presidential 2004-2014: The electoral challenges of building democracy in a post-conflict state

Will McQuire

A thesis in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Philosophy

School of Humanities and Social Sciences UNSW Canberra

2015

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Abstract Since the allied invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001, there have been three presidential , with the first democratic hand-over of power happening in 2014. Post-conflict elections have been widely debated by academics, with particular concern over the environment in which they are held and to which they contribute. If the elections are successful in producing a legitimate outcome, they can be used to further stability and nation building. If the elections are unsuccessful, then they risk a return to conflict. The lack of interference in the electoral process by politicians and non-relevant government agencies is one factor that adds to their legitimacy; if such interference occurs, the results are muddied. Legitimacy and unambiguous outcomes are crucial in determining the success of an . This thesis explores the three Afghanistan presidential elections from 2004-2014 to assess if the elections are helping to enable – in this respect, at least - a post-conflict, democratically viable state.

This thesis contributes to the literature on post-conflict democracy building in a measured way, by focusing on the three Afghanistan presidential elections to gauge whether they have been successful and effective in enabling a democratically viable Afghanistan, or at the very least, demonstrate an increasing democratic integrity. The findings present significant challenges to reports that the three presidential elections in Afghanistan bode well for democratic consolidation. They suggest, rather, that these elections have been to a greater or lesser extent rife with fraudulent votes, corrupt candidates and officials, and corruption by representatives of the government such as the Independent Election Commission. The corrosive effects of corruption are not restricted to the presidential elections, but have become an increasing part of everyday life in Afghanistan. What makes the situation worse is that the international community supporting democratization is more inclined for an electoral result to emerge that to highlight the shortcomings of the process. My conclusion is that Afghanistan continues to face major challenges in conducting free and fair elections, and while elections are not the entire picture of democratization, they are its symbolic and genuine centrepiece. As long as this situation continues, democratization will be compromised, perhaps fatally.

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Contents Originality statement ...... 1 Abstract ...... 2 Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 5 A statement of the problem ...... 5 Criteria for a successful election ...... 8 Democracy ...... 9 Relevant literature ...... 10 Description of remaining chapters ...... 12 Chapter 2: Building democracy in Afghanistan ...... 13 A short ...... 13 The United States and Afghanistan ...... 14 History of elections in Afghanistan...... 15 The Bonn Agreement ...... 16 The three presidential elections ...... 18 Democratic challenges in Afghanistan ...... 20 Chapter 3: Openness ...... 23 Procedural transparency ...... 23 Afghanistan media ...... 25 Corruption and transparency in the IEC, officials and the government...... 27 Language barriers ...... 30 Summary...... 32 Chapter 4: Universal Suffrage ...... 34 The new role of women ...... 35 Women presidential candidates ...... 39 Increased education for women ...... 41 for women ...... 42 2004 election turnout ...... 42 2009 election turnout ...... 42 2014 election turnout ...... 42 Summary...... 43 Chapter 5: Secret Ballot ...... 44 Ethnic differences in the ...... 45 2004 election ethnicity differences ...... 46 2009 election ethnicity differences ...... 47 Page 4 of 93

2014 election ethnicity differences ...... 48 Voting along tribal lines ...... 49 Summary...... 52 Chapter 6: Electoral Integrity ...... 54 Ballot stuffing by citizens ...... 54 Ballot stuffing in the 2004 election ...... 55 Ballot stuffing in the 2009 election ...... 56 Ballot stuffing in the 2014 election ...... 57 by officials ...... 57 Electoral fraud by officials in the 2004 election ...... 58 Electoral fraud by officials in the 2009 election ...... 58 Electoral fraud by officials in the 2014 election ...... 59 Summary...... 60 Chapter 7: Sustainable elections in Afghanistan ...... 61 International efforts ...... 61 Technical assistance ...... 63 Stabilising the security situation ...... 64 Summary...... 65 Chapter 8: Conclusion ...... 67 Statement of findings ...... 67 The future of Afghanistan ...... 69 Further research possibilities in this area ...... 70 Appendix ...... 72 After the first round of voting, June 2014 ...... 72 Figures ...... 74 Figure 1 ...... 74 Figure 2 ...... 74 Figure 3 ...... 74 Figure 4 ...... 74 References ...... 75

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Chapter 1: Introduction

A statement of the problem

Elections are a cornerstone of modern democracies, the building block that supports the fundamentals of stable and prosperous nations. A number of countries, especially since the mid- 1970s, have gone through the process of democratization. These countries, as noted by Samuel Huntington (1991, p.13), were part of the third wave of democratization which began in “Portugal and Spain, [and] swept through six South American and three Central American countries, moved on to the Philippines, doubled back to Mexico and Chile,” and other countries such as Namibia (1989), El Salvador (1994), and Mozambique (1994). As noted by Large and Sisk (2006, p.196) democratization, together with state building, has also emerged as a key strategy of peace building after civil war. Democratization is not just about holding elections, it is, amongst other things, about building and reconstructing the broken relationships that often subsist in a nation between government officials and citizens. This process is not immediate, and must take many things into consideration, often including reconciliation between different parts of the nation. The process requires many people willing to make a difference, and post-conflict democracy building does not always work, for example in Thailand (Mishra,2010). In countries including Angola (1992), Cambodia (1993), El Salvador (1994), Mozambique (1994), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996), and Liberia (1997), as explained by Kumar (1998) elections have been designated in the peace accord as the mechanism for ending the transition process of democratization and cementing a new era of social and political peace.

Following the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan to hunt down those responsible, the al-Qaeda terrorist network that had found safe haven in the -held Afghanistan. The Taliban had taken control of Afghanistan in the 1990s through force and had imposed a strict interpretation of Sharia law, as noted by Emadi (2010, p.184). Once they were removed from power soon after the invasion, the opportunity was presented to rebuild Afghanistan into a democratic nation, and after a a new government was installed even in the midst of an uncertain security situation. A Loya Jirga, as explained by Bezhan (2013) and Lila (2013), is a traditional gathering of Afghan leaders, politicians, activists, prominent Afghans (usually representatives from the various ethnic, religious, and tribal communities in Afghanistan), and village elders used to make communal decisions and settle disputes. Essentially, the Loya Jirga is a tribal council, as they were predominantly attended by tribal elders and religious. Such gatherings have been held for events such as choosing a new king, adopting a constitution, or discussing important national political or emergency matters, such as the Page 6 of 93

2002 Loya Jirga to form the new Transitional Administration to govern Afghanistan until the subsequent election, and earlier - in 1985 - to ratify the new Constitution of the Democratic .

During the early 1990s, the ethnic fault lines deepened as Afghanistan spiralled into civil war. Throughout the process of the 2001 allied invasion and subsequent war, Afghanistan started a process of rebuilding, which included the adoption of a new constitution, a new government and the goal of democracy. The Constitution of Afghanistan made provision for the National Assembly of Afghanistan to have two houses: the Wolesi Jirga (the House of the People) and the Meshrano Jirga (the House of Elders). The Wolesi Jirga has 249 seats with members directly elected by the people. Under the Constitution, 68 women are elected to seats reserved for them, while 17 women are elected in their own right. The Meshrano Jirga consists of a mixture of appointed and elected members (total 102 members). 68 members were selected by 34 directly-elected Provincial Councils, and 34 were appointed by the President. Adopting a new constitution, and embarking upon democratization, meant that the reconstruction of broken relationships could begin in Afghanistan. One of the long-term challenges in this process is the merging of Islamic values and democratic principles, underlined by Taliban threats against those who vote in the elections.

No-one expects this process to be easy. Afghanistan is emerging from a period of 35 years of successive conflicts, including the Soviet occupation from 1979 - 1989, factional fighting, as well as the ongoing struggle against the oppressive Taliban regime and its remnants. A major issue in Afghanistan is the democratic reform process that has been encouraged - some would say imposed - externally by the United States (Bastian and Luckham,2003; and Warnock,2010). There remain elements of Afghan society not only at war with external states (and coalition forces), but also at war with each other on many levels, including at least political infighting for the spoils of office. With the infighting and bickering comes a level of corruption among the leaders and the officials (Alexiev, sighted in Tanner 2002, p.262); corrupt and ineffective government will not mend fraught relationships, or assist in the development of the Afghan people as a whole, and will not help with peace and stability in the nation. Where there is corruption, there is a deficit in transparency and accountability; the absence of an effectual government provides no united stance against common threats, and no national focus. If a major impediment towards democratic processes and an effectual government is the government itself, national unity will be extremely hard to achieve. Above all, a state in constant conflict is close to failing: a sentiment echoed by Rotberg (2004, p.1) who explains that a nation state fails when it is consumed by internal violence and ceases delivering positive political goods to its citizens. Page 7 of 93

Since the signing of the Bonn Agreement in 2001 to promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in Afghanistan; and the fall of the Taliban in 2001, there has been one , . Karzai was given the responsibility of President of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan at the June 2002 Loya Jirga, a position which he held until 2014, after winning popular elections in 2004 and 2009. The third presidential and provincial council elections in the new democratic Afghanistan on April 5 2014 represented a vital turning point for the nation, marking the first time that power was to be democratically transitioned from one elected head of state to another. This election also marked the end of the post-Taliban transition with Karzai stepping down as President of Afghanistan, and hopefully - with International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) forces due to depart soon - an end to the violence. The 2009 presidential elections which were marred with fraud show that after two elections, as noted by Kraemer (2010, p.637) the “prospects of achieving a functioning, democratically governed state are facing ever greater dangers”, a sentiment echoed by Smith (2014b, p.1) who nevertheless hoped that the 2014 “election could create space for political elites to address root causes of the country's continuing crisis”.

Whilst elections are an extremely important part of the democratization process, they are not the only component, and they need to meet high standards to be effective in the process. Any country can hold an election: even the held elections. But for an election to be free and fair, it requires many elements, including information to the citizens on how to vote, hiring and training of competent electoral officials, and of course an overarching organization to monitor the process, build and maintain an accurate electoral roll, and oversee the checks and balances through accountability and transparency. This process will also need to happen on multiple occasions, not just once. The holding of elections in Afghanistan, as highlighted by Smith (2014b) “were a fundamental part of the state-building roadmap that Afghans defined under international auspices at the December 2001 Bonn conference”. Without elections, the state-building process for Afghanistan would be undermined from the start.

A number of recent articles (BBC (2014), Bose (2014), Graham-Harrison (2014a), Nordland and Rosenburg (2014), and Yunespour (2014)) have noted the partial success of the Afghanistan Presidential elections in April 2014. The result of this election was that neither candidate received over 50 percent of the ballot, which led to a run-off ballot held in June 2014 by the two highest polling candidates: Dr and Dr . This runoff was held under Article 61 of the Afghanistan Constitution (Government of Afghanistan, 2004) which states in part that:

The President shall be elected by receiving more than fifty percent of votes cast by voters through free, general, secret and direct voting… If in the first round none of the Page 8 of 93

candidates gets more than fifty percent of the votes, elections for the second round shall be held within two weeks from the date election results are proclaimed.

But what constitutes a successful election? To the successful candidates and their respective parties (if applicable), any election that results in their victory is by definition ‘successful’. Losers beg to differ. And of course, the voters themselves will have a view on what constitutes a successful election, and what does not. If they were kept informed of the election and its processes, and are able to form a view about what is in the best interests of the country from the candidates’ manifestos, then it may also be considered a success. International observers will also have a different idea of what is deemed a successful election, such as the European Union External Action group (n.d), European Union's (EU) diplomatic service, who note that “election observation is a vital EU activity aiming to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide. It contributes to strengthening democratic institutions, building public confidence in electoral processes, helping to deter fraud, intimidation and violence”. Such judgments are important, but the key criteria for success used by this thesis is whether the elections in Afghanistan continue the process of democratic consolidation.

This thesis will compare the three Afghanistan presidential elections from 2004-2014 to gauge whether they have been successful and effective in enabling a post-conflict democratically viable Afghanistan, or, at the very least, demonstrate an increasing democratic integrate. Precisely what constitutes ‘success’ for our purposes is examined below.

Criteria for a successful election

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) propose six criteria for ethical elections in their 2005 fact sheet. These criteria are: Respect for the principles of electoral democracy; Ethical conduct; Institutional protections; Accurateness; Continuous enforcement; and Transparency. In their 2013 publication Evaluating Elections: A Handbook of Methods and Standards, Alvarez, Atkinson and Hall focus on using data from previous elections to develop strategies and measures towards improving future elections to ensure that an election is run successfully and legitimately. The Ontario (Canada) Citizens Assembly on Electoral Reform (2006) released a report noting legitimacy, fairness of representation, voter choice, effective parties, stable and effective government, effective parliament, stronger voter participation, accountability and simplicity as main areas on which elections should be judged. For the purposes of this thesis, an election is to be considered successful in a post-conflict democratization process, if it passes the test in five key areas: openness, universal suffrage, secret ballot, electoral integrity, and sustainability. I shall explain each of these in turn. Page 9 of 93

Openness – This criterion is chiefly concerned with a process free from corruption. From the calling of the election, to the naming of the candidates, to declaring the results, the general public need to be informed and involved at every step through generous and transparent information. A fair and on-balance unbiased media coverage, as well as corruption and internal language barriers will need to be overcome for this criterion to be met.

Universal suffrage – This is primarily about encouraging participation from citizens, providing opportunity and accessibility for people to vote. Increased community participation and acknowledging the important role of women is fundamental to this criterion.

Secret Ballot – This is to ensure that the vote from the person has been made without undue influence, intimidation or coercion, violence or the threat of violence through a secret ballot. Voting along tribal or religious lines undermines an open and honest election.

Electoral Integrity – This criterion insists that each eligible voter should only vote once in each election; one person – one vote. Ballot stuffing and electoral fraud (by citizens, election officials and candidates) severely undermines the validity of any election.

Sustainability – the holding of one successful election must be confirmed by the holding of multiple successful elections. While the impact and assistance of the international effort has been important in the electoral process, its reduction over time must enable and make way for a self-sustaining electoral process.

These five key areas will be examined to analyse the three presidential elections in Afghanistan in 2004, 2009, and 2014. This will help us answer the question whether the Afghanistan presidential elections have been successful or effective in enabling an increasingly viable democratic Afghanistan.

Democracy

The most common definition of democracy stems from the Greek word dēmokratía meaning “rule of the people”. Modern democracy is a system of government directed by politicians who have been elected freely and fairly by the overwhelming majority of citizens1 in the interests of the people, based on the wishes of the citizens, and for the benefit of the nation. Modern democratic institutions need genuinely to acknowledge and reflect the people. To protect their rights and liberties, there need to be checks and balances, by an opposition political party or parties, by the judicial system, or when the need arises, by media and other non-institutional surveillance. Whilst democracy is the most popular form of government in the world (Mandelbaum, 2007), there are

1 This would, in most democratic jurisdictions, exclude people under the age of eighteen. Page 10 of 93

many different ways in which it is implemented, including by a parliamentary system where the executive branch of government is typically a cabinet of ministers, and headed by a prime minister. The U.S. model, by contrast, with its executive President sitting outside, and elected separately from, the legislature is a quite different institution, and with its “winner-take-all” approach, may not suit all democratizing states. In Afghanistan, as noted by Katz (2012, p.30), “the system the U.S. government set up is a centralized presidential system with a weak parliament unable to check the president”.

For our purposes a viable democracy is where the elected officials are not corrupt, where there is a sincere attempt to represent the national interest, and where appropriate checks and balances are in place to limit government and protect freedoms. There is an independent court that holds all to account, and the people are able to hold their elected officials accountable for their actions at regular elections. A viable democracy has a working and effective form of government, and political participation from all genders, races and religions and areas of society. In all of this, elections are the bedrock of the link between the people and the government, the centre of the trust that needs to be built in a democracy.

Relevant literature

There is a large literature regarding post-conflict states and democracy including Lappin (2008), Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) and Banks (2007) and their analysis agrees that post-conflict elections need to be seen to strengthen peace and need to be meaningful to the citizens. Likewise, there is a large literature on the use of force to create a democracy, including from Meernik (1996 and 2000), along with McDonagh (2008), Burnell (2000) and Walter and Snyder (1999). Meernik’s work specifically focuses on the forceful democracy promotion of the U.S., and argues that nations that have had a military intervention have a greater movement toward democracy, such as the Philippines and Nicaragua. The need for enabling democracy in non-democratic states was, and is, central to the foreign policy from recent U.S. presidents. This is echoed by Heywood (2011) who noted that the promotion of democracy has been seen as a way for peace in the Middle East since the 1990s, especially as a way to counter the increasing spread and threat of militant Islam. A central plank of the foreign policy of former U.S. President George W. Bush, as highlighted by Serewicz (2007, p.152), was a “global democratic revolution to create a decent world order”.

