THE ACCORD Evagoras C. Leventis*

The Waziristan Accord between ’s government and tribal leaders in that country’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has failed not only to curb violence in the immediate region but also to restrict cross-border militant activity--including resurgent and al-Qa’ida cadres-- between Pakistan’s “tribal belt” and . The purpose of this article is to examine the Waziristan Accord and to indicate why agreements of this nature will continue to fail unless there is a substantial modification in Pakistan’s internal and regional policies.

On September 5, 2006, in the town of eradicating the presence of foreign militants in Miranshah, on the football field of the the area.3 However, even a cursory monitoring Government Degree College, Maulana Syed of the situation since the September 2006 Nek Zaman, a member of the National agreement indicates that the former is Assembly for the North Waziristan Agency probably closer to the truth. Nevertheless, and a tribal council member, read out an describing the Waziristan Accord as an agreement between the Pakistani government “unconditional surrender” is probably too and tribal elders that has since been known as extreme a characterization, since the the Waziristan Accord. The agreement, government of Pakistan hardly surrendered witnessed by approximately 500 elders, anything but rather reaffirmed the status quo-- parliamentarians, and government officials, a state of affairs that certain segments of the was signed on behalf of the Pakistan Pakistani administration do not consider to be government by Dr. Fakhr-i-Alam, a political adverse but rather vital to Pakistan’s greater agent of North Waziristan, tribal and militia strategic interests.4 leaders from the mainly and This article is divided into two sections. clans of the area, and seven militants The first will provide a brief background of representing the Taliban shura (advisory the events that culminated in the signing of the council). The signing was witnessed by Major- Waziristan Accord, its main purpose being to General Azhar Ali Shah, the commanding situate this particular agreement in the wider officer of the Pakistani army in the region. The context of regional history and politics, venue was heavily guarded by armed tribal including Pakistan’s role in the . militia members and allegedly also by armed The second part will examine what little has Taliban members.1 been made public regarding the Waziristan The Treaty of Waziristan (or the Waziristan Accord and juxtapose its terms to events on Accord) is considered by some to be the the ground in an attempt to provide an “unconditional surrender” of the government assessment of it. The overall intention of this of Pakistan to the tribes of the area, the article is not only to illustrate how this Taliban, and al-Qa’ida.2 On the other hand, agreement, like its predecessors, has failed to government representatives continuously solve the two main issues it was designed to reiterate that the treaty was signed only with settle--the cessation of violence in the the elders and leaders of the tribes inhabiting immediate area and the termination of cross- the region, who have in turn committed border militant movement and activity against themselves to suppressing cross-border the nascent Afghan government and U.S. and Taliban and al-Qa’ida activity and to NATO troops in Afghanistan--but perhaps

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more importantly to highlight the reasons why (Nangarhar); as well as Mohmand and Bajaur accords of this nature will continue to fail (Konar). Konar also shares a border with the unless the Pakistani government (in its Dir Agency of the NWFP. The northeastern entirety) radically alters its policies in the area provinces of Afghanistan (from south to and substantially shifts its regional strategy north)--Nurestan and Badakhshan--border (both with respect to Afghanistan as well as Pakistan’s NWFP agencies of Dir and Chitral Kashmir). to the east (Badakhshan also shares a small strip of border with Pakistan’s Northern BACKGROUND TO THE WAZIRISTAN Areas). Characterized by mountainous terrain ACCORD and a bewildering array of autonomous, mainly Pashtun tribes and clans, the FATA are In 2001-2002, as a result of successful U.S. ostensibly controlled by the federal operations in Afghanistan (Operation government of the Islamic Republic of Enduring Freedom, OEF) against the Taliban Pakistan, but in reality the government has movement and al-Qa’ida elements, the former never exercised any level of substantial control were ousted from power and the latter lost over the area. their state sanctuary, effectively destroying Unlike Balochistan and the NWFP, the them as an organization. However, it is by FATA have never been truly incorporated into now a widely accepted fact that many the Pakistani state. Epigrammatically, the members of both groups, including their top- government controls the area indirectly tier leadership, managed to escape and find through political agents (PA), who are federal refuge across the country’s eastern border with or provincially recruited bureaucrats that wield Pakistan--a region known as the Federally considerable executive, judicial, and revenue Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)5--and power in each FATA agency. These PAs, have since (especially the Taliban) which are appointed by the NWFP’s “…established themselves in parts of south- provincial governor, essentially control access western and south-eastern Afghanistan, to political and financial privileges and have control parts of FATA and have their main the authority to suspend them arbitrarily headquarters and support networks in according to the interests of the state (in Baluchistan.”6 consultation with the governor). The PAs are The FATA consist of 12 administratively in turn supported by khasadars (irregulars autonomous regions7 of western Pakistan. drawn from the tribes in the area and Together with the North West Frontier employed and financed by the PA) and levies Province (NWFP) that lies to the north and the (tribal militias) as well as by paramilitary province of Balochistan (or Baluchistan) to the forces under the control of the army, whose south, these three administrative divisions task is to maintain law and order and suppress (two provinces and one territory) form the crime. For purposes of daily administration, greater part of Pakistan’s border with however, the PAs--and by extension, the Afghanistan. The southern Afghan provinces government of Pakistan--rely on the support (from west to east) of Nimruz, Helmand, and services of maliks or holders of lungi Kandahar, Zabol, and Paktika border positions, titles of official recognition and Balochistan to the south. Paktika also shares privilege (including financial benefits) granted its eastern border with North and South by the political administration to tribal elders Waziristan, the largest and southernmost and leaders in order to secure their agencies of Pakistan’s FATA. The remainder cooperation. Essentially, the PAs, as proxies of Afghanistan’s eastern provinces (from of the central government, control access to south to north)--Khost, Paktia, Nangarhar, and political and financial privileges that they use Konar--border the FATA agencies of North as incentives and control mechanisms in order Waziristan and Kurram (Khost); Kurram to manage the tribes of the FATA upon which (Paktia); Kurram, Khyber and Mohmand they depend for their manpower needs. The

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administrative and legal structures that the constitutionally guaranteed civil and Pakistani government uses to manage the political rights and protection of the FATA are codified in a framework known as courts.12 the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, a colonial-era arrangement that has been The conclusion that can thus be made is variously described as “arbitrary,” that “draconian,” “oppressive,” and contrary to human rights.8 A former chief justice of the …poor governance, combined with a Peshawar (NWFP provincial) High Court long history of official [state] support explained in an interview with the for Islamist Pashtun proxies in International Crisis Group (ICG) that: Afghanistan… explains the growth of militancy and extremism in Pakistan’s The present system of administration Pashtun-majority tribal region.13 embodied by the PA and the FCR is a mechanism of social control that suited The aforementioned administrative and the colonial needs of the British but legal issues are to a large extent responsible cannot be justified by any standards of for the current state of underdevelopment in modern administration and even basic the region, which is the least developed human rights.9 territory in Pakistan. Not only are literacy rates far below the national average (which is itself The FCR is a parallel legal system used by comparatively low internationally--49.9 the Pakistani government in essentially the percent),14 but due to its lack of infrastructure, same way as it was used by the British Raj, to the FATA comprise one of the most control a supposedly “unruly” population inaccessible areas in the world. Thus, although according to the best interests of the central the FATA are “…formally a part of Pakistan administration. In cases where the interests of [the region] more closely resembles a colony the state are not directly at stake, the tribes of whose population lives under laws and the FATA are left to their own devices to administrative arrangements that set it apart settle criminal and civil disputes. This state of from the rest of the state.”15 affairs creates perceptions of exclusion rather A further issue that complicates matters is than inclusion. Unlike the rest of the country, the transnational character of the Pashtun which falls under the jurisdiction of the tribes living in the area. The are country’s regular court system (district and probably the largest “stateless ethnic group” in sessions courts that can appeal to the the current Westphalian international system provincial High Courts or the Supreme Court (a description usually reserved for the of Pakistan), the FCR, with its arbitrary Kurds)16 and inhabit large sections of provisions for collective punishment, Pakistan’s western regions (the NWFP, the discrimination against women, and no right of FATA, and Balochistan) and Afghanistan’s appeal (to mention but a few), is the only law eastern and southeastern provinces. They are of the land. Thus, the FCR is not only an the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the anachronism but also breeds clientelism10 and second or third-largest in Pakistan (after the “…strengthen[s] conservative and patriarchal Punjabis and Sindhis, depending on which values.”11 While the Pakistani state claims that census data one chooses to use). They straddle governance in the FATA is based on Pashtun the , an artificial, colonial tribal customs, in reality it has demarcation that forms the border between the two countries. …elected to govern [the region] As with the FCR mentioned previously, the through local proxies and draconian Durand line is a product of the British Raj’s colonial-era administrative structures Afghan policy, inherited by the state of and laws, depriving locals of Pakistan after independence in 1947, and was

