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An Analysis of General Pervez Musharraf's Approach to Extremism and Militancy in Pakistan Post 9/11

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An Analysis of General Pervez Musharraf's Approach to Extremism and Militancy in Pakistan Post 9/11 AN ANALYSIS OF GENERAL PERVEZ MUSHARRAF'S APPROACH TO EXTREMISM AND MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN POST 9/11 Chetna Mishra1 Vivek Kumar Mishra2 ABSTRACT General Pervez Musharraf took over the reins in Pakistan by staging a coup in October, 1999. Even while he was struggling hard to curb the rising radicalization and extremism inside, the catastrophic 9/11 incident happened. Musharraf could not put off pressures of America to be an ally in 'War on Terror'. The partnership with America rained hell on his regime as he saw every move of his government producing reaction bigger than before. The menace of extremism remained uncontrolled, rather exacerbated to the extent that Pakistan saw almost an insurgency in the border regions of FATA and NWFP. The Paper attempts an analysis of the approach of then President Musharraf on militancy and extremism and draws conclusion that Musharraf's policies backfired. Methodology: The Paper adopts Content Analysis and Historical Methodology. For this the available government documents as well as secondary data have been used. For statistical analysis, South Asia Terrorism Portal Database has been used. Keywords: Extremism, Militancy, Terrorism INTRODUCTION asset for Pakistan. It is no more a hidden secret that Taliban would not have come to existence without Pakistan’s help As Pakistan’s partnership into war on terror began post 9/11, and support. They were created for a purpose, the purpose it began deploying forces for the first time in its lawless being to counter India — Pakistan’s strategic and ideological frontiers. To begin with, it deployed some 25000 military and enemy. In fact, even top ranked al Qaida operatives—Osama non-military forces in Federally Administered Tribal Agencies bin Laden and Ayman-al-Zawahiri were not the targets of [FATA]. Later they [Pakistan] had to increase the strength of Pakistan’s hunt. They were rather provided ‘safe’ heavens the forces up to 1,00,000 gradually. Various minor operations inside Pakistan (Jones and Fair 2010: 45-46). were conducted to begin with, before launching the gigantic Operation Al Mizan. Both the above facts —deployment of As the facts after the foiled attempts at President Musharraf’s comparatively low level of forces and relying on minor life unfolded [December 14, 2003; December 25, 2003], it operations—reflected the perception of the Musharraf regime was clear that the threat that Pakistan was facing internally that extremists/militants were no match to State forces as far was more real than what was perceived. Only if President as the strength and the depth was concerned. To begin with Musharraf had heeded to them, Pakistan would not have been and up to 2003 some big al Qaida operatives were captured in the quagmire that it found itself in. The investigations in Pakistan. Operations director, al Qaida - Abu Zubaydah showed that the attack was planned by senior al Qaida leader, was arrested from Faislabad [Pakistan] in March, 2002. He Abu-Faraz-al-Libi [later arrested in 2007] and carried out by was the first high ranking member of the al Qaida to be arrested Jaish-e- Mohammad [JeM], a militant group geared towards from Pakistan. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad - al Qaida’s number proxy war in Indian Kashmir — a category of militants termed three ranked and alleged mastermind of September 11 attacks, “good” Taliban by Pakistan (Younus 2015). was captured in Rawalpindi during raids in March, 2003 The group [JeM] was proscribed by President Musharraf but (Reuters 2008). Ramzi Bin-al-Shibh - a Yemeni national was resurfaced with different names to keep operating. The attack captured in Karachi (Reuters 2008). However, these successes plan on General Musharraf, though went foiled, it revealed do not tell the entire story. As the Operation Enduring Freedom the nexus that was unfolding between different varieties of progressed, it was rather becoming clear that Pakistan was militant groups. Pakistan wanted to chase al Qaida, albeit more interested in killing or capturing al-Qaida. For that under US pressure, but not groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad. matter, even America’s interest was more in al-Qaida rather Outfits like Jaish were to be harbored instead, so as to unsettle than Taliban. Al Qaida was treated as number one enemy for India. When the Taliban was ousted from Afghanistan and the obvious reasons (Jones and Fair 2010: 45). For America, was forced to flee inside Pakistan, groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba they [Taliban] were the “spent” force, having been defeated [LeT] and Jaish-e-Mohammad whole heartedly welcomed and ousted in Afghanistan. This spent force was the strategic them [Taliban and al Qaida operatives] inside FATA (Wright 1 Associate Professor, L R P G College, Sahibabad, Ghaziabad, Gautam Buddha University, Greater Noida E-mail : [email protected] 2 