In the case of Afghanistan, the works of Goodson (2005), Kraemer (2010), Ponzio (2007) and Riphenburg (2007), who look at peacebuilding in Afghanistan and the elections, will be utilised as a starting point for this paper, coupled with Diamonds’ 1992 important work ‘Promoting Democracy’ which has served as a basis for much of the democratic promotional activities for the U.S.. Page 11 of 93

Democracy and elections in post-conflict nations are now a feature of the efforts to democratize war-torn nations. Snyder (2000) shows that democratizing nations do not bring stable domestic politics and peaceful foreign relations, they in fact are often more, not less, conflict prone in the early stages of democratization, and Sadiki (2009, p.2) theorizes about the process of democratization in the Arab Middle East, and how it encompasses different styles and approaches noting that “their methodological plurality has undermined the imposition of a single authoritative approach”. Herb (1999) and Kamrava (2005) also focus on democracy in the Middle East, and the associated issues of democracy in the Muslim world, highlighting features that have been detrimental to the process of democratization (desecularization and modernity, for example), and the need for changes in development strategies to encourage the move towards democratization.

Powell (2000) offers a study of the roles that elections play giving citizens influence over policy makers, but shows that elections are not the only instrument of democracy, and must be helped by other organisations and rules. Further to this is the work by Kumar (1998), who shows the need for international assistance in supporting post conflict elections at least, and especially, in the early days of rebuilding.

There are those that agree (Soudriette, 2005; Gupta, 2000; and Talbott, 1996) that elections build and support democracy in post-conflict states (and in turn the security rationale of the democratic peace theorem). As Smith (2014a) adds, the recent election in Afghanistan must be “sufficiently credible to prevent severe division among elite political actors and ensure the survival of the current constitutional order”. Without credibility in the election process, there will be no credibility in the government. Issues around elections in democratizing countries are central to the works of Huntington (1992), Mansfield and Snyder (1995), Zakaria (1997); and more specifically the works of Grimm & Merkel (2007), Tadjbakhsh & Schoiswohl (2008), Suhrke (2008) and Nixon & Whitty (2009) examine the democratization challenges in Afghanistan, and the effect of the international community in supporting it. The major point noted by Grimm & Merkel (2007, p.1) is that “if external actors withdraw before the roots of democracy are deep enough and before democratic institutions are strong enough to stand alone, then the entire endeavour may fail”. Suhrke (2008, p.1) notes that “the heavy foreign hand contradicted the promise of national autonomy, representation, and fair process held out by the democratization agenda,” whilst Tadjbakhsh & Schoiswohl (2008, p.1) theorize that “Afghanistan has become an experiment for the international community in installing democracy from outside”.

Whilst Dawisha and Dawisha (2003) theorize about how to build a democratic Iraq, their lessons about a federal system of government, executive branch of government and developing the middle class, can in some aspects be carried over to Afghanistan, specifically when they note that “having Page 12 of 93

factions zealously check each other’s' power could actually promote democracy at the expense of rigid communal particularism”. However, the question regarding a democratic Afghanistan, one that holds free and fair elections on a regular basis, is of course, posed acutely by Collins and Owen (2012): “do Muslims want democracy?” Indonesia is an example of a Muslim state where democracy has worked, so the answer has less to do with democracy as such than with broader issues of cultural and political history.

Along with the five key areas outlines above - openness, suffrage, secrecy, fraud, and sustainability - there are other areas of concern in building a democratic Afghanistan. These are the security situation (both the Taliban threat and the lack of a reliable self-defence force), the need to work within the local social frameworks (i.e. the tribes and ), as well as giving citizens themselves the responsibility for the democratization process, not international government and aid bureaucracies. This thesis draws on the work on post-conflict states and democracy building, by contributing to the literature on elections in post-conflict democracy building in the case of Afghanistan.

Description of remaining chapters

This thesis will be divided into seven substantive chapters, with chapter 2 looking at the history of elections in Afghanistan, set within a short history of Afghanistan to demonstrate how history weighs on attempts at democratization. The Bonn Agreement in 2001 will be examined as the background to the three presidential elections subsequently held.

The thesis goes on to focus on the five key criteria identified above, with a chapter devoted to each. These chapters will look at issues such as corruption, increased education for women, ethnicity in the 2014 presidential election, ballot stuffing and electoral fraud in the 2009 presidential election, to name a few. Chapter 7 will finish with an account of the international effort to assist the electoral process in Afghanistan, and explain that for Afghanistan to hold sustainable and increasingly free and fair elections, the international support can assist in two distinct ways; technical assistance and stabilising the security situation.

The thesis will conclude in Chapter 8, with a statement of findings, some recommendations, and further research possibilities in this area. Above all, this thesis will argue that the record of Afghanistan’s presidential elections does not yet provide a strong foundation to enable a post- conflict democratically viable Afghanistan.

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Chapter 2: Building democracy in Afghanistan

A short history of Afghanistan

The history of Afghanistan over the last 2300 years bears many unfortunate similarities to its recent history. The history is turbulent, marred with war since 328BCE when Alexander the Great entered the territory now known as Afghanistan to capture one of the provinces presently known as (U.S. Department of State, 2010). In 632CE, the Prophet Muhammed died, and in 637 the Arab Muslims moved to control all of the Persian territories (Sabahuddin, 2008) and as such, the physical and religious control of the region was lost as the Arab Muslims spread the teaching of their fallen Prophet throughout the region, and entrenched Islamic influence.

Following the Arab Muslim rule from 642–870, Afghanistan was ruled by the Persians until 962, who were then conquered by the and spread their Islamic Empire across Asia, encompassing Iran, India and , until they were overthrown by the Ghorid Empire in 1151. The Ghorid Empire reigned until 1219, when they were defeated by the Mongols. The Ghorid Empire, much like the Ghaznavids, encompassed not only Afghanistan, but also the areas from Iraq to India (Runion, 2007).

In 1219 the Mongols, who were controlled by the infamous Genghis Khan, headed west towards Persia, and levelled the provinces of Balkh and in the north, destroyed the fertile soils of the south, and incorporated the ruins of the cities and towns of what is now Afghanistan into their expanding empire (Rashid, 2002). From here the Mongols were in power over the Afghanistan region and surrounds until 1381, when Tamerlane rebelled and declared himself king. Tamerlane, or Timur, readily attacked Muslims throughout the regions of modern Afghanistan, as if he was on a holy war. The rule of the Timurid Empire was diminishing towards the end of the fifteenth century and the start of the sixteenth, and it was Babur, a descendant of Tamerlane, who would ultimately write another chapter into the already bloody history of Afghanistan (Byfield, 2010).

In 1504, Babur occupied , and from there he set about laying claim to the where he stayed for 20 years. After proclaiming himself king, he set about raiding areas close to his safe haven of Kabul, namely the Lodi Empire (which was an Indian dynasty) and the western Punjab , in 1525, Babur marched into India and spent the next 5 years eliminating threats to his kingdom (Ali, 2003).

During the sixteenth century until 1747, a succession of chiefs, thieves and kings ruled, reigned and conquered Afghanistan. Incorporated under the rule of the Mughals in Kabul, the Safavids in , as well as the in Balkh, Afghanistan would soon fall under the banner of the Page 14 of 93

Durrani Empire, which it would hold until 1823. In 1839, the British invaded Afghanistan (Clements, 2003) to keep its “Indian empire secure from the perceived threats posed by French and Russian aspirations” and a second war ensued in 1878 to 1880. These Anglo-Afghan tensions also resulted in a third war in 1919, lasting for a month.

Afghanistan (Emadi, 2005, p.7) was divided in the eighteenth century into 4 provinces: Herat, Qandahar, Turkistan and Qataghan-. Kabul remained the capital city. In 1964, and as a result of a constitution which was ratified in the hope of a democratic Afghanistan, the country was divided into 26 provinces (or Wilayat), and in 2004 this had expanded to the 34 provinces that exist today.

The Soviet Union invaded in 1979, withdrawing in 1989, but the impact of this war had ramifications that have been felt worldwide. It was during this period that the rose to harass the . The Taliban continued to make Afghanistan a violent country since their rise to power in the 1990s, perhaps more violent even than during the fourteenth century through to the sixteenth centuries. In 1996, the Taliban overran most of Afghanistan, driven by an extremely harsh interpretation of Sunni Islam. This interpretation, noted by Phelps (2009, p.171), included the banning of music and dancing, forcing men to wear beards, and was in effect until the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.

The United States and Afghanistan

It was in October 2001 that, as the then-President of the United States, George W. Bush (2001) said that the “United States military has begun strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan”. These strikes were in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001 on America perpetrated by Al Qaeda elements, who had found safe haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

It was from this point that the Taliban lost their various strongholds in Afghanistan, which would lead to United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1378 (2001) which encouraged “Afghan people to establish a new and transitional administration leading to the formation of a government”. After the signing of this resolution in November 2001, UNSC Resolution 1383 was signed the day after the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, giving the people of Afghanistan “the provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the reestablishment of permanent government institutions, noting that the provisional arrangements are intended as a first step towards the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government”. Page 15 of 93

As part of the rebuilding process, the U.S. agency USAID (2014), which is one arm of U.S. foreign policy, committed to “promoting more-accountable, transparent governance, encouraging national unity and serving the needs of the Afghan people”. As well as activities that promote gender equality and political leadership some current projects of USAID in Afghanistan include: Awareness Rising and Education of Afghan Citizens; Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society; and Supporting Political Entities and Civil Society. Some of the completed projects include: Building Independent Media in Afghanistan; Support to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission; and Voter Registration and Election Implementation Program. A major success, as USAID (2010) notes, is the “Afghan carpet makers and dealers showcasing their country’s best handmade carpets at Domotex, the world’s premier flooring trade show in Hannover, Germany [with] nearly 90 percent of the entire inventory of the Afghanistan pavilion sold in deals made with buyers from Europe and the USA”. This success shows improved business development and management skills, global development alliances, and increased human capacity building for some of the people of Afghanistan.

Above all, as Thaler et al (2008, p.2) note, “lasting security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan are critical to U.S. interests, which include promoting stability and representative government, ensuring access to resources, and defeating global terrorism”. This assistance has been coupled with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (2014) mission in Afghanistan which is to “enable the Afghan government to provide effective security across the country and develop new Afghan security forces to ensure Afghanistan can never again become a safe haven for terrorists”. As part of the rebuilding process, responsibility for security in Afghanistan has gradually been transferred to its own people since 2011, and the ISAF mission has increasingly focused on training, advising and assisting.

History of elections in Afghanistan

Afghanistan had held parliamentary elections prior to the first presidential election in 2004, but these were held many years earlier. As shown by Coburn and Larson (2014), the first-ever election in Afghanistan was a parliamentary one, held in 1931. This election, and the subsequent parliamentary ones held up until 1988 were, as highlighted by Sarabi (2004, p.503) held with universal suffrage, which at the time enfranchised only males over 20 years of age. Under communist rule in 1988 these elections, however, were not competitive and merely served as show elections without playing any significant role in Afghanistan politics. This is reaffirmed by Arnold (1985, p.32) who shows that these periodic parliamentary elections had their results predetermined by the ruling elite in Kabul. Elections from 1931 were held every three years, as per the 1931 Constitution; Sarabi (2004, p.509) notes they were held on eleven occasions, with the last being in 1961. Page 16 of 93

In 1964, Afghanistan adopted a new constitution, and did not hold an election until 1965; another parliamentary one. With the parliamentary elections of 1965 and 1969, Sarabi (2004, p.507) shows that the plurality system, a single-winner voting system in single-member constituencies was applied, a voting system which has the potential to increase accountability between the representative and the citizens that vote in that province. In these elections, the voters put “an envelope with a stamped ballot into the box of the representative candidate, with the boxes marked with photographs and symbols of the candidate”. A similar process would be utilized in the presidential elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014. The 1965 elections marked the first time in Afghanistan that women were allowed to vote, a right which had been written into the 1964 Constitution. These elections were mostly for show, according to Christensen (1995, p.23), as the parliament was mostly made up of members who were part of the elite and upper-class of Afghanistan. The 1969 election followed in the same mold, with the elite being elected into the parliament.

From 1969 it would be another 19 years until Afghanistan voted at parliamentary elections in 1988. Following the newly adopted 1987 Constitution, these elections were, as Larson (2014, p.xii) note, held “only in government controlled areas”, due to the Russian war, and to the associated Mujahideen who were still in control in different areas of Afghanistan. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan lasted until April 1992. It was in 1992, where Sarabi (2004, p.505) shows that the elected parliament of 1988 was dissolved, and the constitution abandoned.

The last pre-Taliban election was held in 1988, with 16 years until the next, which was the 2004 presidential election. For any Afghans who had voted in 1988, the idea, concept and knowledge of voting would have been a distant memory, and much if not most of the population would never have has the opportunity to cast a vote. Noting that those that voted in 1988 were in government controlled areas (i.e. safe areas) there would have been a relatively small voter turnout, and not all Afghans would have been aware of, or able to participate in, the election. None of these elections met the democratic standard of ‘free and fair’.

The Bonn Agreement

In December 2001, as there had be no nationally-agreed-upon government in Afghanistan since 1979, and as noted by the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (ND):

A group of prominent Afghans and world leaders met in Bonn, Germany under United Nation auspices to design an ambitious agenda that would guide Afghanistan towards ‘national reconciliation, a lasting peace, stability, and respect for human rights’, culminating in the establishment of a fully representative government. Page 17 of 93

These Afghan representatives had convened under an Emergency Loya Jirga. The Taliban, as Braithwaite and Wardak (2011) note, were excluded from participation in the Bonn Agreement. Once signed, the Bonn Agreement (2001) gave an Interim Administration to the Afghan people through a government headed by the Interim President Hamid Karzai. The Agreement also noted, very importantly, that the Interim Administration was to lead Afghanistan until a fully representative government could be elected through free and fair elections to be held no later than two years from the Emergency Loya Jirga and within six months of the establishment of the Interim Authority, which was on 22 December 2001. Included in the Bonn Process, as Larson (2009, p.7) notes, was the “outline of an electoral cycle allowing the public election of the country’s president for the first time in 2004”.

The Bonn Agreement, officially entitled The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, set out an agenda for Afghanistan. The first item on the agenda is that the Agreement is “Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country”. This Agreement set out many items, but the first item is the most poignant. The interim leaders of Afghanistan, and those elders of the Loya Jirga, were willing to end the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and attempt to have lasting peace and stability, promote national reconciliation and unity, and to act in accordance with the basic principles of human rights.

Apart from enacting an Interim Administration in Afghanistan with a view to a freely and fairly elected government, the Bonn Agreement also provided the basis for many Commissions to assist in the redevelopment of Afghanistan. The Special Independent Commission was created for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan; a Constitutional Commission was created to write the new constitution; in consultation with the United Nations, a Judicial Commission was created to rebuild the domestic justice system; a Civil Service Commission provided shortlists of candidates for key posts in the administrative departments; and a Human Rights Commission were all created by the Bonn Agreement. The Bonn Agreement also outlined that the “Special Independent Commission will publish and disseminate the rules and procedures for the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga at least ten weeks before the Emergency Loya Jirga convenes, together with the date for its commencement and its suggested location and duration” which shows that notions of accountability and transparency were fundamental to this Agreement. The Bonn Agreement provided the best chance for peace and stability in Afghanistan through the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government. Page 18 of 93

One year after the signing of this Agreement, Human Rights Watch (2002) released a briefing paper that showed that the conditions in Afghanistan had changed little. Some key points from this report include:

Virtually all the institutions of a functioning civil society had been destroyed, including the parliament, the courts, much of the civil service, and most of the educational and health systems.

In Kabul, the security and human rights situation has improved markedly, largely because of the introduction of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the heavy international presence in the capital. Beyond Kabul poor security, generalized criminality, and limited regard for basic human rights have marked the year since the signing of the Bonn Agreement.

Travel on many roads remains unsafe from extortion by local soldiers or criminals (often one and the same).

Vulnerable women and minorities, displaced persons, Afghans who stand up to abusive warlords, and even Afghan government officials have virtually no one to turn to when their lives or safety are threatened.

The power of the warlords has made it impossible for the Afghan Transitional Administration to establish its authority much beyond Kabul.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has not implemented a strong strategy on human rights over the past year.

One year after the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan Human Rights Commission still does not have adequate resources or receive sufficient political, logistical, or moral support from the international community to effectively investigate or monitor human rights conditions.

These issues show that whilst the intent of the Bonn Agreement was commendable, its implementation still left a lot to be desired. Understandably, it took more than a year for a country that had been at war for the past 35 years to transition into a democratic nation.

