Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond
By Robert Killebrew
ven before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the global context for American secu- rity policy was changing. While the traditional state-based international system continued E to function and the United States reacted to challenges by states in conventional ways (for example, by invading Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11), a cascade of enormous technological and social change was revolutionizing international affairs. As early as the 1990s, theorists were writing that with modern transnational communications, international organizations and corporate con- glomerates would increasingly act independently of national borders and international regulation.1 What was not generally foreseen until about the time of 9/11, though, was the darker side: that the same technology could empower corrupt transnational organizations to threaten the international order itself. In fact, the globalization of crime, from piracy’s financial backers in London and Nairobi to the Taliban and Hizballah’s representatives in West Africa, may well be the most important emerging fact of today’s global security environment. Transnational crime operates on a global scale, and the criminal networks that affect national security include actors ranging from Russian mafias to expanding Asian drug-trafficking organiza- tions in U.S. cities. Without discounting their importance, this article focuses on illegal groups native to this hemisphere and particularly Latin America, those identified by the Department of Justice as posing the most significant organized criminal threat to U.S. security. Two factors related
Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.), is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
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to human mobility—demographics and geogra- a broad-based, hemisphere-wide, and long-term phy—combine to make Latin American insta- effort focused on defeating the criminal cartels bility very close to us today. Latin American and their networks of gangs. criminal cartels and their allies are not simply st a crime problem anymore, but a growing threat Organized Crime in the 21 Century that is metastasizing into a new form of crimi- Crime is part of the human condition— nal insurgency. crooks, pirates, and smugglers have always been To be clear, the cartels and the criminal cul- around. However, the collapse of colonial- ture that accompanies them are not yet a direct ism after World War II, the fall of the Soviet national security threat to the United States. As empire in 1991, and the simultaneous explo- one U.S. official put it, they are now a threat sion of global networking technology have all to the national welfare—but are spreading in supported a period of unprecedented expansion such a way as to become a potential threat to and transformation of international crime. New national security. For other nations in the hemi- communications technologies have led to new sphere, though, the cartels already constitute a criminal business models of widely distributed, direct security threat. Only Colombia has thus constantly shifting networks of personal contacts far begun to turn back the lawlessness and vio- and fleeting alliances to produce, market, trans- lence associated with the cartel insurgency.2 port, or distribute illegal trade—sometimes drugs, sometimes human beings, sometimes extortion, kidnapping, counterfeiting or whatever activity new communications technologies have turns a profit. Although the majority of criminal led to new criminal business models of networks are operated by thugs, they should not widely distributed, constantly shifting be underestimated; to survive, they have to be networks of personal contacts and intelligent, clever, and ruthless. Their outreach fleeting alliances also embraces white-collar criminals in banking or legitimate businesses throughout the world, including banks and other institutions in the Meeting the cartels’ challenge will require, United States. As a rule, the networks oper- first, that we recognize the broad and varied ate globally and clandestinely, laundering huge scope of the new face of violent crime in this sums of illicit profits—virtually unlimited flows hemisphere, from Venezuela’s support of narco- of cash—through the “black economy” in such crime to gang recruitment in our own schools large amounts that they can even threaten the and neighborhoods. Second, we must see the stability of the international economic order. problem for what it is: a criminal insurgency One expert has observed: contrary to the foundations of our own society and those of states such as Mexico, Colombia, Ultimately it is the fabric of society that is and others in between. “Profit” can now be at stake. Global illicit trade is sinking entire added to motivations for insurgency, along industries while boosting others, ravaging with religion, ideology, nationalism, and other countries and sparking booms, making causes. Finally, we must step up, and shift the and breaking political careers, destabiliz- focus of, our decades-long “war on drugs” to lead ing some governments while propping up
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Figure 1. Estimated Values of Selected Transnational Trafficking Flows, 2008
Cocaine from South America to North America 38,000
Cocaine from South America to Europe 34,000
Heroin from West Asia to Europe 20,000
Heroin from West Asia to Russia 13,000
Smuggled migrants from Mexico to the United States 6,600
Timber from Southeast Asia to Asia and Europe 3,500
Tracked women to Europe 1,250
Global stolen identity information 1,000
Ivory from Africa to Asia 62
Firearms from United States to Mexico 20
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000
US$ millions
Source: UNODC
others. At one extreme are countries where the smuggling routes, the hidden factories, the pilfered natural resources, the dirty-money transactions can no longer be distinguished from the official economy and government. But comfortable middle-class lives in wealthy countries are far more connected to trafficking—and to its global effects—than most of us care to imagine.3
Fragile states struggling to control their territories, support the rule of law, and develop civil societies are in many cases losing. Worldwide, the number of fragile states is increasing. In 1996, for example, only 11 states were judged to be “failing” around the world. By 2006, the number had increased to 26, and the number of “not quite failing” states with weak governments and “ungoverned spaces” continues to grow.4 Douglas Farah has pointed out the contradiction between increased global trade and a trend toward growing social and political disintegration as weaker states buckle under the strain of corruption, illegal weapons, population pressure, and technology.5 The Globalization of Crime The worldwide black economy is fluid and difficult to gauge accurately; practically all global criminal organizations shift from one illegal market to another as necessary to maximize profits and avoid law enforcement. Figure 1 estimates the magnitude of some of the most significant trafficking flows in 2008.
