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Afghanistan's Insurgency After the Transition

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Afghanistan's Insurgency After the Transition Afghanistan’s Insurgency after the Transition Asia Report N°256 | 12 May 2014 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. Transitioning to December 2014 ...................................................................................... 3 A. Escalating Violence .................................................................................................... 3 B. Fears of Greater Instability in 2014-2015 .................................................................. 4 C. Stalled Peace Talks ..................................................................................................... 4 D. Pakistan’s Role ........................................................................................................... 5 E. Insurgent Factions Gain Prominence ........................................................................ 6 F. Motivation to Fight .................................................................................................... 7 G. Assessing the Insurgency ........................................................................................... 7 III. Case Study: Faryab Province ............................................................................................ 9 A. History of Conflict ...................................................................................................... 9 1. Pashtuns vs. Uzbeks, 1700s-1900s ....................................................................... 9 2. Civil wars, 1980s and 1990s ................................................................................. 9 3. Ethnic dynamics post-2001 .................................................................................. 9 4. NATO troop surges, 2005-2012 ........................................................................... 10 5. Security transition, 2012 ...................................................................................... 10 B. Drivers of Conflict in 2013 ......................................................................................... 10 C. Insurgent Strategies ................................................................................................... 11 1. Interrupting road access ...................................................................................... 11 2. Capturing territory ............................................................................................... 12 3. Economic sabotage ............................................................................................... 13 4. Cultivating local support ...................................................................................... 13 D. Prospects for 2014 and 2015 ...................................................................................... 14 1. Pashtun alienation ................................................................................................ 15 2. Feuds between pro-government actors ................................................................ 15 IV. Case Study: Kunar Province ............................................................................................. 17 A. History of Conflict ...................................................................................................... 17 1. Civil wars, 1980s and 1990s ................................................................................. 17 2. U.S. invasion and surges, 2001-2012 ................................................................... 17 3. Security transition, 2012 ...................................................................................... 18 B. Directions of Conflict in 2013 .................................................................................... 19 C. Insurgent Strategies ................................................................................................... 20 1. Disrupting road access ......................................................................................... 20 2. Unifying insurgent groups ................................................................................... 21 3. Cultivating support ............................................................................................... 22 D. Prospects for 2014 and 2015 ...................................................................................... 22 1. Splits among pro-government forces ................................................................... 22 2. Growing tensions with Pakistan ........................................................................... 23 3. Defending Asadabad ............................................................................................ 24 V. Case Study: Paktia Province ............................................................................................. 25 A. History of Conflict ...................................................................................................... 25 1. Armed Resistance and Civil War .......................................................................... 25 2. U.S. intervention, 2001-2005 .............................................................................. 25 3. NATO troop surges ............................................................................................... 26 4. Security transition, 2012 ...................................................................................... 26 B. Direction of Conflict in 2013 ...................................................................................... 27 C. Insurgent Strategies ................................................................................................... 28 1. Shifting targets ..................................................................................................... 28 2. Waiting for the exit ............................................................................................... 29 D. Prospects for 2014 and 2015 ...................................................................................... 30 1. Tribes keeping the peace ...................................................................................... 30 2. Afghan security forces and tribal feuds ................................................................ 31 3. Surviving the economic transition ....................................................................... 31 VI. Case Study: Kandahar Province ....................................................................................... 33 A. History of Conflict ...................................................................................................... 33 1. Civil wars, 1980s and 1990s ................................................................................. 33 2. U.S. intervention, 2001-2005 .............................................................................. 33 3. NATO surges, 2006-2012 ..................................................................................... 34 4. Security transition, 2012 ...................................................................................... 34 B. Directions of Conflict in 2013 .................................................................................... 35 C. Insurgent Strategies ................................................................................................... 36 1. Isolating and capturing districts .......................................................................... 36 2. Exploiting grievances against security forces ...................................................... 37 D. Prospects for 2014 and 2015 ...................................................................................... 38 1. Economic concerns............................................................................................... 38 2. Fractured elites ..................................................................................................... 39 3. Cross-border conflict ............................................................................................ 39 VII. Enablers Required ............................................................................................................ 41 VIII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 42 APPENDICES A. Map of Afghanistan .......................................................................................................... 45 B. Map of Case Study Provinces ........................................................................................... 46 C. Map of 2013 Fighting Season in Faryab ........................................................................... 47 D. Map of 2013 Fighting Season in Kunar ............................................................................ 48 E. Map of 2013 Fighting Season in Paktia ............................................................................ 49 F. Map of 2013 Fighting Season in Kandahar ...................................................................... 50 G. Glossary
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