The three presidential elections

The end of democracy in Afghanistan, as noted by Arnold (1985, p.54) “came on July 17 1973, when Mohammed Dauod again took over the country, this time in a bloodless coup that saw the king exiled, the constitution abrogated, and civil liberties suspended”. Over the next 30 years, there was no democracy in Afghanistan, no general elections (parliamentary elections were held in 1988 as noted above), and little that resembled a nation state. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Page 19 of 93

Afghanistan and occupied the nation until 1988. Reunion (2007, p.110) notes that “against a practically paralyzed Afghan army, sometime during the night of December 27 1979, some of the Soviet troops took over the city of Kabul, and stormed the Presidential Palace”. The Soviets killed Hafizullah Amin the President of Afghanistan, (Braithwaite, 2011) who two months earlier had killed the previous President Nur Muhammad Taraki who himself had led a coup in 1978 under the communist Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against the ruling President Mohammad Daoud Khan, commonly known as the Saur Revolution. From 1979 through to 1988 there were three Presidents of Afghanistan, none of whom was elected.

On October 9 2004, Afghanistan held its first post-Taliban presidential election, with the ‘incumbent’ Hamid Karzai winning the election in the first round with, as noted by Afghanistan Presidential Elections 2004 (2004) 55.4 percent of the vote, with the next candidate, Yunus Qanuni, acquiring 16.3 percent of the 8,024,536 valid votes cast. There were 104,404 invalid votes cast in this election, 1.3 percent of the total votes. This election, according to Goodson (2005, p.94) “had nearly 5,000 polling centres (with 22,000 polling stations) in all 34 Afghan provinces, and handled over eight million Afghan voters, a 70 percent turnout rate”. For a nation that was new to elections, this was an outstanding result. However, these first elections were marred with violence, accusations of corruption through ballot stuffing, and multiple voting, as noted by Riphenburg (2007, p.20). Controversies surrounding electoral fraud were to be raised at subsequent elections, as we shall see.

The next presidential election was held on 20 August 2009. The National Democratic Institute (n.d.), a U.S. non-profit, non-partisan organization working to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability in government, reported that victory in this election went to incumbent Hamid Karzai, who won ultimately 49.67 percent of the vote. The closest candidate to Karzai was Dr. Abdullah Abdullah with 30.59 percent of the primary vote. As neither candidate achieved the required 50 percent of the vote, there should have been a second round of voting.

This election runoff, however, did not eventuate. As noted by Mullen (2010, p.132) Abdullah averted the runoff by conceding amongst grave concerns surrounding election fraud. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) of Afghanistan (2009a) shows that Karzai received “3,093,256 votes, or 54.62 percent of the total and Abdullah obtained 1,571,581 votes, or 27.75 percent of the total”. This result, however, was changed after a recount and the removal of some fraudulent ballots. As noted by the National Democratic Institute (2009, p.47), after receiving numerous complaints of fraud, the final presidential results decreased Karzai’s percentage of the vote from 54.62 to 49.67 and increased Abdullah’s percentage from 27.75 to 30.59. The 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, Smith (2014b) argued, “have not added much legitimacy to Afghan governing institutions, but they Page 20 of 93

have undermined the relationship between Afghanistan and its international backers, contributing to the current political crisis”.

The third election to be held in Afghanistan post-conflict was held on 5 April 2014. As the incumbent, Karzai, had served two terms as president, he was ineligible to run for a third. This marked the first time in Afghanistan’s history where power would be democratically transferred from one political leader to another. Based on the announced primary results, the IEC (2014c) released the proportion and percentage of votes of the leading candidates showing that Dr. Abdullah Abdullah had received 2,973,706 votes (44.9 percent), and the next closest candidate was Dr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai (Ashraf Ghani), who received 2,082,417 votes (31.5 percent).

A run-off election was held on held June 14, with the outcomes discussed in the Appendix to this thesis.

Democratic challenges in Afghanistan

There are many problems and challenges with a state transforming itself into a democracy, and there are many problems and challenges in Afghanistan in particular. Government corruption, unemployment, literacy rates, education, illegal activity (such as opium production), security threats including the Taliban, violence (both due to the ongoing conflict as well as sectarian violence and ethnic clashes), the need for a sense of national unity, and equality are all issues in Afghanistan that will serve as an impediments to a functioning democracy. There are five key challenges to sustainable democracy in Afghanistan and I outline them below.

There is a deep challenge with openness and transparency. In 2013, as noted by Transparency International (2013) in their Corruption Perceptions Index which measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption in 199 countries and territories, Afghanistan ranked 175th. In 2012, Afghanistan ranked 174th out of 176, in 2011 180th of 183, and in 2010 Afghanistan was ranked 176th of 178 countries and territories. In 2009, Mullen (2010, p.133) notes “corruption charges against high-ranking government officials and many of Karzai’s own family members continued to surface with little indication that the government was willing to address this issue”. There is a related problem with the IEC, as highlighted by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2014): in the lead up to the 2014 Presidential election, nearly 3000 of its staff were terminated as there were widespread accusations of fraud from within the IEC with the first round of elections. Afghanistan has suffered a vicious cycle of corruption, and this problem needs to be addressed, especially within the IEC, if there is to be any chance of there being a post-conflict democratically viable Afghanistan. Page 21 of 93

For democracy to work in Afghanistan, it is the Afghanistan people are the ones that will want it, will need it and will require it to work. And this will be assisted through the promotion of universal suffrage, and that early and targeted promotion of participation will help to fulfil the potential of universal suffrage, especially for women. Enterline and Greig (2008, p.884) note that there is the “potential for self-maintenance” in Afghanistan, where “imposed political institutions cultivate and select political leaders exhibiting consistent norms, goals, and policy preferences suitable to the imposer and as such obviate the necessity of overt maintenance by the imposer in the form of repeated interventions”. Whilst others states and independent non-governmental organisations have a vested interest in seeing democracy flourish in Afghanistan, it is up to the people of Afghanistan to make it work, and this will be achieved through greater participation of all citizens in the democratic process.

There is a further challenge concerning tribalism in Afghanistan, as in the 2004 and 2009 Presidential elections there was obvious and overwhelming rural and urban divide in the 34 provinces in Afghanistan. This also highlights the ethnic divide that is not only between provinces, but also within the provinces as well. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009) note that account for about 45 percent of Afghanistan's population; the current president, Hamid Karzai, is Pashtun, as is just under half of the Wolesi Jirga elected in the 2009 Presidential Elections. As further shown by this report, among Pashtuns, half are of the Durrani tribe, and the other half from the Ghilzai tribe. Within the Durrani tribe, there are two distinct sets of tribes, Zirak and Panjpai. And each of these tribes has its own subsets. The Durrani tribe have historically dominated Afghanistan politics, and the Ghilzai provided the largest base for the Mujahedin, with the original Taliban mostly comprised of Ghilzai Pashtuns. Overall there are at least 60 Pashtun tribes. There is a problem with secret ballots, ensuring that the vote from the person has been made without influence, intimidation or coercion, violence or the threat of violence from tribal or ethnic leaders.

Fraud also presents a challenge to elections in Afghanistan. As noted by Sara (2009), the 2009 Afghanistan presidential elections were marred with accusations of rampant fraud, with hundreds of thousands of votes tallied in regions where as few as 5,000 people are believed to have voted. Sara added that “in the southern more than 134,000 votes were counted even though the UN estimates only 38,000 people voted. It may have been as few as 5,000”. Unfortunately, this seems fairly common practice in Afghanistan from the three presidential elections that have been held since 2004. Norland and Ahmed (2014) quote in their article that Afghan citizen Ahmed Zia voted twice in the 2014 presidential elections, as he “was worried that my candidate wouldn’t win; because of all the fraud and corruption”. Page 22 of 93

There is a challenges with sustainable elections in Afghanistan and the international support effort. As a new democracy, there are many international non-government organisations as well as state actors assisting the democratic transition, however, as pointed out by Ghufan (2006, p.92) “the presence and activities of a large number of NGOs in Afghanistan should not be mistaken for a growing civil society”. Technical assistance and stabilising the security situation are paramount to holding sustainable and increasingly free and fair elections in Afghanistan, and this needs to be achieved from the international support. Ponzio (2007, p.270) notes that “approaches through the UN that ensure political neutrality, technical competence, cultural sensitivity, and burden-sharing” is one guiding principle that the UN Peacebuilding Commission needs to adapt better in their democratic peacebuilding approaches. The international community cannot simply ‘walk away’ from what they have created, the assistance needs to be on-going.

There are challenges with the elections in general in Afghanistan, and the openness, universal suffrage, secret ballot, rampant electoral fraud and the support in elections are more of a hindrance than a benefit to a successful democratic consolidation. If these five key challenges remedied to an acceptable level, then the outlook for future elections in Afghanistan will improve.

For an election to be successful, voting must be procedurally transparent, votes must translate directly and understandably into results, and results must be accepted by all voters. The results also need to be accepted by the international community, there must not be ambiguity in the results. Elections provide winners and losers, but losers – and their supporters – must be satisfied that the result was free and fair, and that they chances of winning at subsequent elections are not influenced by systemic weakness or bias.

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Chapter 3: Openness

Procedural transparency

Transparency is a means of holding public officials accountable, whereby information about their decisions and actions is made available for people to consider. It is also essential for informed voting. Svetlik (2004) points out that a lack of transparency and impartiality casts doubt over election results, while Alvarez, Atkinson & Hall (2013) and Hutter (2013) and Azfar (2007) focus on the corruption that damages elections, as corruption inhibits transparency in the electoral process. Transparency is an underlying principle in democracy, as it builds legitimacy and confidence in the elected officials and the electoral process.

Freedom of information from government is something that is increasingly demanded in established liberal democracies. Some pieces are exempt from this process in Australia, as shown by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (2014), including “documents affecting national security, defence or international relations, Cabinet documents and documents disclosing trade secrets or commercially valuable information”. Nevertheless, a substantial part of information that government uses to make its decisions is available to the general public. This is not the case in Afghanistan. Freedom House (2013) noted that:

Afghanistan has yet to pass a freedom of information bill. In 2012, local media and civil society organizations urged the government to consider such a law, which would ensure the right to access public information and provide a functional mechanism for obtaining it.

As the democratic and electoral processes in Afghanistan are new, greater freedom of information in making government documents available, and greater opportunities for public discussion about political issues would assist in consolidating them.

As far as the presidential elections in Afghanistan are concerned, there is a great deal of transparency in the electoral process, including the dates when milestones are set to occur. The IEC (2014b) provided a timeline of the 2014 presidential election process on their website, including items such as:

Election Day Announcement and Election Calendar Publication on 31 Oct 2012;

Verification of Candidates Nomination Information 7 Oct – 18 Oct 2013;

Presidential Candidates Political Campaign Period 2 Feb – 2 Apr 2014;

Election Day 5 Apr 2014; Page 24 of 93

Adjudication of Complaints of Presidential Election 7 Apr – 7 May 2014; and

Presidential Election Probable (Run Off) 28 May 2014.

This web-based approach is a useful way to disseminate such information to people in Afghanistan and around the world. Yet, there is a lack of transparency relating to the prevention, detection and consequences of fraud in the electoral process, highlighted by López-Pintor (2010, p10) who establishes that the occurrence of fraud in Afghanistan is a “symptom of a lack of regulations and institutional inefficiency, especially from within the ranks of government”. The lack of transparency here undermines the electoral process by not publicly naming all the instances of fraud.

The IEC (2014c) conducted a review of problematic polling stations after the first round of the 2014 presidential elections. In total, there were 43 polling centre stations that were included in the review. Fourteen were found to have no problem, fifteen were deemed to have to undergo a recount, eight were to be audited, three were to have ballots separated and recounted, and three were to be excluded from the counting process. Some of the reasons why the ballots were to be examined from these stations were: due to the occurrence of war (i.e. fighting nearby and the station was unmanned for a period of time); electoral materials were out of control of electoral staff for five hours; recording results of two stations on one result form; and most surprisingly, dividing votes to specific candidates by multiples of ten, which occurred five times. Final results from the IEC (2014d) show that the in the contained some very suspicious results. There are four polling stations that fall under the code 1305129, and the third and fourth stations received exactly 600 votes, split up with 300 to Ashraf Ghani and the remaining 300 divided 200-100 between two other candidates. This seems a clear case of ballot stuffing. However, these ballots were not removed from the total count.

With the total of 1199 votes (600 each from three stations, and 599 from one station in the Zadran district) added to other stations, Zadran contributed 2399 votes to the presidential elections. It is of interest to note here that polling station number one had 599 votes, and the second station had 600 votes cast. The results from these stations are not as obvious cases of fraud as the third and fourth, but certainly suggest it. Fraudulent votes were made public, and the audits of the suspect stations were announced. This part of the electoral transparency process is appropriate. What is far less certain is why these 1199 votes have been included in the final tally, and there has been no information from the IEC as to why they were included, and nothing to say why they were not deemed fraudulent.

Transparency in Afghanistan does not yet go deep enough to allay concerns over procedural fairness. As shown above, the IEC released the results from a prima facie electoral fraud in polling Page 25 of 93

centre 1305129, and noted that they would audit this. However, these potential fraudulent ballots were included in the final result, and no public announcement was made regarding these votes. The IEC did, however, announce that they would be focusing in the 2014 presidential election on fraud in the province on , which borders Paktia to the east. Transparency must increase in all facets of the electoral process for the elections to contribute to enabling a democratically viable Afghanistan.

Afghanistan media

The media plays an extremely important part in a democratic society. Without a strong, free and diverse media, the prospects for a democracy to function openly and transparently are severely limited, with Voltmer (2013) arguing that the media plays a pivotal role in the rise of democracy, and McEachern (2007, p.54) ascertaining that the media are crucial institution in a new democracy. Alternative media (such as through the internet), differing opinions, empowering individual citizens and the promotion of democratic ideals are all part of the remit of the media, and through the spreading diverse information it helps to build a healthy democracy. The United Nations (2011, p.4) stated in May 2011 that the internet is “one of the most powerful instruments of the 21st century for increasing transparency in the conduct of the powerful, access to information, and for facilitating active citizen participation in building democratic societies”.

A fair and impartial media will be able to spread information, not propaganda, and report openly and honestly on election campaigns, not simply on limited elements and events. The media shapes the perceptions of people about their political environment, forming the foundation on which political action is begun, as it is the media that is the main tool that political candidates utilize to communicate with the voting public.

With the Taliban in control in Afghanistan, a strong, free and diverse media was impossible. In 1996, according to Rashid (2013), after the Taliban conquered Kabul, all news media was banned except for the Taliban-run radio, and television sets were hung from lampposts to further illustrate the regime’s hostility to a free media. This was coupled with the Taliban offering no news, no facts, no differing opinions, only propaganda. An example of this is highlighted by Hairan (2010), who quotes an article published in an early 2010 issue of Shahamat (The Bravery), a magazine. The article in part reads that:

The latest sad news is that the Christian Crusaders (Americans) have burned a copy of the Holy Quran in Wardak province and have thus shown their enmity with Islam and the Muslims... The saddest aspect of this incident is that the American invaders have committed this heinous crime in a province (Wardak) that has been known for long as home to mujahedeen (the holy warriors). Page 26 of 93

It is this type of propaganda that the Taliban media used to incite unrest amongst the citizens of Afghanistan to help them in their proclaimed holy war. Camilla Fuhr (2010), a freelance journalist, reported that, after speaking with the U.S. Army Lieutenant from the platoon allegedly responsible for the incident, that “the American troops deny the incident, the ANA [Afghan National Army] says it didn’t happen, local Afghans says it didn’t happen”.

Now, however, things are very different in Afghanistan. Altai Consulting (2010) conducted a survey of the media landscape in Afghanistan, which shows that there have been roughly 9 television stations and 20 radio stations created per year since 2003; totalling over 75 television stations and 175 radio stations. Furthermore, the influx of these two types of media alone has resulted in between US$75m and US$100m revenue per year for these sectors of the media in Afghanistan. With more media outlets, there has also been an increase in the production of local media and television shows, with an estimated 10,000 staff involved in these industries, and the bandwidth in Kabul radio spectrum verging towards saturation with 30 TV channels and 42 radio stations. A report from the United States Institute of Peace (2014) notes that some “politically active youth have established their own mostly low-frequency radio stations”. This is a win for the Afghan people and for transparency, however, as noted in the same report, “large provincial media are still controlled either by power brokers or by religious organizations or individuals”. This increase in the media and access to the media in Afghanistan should lead to more open and transparent elections in the future. Unfortunately, the results are not yet fully apparent.

