DOCSLIB.ORG

Aasen -- Constructing Narcoterrorism As Danger.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Aasen -- Constructing Narcoterrorism As Danger.Pdf WestminsterResearch http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch Constructing Narcoterrorism as Danger: Afghanistan and the Politics of Security and Representation Aasen, D. This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. © Mr Donald Aasen, 2019. The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners. Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail [email protected] Constructing Narcoterrorism as Danger: Afghanistan and the Politics of Security and Representation Greg Aasen A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2019 1 Abstract Afghanistan has become a country synonymous with danger. Discourses of narcotics, terrorism, and narcoterrorism have come to define the country and the current conflict. However, despite the prevalence of these dangers globally, they are seldom treated as political representations. This project theorizes danger as a political representation by deconstructing and problematizing contemporary discourses of (narco)terrorism in Afghanistan. Despite the globalisation of these two discourses of danger, (narco)terrorism remains largely under-theorised, with the focus placed on how to overcome this problem rather than critically analysing it as a representation. The argument being made here is that (narco)terrorism is not some ‘new’ existential danger, but rather reflects the hegemonic and counterhegemonic use of danger to establish authority over the collective identity. Using the case study of Afghanistan, this project critically analyses representations of danger emerging from the Afghan government and the Taliban. While many studies have looked at terrorism and narcotics as security concerns, there has not been a critical analysis of these two dangers as a political representation in the Afghan context. Therefore, this study will be of great benefit to scholars and practitioners of security as it presents a unique look on how identity is shaped through representations of danger in Afghanistan. Through applying Critical Discourse Analysis to contemporary representations in Afghanistan, this study provides new insight into the aims and objectives of both the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban. 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... 5 Author’s Declaration ......................................................................................................... 6 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 7 Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 9 Research Focus ............................................................................................................ 10 Chapter Structure ......................................................................................................... 12 Chapter I: Theoretical Framework and Methodology ..................................................... 16 Danger as a Discourse ................................................................................................. 18 Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................... 29 Methods and Data Set - Critical Discourse Analysis .................................................. 38 Using Critical Discourse Analysis ........................................................................... 43 Who ‘speaks’ security? ............................................................................................ 44 Choice of Texts ........................................................................................................ 46 Limitations ............................................................................................................... 50 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 51 Chapter II: Danger, (Narco)Terrorism, and Afghanistan ................................................ 53 Section I: Critical Approaches to Insecurity and Danger ............................................ 54 What is danger? ....................................................................................................... 55 How is danger constructed? ..................................................................................... 59 Why is danger represented? ..................................................................................... 63 Section II: (Narco)Terrorism Literature ...................................................................... 71 Mainstream Approaches to Terrorism and Narcoterrorism ..................................... 71 Critical Terrorism Studies ........................................................................................ 74 Critical Approaches to Drugs .................................................................................. 79 Section III: The Politics of (In)Security in Afghanistan ............................................. 84 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 93 Chapter III: Tracing the Discourses of (Narco)terrorism ................................................ 95 Terrorism, Hegemony and Identity ............................................................................. 97 Historical Representations of Terrorism ................................................................... 104 The Political Value of the Terrorist Label ................................................................. 109 Narcotics and Other Societal Plagues........................................................................ 116 Constructing Narcotics as Danger ............................................................................. 120 3 Conflation and the Emergence of Narcoterror .......................................................... 124 The Nexus .............................................................................................................. 128 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 131 Chapter IV – Securing Identity: Hegemonic Representations of (Narco)Terrorism .... 133 Data and Methods ...................................................................................................... 134 Section I - Violent Politics: The Afghan Political Context ....................................... 137 Section II: Building the Discourse: (Narco)Terror in Afghanistan ........................... 141 Section III: Institutional Control and Representations of Danger ............................. 