DOCSLIB.ORG

VOTING TOGETHER Why Afghanistan’S 2009 Elections Were (And Were Not) a Disaster

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
VOTING TOGETHER Why Afghanistan’S 2009 Elections Were (And Were Not) a Disaster AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT Briefing Paper Series Noah Coburn and Anna Larson November 2009 VOTING TOGETHER Why Afghanistan’s 2009 Elections were (and were not) a Disaster Overview Contents The Afghan elections in 1. Contextual 2009 have become infamous Background and for low turnout, fraud and Political Landscapes ...2 insecurity. Delay in announcing 2. Voting Blocs. ..........7 the results and rumours of private negotiations have 3. Why Blocs Persist increased existing scepticism and Continue to of the electoral process among Shape Elections .... 10 national and international 4. Conclusions and commentators. What has been Ways Forward ...... 17 overlooked, however, is the way in which—at least at the local level—these elections About the Authors have been used to change the Noah Coburn is a sociocultural balance of power in a relatively anthropologist in Kabul with peaceful manner. In many the United States Institute of areas of Afghanistan, the polls Voters queuing in Qarabagh Peace. He is also a Presidential emphasised local divisions and Fellow at Boston University, groupings, and highlighted the importance of political and voting where he is completing a blocs (which can include ethnic groups, qawms,1 or even family doctoral dissertation on units) in determining political outcomes. Also, while perhaps not local political structures, “legitimate” by international standards, these elections reflected the conflict and democratisation highly localised cultural and social context in which they took place: in Afghanistan. He has a MA a context that is often patronage-based and in which power is gained from Columbia University. through constant struggle and dialogue between political groups and Anna Larson is a Researcher leaders. with the governance team at AREU, and has been This study presents the August 2009 electoral process as it played out working in Afghanistan on in three different areas of Kabul Province: Dasht-i Barchi, Qarabagh governance and gender and Istalif. In each of these locations, the presidential and provincial issues since 2004. She has council elections were key events in shifting the balance of local an MSc in Violence, Conflict and Development from power. These areas also demonstrate the different ways in which SOAS, University of London. voting blocs functioned and, while not representative of the country as a whole, provide valuable insights into the meaning and usefulness This study was partially funded of elections at the local level. by the Foundation of the Open Society Institute (FOSIA). 1 Often translated as “tribe” or “clan”; essentially a kinship group that can range considerably in size and scope. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Four key findings from this research are met, they can threaten noncooperation with discussed: the electoral system and civil disruption 1. Bloc voting in Afghanistan persists primarily Essentially, it is evident that blocs are and will because material and political rewards can continue to be important in shaping the way in be gained by emphasising to candidates the which elections in Afghanistan play out. value of a group’s support; voting individually minimises the potential political capital that These characteristics do not always fit well with can be gained during elections Western models of democratic elections. However, they demonstrate the way in which elections have 2. The combination of systematic fraud and been incorporated into local politics and used widespread accusations of corruption can as a way to promote the interests of different affect the power of winning and losing blocs; groups. This has important implications for the if the balance of power is changed in a certain way in which the process of democratisation is community, accusations of corruption, which likely to develop in Afghanistan. It is very clear are plausible given its widespread actual from this study that: occurrence, can be an important way of undermining the newfound legitimacy of the • Local elections matter and need to be victorious group prioritised by both national and international actors 3. Ambiguity about which candidate a bloc will support and even ambiguity about the • Elections in 2009 were not a complete failure: composition of the bloc itself is strategic, people did vote and power balances did because