A report in 2012 from The Asia Foundation (2012) noted that in opinion surveys of Afghans corruption is consistently singled out as a problem, and that “many former warlords have transformed themselves into a politically connected market oligarchy”. Corruption in Afghanistan has now become a major challenge and has become entrenched in all areas of life. Even though this is widely recognised, not a lot is done about corruption and it continues to erode the legitimacy of state-building and democratization, and this is also evident within the media and their reporting, or lack of reporting, of certain events. The role of the media in open democracies is also to investigate corruption from elected officials, but this role is limited in Afghanistan. As reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010), “country-wide, 43 percent of city dwellers say that the media rarely addresses corruption issues. In the South, two thirds indicated that corruption is seldom, or never, in the news”. Without addressing these sort of issues in the media, the hope for the elections in Afghanistan enabling a democratically viable Afghanistan remains poor.

Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization, releases ‘Freedom of the Press’ reports on an annual basis. The latest version (2013) on Afghanistan shows that the press in Afghanistan is not free. However, it is noted that the freedom of the media in Afghanistan: Page 27 of 93

Improved markedly due to a decline in attacks against journalists in 2012, coupled with an increasingly vibrant and diverse media landscape and a decrease in cases of legal harassment and censorship against journalists and media outlets.

Reporters Without Borders (2014a), in their effort to support and protect journalists, appealed to all the local media in Afghanistan to reinforce provisions for the protection of their journalists, especially those reporting from the provincial polling stations. Unfortunately due to the ongoing security situation, the press are not safe in many parts of Afghanistan, which limits free and open reporting on issues that affect citizens. Up to the 16th of July 2014, there were four reporters murdered in Afghanistan, as Reporters Without Borders (2014b) show. Since 2006, the Committee to Protect Journalists (2014) notes that there have been 21 reporters murdered in Afghanistan, who covered issues such as corruption, crime, politics and the ongoing war.

Afghans in 2014 got their information about the elections from radio, TV, and through the internet, and in particular sites like Paiwandgah (2014), which is a “social media and mobile technology-based platform that allows Afghans to connect and contribute to the national dialogue”. It is on this site that some Afghans have responded to the question of ‘Where are you getting your information about the elections?’ with ‘TOLO TV, Ariana TV’ and ‘Election information from Twitter (40 percent), from other site like BBC, Tolo and Bokhti news and etc. (25 percent), from radio BBC and some local radio station in Bamyian like radio Bamyian, radio Paiwad and radio Bayan (around 15 percent).’ That there is a widespread availability of aural information related to the electoral process to some extent makes up for low literacy rates.

The media has recovered from Taliban repression to becoming a stronger voice for the people of Afghanistan. However, more needs to be done. The government of Afghanistan, in 2012 as noted by Freedom House (2013), drafted a new Mass Media Law, increasing the government’s control over the press. Areas such as broadcasting foreign programs and information dishonouring and defaming individuals became violations of this law. Such government control impedes the media from fulfilling its role in enabling a democratically viable Afghanistan. With the threat of violence, intimidation and other forms of coercion from the Taliban and corrupt officials lingering over their heads, along with new government regulations, the ability of the media to contribute to free and fair elections – the major concern of this work – is diminished.

Corruption and transparency in the IEC, officials and the government

Corruption in any level of government is a major cause for citizen concern. Corruption among the elected officials is an extreme concern. Articles Seventy-one and Eighty-five of the Constitution of Afghanistan (2004) specifically exclude those who have been convicted of crimes “against humanity, Page 28 of 93

criminal act, or deprivation of civil rights by a court” from serving in the government. This is also true for the president, and this is stated in Article Sixty-Two of the Constitution. However, without a fully functioning legal system, many court cases will not go through the proper due processes, as Johnson and Leslie (2004, p.77) note “in the absence of functioning courts and legal systems, due process was clearly a distant prospect”. There is the possibility, for example, that if a case against a government official goes to court then the judge may have been corrupted. Rubin (2013, p.161) notes the existence of a “corrupt network of judges” in Afghanistan due to the “Supreme Court appointing members, and controlling their careers, salary and disciplining of lower court judges”.

As previously noted, the IEC in Afghanistan terminated nearly 3000 of their staff in 2014 before the presidential elections due to widespread accusations of fraud from within. As also noted above, the results in the 2014 presidential election resulted in a runoff election (as was meant to be the case in 2009), with candidate Dr. Abdullah Abdullah again raising allegations of fraud, this time against the IEC.

Suggestions of rampant corruption among election officials does not bode well for anything resembling a legitimate democracy. As Mullen (2010, p.134) further adds, there are reports of Interior Ministry officials receiving bribes from senior police officers, who are in turn taking a portion of the salaries from ordinary police officers.

The corruption among local Afghan police, the judiciary, and government officials continued to undermine public confidence in the enforcement of the law, leading to more support for the Taliban—who offer a draconian but functioning legal system.

Government corruption in Afghanistan is undermining attempts to democratise. The recruitment of apolitical and honest civil servants is a crucial area for ensuring both the competence and integrity of a professional civil service.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2012) released a report into corruption in Afghanistan, noting as areas of concern the prevalence of bribery, public officials and bribery, recruitment practices in the public sector, and responses to bribery by citizens. Some key points from this report are:

The population of Afghanistan considered corruption, together with insecurity and unemployment, to be one of the principal challenges facing their country.

Corruption seems to be increasingly embedded in social practices, with patronage and bribery being an acceptable part of day-to-day life. Page 29 of 93

The frequency of bribery has increased from 4.7 bribes to 5.6 bribes per bribe-payer and the average cost of a bribe has risen from US$ 158 to US$ 214, a 29 percent increase in real terms.

The prevalence of bribery in Afghanistan in 2012 was 50.1 percent, meaning that half of adult Afghans still resort to bribery when dealing with public officials.

Bribes tend to be larger in the justice sector, where the average bribe paid to both prosecutors and judges is more than US$ 300.

Less than one in five people (19 percent) secured a public job without assistance from a relative, friend or member of their own community and without paying a bribe.

In the 12 months prior to the 2012 survey a total of US$ 3.9 billion was paid in bribes.

With these figures showing the level of corruption in Afghanistan are concerning, the amount of bribes and the total of bribes paid is astounding. Felbab-Brown (2013, p29) shows that the Afghanistan people “intensely resent the abuse of power, impunity for power brokers and government officials, and lack of justice that have become entrenched over the past decade”.

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah’s speaking out in 2014 regarding the IEC and the way it conducts elections does not inspire confidence amongst international observers. As this is the first democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan, if the IEC is unable to conduct a smooth election, and subsequent runoff election, they have failed an important test. The comments from Abdullah could, unfortunately, offer more incentive to the Taliban to ‘take back’ Afghanistan once the ISAF troops withdraw at the end of 2014, as there may not be a government in power that is trusted by the people of Afghanistan.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan (2014) noted in their National Corruption Survey that there are still major problems in Afghanistan. Bribery has doubled in the last 4 years reaching close to $2bn, access to services has improved but citizens are forced to pay bribes in return, the justice institutions and the police are viewed as the two most corrupt public institutions, and corruption has become the second biggest concern for ordinary Afghans. There was a 25 percent increase in participation in bribery in two years in Afghanistan. There seems to be a serious lack of repercussions for corruption. And this is evident in the electoral process as well. Bribery in public institutions means that there will be little transparency in the day to day public administration, and there is scant hope for a transparent electoral process in the immediate future.

Corruption is rife within Afghanistan, which as noted by Luo (2007, p.81) poses not only a serious development challenge, but it “undermines democracy and good governance by subverting formal processes”. With transparency, as highlighted by Richter & Burke (2007, p.73) “comes the possibility Page 30 of 93

of self-correction, so that ‘professional integrity’ and democratic accountability can fruitfully co- exist”. Without transparency, questions about the legitimacy of the government will continue to be raised, leading to doubts over the entire electoral process. Transparency International (2013) has ranked Afghanistan in the top three most corrupt nations for two years in a row. Corruption often starts at the top, and works its way down. With an ingrained culture of corruption at all levels of government in Afghanistan, the hopes for a presidential election to be run without claims of corruption and fraud are remote. It will take perhaps at least a generational change to dispose of the embedded corruption in Afghanistan, and only then can there be hope for an election to be run without corruption from electoral officials and from elected officials.

Language barriers

Language and literacy rates in Afghanistan are an impediment to national unity, and also to elections being able to contribute to a viable and functioning democracy. Increases in literacy rates since the fall of the Taliban have been due to an increase in education, and the increased ability to access educational institutions. A report from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2011, p.28) shows that between 2001 and 2009, primary school enrollment rose from 0.9 million to nearly 7 million, and that the proportion of girls attending primary school went from almost zero to 37 percent. The UNESCO report further shows that there have been over 5000 new or re-built school buildings since 2003. This demonstrates not only the rise in education leading towards better literacy rates, but shows that regardless of insurgent attacks on educational structures that the citizens of Afghanistan are determined to learn.

The Constitution of Afghanistan (2004) states that “ and shall be the official languages of the state”, and these two languages are the main languages spoken in Afghanistan with Pashtu being the most common. However, whilst there are official languages, there is no common language. Austin (2008) identifies numerous languages used in Afghanistan. Apart from the official languages of Pashtu and Dari, Tajik is spoken in the provinces of Kabul and Herat, whilst Baluchi, Kazak, Uzbek, Mongolian, Brahui, Kyrgyz, Kashmiri and Uyghur are all spoken in parts of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a largely rural country, and there is limited interaction between ordinary people using their different languages, especially from in the North East where Dari, Uzbeki, Pashto, Hazaragi, Pamiri, Kyrgyz, and Baluchi are spoken, to in the south west where Pashto, Dari and Baluchi are the main languages.

The provinces that bind people by a geographical region also bind them by language, and can undermine a sense of national identity that the people of Afghanistan may be developing. Article Sixteen of the newly created Constitution of Afghanistan (2004) states that: Page 31 of 93

From amongst Pashto, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pachaie, Nuristani, Pamiri and other current languages in the country, Pashto and Dari shall be the official languages of the state.

In areas where the majority of the people speak in any one of Uzbeki, Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamiri languages, any of the aforementioned language, in addition to Pashto and Dari, shall be the third official language, the usage of which shall be regulated by law.

To foster and develop all , effective programs shall be designed and applied by the state.

The Constitution of Afghanistan states that there are two official languages, and a third language depending on the province. Columbia University (2012) produced a map (see Figure 1, Appendix) showing the different languages used in Afghanistan. As is evident, there are a multitude of languages and dialects in Afghanistan, which is difficult for the electoral process due to people not being able to understand and comprehend information that is presented to them in languages they do not understand.

Language barriers are a large, but not insuperable, impediment to the viability of democracy in Afghanistan, and to the electoral process. Limited literacy in Pashtu or Dari may diminish the legitimacy of not only the electoral process, but also the legitimacy of the government. Full parity for all the languages is not possible due to the number of dialects, and to rectify this there is an image of the candidates on the ballot paper, with the Washington Post (2009) producing a mock ballot (Figure 2) to demonstrate. This system was also utilised in the parliamentary elections in 1965 and 1969, and has been used in a number of other countries, such as, as shown by Weaver (2012) in the 2012 Egypt elections. For the 2014 Presidential elections, the same method was in force, with the Australian newspaper (2014) also noting this, by stating that “the designs help illiterate voters differentiate between hundreds of contenders”. The symbols, including paint brushes, naan bread, a hair comb, a ladder, parrots and a bulldozer (the symbol for , who earned the nickname of “the bulldozer” for pushing though major road and infrastructure projects — as well as for his forceful personality) are decided through a mixture of candidate preferences and allocation by the IEC. Coburn and Larson (2014, p.11) note that Ashraf Ghani “used an image of the Koran holder as his chosen symbol on the ballot paper during the presidential election of 2009, implying a commitment to Islamic values”. Of note, other developing countries also use election symbols, including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Egypt, as previously noted. But without fully knowing or appreciating what they were doing, would the citizens of Afghanistan have known the meaning of exactly what they were doing? The designs themselves may unhelpfully influence voter choice. Page 32 of 93

The United Nations Development Programme (2004, p.21) notes that the literacy rate in Afghanistan for males in 2003 was 43.2 percent, and for females was 14.1 percent. This is up slightly from the AusAID (2012, p.1) report estimating that in 2000 the literacy rate in Afghanistan was 43 percent for men and 12.6 percent for women. At the start of 2010 the literacy rate in was estimated at five percent, and while nearly 10 percent of men are literate, the literacy rate for women is recorded at less than one percent. The Asia-Pacific Cultural Centre for UNESCO (2010, p.4) notes that the literacy rate for has risen from to roughly 60 percent in 2011. The increase in literacy rates is positive for the electoral process, as it grants the possibility of greater political awareness to more people. However, as the ballots for the elections since the invasion of 2001 were in Pashtu or Dari only, over half of the citizens that were eligible to vote in Afghanistan would not have been able to fully understand the form or what they were doing due to being illiterate.

An increase of literacy rates will undoubtedly increase political awareness, transparency and in turn openness. This will lead to strengthening existing parties and perhaps even to new parties. This will in turn lead to a rise in participation not only through elections, but through the entire democratic process by keeping the elected officials aware of individual and group concerns. The main languages of Pashtu and Dari may hinder national unity, the sense of identity between Afghan citizens, but their search for education and striving for knowledge will eventually overcome the language barriers. By striving for a greater political awareness, the citizens of Afghanistan will be able to work towards a strong and viable democracy.

Summary

Openness is a key consideration in making the Afghanistan presidential elections contribute to a democratically viable Afghanistan. Transparency, the role of the media, rampant corruption, and the impediment of language barriers will remain issues in Afghanistan for a long time. Understandably, these issues cannot simply change overnight. But the process has begun and must prosper, otherwise the younger generation will become complacent about, and perhaps dismissive of, the electoral process in Afghanistan.

The role of the IEC needs to be expanded, results should be made public quickly, and results which are obvious cases of fraud should be removed from the election tally. The media needs to report on these issues fairly and without bias, and needs to start publicly naming and shaming officials both elected and appointed who are corrupt to show that this behaviour will not be tolerated. The corruption needs to stop, but this will take a long time, since patronage and bribery are often acceptable parts of day-to-day life. The language barriers are improving, and there is hope for the Page 33 of 93

future in this area. On balance, openness in Afghanistan’s elections has been limited and continues to present barriers to democratic consolidation.

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Chapter 4: Universal Suffrage

Universal suffrage encourages the participation of all citizens, providing opportunity and accessibility for people to vote regardless of their gender, race, religion or other characteristics or identifiers. The importance of universal suffrage and its enablers in Afghanistan cannot be understated. Polling places should be within reasonable distances for citizens, and should be safe from threats and undue influence. Polling places should be open for extended hours, as well as having pre-election voting, to ensure greater participation. Polling places opening later in the day than other places by many hours affects the voter turnout. For practical purposes, participation is not about 100 percent turnout at polling stations, it is about 100 percent of the people having the opportunity to have their say in the electoral process.

Jackson (1998, p.37) shows that suffrage - in addition to its practical role in choosing from competing candidates - is also a symbolic right and that voting is a symbolic act, and this is a concept that is reasonably new to the people of Afghanistan. Coburn and Larson (2014, p.56) show that a system that enshrines a single vote cast for a single candidate is the easiest way to conduct an election for a nation with no history of universal suffrage. And while suffrage is extremely important, the role of women in the electoral movement in Afghanistan is of critical importance. Darcy (1987) focuses on women in political institutions, Luce (2005) highlights that women in the urban areas of Afghanistan are deeply committed to political participation, and this work is extended by Ford (2010, p.70) who adds that “suffrage for women guarantees that women will be active on all sides of the debate, from inside the political system and as outside activists”.

Universal suffrage will also go a long way to showing the people of Afghanistan the benefits of political participation: through open debates by elected officials and those contesting elections; citizens taking an active role in how government allocates funds to social services and programs that they need on a daily basis (i.e. health and medical, transport, education and so on); increased community participation in decisions about local issues and needs; and encouraging transparency and accountability of the elected officials.

The holding of ‘town hall’ meetings to educate citizens about upcoming issues will help to develop a political culture where everyone has the skills, information, opportunities and sense of entitlement to contribute to decision-making processes. Targeted promotion of participation will help to fulfil the potential of universal suffrage. Page 35 of 93

The new role of women

A viable and functioning democracy has to be effective and not just apparent, as this adds to the legitimacy of elections and removes ambiguity of outcomes. And in Afghanistan this process will be greatly assisted by women’s participation. This section will look at how women will help the electoral process in Afghanistan. Women under the Taliban were seen to be lower in social standing than the males, as shown by Skaine (2002, p.24); they were “subject to strict social traditions that forbid them to talk with strangers, and that separate them from the men at such events as funerals and in public transportation”. For elections to be successful and effective in enabling a post-conflict democratically viable Afghanistan, women need to have increased rights, participation and education.

