THE WAZIRISTAN ACCORD Evagoras C. Leventis* The Waziristan Accord between Pakistan’s government and tribal leaders in that country’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has failed not only to curb violence in the immediate region but also to restrict cross-border militant activity--including resurgent Taliban and al-Qa’ida cadres-- between Pakistan’s “tribal belt” and Afghanistan. The purpose of this article is to examine the Waziristan Accord and to indicate why agreements of this nature will continue to fail unless there is a substantial modification in Pakistan’s internal and regional policies. On September 5, 2006, in the town of eradicating the presence of foreign militants in Miranshah, on the football field of the the area.3 However, even a cursory monitoring Government Degree College, Maulana Syed of the situation since the September 2006 Nek Zaman, a member of the National agreement indicates that the former is Assembly for the North Waziristan Agency probably closer to the truth. Nevertheless, and a tribal council member, read out an describing the Waziristan Accord as an agreement between the Pakistani government “unconditional surrender” is probably too and tribal elders that has since been known as extreme a characterization, since the the Waziristan Accord. The agreement, government of Pakistan hardly surrendered witnessed by approximately 500 elders, anything but rather reaffirmed the status quo-- parliamentarians, and government officials, a state of affairs that certain segments of the was signed on behalf of the Pakistan Pakistani administration do not consider to be government by Dr. Fakhr-i-Alam, a political adverse but rather vital to Pakistan’s greater agent of North Waziristan, tribal and militia strategic interests.4 leaders from the mainly Pashtun tribes and This article is divided into two sections. clans of the area, and seven militants The first will provide a brief background of representing the Taliban shura (advisory the events that culminated in the signing of the council). The signing was witnessed by Major- Waziristan Accord, its main purpose being to General Azhar Ali Shah, the commanding situate this particular agreement in the wider officer of the Pakistani army in the region. The context of regional history and politics, venue was heavily guarded by armed tribal including Pakistan’s role in the War on Terror. militia members and allegedly also by armed The second part will examine what little has Taliban members.1 been made public regarding the Waziristan The Treaty of Waziristan (or the Waziristan Accord and juxtapose its terms to events on Accord) is considered by some to be the the ground in an attempt to provide an “unconditional surrender” of the government assessment of it. The overall intention of this of Pakistan to the tribes of the area, the article is not only to illustrate how this Taliban, and al-Qa’ida.2 On the other hand, agreement, like its predecessors, has failed to government representatives continuously solve the two main issues it was designed to reiterate that the treaty was signed only with settle--the cessation of violence in the the elders and leaders of the tribes inhabiting immediate area and the termination of cross- the region, who have in turn committed border militant movement and activity against themselves to suppressing cross-border the nascent Afghan government and U.S. and Taliban and al-Qa’ida activity and to NATO troops in Afghanistan--but perhaps Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) 19 The Waziristan Accord more importantly to highlight the reasons why (Nangarhar); as well as Mohmand and Bajaur accords of this nature will continue to fail (Konar). Konar also shares a border with the unless the Pakistani government (in its Dir Agency of the NWFP. The northeastern entirety) radically alters its policies in the area provinces of Afghanistan (from south to and substantially shifts its regional strategy north)--Nurestan and Badakhshan--border (both with respect to Afghanistan as well as Pakistan’s NWFP agencies of Dir and Chitral Kashmir). to the east (Badakhshan also shares a small strip of border with Pakistan’s Northern BACKGROUND TO THE WAZIRISTAN Areas). Characterized by mountainous terrain ACCORD and a bewildering array of autonomous, mainly Pashtun tribes and clans, the FATA are In 2001-2002, as a result of successful U.S. ostensibly controlled by the federal operations in Afghanistan (Operation government of the Islamic Republic of Enduring Freedom, OEF) against the Taliban Pakistan, but in reality the government has movement and al-Qa’ida elements, the former never exercised any level of substantial control were ousted from power and the latter lost over the area. their state sanctuary, effectively destroying Unlike Balochistan and the NWFP, the them as an organization. However, it is by FATA have never been truly incorporated into now a widely accepted fact that many the Pakistani state. Epigrammatically, the members of both groups, including their top- government controls the area indirectly tier leadership, managed to escape and find through political agents (PA), who are federal refuge across the country’s eastern border with or provincially recruited bureaucrats that wield Pakistan--a region known as the Federally considerable executive, judicial, and revenue Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)5--and power in each FATA agency. These PAs, have since (especially the Taliban) which are appointed by the NWFP’s “…established themselves in parts of south- provincial governor, essentially control access western and south-eastern Afghanistan, to political and financial privileges and have control parts of FATA and have their main the authority to suspend them arbitrarily headquarters and support networks in according to the interests of the state (in Baluchistan.”6 consultation with the governor). The PAs are The FATA consist of 12 administratively in turn supported by khasadars (irregulars autonomous regions7 of western Pakistan. drawn from the tribes in the area and Together with the North West Frontier employed and financed by the PA) and levies Province (NWFP) that lies to the north and the (tribal militias) as well as by paramilitary province of Balochistan (or Baluchistan) to the forces under the control of the army, whose south, these three administrative divisions task is to maintain law and order and suppress (two provinces and one territory) form the crime. For purposes of daily administration, greater part of Pakistan’s border with however, the PAs--and by extension, the Afghanistan. The southern Afghan provinces government of Pakistan--rely on the support (from west to east) of Nimruz, Helmand, and services of maliks or holders of lungi Kandahar, Zabol, and Paktika border positions, titles of official recognition and Balochistan to the south. Paktika also shares privilege (including financial benefits) granted its eastern border with North and South by the political administration to tribal elders Waziristan, the largest and southernmost and leaders in order to secure their agencies of Pakistan’s FATA. The remainder cooperation. Essentially, the PAs, as proxies of Afghanistan’s eastern provinces (from of the central government, control access to south to north)--Khost, Paktia, Nangarhar, and political and financial privileges that they use Konar--border the FATA agencies of North as incentives and control mechanisms in order Waziristan and Kurram (Khost); Kurram to manage the tribes of the FATA upon which (Paktia); Kurram, Khyber and Mohmand they depend for their manpower needs. The 20 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) Evagoras C. Leventis administrative and legal structures that the constitutionally guaranteed civil and Pakistani government uses to manage the political rights and protection of the FATA are codified in a framework known as courts.12 the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, a colonial-era arrangement that has been The conclusion that can thus be made is variously described as “arbitrary,” that “draconian,” “oppressive,” and contrary to human rights.8 A former chief justice of the …poor governance, combined with a Peshawar (NWFP provincial) High Court long history of official [state] support explained in an interview with the for Islamist Pashtun proxies in International Crisis Group (ICG) that: Afghanistan… explains the growth of militancy and extremism in Pakistan’s The present system of administration Pashtun-majority tribal region.13 embodied by the PA and the FCR is a mechanism of social control that suited The aforementioned administrative and the colonial needs of the British but legal issues are to a large extent responsible cannot be justified by any standards of for the current state of underdevelopment in modern administration and even basic the region, which is the least developed human rights.9 territory in Pakistan. Not only are literacy rates far below the national average (which is itself The FCR is a parallel legal system used by comparatively low internationally--49.9 the Pakistani government in essentially the percent),14 but due to its lack of infrastructure, same way as it was used by the British Raj, to the FATA comprise one of the most control a supposedly “unruly” population inaccessible areas in the world. Thus, although according to the best interests of the central the FATA are “…formally a part of Pakistan administration. In cases where the interests of [the region] more closely resembles a colony the