Paktia-Southeast, Kandahar-South, Nangarhar-East) and five (5) provincial (Uruzgan, Khost, Paktika, Helmand, and Kunduz) offices across Afghanistan, with about 160 staff. TLO was established in 2003 by swisspeace on the request of community leaders in the Southeast. TLO has been funded by various donors from the non-governmental and governmental sectors, international organizations and foundations. Its main donors include the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace and the governments of Australia (AusAID), Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland (SDC). 2010/11 Uruzgan 18 Months Assessment Table of Contents Glossary of Acronyms and Terms ........................................................................................ vi Executive Summary ............................................................................................................. ix Recommendations ............................................................................................................ xvi 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Methodology/Study Limitations ...................................................................................... 2 1.2 Provincial Background ..................................................................................................... 4 2 Socio-Economic Development and Reconstruction ...................................................... 8 2.1 Development Actors in Uruzgan ...................................................................................... 9 2.1.1 Adjusting to a new Development Lead ............................................................................ 12 2.2 Education ...................................................................................................................... 13 2.2.1 Educational Facilities ....................................................................................................... 14 2.2.2 School Enrolment Figures ................................................................................................ 15 2.2.3 The Teaching Profession .................................................................................................. 18 2.2.4 The Capacity Gap in Education ........................................................................................ 20 2.3 Healthcare .................................................................................................................... 21 2.4 Agricultural Development ............................................................................................. 28 2.4.1 Opium Poppy ................................................................................................................... 32 2.5 Water and Energy ......................................................................................................... 33 2.5.1 Potable Water and Irrigation ........................................................................................... 34 2.5.2 Energy Sector ................................................................................................................... 36 2.6 Key Infrastructure Development ................................................................................... 37 2.6.1 Key Road Projects ............................................................................................................ 39 2.6.2 Challenges in Infrastructure Development ...................................................................... 40 2.7 Private Sector ............................................................................................................... 42 2.7.1 Banking/Lending .............................................................................................................. 44 2.7.2 Private Sector Development ............................................................................................ 45 2.8 Media and Communications .......................................................................................... 46 2.8.1 Media Outlets .................................................................................................................. 47 2.8.2 Telecommunications........................................................................................................ 49 3 Achievements in Gender Equality ............................................................................... 52 3.1 Women’s Overall Mobility ............................................................................................ 52 3.2 Women’s Participation in Politics .................................................................................. 54 3.3 Women’s Access to Education ....................................................................................... 55 3.4 Women’s Employment .................................................................................................. 60 The Liaison Office, April 2012 Page i 2010/11 Uruzgan 18 Months Assessment 3.5 Women’s Access to Healthcare ..................................................................................... 61 3.6 Women’s Access to Justice ............................................................................................ 63 3.7 Women’s Access to Information .................................................................................... 64 4 Governance Overview ................................................................................................ 66 4.1 Provincial Governance .................................................................................................. 67 4.1.1 The 2010 Wolesi Jirga Elections ....................................................................................... 68 4.1.2 Provincial Governor’s Office ............................................................................................ 69 4.1.3 Provincial Chief of Police ................................................................................................. 72 4.1.4 Provincial Line Departments ............................................................................................ 76 4.1.4.1 Existing Capacity Gaps .......................................................................................................... 78 4.1.5 Provincial Council ............................................................................................................. 81 4.1.6 Other Provincial-Level Bodies .......................................................................................... 82 4.2 District Governance ...................................................................................................... 84 4.2.1 District Governor ............................................................................................................. 86 4.2.2 District Chiefs of Police (DCoPs) ...................................................................................... 88 4.2.3 District Line Departments ...............................................................................................
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