153 International Discourse .......................................................................................... 166 Section IV: Establishing the Endangered Identity .................................................... 172 Islam....................................................................................................................... 174 Nation of Victims................................................................................................... 178 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 181 Chapter V – Counterhegemonic Voices: The Taliban’s (re)Representations of Danger ....................................................................................................................................... 183 Counterhegemonic Discourse .................................................................................... 185 Painting the Other as Danger: Commonalities in Hegemonic and Counterhegemonic Representations of Danger ........................................................................................ 198 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 213 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 215 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 219 4 Acknowledgements It has been quite a journey and I will never forget the many people who have helped me along the way. I’ve spent months thinking about what I would write and now that it has come time, there are no words that fully express my gratitude. I am forever indebted to my supervisory team: Prof. Dibyesh Anand and Dr. Thomas Moore. Without their help and guidance, I would never have made it this far. Thank you Dibyesh for your encouraging words, your constant questioning, and your emotional support. I hope with all my heart to continue to work with you on future projects and to (finally) co-publish that article. I also want to thank the many students I’ve met over the years.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015
    Conflict and Peacebuilding Observatory Nº 35 – November 2015 WORSENING AFGHANISTAN: As the conflict rages, the Taliban split and Islamic State acquires new prominence US military sources announced the dismantling of what was probably al-Qaeda’s largest training camp. Located in the district of Shorabak in Kandahar province, the camp covered 77.7 km2. Losses of territory to the Taliban in some districts have been offset by gains in others. In Helmand, an offensive lasting several months pitted Afghan forces against the Taliban for control of the districts of Marjah and Nad-e-Ali, where over 200 Taliban and 85 soldiers were killed, according to the provincial government. In Kunduz, Afghan forces recovered a base in the district of Dasht-e-Archi, but lost a district in the province of Badakhshan. Government forces confirmed that alongside the Taliban, over 1,300 foreign insurgents (Pakistanis, Tajiks, Uyghurs and others) participated in the battle of Kunduz. Furthermore, in Nangarhar, where there is a group loyal to Islamic State, over 30 insurgents were killed in drone strikes. The local provincial government has stated that around 200 university students there are linked to Islamist groups. In fact, Islamic State banners were waved during an anti-government demonstration. In Zabul, Islamic State executed seven members of the Hazara (Shia) ethnic group that it abducted in September. Among them were three women, the first to be victims of beheading. Their families carried their bodies to Kabul, where they were joined by thousands of people (20,000 according to some media outlets) in one of the largest protests ever seen in the capital.
    [Show full text]
  • Narco-Terrorism: Could the Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses Threaten Our Civil Liberties?
    Narco-Terrorism: Could the Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses Threaten Our Civil Liberties? John E. Thomas, Jr.* Table of Contents I. Introduction ................................................................................ 1882 II. Narco-Terrorism ......................................................................... 1885 A. History: The Buildup to Current Legislation ...................... 1885 B. Four Cases Demonstrate the Status Quo .............................. 1888 1. United States v. Corredor-Ibague ................................. 1889 2. United States v. Jiménez-Naranjo ................................. 1890 3. United States v. Mohammed.......................................... 1891 4. United States v. Khan .................................................... 1892 III. Drug-Terror Nexus: Necessary? ................................................ 1893 A. The Case History Supports the Nexus ................................. 1894 B. The Textual History Complicates the Issue ......................... 1895 C. The Statutory History Exposes Congressional Error ............ 1898 IV. Conspiracy: Legitimate? ............................................................ 1904 A. RICO Provides an Analogy ................................................. 1906 B. Public Policy Determines the Proper Result ........................ 1909 V. Hypothetical Situations with a Less Forgiving Prosecutor ......... 1911 A. Terrorist Selling Drugs to Support Terror ............................ 1911 B. Drug Dealer Using Terror to Support Drug
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of the Taliban
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2008-06 The evolution of the Taliban Samples, Christopher A. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4101 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE EVOLUTION OF THE TALIBAN by Shahid A. Afsar Christopher A. Samples June 2008 Thesis Advisor: Thomas H. Johnson Second Reader: Heather S. Gregg Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2008 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Evolution of the Taliban 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHORS Shahid A. Afsar and Christopher A. Samples 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Strategic Value of Proxies and Auxiliaries in Wars Amongst the People