it allows greater space for negotiation. change at the local level; but In maintaining a degree of mystery over who • There is an urgent need to reassess they voted for, political blocs (and those (especially international) expectations of individuals that claim to represent them) can what an “electoral success” might look like. gain rewards from more than one elected In a context in which an ongoing insurgency official meant that much of the country was not represented at the polls, and with a flawed 4. The threat of violence, or even of a general voter registration process that has been a poor rejection of the current system, also generates substitute for a valid census, it was misguided political capital for groups—particularly in a to expect elections this year to be a test of system based on ambiguity. In the context of “democracy” in Afghanistan Afghanistan, in which the state does not hold a monopoly on violence, the threat of an uprising • Preparations for 2010 parliamentary elections can be portrayed by a dissatisfied opposition must begin now if the polls are to be seen as very real. Indeed, if opposition groups feel by the voting public—and the international that their needs and interests have not been community—as worthwhile and credible 1. Contextual Background and Political Landscapes 1.1 Kabul Province: Political overview provinces: Kabul is divided into 15 districts, of which the city is one.2 Each of the 14 remaining Kabul Province is at the centre of politics in rural districts has an appointed district governor. Afghanistan. The economic and political dynamics However, the official constituency for presidential, of the province are to a large extent determined parliamentary and provincial council elections (as in by the capital city, but some rural districts are the rest of the country) is the province as a whole. relatively remote and exist quite independently of urban life. 2 The city district is then subdivided into 18 urban “police districts” or sectors, which are all overseen by the Kabul Formal administrative structures exist as in other Municipality. 2 Voting Together: Why Afghanistan’s 2009 Elections were (and were not) a Disaster There were 41 candidates running in the others. In Kabul, with 217 candidates running presidential race, most of whom focused the for 29 seats, one provincial council candidate key aspects of their campaign in Kabul city. The won with as few as 2,918 votes. Concerns over majority of these candidates were relatively vote-splitting and that voting blocs might not be unknown to most voters, with only a handful of cohesive, and an awareness of the need to gain frontrunners dominating most local discussions of representation in the national government, were the elections, particularly the current president at the centre of voter discussion about the election Hamid Karzai, former minister of foreign and reflect many of the most important issues in affairs Dr Abdullah Abdullah, reformer Ramazan Afghan politics today. Ultimately, communities in Basherdost, and former minister of finance Ashraf the three areas studied met with mixed success Ghani. Some other candidates also stood out, in their attempts to get local representatives such as the well-known mujahiddin fighter Mullah elected to the provincial council: the residents of Rocketi, poet Abdul Latif Pedram, and Abdul Jalil Dasht-i Barchi succeeded in electing eight or nine Karim, a former child prodigy who is better known candidates, while two candidates from Qarabagh as “The Genius.” and one from Istalif were successful.4 Despite international focus on the presidential The three sites selected for this research were elections, some of the most heated and interesting chosen on account of their diverse political campaigning in Kabul took place for the provincial landscapes and their proximity to Kabul. This was council, with many voters going to the polls for largely a result of security constraints during the local issues rather than national ones.3 Kabul elections and a limited number of researchers Province has 29 seats allocated for its provincial being available for data collection. Nevertheless, council, nine of which are reserved for women. the areas were selected to be demographically, Thirty-three seats are allocated for the Wolesi geographically and politically diverse, Jirga (Afghanistan’s parliament), ten of which are representing a range of ethnicities and economic reserved for women. The single non-transferable strata. A total of 170 interviews were conducted vote (SNTV) system requires that all candidates in across