Western support to warlords in Afghanistan from 2001 - 2014 and its effect on Political Legitimacy Submitted by Lucy Morgan Edwards to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics by Publication, in March 2015 This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. I certifythat all the material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted or approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University. !tu ?"\J�� Signature. ... .......................L�Uv) ......... ...!} (/......................., ................................................ 0 1 ABSTRACT This is an integrative paper aiming to encapsulate the themes of my previously published work upon which this PhD is being assessed. This work; encompassing several papers and various chapters of my book are attached behind this essay. The research question, examines the effect of Western support to warlords on political legitimacy in the post 9/11 Afghan war. I contextualise the research question in terms of my critical engagement with the literature of strategists in Afghanistan during this time. Subsequently, I draw out themes in relation to the available literature on warlords, politics and security in Afghanistan. I highlight the value of thinking about these questions conceptually in terms of legitimacy. I then introduce the published work, summarising the focus of each paper or book chapter. Later, a ‘findings’ section addresses how the policy of supporting warlords has affected legitimacy through its impact on security and stability, the political settlement and ultimately whether Afghans choose to accept the Western-backed project in Afghanistan, or not. I argue that this issue is important as it has security implications not just in the immediate region, but increasingly, throughout the Middle East and possibly further. 2 Acknowledgements There are many people to whom I am grateful for advice and support over the years. Most are mentioned in my Book. At the University of Exeter, I am particularly indeBted to my supervisor, John Heathershaw, for his advice, feedBack and comments on my work. Victoria Basham has also provided valuaBle advice, and I am grateful to Both for their time and constructive comments on this integrative chapter and a recently puBlished peer reviewed paper. I am especially grateful to my family for their love, support and patience in recent years. 3 Abbreviations AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Centre ANA Afghan National Army ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces AREU Afghan Research and Evaluation unit CENTCOM US Military’s Central Command CFC-ALPHA Coalition Forces Command - ALPHA CIA Central Intelligence Agency COIN Counter Insurgency DDR Disarmament, DemoBilisation and Re-integration DEA US Drug Enforcement Agency DFID Department for International Development DIAG Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups DIS Defence Intelligence Service DOD US Department of Defence ELJ Emergency Loya Jirga EUSR European Union Special Representative FATA Federally Administered TriBal Areas GCHQ General Central Head Quarters (Britain’s Intelligence Centre) IC International Community ICG International Crisis Group ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ILG Informal Local Governance IOM International Organisation for Migration ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISI Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (of Pakistan) Mi6 British Secret Intelligence Service (International) MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal MOD Britain’s Ministry of Defence MOI Ministry of Interior NA Northern Alliance NATO the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NDS National Security Directorate (also known as NSD) NGO Non-Governmental Organisation NIE National Intelligence Estimate NIFA National Islamic Front for Afghanistan NSP National Solidarity Programme NWFP North West Frontier Province PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team RAWA Revolutionary Afghan Women’s Association SIS Secret Intelligence Service UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan UNCHS United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (HaBitat) UNDP United Nations Development Programme USAID United States Agency for International Development 4 CONTENTS Abstract 2 Acknowledgements 3 Abbreviations 4 Integrative Chapter - Introduction 6 - Research Rationale 7 - Approaches in the literature 9 - Political ethnography as a basis for research design 16 - Introduction to the Published Works utilized 17 - Findings 19 - Bibliography 28 - Appendix ‘Biography and Positionality’ 33 Published works utilised: 1) How the ‘entry’ defines the ‘exit’: contradictions between the political and