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) 21 The Waziristan Accord a further attempt by the British Empire to It can thus be argued that the partnership control the “unmanageable” territory and between the Pakistani state and Afghan population to the northwest of and adjacent to Islamist groups has been a direct result of British India.17 Indeed, the Durand line can be successive regimes’ simultaneous (and perceived as an attempt to weaken the continuing) collaboration with Pakistani potential unifying strength of Pashtun tribes in Islamists. In the case of the Zia regime, in an the area (a variation of the British Empire’s attempt to legitimize military rule, it pursued a “divide and conquer” approach), since it program of “Islamization” of the country,21 essentially divided the Pashtun ethnic group in which in turn led it to support the jihad in two. Although the demarcation has been Afghanistan and brought it into a strategic upheld under the uti possidentis juris principle alliance with Pakistani Islamist parties and of international law--where agreements with groups as a means to further this specific end. or between colonial powers are “inherited” by The aforementioned concomitant policies can and are considered binding upon successor also be considered as part of the larger independent states--successive governments of regional strategy pursued by Pakistan since its Afghanistan (including the administration of independence in 1947--the provision, by Hamid Karzai and, to Pakistan’s chagrin, the Afghanistan, of “strategic depth” for Pakistan Taliban during their time in power)18 have not in the event of total war with India, Pakistan’s recognized the line as the official border. arch-rival on the subcontinent; a situation that On the other hand, governments of could only come about through the rise to Pakistan, fearing Pashtun nationalist claims power in Afghanistan of a regime that shared within Pakistan as well as irredentist claims ’s outlook. from Afghanistan, have continuously The nexus then, among Pakistani expressed recognition of the Durand line and governments, Pakistani and Afghan Islamists, have attempted to solve the dispute through and Pakistan’s Afghan policy in general, thus the subversion of Pakistani- and Afghan- becomes evident when the strands mentioned Pashtun nationalist movements while previously are considered concurrently. This supporting Pashtun groups that espouse a non- was illustrated during the period of the jihad nationalist agenda.19 This approach can best against the Soviet Union’s invasion of be illustrated by the rule of General Afghanistan (1979-1989). Throughout the Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). As part jihad, the border tribal regions of Pakistan of a deliberate policy on the part of his regime, (Balochistan, the NWFP, and the FATA-- Afghan guerrilla groups that advocated including North and South Waziristan) were at Islamic (as opposed to purely nationalist) aims the forefront of the mujahidin resistance effort, were supported in order to dampen Pashtun providing staging posts for cross-border nationalist and Afghan irredentist claims on operations against the Soviets as well as areas of the FATA, the NWFP, and sanctuaries from which prospective and Balochistan (a region claimed by Pashtun returning mujahidin to and from the “Afghan nationalists as part of “”--the front” could be housed, trained, armed, and “homeland” of the Pashtuns straddling the indoctrinated.22 Pakistani Islamist parties and Durand line). Even the administration of their members, such as the Jamaat-i-Islami General Pervez Musharraf, while paying lip- (JI), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and service to wide-ranging reforms and half- Maulana Fazlur Rehman, were instrumental in heartedly implementing a few (mainly to ease setting up (religious schools) and international pressure), “…is following the networks in support of the jihad against the pattern of the country’s previous military Soviets.23 The Maktab al-Khidmat lil rulers in co-opting religious extremists to Mujahidin al-Arab (Afghan Service Bureau, support his government’s agenda and to MAK), the forerunner to al-Qa’ida (as an neutralize his secular political opposition.”20 organization), was formed in Peshawar, Pakistan (the capital city of both the NWFP

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and the FATA) in 1984 in order to facilitate NWFP and Baluchistan.”32 Although this the movement of mujahidin fighters to the passage specifically refers to the emergence jihad in Afghanistan. It was, however, just one and consolidation of the Taliban movement of many such support structures on both sides during the period of 1994 to 1996, Rashid of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.24 The illustrates a number of the same points evident Taliban themselves grew out of a movement in Roy’s aforementioned analysis. based around Kandahar in Afghanistan and Additionally, he highlights the difficulty in Balochistan25 (specifically Quetta) in Pakistan distinguishing between Afghan- and Pakistani- in 1994 and were supported by individuals in based groups that refer to themselves as the JUI, such as Samiul Haq (who “…has deep “Taliban,” since the movement, far from being respect for Mullah Omar”26) and the Pakistani territorially confined to specific areas such as Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).27 The Kandahar in Afghanistan or Quetta or sanctuaries, entry and exit routes, and support Peshawar in Pakistan, is as transnational as the networks that were created as a result of the population that spans both sides of the Durand jihad and Pakistan’s Islamist-tilted Afghan line. The reason is that the Taliban is a product policy, as well as the ties established between of a system of “Islamization,” created, the Taliban and al-Qa’ida movements and operated, and supported by Pakistani and Pashtun tribes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Afghan Islamist parties and movements. border, never really ceased to exist and were Despite the fact that “…there was mounting reactivated28 following the fall of the Taliban. public concern about the Talibanization of Writing in 1996, Olivier Roy stated: Pakistan, the country’s leaders ignored the growing internal chaos.”33 The triumph of the Taliban has The rise in militancy along the border virtually eliminated the border between regions and the weakness of the Pakistani Pakistan and Afghanistan. On both government to confront it and decisively deal sides, Pashtu tribes are simultaneously with it are not issues confined to Islamabad’s slipping towards fundamentalism and past actions alone. Within the Pakistani becoming increasingly implicated in political establishment itself there continue to drug trafficking. They are gaining exist powerbrokers that are either pro-Taliban autonomy; already small or exhibit radical Islamist tendencies. The fundamentalist emirates are appearing Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Council for on Pakistani soil.29 Action, MMA)--an alliance of six major religious parties including the Jamaat-i-Islami A more succinct analysis of the state of the (JI), the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam faction of Afghanistan-Pakistan border region (including Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F), the Jamiat Ulema-e- the FATA) is difficult to find. Roy’s statement Islam faction of Samiul Haq (JUI-S), the encapsulates not only the porous and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), the Jamiat transnational nature of the border and its Ahle Hadith (JAH), and the Islami Tehrik population, but also indicates the effects that Pakistan (ITP)--was explicitly formed in Pakistani government policies have had in the opposition to President Pervez Musharraf’s region. Government support for Islamist decision to ally Pakistan with the United movements--such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s States in its Global War on Terror following Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic Party)30 and the the .34 While the JI, one Taliban--during the jihad and Afghanistan’s of the most organized political parties in civil wars (1989-2001) in pursuit of its Afghan Pakistan, is the prominent force behind this and Pashtun policies in effect “…militarized alliance, the MMA includes within its ranks and radicalized the border region.”31 Ahmed both factions of the pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema- Rashid makes a similar point when he states e-Islam (the Fazlur Rehman and Samiul Haq that: “Tribal groups imitating the Taliban factions).35 sprang up across the Pashtun belt in the

