No Easy Exit: Drugs and Counternarcotics Policies in Afghanistan
NO EASY EXIT: DRUGS AND COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICIES IN AFGHANISTAN No Easy Exit: Drugs and Counternarcotics Policies in Afghanistan Vanda Felbab-Brown Brookings Institution Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Key Findings • Afghanistan’s illicit drug economy is unprecedented in its scale and has been deeply entrenched within the coun- try since the 1980s. • Temporary decreases in poppy cultivation and heroin production, driven by market forces, acts of nature, or policies, have not been sustained or sustainable. • Structural drivers of the illicit drug economy—insecurity, political struggles, and a lack of economic alterna- tives—remain unaddressed and cannot easily be overcome for years to come. • Although the illicit drug economy exacerbates insecurity, strengthens corruption, produces macroeconomic dis- tortions, and contributes to drug use, it also provides a vital lifeline for many Afghans and enhances their human security. • Most counternarcotics measures adopted since 2001 have been ineffective or outright counterproductive eco- nomically, politically, and with respect to counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts. • Eradication and bans on opium poppy cultivation, often borne by the poorest and most socially marginalized, have generated extensive political capital for the Taliban and undermined counterinsurgency. • The Obama administration’s decision to defund centrally-led eradication, a courageous break with U.S. counter- narcotics dogma, is correct. • Selective interdiction focused on Taliban-linked traffickers, conducted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- tion’s International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan between 2008 and 2014, complicated the Taliban’s logistics, but did not severely weaken the Taliban. • Alternative livelihoods efforts, when available, are poorly designed and ineffective and rarely have generated sustainable income for poppy-production-dependent populations.
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