the three areas, including in the lead-up, the province in the provincial council and Wolesi on election day, and afterwards. Where possible, Jirga elections compete against each other for the same respondents were interviewed before every vote, with the highest scoring candidates and after the polls. In addition to voters, 20 winning seats. This often results in local provincial council candidates, 20 individuals who communities that have more than one candidate worked for specific campaigns, and 30 community not gaining a representative in an elected body. leaders were interviewed. Due to the fact that the majority of the research team were male, it A concern that was raised repeatedly by voters was not possible to interview as many women as and provincial council candidates in interviews men. However, efforts were made to interview across the province was that multiple candidates as many women as possible. Researchers also representing a single community or political group spent a significant amount of time going through would split the vote. Thus, in Kabul Province, election results from the Independent Election a major local issue in these elections was how Commission (IEC) and comparing these results to a community with multiple candidates could responses by voters and candidates.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar
    Justice & Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar M AY 2014 Above: Behsud Bridge, Nangarhar Province (Photo by TLO) A TLO M A P P I N G R EPORT Justice and Security Practices, Perceptions, and Problems in Kabul and Nangarhar May 2014 In Cooperation with: © 2014, The Liaison Office. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, The Liaison Office. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] ii Acknowledgements This report was commissioned from The Liaison Office (TLO) by Cordaid’s Security and Justice Business Unit. Research was conducted via cooperation between the Afghan Women’s Resource Centre (AWRC) and TLO, under the supervision and lead of the latter. Cordaid was involved in the development of the research tools and also conducted capacity building by providing trainings to the researchers on the research methodology. While TLO makes all efforts to review and verify field data prior to publication, some factual inaccuracies may still remain. TLO and AWRC are solely responsible for possible inaccuracies in the information presented. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Cordaid. The Liaison Office (TL0) The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization established in 2003 seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan 2005 Parliamentary Elections.Pdf
    THE INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE ADVANCING DEMOCRACY WORLDWIDE AFGHANISTAN PARLIAMENTARY AND PROVINCIAL COUNCIL ELECTIONS SEPTEMBER 18, 2005 ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION FINAL REPORT Afghanistan Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections September 18, 2005 Election Observation Mission Final Report The International Republican Institute 1225 Eye Street, N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20005 www.iri.org TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary…….…..…………………………………….. 2 I. Introduction…………………………………………… 5 II. Pre-Election Period…………………………………… 8 A. Electoral System B. Election Administration C. Voter Registration D. Candidate Nomination E. Campaign Finance F. Election Campaign G. Media Access III. Election Day………………………………………….. 10 IV. Counting Process…………………………………….. 11 V. Post-Election Analysis………………………………… 12 VI. Findings and Recommendations…………………….. 14 VII. IRI in Afghanistan……………………………………. 16 IV. Appendix………………………………………………. A. Appendix I: Election Observation Delegation Members and IRI Staff B. Appendix II: IRI’s Preliminary Statement on Afghanistan’s Parliamentary Elections, September 19, 2005 C. Appendix III: Summary of the Afghan Electoral Law 1 Executive Summary The International Republican Institute (IRI) received funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to conduct an election observation mission for Afghanistan’s September 18, 2005 parliamentary and provincial council elections. IRI’s 19- member delegation was led by former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Constance B. Newman and IRI President Lorne W. Craner. IRI observers were accredited through the United Nations and Afghan Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) and, in partnership with indigenous observer groups, deployed to 22 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. This was the second election observation mission for IRI in Afghanistan. In 2004, IRI was one of a small number of international nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to monitor the presidential election.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan: Opportunity in Crisis Series No