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Criminal Networks. Almost all of the number of legislated and regulatory restrictions illicit cartels and gangs discussed in this article and bans.7 Currently, Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and organize in various forms of networks, facilitated Syria are listed as state sponsors of terrorism. by widely available communications technol- For decades, the State Department has labeled ogy and protected from interception by cellular Iran as “the most active state sponsor of terror- structures, layered “cores” of leaders, intimida- ism” because it routinely provides safe haven, tion, and other means. The various forms of resources, and guidance to terrorist groups network organization can range from semifor- allied with Iran’s foreign policy objectives.8 mal, hierarchical models to handshakes and The designation, however, is subject to politi- the exchange of cash or merchandise on the cal calculations within the U.S. Government. street. Cartel networks have extensive reach, North Korea, for example, despite clear evi- crossing borders and jurisdictional lines with dence of support for terrorist activities, was impunity. Two leading authorities in the field taken off the list in 2008 as an inducement to of network analysis and the theory of “netwar,” negotiations. Venezuela, despite clear ties to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, argued in a the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia RAND study in 2001: (FARC), Hizballah, and Iran, is not designated.
The capacity to cross national borders Selected Theaters creates several advantages for criminal The United States. As the largest drug networks. It enables them to supply mar- market in the hemisphere, the United States kets where the profit margins are largest, is a magnet for the cartels and their allies. operate from and in countries where risks Mexican cartels dominate the wholesale dis- are the least, complicate the tasks of law tribution of drugs throughout the Nation, as enforcement agencies that are trying to recognized by the Department of Justice and combat them, commit crimes that cross summarized in the Wall Street Journal: jurisdictions and therefore increase com- plexity, and adapt their behavior to counter Mexico’s cartels already have tentacles that or neutralize law enforcement initiatives.6 stretch across the border. The U.S. Justice Department said recently that Mexican Criminal States. A relatively new devel- gangs are the “biggest organized crime opment on the modern scene, different from threat to the United States,” operating weak or struggling countries, is the emergence in at least 230 cities and towns. Crimes of criminal states. These states are in effect connected to Mexican cartels are spread- descendants of the Barbary pirate states of old, ing across the Southwest. Phoenix had acting in contravention of international law more than 370 kidnapping cases last year, and supporting extremist organizations that turning it into the kidnapping capital of the attack other states. U.S. policy and law require U.S. Most of the victims were illegal aliens the Department of State to designate “those or linked to the drug trade.9 countries that have repeatedly provided sup- port for acts of international terrorism” as state So far, the violent impact of the cartels sponsors of terrorism, a status that includes a and gangs in the United States has not risen to
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the level it has elsewhere in the hemisphere.10 Cartel operations have become so extensive, American political culture supports honest law and associated gang culture has spread so rap- enforcement and does not tolerate the levels idly in the Nation, that all major U.S. cities of corruption found historically in Mexico and and most smaller cities are feeling the cartels’ other countries in the hemisphere. Public offi- impact as their influence spreads.12 While few cials are more difficult to corrupt, the public less tolerant of lawbreaking, and the general culture unfriendly to the kinds of murder and intimida- the more effective policing power tion the cartels employ elsewhere. Additionally, of various U.S. law enforcement so far the more effective policing power of organizations has deterred cartels and various U.S. law enforcement organizations— gangs in the United States from the local and state police, the Drug Enforcement kind of large-scale intimidation and Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of criminality seen in Mexico and elsewhere Investigation (FBI), and others—has, by and large, deterred cartels and gangs in the United States from the kind of large-scale intimidation top cartel leaders travel to the United States and criminality—kidnapping, extortion, mur- because of fears of arrest, law enforcement der—seen in Mexico and elsewhere. personnel arrest hundreds of lower ranking The U.S.-Mexico border region has cartel members every year. As an example, become a significant geographical flashpoint after a 2-year investigation that spanned three between the two countries. One resident countries—the United States, Mexico, and reported: “One week before the murder [of an Colombia—the DEA arrested 755 people in Arizona rancher] Bob and his brother Phil . . . California, Florida, and Maryland, seized over hauled a huge quantity of drugs off the ranch $59 million in cash, tons of assorted drugs, that they found in trucks. One week before that 149 vehicles, 3 aircraft, 3 maritime vessels, a rancher near Naco did the same thing. Two and over 150 weapons; the operation also dis- nights later gangs broke into his ranch house rupted Canadian cartel operations. The arrest and beat him and his wife and told them that if of so many operatives indicates that foreign they touched any drugs they found they would cartels are increasing their operations in the come back and kill them.”11 United States and linking up with local and Accurate assessments of the magnitude transnational gangs here. of “spillover violence” are difficult, partly Transnational Gangs. The growth of trans- because of cartel and gang success in blending national gangs in the United States, which act into local environments, and political pres- as the “retail” arms of the cartels, is a relatively sures from local governments—some locals new and dangerous phenomenon in American play down violence to avoid stigma, while crime. The gangs represent networks of ruthless others overplay it. The number of kidnap- and sometimes random killers, deeply embed- pings in U.S. cities near the border has bal- ded in violent and amoral cultures that extend looned in recent years as large populations of the reach of the cartels far into American civic immigrants have been infiltrated or targeted by society. For example, one Atlanta news organi- cartels or splinter groups of small-time thugs. zation reported:
