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Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015

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Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015 Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015 WORSENING AFGHANISTAN: As the conflict rages, the Taliban split and Islamic State acquires new prominence US military sources announced the dismantling of what was probably al-Qaeda’s largest training camp. Located in the district of Shorabak in Kandahar province, the camp covered 77.7 km2. Losses of territory to the Taliban in some districts have been offset by gains in others. In Helmand, an offensive lasting several months pitted Afghan forces against the Taliban for control of the districts of Marjah and Nad-e-Ali, where over 200 Taliban and 85 soldiers were killed, according to the provincial government. In Kunduz, Afghan forces recovered a base in the district of Dasht-e-Archi, but lost a district in the province of Badakhshan. Government forces confirmed that alongside the Taliban, over 1,300 foreign insurgents (Pakistanis, Tajiks, Uyghurs and others) participated in the battle of Kunduz. Furthermore, in Nangarhar, where there is a group loyal to Islamic State, over 30 insurgents were killed in drone strikes. The local provincial government has stated that around 200 university students there are linked to Islamist groups. In fact, Islamic State banners were waved during an anti-government demonstration. In Zabul, Islamic State executed seven members of the Hazara (Shia) ethnic group that it abducted in September. Among them were three women, the first to be victims of beheading. Their families carried their bodies to Kabul, where they were joined by thousands of people (20,000 according to some media outlets) in one of the largest protests ever seen in the capital. The demonstrators tried to enter the presidential palace, but were repelled by police gunfire. However, kidnappings of Hazara are common. Thirty-one Hazara were abducted in February and this month, after the demonstration in Kabul, 20 were kidnapped, once again in Zabul. Islamic State has been increasing its influence, partially thanks to clashes with the Taliban. In Zabul, Mullah Rasool Akhund was chosen to be leader of a Taliban faction opposed to the faction led by Mullah Akhtar Mansoor. This Taliban faction is fighting alongside Islamic State (composed mainly of members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). As a result of this division, a well known leader of the new group, Mullah Mansoor Dadullah, was assassinated by a Taliban loyal to Akhtar Mansoor. Concerning the reconciliation process with the government, Akhtar Mansoor’s group appointed a Taliban veteran that has participated in various rounds of talks, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai, to be spokesman of the political bureau of Qatar. However, the Afghan government is reluctant to return to dialogue. Meanwhile, in the Taliban-controlled province of Ghor, a woman was sentenced to be stoned by a tribal court. (The Washington Post, 31/10/15, 08/11/15; Al Jazeera, 4/11/15;ToloNews, 05-24/11/15; The New York Times, 25/11/15) CHAD: Faced with escalating violence by Boko Haram, the government declares a state of emergency On 9 November, the government proclaimed a state of emergency in the Lake Chad region, which was extended by Parliament for four months (until 22 March 2016) on 19 November, the day after a new suicide attack was committed by two women who blew themselves up, killing themselves and two other people and injuring 14 in the Chadian village of Ngouboua. On 1 November, 11 civilians died in the same region, this time at the Bougouma military base during another suicide attack that killed two members of Boko Haram and wounded a third. On 3 November, according to military sources, another attack was committed that killed 11 Boko Haram combatants. The declaration of this state of emergency bans the movement of people and vehicles at locations and times to be set soon and orders the registration of homes 24 hours per day, among other prerogatives. In recent months, Boko Haram has multiplied offensives and suicide attacks in villages around the lake, located a few kilometres from the Nigerian border. The most serious attack took place on 10 October, with a triple suicide bombing committed in the prefecture of Baga Sola that claimed 41 people’s lives and wounded another 48. In this regard, on 20 November the heads of state of the Sahel, known as the G5 (Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, 1 Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015 Mali and Mauritania) met in N’Djamena and announced the creation of a joint regional military force to combat the actions of the armed groups. They also announced the creation of a regional military school in Mauritania, a regional airline, the construction of a railway linking all five countries and the abolition of visas among them. (Jeune Afrique, 01, 08-10, 19 and 