    Briefing Noah Coburn Asia Programme | March 2015 | Afghanistan: Opportunity in Crisis Series No. 8 Afghanistan: The 2014 Vote and the Troubled Future of Elections Summary • The September 2014 power-sharing agreement for the management of future votes, including between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah upcoming parliamentary elections. only partially resolved the political crisis that • The 2014 crisis has created opportunities for followed Afghanistan’s disputed presidential reform, in part by disrupting a political system elections. The compromise of Ghani’s reliant on patronage. Popular dissatisfaction inauguration as president and Abdullah’s with the status quo could create space for appointment to the new role of chief executive devolution of some powers to local levels. officer ended a stand-off that had threatened a The crisis has also potentially provided the political collapse, but in-fighting has continued to United Nations with a more central role in impede the day-to-day functions of government. supporting democratization. • The post-election crisis, and the extra- • Obstacles to reform include the timing of constitutional negotiations it generated, parliamentary polls in 2015 and the weakness highlighted the weakness of the legal of the electoral agencies that oversaw the framework, which was unable to provide an 2014 transition. effective, transparent transfer of power. • A commitment to transparent elections by the • A timely assessment of the flawed 2014 Afghan government, the ruling elite and the transition is needed if stakeholders are to international community is imperative. Failure address the concerns arising from it and to undertake reform will undermine the notion prevent further damage to democratic of democratic elections for the Afghan public.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratization in Afghanistan by Chris Rowe
    H UMAN R IGHTS & H UMAN W ELFARE Democratization in Afghanistan by Chris Rowe What determines whether a specific country embarks on the road to democracy, if it completes that voyage successfully, and finally consolidates democratic values, practices, and institutions? Analysts have debated these issues for decades and have identified a number of historical, structural, and cultural variables that help account for the establishment of successful democracies in some countries and its absence in others. Frequently cited prerequisites for democracy include social and economic modernization; a large and vibrant middle class; and cultural norms and values relating to politics. Yet whatever its determinants, operational democracies normally include contested elections, a free press, and the separation of powers. Although these characteristics have been identified as vital features of a democracy, emerging democracies also need to address serious social and economic injustices that threaten democratic consolidation. Afghanistan is a case in point in this regard. As a burgeoning democracy directly influenced by U.S.-led nation-building efforts, Afghanistan presents a unique and challenging case for democratization. Afghanistan has been ruled by warlords since the era of Taliban rule, and to an extent still is. Informal rule combined with the heroin trade and severe gender inequalities have created a frail foundation on which to promote democratic reforms. Although international human rights, judicial and national assembly commissions have presented significant mandates for change, all have met with problematic results. In order for democracy to take hold in Afghanistan, the fruits of warlord economy–opium production, smuggling, and illicit taxation of trade–must be wrested away from regional power brokers and replaced with socially stable economic incentives.
    [Show full text]
  • AFGHANISTAN: Health Organizations in Districts (3W) October 2012