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The brutality of the Atlanta drug trade has gamut from illegal drugs, extortion, murder for raised concerns that it is at the first step in hire, theft, and other activities. Beatings, rape, a violent evolution that has already turned murder, and mutilation are commonly used to Phoenix into a major kidnapping capital. recruit gang members and to enforce discipline. In that city, drug gangs are so well armed Large immigrant communities of Latin and trained in military tactics that wit- Americans, which for a variety of reasons may nesses have mistaken their attacks for police be reluctant to approach the police, inadver- SWAT raids.13 tently provide shelter for Latino gangs (and are often their first victims). A conference of law The big international gangs now on the enforcement officers with extensive gang expe- scene are different from local gangs in their rience recently concluded that: organization and inclination to violence out- side their ethnic or economic group. They may The extensive pool of illegal immigrants include more traditional nationalist groupings in the country bolsters the influence of such as the Russian mafia, but the particular Latino gangs in the United States. Poor gangs from the Western Hemisphere of inter- socio-economic conditions and reliance on est here are the primarily Latino gangs such as strong social networks make gangs seem desirable. In addition, the current status of immigration law makes many immigrant Latino gangs have an international reach, communities fearful of cooperating with running from South and Central America police, thus depriving law enforcement of into the United States and Canada critical human intelligence. Even when an individual is a legal immigrant, close ties to undocumented aliens raises fears of attract- MS–13 (Mara Salvatrucha), the 18th Street Gang, ing attention to a particular community.15 and other groups such as the Mexican Mafia or its Texas branch, the Mexikanemi. MS–13 and Mexico. No state in this hemisphere is 18th Street count an estimated 6,000–10,000 more important than Mexico to the security of and 30,000 members, respectively, in the United the United States. It is our second-largest trad- States alone, with thousands more in Central ing partner (after Canada) and has strong ties America (primarily El Salvador, Honduras, and to the United States; over 500,000 Americans Guatemala), where they challenge local authori- live in Mexico, while over 11 million Mexicans, ties for control of streets and towns.14 The Latino or Americans of Mexican origin, live in the gangs are distinguishable by their closed natures United States, comprising 6.5 percent of the and tight discipline, by body tattoos, and by total U.S. population.16 frequent use of extreme violence. They have Although a strong state otherwise, Mexico an international reach, running from South for decades tolerated high crime rates, particu- and Central America into the United States larly in Mexico City, and high levels of corrup- and Canada. Recruits in some cases have prior tion in government circles, especially among Central American military training or combat law enforcement officials at the federal and local experience, and their criminal enterprises run the levels.17 The state’s war against the cartels has
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Figure 2. Drug-related Executions, 2006–2009
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0 Jan FebMarch AprilMay June July AugSeptOct NovDec
2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: EMPRA, based on statistics from Milenio newspaper
not only cost the lives of tens of thousands of Mexican citizens, but also has challenged Mexican law enforcement officials to find and weed out corrupt police at every level of government, from low- ranking policemen to cabinet-level law enforcement professionals. Partly for that reason, the Mexican army, which has heretofore enjoyed high levels of public respect and was regarded as less corrupt than the federal and local police forces, was deployed against the cartels in 2007. When deployed, the Mexican army had had little or no training in domestic policing or counterinsurgency as it would apply against the cartels. Results have been mixed, but may have bought time for the government to train or retrain special police forces.18 Cartel violence has affected everyone from high-profile government officials to innocent bystanders, who are increasingly caught in the crossfire. As a result, there have been more than 30,000 deaths tied to drug trafficking in recent years (see figure 2). The narcotics industry is now a significant component of the Mexican national economy: esti- mates of annual profits from illicit drug sales range from $25 billion to $40 billion, or up to 5 percent of Mexico’s gross domestic product—twice the value of remittances by Mexican migrants.19 According to the U.S. Department of State, as of 2009, cartels and gangs employed about 450,000 people in the cultivation, processing, and sale of illegal drugs. Of this number, approximately 150,000 were directly involved in processing and selling. The remainder—approximately 300,000 persons—engaged in crop growing and harvesting.20 Profits from drug cultivation far outstrip profits from legitimate agriculture; while a kilo of corn can sell for 40 cents, a kilo of opium can sell for $1,000.21 Unemployment, public
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sector budget cuts, and decreasing remittances cult symbols, and political action to assert to Mexico from immigrants in the United States their control over the mega-turf they seek to increase monetary incentives for rural dwellers to dominate. They also seek community legiti- participate in the drug trade. macy, cultivating a folk perception that they But it is not only about drugs. Kidnapping, are social protectors.22 extortion, and other kinds of crime have long been staples of cartel operations, even reach- Mexico’s criminal cartels are complex, ing across the border into U.S. cities. Recent networked organizations that combine flexible, U.S. assistance to the Mexican government in task-focused sophistication with an inclina- the form of the Merida Initiative and the rela- tion to family-based, almost tribal leadership tive prosperity of U.S. businesses in Mexico and structures. However, while they may still center along the border increase the probability that on the same family group as they did a decade cartels will be directed at U.S. targets. ago, the constant attrition of leadership has led The Mexican cartels in their present form are over time to a more decentralized operational examples of 21st-century criminal insurgent move- model.23 Drug cartel membership is growing ments, attacking the state from within through increasingly younger and is more horizontally organized. Cell phones, computers, and other cartels are managed from “corporate technologies enable cartel members to rapidly offices” in countries where they are transmit orders, organize and reorganize, and replace losses. As a rule, cartels are managed based, often in locations made secure from “corporate offices” in countries where they with the complicity of local officials are based, often in locations made secure with the complicity of local officials. Below corporate corruption and violence, and seeking to establish headquarters are command and control cells areas of influence in which they can operate with- that manage daily activities. A certain group out restriction. John Sullivan has pointed out: of unit members may deal specifically with the intimidation and coercion of rural populations Mexican cartels have employed psychologi- to enlist them in the drug trade.24 Another may cal operations, fomented anti-government focus on killings, as used to be the case with Los protests, attacked both police and military in Zetas, the hired mercenary group of ex-military infantry-style assaults, assassinated political members at the service of the Gulf Cartel until officials, journalists, beheaded and maimed they struck out on their own. Today, many of their victims, to amplify the strategic impact the cartels have a specific group of sicarios (hit of their attacks, and co-opted and corrupted men) on call to provide lethal services. the military, police and political officials Colombia. The staunchest U.S. ally in the at all levels of government. The result is Andean Ridge, Colombia continues its success- extreme brigandage, and a set of interlock- ful fight back from the brink of becoming the ing “criminal insurgencies” culminating in world’s first narcostate even as it remains the virtual civil war. As a consequence, some primary source of cocaine in the world. The con- Mexican cartels, like La Familia, have cept of narcoterrorism was born in Colombia in embraced high order violence, religious and the 1980s and 1990s, when cocaine traffickers25