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The MMA’s political platform aims at the it is enough to make the connection that any Islamization of Pakistan through the form of external support to insurgent or introduction of the Shari’a, the end of terrorist elements across the Durand line coeducation, and the introduction of more (given the transnational nature of the Islamic texts into school and college curricula. population and the difficulty of policing the Furthermore, it shares the outlook of the border) would make it difficult for a Pakistani military regarding India and stabilizing force (on either side) to establish Kashmir and Afghanistan’s role as a provider control effectively. Without wanting to draw of strategic depth against the former--this too much of a parallel between the Soviet being one of the reasons for the lack of serious invasion of Afghanistan and the current confrontation between the religious parties and situation, what does become evident from a the military. In the October 2002 general comparison of the two is the role that cross- election, the MMA achieved considerable border networks can have in sustaining political successes, which enabled it to both insurgencies (or for that matter terrorist become the ruling party in the NWFP and a activity) on both sides of the Afghanistan- major partner in Balochistan (in cooperation Pakistan border.39 with Musharraf’s Muslim League, Quaid-i- Thus, in order to deal with Taliban and al- Azam, PML-Q) as well as to win control of 62 Qa’ida members fleeing across the out of 342 seats in the National Assembly Afghanistan-Pakistan border and because of (making it the third largest party).36 the potentially negative political fallout of Constituent groups within the MMA and stationing foreign troops on Pakistani soil or prominent personalities of the alliance (such as of conducting large-scale, highly visible “hot Rehman) have been instrumental in brokering pursuit” cross-border actions, the United the agreements reached with pro-Taliban States was forced to enlist the assistance of the tribes in the FATA (including the Waziristan Musharraf government in order to suppress Accord).37 Taliban and al-Qa’ida movement and action The transnational relationships between the between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2001- inhabitants on both sides of the Afghanistan- 2002. As a result, in July 2002, the federal Pakistan border and its porous nature are also government dispatched approximately 80,000 reflected in one of the key judgments made in troops to sensitive border areas of the FATA a 1985 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the first time since 1947, in search of report regarding Afghanistan, which stated Taliban and al-Qa’ida members.40 that “…as long as the insurgents have access Almost immediately, a violent and to strong external support and open increasingly expanding resistance against this borders,”38 the Soviets would find it difficult perceived incursion by the Pakistani military to control much of the countryside. Although surfaced. Although this outbreak of violence this conclusion was made in reference to CIA can be directly attributed to the military’s estimates of the number of Soviet troops that (regular army and paramilitary units--for could be used to reinforce the Union of Soviet instance, the ) indiscriminate Socialist Republics’ (USSR) commitment in use of force and human rights violations,41 it Afghanistan, the previously quoted extract is also the product of Islamabad’s previously crystallizes the two main difficulties faced by outlined policies. The perception among Soviet counterinsurgency efforts to defeat the certain tribes and clans of the central mujahidin resistance--external support and a government (and by extension its armed porous border. Additionally, while the forces) as an opponent to be resisted; the “external support” portion of the quotation history of the FATA; the similar ethnic undoubtedly refers to the various types of aid composition of populations on both sides of provided by third parties to the mujahidin (for the Afghan-Pakistan border; the transnational instance, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the social networks straddling the Durand line; ), for the purposes of this article, Islamabad’s unfulfilled development and

24 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) Evagoras C. Leventis political promises towards the region; and its Aziz, Maulvi Abbas, and Haji Noorul Islam-- oscillating policy of repression and accused of harboring al-Qa’ida members appeasement towards militias and armed tribes “surrendered” to the Pakistani military and all coalesced to fuel the violence that was reportedly “pledged loyalty” to the observed following government operations in government in return for leniency. As part of mid-2002.42 the same agreement, the government released According to Pakistani security authorities, 155 of the 163 tribesmen captured in March in December 2003 two assassination attempts 2004 as a result of military operations and against President Pervez Musharraf were gave “foreign terrorists” until the end of the traced to militants in the region comprising the month (April 30, 2004) to surrender and agencies of North and South Waziristan.43 In receive a pardon. The then interior minister, early 2004, a general insurgency developed Faysal Saleh Hayat, announced that this against the central government of Pakistan, general amnesty was open to all except top- marking the beginning of what has come to be tier leaders of al-Qa’ida and the Taliban. The known as the Waziristan conflict. Despite the amnesty date was extended twice, and the fact that a number of combatants battling tribal forces that were created to hunt down al- Pakistani troops came from the numerous Qa’ida and Taliban members apparently failed tribes of the area, the insurgency generally to locate any foreign terrorists in South involved militants belonging to pro-Taliban Waziristan.48 tribes as well as members of the Taliban and Following the Shakai deal, violence in the al-Qa’ida movements.44 As a result of the Waziristans continued both from tribal militias inherent political chaos in the FATA and the as well as from government troops, and resistance of the population due to this latest although some successes were announced, the military crackdown, the Taliban movement deal failed to stem cross-border movement. By and al-Qa’ida members were provided with an June 9, 2004, a militant group led by Nek environment in which they could regroup, Muhammad allegedly took responsibility for rearm, recruit, and rebuild their training an attack that killed 25 people (including 17 infrastructure through alliances developed security personnel) and wounded 11 in the with certain tribes and clans in the region.45 It Tiyarza area of South Waziristan. (Nek is estimated that in the period from 2004 to Muhammad was subsequently killed when a 2006, as a direct result of the “war in precision-guided missile hit the house he was Waziristan,” the Pakistani army lost staying at in the village of Dhok, near Wana, approximately 1,000 to 3,000 men.46 The South Waziristan on June 17, 2004.)49 possibility of an extreme deterioration of the The second agreement between the situation and a spillover of the violence into Pakistani government and pro-Taliban agencies and provinces neighboring the militants was signed on February 7, 2005, in Waziristans (North and South) and the FATA Sararogha, South Waziristan. Baitullah in general (mainly areas of the NWFP and Mehsud, a pro-Taliban mujahidin commander Balochistan) led the Musharraf government to belonging to the Mehsud tribe, allegedly agree to a ceasefire with the tribes and “surrendered” and “laid down his arms” at a militants inhabiting North Waziristan on ceremony held in an open field surrounded by September 5, 2006. Taliban cadres.50 Abdallah Mehsud (who has It is worth mentioning that this particular ties to the JUI-run Jamiat-ul Uloomi Islamiyya agreement between the Pakistani government seminary in Binori, Karachi, which sent at and tribal and militia leaders (including pro- least 600 students to fight for the Taliban in Taliban elements) is the third of its kind since 1997),51 an associate of Baitullah and a 2004.47 The “Shakai deal” (April 24, 2004) in member of the same tribe, never signed the South Waziristan was the first, wherein five aforementioned agreement, denounced it, and tribal elders of the Zalikhel tribe--Nek continued his attacks against military Muhammad, Haji Sharif, Maulana Abd al-