HOD, L R P G College, Sahibabad, Ghaziabad, Gautam Buddha University, Greater Noida E-mail : [email protected] 50 J-GIBS Volume 11, Number 1, January-December 2019 2011). As the sentiments in Pakistan started building up against worked for not more than seven weeks and the military the US for latter being the intruder in an Islamic land, the half operations were restarted on June 11, 2004 (Younus 2015). hearted pursuit against them [Taliban and al Qaida] became While the government fought with several thousand forces, even more natural. Lashkar and Jaish were throughout jets and helicopters, the militants relied on a few thousand supported by Pakistan against incursions in India and now men and guerilla technique. However, the support and they were sheltering Taliban and al Qaida. sympathy of the people remained with the militants. While As the threat of militancy seemed more real than perceptive, the conventional warfare techniques’ used against the tribal Pakistan went in for force enhancement in Waziristan in FATA. extremists and foreign mujahideens enforced among them the Operation Kaloshah was launched which led to high degree feeling about government and military as an enemy. The of casualties and collateral damage. The enhancement in the collective punishment against them rekindled and reinforced number of forces was taken by tribal people as enemy’s forces the ties of unity among them despite the traditional inter-tribes leading to tribal resistance. The casualties accruing to the rivalry. In such circumstances the government relied, out of military were as high as 50 soldiers dead in just 12 days of frustration, on sheer force. However, when the force would fighting (Hussain 2010: 69). Even at this level the regime not seem to deter the militants, the regime would come on the continued to underestimate the militant threat to the internal back foot and sign a peace deal in the hope of buying peace. security of the country or they got overawed by the militants’ The deal, however, would be treated by the militants as threat or both. The best option they found to tackle the surrender of the government and acceptance of superiority of militants was appeasement in the form of pacts with them. the militants’ strength. All this made a pattern of the behavior The first such pact was Shakai Agreement, signed on April and action of the government which the militants could use 24, 2004 in the midst of Operation Al Mizan. The deal signed of very cleverly. The government moves became so with militants — Nek Mohammad, Noor-ul-Islam, Hazi Sharif predictable that analysts would start writing about upcoming and Baitullah Mehsud sidelined the Maliks - the caretakers peace deals which was not even signed. of administration under the Political Agents in the previous In terms of statistical data available, South Asia Terrorism environment. The prominence given to the militants led to a Portal [SATP] Database has widely been used in this work. situation comparable to a saying: ‘feeding milk to the snake’. However SAT Portal clearly states that data has been compiled The milk-fed snake becomes even more ferocious to the on the basis of news paper information and all the information perceived enemy. This is what happened in Pakistan under may not have been available to the news papers], the President Musharraf. As 106 militants were released granting percentage increase in the fatalities comprising civilians and them amnesty under the Shakai deal, the promises that were the security forces in 2004 over the year 2003 was 311% for undertaken by the government from the militants’ side — civilians and 767% for security forces - a mammoth rise registration of the foreigners, the stoppage of attacks --were indicating the anger of the terrorists against the government not fulfilled. Rather, the violence level got enhanced. The and the support of the people for the militants. The percentage foreign terrorists kept on being harbored. The murders and increase over the year 2003 went on rising throughout the assassinations of pro-government tribal Maliks and elders and Musharraf regime up to 2008, except in 2005. Table 1, Figure anyone who would not come up to the whims and fancies of 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4 here are statistical the Taliban became the order of the day. As the foreign representation of failure of Musharraf policies to tackle rising militants were not surrendered, the government had to revoke extremism post 9/11. amnesty and restart the military operations. The agreement J-GIBS Volume 11, Number 1, January-December 2019 51 Table 1: Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan % increase Security % increase % increase Year Civilians over 2003 Forces over 2003 Total Terrorist over 2003 Total 2003 140 24 164 25 189 2004 435 311 184 766.7 619 244 976 863 2005 430 307 81 337.5 511 137 548 648 2006 608 434 325 1354.2 933 538 2152 1471 2007 1522 1087 597 2487.5 2119 1479 5916 3598 2008 2155 1539 654 2725.0 2809 3906 15624 6715 Total 5290 1865 7155 6329 13484 Source: Institute of Conflict Management, “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000-2008”, Database Interpretation.
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