military strategies adopted in 2001 and how they have deleteriously affected the longer-term possibilities for stabilization in Afghanistan 593 - 619 2) State-building in Afghanistan; a case showing the limits 967 - 991 3) A Better Path to Peace; a more optimistic solution for Afghanistan 1 - 18 4) The Afghan Solution: the inside story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and how western hubris lost Afghanistan (2011) Chapter 1 - The ‘Peace versus Justice’ Strategy 19 - 40 Chapter 2 - Re-Igniting Fundamentalism 41 - 55 Chapter 9 - First you call us Freedom Fighters, now Warlords 132 - 149 Chapter 10 - Playing the ‘al Qaeda’ card 150 - 166 Chapter 12 - A perspective on British post 9/11 strategy 182 - 208 and intelligence (UK Haq effort) Chapter 13 - He would have begun a Revolution 209 - 214 (that’s why they killed him so fast) Chapter 18 - Governance and Traditional structures 248 - 261 Chapter 19 - UK Haq effort Part 2 262 - 274 Chapter 21 - Abdul Haq and CIA strategy in Afghanistan 281 - 298 Appendix V 'Letter from Abdul Haq to Former US Ambassador Peter Tomsen (January 1993) 333 - 334 Endnotes 335 - 356 5 1. Introduction Following the events of 11 September 2001, the US and UK Began a Bombing campaign on Afghanistan under the name Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The stated aim of the campaign was ‘to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist Base of operations and to attack the military capaBility of the TaliBan regime’.1 Additional aims, elucidated in the general discourse, were for a ‘liberal humanitarian intervention’ in Afghanistan. This was despite the contested nature of the terminology with Chomsky (2001), Ali (2000) and Chesterman (2001) all of whom questioned whether ‘humanitarian intervention’ was really a pretext for geopolitical control in strategically important regions rather than importing democracy and human rights to conflict-affected countries. By 2001, war had Been ongoing in Afghanistan for over two decades and the conflict had evolved through several distinct phases (Maley, 2011). A central part of the US-led strategy after 9/11 was re-empowering un-indicted warlords. 2 Support was principally rendered by the US with the UK acting as a junior partner. Initially, this support was delivered in the form of cash and weapons to strongmen allies Brought Back from exile aBroad, as recalled by Dobbins (2008), Rubin (2004), Shroen (2003), Beardon (2005) and Grenier (2015). The CIA initiated the strategy and later US military chiefs justified it as an alternative to putting Western military ‘Boots on the ground.’ Later, significant political support for warlords manifested in a variety of ways, 3 which ultimately enaBled warlords to shape and constitute the state itself. A secondary phase of support started in 2003 when ISAF (later NATO) moved outside the cities in the guise of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), whose remit, in reality, was undefined (Stapleton, 2008). The estaBlishment of PRTs had further implications for direct and indirect support to regional warlords; in 1 Statement given after the start of the US and British military strikes on targets in Afghanistan on Sunday, 7th October 2001 By President George Bush. 2 I have used the generic term ‘warlords’ throughout this paper for simplicity even though in some places the term ‘strongmen’ may Be more appropriate. Barfield (2010, p. 282) descriBes how landowning khans (previous allies of the state) were replaced during the jihad by “a new generation of younger, self-made military commanders, fighting for the mujahideen against the KaBul government”. Barfield adds that ‘militia leaders created By NajiBullah as the Soviets withdrew’ were added to this group. They Became dominant after the Soviet withdrawal and, though many prominent regional commanders were killed or went into exile during the Taliban period, the associated structure of ‘local commanders’ could not be so easily displaced. It was to these lower level commanders, Barfield says, that the regional leaders (the ‘warlords’) reconnected following the collapse of the TaliBan regime in 2001 (iBid). 3 Political legitimization of warlords by the international community (IC) was initiated at the Bonn Conference in DecemBer 2001, which was a ‘victors peace’ rather than a Peace Agreement. There was no move to sideline those previously accused of crimes against humanity or war crimes despite the fact that in 2004, in ‘A Call for Justice’ ordinary Afghans expressed their desire for accountaBility. Further political legitimization continued with the aBility of warlords to usurp the rules of Bonn and with their last minute inclusion in the June 2002 ‘Emergency Loya Jirga;’ a development that UN chief Lakhdar