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personnel and locals accused of spying for Accord as “weaker” than previous ones, Pakistan or the United States.52 stating that: “The Taliban’s pledges are no The terms of this second agreement were more than a general statement that they will similar to the ones included in the Shakai deal, not do this and that.” 56 in that the six provisions of the agreement It can thus be summarized that the included clauses whereby Baitullah and his government of Pakistan entered into the supporters would not support “foreign aforementioned agreements due to its inability terrorists” in their area, would cease their to impose its control on a particular region (or attacks against government personnel and regions)--as a result of both its fractured installations, and would be given official stance regarding radical Islam within the pardons in return. In the event of violations to country and its chronic mismanagement of the the agreement, cases would be adjudicated area(s) under consideration (namely the FATA under the FCR.53 However, violence from as well as the NWFP and Balochistan). Given both government forces and militants Pakistan’s categorization as a failed or failing (including members of the Mehsud tribe) state,57 a feature of which is a lack of capacity continued, and by July 27, 2005, Baitullah to control certain portions of their territorial Mehsud declared the agreement void, resumed expanse--thus providing space for opponents attacks, and blamed the government, stating to their authority to surface--it is perhaps that: “The government has not kept the predictable that “peace deals” such as the agreement with us. It is not holding Waziristan Accord would be sought by the anymore…. They have violated the agreement central government. Generally speaking, in the by arresting our .”54 case of “weak states,” governments adopt one The third agreement, the Waziristan of two, or both, strategies--appeasement Accord, has (unsurprisingly perhaps) gone the and/or repression vis-à-vis regional way of its predecessors. Although violence challengers. Pakistan has implemented both directed against government troops on the responses; Waziristan-style agreements Pakistani side of the border did decrease provide an example of the former somewhat in the immediate aftermath of the (appeasement), usually after the failure of the signing, extra-judicial killings continued, and latter (repression). This oscillating approach insurgent and terrorist actions within has resulted in an increase and entrenchment Afghanistan increased dramatically. Talat of armed opposition to the Musharraf regime Masood, a defense analyst and former in most areas of the FATA, wherein future Pakistani army general stated that “…it would agreements are perceived not as genuine take at least six months to see if the truce is attempts at some sort of conflict resolution, effective, or whether militants use it to but rather as opportunities to recuperate, consolidate their positions.”55 As of 2007, extend influence, solidify gains, and prepare more than a year after the signing of the for the next round of hostilities. Waziristan Accord, it appears that the latter is the case. Militant elements (including the ASSESSMENT Taliban and al-Qa’ida) are consolidating (or have consolidated) their positions and are Although little has been published expanding their influence along both sides of regarding the terms of the Waziristan Accord, the Durand line. Like previous “peace deals,” from the information available in the public the Waziristan Accord was just as domain and according to various reports inconclusive and lacked definite guarantees dealing specifically with the agreement, the and effective monitoring provisions. The Waziristan Accord is a three-page document former secretary of security of the FATA, that contains 16 clauses and four subclauses Brigadier Mehmood Shah (now retired), who and follows the format of previous “peace had been personally involved in the previous deals” between militants and Pakistani forces two agreements, described the Waziristan

26 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) Evagoras C. Leventis in the FATA. The terms of the agreement Government would pay compensation include the following: for the loss of life and property of innocent tribesmen during recent There shall be no cross-border operations. movement for militant activity in Afghanistan. On its part, the There is no ban on display of arms. Government pledged not to undertake However, tribesmen will not carry any ground or air operations against heavy weapons. the militants and to resolve issues through local customs and traditions. A 10-member committee--comprising elders, members of political The agreement will come into force administration and ulema [religious with the relocation of the Army from scholars]--is to monitor progress of the checkpoints in the region. The accord and ensure its Khasadar force [a local tribal force] implementation.58 and Levy personnel [tribal militias] will take over the check-posts. It is evident from the aforementioned that the government of Pakistan has made quite a Foreigners living in North Waziristan number of important concessions to the will have to leave Pakistan, but those militants in North Waziristan. In return for who cannot leave will be allowed to vague guarantees of cessation of attack against live peacefully, respecting the law of government personnel and installations, the the land and the agreement. state has not only allowed the existence of armed groups within its borders, but has so far Both parties will return each other’s also released militants arrested during weapons, vehicles and communication operations, provided them with some sort of equipment seized during various amnesty, and withdrawn from certain areas, operations. handing their control over to questionable armed groups.59 Furthermore, and perhaps Tribal elders, mujahidin and the more importantly, the Musharraf government Utmanzai tribe would ensure that no- has no real means of monitoring militant one attacked security force personnel pledges and imposing its will in the event that and state property. tribal and militia promises made are not kept, short of a return to violence. The Mujahidin There will be no target killing and no Shura Council (the 10-member committee that parallel administration in the agency. is supposed to monitor the progress of the accord and ensure its implementation) has no Militants would not enter the settled real power but exhibits the potential of districts adjacent to North Waziristan. circumscribing and acting as a “check” on government decisions to impose its will. In Government would release prisoners effect, should the government of Pakistan held in military operations and would decide to act in response to violations of the not arrest them again. accord without the support of the ten-member committee, it will find itself not only acting Tribesmen’s “incentives” would be unilaterally, but also in contravention of said restored. The administration is to agreement (thus exposing itself to accusations resolve disputes in accordance with of not honoring its own pacts). local customs and traditions. Additionally, the Pakistani government has, through the terms of the Waziristan Accord, turned over checkpoints to militias composed

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) 27 The Waziristan Accord

of fighters against whom it had been battling authority, killing hundreds of pro-government since 2002. Although it is true that the tribal leaders.”63 Similar arguments can be government retains some form of control made regarding the effectiveness of the (either directly or indirectly) over certain government’s paramilitary forces in the area, checkpoints and border-crossings, it does not namely the Frontier Corps (FC NWFP and FC maintain the kind of direct presence needed to Balochistan). manage North Waziristan and the border with Despite ongoing material assistance from Afghanistan effectively. In withdrawing army the United States (especially for FC NWFP units to their barracks and removing visible units),64 the Frontier Corps’ operational value signs of military presence from the area, the remains questionable. Although FC NWFP Musharraf administration appears to believe (comprised mainly of ethnic Pashtuns from the that by appeasing pro-Taliban elements it can region) “…has a comparatively better remain in power, while retaining the option of reputation among people of the province,”65 violence through proxies.60 FC Balochistan (whose members are largely Indeed, it can be argued that the non-Baloch) “…is not popular in Balochistan government has left the difficult and and is seen as an outside force that is widely hazardous task of combating pro-Taliban believed to be involved in human rights tribes and members of the Taliban and al- violations and is known for the Qa’ida to local militias that it perceives can be disproportionate use of force.”66 Irrespective controlled through financial incentives and the of the “better reputation” of FC NWFP as occasional, limited operational assistance. compared to FC Balochistan, both branches Recent actions by the military, ostensibly in stand accused of indiscriminate and support and at the request of pro-government disproportional use of force, extrajudicial tribes during their clashes with Taliban and al- killings, and human rights violations generally Qa’ida members and their local allies appear attributable to the Frontier Corps’ poor to corroborate this change in strategy.61 discipline, training, and coordination.67 This However, this approach carries the risk of state of affairs (pro-government tribal drawing the military into local “score-settling” weakness and paramilitary unit excesses) has among tribes who will be given the not only assisted pro-Taliban, Taliban, and al- opportunity to denounce rivals as pro-Taliban Qa’ida groups in consolidating their presence or al-Qa’ida, thus eliciting financial and/or but has enabled such groups to create parallel military support from the government in their administrations in areas of South and North parochial struggles. The polarizing effect of Waziristan. such a scenario risks making the situation Apparently, more recently, in the Bajaur worse rather than better. Additionally, a Agency of the FATA, an agreement similar to “proxy war” presupposes that the proxies in the Waziristan Accord has been reached with question have the ability (with a certain Faqir Muhammad, who has been described as amount of support) to attain predetermined “al-Zawahiri’s Pakistani Ally.”68 Whether or goals. not the federal government can still use pro- In the case of North Waziristan (and other government tribes against pro-Taliban and al- areas of the FATA, the NWFP, and Qa’ida elements remains to be seen. While it Balochistan) this means that pro-government can be argued that more effective and efficient tribes are strong and capable enough to carry support and empowerment of pro-government out independently (to a certain degree) the tribal forces may yet yield positive, tangible eradication of Taliban and al-Qa’ida elements results, the fact remains that events in the from the aforementioned regions and to stem wider region during the 1980s and 1990s have cross-border activity. However, Mehmood tended to have a detrimental effect on Shah has commented that the Taliban “…are “traditional” tribal authority (on both sides of too strong to be controlled by the tribes”62 the Durand line). The Soviet invasion of since they have “…shattered the tribes’ Afghanistan, the civil wars that followed it,