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began using terrorist tactics—car bombs, massa- North America. The FARC became involved cres of civilians, executions of political candidates, with high-profile crime and cocaine-trafficking and other attacks against both law enforcement groups during the 1980s to finance its fight officials and civilians—to fight extradition of against the Colombian state. After the defeat convicted drug traffickers to the United States.26 of Colombia’s big drug cartels and the demobi- At the same time, the FARC was making major lization of the right-wing Autodefensas Unidas de gains in the countryside. For a time, Colombia Colombia in 2003, the FARC became the domi- seemed to be on the verge of anarchy; in 1999, for nant player in illegal drugs.30 The movement’s example, civilian deaths were averaging 20 a day, original ideological motivation has receded over and kidnappings were occurring at a rate of 200 time. Although the leadership retains an ideolog- a month.27 Today, while the major cartels have ical core and conducts periodic purges, the focus been defeated and the FARC driven back into the now is on drug profits to fund weapons, recruits, jungle, the government is moving on to the com- and corrupt officials that enable it to continue its plex task of adapting its strategies to ensure gains perpetual struggle against the state. The FARC remain permanent.28 has also evolved from the traditional insurgent- The United States has actively supported guerrilla model to a highly decentralized, net- Colombia’s struggles for decades. U.S. aid against worked narcoterrorist organization. Today, there drug cartels began in the 1990s, though with ini- are approximately 7,000 to 8,000 armed combat- tial restrictions against its use to fight guerrillas, ants in the movement, in numerous geographi- but these restrictions became moot as the FARC cally based “blocs” and “fronts” operating primar- turned into a cocaine-producing narcoterrorism ily out of the jungles of the southern and eastern organization in the late 1990s and was classed regions of the country. At present, the FARC is by the United States as a terrorist organization. no longer an existential threat to the Colombian Although the government now has state, but as it has withdrawn into the jungles momentum in its fight to restore the rule of law and rest camps on the borders of Ecuador and in the state, conflict in Colombia is far from Venezuela, it has become harder to finish off. In resolved. While security was restored along the addition to cocaine production and shipment main population corridors, many Colombians on an international scale, it is still capable of are still at risk of armed violence.29 According kidnappings, raids, and terrorist acts, such as the to the Colombian Defense Ministry, the con- kidnapping and assassination of the governor of flict claimed the lives of 20,915 people between Caquetá in December 2009. The Caquetá killing 2002 and March 2010, including 13,653 mem- led then–Defense Minister Gabriel Silva to cau- bers of “subversive groups,” 1,611 members of tion that the FARC is “neither vanquished nor “illegal self-defense groups,” 1,080 members in its death throes.”31 of “criminal gangs,” and 4,571 members of The FARC has extensive international Colombian security forces on duty. links with other narcoterrorist organizations, The FARC remains the world’s main including Hizballah. Operation Titan, a 2-year cocaine-producing organization. It occupies a investigative endeavor culminating in October central role in the Western Hemisphere’s drug 2008 and led jointly by U.S. and Colombian trade, linking cocaine production in Colombia authorities, resulted in more than 130 arrests to cartels for onward movement to Mexico and and the seizure of more than $23 million and 360
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kilos of cocaine.32 Of the individuals arrested, in 2009.38 His confrontational and often 21 were in Colombia, and 3 of these were of erratic approach to relations with the United Lebanese or Jordanian descent.33 Among them States, support of anti–U.S. governments in was Lebanese-born Chekry Harb, who under Bolivia and Nicaragua, and high-profile alli- the alias “Taliban” led a money-laundering ring ance with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran are that funded Hizballah activities through a net- parts of a campaign to raise Venezuela’s—and work of militants and drug traffickers extend- his—impact on the hemisphere and on global ing from Panama to Hong Kong, and included affairs. Some recent foreign policy initiatives, the FARC as a primary producer and exporter.34 for example, included supporting the over- The FARC’s Sixteenth Brigade in particular thrown president of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, supplies cocaine to not only the Arellano Felix claiming sovereignty over Guyana, and join- Organization in Mexico but also Brazilian cartels ing Muammar Gaddafi to condemn the United like the one run by Luiz Fernando da Costa.35 Nations Security Council, North Atlantic According to Sergio Jaramillo, FARC finance Treaty Organization, and other perceived mani- chief Oliver Solarte acted as a primary linking festations of imperialism.39 contact for both organizations. In 2001, famous Even as its economy struggles, Venezuela Brazilian kingpin Fernandinho Beira-Mar was has embarked on a significant arms buildup. arrested in Colombia as he attempted to execute Along with other South American countries, a guns-for-cocaine transaction with the FARC.36 Venezuela recently increased defense spend- At least one of the FARC’s “fronts” (the 48th) ing so that it now ranks third in the region has connections with the Tijuana Cartel dating behind Brazil and Colombia. The U.S. Defense back to the 1990s, and the various FARC fronts Intelligence Agency estimates that Venezuela and smaller Colombian cartels often engage spent approximately $4.3 billion on weapons in joint ventures. More recently, officials have between 2005 and 2007. Russian arms sales to uncovered cooperation between the FARC and South America increased by approximately 900 traffickers belonging to al Qaeda in the Maghreb percent from 1999 to 2008, mostly as a result and other gangs in the Sahel region of Africa.37 of increased transfers to Venezuela.40 These Other drug production and trafficking groups transfers included 100,000 assault rifles, 15 heli- remain in Colombia, either as “mini-cartels” or copters, and a license to produce Kalashnikov as armed groups in lawless parts of the country. rifles (AK–103s, similar to the AK–47 model) Some of these emerging groups are remnants in Venezuela itself.41 In addition, Venezuela has of right-wing militias that did not demobilize acquired naval patrol units from Spain.42 when called on to do so by the government, but The relationships among Chávez, his advi- instead fell into organized crime; others include sors, and the FARC and cartels throughout the individuals with no previous relationship with region are personal and complex and consti- the paramilitaries who joined criminal groups tute some of the most important alliances in to profit from drug trafficking. the region. He has long supported the FARC in Venezuela. Hugo Chávez was elected pres- Colombia, with which the Venezuelan state has ident of Venezuela in 1998, was subsequently had a number of long-running disagreements, reelected in 2000 and 2006, and won a national though not until recently ones sufficiently seri- referendum to lift term limits for the presidency ous to suggest war.