In 1948, the United Nations drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (2009), affirming in Article 21 that:

1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

The aim of this Article is to bring peace to nations throughout the world, and to insist that everyone in the world has the same rights, regardless of their race, religion, gender etc. The Taliban, as noted by Amnesty International UK (2014), enforced their strict version of Islamic Sharia law, where women and girls were banned from: going to school or studying, working, leaving the house without a male chaperone, showing their skin in public, accessing healthcare delivered by men (with women forbidden from working, healthcare was virtually inaccessible), and banned from being involved in politics or speaking publicly. Punishments for not abiding by these rules were very harsh, with Amnesty adding that “a woman could be flogged for showing an inch or two of skin under her full- body burqa, beaten for attempting to study, stoned to death if she was found guilty of adultery”.

In 1994 as the Taliban began capturing cities and taking over Afghanistan, it began to restrict the public role of women. As noted by Skaine (2008, p.7) the “Taliban edicts and restrictions did not allow women free mobility and women were prohibited from employment, education or medical care”. This was justified by the Taliban as being for the protection of women. Skaine (2002, p.7) further argues that under the Taliban, Afghan women “were forced to suffer specific unrelenting and often violent adversity, including the denial of basic human rights, veiling, seclusion and Page 36 of 93

segregation”. When the Taliban were removed from power in 2001, most of these restrictions against women stopped; however, as noted by Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites (2009, p.289) “Afghan girls and women are still enduring chronic high levels of insecurity, such as suicide to prevent unwanted marriages, a shortage of health facilities, and high illiteracy rates”.

When the Taliban fell in 2001, the public role of women in society increased, although the oppression has not ended. The role of women in civil society is paramount, and as Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites (2009, p.xxi) note, “the strength of civil society in both urban and rural areas is one of the most important measure in facilitating a strong citizenship and an active democracy”. This is further exemplified by Brodsky (2011, p.133) who declares that “it cannot be overstated that the true experts in the fight to end violence against women in Afghanistan are Afghans, and particularly Afghan women themselves”. The role of Afghan men in allowing Afghan women to live as equals in society is also important to women being an active part of society; men must accept that women are free under the laws enacted in 2003. Men who are elected officials, men who are in public office, and men who are normal citizens, must acknowledge this new status. Without this recognition, women will be little better off than before.

In June 2000, as Benard et al (2008, p.69) note, a conference was held in Tajikistan with 300 Afghan women from all over the world to create a way forward for women in Afghanistan. These women created a document, entitled the “Declaration of the Essential Rights of Afghan Women” (The Declaration), which contains statements on how the women of Afghanistan should, and more importantly will, be treated by men and by each other. The Declaration (2000) states that all the women of Afghanistan are equal, regardless of their social and political connections; that Afghan women have the right to institutional education in all the intellectual and physical disciplines; the right to just and favourable conditions of work; and the right to wear or not to wear the chadari (burqa) or the scarf to name but a few. The rights listed were all derived from other documents of importance to women (such as the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), and shows that the women who created the Declaration were champions of the rights of Afghan women. The Declaration also shows a very important aspect of modernity, as noted above where women have the right to wear, or not to wear, their burqa. This is a far cry from the strict Taliban-imposed Islam where women were forced to wear their burqa. In 2003, Karzai signed The Declaration making it into law. With this implemented, women in Afghanistan now enjoy full equal rights with men, at last at a formal level.

Further to the signing of The Declaration, with the ratification of a new Constitution of Afghanistan in 2004, women were to be treated as equals. A clause was included in the Constitution that prescribed an increased participation of women in government. Article Eighty-three Chapter 5, Page 37 of 93

Article 3 in part states that at least two female delegate should be elected from each province. Article Eighty-four, Chapter 5, Article 4 in part states that 50 percent of the Members of the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders) appointed by the President are to be women. Through the abolition of formal barriers between men and women in 2003 under the Declaration of the Essential Rights of Afghan Women, Afghanistan has a greater sense of unity. Men no longer act on behalf of women; women are able to raise their voices and be heard.

In present day Afghanistan, women are able to get an education; a job; leave the house; seek medical assistance from a male; choose not to wear their burqa; laugh; play sport and even choose to wear brightly coloured clothes. Through their active and ever increasing participation in society, Afghan women are taking their place in an increasingly democratic society, which, as noted by Ilham (2013), points to “evidence of gradual improvements of women’s influence, [which] has been largely driven by women’s political participation”. The help from within will strengthen the national bonds, strengthen the role of women and strengthen the incipient democracy. There are, of course, barriers and impediments to this development, including corruption and religious zealotry. Gopal (2009) notes that “Afghan women [still] rank at or near the bottom in almost every conceivable world ranking: life expectancy, maternal mortality, access to education, access to health care, suicide rates, domestic violence, and more”.

The local participation of women in the electoral and democratic process will need to springboard from the expanded role that women have in a new post-conflict Afghanistan. This is something that the National Democratic Institute (n.d.) encourages, with its efforts “to promote the participation of civic groups, political parties, women and government bodies in the country’s political and electoral processes”. Above all, education and the promotion of elections and full participation in universal suffrage will enable a more democratically viable Afghanistan.

A key test of universal suffrage in Afghanistan is the role of women. Benard et al (2008, p.66) show that after the 2004 presidential elections, women’s advocacy groups started to identify challenges and problems that the elections would pose for women. This process was started early, and not just for the candidates, but also for the voters. Obviously, security and safety were amongst the highest challenges that faced women both voting and running as candidates in the elections. Benard et al further show some relevant statistics from the 2005 Afghanistan Parliamentary elections:

44 percent of new voters were women.

Registration of women voters had increased by 35 percent in Uruzgan province.

35 percent of the voter educators were women.

2.4 million women in Afghanistan received some sort of civic education and outreach. Page 38 of 93

These statistics confirm that the participation of women in the democratic process in Afghanistan is increasing. With greater education and openness, the political landscape will change and allow for more women to freely express their political views without fear of reprisal. But it will not be a simple process.

Without a high level of genuine participation, it can be said that democratic elections are hollow, and perhaps even worthless. Without a high representation of women voters, the elected officials are not fully representative. Starkey (2009) noted that in the 2002 presidential elections “millions of Afghan women [would] be denied their chance to vote in presidential elections this week because there aren't enough female officials to staff the women-only polling stations”. This is coupled, he added, with a lack of “female staff to operate the strictly segregated stations, and more importantly, without female searchers to frisk women voters as they arrive at those stations, [so] conservative men across the country will ban their wives and daughters from taking part”. Women need to help women. With women only allowed to vote in the separate women’s voting centres, the ability to have a broad public conversation about political matters is significantly reduced.

The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (2009a) released a report in 2009 on voter registrations. Some of the problems highlighted in this report are:

Registration of people that would not be eighteen years of age on the polling day.

Multiple registration, where people obtained more than one registration card.

Lack of impartiality and political independence of electoral staff.

Registering women based on a list that was provided by male relatives.

Location and distance of registration centers away from residential areas.

Lack of observers and media in registration centres.

Security situation that stopped people from taking part in the process.

Some of these issues in the 2009 Presidential elections have still not been overcome, as the threats to women continue. Benard et al (2008, p.69) note a history of “physical safety and security [issues] prompted by several public acts of violence, such as a June 2004 attack on a bus containing female election workers”. Why would women risk their lives to vote?

Data from Afghanistan Election Data (n.d.) concerning the 2009 presidential elections show that voter turnout was extremely low, and Oppel (2009) notes that in a district in Helmand Province with a population estimated between 35,000 to 50,000 people, between 250 and 300 people voted, none of whom were women. However, in the 2014 presidential election, there was a remarkably better turnout, with the IEC (2014d) showing that 103,558 votes were tallied for this province. Granted, the Page 39 of 93

security situation has improved remarkably in the five years; but this is also a very positive step towards women engaging in the electoral process.

Of course, just because a woman is registered to vote doesn’t mean that she will vote. Threats against women and their families’ lives through intimidation will often discourage them. Not having women’s polling places staffed by women will also discourage them. Without women voting in large numbers, there will continue to be questions about the representativeness and legitimacy of the government.

The participation of women is regarded as critical to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and to the viability of a functioning democracy. The World Bank (2005, p.38) noted that the participation of women in Afghanistan would increase the available labour supply, and bring additional knowledge, techniques and ideas which will enhance the Afghanistan economy. By having women being able to participate in Afghanistan through their contributions to the labour market and other non-traditional roles such as trade related employment, and not constrained by their traditional roles, Afghanistan has a better chance of prospering. Contribution to education by enabling women to teach will also reap rewards, as will having a stronger presence in health services. By giving women the education to earn a living, it will see a greater participation from women in Afghanistan, which will lead to their essential contribution to a functioning democracy.

Women presidential candidates

The role of women in Afghanistan has changed dramatically since the fall of the Taliban and the adoption of a new constitution, as we have seen. The 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan, as noted by Luce (2005, p.551), granted universal suffrage, however limited access to education still inhibited the participation of women in the voting process except in Kabul. Under this constitution, the first woman was elected to parliament and in 1965 the first woman was appointed a cabinet member.

Kubra Noorzai was the first elected woman to hold a cabinet position in Afghanistan. In 1965, as Emadi (2002, p.85) notes, Noorzai served as the minster of public health until 1969. This paved the way for Shafiqa Ziaye, who in 1971 served as a political advisor to the then Afghanistan Prime Minister Abdul Zahir. Further, in 1965, four other women, who like Noorzai had upper-class origins, ran for and won seats in the House of the People, the Wolesi Jirga. From 1965 through to 1972, there was a disparate proportion of men and women in the cabinet, parliament and senate of Afghanistan. There were two women to 20 men in the cabinet, four women to 216 men in the parliament, and two female senators out of 56. In total, eight women compared to 292 men.

Malalai Joya was elected to the Wolesi Jirga (Lower House) in September 2005. Whilst this election was not a presidential one, the parliamentary election of Joya and other women in this election was Page 40 of 93

significant, as this was the first post-Taliban election with women candidates. There are 249 seats in the Lower House, and as stated in the Constitution, 68 must be women (at least two per province). During this election period, as noted by the National Democratic Institute (2006), a total of 2,835 people had nominated themselves as Wolesi Jirga candidates, including 344 women. A total of 3,201 Afghans had come forward as candidates for the 34 Provincial Councils, including 285 women. Malalai Joya served in the Lower House from 2005 until early 2007, after being dismissed for publicly denouncing the presence of warlords and war criminals in the Afghan Parliament, and in 2009 released an autobiography, Raising my voice: The extraordinary story of the Afghan woman who dares to raise her voice.

Joya (2009) claimed that despite considerable international efforts, Afghanistan is still ruled by “women-hating” criminals, with the fundamentalists preaching that women are meant to stay in their houses. After speaking out about the “chaotic and almost useless” Afghanistan parliament, as well as condemning the elected warlords, Joya received numerous death threats - not from the public - from other elected officials in the Afghan parliament. After she was suspended from parliament, there was never an opportunity given to her to publicly defend herself. Thankfully, even after such treatment, there are still women who wish to stand up and run for public office against the brutality of the warlords and corrupt government officials.

There have been few women candidates on the three presidential ballots in Afghanistan since 2004; in fact there have been only three. In 2014, Khadija Ghaznawi stood for president; however after some initial campaigning, she was removed from the list of candidates. As documented by Mahr (2013), the IEC removed Ghaznawi without explanation. This sends a poor signal to women about the worth of democracy. In an interview from February 2014 posted on the Huffington Post website (2014), Ghaznawi notes that one of her worst fears is regarding the “extensive corruption in all aspects of government”. She also argued that the women of Afghanistan are still oppressed by the patriarchal system.

The National Democratic Institute (2006) produced a report on the 2005 parliamentary and provincial council elections in Afghanistan. They found that women ran as independents in the elections, however, for women to locate the resources (such as volunteers, financing, and mobility) to run adequate campaigns, many had to run as party candidates. It is important to note here that Article 35 of the Afghanistan Constitution (Government of Afghanistan, 2004) states, in part, that:

The citizens of Afghanistan have the right to form social organizations for the purpose of securing material or spiritual aims in accordance with the provisions of the law. Page 41 of 93

The citizens of Afghanistan have the right to form political parties in accordance with the provisions of the law, provided that:

1. The party is not contrary to the principles of sacred religion of Islam or the Constitution. 2. The organizational structure, and financial sources of the party are made public. 3. The party does not have military or paramilitary aims and structures. 4. Should have no affiliation to a foreign political party or sources.

The 2005 parliamentary and provincial council election also highlighted, that 10.5 million Afghans registered to vote, with women making up 41.3 percent of those registered.

But what about the female candidates more generally? As noted above, the only woman candidate in the 2014 presidential election was ruled out of the running, for no apparent reason. In the 2004 presidential elections, there was a solitary female candidate, Masooda Jalal, who tallied 91,415 votes, or 1.1 percent of the total vote. In the 2009 presidential election there were two female candidates: Dr. Frozan Fana, who received a total of 8,159 votes, and Shahla Atta who received a total of 4,356 votes. This totals 12,515 of the 4,294,719 votes cast, or 0.003 percent of the vote for women. This makes the results for Masooda Jalal in the 2004 presidential election even more impressive.

Increased education for women

As noted earlier, between 2001 and 2009, primary school enrolment rose from 0.9 million to nearly 7 million, and the proportion of girls at primary school went from almost zero to 37 percent. This helps the young women of Afghanistan to obtain an education, and perhaps one day participate more in the electoral and democratic process. The 1964 Constitution granted universal suffrage, however limited access to education still inhibited the participation of women in the voting process except in Kabul. The Taliban, declared Skaine (2002, p.61) had “not been able to provide women with any means of sustenance or any means of living”, and had closed schools and thereby opportunities for young women, and cost thousands of jobs for the women teachers.

The ever expanding participation of women in Afghanistan is mostly confined to the capital of Kabul, as Mohib (2012) notes that “women in Kabul gives the impression of change, but Kabul holds only a very small representation of Afghan women. Most women live in rural areas and are not affected by the more lenient cosmopolitan environment in the capital”. The women in the rural and countryside areas of Afghanistan are still living in traditional roles, and will need the assistance of urban women to ensure that they are able to fully participate in a new Afghan society. Once the international community and the security forces withdraw from Afghanistan, these women will have to stand up Page 42 of 93

for themselves and become stronger to ensure that they are not forced back into the ways that applied under the Taliban. An article in Time magazine by Aryn Baker (2010) highlights this. Baker raises the issue of the lack of safeguards once the ISAF forces start their withdrawal at the end of 2014, noting that the women fear that in the quest for quick peace, their progress may be sidelined. Fawzia Koofi, the former Deputy Speaker of Afghanistan's parliament, highlights in the article that “women's rights must not be the sacrifice by which peace is achieved”. The rights of women, and ensuring their right to freedom and participation in society will ensure that the viability of a functioning democracy in Afghanistan rests on the representation of women helping the nation more towards a sustainable democracy.

Voter turnout for women

2004 election turnout

The 2004 election had an estimated 40 percent female turnout. Afghanistan Presidential Elections (2004) data shows that provinces in the north were more highly represented than those in the south, for example Jozjab and Takhar in the north with 46 and 40 percent respectively, and Uruzgan and Helmand in the south with 2 and 7 percent respectively. Since this was the first time that many of these women were able to vote, the estimated 40 percent turnout is a strong result. Voter turnout of the estimated 8 million in this landmark election included 3,200,000 women.

2009 election turnout

The IEC (2009a) highlighted that in 2009, 38.75 percent of the estimated 15,295,016 eligible voters (of which 38.70 percent were able to participate) were females. This works out to be 2,293,679 female voters, a poor voter turnout for women. Driving this election period, as noted by the International Republican Institute (2009), there were some difficulties in recruiting female poll workers. Sometimes, male elders were used as poll workers instead, which served to deter many female voters. This report also notes that males were hired in the southern provinces, due to tradition and culture. The NDI (2009, p.71) states that there were 1,675,596 new female registrants for this election.

2014 election turnout

Tolo news (2014) reported that the IEC Chair estimated that 35 percent of the over seven million Afghans that voted in the elections were female, which would total over 2,450,000 female voters, a slight increase on the 2009 turnout, but nowhere near the 2005 parliamentary election and smaller than the 2004 presidential election mark. Without female Page 43 of 93

workers at the polling stations, coupled with intimidation and violence as noted by (Jalalzai and Jefferess (2011, p.19), the lower women voter turnout will likely continue.