28 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) Evagoras C. Leventis the steady flow of refugees across the border, Taliban operations (involving 50 fighters or the marginalization of tribal leaders in favor of more) have increased significantly.77 religious ones and the education According to Reuters, “since the [Waziristan provided to generations of tribal Afghans and Accord] was clinched, attacks against U.S.-led Pashtuns have generally had negative effects NATO troops and Afghan government forces on tribal social structures and the ability of have tripled in eastern Afghanistan, especially tribal leaders to assert their control.69 in areas bordering North Waziristan.”78 As a A further complication to agreements such result, NATO has been requesting that its as the Waziristan Accord is the existence and members both increase their troop status of so-called “foreigners” in the tribal contributions and (to those countries that areas and the opposing definitions that the refuse to do so) allow their troops to engage in tribes themselves and the government of combat operations in order to counter Pakistan ascribe to these individuals. It is a resurgent Taliban and al-Qa’ida forces generally accepted fact that the “foreigners” in operating across the Afghanistan-Pakistan the FATA are comprised (mainly) of five border. “groups”: Afghan Pashtuns, Uzbeks, In addition to the external effects of the Chechens, Uighurs, and Arabs (mostly Waziristan Accord, the “deal” has also had Yemenis, Saudis, and Egyptians).70 All the internal consequences for the state of Pakistan. “peace agreements” that the government of While it is certainly the case that the accord is Pakistan has entered into with militants in the a result of the Pakistani government’s tribal areas included tribal promises to expel ambivalent and oscillating attitude towards “foreigners” from the region, or in situations radical Islamist tendencies within its territory, where this is not possible, “…those who it is also a cause for further violent action by cannot leave will be allowed to live other groups. The siege of the Lal Masjid (Red peacefully, respecting the law of the land and Mosque) in the capital Islamabad from July 3- the agreement.”71 Given the intermarriages 10, 2007, is an indication of this parallel between “foreigners” and local women process. On the one hand, the violent (wherein the former are considered to be showdown can be perceived as the members of the latter’s tribe),72 as well as the culmination of a year-long struggle between norms of melmastia (hospitality) radical Islamist elements of this particular and nanawati (defense of a guest),73 it is establishment and the Musharraf government. perhaps unsurprising that in all cases, On the other, it can be argued with equal signatories to the “peace deals” have been validity that “peace-deals” in the FATA (such unable to locate foreign militants since, as the Waziristan Accord) emboldened according to the aforementioned sociocultural activists of the Red Mosque (who share links factors, there are no (or few) “foreigners” in to radical Islamic groups in the Waziristans the FATA per se (although there appears to be and the FATA) into asserting themselves more some tension between the locals and Uzbek forcefully, since they perceived the Musharraf fighters).74 government as weak and ineffective (because In tandem to the developments in of Waziristan Accord-style agreements). Pakistan’s FATA (and it is reasonable to argue Although in the case of the Lal Masjid as a result of them), pro-Taliban and Taliban siege it can be concluded that the Islamists forces have increased their activity in “over-reached” and misread the situation neighboring Afghanistan. According to (since Islamabad and the FATA exhibit International Security Assistance Force different political and social trends), there (ISAF), attacks against members of the NATO nevertheless appears to be a connection alliance and the National Army of Afghanistan between government appeasement of militants have increased by 62 percent since 2005,75 (such as the Waziristan Accord) and further suicide attacks have increased five-fold from violence elsewhere. Unsurprisingly perhaps, in 25 in 2005 to 139 in 2006,76 and large-scale the same way that militants have used

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government actions to extricate themselves order, and the distribution of leaflets to that from past agreements (labeling them effect.80 Something similar has been observed “violations”), the Lal Masjid incident provided in certain areas of Afghanistan.81 Given these armed elements in the FATA with an excuse-- developments, it is possible to conclude that intended primarily for local consumption--to “Pakistan is now paying the price by… losing withdraw from the Waziristan Accord, thus control of much of the frontier area to groups leading to its collapse. This is not said to it has supported, groups that exploit their ties imply that the Red Mosque incident was in Afghanistan just as the Taliban exploit their staged specifically to provide militants in the ties in Pakistan”82 and that “…Pakistan [is] FATA with a pretext for renouncing the providing strategic depth to the Taliban.”83 accord, but rather to illustrate how agreements Additionally, it has become possible to of this nature have strengthened militants in describe the Waziristan Accord and the tribal areas both militarily and politically agreements like it as the effective “ceding of and to demonstrate their “spillover” effect. territory to the Taliban.”84 In conclusion, although the Waziristan CONCLUSION Accord and its predecessors did indeed offer the Musharraf government some degree of A pattern is clearly emerging. Waziristan respite and (temporarily) decreased the “hot- Accord-style agreements have, to date, spots” of violence and areas of contention with occurred in at least three (if not four) areas of which the administration has had to deal, they the FATA. These “deals,” while alleviating the proved to be short-term solutions that Pakistani military somewhat, have not resulted provided the opportunity for radical and in a cessation of attacks against it and its local militant elements to regroup and consolidate allies and have emboldened pro-Taliban their positions. Given the escalating popular militants both in these particular areas and in resentment against the government of General neighboring ones; territory that is crucial in Pervez Musharraf in increasingly varied areas the War on Terror and Afghanistan’s of governance--including amplifying levels of reconstruction. Indeed, the effects of the violence in the province of Balochistan85 and Waziristan Accord and similar agreements vocal opposition by pro-democracy elements-- have already manifested themselves beyond it can be argued that the regime’s choice of the Waziristans (the events of the Lal Masjid this particular method (Waziristan-style siege providing a poignant example). Not only accords) for dealing with the “Islamic are Taliban and pro-Taliban elements component” of the turmoil plaguing Pakistan consolidating their position in the FATA, but was perceived as offering the most politically it appears that their influence has spread to expedient (and promising) approach to keep areas of the NWFP, Balochistan, and possibly the Musharraf regime in power and to Kashmir. It is estimated that one of the reasons decrease the “problem-spots” in the country.86 for the increase of Taliban attacks against The military’s traditionally close ties with NATO and Afghan forces in areas that were Islamic elements and the electoral hitherto considered “safe,” such as the collaboration between Musharraf’s PML(Q) northern and western provinces of and the MMA in the October 2002 elections Afghanistan,79 is the fact that crossing-points suggest that, after government failures to deal have been established in areas of the FATA, unilaterally with the situation in the FATA, the NWFP, and Balochistan. Withdrawal of mediation through the use of Islamist allies Pakistani army units has generally resulted in was a political option that seemed to carry the an increase of extrajudicial killings by pro- least risk. However, continued instability and Taliban elements against pro-government negative “spillover,” both violent and political, tribal leaders, the opening of offices run by indicates not only the shortcomings of this Taliban-affiliated groups claiming to be policy, but also underscores the inability (or responsible for the maintenance of law and unwillingness) of certain groups (Islamic,