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Chávez personally has had a long association weapons sales to Venezuela and further strained with the FARC, particularly with Raul Reyes, the already tense relationship between Caracas a former deputy commander who was killed and Bogota.46 More recently, an indictment by in a Colombian raid on a base in Ecuador in a prosecutor of Spain’s High Court implicated 2008. Computer material captured from rebels, high-ranking members of the Chávez regime reviewed by INTERPOL and intelligence agen- in cooperation between the FARC and Spain’s cies from various countries, spelled out what had Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and long been rumored: deep collaboration between Freedom) to exchange know-how in terrorist the FARC and high-ranking Venezuelan officials tactics and even plan abductions of officials like involved in providing weapons and resources. Colombia’s ex-President Andrés Pastrana.47 The “Reyes files” implicated Venezuelan offi- Ties between Venezuela and Iran are gaining cials at the highest levels of government who increasing attention as a potential threat to U.S. helped the FARC safeguard their operational and regional security. According to Manhattan areas, obtain weapons, and ship illegal narcotics District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, “Nobody through Venezuela to other destinations. is focused sufficiently on the threat of the Iran- In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department Venezuela connection.”48 Secretary of Defense indicted two senior Venezuelan officials, Robert Gates also expressed concern in a January Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, director of 2009 statement on Iranian international activi- Venezuela’s Military Intelligence Directorate, ties.49 Chávez and Ahmadinejad are both vocifer- and Henry de Jesus Silva, Director of the ously hostile to the United States, invoking the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention need to “save humankind and put an end to the Services, and one former official, Ramón Emilio U.S. Empire.”50 Chacín, for “materially assisting” FARC nar- Lax Venezuelan-Iranian immigration con- cotics trafficking activities.43 A statement by trols have alarmed U.S. officials, who point out Treasury points out that these officials “armed, that Venezuelan passports are apparently widely abetted and funded the FARC, even as it ter- available to all comers, and have been issued rorized and kidnapped innocents.”44 to a number of travelers from Syria, Yemen, In December 2004, Rodrigo Granda was kid- Iran, and other Middle East states that have napped by bounty hunters while attending the been known to harbor terrorists. In November Second Bolivarian People’s Congress in Caracas. 2008, Turkish authorities intercepted 22 ship- As FARC “foreign minister,” it had been Granda’s ping containers labeled “tractor parts” bound duty to liaise throughout Latin America, gather- for Venezuela from Iran that contained bomb- ing support for his group’s activities. When he was making chemicals and laboratory equipment.51 taken, he had been living in Caracas for 2 years “What they contained,” one Turkish official after having been granted Venezuelan citizenship was quoted as stating, “was enough to set up an by the Chávez government.45 explosives lab.”52 Likewise, in September 2006, In July 2009, the government of Sweden Rodolfo Sanz, the Venezuelan Minister for Basic pressed Venezuela to explain how Swedish- Industries, announced that “Iran is helping us made weapons ended up in the hands of FARC with geophysical aerial probes and geochemical rebels. As a clear violation of end-user licenses, analysis” in its search for uranium in a promis- the finding compromised the future of Swedish ing area near the border with Guyana.53
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The Venezuelan connection is useful to military and civilian role, managing a number Tehran for a number of reasons. First, it provides of Iranian-owned and -controlled factories in an opportunity for Iran to break out of its increas- remote areas in Venezuela. ing international isolation and to project power Third, Iran uses Venezuela to circumvent in Latin America. Chávez has facilitated growing U.S. and United Nations economic sanctions Iranian commitments to other ideological part- and to launder illicit funds to support Iranian ners in Bolivia and Nicaragua, where diplomatic weapons programs, including its nuclear program. openings have been swiftly followed by trade In January 2008, Iran opened the International agreements and other ties.54 Then–U.S. Director Development Bank in Caracas under the Spanish name Banco Internacional de Desarrollo C.A., Iran uses Venezuela to circumvent U.S. an independent subsidiary of the Export Bank of and United Nations economic sanctions Iran. In October of that year, the U.S. Department and to launder illicit funds to support of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Iranian weapons programs, including its imposed economic sanctions against both banks for providing financial services to Iran’s Ministry nuclear program of Defense and its Armed Forces Logistics, the two military components charged with support- of National Intelligence Dennis Blair maintained ing Iran’s nuclear program.58 In April 2009, the in February 2009 congressional testimony that Iran-Venezuela Bank was established, with each Venezuela “is serving as a bridge to help Iran build country making an