Summary

Universal suffrage in Afghanistan needs to continue to deepen for elections to flourish. Open debates by candidates, an increased community participation, and encouraging transparency and accountability of the elected officials need to happen for suffrage taken up. Along with this, and as Szeman (2011, p.166) notes, the 2004 election had “challenges being made against universal suffrage within Afghanistan’s patriarchal culture, and the limited control over the country past the capital”. The challenge of a patriarchal culture continues to contribute to a hollowing-out of universal suffrage in Afghanistan.

As a new democracy, women need more representation on the ballot paper to engage more with democratic consolidation. Having a total of three women run for president over the three elections is a meagre beginning, however this can be seen as inspiration for women in another fledgling democracies in the region, as well as in more mature democracies. Whilst Australia has only had one female head of government, and the U.S. has never had a female president, the opportunity now exists in Afghanistan for the women to have representation in the parliament, which will enable stronger participation and the crushing of some of the old beliefs and systems in place in Afghanistan.

The emancipation of women, their education and entrance into the labour market will take time, but this will assist in the democratic processes. It will take many years, if not decades, to see the role of women as equals in the Afghan society, just as the story continues is the so-called advanced democracies. But there needs to be an education process for women to empower them to want to run in politics at any level, and to want to run in an election without fear of reprisal for speaking out against the government or warlords. Without women on the ballot paper, and without high women turnout, Afghanistan elections will continue to struggle as a means to create a consolidated democracy in Afghanistan.

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Chapter 5: Secret Ballot

A secret ballot ensures that a vote has been made without undue influence, intimidation or coercion, violence or the threat of violence. The secret ballot is a cornerstone of free and fair elections, as agreed by Goodwin-Gill (2006) and Boda (2004), and as highlighted by Freedom House (2013, p.22) “the authority of government is based on universal and equal suffrage based on regular, free, and fair elections conducted by secret ballot”. Without this safety net, an election will not be a genuine election or meet standard free voting procedures, as noted in Article 21, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, as well as Article 61 of The Constitution of Afghanistan (2004) which requires “votes cast by voters through free, general, secret and direct voting”. Anonymity in the voting process is a contributing factor to high participation rates, and Heckelman (1995, p.108) argues, it “eliminated the monitoring mechanism, thereby ending the bribes”.

A secret ballot, Katz explains (1997, p.204) is where “voting is a private act for which the voter is accountable to no one but himself [or herself]”. Yi and Okamoto (2011, p.387) argue that a “challenge to remote voting is voter coercion and vote buying, as the behaviour of the voter can be more controlled by an adversary”. As Afghanistan is a large country with many remote villages, this remains a potentially large problem.

In Afghanistan, voting is not always done through independent free choice for a preferred candidate on the ballot paper. Picard (2005, p.120) argues that “social groups are allowed to promote parochial interests by favouring members of their own community,” showing that voting is done along tribal lines, and in ethnic patterns. In the early presidential elections, this problem was extremely prevalent and obvious; however there seems to have been a certain shift away from this in the initial 2014 election.

Ethnicity, according to Heywood (1992, p.151) is the “sentiment of loyalty towards a distinctive population, cultural group or territorial area”, based on factors such as religion, cultural heritage, language, location, or customs. This is how people would describe themselves to others, and how others describe them. Tribalism, as discussed by Heywood (1992, p.160), on the other hand, is “group behaviour characterized by insularity and exclusivity, typically fuelled by hostility towards rival groups”. Tribalism has to do with whom you marry, who your political leadership and alliances are, the paths by which you trace your own family lineage, and the complex interplays of kinship. These characteristic are prevalent in Afghanistan, where, as highlighted by Isby (2011) the local leaders among a population that has been mobilized along ethnolinguistic, tribal, or local lines help to deliver bloc votes for a particular candidate. Years of warfare and the collapse of a functioning central government, as noted by Suhrke (2007, p.1302) had “led to the formation of parallel power Page 45 of 93

structures at the local level, often headed by local commanders, or the administrative structures were directly controlled by local strongmen”. In the 2004 and 2009 Presidential elections there was an obvious and overwhelming rural and urban divide in the 34 provinces in Afghanistan, still evident in the first round of the 2014 election.

Ethnic differences in the provinces

The variety and diversity of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan is staggering. Like many other countries in the world, Afghanistan is a country of varying climates and land, ranging from the mountainous regions of the north east and the snow covered peaks in the North West, to the dry and sandy deserts predominating in the west. Rain is more abundant in the North of Afghanistan, and there is a notable lack of trees throughout the country which leads to increased rates of soil erosion when it rains. Each of the 34 provinces is divided into several districts (Wuluswali) and sub districts (Alaqadari), depending on the size of the population in the province, with the head of the province being the governor (Wali). The heads of the districts and sub districts are not appointed by people from the province they represent, but by the central government in Kabul.

The Central Statistics Organization (CSO) of Afghanistan (2011, p.8-9) showed that of the total of 24,987,700 people who live in Afghanistan, Kabul is the highest populated province with 3,818,700 people, of whom 3,188,300 live in urban areas, and 630,400 live in the rural areas. The next biggest province is Herat, with 1,744,700 people in the province: 1,259,200 in urban areas and 485,500 in rural areas. The smallest province by total population is Nooristan, which has a total population of 138,600, all of whom are classified as living in rural areas. This figure is similar to the Panjsher province, which has a total population of 143,700 people again all classified as living in rural areas. The total number of Afghanis living in a rural environment is 19,108,500 compared to those living in an urban environment of 5,879,200. This works out to be over 76 percent of people, just over 3 out of every 4 people in Afghanistan living in a rural environment, a rate that has remained steady over the past 5 years, and ranks in the top 25 of nations in the world (World Bank, 2012). This figure of 76 percent living in a rural environment can be compared to 33 percent in Iraq, and 11 percent in Australia.

There is an ethnic divide not only between provinces, but also within provinces as well. Harpviken (1997, p.272) notes that in 1991, the estimated largest ethnic group in Afghanistan was Pashtun with 6 million (44 percent), followed by Tajik with 3.4 million (25 percent), Uzbek with 1.3 million (9 percent), Hazara with 1.1 million (8 percent), with 600,000 and Aimaq with 500,000 (both roughly 4 percent), Turkmen with 400,000 (3 percent), and Nuristani and Baluchi with 100,000 each (under 1 percent). The 2008 figures from the United State Library of Congress (2008, p.6) show that Page 46 of 93

Pashtun is 42 percent, Tajik 27 percent, Hazara 9 percent; Uzbek 9 percent, Aimaq 4 percent, Turkmen 3 percent and Baluchi at 2 percent. A study in 2010 of 6467 Afghans, both male and female, by the Asia foundations (2010, p.157) found that the ethnic divide in Afghanistan is reasonably steady for most ethnicities, with Pashtun at 42 percent, Tajik 31 percent, Uzbek 9 percent, Hazara 10 percent, Turkmen 2 percent, Aimaq 2 percent, Baluchi 1 percent, Nuristani 1 percent, and a rise in the ethnicity identifier of ‘Arab’, coming in at 2 percent of those surveyed. Figure 3, near the end of this thesis, shows a Columbia University (2014a) map outlining the different ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

Data from the Afghanistan Presidential Election Results (n.d.) shows that in the 2004 Presidential election, the Pashtun regions in the south and eastern (such as Kandahar, Uruzgan and Nanghar) overwhelmingly voted for the ethnic Pashtun candidate, Hamid Karzai. In Kandahar, for example, Karzai polled an astonishing 91 percent of the vote, 281,025 of the possible 312,576 votes. He received 76.5 percent of the vote in Uruzgan, and 95 percent in Nanghar. In the Uzbeki region in the north west of Afghanistan, the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan and Sari Pul, the Uzbek candidate Abdul Rashid Dostum received 72.9, 78.0 and 47.7 percent of the vote respectively.

Whilst the most common ethnicity, Pashtun, has remained fairly constant, Tajik and Hazara numbers have risen in the six years since the surveys were conducted. Tajik, being an ethnicity from neighbouring Tajikistan (to the north of Afghanistan) dominates the northern and western provinces of Afghanistan, such as Badakhshan, and Takhar in north eastern Afghanistan; Balkh and Samangan in north western Afghanistan; Kapisa , Panjshir and Parwan in central Afghanistan; Badghis, Ghor and Herat in western Afghanistan. The Tajik religion is a Sunni Muslim religion. Even though they are the major ethnicity in Afghanistan, Adeney (2008, p.543) notes that Pashtuns are particularly concentrated in the southern part of the country. This is in contrast to the who, as the second largest community in Afghanistan, are less territorially concentrated than either the Uzbeks or the , and thus “focused on power sharing in the central state” rather than on territorial autonomy. Interestingly, as Adeney further explains, (2008, p.546) Pashtuns and the Americans argued for a presidential system because of the perceived need for a “strong man” to lead Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are not quite a ruling majority, and consequently, the Afghans running for office in the Wolesi Jirga or the Meshrano Jirga must attempt to win the hearts and the minds of people not in their own ethnicity or community.

2004 election ethnicity differences

As noted above, on October 9 2004, Afghanistan held its first post-Taliban presidential election, with Hamid Karzai winning the election in the first round with, 55.4 percent of the vote, with his closest Page 47 of 93

rival Yunus Qanuni acquiring 16.3 percent of the 8,024,536 valid votes cast. There were nearly 5,000 polling centres (with 22,000 polling stations) in all 34 Afghan provinces, and over eight million Afghan voters, a 70 percent turnout rate. Hamid Karzai is Pashtun, and Yunus Qanuni is an ethnic Tajik. In the provinces where these two candidates were born, Kandahar and Panjshir provinces respectively, the results from the 2004 presidential election show marked ethnic loyalty in Kandahar, Karzai received 281,025 (91.0 percent) votes compared to Qanuni with 9,202 (3.0 percent). In Panjshir, Qanuni received 45,158 (95.1 percent) votes to Karzai’s 367 (0.8 percent). The difference in these provinces demonstrates a strong link between ethnicity and voting.

Furthermore, if the provinces that border Kandahar and Panjshir are viewed as a separate entity for results, they show that the provinces surrounding Kandahar (Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul) have Karzai with 335,664 (87.63 percent) votes, and Qanuni with 11,671 (0.3 percent). For the provinces surrounding Panjshir (Baghlan, Takhar, Badakhskan, Nuristan, Lagman, Parwan and Kapisa), the election results show Karzai receiving 381,164 (33.87 percent) votes, with Qanuni receiving 369,145 (34.98 percent). The results around Panjshir show some diversity, however the results for the three provinces surrounding Kandahar are a clear indication of voting along ethnic lines. Ethnic divisions, as noted by Goodson (2005, p.94) would become even clearer in the aftermath of the 2004 election, originally scheduled for June but postponed for multiple reasons, including insecurity in much of the south and east that delayed voter registration.

2009 election ethnicity differences

The next presidential election was held on 20 August 2009, with incumbent Hamid Karzai winning 49.67 percent of the vote and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah with 30.59 percent in the first round. Abdullah, as reported by Farmer (2009b) is the son of a Pashtun father from Kandahar and Tajik mother with ancestral roots in Kandahar, although he was born in Kabul. In the provinces where these two candidates were born, the results from the 2009 presidential election show that in Kandahar, Karzai received 221,36 (87.57 percent) votes compared to Abdullah with 9,289 (3.7 percent). Whilst in Kabul, Abdullah received 130,027 (24.64 percent) votes to Karzai’s 290,430 (55.04 percent).

If the provinces that border Kandahar and Kabul are viewed as a separate entity for results, they show that the provinces surrounding Kandahar (Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul) have Karzai with 145,974 (79.95 percent) votes, and Abdullah with 7,899 (0.4 percent). For the provinces surrounding Kabul (Wardak, Parwan, Kapisa, Lagman, Nangarhar and Logar), the results show Karzai receiving 472,413 (62.19 percent) votes, with Abdullah receiving 158,833 (20.91 percent). The results around Kabul show some diversity in voting, however the results for the three provinces surrounding Kandahar, again show an extremely clear indication of voting along ethnic lines. Page 48 of 93

2014 election ethnicity differences

The 2014 presidential election, resulted in neither Abdullah Abdullah nor Ashraf Ghani receiving the required 50 percent of votes in the first round, resulting in a run-off election. Abdullah received 2,973,706 votes (44.9 percent), with Ghani receiving 2,082,417 votes (31.5 percent). It was during this time, as ascertained by Bezhan (2014), that “ethnic tensions have escalated amid the election deadlock, fears have risen that the country could return to the type of interethnic violence seen in the 1990s”. This situation would not be a desirable as the constant threat of the Taliban, coupled with civil unrest would be a catastrophic outcome for the first time in the nation’s history where it has the opportunity to democratically transfer power from one ruler to another.

Bezhan also noted the ethnicity of the two candidates has added to speculation that there could be ongoing civil unrest and violence in the period after the announcement of the presidential vote winner. Abdullah, who is half-Tajik and half-Pashtun, has strong support among the Tajik community in the country's north. Ghani, who was born in , is a Pashtun whose main support base lies in the Pashtun heartland, in Afghanistan's south and east. In Afghanistan, there is a north/west vs south/east divide, based on ethnicity, as shown at Figure 3. In the provinces where these two candidates were born, Kabul and Logar provinces respectively, the results from the 2014 presidential election show that in Kabul, Abdullah received 389,584 (49.62 percent) votes compared to Ghani with 248,220 (31.62 percent). Whilst in Logar, Ghani received 20,953 (63.35 percent) votes to Abdullah’s 6,169 (18.65 percent). These provinces neighbour each other.

These two prominent ethnic groups in Afghanistan are unsurprisingly wanting to protect their interests in the state. The ethnic group with which the president is associated, or the group that has the most representative in the government and wields the most power, may cause tension and even violence in Afghanistan if it does not handle power wisely. Posner (2005, p.127) highlights that in the southern African nation of Zambia, for example, “ethnic competition and conflict rose not from the presence of ethnic groups, but from the pattern of their relative sizes and geographic distribution”. Posner further explains that countries that have one large ethnic group, or where there are two similar or evenly matched groups, have been found to be more prone to violence than countries that have a larger number of different equally sized ethnic groups. The parallels with Afghanistan are troubling.

Whilst Posner argues that a predominance of one ethnicity may cause tension and violence in nations, Fearon and Laitin (2003, p.75) show that this is not the sole cause of such problems, rather that poverty, political instability, rough ground, and a large population are contributing factors, along with an ethnic divide that can drive a country into conflict. This is further discussed by Page 49 of 93

Riphenburg (2005, p.31), who argues that it is “not the presence of ethnic groups per se that leads to violence or instability but the absence of civil society and democratic governance and norms”. In Afghanistan there is a major ethnic divide, there is a large population (estimated from the CIA World Factbook (2014) in July 2014 to be 31,822,848), and there are major security threats.

The differences in ethnicity are a factor contributing to the shortcomings of the Afghanistan presidential elections in consolidating a democratically viable Afghanistan. Different ethnic groups strongly favour their own candidate. Whilst the first round of votes for the 2014 election showed the Tajik Abdullah in front, the run-off reversed that trend, with the Pashtun Ghani becoming a clear leader (albeit amid accusations of fraud), as noted by Graham-Harrison (2014b).

Voting along tribal lines

Unsurprisingly, for those people new to the voting process, many look to their religious leaders and tribal elders to assist them in making a decision about whom to vote for. Ponzio (2007, p.264) argues that after the presidential election in 2004, the religious leaders, "" commanders, and tribal elders were seen to have and be using more power and influence than the elected officials. One reason for this is that these tribal leaders and elders had the ability to solve the problems of the people in their area more quickly and effectively than the remote elected officials were able to do. This adds a further dimension to the ethnic Pashtun/non-Pashtun divide in Afghanistan that surfaces at moments of political instability (see Figure 4).

Whilst the people of Afghanistan vote in secret on the ballot paper, they are likely to have been informed by their village elders to vote for a specific person or party that supports their tribal interests. This raises a question about the legitimacy of the elections and of the elected officials. This is highlighted by Ibrahimi (2014) who noted that in the 2014 Presidential election “a specific feature of Paktia (province) is a tribal bloc vote, directed by elders who seem to favour candidate Ashraf Ghani in the areas populated by the Ahmadza”. Results from the IEC (2014) show that Ashraf Ghani amassed 157,826 of the 253,234 votes cast in the province of Paktia, 62.32 percent of the vote. The next closest candidate was Prof-Abdo Rabe Rasool Sayyaf with 34,847 votes, 13.76 percent. This Pashtun province recorded votes of 221,574 (95 percent) of 231,915 and 193,541 of 212,405 (91 percent) to Hamid Karzai in the 2004 and 2009 Presidential elections respectively. That the leading candidate in the province has such a small percentage share of the vote compared to previous years is interesting, as it shows that perhaps there is more openness in the voting, and less voting along tribal and ethnic lines.