    AFGHANISTAN: Health Organizations in Districts (3W) October 2012 Darwaz AKDN Darwazbala AKDN 2 3 DRAFT Shaki 2 AKDN Kuf Ab AKDN WORK IN PROGRESS 2 Khw2ahan TA J I K I S T A N CAF, Medair Raghistan 3 CAF, Kinder Berg Shighnan Note: WHO supports government in national coverage U Z B E K I S TA N AKDN 5 Darqad Chah Ab CAF 2 Yangi CAF Yawan Kohistan 3 Q3ala 5 Shahri Buzurg CAF CAF, Merlin 1 CAF Qarqin Khwaja BahCaAwF uddin BDN, MOVE 2 CAF, Turkish 4 Yaftal Sufla 2 2 Shortepa Foundation CAF, 6Kinder 3 CHA Berg, Merlin Fayzabad Kham Ab Dashti 1 Sharak Hairatan 2 AKDN1,4 ARCS, Arghanj BDN, MOVE Imam Sahib Qala CAF, ICRC, Shahada Khaw Khani Chahar Mangajek Kaldar ARCS, Merlin CAF Kinder CAF, SHDP 5 Khwaja Du 3 Berg, MoPH CAF Qurghan Bagh 1 MOVE, SAF CHA 13 9 4 3 AADA Koh Mardyan C H I N A AADA 2 2 8 Dashte Archi Rustaq Argo 1 SAF BDN Dawlatabad Khwaja Baha3rak Kinder Berg, 4 CAF, CDAP CAF Kinder Berg, Jawzjan CHA Ghar 5 Merlin Hazar Merlin, SHDP 1 2 Aqcha Qalay-I- Zal CAF Sum1uch Khash 2 Khulm Kunduz Andkhoy BDN Chahar Bolak Balkh Merlin SHDP Kishim Darayim SHDP 2 CA4F, Kinder 3 Qaramqol Khaniqa 7 ARCS, 4 Nahri CHA Kunduz Baharak 3 CAF, AADA Fayzabad ARCS, CHA 12 7 5 23 Berg, Merlin Jurm Warduj AADA 1 BDN, MOVE BDN, CHA, Mazari ShSahraifhi ARCS, Kinder Taluqan Kinder Berg 2 BDN Kinder Berg, SHDP ARCS, Kinder 3 Kinder Berg, AFGA, ARCS, CHA, IAM, Berg, Merlin, Kalfagan 7 Tashkan 3 JACK CHA MoPH, 1B5erg, MoPH, Merlin, 5 AKDN, Shibirghan LEPCO, MoPH, MSI, Chahar Dara SHDP 22 Marmul Spinzar SHDP, Turkish CAF, Kinder Berg, Ishkashiem Afghan turk, Merlin
    [Show full text]
  • Petersberg Papers on Afghanistan and the Region
    Liechtenstein Colloquium Report Petersberg Papers on Afghanistan and the Region Wolfgang Danspeckgruber Editor Volume IV 2009 Petersberg Papers on Afghanistan and the Region Wolfgang Danspeckgruber Editor Liechtenstein Colloquium Report Volume IV © 2009 The Trustees of Princeton University Produced and published by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination This report was made possible in part by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The statements made and the views expressed herein are solely the responsibility of the contributing authors. Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey 08544 USA Telephone: 609.258.6200 Facsimile: 609.258.5196 Electronic Mail: [email protected] Website: www.princeton.edu/lisd CONTENTS List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................... 4 Foreword Wolfgang Danspeckgruber .................................................................................................................. 6 Special Statements Opening Address Rangin Dadfar Spanta .................................................................................................................. 7 An Exit Strategy for Afghanistan Volker Stanzel .............................................................................................................................. 10 Special Statement Rita Kieber-Beck ........................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Province: Kabul Governor: Hajji Din Mohammad NDS Chief
    Program for Culture & Conflict Studies www.nps.edu/programs/ccs Province: Kabul Governor: Hajji Din Mohammad NDS Chief: Nazar Shah Population Estimate: 3,445,000 Urban: 615,900 Rural: 2,829,100 Area in Square Kilometers: 4,462 Capital: Kabul Names of Districts: Bagrami, Chahar Asiab, Dih Sabz, Guldara, Istalif, Kabul, Kalakan, Khaki Jabbar, Mir Bacha Kot, Musayi, Paghman, Qarabagh, Shakar Dara, Surobi Composition of Population: Ethnic Groups: Religious Groups: Ethnic Groups: Tajik, Hazara, Primarily Sunni; some Pashtun: Ghilzai, Pashtun, Kuchi, Shia Shinwari, Wardak Qizilbash Total # Mosques: 3,025 Occupation of Population Major: Business, government service, Minor: Animal husbandry agriculture, skilled professionals, day labor Crops/Farming/Livestock: Wheat, potato, vegetable, corn, Cow, sheep, goats, donkeys, horses, fruit, poultry 1 Literacy Rate Total: 57% Number of Educational Colleges/Universities: 9 Universities; Kabul University, Teacher Training Institutions: 696 Colleges, Polytechnic Institutes, Institute of Health Science Number of Security January: 7 March: 3 May: 8 Incidents, Jan-Jun 2007: 24 February: 1 April: 1 June: 4 Poppy (Opium) Cultivation: 2006: 80 ha 2007: 500 ha Percent Change: 525% NGOs Active in Province: UNHCR, HAND, AMDA, WROR, ISRA, DACAR, NCA, SCA, UNICEF, NPO, CARE, MEDAir, INTERSOS, Provincial Aid Projects:2 Total PRT Projects: 107 Other Aid Projects: 1,332 Total Projects: 1,439 Planned Cost: $11,426,983 Planned Cost: $49,980,289 Planned Cost: $61,407,272 Total Spent: $9,729,006 Total Spent: $31,182,209 Total Spent: $39,911,215 Transportation: Primary Roads: Three main asphalt roads/highways connect the capital with the rest of the country; the Salang road links Kabul with the northern provinces; the Kabul-Kandahar Highway connects Kabul to the southern provinces.