20/11/15) EGYPT (SINAI): The bombing of a plane travelling from Sinai to Russia claims 224 lives in an attack claimed by the armed group ISIS A bomb attack against a Russian plane that was travelling from Sharm el-Sheikh, in Sinai, to Moscow killed 224 people on 31 October. The action was claimed by the armed group Sinai Province, a branch of ISIS in the region known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM) before pledging allegiance to Islamic State in late 2014. According to the group, the attack was a response to Russia’s campaign against ISIS in Syria. At first, both the Egyptian and Russian authorities denied the possibility of an attack, but following the attacks in Paris on 13 November, also claimed by ISIS, the government of Vladimir Putin acknowledged that it was an attack and announced harsh punishment for those responsible. In this context, Moscow intensified its air strikes against ISIS positions in Syria, where Russia has become actively involved in supporting the regime of Bashar Assad. In late November, an attack attributable to Sinai Province killed four other people in the provincial capital of Sinai, al- Arish. Militiamen attacked a hotel where judges who had participated in monitoring the second round of the parliamentary elections in the country were staying. Also during the month, Ashraf Gharabli, a leader of Sinai Province, was reportedly killed in a shootout in Cairo. At least 20 people were also reportedly shot dead, allegedly while trying to enter Israel from the vicinity of Rafah. Media outlets reported that they were African immigrants and that at least five of them, of Sudanese origin, had been shot dead by Egyptian security forces. (BBC, 09, 23, 24/11/15; The Guardian, 02, 05, 17, 24/11/15) FRANCE: ISIS claims responsibility for a series of attacks in Paris that kill 130 people and the French government responds by stepping up attacks against the group in Syria A string of shootings and suicide attacks in Paris caused the deaths of 130 people and wounded over 350 in an offensive claimed by the armed group Islamic State (ISIS) in retaliation for France’s participation in the air campaign against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The coordinated attacks took place on the night of 13 November near the Stade de France stadium, where a match was underway that was attended by French President François Hollande, in the Bataclan concert venue and in restaurants and bars in Paris. Seven assailants died in the attacks, while an eighth member, identified as Salah Abdeslam, remained missing. The French government considered the attacks an act of war, declared a state of emergency for three months and imposed border controls to try to prevent the perpetrators from escaping. Investigations into the events spread to Belgium. Days after the attacks, the French security forces stormed a flat in Sant Denis that left three people dead, including the presumed mastermind behind the attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud. Meanwhile, French forces intensified their air strikes against ISIS positions in Syria, especially around Raqqa, a stronghold of the armed group. Combined with the bombing of a Russian plane in Sinai and the attacks in Lebanon, the ISIS attacks in France were considered evidence of the group’s determination to act globally, since thus far it has focused its strategy on controlling territory in Iraq and Syria. Other analysts opined that the attacks aimed to revitalise the group following its defeats on the ground, especially after the loss of Sinjar, in Iraq, to Kurdish forces. ISIS also threatened to attack the United States, Russia and Saudi Arabia. After formally requesting EU assistance for France, Hollande began a tour of several countries to try to strengthen the international coalition against ISIS. At the end of the month, Brussels (Belgium) was placed on maximum alert after the threat of attack was considered imminent. (Le Monde, The Guardian, 13-16/11/15; L’Orient Le Jour, 17/11/15; Reuters, 22/11/15) 2 Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015 LEBANON: A double suicide attack claimed by ISIS kills 41 people in Beirut in the bloodiest attack in the Lebanese capital in 2015 At least 43 people were killed and over 200 were injured in a double suicide attack on 12 November in the Burj al-Barajneh district of Beirut, a Shia-majority suburb considered a stronghold of Hezbollah. One of the three suicide assailants (identified as two Palestinians and one Syrian) detonated the explosives near a Shia mosque and the second blew his up at a nearby bakery, while the third died without managing to set off his charge. The armed group Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility for the attack, the bloodiest in the Lebanese capital in 2015. After the attacks, the authorities arrested around 20 people and seized 330 kilos of explosives in Tripoli and other areas. Lebanon has suffered the effects of the war in neighbouring Syria.
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