initial investment of $100 mil- relations with other Latin American countries.”55 lion.59 One expert stated that: Second, Venezuela’s entrepot to Latin America provides a base of operations located, All of this activity is designed to facilitate as Ahmadinejad stated, at America’s backdoor. the funding of . . . terrorist organizations Iran’s support for terrorist or criminal organiza- . . . and to circumvent financial sanc- tions that attack or weaken the United States tions imposed by the United States, the would be in keeping with the Iranian under- European Union and the United Nations. standing of “asymmetric warfare”—and ours, The Iranian Development and Export too, for that matter. One expert has testified Bank has now opened a branch in Quito that “Iran has expanded its influence, albeit (Ecuador). The Treasury Department has in a limited capacity, into the Latin American sanctioned the Iranian banks and various backyard of the United States. It is suspected of individuals, but so far has not sanctioned seeking to develop rudimentary retaliatory capa- any Venezuelan bank.60 bility against the United States throughout Latin America should Iran be attacked or invaded.”56 Policies and Strategies Since about 2006, Iranian military advi- sors have been serving with the Venezuelan International. Essentially, the United army, joining a strong contingent of Cuban States faces external and internal challenges in military officers.57 The Iranian Revolutionary reorienting to more effectively fight the cartels Guard Corps, including members of the elite and their allies. Refocusing U.S. policy from a Quds Force, operates in Venezuela in both a “war on drugs” to a more comprehensive fight
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against the cartels and gangs is essential if the forces, but the size of the agency must be greatly United States and its allies are to prevail. Since increased. With 5,500 agents spread over the the basis of the cartels’ survival lies in the con- hemisphere—including the United States—the trol of regions where governmental control is agency that plays such a key role in the ongoing nonexistent and populations may be impover- war with the cartels is spread too thin. ished and alienated, successful counter-cartel Second, the U.S. and its allies must con- strategies are fundamentally counterinsurgency tinue to attack the cartels’ financial networks and strategies developed by the concerned states money-laundering capabilities—a key strategy themselves and supported by the United States. that requires more resourcing at Treasury. Cartel Counter-cartel strategies must first be politi- leaders fear U.S. indictments and extradition to cal strategies, integrating military and police American courts; extradition, exposure, and sei- activity into a broader political approach that zure of “dirty” money from criminal operations emphasizes the rule of law as an alternative are all effective strategies that identify kingpins to the rule of force. Four aspects of a Western and threaten them with trials in U.S. courts and Hemisphere counter-cartel strategy follow. long terms in U.S. prisons. The United States First, step up the direct attacks on the car- has learned to use financial analysis and indict- tels. Over the past decades, U.S. law enforce- ments as weapons against the cartels, even when ment professionals have developed successful they are beyond the immediate reach of U.S. law. operational techniques that cartel leaders fear: Their use should be expanded. partnerships with effective local police (often Third, help our neighbors build more func- with U.S. training), expertise with judicially tional state institutions, particularly courts, approved wiretaps and electronic surveillance, and stimulate economic growth. In terms of rewards programs that make criminal bosses the U.S. role and our assistance to allies, our vulnerable to betrayal, and, above all, when understanding of security assistance must be local laws permit, extradition to U.S. courts broadened to include effective assistance to and prisons. The United States and its allies police and courts. For example, as part of Plan should increase the capability for multiagency Colombia—a Colombian-developed counter- field operations in all these dimensions, as cartel strategy—the United States provided well as the professionalization of host country the Colombian National Police (CNP) with military forces for operations requiring holding telecommunications-intercept equipment and, ground while the rule of law is reinstituted by working through the Department of Justice, other national agencies. DEA already operates helped the CNP build a judicial process to sup- throughout the region and has solid relation- port wiretap investigations. The result was a ships with counterpart agencies; addition- powerful tool that assisted indictments against ally, the agency has worked closely with U.S. cartel leadership and extraditions to the United combatant commands, notably U.S. Southern States for prosecution. Likewise, assisting host Command, where its powerful extraterritorial nations to build strong, noncorrupt judicial jurisdiction authority supplemented the mili- systems is critical to assisting or restoring sta- tary’s own programs to help U.S. allies in the ble governments in areas threatened by cartel region. DEA should continue to advise and or other insurgent violence; courts, appellate assist host country police and counternarcotics courts, and efficient prisons are key pieces.
