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Home Country of Origin Information Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests Responses to Information Requests (RIR) are research reports on country conditions. They are requested by IRB decision makers. The database contains a seven-year archive of English and French RIR. Earlier RIR may be found on the European Country of Origin Information Network website. Please note that some RIR have attachments which are not electronically accessible here. To obtain a copy of an attachment, please e-mail us. Related Links • Advanced search help 15 August 2019 MEX106302.E Mexico: Drug cartels, including Los Zetas, the Gulf Cartel (Cartel del Golfo), La Familia Michoacana, and the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO); activities and areas of operation; ability to track individuals within Mexico (2017-August 2019) Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1. Overview InSight Crime, a foundation that studies organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean (Insight Crime n.d.), indicates that Mexico’s larger drug cartels have become fragmented or "splintered" and have been replaced by "smaller, more volatile criminal groups that have taken up other violent activities" (InSight Crime 16 Jan. 2019). According to sources, Mexican law enforcement efforts to remove the leadership of criminal organizations has led to the emergence of new "smaller and often more violent" (BBC 27 Mar. 2018) criminal groups (Justice in Mexico 19 Mar. 2018, 25; BBC 27 Mar. 2018) or "fractur[ing]" and "significant instability" among the organizations (US 3 July 2018, 2). InSight Crime explains that these groups do not have "clear power structures," that alliances can change "quickly," and that they are difficult to track (InSight Crime 16 Jan. 2019). Similarly, in a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor from Sam Houston State University, whose research focuses on drug violence in Mexico, stated that it is difficult to keep track of splinter groups and their affiliations; a gang’s representation in another area may not be documented, as intelligence gathering in other territories is done discretely (Assistant Professor 1 Aug. 2019). 2. Structure 2.1 Los Zetas According to sources, Los Zetas began as an "enforcer" (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018) or armed (International Crisis Group 15 June 2017) gang for the Gulf Cartel [see section 2.2, Gulf Cartel] (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018; Business Insider 9 Feb. 2018; International Crisis Group 15 June 2017). They split off as an independent group around 2010 (Popular Science 25 Mar. 2014, 3; US 3 July 2018, 16-17; Business Insider 9 Feb. 2018). Sources report that since the arrest of high-level leaders, the group has dissolved into smaller local factions (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018; Business Insider 9 Feb. 2018). InSight Crime indicates that these splinter- groups or factions each have their own "operations, priorities and alliances" and that they rely on crime in their areas of operation for revenue (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018). Sources report the following splinter groups: • Northeast Cartel (Cartel del Noreste) (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018; Excelsior 26 Nov. 2018); • Zetas Old School (Los Zetas Vieja Escuela) (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018); • Los Talibanes (Mexico News Daily with Reforma 15 Feb. 2019); • Grupo Operativo Zetas (Justice in Mexico 19 Mar. 2018, 19; 14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018) and Grupo Operativo Los Zetas (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018); • Fuerzas Especiales Zetas (Justice in Mexico 19 Mar. 2018, 19; 14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018). 2.2 Gulf Cartel According to InSight Crime, the Gulf Cartel used to be one of the most powerful gangs in Mexico, but has lost territory to rivals, including Los Zetas (InSight Crime 10 Mar. 2017; esglobal 28 June 2018). According to a US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report on organized crime and drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, [a]nalysts have reported that the structures of both the Gulf [drug trafficking organization] and Los Zetas have been decimated by federal action and combat between each other, and both groups now operate largely as fragmented cells that do not communicate with each other and often take on new names. (US 3 July 2018, 17) Sources report the following factions: • Metros (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018; Excelsior 26 Nov. 2018); • Rojos (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018); • Grupo Dragones (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018); • Les Fresitas (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018); • Ciclones (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018; Excelsior 26 Nov. 2018); • Los Pelones (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018); • Talibanes (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018); • Grupo Sombra (Excelsior 26 Nov. 2018); • Grupo Pantera (Excelsior 26 Nov. 2018); • Escorpiones (Excelsior 26 Nov. 2018); • Group Operational R (Excelsior 26 Nov. 2018). 