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The Evolution of the Taliban

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The Evolution of the Taliban Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2008-06 The evolution of the Taliban Samples, Christopher A. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4101 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS THE EVOLUTION OF THE TALIBAN by Shahid A. Afsar Christopher A. Samples June 2008 Thesis Advisor: Thomas H. Johnson Second Reader: Heather S. Gregg Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2008 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Evolution of the Taliban 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHORS Shahid A. Afsar and Christopher A. Samples 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The Taliban organization has undergone a major transformation, since its ouster from power in Afghanistan and continues to wage an effective defensive insurgency or “war of the flea.” The study uses results of a survey of knowledgeable participants in the Afghan-Pakistan arena, conducted by the authors, to analyze the current situation and prospects for success. The thesis explains the Taliban's survival and growth in the face of significant odds by analyzing the organizations' strengths, weaknesses, and how it adapts in response to Coalition Forces' counterinsurgency efforts. The Taliban are deeply rooted in the cultural, religious, and ethnic linkages of the Pashtun population. The thesis emphasizes that a conventional counterinsurgency strategy using large-scale military operations and a fundamentally alien system of governance out of harmony with local traditions cannot penetrate the Pashtun tribal, religious, and cultural web in which the Taliban operate. The thesis concludes with recommendations for designing and implementing a broader Coalition strategy to target identified Taliban critical linkages. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Taliban, Afghanistan, Pakistan, FATA, Pashtuns, counterinsurgency, 15. NUMBER OF strategy, ISAF, Al Qaeda, organizational design. PAGES 199 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE EVOLUTION OF THE TALIBAN Shahid A. Afsar Major, Pakistan Army B.S., Pakistan Military Academy, Kakul, 1994 M.S., University of Balochistan, 2005 Christopher A. Samples Major, United States Army B.A., Campbell University, 1997 M.A., Louisiana State University, 2003 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2008 Authors: Shahid A. Afsar Christopher A. Samples Approved by: Professor Thomas H. Johnson Thesis Advisor Professor Heather S. Gregg Second Reader Professor Gordon H. McCormick Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The Taliban organization has undergone a major transformation, since its ouster from power in Afghanistan and continues to wage an effective defensive insurgency or “war of the flea.” The study uses results of a survey of knowledgeable participants in the Afghan-Pakistan arena, conducted by the authors, to analyze the current situation and prospects for success. The thesis explains the Taliban's survival and growth in the face of significant odds by analyzing the organization’s strengths, weaknesses, and how it adapts in response to Coalition Forces' counterinsurgency efforts. The Taliban are deeply rooted in the cultural, religious, and ethnic linkages of the Pashtun population. The thesis emphasizes that a conventional counterinsurgency strategy using large-scale military operations and a fundamentally alien system of governance out of harmony with local traditions cannot penetrate the Pashtun tribal, religious, and cultural web in which the Taliban operate. The thesis concludes with recommendations for designing and implementing a broader Coalition strategy to target identified Taliban critical linkages. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................3 B. MAJOR QUESTION AND ARGUMENT ....................................................3 C. RELEVANCE OF THE TOPIC.....................................................................4 D. THESIS CONTENTS BY CHAPTER...........................................................5 E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................6 II. RESEARCH DESIGN, THEORETICAL FRAME, AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL ........................................................................................................................7 A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................7 B. RESEARCH DESIGN.....................................................................................7 C. TALIBAN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL ............................................................................................................9 D. THE CONGRUENCE MODEL INPUTS EXPANDED ............................12 E. COALITION APPROACH: CONCEPTUAL MODEL, THEORETICAL FRAME AND PROPOSITIONS ...................................13 F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................15 III. BACKGROUND: KNOW THY ENEMY ...............................................................17 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................17 B. HISTORY .......................................................................................................17 C. ENVIRONMENT...........................................................................................23 1. Physical Environment........................................................................23 2. Culture ................................................................................................26 3. Religion ...............................................................................................29 4. Ethnicity..............................................................................................29 5. Pashtun Tribal Breakdown...............................................................31 D. RESOURCES .................................................................................................33 E. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS .................................................36 1. Regional Players.................................................................................36 2. Non Governmental Organizations and Humanitarian Aid ...........39 3. Coalition Forces .................................................................................41 F. TALIBAN STRATEGY AND OBJECTIVES ............................................41 G. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................46 IV. STRUCTURE OF THE TALIBAN..........................................................................47 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................47 B. FORMAL AND INFORMAL ORGANIZATION......................................47 C. LEADERSHIP ...............................................................................................51 D. DECISION MAKING ...................................................................................53 E. COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION..........................................55 F. THE PEOPLE ................................................................................................57 1. Recruitment and Training ................................................................57 vii 2. Motivation...........................................................................................58
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