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political, or otherwise) in the country to partnership in favor of the more radical influence, “rein-in,” or control particular Islamic approaches (as espoused by the JUI-F Islamic militant elements in Pakistan’s tribal and JUI-S factions). Furthermore, the MMA is areas. It is perhaps the realization by less than the monolithic Islamic alliance than Musharraf of the limitations of continued it is usually portrayed as being. Although their association with the MMA that a limited ethnic, doctrinal, and policy differences are rapprochement with Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan downplayed by representatives of the alliance, People’s Party (PPP) has been initiated. the MMA represents an uneasy coalition of As a final point, although radical Islamist Islamic parties with widely different groups have increased their power in the constituencies.92 Illustrative of this is the fact FATA, NWFP, and areas of Balochistan, and that the JI draws most of its support from violence has moved beyond the boundaries of Punjabi and muhajir (migrant) communities in the Waziristans to a degree that threatens the the Punjab and urban areas of , whose viability of the Pakistani state, it is unlikely interests do not coincide with the more tribally that Taliban or militant elements (and/or their based JUI, which caters to a Pashtun electorate political/military allies) can use their power in located in the FATA, the NWFP, and areas of the tribal belt to take over the government. Balochistan (although it does have limited While it is true that some circles within support in Sindh).93 Pakistan see no reason to end the strategic The point is that in the event of a alliance with movements such as the Taliban consistent, popularly endorsed government and their domestic backers, the religious response to radical Islamic elements, the right87--since they are considered to be more MMA is likely to face internal pressures reliable allies in the pursuit of “traditional” threatening its cohesion, making it possible to Pakistani policies (especially given improving surmise that more moderate Islamists might U.S.-Indian relations)88--and that the Pakistani opt for accommodation rather than military has traditionally adopted a stronger confrontation with the government (provided Islamic stance when perceiving its domestic of course that this does not damage their position as being undermined,89 there is a relationship with the electorate). Thus, it is growing realization among the country’s elites worth noting that although the threat from (including the military) that Taliban and radical Islam in Pakistan persists and radical similarly inspired groups pose a serious threat Islamists “…have managed to exert a political to the continued existence of the Pakistani and ideological influence in excess of their state.90 This is not meant to imply that the numbers…”94 their potency “stems less from threat to Pakistan posed by increased [their strength] than from the weakness of radicalization and violence in the FATA, their opponents.”95 This implies that a more NWFP, and Balochistan and their propensity stable government with a clear strategy for to spread is trivial, since a “failed” (as dealing with a variety of sociopolitical issues opposed to “weak”) Pakistan carries stands a chance of combating the significant regional implications, not least for radicalization evident in Pakistan. the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Yet The kind of government response that is the argument that a Taliban-style, nuclear required to reverse the “Talibanization” of the weapons-toting Pakistan is considered to be FATA and parts of the NWFP and Balochistan unlikely must be emphasized. will obviously not be an easy task. Continued Islamic parties have usually relied on the governmental mismanagement (at all levels military’s support to increase their electoral but particularly at the regional level), appeal, which reached a record high in the widespread corruption, uneven development, October 2002 elections.91 Given this reliance, the fact that both Pakistani political parties and it is improbable that, for instance, the JI (the successive governments have “…failed largest, most organized constituent member of lamentably to develop Pakistan or improve the the MMA alliance) will willingly dissolve this living conditions of its people, thus making

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the radical option seem all the more attractive,”96 and an obsession with India http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/5315564 mean that substantial shifts in the country’s .stm (accessed April 15, 2007); Ali internal and external policies will be Mohammad Jan Orakzai, Governor of North necessary. Waziristan-style agreements are West Frontier Province (NWFP), “Interview thus a symptom of the multifaceted problems with Zeeshan Haider,” Reuters, April 5, 2007, afflicting Pakistan. Despite offering vague, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idU short-term solutions, they only serve to further SISL221541 (accessed April 16, 2007). weaken the central government while 4. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The strengthening opponents who perceive Mullahs and the Military,” Asia Report, No. violence as the only method that can achieve 49, (March 20, 2003); Barnett R. Rubin and results. Abubakar Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan- Afghanistan Stalemate,” United States *Evagoras C. Leventis holds a Bachelor of Institute for Peace, Special Report, No. 176 Arts (B.A.) in International Relations from the (October 2006), p. 11; Michael Rubin, “Who University of Indianapolis and a Master of is Responsible for the Taliban?” Middle East Letters (M.Litt.) in International Security Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Studies from the University of St. Andrews, Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 1-16, Scotland. http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue1/mrub in.pdf. NOTES 5. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,” Asia Report, No. 125 (December 11, 2006), p. 13; 1. Pazir Gul, “Waziristan Accord Signed,” Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the Pakistan- Dawn, September 6, 2006, Afghanistan Stalemate,” pp. 3, 11; Mariam http://www.dawn.com/2006/09/06/ top2.htm Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist (accessed April 12, 2007). Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection 2. “Pakistani Troops to Remain in Waziristan (London: Hurst and Company, 2002), p. 64. Despite Truce with Militants: Report,” 6. Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the Associated Press, September 9, 2006, Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 11. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/09/asi 7. Comprising seven agencies (Khyber, a/AS_GEN_Pakistan_Militant_Truce.php Kurram, Bajaur, Mohmand, Orakzai, and (accessed April 15, 2007); Kanchan North and South Waziristan) and five frontier Lakshman, “Waziristan: Deal with the Devil,” regions (Peshawar, Kohat, Tank, Banuu, and South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 9 Dera Ismail Khan). (September 11, 2006). 8. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s 3. Pervez Musharraf, , Tribal Areas;” Human Rights Watch, Prison “President Bush and President Musharraf of Bound--The Denial of Juvenile Justice in Pakistan Participate in Press Availability,” Pakistan (Washington DC: Human Rights Office of the Press Secretary, The White Watch, 1999); Sher Baz Khan, “Islamabad: House, September 22, 2006, NWFP Jails Have over 70 Children under http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 FCR,” Dawn, October 18, 2004, 6/09/20060922.html# (accessed April 15, http://www.dawn.com/2004/10/18/local24.htm 2007); Aftab Sherapo, Federal Interior (accessed May 7, 2007); Amir Mohammad Minister of Pakistan, Khan, “Justice Denied,” Newsline, The World http://www.pakistanlink.com/Headlines/Sep06 Sindhi Institute, December 2004, /29/02.htm (accessed April 15, 2007); http://www.worldsindhi.org/relatedpress/dec0 “Pakistan ‘Taleban’ in Peace Deal,” British 4.html (accessed May 7, 2007); Shaheen Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), September Sardar Ali, “The Rights of Ethnic Minorities 5, 2006, in Pakistan: A Legal Analysis,” International