Further to the tribal bloc vote, an article by Latifi (2014) regarding the 2014 Presidential elections in Afghanistan, notes that “among the eight candidates vying for the presidency were technocrats who Page 50 of 93

served in the 13-year administration of Hamid Karzai, (including) former militia leaders, a former deputy in the nation’s second-largest armed opposition movement, and a member of the royal family”. Latifi continues with information regarding the importance of ethnic and historical ties, noting an example of “reported intimidation and intrusion by regional strongmen” leading up to the election. Latifi further notes that “though votes were cast by secret ballot, locals in three districts of the northern province feared strongmen could exert their influence to gain access to the vote counts,” and quotes Obaid Ali, a Kabul-based citizen, who declared that “in the past, if they saw that people didn’t vote for their favored candidate they would harass the entire community until they could punish those who didn’t, so people found it easier not to vote”. Abirafeh (2009, p.72) adds that “most rural areas have commanders whose word is law, and no one would be likely to vote against the commander’s preferred candidate for fear of persecution”. Fear, intimidation, provincial power-brokers and tribal, religious and regional divides are sadly all part of the Afghan election scene at present.

In April 2014, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) released a study of youth politics conducted ahead of the Presidential elections. One of the key findings was that “in many provinces, power brokers use youth organizations to maintain political control. Continuing dominance of the old guard will likely prevent the emergence of a youth bloc or a youth vote in the upcoming elections”. As an aside to the presidential elections, more Afghan youth stood for provincial council seats in 2014 than in 2009. The youth of Afghanistan are torn between the increasing globalisation that ISAF has brought, and the family and traditional values on which they have been raised. This difference, as noted in the USIP report (2014), is one of the “fundamental reasons that youth political movements at both the national and provincial level remain fragmented and will likely line up behind an older generation of power brokers in the coming elections”. Unfortunately, unless this changes then the prospects for genuinely free and fair elections in Afghanistan are dismal. The generation gap may overcome some of these barriers, however if the youth are convinced that due to the dominance of power brokers they have absolutely no say in political matters at the provincial level, then they will not rise to the challenge. And if the youth look to become involved in politics only for their own personal gain, as their elders often do, then the future of democracy is likewise bleak.

Once the tribal elders decide on who to vote for, they inform the rest of the tribe of their decision. Electoral campaigning in Afghanistan is not chiefly about informing the entire populace about what you want to do, it is about getting information to the tribal leaders. One of the latest Loya Jirga meetings towards the end of 2013, convened by the president, as reported by The Guardian (2013), was to determine whether U.S. troops remain after 2014. This national meeting to discuss the fate of a future security deal with the United States, was a consultative assembly of tribal elders. This issue Page 51 of 93

was discussed by tribal leaders, not elected officials in a Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders). The Loya Jirga voted in favour of the continued presence of U.S. troops, however, this has yet to be ratified by the Karzai government.

One pressing matter is that the government is visible chiefly in the capital city of Kabul. Rubin (2004) explains that the U.S.-supported warlords now have official positions as civilian governors or military generals in Afghanistan. Some of them are assuming legitimate roles, but others continue to use their forces, regardless of the uniforms they now wear, for drug trafficking and preying on people. Such warlords and tribal leaders have coerced their way into power, and are destabilising any attempt for a strong, central government in Afghanistan to introduce reforms and preside over reconstruction. Without the government going out to the regional provinces to assist in the reconstruction, to assist in the transfer to democracy, the people will continue to rely on those who have been able to assist them in the past: tribal elders and leaders.

Due to the political and government structure in Afghanistan, the officials in the 249 seats of the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) have been elected to their position based on the population in provinces. This is broken up, as noted by Wolesi Jirga & Provincial Council Elections (2005), to provinces with less than 500,000 inhabitants receiving 9 members in the parliament, those between 500,000-1,000,000 inhabitants receiving 15 members, those with more than 1,000,000- 2,000,000 inhabitants receiving 19 members, those with more than 2,000,000-3,000,000 inhabitants receiving 23 members and provinces with more than 3,000,000 inhabitants receiving 29 members.

For citizens of Afghanistan who wish to form a political party, there is no restriction providing it conforms to Article Thirty-five of the Constitution of Afghanistan (2004) which in part states that the “formation and operation of a party on the basis of tribalism, parochialism, language as well as religious sectarianism shall not be permitted”. The Afghanistan Ministry of Justice (n.d.), declares there are 84 registered political parties in Afghanistan, including parties such as the Afghanistan Peoples’ Treaty Party, Freedom and Democracy Movement of Afghanistan, Afghan Society for the Call to the Koran and Sunna and the Tribes Solidarity Party of Afghanistan. Of these registered parties, two each are operating in Balkh and , whilst one is operating in the Provinces of Herat, Khost, Kunar and Takhar. There are 74 political parties in Afghanistan that are operating within the capital province. There are no political parties operating in 27 of the 34 provinces; there are no political parties that are based in the southern provinces; and there are no political parties that are based in central Afghanistan. In fact, all the provinces that have a registered political party operating from it, except for Kabul, are border provinces, with four bordering Pakistan: The Afghanistan’s Mujahid Nation’s Islamic Unity Movement, the Islamic Society of Page 52 of 93

Afghanistan, the National Tribal Unity Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the Muslim Unity Movement Party of Afghanistan. All of these areas have strong tribal social organisations.

The Bonn Agreement (2001), was written to recreate Afghanistan as a functioning state after the invasion of the U.S. and its allies. As there was no legitimate government in Afghanistan in 2001, the Agreement endeavoured to ensure that there was a nationally agreed upon government to rule Afghanistan before a Loya Jirga to be held within eighteen months to elect a president. It states that “these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government”. Considering that 27 of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan are not ‘represented’ by a political party, one key intention of the Bonn Agreement has so far failed. This same objective is reiterated in Article Six of the Constitution of Afghanistan (2004) which declares that:

The state is obliged to create a prosperous and progressive society based on social justice, protection of human dignity, protection of human rights, realization of democracy, and to ensure national unity and equality among all ethnic groups and tribes and to provide for balanced development in all areas of the country.

Even if the ten registered political parties that represent nine provinces (not including Kabul) represented the remainder of Afghanistan, this would not amount to ‘equality among all ethnic groups’ or ‘balanced development’. The tribal culture in Afghanistan runs deep, and will doubtless continue that way until there is a greater sense of national identity and effective national government in Afghanistan.

Summary

A secret ballot in Afghanistan needs to ensure that a citizen’s vote has been made without undue influence, intimidation or coercion, violence or the threat of violence. The vote also needs to be detached from ethnic or tribal determination. Anonymity in the voting process will contribute to higher participation rates, which will lead to voting freely and without coercion in Afghanistan. Sadiki (2009, p.283) highlights that with democratization in the Arab world, modernization “targeted the symbols of tradition – religion and tribalism”, and the people of Afghanistan need to overcome these divisions to make democracy flourish. The delivering of bloc votes for particular candidates based on their ethnicity or tribal alignment undermines the electoral and democratic process, because elections can be considered to be decided without any votes being cast based on the ethnicity or tribal heritage of the candidates.

Afghan citizens will need to transcend tribal and ethnic lines when they vote to ensure that the Afghanistan presidential elections can contribute in powerful ways to enabling a democratically Page 53 of 93

viable Afghanistan. Without this transformation, then the elections will be predictable, and pointless, or will be an excuse for spoilers. Whilst there are certainly no suggestions for people to abandon their ethnic or tribal identities, for a democratically viable Afghanistan there will need to be results based on national, not tribal or ethnic, interests. And without the weakening of tribal and ethnic identities, there is little hope of a genuine secret ballot in the elections along with the opportunity for citizens of Afghanistan to vote independently.

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Chapter 6: Electoral Integrity

In a democratic election citizens vote once, and each vote is of approximately equal value (different electoral systems notwithstanding). Multiple votes, tampering of vote boxes and ballot stuffing severely undermine the effectiveness of an election. Public confidence in the elected official’s waivers, along with the confidence in the electoral commission and the electoral process, if there are constant allegations or speculation of ballot stuffing and fraud. Maley (2011a, p.77) noted that in 2009, a provincial head of the border police took empty ballot boxes to his compound to have IEC members fill them with ballots for Karzai, and then delivered them to the polling stations the next morning. Drawing on such evidence, this chapter will look at the big picture of electoral integrity and fraud in Afghanistan’s presidential elections.

Utter and Strickland (2008) outline some of the techniques used to undermine electoral integrity, such as impersonating voters, registering illegal votes and falsifying election returns. Norris (2014) focuses on some of the electoral integrity challenges around the world, whilst Merloe (2009, p.31) points out that the holding of regular consultations with candidates and those concerned with electoral integrity would assist in the process of addressing such concerns and complaints.

In Afghanistan electoral fraud is a serious problem. Without the appropriate measures in place to ensure integrity doubts are cast over the legitimacy of the outcome of the ballot. Article 6 of the Afghanistan Election Law (2013) states “every voter shall, in an election, have the right of one vote which he/she can use directly in favour of his/her candidate of choice”. As Perelli and Smith (2014) point out, “ballot-stuffing, collective voting, vote count tampering, bribery of local electoral officials, vote-buying, voter coercion, violence to force the closing of polling centres and ‘remedial fraud’ are just a few of the flagrant instances of fraud” that occurred throughout some of the three presidential elections held in Afghanistan. Some of these problems have also appeared in parliamentary elections. Questions surrounding electoral integrity and fraud contribute to doubts over the legitimacy of the three presidential elections that have thus far been held in Afghanistan

Ballot stuffing by citizens

The 2009 election, as Sky News (2014) claimed, was marred by massive fraud. This claim was echoed in 2014, as Graham-Harrison reported (2014a) in The Guardian, that “one powerbroker admitted he had stockpiled voter registration cards needed to cast a ballot; another promised to bring his district to the polls in return for tens of thousands of dollars”. This type of behaviour casts serious doubt over the presidential elections. Page 55 of 93

As previously noted, Norland and Ahmed (2014) recount that Ahmed Zia voted twice in the 2014 presidential elections, as he “was worried that my candidate wouldn’t win; because of all the fraud and corruption”. These elections aren’t the only ones with multiple votes, with Riphenburg (2007, p.20) also noting that in the 2004 elections, “there was ample evidence of failings in the registration process, a lack of election oversight, potential for voter intimation and fraud, and a general situation of insecurity outside Kabul”. Such improper behaviour by the citizens of Afghanistan seems to be widespread throughout the elections we have studied. Without change in this area, there is little hope for elections and democracy to flourish.

Ballot stuffing in the 2004 election

The 2004 presidential election was largely an exercise in ratifying the power already conferred upon Karzai, but this didn’t stop Afghan citizens stuffing the ballot boxes. Gall (2004) noted that after the 2004 presidential election, a United Nations panel was appointed to look at some of the irregularities in the election results. The panel estimated that 10 percent to 15 percent of the 11.5 million registered voters may have been registered more than once. This includes Afghans at home and abroad. The panel concluded that fraud had occurred, particularly ballot-box stuffing, but that it was neither widespread nor limited to one candidate. The panel called for an immediate and thorough audit of the electoral register, as the duplicate registering of voters constituted electoral fraud.

The illegal actions in the Afghanistan elections were being perpetrated abroad as well, showing that the rationale of the people that they need to stuff the ballots to get their favoured candidate into office was widespread. There were 46 ballot boxes from Iran and Pakistan that were, as reported by Slavu (2012, p.3), not included in the final count of votes, mostly due to ballot stuffing. Furthermore, the indelible ink that was used, as reported by Walsh (2004), easily rubbed off enabling many people to cast multiple votes. This would not be the last case of voter fraud in Afghanistan. As all of the candidates except for Karzai declared they would boycott the poll over the alleged voter fraud, as Hill (2011) noted, however, they did not after allowing an independent commission to investigate the alleged irregularities. It was the beginning of a common theme of fraud, ballot stuffing, and candidates voicing their opposition to the results and refusing to accept the results that appeared again in 2009 and 2014.

The single non-transferable voting system in place in Afghanistan, which, as shown by Reynolds and Carey (2012, p.2) is where “each voter gets a single vote to cast for a single candidate, and the top vote-getters win up to the number of seats in a given constituency,” has been undermined in the practice of the three presidential elections. Page 56 of 93

Ballot stuffing in the 2009 election

The 2009 presidential elections were marred by extremely high levels of fraud. In their report on the 2009 elections, Free and Fair Election Forum of Afghanistan (FEFA) (2012a) observers reported incidents of male proxy voting for female voters. FEFA (2012b) further noted in this election the abuse of government resources and official authority in support of one or several candidates; participation of government officials in electoral campaigns; and a lack of impartiality of government officials in the campaign process.

If there was a theme for this election, ‘fraud’ would be the one. Voter intimidation by the Taliban and also by some powerful candidates as well as fraud marked this election. Abdul-Ahad (2009) notes considerable fraud in his article. As well as footage showing two election monitors inspecting a book of 100 ballot papers that are still stitched together and pre-marked with votes for Karzai, there are stories from citizens such as one who “put 20 ballots in for Ashraf Ghani, and then called all my friends in other villages and we collected more ballots for him,” and another who stated that “the big tribal elders took lots of money from Karzai and Abdullah Abdullah”. Another voter noted that he was offered a bribe "to work for Abdullah's team on election day, but didn't, further describing a range of violations, from police ferrying voters so they could vote Karzai, to officials stuffing hundreds of ballots”.

Organised ballot stuffing, as noted by The International Republican Institute (2009, p.19) requires the:

Complicit involvement of IEC polling officials, candidate representatives and local officials who either perpetrated fraud or allowed fraudulent behaviour to occur, such as allowing the removal of ballot boxes from polling stations to be filled in support of particular candidates.

It is this kind of organised and carefully planned out fraud that brings the electoral process into disrepute.

The tribalistic nature of the people of Afghanistan, and the traditional decision making by the tribal elders also made some of the results in this election questionable. As highlighted by Democracy International (2010a), problems included: voter cards being both bought and sold in various provinces in the months before elections; 67 percent of polling stations in being suspect; round numbers (such as multiples of ten or fifty); and tribal or bloc voting where entire communities vote a certain way so as not to split the vote between candidates, and thereby lose a potential seat. The opportunity for voting along tribal lines through corruption and ballot stuffing was exemplified in this election. It clearly demonstrated that the self-serving and unscrupulous Page 57 of 93

political elements that seek to undermine electoral transparency and accountability were active in Afghan society.

Ballot stuffing in the 2014 election

The third presidential election in Afghanistan again saw ballot stuffing. After the previous presidential election in 2009 had been marred by serious allegations of fraud, one of the concerns in 2014 was that both irregularities and fraud would take place again. After the initial round of voting, Abdullah and Ghani were in a stalemate over who would win the presidency, amid more accusations of fraud.

The ever-present allegations of electoral fraud must be worrying for the citizens of Afghanistan. As noted above, the province of Khost recorded 113,083 total votes in the first round of the 2014 Presidential election, and there are reports that in the second round, somewhere in the vicinity of 400,000 votes had been cast. It is areas like this that have helped Ghani make up his 56 percent vote.

The 2014 election saw Abdullah becoming increasingly vocal about ballot stuffing, and he has been able to provide evidence of this as well. From the tapes that reveal an Afghan election official ordering ballot stuffing on behalf of Ghani, to blatant accusations of fraud, Abdullah has been highly critical of the electoral process. These tapes, as referenced by Noori (2014) highlights that ballot stuffing is not confined to one province, or particular citizens. It is done by officials as well as citizens, and is often done as a result of bribery.

Whilst Stancati (2014) argues that “domestic and foreign observers reported irregularities that included ballot stuffing and proxy voting across the country”, these reports of irregularities are not always confined to the one province or region. Whilst ballot stuffing and proxy voting may be a ploy of those who are abusing the electoral process, it still remains clear that there is rampant fraud and ballot stuffing in the Afghanistan presidential elections.

Electoral fraud by officials

Electoral manipulation is a major impediment to electoral integrity and the chances of democratic consolidation. It is an even greater concern when the manipulation is done by those who have been given the responsibility and trust to run the electoral process. The problem isn’t just confined to officials in the IEC, but also to candidates, government actors, observers, agents, media and civil society. Page 58 of 93

Electoral fraud by officials in the 2004 election

Afghanistan's first presidential election was not a smooth process. As Constable (2004) noted, the candidates opposing Karzai complained of fraud and improper procedures. More complaints arose after election workers marked voters with regular, instead of indelible, ink.