    Conceptualising the regular-irregular engagement: the strategic value of proxies and auxiliaries in wars amongst the people Book or Report Section Accepted Version Rauta, V. (2019) Conceptualising the regular-irregular engagement: the strategic value of proxies and auxiliaries in wars amongst the people. In: Brown, D., Murray, D., Riemann, M., Rossi, N. and Smith, M. (eds.) War Amongst the People. Howgate Publishing Limited, Havant. Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/81725/ It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing . Publisher: Howgate Publishing Limited All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement . www.reading.ac.uk/centaur CentAUR Central Archive at the University of Reading Reading’s research outputs online 1 Chapter 5: Conceptualising the Regular-Irregular Engagement: The Strategic Value of Proxies and Auxiliaries in Wars amongst the People Vladimir Rauta Introduction The notion of ‘war amongst the people’ is a central feature of the twenty-first century security environment. Introduced by Rupert Smith in his ground-breaking The Utility of Force,1 ‘war amongst the people’ captured a reality long in the making, whose historical lineage could partly be traced back to the origins of war itself. The appeal of the concept came from combining the simplicity
    [Show full text]
  • Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond
    Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond BY ROBERT KILLEBREW ven before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the global context for American secu- rity policy was changing. While the traditional state-based international system continued E to function and the United States reacted to challenges by states in conventional ways (for example, by invading Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11), a cascade of enormous technological and social change was revolutionizing international affairs. As early as the 1990s, theorists were writing that with modern transnational communications, international organizations and corporate con- glomerates would increasingly act independently of national borders and international regulation.1 What was not generally foreseen until about the time of 9/11, though, was the darker side: that the same technology could empower corrupt transnational organizations to threaten the international order itself. In fact, the globalization of crime, from piracy’s financial backers in London and Nairobi to the Taliban and Hizballah’s representatives in West Africa, may well be the most important emerging fact of today’s global security environment. Transnational crime operates on a global scale, and the criminal networks that affect national security include actors ranging from Russian mafias to expanding Asian drug-trafficking organiza- tions in U.S. cities. Without discounting their importance, this article focuses on illegal groups native to this hemisphere and particularly Latin America, those identified by the Department of Justice as posing the most significant organized criminal threat to U.S. security. Two factors related Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
    [Show full text]
  • Narcotics Funded Terrorists/Extremist Groups
    A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF NARCOTICS-FUNDED TERRORIST AND OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Department of Defense May 2002 Researchers: LaVerle Berry Glenn E. Curtis Rex A. Hudson Nina A. Kollars Project Manager: Rex A. Hudson Federal Research Division Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540−4840 Tel: 202−707−3900 Fax: 202−707−3920 E-Mail: [email protected] Homepage: http://www.loc.go v/rr/frd/ Library of Congress – Federal Research Division Narcotics-Funded Terrorist/Extremist Groups PREFACE This global survey, based entirely on open sources, is intended to provide an assessment of the nexus between selected anti-U.S. terrorist and extremist groups in the world and organized crime, specifically drug trafficking, and how this relationship might be vulnerable to countermeasures. More specifically, the aim is to help develop a causal model for identifying critical nodes in terrorist and other extremist networks that can be exploited by Allied technology, just as counterdrug technology has been used in the war against drug trafficking. To this end, the four analysts involved in this study have examined connections between extremist groups and narcotics trafficking in the following countries, listed by region in order of discussion in the text: Latin America: Triborder Region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Colombia, and Peru; the Middle East: Lebanon; Southern Europe (Albania and Macedonia); Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; and East Asia: Philippines. These are preliminary, not definitive, surveys. Most of the groups examined in this study have been designated foreign terrorist organizations by the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Al Qaeda’S Command- And-Control Structure
    Testimony of Steven Emerson Before the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence April 9, 2008 Steven Emerson Executive Director Investigative Project on Terrorism www.investigativeproject.org email:[email protected] Introduction: The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was successful in obliterating much of al Qaeda’s command- and-control structure. Due to a robust and successful counter-terrorist policy made up of good intelligence gathered by the FBI, asset forfeitures and designations by the Department of the Treasury, and other good work by the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies within the intelligence community, the U,S. has fortunately not been hit with another attack since 9-11. Moreover, in the six and a half years since the those horrible, al Qaeda’s direct orchestration of acts of terrorism on the operational level has been somewhat constrained. This is not to say that al Qaeda has not been involved in terrorist attacks and plots since 2001 (training and guidance provided by al Qaeda in the 2005 London transit bombings and foiled 2006 Heathrow plot prove otherwise), but the group’s leaders have relied largely on the power of self- anointed franchises and recognized the power of spreading its message and ideology via the Internet. Extremist Muslims throughout the world have responded to this message and have sought to execute a number of attacks. While most have been stopped, some have been successful, killing hundreds and injuring thousands more, resulting in propaganda coups for al Qaeda and its leadership. Parallel to franchising the al Qaeda ideology, the group has successfully regenerated its operational capabilities in the sanctuary of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan.
