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Embassy Kabul US Embassy Diplomatic Cables Wikileaks Embassy Kabul US Embassy Diplomatic Cables WikiLeaks Viewing cable 06KABUL3934, If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 2006-09-03 2010-12-02 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR Embassy 06KABUL3934 08:08 21:09 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Kabul Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de VZCZCXRO3979 PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG DE RUEHBUL #3934/01 2460836 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 030836Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2240 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHMCSUU/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//JF/UNMA// RHMCSUU/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3// RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHMFIUU/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2936 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6265 RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1616 UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003934 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG NSC FOR AHARRIMAN OSD FOR BREZINSKI CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD ... Viewing cable 07KABUL1132, ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS’ MARCH 17-20 VISIT TO If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 2007-04-06 2010-12-02 Embassy 07KABUL1132 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN 10:10 21:09 Kabul VZCZCXRO7063 PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW DE RUEHBUL #1132/01 0961045 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 061045Z APR 07 FM AMEMBASSY KABUL TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7308 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 001132 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG OSD FOR KIMMITT ONDCP FOR DIRECTOR STATE FOR INL/AP, INL/FO, AND INR CIA FOR CNC EO 12958 DECL: 04/04/2017 TAGS SNAR, KCRM, AF SUBJECT: ONDCP DIRECTOR WALTERS’ MARCH 17-20 VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN REF: KABUL 1014 Classified By: DCM Richard B. Norland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Director of the Office of Drug Control Policy John Walters visited Afghanistan March 17-20 to discuss with senior Afghan and international officials this year’s progress on reducing the poppy crop. Senior ISAF officials told Walters that although eradicating poppy would, in their estimation, increase the security threat, it needed to be done and they would be as supportive as their mandate allowed. ISAF is also increasingly convinced of the links between narcotics traffickers and insurgents. Senior Afghan government officials agreed with the need to take strong action against growers and traffickers but acknowledged that widespread corruption and the weakness of the justice system made that difficult. Many made the point that considerable progress in other parts of the country was at risk of being overshadowed by the lack of progress in Helmand. They all emphasized the importance of increasing development aid, and pitched the idea of funneling more assistance through government ministries instead of international contractors. Lastly, Walters visited the Afghan Eradication Force base camp in Helmand, where discussions with Deputy Minister of Interior for Counter-narcotics Mohammad Daud and local elders illustrated how difficult it is for the central government to exert its authority on controversial issues. END SUMMARY. KARZAI NEEDS TO TAKE ACTION --------------------------- ¶2. (C/NOFORN) ONDCP Director Walters met with COM ISAF General McNeill in Kabul, and separately with RC South Commander Major General Van Loon (Dutch) in Kandahar. McNeill told Walters there had been a lot of action on counter- narcotics, but little progress. He was particularly dismayed by the British effort. They had made a mess of things in Helmand, their tactics were wrong, and the deal that London cut on Musa Qala had failed. That agreement opened the door to narco-traffickers in that area, and now it was impossible to tell the difference between the traffickers and the insurgents. The British could do a lot more, he said, and should, because they have the biggest stake. ¶3. (C/NOFORN) McNeill thought the missing ingredient in the counter- narcotics effort was Karzai. Despite some public statements, he had failed to take a real stand. Karzai needed to keep his support base happy, and as a result, he placated many of those involved in the drug business, especially in the west and south of the country. However, by not taking the issue on, Karzai was tacitly signaling his OK for poppy production. While the international community could come down harder on Karzai, McNeill observed that for the time being, Karzai is the only one who can lead, so for now we have to ride with him. The counter-narcotics effort has to have an Afghan face, and that is going to take time. HIGH VALUE TARGETS ------------------ ¶4. (C) To Walters’ question on going after high value targets, McNeill said it was necessary to prosecute a few to keep faith with the general public. But he was skeptical it would have any real effect on the trafficking networks, as those arrested would simply be replaced by others. McNeill described having been called to answer questions before the Afghan parliament, and said that during the session, the parliament had come down hard on MOI Zarar for not doing more on narcotics arrests and basic law enforcement. McNeill also criticized the timing and conduct of eradication, arguing that farmers eradicated in the spring would be fighting by summer. He asserted that Governor-led eradication was extremely disorganized and said that, for now, eradicators are only going where the local power brokers allow them to go. He suggested that there be a more direct link between eradication and provision of assistance, so that a compact with the people could be created. KABUL 00001132 002 OF 004 VAN LOON AGREEMENT ON TIMING, NEED FOR ASSISTANCE --------------------------------------------- ---- ¶5. (C) In a meeting the next day in Kandahar, RC South commander Major General Van Loon, who was accompanied for part of the meeting by Kandahar Governor Asadullah, argued that provision of alternative livelihoods needs to start much earlier. Once the poppy seeds are in the ground, there is no option for the farmer. Provision of licit crops and other assistance needed to start early in the summer, before farmers made planting decisions. Both Asadullah and Van Loon thought cooperation among the central government, assistance providers, and eradication elements was poor. While farmers are promised alternatives, they do not often see results on a local level. There needs to be more active involvement with local councils, and there should be more of a direct link between development assistance and non-cultivation of poppy. Van Loon suggested this approach would work in Kandahar, where farmers were making their own decisions on what to grow, but would probably not work in Helmand, where large-scale traffickers were in charge. GOVERNOR-LED ERADICATION AND PROBLEMS OF CORRUPTION --------------------------------------------- ------ ¶6. (C) Following Asadullah’s departure, Van Loon agreed that the Governor was making progress on eradication, but he took issue with his targets and methods. Asadullah was using Afghan Police (ANP) to do eradication, which further damaged the already corrupt reputation of the police among average people, and allowed Asadullah to pocket the funding he had been given to hire local labor to carry out eradication. The employment of ANP in eradication means they are not out in the community performing their security functions. In addition, Van Loon said Asadullah has been careful to eradicate only those fields not controlled by powerful people in the Province. ¶7. (C/NF) Van Loon was somewhat defensive in discussing the failure of Uruzgan Governor Monib to take any action on eradication. He argued that the security situation was outside the Governor’s control, and prevented him from moving around much. In addition, the province is extremely poor, and so until more alternative livelihoods are available, the international community should not push too hard on eradication. He said that Monib understood the need to do something, and plans were now being drawn up with the British Embassy Drugs team and the Ministry of Counter-narcotics. ¶8. (C) RC South has begun developing information on ties between traffickers, insurgents, and government officials. They recognize that going after corrupt officials may be too difficult, given the delicate tribal and other balances needed to keep the Afghan government generally intact. But they hope to use the increasing connections between traffickers and insurgents to their advantage; the latter are a legitimate target for ISAF, while pursuing the former is not within ISAF’s direct mandate. VISIT TO HELMAND ---------------- ¶9. (C) On March 20 Director Walters visited the INL-funded Afghan Eradication Force’s (AEF) forward operating base in Helmand. During the visit he discussed Helmand eradication with Deputy Interior Minister Daud and members of the provincial eradication commission, who represented tribal elders and the poppy growing communities in the operating areas of the AEF base. Walters told Daud and the commission members that he was disappointed with the recent lack of eradication progress in areas with the highest concentration of poppy cultivation, like Marja sub-district.
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