32 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) Evagoras C. Leventis

Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 6 groups such as the Jammu and Kashmir (1999), pp. 169-95; Liberation Front, whose stated goal is the Muhammad Raza, “Frontier Crimes independence of the area from both India and Regulation (1901),” January 16, 2006, Pakistan, were sidelined in favor of http://www.awaminationalparty.org/articlesDe movements such as the Hizb ul-Mujahideen, tails.asp?aid=5 (accessed May 7, 2007). which supports annexation to Pakistan and has 9. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s links to Jamaat-i-Islami. Tribal Areas,” p. 4 Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, p. 54. 10. For a discussion on the “patron-client” 20. International Crisis Group, “Unfulfilled relationship in “young” or “new” democracies, Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle see Philip Keefer, “Clientelism, Credibility Extremism,” Asia Report, No. 73, (January 16, and the Policy Choices of Young 2004), p. ii. Democracies” presented at The Quality of 21. Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the Government: What It Is, How to Get It, Why Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 8. It Matters, International Conference, 22. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Göteborg, November 17-19, 2005, Tribal Areas,” pp. 13-14; Rubin and Siddique, http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/conferences/novemb “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan er2005/papers/Keefer.pdf (accessed May 9, Stalemate,” p. 10. 2007). 23. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban--The Story of the 11. Raza, “Frontier Crimes Regulation (1901).” Afghan Warlords (London: Pan Books, 2001), 12. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s pp. 26, 130. Tribal Areas,” p. 3 (see also p. i). 24. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New 13. Ibid. York: Berkley Books, 2002), p. 5; Shaul Shay, 14. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “Adult The Red Sea Terror Triangle (New Literacy Rate (%) Total--2005,” Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), p. http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco/TableViewer 177; Michael Scheuer, Imperial Hubris /document.aspx?ReportId=125&IF_Language (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), p. =eng&BR_Fact=LTRAT&BR_Region=40535 64. (accessed October 16, 2007). 25. Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the 15. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 9. Tribal Areas,” p. 3 26. Rashid, Taliban, p. 91. 16. Although accurate population counts are not 27. Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, p. 55. available, estimates place the total number of 28. Scheuer, Imperial Hubris, p. 64. Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan to be 29. Olivier Roy, “Rivalries and Power Plays in anywhere between 40 to 45 million, as Afghanistan: The Taliban, the Shari’a and the opposed to the total Kurdish population, which Pipeline,” Middle East Report, No. 202 is estimated to be between 27 and 37.5 (Winter 1996), p. 40. million. 30. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: 17. For an excellent historical narrative of Penguin Books, 2004), p. 114; Rashid, events during the period of British- Taliban, p. 26. Russian/Soviet rivalry (the “Great Game”) in 31. Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the the region, see Peter Hopkirk, The Great Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 8. Game (London: Oxford University Press, 32. Rashid, Taliban, p. 194. 2001). 33. Ibid. 18. Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the 34. “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military,” Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 2. pp. i-ii, 1. 19. The Pakistani government has adopted a 35. Ibid., p.1; Global Security website, similar strategy with regard to armed groups in http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ the disputed Kashmir region. In this case, pakistan/mma.htm (accessed April 29, 2007).

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36. “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military,” 42. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s p. 1. Tribal Areas,” p. 15; Rubin and Siddique, 37. “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2006,” South “Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Asia Terrorism Portal, Stalemate,” p. 12. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakist 43. On December 14, 2003, near Rawalpindi, a an/Waziristan/timeline/2006.htm (accessed bomb exploded on the Amar Chowk Bridge April 15, 2007). shortly after Musharraf's motorcade had 38. “The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Five passed over it. On December 25, 2003, Years After,” Directorate of Intelligence (May Musharraf narrowly survived two suicide car- 1985), p. iv. bomb attacks on his motorcade in the same 39. For a discussion on transnational networks area. Breffni O’Rourke, “Pakistan: see Shawn Brimley, “Tentacles of Jihad: Investigation Continues Into Musharraf Targeting Transnational Support Networks,” Assassination Attempt,” Radio Free Parameters, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 2006), Europe/Radio Liberty, December 15, 2003, pp. 30-46. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/ne 40. Zaffar Abbas, “Pakistan’s Undeclared ws/pakistan/2003/pakistan-031215-rferl- War,” BBC, September 10, 2004, 171433.htm (accessed April 18, 2007); David http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3645114 Rohde, “Al Qaeda Finds Its Center of .stm (accessed April 12, 2007); Arnaud de Gravity,” New York Times, Borchgrave, “Disaster Opportunity?,” The http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/10/weekinre Washington Times, October 15, 2005, view/ http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 10rohde.html?ex=1177041600&en=5e1c9ab3 commentary/20051014-094315-7127r.htm 16d13035&ei=5070 (accessed April 18, (accessed April 14, 2007); International Crisis 2007); Owais Tohid, “Pakistan Toughens on Group, “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas,” p. 2. Militants,” Christian Science Monitor, 41. U.S. Department of State Bureau of December 29, 2003, Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1229/p07s01 Pakistan: Country Reports on Human Rights -wosc.htm (accessed April 18, 2007). Practices 2005, (March 8, 2006), 44. International Crisis Group, “Pakistan’s http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/6171 Tribal Areas;” Daan van Der Shriek, “Recent 0.htm (accessed September 20, 2007); Developments in Waziristan,” Terrorism “Human Rights Abuses in the Search for al- Focus, Vol. 3, No. 5 (March 11, 2005); Ismail Qa’ida and Taleban in the Tribal Areas,” Khan, “Forces, Militants Heading for Truce,” Amnesty International, ASA 33/011/2004, Dawn, June 23, 2006, April 1, 2004, http://www.dawn.com/2006/06/23/top2.htm http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAS (accessed April 17, 2007). A330112004?open&of=ENG-PAK (accessed 45. Reports of resurgent Taliban and al-Qa’ida September 20, 2007); “Pakistan: Allegations activity in the FATA and Afghanistan and of Serious Human Rights Violations in their cooperation with local tribes are too Balochistan Must be Investigated,” Amnesty numerous to comprehensively catalogue here; International, ASA 33/004/2006, February 10, a representative selection is provided: “Al 2006, Qaeda Resurgent,” International Herald http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/Index/EN Tribune, February 25, 2007, GASA330042006 (accessed September 20, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/25/opinio 2007); Human Rights Watch, Afghanistan, n/edqaeda.php (accessed April 14, 2007); Iran and Pakistan--Closed Door Policy: Dafna Linzer and Walter Pincus, “Taliban, Al- Afghan Refugees in Iran and Pakistan, Qaeda Resurge In Afghanistan, CIA Says,” (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, Washington Post, November 16, 2006, February 2002). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/conte

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nt/article/2006/11/15/AR2006111501622. an/Waziristan/timeline/2004.htm (accessed html (accessed April 14, 2007); Tim McGirk April 15, 2007). with Ghulam Hasnain, “In These Remote 49. Ibid. It has been alleged that a U.S. missile- Hills, a Resurgent al-Qaeda,” Time, September armed drone was responsible for Nek 15, 2003, Muhammad’s death. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0, 50. “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2005,” South 9171,485740,00.html (accessed April 14, Asia Terrorism Portal, 2007); B. Raman, “Looming Jihadi Anarchy http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakist in Pakistan,” International Terrorism Monitor, an/Waziristan/timeline/2005.htm (accessed No. 212, South Asia Analysis Group (March April 15, 2007). 30, 2007); Michael Scheuer, “Afghanistan: 51. Rashid, Taliban, p. 92; Lakshman, Forgetting the Lessons of History,” Terrorism “Waziristan.” Focus, Vol. 4, No. 4 (March 6, 2007). 52. Lakshman, “Waziristan.” 46. The number of casualties suffered by the 53. “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2005.” Pakistani army during the “war in Waziristan” 54. Ibid. varies considerably. The official figure given 55. by the government of Pakistan is 200, while http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2006Sep13/0, most independent analysts claim the total 4670,PakistanTruceorSurrender LH1,00.html number of casualties of both sides is over (accessed May 1, 2007). 1,000. On the March 21, 2007, Agence 56. Lakshman, “Waziristan.” France-Presse (AFP) reported that between 57. Country Profiles–Pakistan, Failed States 2003 and early 2007, approximately 700 Index, The Fund for Peace, government troops and 1,000 militants were http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?o killed, ption=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemi http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070321/wl_sth d=299 (accessed September 19, 2007). asia_afp/pakistanafghanistan (accessed April 58. Although the author has been unable to 15, 2007). Bill Roggio writes in his web log locate a copy of the agreement, since it “The Fourth Rail” that unofficial numbers put appears that it has not been published, most the figure of government casualties at about sources outlining its terms appear to 3,000, corroborate one another. Lakshman, http://billroggio.com/archives/2006/09/the_fall “Waziristan;” Gul, “Waziristan Accord _of_wazirist.php (accessed April 15, 2007). Signed;” Steven Schippert, “Pakistan Cedes Ayaz Amir, writing for the Pakistani North Waziristan to Taliban,” Threats Watch, newspaper Dawn, states: “Casualties were September 6, 2006, high, perhaps unsustainable, although we’ll http://inbrief.threatswatch.org/2006/09/pakista never know the exact figures, the Pakistan n-cedes-north-wazirista (accessed May 12, army [is] not given to embarrassing 2007); Haji Mujtaba and Iqbal Khattak, disclosures.” See “War and Peace, Army “Waziristan Taliban Sign Peace Deal with Style,” Dawn, September 15, 2006, Government,” Daily Times, September 6, http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20060915. 2006, htm (accessed April 15, 2007). http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?pag 47. Lakshman, “Waziristan;” Ismail Khan, e=2006\09\06\story_6-9-2006_pg1_1 “Forces, Militants Heading for Truce,” Dawn, (accessed May 12, 2007). June 23, 2006, 59. “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2006,” South http://www.dawn.com/2006/06/23/top2.htm Asia Terrorism Portal, (accessed April 17, 2007). http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakist 48. “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2004,” South an/Waziristan/timeline/2006.htm (accessed Asia Terrorism Portal, April 15, 2007); Isambard Wilkinson, “US http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakist Outraged as Pakistan Frees Taliban Fighters,”

Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) 35 The Waziristan Accord

Daily Telegraph, September 15, 2006, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 3 (February 9, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml? 2006); Stakelbeck, “Bajaur.” xml=/news/2006/09/15/wpak15.xml (accessed 69. Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of May 12, 2007). Afghanistan (New Haven: Yale University 60. Erick Stakelbeck, “Bajaur: When ‘Peace’ Press, 2002), chapter 8. Although Rubin writes Yields War,” CBN News, April 3, 2007, specifically about Afghan tribal society, most http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/130966.aspx? of his analysis is applicable to the tribal areas option=print (accessed May 12, 2007). of Pakistan as well. 61. “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2004;” 70. B. Raman, “Musharraf Seeks Taliban’s “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2005;” Help Against Balochs,” International “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2006.” Terrorism Monitor, No. 116, South Asia 62. James Rupert and Zubair Shah, “Taliban Analysis Group Paper, No. 1938 (September Truce Raises Doubts,” Newsday, September 6, 2006). 27, 2006, 71. See note 58. http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/w 72. Raman, “Musharraf Seeks Taliban’s Help orld/ny- Against Balochs.” wofata274907968sep27,0,4074863.story?coll= 73. Palwasha Kakar, “Tribal Law of ny-worldnews-print (accessed May 12, 2007). Pashtunwali and Women’s Legislative 63. Ibid. Authority,” Afghan Legal History Project, 64. “Frontier Corps NWFP Receives Harvard Law School, Equipment To Enhance Border Security,” http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/res Embassy of the United States Islamabad- earch/kakar.pdf (accessed September 19, Pakistan, U.S. Department of State, January 2007). 12, 2004, 74. “Uzbeks Outstay Pashtun Welcome,” al- http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h041 Jazeera, March 28, 2007, 20101.html (accessed September 25, 2007); http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/A8391A “U.S. Delivers Protective Equipment To 95-17DC-497E-84C4-4EDA05B28931.htm Frontier Corps NWFP,” Embassy of the (accessed October 16, 2007); Jeremy Page, United States Islamabad-Pakistan, U.S. “Army Breathes a Sign of Relief as Militant Department of State, May 12, 2006, Groups Turn on Each Other in Spring Thaw,” http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h061 The Times, April 11, 2007, 20501.html (accessed September 25, 2007). http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ 65. Hassan Abbas, “Transforming Pakistan’s asia/article1637170.ece (accessed October 16, Frontier Corps,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 5, 2007). No. 6 (March 29, 2007). 75. ISAF Development Factsheet, October 27, 66. Ibid.; see also note 41. 2006, 67. Ibid. http://www.nato.int/isaf/media/pdf/Developme 68. Bill Roggio, “Coming Soon: The Bajaur nt_In_Afghanistan.pdf (accessed April 16, Accord,” The Fourth Rail, October 23, 2006, 2007). http://billroggio.com/archives/2006/10/coming 76. Brian Glynn Williams and Cathy Young, _soon_the_baja.php (accessed May 12, 2007); “Cheney Attack Reveals Taliban Suicide Bill Roggio, “Pushing Forward with the Bombing Patterns,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. Bajaur Accord,” The Fourth Rail, November 5, No. 4 (March 1, 2007). 2, 2006, 77. Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, http://billroggio.com/archives/2006/11/pushin USA Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, g_forward_with.php (accessed May 12, 2007); Testimony before Senate Armed Services Sohail Abdul Nasir, “Al-Zawahiri's Pakistani Committee, February 27, 2007, http://armed- Ally: Profile of Maulana Faqir Mohammed,” services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/February/M

36 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 4 (December 2007) Evagoras C. Leventis

aples%2002-27-07.pdf (accessed April 16, domestic and regional implications of the 2007).] Balochistan conflict, instead placing their faith 78. “Taliban-Style Militants Roam Pakistan in a military government that is targeting the Region After Pact,” Reuters, October 24, anti-Taliban Baloch and rewarding pro- 2006, Taliban Pashtun parties.” Quoted from: http://www.reuters.com/article/inDepthNews/i International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The dUSISL25939220061024?pageNumber=2 Worsening Conflict in Balochistan,” Asia (accessed April 16, 2007). Report, No.119, (September 14, 2006), pp. i-ii. 79. Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the 86. See note 37. Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 2. 87. “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military,” 80. “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2006;” pp. 1-2. “Waziristan Timeline--Year 2007,” South 88. Daniel W. Drezner, “The New New World Asia Terrorism Portal, Order,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakist (March/April 2007), pp.34-46; Isaac Kfir, an/Waziristan/timeline/index.html (accessed “The Crisis of Pakistan: A Dangerously Weak April 15, 2007); Bruce Loudon, “Taliban State,” MERIA Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3 Opens Office at Pakistani Bus Stop,” The (September 2007), pp. 81-82, Australian, September 20, 2006, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue3/8.pdf http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0, ; Barnett R. Rubin, “Saving Afghanistan,” 20867,20500788-2703,00.html (accessed May Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 1 12, 2007). (January/February 2007); Jessica Stern, 81. “Leaflet War Rages in Afghan “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, Countryside,” Associated Press, February 14, Vol. 79, No. 6 (November/December 2000), p. 2003, 115. http://www.intellnet.org/news/2003/02/14/167 89. Kfir, “The Crisis of Pakistan: A 88-1.html (accessed April 21, 2007). Dangerously Weak State,” p. 82 82. Rubin and Siddique, “Resolving the 90. Anatol Lieven, “The Pressures on Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate,” p. 14. Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 83. Rashid, Taliban, p. 187. (January/February 2002), p.114, 116. 84. Schippert, “Pakistan Cedes North 91. “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military,” Waziristan to Taliban;” Syed Saleem Shahzad, pp. 17-18. “The Knife at Pakistan’s Throat,” Asia Times, 92. Ibid., p. 20; Lieven, “The Pressures on September 2, 2006, Pakistan,” p. 109. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/HI 93. “Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military,” 02Df02.html (accessed May 12, 2007). p. 20. 85. “Reliance on the Pashtun religious parties 94. Lieven, “The Pressures on Pakistan,” p. to counter their Baloch opposition has 108. strengthened Pashtun Islamist forces at the 95. Ibid. cost of the moderate Baloch. With their chief 96. Ibid., p. 110. Pakistani patron, Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Islami, running the Balochistan government in alliance with Musharraf’s Muslim League (Quaid-i-Azam), a reinvigorated Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are attacking international forces and the Kabul government across Balochistan’s border with Afghanistan. However, the international community, particularly the United States and its Western allies, seems to ignore the

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