    [Show full text]
  • The Current Peace Process in Colombia As Nation-Building Todos Por Un Nuevo País?
    The Current Peace Process in Colombia As Nation-building Todos Por Un Nuevo País? (Master Thesis) Executive Master in International Politics Centre Européen de Recherches Internationales et Stratégiques – Université Libre de Bruxelles Author: Krisztián Manzinger Brussels, 2018 1 2 Content Introduction.................................................................................................................................5 I. 1. Nation-building....................................................................................................................8 I. 2. Colombia ...........................................................................................................................12 I. 3. Spanish colonial social heritage ........................................................................................18 II. 1. The history of the conflict in Colombia ...........................................................................22 II. 2. La Violencia and its aftermath .........................................................................................23 II. 3. The birth of the FARC .....................................................................................................26 II. 4. The decades of the civil war.............................................................................................27 II. 5. Colombia’s importance to the US ....................................................................................32 II. 6. Paramilitaries....................................................................................................................37
    [Show full text]
  • The Challenges of Explosive Detection
    v Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Objective • Relevant • Rigorous | May 2016 • Volume 9, Issue 5 FEATURE ARTICLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE The Challenges of Brigadier General Explosive Detection Donald C. Bolduc How terrorists innovate to circumvent airline security measures Commander, Special Operations Robert Liscouski and William McGann Command Africa FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Evolving Challenges for Explosive Detection in the Aviation Sector and Editor in Chief Paul Cruickshank Beyond Robert Liscouski and William McGann Managing Editor Kristina Hummel INTERVIEW EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. 7 A View from the CT Foxhole: Brigadier General Donald C. Bolduc, Department Head Commander, Special Operations Command Africa Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) Brian Dodwell Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. Deputy Department Head ANALYSIS Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Price, Ph.D. 11 Microfinancing the Caliphate: How the Islamic State is Unlocking the Assets Director, CTC of European Recruits Magnus Ranstorp Brian Dodwell Deputy Director, CTC 16 Al-Zawahiri’s Bay`a to Mullah Mansoor: A Bitter Pill but a Bountiful Harvest Tore Hamming and Olivier Roy CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center 21 The Strategic Topography of Southern Libya U.S. Military Academy Andrew McGregor 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 27 How Bangladesh Became Fertile Ground for al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State Phone: (845) 938-8495 Email: [email protected] Animesh Roul Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ The crash
    [Show full text]
  • TM September 30, 2016.Pages
    THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 VOLUME XIV, ISSUE 19 p.1 p.3 p.5 p.7 Alexander Sehmer Sunguta West Jacob Zenn & Abdou Waliullah Rahmani Cisse BRIEFS Kenya Unveils New Boko Haram in Sene- The Taliban’s ‘Double Strategy for Tackling gal: Expanding West Act’: Will the New Terror Africa Province Leadership Strategy End Infighting in the Group? KENYA: SEEKING PARTNERS FOR A NEW TERROR Nairobi already receives anti-terror support from the STRATEGY West, including from the United States as part of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, or Alexander Sehmer PREACT. Nevertheless, Kenya’s relationship with the West on terrorism issues is not always a comfortable Jordan’s King Abdullah has promised greater counter one. Kenyatta has shown himself happy in the past to terrorism support to Kenya during a meeting with use the so-called war on terror to put his Western allies Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in Nairobi. The visit under pressure, warning in May that Kenya could scale has received a good deal of publicity in Kenya, where back its military engagement in Somalia if international the two leaders were photographed greeting each other partners did not help fund its efforts (Africanews, May on the tarmac of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport, 22). That was likely posturing on the Kenyan president’s both dressed in military fatigues (The East African, Sep- part – al-Shabaab poses a more immediate threat to his tember 26). The two leaders then viewed an anti-terror- country than to the West – but the tactic appears to ism training exercise, with units from both the Kenyan have had some success, with the European Union re- Defense Forces and the Jordanian military simulating a cently stepping in to ensure African Union troops in So- response to an aircraft hijacking and an attack on a vil- malia receive their pay (The Star [Kenya], September 26).