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Other U.S. agencies and contractors can pro- have been sensitized to them. Most have some vide other materiel assistance, training, partner- form of intelligence staff that focuses on gangs, ship, and, when authorized, direct help in speci- though those staffs may ebb and flow depending fied areas such as the collection of certain kinds on local tax dollars and Federal grants. Cross- of strategic intelligence. The U.S. Department jurisdictional coordinating bodies and local of Defense can provide advisors and trainers on information-sharing arrangements are common the Colombia model to supplement local mili- among police departments. tary and law enforcement efforts, and occasion- But intelligence-sharing among various ally direct aid in the form of helicopter trans- law enforcement organizations has been a key portation and naval support.61 issue. Progress has been made, but more work U.S. efforts should have a minimal foot- is required. On the front lines, local police print appropriate to political considerations in departments struggle to exchange and analyze the area. Models are the U.S. assistance effort in data on a regional and national basis, compet- the Philippines and long-running Special Forces ing with criminal cartels and gangs that have no advisors in Colombia. U.S. military planners practical limit on funds, mobility, or access to should consider other kinds of low-key integra- modern electronics. Federal legislation passed tion of military advice and capabilities into host after 9/11 mandated the development of a law country security systems, and—in light of likely enforcement “information-sharing environ- future challenges worldwide—consider updating ment” and an Information Sharing Council, present counterinsurgency doctrines to include which in turn led to the establishment by the the selection and training of military advisors. U.S. Department of Homeland Security of a Domestic. The domestic response to the nationwide network of 58 “fusion centers” to challenge of the cartels and gangs falls into two synthesize and share law enforcement–related categories. The first is the challenge to pub- information and intelligence to agencies that lic order posed by the cartels themselves and voluntarily participate. Some feedback from their associated gangs; they must be confronted, the field, however, is that fusion centers remain indicted, and prevented from consolidating their underfunded and undermanned—and participa- criminal “businesses” as they do farther south. tion is voluntary across jurisdictions. Second, the United States must prosecute simul- Also, in addition to information-sharing, taneous campaigns to reduce drug consumption local police departments need access to better as a way to attack the gangs, treat abusers, and analysis of data, either produced by their own roll back the effects of local gangs on communi- analysts in their own departments, or aggre- ties and, importantly, recruitment in schools. gated data pushed down to the cop on the Enhance support to local law enforce- beat from Federal levels. DEA and FBI assis- ment. Local police departments, backed up by tance is invaluable, but more can be done. The state and Federal assistance, are the front line Department of Justice’s El Paso Intelligence against cartels and gangs. Many police depart- Center (EPIC) has the potential to become ments have already adapted to the gang chal- a national “super” fusion center, although its lenge in inventive and effective ways. Most analysis capability at present is uniquely spe- urban departments now have detectives and cific to certain areas. EPIC analysis capability policemen who either specialize in gangs or should be expanded, and it should be joined to
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an enlarged and more inclusive national fusion and punishment, as well as other shifts, and a center network. Access to the Homeland national drug treatment program, open to abus- Security Data Network should be expanded, ers at all levels and ages, should be started as and continued progress in standardizing data a necessary part of the war against the cartels. processing languages and programs should be Begin a consistent, long-term national encouraged and Federally resourced. campaign to reduce the attractiveness of gang Support community knowledge-sharing culture, including illegal drug use, to American of counter-gang strategies. While police and teenagers. Often, there is an absence of elite other law enforcement agencies are the “thin leadership in programs to discourage the con- blue line” that deals with the substance of nected pathologies of gang culture and illegal crime, widespread community effort is needed drug use. In fact, it sometimes appears that elite to prevent or moderate gang-related culture in local neighborhoods. Federal assistance to communities in the form of knowledge-sharing, gangs of all types actively recruit in gang analysis, and community development public and private schools using a variety should also be available on an as-needed or les- of techniques—positive incentives, sons-learned basis. A Federally facilitated pro- Facebook and other social media, gram to help communities and towns learn les- and intimidation sons from others who have successfully defeated gangs would be valuable to establish networks of towns and cities—and even rural counties— opinion finds both activities to be exciting and hostile to the establishment of gang infestation. fashionable. At one of the conferences supporting Provide treatment for drug abusers to this article’s findings, an experienced police officer reduce the level of illicit drug use. One of the specializing in gangs stated, “We have national ironies of the Nation’s struggle with illegal drugs campaigns to stop smoking and to use our seat is that it already knows how to decrease drug belts. Why can’t we have a national campaign use. In fact, under one U.S. President, drug use to get our kids to stop thinking gangs are cool?”62 was actually reduced; in 1972, Richard Nixon Fight for our schools. Gangs of all types established a national program that combined actively recruit in public and private schools enforcement and effective treatment centers at all levels—high, middle, and elementary that lowered drug use nationwide. schools—using a variety of techniques—posi- However, the picture of drug abuse as a tive incentives, Facebook and other social public health problem rather than as a crimi- media, and intimidation. Despite various state nal act eventually eroded in the political laws against recruitment, gangs continue to wars that followed the Nixon resignation. As attract students at increasingly younger ages. drug use became more widespread, a backlash A 2009 survey by the National Gang Crime against treatment grew—and endured—among Research Center reported that over a third of the voting public and their representatives. public schools surveyed reported gang recruit- The Obama administration’s recently pub- ment in the previous year.63 Gang recruitment lished National Drug Control Strategy seeks of the next generation of American children to restore the general balance of treatment should be addressed as a national challenge.
