Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar

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Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar M AY 2014 Above: Behsud Bridge, Nangarhar Province (Photo by TLO) A TLO M A P P I N G R EPORT Justice and Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar May 2014 In Cooperation with: © 2014, The Liaison Office. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, The Liaison Office. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] ii Acknowledgements This report was commissioned from The Liaison Office (TLO) by Cordaid’s Security and Justice Business Unit. Research was conducted via cooperation between the Afghan Women’s Resource Centre (AWRC) and TLO, under the supervision and lead of the latter. Cordaid was involved in the development of the research tools and also conducted capacity building by providing trainings to the researchers on the research methodology. While TLO makes all efforts to review and verify field data prior to publication, some factual inaccuracies may still remain. TLO and AWRC are solely responsible for possible inaccuracies in the information presented. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Cordaid. The Liaison Office (TL0) The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization established in 2003 seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups. TLO’s mission is to facilitate the formal integration of communities and their traditional governance structures within Afghanistan’s newly emerging peace, governance and reconstruction framework. TLO main areas of activity are Research/Analysis using the do-no harm approach; Dialogue facilitation and participatory peacebuilding, access to justice and livelihoods. Visit: www.tloafghanistan.org iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................................... iii The Liaison Office (TL0) ................................................................................................................. 3 List of Acronyms and Non-English Terms ....................................................................................... 6 Executive Summary .................................................................................................................... 11 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 28 A. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN BEHSUD DISTRICT OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE ......... 31 1. Background: Behsud ............................................................................................................... 32 1.1. Geography .............................................................................................................................. 32 1.2. History .................................................................................................................................... 32 1.3. Demography ........................................................................................................................... 36 1.3.1. Ethnic Composition ............................................................................................................. 36 1.3.2. Migration Trends ................................................................................................................. 37 1.4. Economy ................................................................................................................................. 39 1.5. Services ................................................................................................................................... 40 1.6. Governance Structure ............................................................................................................ 41 2. Security and Access ................................................................................................................ 43 2.1. General Security Situation ...................................................................................................... 43 2.2. Feelings of Security ................................................................................................................. 44 2.3. Practices for Addressing Security in Behsud .......................................................................... 46 3. Landscape of Conflicts in Behsud ............................................................................................. 51 3.1. Main Conflict Trends .............................................................................................................. 51 3.2. Land-based Conflicts and Land Grabbing in Behsud .............................................................. 54 4. Access to Justice and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms ............................................................. 57 4.1. Conflict Resolution Processes: The Predominance of the Informal System .......................... 57 4.2. The Role of State Institutions in Justice Provision .................................................................. 59 4.3. Barriers to Access to Justice ................................................................................................... 60 5. Overview of Development Programming ................................................................................. 63 B. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN BAGRAMI DISTRICT OF KABUL PROVINCE ................. 65 1. Background: Bagrami ............................................................................................................. 66 1.1. Geography .............................................................................................................................. 66 1.2 Demography ............................................................................................................................ 66 1.3 History ..................................................................................................................................... 68 1.4 Governance Structure ............................................................................................................. 72 1.6 Services .................................................................................................................................... 80 2. Security and Access ................................................................................................................ 83 2.1. Criminality .............................................................................................................................. 83 2.2. Capacity of Security Forces ..................................................................................................... 84 2.3. Citizen Response ..................................................................................................................... 86 2.4. Armed Opposition Groups and Insurgency ............................................................................ 87 3. Landscape of Conflicts in Bagrami ........................................................................................... 89 3.1. Main Conflict Lines ................................................................................................................. 89 3.2. The Prominence of Land Grabbing ......................................................................................... 89 4 3.3. Major Conflicts by Area .......................................................................................................... 91 4. Access to Justice and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms ............................................................. 95 4.1. Preferred Justice Mechanisms ............................................................................................... 95 4.2. Access to Justice ..................................................................................................................... 97 5. Overview of Development Programming ................................................................................ 102 C. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN KAMA DISTRICT OF NANGARHAR PROVINCE ............ 103 1. Background: Kama ................................................................................................................. 104 1.1. Geography ............................................................................................................................ 104 1.2. History .................................................................................................................................. 104 1.3. Demographics ....................................................................................................................... 107 1.4. Economy ............................................................................................................................... 109 1.5. Access to Services ................................................................................................................. 110 2. Security and Access ............................................................................................................... 113 2.1. 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