2.3 La Familia Michoacana According to 14 Milímetros, a journalism website that reports on wars, La Familia Michoacana was founded by the now-deceased Nazario Moreno González (alias El Chayo) (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018). The BBC reports that La Familia cartels have been "largely vanquished by vigilante groups," and that the remnants have formed smaller groups that still fight for control in Michoacán (BBC 27 Mar. 2018). 14 Milímetros reports that cells of the cartel include La Empresa (The Company) and La Nueva Empresa (The New Company) (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018). According to the US CRS report, there is also a group called the New Michaocan Family (La Nueva Familia Michoacana) (US 3 July 2018, 20). Sources state that the Knights Templar (Los Cabelleros Templarios) is also a splinter group of La Family Michoacana (InSight Crime 22 June 2017; US 3 July 2018, 20). 2.4 BLO The Daily Beast, a US-based news website (The Daily Beast n.d.), reports that the BLO or Beltrán Levya Cartel was formed by a pair of brothers who were sent to the Guerrero area by the Sinaloa Cartel in the early 2000s (The Daily Beast 14 June 2019). Similarly, InSight Crime indicates that the BLO, which split from the Sinaloa Cartel, is led by the Beltran Leyva brothers (InSight Crime 16 Feb. 2017). Sources report that since the arrests [or deaths (esglobal 28 June 2018)] of its leaders, the BLO has been weakened (InSight Crime 16 Feb. 2017; esglobal 28 June 2018). However, sources report that the organization continues to operate (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018; InSight Crime 16 Feb. 2017), in part thanks to alliances with other groups, such as Los Zetas (InSight Crime 16 Feb. 2017). Sources report that splinter groups include Los Rojos (Felbab-Brown Mar. 2019, 14; The Daily Beast 17 July 2015; 14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018), Los Ardillos (The Daily Beast 17 July 2015; 14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018), Los Mazatlecos, El 2 mil, Los Granados, La Oficina, and the Cártel Independiente de Acapulco (14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018). 3. Activities and Areas of Operation According to sources, rival factions fight for control of territory (Forbes 6 Nov. 2018; InSight Crime 16 Jan. 2019). The Los Angeles Times (LA Times) reports that cartel violence is less focused on drug trafficking routes and now mainly involved in competition over local drug trade territory (LA Times 30 Jan. 2019). However, Vanda Felbab-Brown [1], in her report on the Mexican criminal market, notes that drug smuggling "hubs" are still points of rivalry, as well as areas where drugs are cultivated, particularly poppy crops (Felbab-Brown Mar. 2019, 3, 7). Associated Press (AP) also notes that Guerrero is one of the main opium poppy growing areas, as well as a major site of confrontation between gangs for control of the drug and extortion trade (AP 18 Apr. 2018). According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, controlling areas of poppy cultivation, such as Guerrero and Michoacán, aids organized crime groups in gaining political capital (Felbab-Brown Mar. 2019, 15-16). Sources indicate that kidnapping and extortion by small gangs are common in order to generate income (InSight Crime 16 Jan. 2019; Felbab-Brown Mar. 2019, 12). Sources further state that extortion is "widespread," targeting profitable businesses, including company owners and restaurant operators (Felbab-Brown Mar. 2019, 12; US 3 July 2018, 17). According to AP, mines in southern Mexico are targeted for extortion by gangs (AP 21 June 2019). Sources report that avocado farmers have been targeted for extortion in Michoacán (US 3 July 2018, 21) or theft, or the kidnapping of drivers (OCCRP 18 June 2019). 3.1 Los Zetas Sources report that Los Zetas factions operate in the state of Tamaulipas (Forbes 6 Nov. 2018; Business Insider 9 Feb. 2018; 14 Milímetros 28 Nov. 2018). Sources also note Los Zetas presence in Nuevo León and Coahuila (Business Insider 9 Feb. 2018; US 3 July 2018, 12), among other states (US 3 July 2018, 12). InSight Crime describes Los Zetas as "limited to Mexico"; it "occupies a patchwork of territory across the country" and its "most critical areas are Tamaulipas and the Gulf Coast" (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018). According to Forbes, "[t]he current conflict in [Tamaulipas] stems from a fight for control of smaller geographic zones confined to single cities and their surrounding areas" (Forbes 6 Nov. 2018). According to InSight Crime, alliances and disputes tend to be "more localized," due to the fragmented nature of the Zetas (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018). Sources indicate that Los Zetas rivals include the Gulf Cartel (InSight Crime 6 Apr. 2018; Forbes 6 Nov. 2018; US 3 July 2018, 16). Sources report that violence in Tamaulipas is fueled by fighting between splinter groups of the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas (Forbes 6 Nov. 2018; Reuters 10 Jan. 2019) for control of cities such as Reynosa, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Victoria (Forbes 6 Nov. 2018). Stratfor, a "geopolitical intelligence platform" (Stratfor n.d.), also reports fighting between Los Zetas factions (Stratfor 29 Jan.
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