    [Show full text]
  • Statement by Thomas W
    STATEMENT BY THOMAS W. O’CONNELL ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT BEFORE THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 108th CONGRESS STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD JUNE 17, 2004 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERNARCOTICS IN COLOMBIA Chairman Davis, Representative Waxman, and distinguished members of the Committee, it is my honor to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense programs and policy that support for National Drug Control Strategy and to provide a current assessment of this strategy’s effectiveness in Colombia. The Department appreciates that the support Congress provides is critical to our efforts in fighting narcoterrorism in Colombia. DoD’S Role in the National Drug Control Strategy The Office of Counternarcotics is the focal point for DoD’s counterdrug activities, which support the National Drug Control Strategy. The Department’s counternarcotics missions include detection and monitoring, demand reduction, support to domestic and host nation law enforcement and/or military forces. The Department carries out these activities by acting as the lead federal agency to detect and monitor the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs toward the United States; collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence on drug activity; and providing training for U.S. and foreign drug law enforcement agencies and foreign military forces with drug enforcement responsibilities. In the international arena, the Department of Defense provides much of its counternarcotics support through deployments and programs to train, equip and furnish intelligence and operational support for drug detection, monitoring, and interdiction operations conducted by partner counterdrug forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Enforcement of Drug Laws
    REPORT ENFORCEMENT OF DRUG LAWS REFOCUSING ON ORGANIZED CRIME ELITES LOUISE ARBOUR PAVEL BÉM RICHARD BRANSON Former High Commissioner for Former Mayor of Prague, Entrepreneur, founder Human Rights, Canada Czech Republic of the Virgin Group, United Kingdom FERNANDO HENRIQUE MARIA CATTAUI HELEN CLARK NICK CLEGG RUTH DREIFUSS CARDOSO Former Secretary-General Former Prime Minister of New Former Deputy Former President of Former President of Brazil of the International Chamber Zealand and Administrator of Prime Minister of the Switzerland (Chair) of Commerce, Switzerland the United Nations United Kingdom Development Programme MOHAMED ELBARADEI GEOFF GALLOP CÉSAR GAVIRIA ANAND GROVER MICHEL KAZATCHKINE Director General Emeritus Former Premier Former President Former UN Special Rapporteur Former Executive Director of of the International Atomic of Western Australia of Colombia on the right to health, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Energy Agency, Egypt India Tuberculosis and Malaria, France ALEKSANDER KWASNIEWSKI RICARDO LAGOS KGALEMA MOTLANTHE OLUSEGUN OBASANJO GEORGE PAPANDREOU Former President Former President Former President Former President Former Prime Minister of Poland of Chile of South Africa of Nigeria of Greece JOSÉ RAMOS-HORTA JORGE SAMPAIO JUAN MANUEL SANTOS GEORGE SHULTZ JAVIER SOLANA Former President Former President Former President Former Secretary of State of Former European Union of Timor-Leste of Portugal of Colombia the United States of America High Representative for the (Honorary Chair) Common Foreign and Security Policy,
    [Show full text]