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Federally finance local “drug courts.” taking advantage of the global black economy Many states now operate unique and highly not only to move drugs, but also to support effective drug courts that bring together inter- human trafficking, prostitution, identity theft, vention teams of treatment, education, law arms trading, illicit financial transactions, and enforcement, and court probation personnel so forth. They have powerful state sponsors in to aggressively deal with first-time offenders. a global network of illicit commerce. For the Under the direction and close supervision of United States to turn to legalization as a primary a drug court judge, a person arrested on drug strategy against the cartels would be a shot in possession charges passes through a rigorous the dark, particularly when other strategies to court-managed intervention program that typi- decrease drug use have been effective. cally lasts for several months. If the subject suc- Pass immigration reform. The large popu- cessfully completes the intervention program, lation of illegal immigrants in the United States charges are dismissed, and the arrest record is provides unwitting cover for narcogangs and expunged. When used, these courts have low cartels. The overwhelming number of illegal recidivism rates.64 These programs are subject to immigrants living in the United States have the pressures of local budgets, competing with proven to be law abiding and focused on mak- schools, police departments, and other munici- ing a living for themselves and their families.65 pal services for funding. With their detailed Since the economic crisis, the Department of intervention programs, drug courts are relatively Homeland Security reports that over 1 million expensive—and effective. undocumented aliens have departed, leaving No subject is liable to be more controver- the United States with a remaining population sial than the question of whether to legalize of around 10 million.66 The illegal immigrants drugs in the United States. The often repeated who remain cannot safely return to their home belief that legalization would defeat the cartels countries, nor can they seek the protection of breaks down on the data. As stated previously, the law when preyed upon by gangs or cartels. the drug cartels have reached a stage of develop- Setting aside arguments regarding their contri- ment that would ensure their continued opera- butions to society and to the national economy, tion during any transition to legalized drugs on stripping away the protective cover that their the part of the United States and beyond. It is communities unwillingly provide is necessary highly unlikely that the legalization of drugs— to isolate and attack cartels and gangs who both some or even all drugs—in the United States lodge with, and prey upon, Latino immigrants. would end the threat from these organizations. The presence in the Nation of a permanently The cartels and other drug trafficking organi- alienated Latino community represents a serious zations are multifaceted criminal enterprises strategic vulnerability that should be addressed dedicated to making profits from any activity by reform and assimilation as rapidly as possible. that brings in money. Although the majority of Reform prisons. In a sense, prisons have their income comes from illicit drugs, they also become the “graduate schools” of gang life, engage in other violent and white-collar crimes. and prison gangs play active roles in recruiting The assorted cartels—the Mexican cartels, the members and managing territories. Younger FARC, and other organizations—are a new first-timers are often recruited into gangs while kind of transnational criminal organization, serving alongside more hardened offenders,
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prisons often lack education or job training, and former inmates are released with little or no pros- pects for reentering society.67 Lowering recidivism is dependent on training and education programs in detention facilities as well as effective reintegration of inmates into society, including securing a job or job training, an education, and so forth.68 Finally, the ability of cartel and gang leaders to control their activities from prison should be curtailed, either by geographical space or some other method to prevent their communication with their organizations. Conclusion At the beginning of this article, I quoted Moisés Naím, the author of Illicit, who stated that ultimately, it is the fabric of society that is at stake in the struggle against global corruption. With no intent of sounding alarmist, I believe him to be correct—certainly, residents of Guatemala City, Tegucigalpa, Managua, or Barranquilla would agree. The Mexican and Colombian cartels, and the corrupt government officials who export the FARC’s products under the once-proud flag of Venezuela, though, are just the first wave of criminals to take advantage of the displacements of the early 21st century. There are now others around the globe; the Ukrainian and Russian mobs, Hizballah, and the Taliban are symptomatic of transnational criminal networks that weave in and out of states and governments, enabled by the latest technolo- gies and unrestrained by laws or decency. The same forces that fight international drug cartels are also the forces that fight ideologically based terrorism and insurgents as well. Crime, terrorism, and insurgency differ mainly in scale, and distinctions are becoming less meaningful. While the threat of war between states will always exist as long as there are states—and we need to keep strong forces in the field, aloft, and afloat to deter such a possibility—the field of major conflict now includes large-scale crime, or criminal networks that challenge the authority of states at the most basic levels—wholesale corruption, neighborhood intimidation, murder of government officials and candidates for public office, kidnapping of citizens. To defeat the cartels threatening our neighbors and us, we must use our existing operational advantages as building blocks for new regional strategies. We have effective, paramilitary, global antigang forces in the DEA and some other agencies, and they know what to do. We know how to assist our allies when they request help, as in the case of Colombia. We know how to root out the cartels’ minions in the United States, how to make our cities and schools unattractive to gangs, and how to decrease drug use in the United States. We have done it in the past. We know how to assimilate new immigrants and win them to lawful citizenship. We have done that, too. Now, the question is whether we, as a government and people, can put these things together to defeat the cartels that threaten security in the region. PRISM Notes 1 See Walter Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty (New York: Scribner, 1992), for an elegant discussion on this point. 2 Definitions have been a problem because of the variety of networked criminal organizations. In eco- nomics, the term cartel refers specifically to an enterprise’s conspiracy to fix prices, limit production, or both. The early Colombian drug cartels were proper cartels; current criminal drug organizations no longer strictly fit
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the definition. Although law enforcement organizations in-house prefer the term drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), popular usage has stayed with cartels and so does this article, although DTO does appear from time to time. 3 I am grateful to Moisés Naím for these and other insights. See Illicit (New York: Random House, 2005), 33. 4 See “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy (July–August 2007), 54–63. 5 Douglas Farah, The Criminal-Terrorist Nexus and Its Pipelines (New York: Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation, January 2008), 3. 6 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 78. Though dated, this paper is fundamental for understanding theories of criminal networks. 7 U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, available at
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25 Coca is not a native plant to Colombia, but was “exported” when the Colombian cartels and FARC seized land and expanded their operations in the 1980s and 1990s. 26 See the first report by the Colombian National Commission on Reparations and Reconciliation, Disidentes, rearmados y emergentes: Bandas criminales o tercera generación paramilitar? (August 2007). 27 Patricia Bibes, “Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism—Colombia, a Case Study,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 17, no. 3 (August 2001), 250. 28 See, for example, International Crisis Group, “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict: Dealing the Right Card,” Latin America Report No. 30, March 26, 2009. 29 Comments by Adam Isacson at CNAS roundtable, February 25, 2010. 30 The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia was a bigger cocaine producer than the FARC from approximately 1999 to 2003. See Douglas Farah, Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling; Challenges for the Merida Initiative (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 2010). 31 “Kidnappers Slit Colombian Pol Luis Francisco Cuellar’s Throat; FARC Eyed in Assassination,” Associated Press, December 23, 2009. 32 Chris Kraul and Sebastian Rotella, “Colombia Drug Ring May Link to Hezbollah,” Seattle Times, October 25, 2008, available at
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48 “Venezuela Called the Critical Link in Iran Plan to Duck Sanctions,” World Tribune, September 22, 2009. 49 Ann Scott Tyson, “Gates Predicts ‘Slog’ in Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, January 28, 2009, avail- able at
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