    [Show full text]
  • Elections and Conflict in Afghanistan
    INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS Elections and Conflict in Afghanistan SHAHARZAD AKBAR AND ZUBAIDA AKBAR March 2011 n The 2009 presidential elections and 2010 parliamentary elections in Afghanistan saw a fall in the number of voters which points to growing public frustration and disillusionment with elections as a result of insecurity, systematic fraud, misuse of power and a lack of awareness about procedures. n The challenges to institutionalising elections as a democratic procedure in Afghanis- tan are numerous. The most prominent are the security situation, a lack of mecha- nisms to encourage meaningful party participation, weak state institutions and a lack of universal impartiality within government authorities. n The international community in the process has sent conflicting messages to the public about the independence and integrity of the process. Political influence from neighbouring countries and regional powers distorted elections results by providing support for specific candidates. Even international observer missions in Afghanistan are less effective in deterring fraud compared to other contexts because of security conditions. n In addition, three major socio-economic challenges influence the success (or lack thereof) of election participation and institutionalisation in Afghanistan: illiteracy, poverty and women’s unequal status in Afghan society. S. AKBAR AND Z. AKBAR | ELECTIONS AND CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN Contents 1. Summary . 2 2. Current Situation. 3 3. Contextual Analysis. 3 3.1 Rules of the Game. 3 3.1.1 Electoral system. 4 3.1.2 Checks and Balances. 4 3.1.3 Security Sector and judicial system. 5 3.1.4 Traditional Authorities. .5 3.2 Key Players and Their Interests . 5 3.2.1 Political Leaders, Parties and Elites.
    [Show full text]
  • Count Serial No Region Province District Village IS ID SHA ID SVP
    ANNEX 11 - Cancelled SHAs Count Serial No Region Province District Village IS ID SHA ID SVP Lat SVP Long SHA Area SHA Device 1 10 Central Bamyan Bamyan Dawoodi HQ-94 HQ-1 34.83529 67.82997 6,188 AP 2 21 Central Bamyan Bamyan Mamarak HQ-96 HQ-1 34.81183 67.61789 78,850 AP/ERW 3 31 Central Bamyan Bamyan Mulayan HQ-103 HQ-3 34.81617 67.86336 52,200 AP 4 32 Central Bamyan Bamyan Mulayan HQ-103 HQ-4 34.81617 67.86336 20,000 AP 5 33 Central Bamyan Bamyan Pay Kotal HQ-1418 HQ-1 34.76258 67.67713 87,750 AP/AT/ERW 6 34 Central Bamyan Bamyan Qafeleh Bashi HQ-86 HQ-1 34.79962 67.76569 446,500 AP 7 47 Central Bamyan Bamyan Selkash HQ-89 HQ-1 34.80570 67.89374 75,162 AP 8 48 Central Bamyan Bamyan Selkash HQ-89 HQ-2 34.80570 67.89374 19,665 AP 9 49 Central Bamyan Bamyan Shahidan HQ-95 HQ-1 34.79608 67.58980 50,588 AP/ERW 10 50 Central Bamyan Bamyan Shahidan HQ-95 HQ-2 34.79608 67.58980 43,000 AP 11 51 Central Bamyan Bamyan Shahidan HQ-95 HQ-3 34.79608 67.58980 31,875 AP 12 58 Central Bamyan Bamyan Shahr-e Zohhak HQ-83 HQ-2 34.83091 67.98247 23,824 AP 13 59 Central Bamyan Bamyan Sheray HQ-90 HQ-1 34.78992 67.80901 13,900 AP 14 89 Central Bamyan Bamyan Sowghdar HQ-81 HQ-5 34.83196 67.72480 36,704 AP 15 99 Central Bamyan Bamyan Tupchi (1) HQ-91 HQ-1 34.82294 67.95820 16,962 AP 16 220 Central Bamyan Sayghan Sokhta Chenar HQ-1439 HQ-2 35.08828 67.69699 61,250 AP 17 282 Central Bamyan Shibar Dara-I-Palang HQ-1354 HQ-3 34.91049 68.03101 117,000 AP 18 290 Central Bamyan Shibar Ereqe Ulya HQ-1356 HQ-2 34.84328 68.03416 78,400 AP 19 321 Central Bamyan Waras
    [Show full text]
  • By PETER D.S. LYON a Thesis Submitted to the Faculty Of
    A SOLUTION FOR ETHNIC CONFLICT: DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFGHANISTAN, A CASE STUDY By PETER D.S. LYON A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Studies, Faculty of Arts University of Manitoba August, 2006 ABSTRACT This thesis considers Michael Ignatieff’s theory regarding ethnic conflict and applies Afghanistan as a case study. Ignatieff correlates the outbreak of ethnic violence to the breakdown of state government which creates societal anarchy and war. Ignatieff argues that ethnic relations can improve through the creation of democratic institutions. Afghanistan represents a model empirical case study to explore the central tenets of the Ignatieff thesis. Ignatieff’s argument is critically analyzed by assessing the viability of transplanting democratic institutions into Afghanistan. According to democratic theory a successful democracy requires a strong economy, a vibrant civil society, an advantageous institutional history and a positive security and geopolitical environment. Based on these five key variables it is reasonable to conclude that Afghanistan is not predisposed to pluralistic governance. Such analysis highlights the limitations of Ignatieff’s thesis as his theory is only relevant to those post-conflict societies that possess the requisite preconditions for democracy. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to express my appreciation to my advisor, Professor James Fergusson, for his support and encouragement throughout my Master’s degree. He truly made all the difference for me. Many thanks are also due to Dr. Lasha Tchantouridze for his willingness to discuss ideas and key theoretical concepts. Lasha was of great assistance due to his knowledge of Afghanistan and Central Asia.
    [Show full text]
  • 2014 Presidential and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan
    UNItED StAtES INStItUtE of Peace www.usip.org SPECIAL REPoRt 2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063 ABOUT THE REPORT Zekria Barakzai Since the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, Afghanistan has held four rounds of elections: the 2004 presidential race, the 2005 and 2010 Wolesy Jirga and provincial council contests, and the 2009 presidential and provincial council votes. The 2014 elections—which will occur as international 2014 Presidential security forces are preparing to leave the country—will be a barometer of how effective U.S. and other foreign forces were in bringing a genuine democratic process to the country. and Provincial Council ABOUT THE AUTHOR Zekria Barakzai is currently a senior policy adviser to Afghanistan’s anticorruption office, a senior consultant Elections in Afghanistan to Democracy International Afghanistan, and general director of Democracy Watch Afghanistan. From 2005 to 2013, he served as a high-ranking official with Afghanistan’s Independent Election Commission and worked as Summary a counterpart to the head of the legal department of the • The constitution of Afghanistan, though formally enshrining the internationally recognized country ’s Joint Electoral Management Body. Barakzai standards of a “free, universal, secret, and direct vote” for elected institutions, is a flawed holds a master’s degree in international relations. document with respect to many aspects of the electoral process. • Deficiencies in the electoral legislation have been addressed. For the first time, the legisla- tion governing the polls has been adopted by parliament rather than issued by decree. In addition, the commissioners for both the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC) and the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) are appointed through a consultative process involving the legislature and judiciary, and not simply by presidential appointment as was the case previously.
    [Show full text]
  • Security in and Around Afghanistan Since the Nato Withdrawal in 2014
    SECURITY IN AND AROUND AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE NATO WITHDRAWAL IN 2014 A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY DURSUN ALPER BİLDİRİCİ IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SEPTEMBER 2019 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Yaşar KONDAKÇI Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. TANRISEVER Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. TANRISEVER Supervisor Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. Hüseyin BAĞCI (METU, IR) Prof. Dr. Oktay F. TANRISEVER (METU, IR) Assoc. Prof. Dr. Burak TANGÖR (Hacettepe Uni., INT) PLAGIARISM I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last Name : Dursun Alper Bildirici Signature : iii ABSTRACT SECURITY IN AND AROUND AFGHANISTAN AFTER NATO WITHDRAWAL BİLDİRİCİ, D. Alper M.S., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever September 2019, 205 pages This thesis aims to examine the effects of the NATO forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan on the security situation in and Afghanistan’s immediate surroundings.
    [Show full text]