Country of Origin Information Report: AFGHANISTAN

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Country of Origin Information Report: AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT AFGHANISTAN 29 AUGUST 2008 UK Border Agency COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE AFGHANISTAN 29 AUGUST 2008 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN FROM 15 AUGUST TO 29 AUGUST 2008 REPORTS ON AFGHANISTAN PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE 15 AUGUST 2008 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY........................................................................................1.01 Maps .............................................................................................. 1.08 2. ECONOMY............................................................................................ 2.01 3. HISTORY.............................................................................................. 3.01 Overview to December 2001........................................................ 3.01 Post-Taliban.................................................................................. 3.02 Presidential election 9 October 2004 and the new Cabinet...... 3.08 Parliamentary and provincial elections 18 September 2005 .... 3.10 Afghanistan Compact 31 January 2006...................................... 3.14 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ..................................................................... 4.01 5. CONSTITUTION..................................................................................... 5.01 6. POLITICAL SYSTEM .............................................................................. 6.01 Overview ....................................................................................... 6.01 The Executive Branch.................................................................. 6.03 The Legislative Branch ................................................................ 6.04 Afghanistan politics in general ................................................... 6.06 Political parties............................................................................. 6.15 Human Rights 7. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................... 7.01 8. SECURITY SITUATION........................................................................... 8.01 Overview ....................................................................................... 8.01 Security situation in different regions........................................ 8.17 Kabul.......................................................................................... 8.17 The West and Herat................................................................... 8.28 Central ....................................................................................... 8.35 South, south-east and east ....................................................... 8.37 North and north-east.................................................................. 8.60 9. SECURITY FORCES............................................................................... 9.01 Developments following 11 September 2001............................. 9.01 Police............................................................................................. 9.05 Structure and reform.................................................................. 9.05 Afghan National Police (ANP).................................................... 9.05 Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) ................................................ 9.21 Afghan Border Police (ABP) ...................................................... 9.22 Afghan National Civil Boarder Police (ANCOP)......................... 9.23 Standby Police........................................................................... 9.24 Afghan Highway Police (AHP) ................................................... 9.25 Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)...................... 9.26 Afghanistan National Auxillary Police (ANAP)........................... 9.27 Torture ....................................................................................... 9.28 ii This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as at 29 August 2008. Older source material has been included where it contains relevant information not available in more recent documents. 29 AUGUST 2008 AFGHANISTAN Extrajudicial killings.................................................................... 9.30 Armed Forces ............................................................................... 9.32 Other Government Forces........................................................... 9.36 National Directorate of Security (NDS) (Amniat-e Melli)............ 9.36 International Forces ..................................................................... 9.39 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)........................... 9.40 The role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)................ 9.43 Avenues of Complaint ................................................................. 9.47 10. MILITARY SERVICE............................................................................. 10.01 11. NON-GOVERNMENT ARMED FORCES ................................................... 11.01 Warlords and commanders ......................................................... 11.01 War crimes and human rights abuses prior to 2001................. 11.10 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (DDR).................................................................... 11.15 Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)........................... 11.19 Anti-Government and Anti-Coalition Forces (ACF)................... 11.22 Overview.................................................................................... 11.22 Taliban/neo-Taliban ................................................................... 11.27 Former Taliban members .......................................................... 11.36 Former Taliban participation in 2005 Elections.......................... 11.53 Hizb-e-Islami (Hisb-e-Islami/Hezb-e-Islami/Hizb-i-Islami).......... 11.55 Former Hizb-e-Islami members ................................................. 11.59 Former Hizb-e-Islami members’ participation in the 2005 elections.................................................................. 11.64 Al Qa’ida (Al-Qaeda).................................................................. 11.70 12. JUDICIARY ......................................................................................... 12.01 Organisation ................................................................................. 12.01 Independence and generalfunctioning....................................... 12.05 Fair trial ......................................................................................... 12.08 Code of Criminal Procedure........................................................ 12.11 13. ARREST AND DETENTION – LEGAL RIGHTS......................................... 13.01 14. PRISON CONDITIONS.......................................................................... 14.01 US military bases ......................................................................... 14.08 15. DEATH PENALTY................................................................................ 15.01 16. POLITICAL AFFILIATION...................................................................... 16.01 Persons with links to the former Communist regime ............... 16.01 KHAD (KhAD) (Former Security Services) ................................ 16.01 Treatment of former KhAD members......................................... 16.08 Former members of the PDPA (Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan)............................... 16.16 Former Communists’ participation in the 2005 elections ........... 16.25 Freedom of Association and Assembly ..................................... 16.32 17. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MEDIA....................................................... 17.01 Overview ....................................................................................... 17.01 Media law ...................................................................................... 17.09 Newspapers, radio, Internet and television ............................... 17.11 Journalists .................................................................................... 17.19 Night Letters ............................................................................ 17.26 18. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, ORGANISATIONS AND ACTIVISTS ......... 18.01 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) ..................................................................................... 18.01 Domestic and international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) ............................................................. 18.05 This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as at 29 August 2008. iii Older source material has been included where it contains relevant information not available in more recent documents. AFGHANISTAN 29 AUGUST 2008 Afghans working for international organisations and international security forces ........................................... 18.11 Women’s rights activists ............................................................. 18.14 19. FREEDOM OF RELIGION...................................................................... 19.01 Background and demography .................................................... 19.01 Constitutional rights, religious law and institutions................. 19.05 Religious groups .........................................................................
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