This election was the first for the Afghanistan people in many years, and as noted by Ghufan (2006, p.88) some members of the election staff were fired for fraud and for stuffing ballots. It is important to note that there was no system in Afghanistan to prevent individuals from registering multiple times. Due to the complaints of fraud, multiple voting, ghost ballot boxes and other irregularities in the process, the results of the 2004 presidential election were delayed, as noted by Johnson (2007, p.312) “and were not declared until November 2005”, 13 months after the ballot. Karzai was eventually declared the winner.

Fraud is perceived to have played a major part in this election. Yet with the U.S. backed Karzai nominated to lead the interim government, anything less than him being declared the winner of the nation’s first ‘free and fair’ election would have been a blow to their democratic credentials. If the election was not generally accepted as legitimate by the international community, then the Taliban would have been able to count it as a moral victory in their anti-western stance.

Electoral fraud by officials in the 2009 election

The 2009 election, won by Karzai, was also rife with accusations of fraud. The IEC, in response to these accusations, mostly from Abdullah, issued a press release (2009b), stating that they “conducted these elections in accordance with the laws, regulations and procedures adopted prior to the election for this purpose”. The EU released a report after the election (2009) noting that there was “ballot stuffing and by the operation of ghost polling stations from the IEC”. Further, the reports note that the IEC announced the measures that they would undertake regarding the detection and mitigation of fraud. These protections were to be built around the quality of the materials, controls on the movement of sensitive materials, procedures to discourage fraud and an emphasis on the transparency of the process. The EU further notes that the IEC, however, did not carry out these actions, and the attempts to defraud in zones with security problems, where candidate agents, observers, media and voters were scarce, if not totally absent, were largely successful. FEFA (2012) also noted that reports about improper interference by local IEC staff with the voting process were received throughout the polling day from many parts of the country. A robust, honest and transparent electoral commission, is key to electoral success.

After the election in 2009, the IEC, as noted by Maley (2011b, p.86) had a clean out, and removed many staff due to “performing lamentably in 2009, turning a blind eye to blatant fraud, with over 1.3 Page 59 of 93

million fraudulent votes cast in the 2009 presidential poll (over three- quarters of which had ostensibly been cast for Karzai)”. The removal of staff is seen as a clear indication of the IEC wanting to free itself of corruption, but it is doubtful whether they were successful. With the IEC not following up on the many reports of fraud, it can even be seen as complicit. Government influence within the IEC, as noted by Farmer (2009a) was highlighted by the plans to open 443 polling centres within insurgent territory where observers, police and the army were too afraid to go. The allegations levelled at the agency severely damaged its credibility and negatively affected the government’s efficacy in the post-election environment. When a country, as well as international observers expect there to be corruption in the voting process, it does not bode well for the outcome to be broadly accepted. This was the case in 2009, and again in 2014.

Electoral fraud by officials in the 2014 election

Fraud by the IEC was again prevalent in the 2014 presidential elections. In almost a repeat of the 2009 election, there were two candidates leading at the end of the first round of voting. This time, however, there was a run off, and that is when the problems and accusations of fraud gained momentum. As noted earlier, the final results from the IEC (2014d) show that the Zadran district in the Paktia province contained some very disturbing results. There are four polling stations in this region, and the third and fourth stations received exactly 600 votes, split up with 300 to Dr. Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, and the remaining 300 split 200-100 between the other two candidates. This is an obvious case of ballot stuffing and electoral fraud. This, unfortunately, wasn’t the only polling station whose integrity in the 2014 election was questioned.

In a modern society, even one with sometimes antiquated infrastructure such as Afghanistan, the mobile-phone is a powerful tool. The portable camera and internet access allows users to shoot and upload images instantaneously. Ziaul Haq Amarkhel knows this all too well. He was the secretary of the IEC. As Muktar (2014) noted, he had resigned from his position on the 23rd of June 2014 after allegations of fraud. A few weeks prior, the Afghanistan police found Amarkhel traveling with thousands of blank election ballots, and without a mandatory police escort,2 all recorded and broadcast to the world. Whilst Amarkhel has denied fraudulent behaviour, his resignation casts serious doubt about his innocence in this matter. This, of course, added fuel to Abdullah’s fire that the elections were rigged through massive fraud, and that this incident was only one of many from the IEC.

The worst thing here, as reported by Nordland and Rosenburg (2014b) is that the IEC has said that “870 instances of fraud had been classified as serious enough to affect the outcome of the April 5

2 See YouTube video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVbBiUKAUCs Page 60 of 93

election, more than the 815 recorded in 2009”. If the 2009 election has been viewed as one of the most fraudulent in history, one can only imagine what this says about the 2014 election.

Summary

Electoral fraud in Afghanistan is a serious problem, and may even be described as ‘rampant’. Over the three presidential elections this thesis has examined, there have been proven accusations of fraud by not only the IEC, but also by candidates and other government actors. Accusations of fraud undermine democratic values, and when they are proved they make a mockery of the electoral process and the transition to democracy. More work needs to be done to educate the people about democracy and the importance of free and fair electoral process.

Widespread fraud from voters and officials is an unfortunate fact in the Afghanistan presidential elections. It is clear that one of the biggest challenges to successful and effective elections to enable a post-conflict democratically viable Afghanistan is fraud and the lack of consequence for fraudulent behaviour. Simply holding the elections in the face of security threats is considered to be a success at the moment, and will continue to be. However they will need to be free and fair elections without ambiguity to be seen as successful in the future.

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Chapter 7: Sustainable elections in Afghanistan

International efforts

There are many international non-government organisations as well as state actors assisting the democratic transition in Afghanistan. This is evident when Barrett (2006, p.147) lists some of the different actors and missions in Afghanistan, including the Operation Enduing Freedom military action, the ISAF mission, and those involved in the recovery, reconstruction and development effort.

Oxfam released a report in 2006 on Aid Effectiveness in Afghanistan noting major discrepancies in the rebuilding framework in Afghanistan. For example, since 2001 some $25 billion has been spent on security-related assistance to Afghanistan, whilst only $10 billion had been spent on reconstruction and development. Without the donors fulfilling their aid commitments, advances in the rebuilding phase will stop. Promising aid and doing something in the country are quite different things.

The Afghanistan Analyst (2013) noted that as at April 2013 there were just under 200 Non- Governmental and international humanitarian organisations operating in Afghanistan. They all had different objectives, such as Foreign NGOs, Afghan NGOs, some focusing on women, and some focusing on children. Further, Farrell (2013, p.91) explains that “ISAF brought forth Provincial Reconstruction Teams…allowing diplomats and aid workers to get governance and development going”. The worry is that too many people are trying to do too many things at once in a nation that is going through the democratic process in the midst of security threats. Whilst the international effort may be well-intentioned, there is a case to be made that there is too much effort, and no joint plan regarding Afghanistan. Perhaps there should have been an over-arching body coordinating all aspects of the peacebuilding in Afghanistan; one candidate is the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

Established in 2005, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (2012) is an inter-governmental advisory body that intended to help countries in post-conflict peace building, recovery, reconstruction and development to “play a unique role in:

(1) Bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing countries;

(2) Marshalling resources and

(3) Advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace”. Page 62 of 93

As at 2014, the Commission has not dealt with Afghanistan. Currently, the Peacebuilding Commission has missions in Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic, while they are not currently in Afghanistan, these other countries can serve as an indication of progress of the Commission and its efforts in peacebuilding. In the Commissions’ meeting on 9 April 2014 (2014) it was noted that:

The facilitation of South‐South exchanges in (i) Côte d’Ivoire, where expertise from Burundi, Liberia and Senegal supported the Government’s security sector reform; (ii) in Liberia, Rwanda provided specialised capacities in the areas of police management and administration, with the support of Sweden to the Ministry of Finance; (iii) the UN Mission in South Sudan benefitted from expertise from Sierra Leone for legislative drafting.

The Commission has assisted in peacebuilding before, and assists nations by using lessons learnt from other nations to avoid a ‘relapse’ into chaos. The Commission provides help to the roles played by domestic actors (such as officials, civil society groups, or others) in defining their strategic direction; however in Afghanistan that role has been reserved for the U.S..

Meernik (1996 and 2000) offers some general insights into the viability of promoting democracy in U.S. foreign policy, especially in connection with military interventions. His papers show that when comparing the progress of democracy in nations in which the U.S. had intervened with those in which it did not, states with intervention have greater movement toward democracy. Criteria Meernik used for this was examining the promotion of democracy in nations that experienced U.S. intervention and in those that did not at intervals of a one-year post-intervention difference, three- year post-intervention difference and a three-year pre and post-intervention difference.

That states with intervention that had a greater movement toward democracy is more than likely due to the pressure from the U.S. to make their foreign policy work. And whilst Meernik notes that it is more likely that a successful intervention will leave behind more democratic governments than unsuccessful interventions, he concludes that the majority of U.S. military interventions do not appear to lead to increased levels of democracy. Afghanistan does not appear to be a major democratic success story.

Diamond’s 1992 work ‘Promoting Democracy’ served as a basis for some early democratic promotional activities. Diamond (1992, p.26) concluded that in the world’s largest democracy, India, “democracy is so marred by political violence, human rights abuses, corruption, and group conflict that Freedom House has downgraded its rating to "partially free”.” Indeed, in 2014 Freedom House (2014) noted that India’s internet and press are partially free, however as a nation it is listed with an Page 63 of 93

overall rating of free. The democratic picture is complex and changing, but India’s example suggest that all is not lost for Afghanistan.

As Afghanistan is transferring from decades of war to a democratic society, it needs to work on other elements of stability besides military to ensure that the process flourishes. Doyle and Sambis (2000) note that “just as civil wars are usually about failures of legitimate state authority, sustainable civil peace relies on its successful reconstruction. Peacebuilding is about what needs to happen in between”. Without clean elections in Afghanistan, the road to a successful reconstruction will be not be a smooth one. Whilst elections and democracy are only one area in the rebuilding process, it is a crucial foundation for building a legitimate state authority. This sentiment is echoed by Ponzio (2007, p.265) who notes that “introducing democracy would be challenging, given that Afghanistan, in late 2001, was a highly factionalized, poor, rural, physically rugged, predominantly illiterate, and socially conservative agrarian society with a dysfunctional government”. There is a strong interest in the international community in particular to make democracy work, but again, it cannot be done without the active engagement of the people in Afghanistan.

For Afghanistan to hold sustainable and increasingly free and fair elections, the international support can assist in two distinct ways; technical assistance and stabilising the security situation.

Technical assistance

Technical assistance, as shown by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2014) “helps countries develop more effective institutions, legal frameworks, and policies to promote economic stability and inclusive growth”. Further to this, the IMF through their core functions of surveillance and lending offer “training through practical policy-oriented courses, hands-on workshops, and seminars strengthens officials’ capacity to analyze economic developments and formulate and implement effective policies”. This technical assistance is needed to continue in Afghanistan to help monitor the progress of democratization. The Australian Electoral Commission (2014) is one such institution that assists “undertaking technical assistance and electoral capacity building projects with the electoral authorities of other countries to ensure that sufficient skills and resources are available within a community to carry out the requirements for future elections”. Australia has been able to assist in the democratic process in Afghanistan through, as noted by Carrio et al (2011, p.13) “domestic observation, media monitoring, capacity building of the IEC and civic education”. This assistance needs to continue not only from Australia, but from other states as well as the NGO’s, if there is any chance of the elections enabling a democratically viable Afghanistan.

Technical assistance, however, is not infallible in holding sustainable and increasingly free and fair elections. The fatal mistakes for the Western support for state-building, as noted by Braithwaite and Page 64 of 93

Wardak (2013, p.186) was “putting criminals in charge, bedding down a culture of impunity, and creating an that was winner-take-all and stunted the development of political parties”. This, coupled with the political obstacles of corruption, the lack of an orderly system of government and ongoing conflict, does not mean that technical assistance will always work. There is, as Ottaway notes (1998, p.149) “the knowledge and experience of specialized organisations [that] can overcome logistical obstacles, but they cannot overcome political obstacles”. Ottaway further notes that there should be “minimum political preconditions that must exist before technical assistance should be considered”.

Whilst technical assistance in electoral matters is, as Dundas and Parris (2007, p.135) to “apply good practice in election organisation”, it also needs to be relevant to the state, to the international assistance, and as Dundas and Parris (2007, p.135) point out, “in line with acceptable standards, locally, as well as internationally”. Again, the local social frameworks (i.e. the tribes and warlords) needs to be addressed, as providing the same assistance for Afghanistan as, for example, Angola, will not be of the benefit to the Afghanistan people in building a democracy.

Stabilising the security situation

Due to the ongoing corruption, political turmoil as well as economic dependence that Afghanistan has, the security situation is of major concern to not only the people of Afghanistan, but also to the international observers. The security situation is, as noted by the UNHCR (2014) “likely to remain complex. Rising poverty and unemployment in urban centers, as well as difficulties in accessing basic services, with the withdrawal of the international forces is expected to have security implications”. These factors will come to the forefront at the end of the year when the ISAF mission concludes, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and aid workers leave Afghanistan to survive on its own and become self-reliant and self-functioning without sinking into civil war.

The security situation will become more difficult once Afghanistan is left to, as the White House (2014) ascertain “take full responsibility for their country’s future”. For them to do this on their own will be a monumental challenge. Afghanistan has had the assistance of the U.S., NATO and the United Nations Assistance Mission, the reduction over time of this assistance must enable and make way for a self-sustaining electoral process. This process will, however, be more challenging in the immediate future, as Katzman (2014, p.56) highlights that:

Further hindering Afghanistan is that its economy and society are still fragile after decades of warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. More than Page 65 of 93

3.5 million Afghan refugees have since returned, although a comparable number remain outside Afghanistan.

The ongoing security concerns are a major problem in Afghanistan. Democracy International (2010b, p.18) note that in the Afghanistan Presidential and Provincial Council Elections 2009, for example, that the security situation in Afghanistan has stopped people from taking part in the process of registration. There have been as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2014) notes, “more than 4,600 security incidents across the country in the past three months leading up to the start of the election campaign, which began in February”. This type of violence is expected to continue in Afghanistan in the lead up to further elections, and has been prevalent at previous presidential elections.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have benefited from training from NATO personal, and will be required to be resilient and self-sufficient from the end of 2014. It is part of this ongoing training that Cordesman (2009, p.68) noted that “bringing all ANA forces up to the highest level of readiness is crucial to completing the U.S. mission in Afghanistan”. Whilst training all the ANA forces to such a high level is difficult to achieve due to ongoing recruitment, both the ANA and ANP will be forced to undertake, it is the responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan to recruit, train and develop these soldiers and police. A safe and secure Afghanistan will assist in a democratic Afghanistan. Stabilising the security situation is a precondition of democratization.

Summary

A post-conflict democratically viable Afghanistan needs many levels of assistance from other nations, and needs to look at other states whose transitions have worked and failed, and to draw lessons from their failures and successes. Barakat (2005, p.29) notes that “despite the lessons learned over the last 50 years, post-war reconstruction at its present level will be unexceptional in its failure to deliver peace and security to the Afghans”. Levels of international support can change, but the key impetus need to be from within Afghanistan, and needs to be driven by the people. If there is no desire for change, change will simply not happen. Barakat (2005, p.31) further notes that a main element for post-war recovery is stability through the creation of a secure environment and re-establishing the rule of law. Without the security element, people will be too afraid to attend polling stations (as we have seen), which will mar election results.

Three ‘successful’ presidential elections that have only been successful because they have been held does not constitute a success. Due to the failings in the key areas, considered in this thesis, we must be cautious about attributing success to them. The bottom line is that if the international community Page 66 of 93

is serious about supporting Afghanistan’s democratization, they cannot simply ‘walk away’ from what they have created. The processes in place need to be further developed and assisted for democracy to be successful in Afghanistan. Page 67 of 93

Chapter 8: Conclusion

Statement of findings

The purpose of this study was to determine whether the three Afghanistan presidential elections from 2004 to 2014 have been successful and effective in helping to build a democratically viable Afghanistan. This study has sought to add to the literature on post-conflict democracy building by arguing that for Afghanistan to be successful in the democratization process, there will need to be success in five key areas relating to elections: openness, suffrage, secrecy, fraud, and sustainability.

In terms of the openness of these elections, I argue that there are significant shortcomings. The lack of transparency, and widespread corruption will remain barriers to an increased openness in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. For change to happen, the process must start sooner rather than later, starting with expanding the removal of corrupt elements within the IEC. Obvious cases of fraudulent ballots should be removed from the election tallies at once, with the media keeping track of this and it being reported as soon as possible. Fraudulent behaviour must not be tolerated.

Deficiencies in the area of universal suffrage in Afghanistan also need to be addressed for the elections to contribute to a democratically viable Afghanistan. Increased community participation is the key to this area, and barriers to women voting and standing for election need to continue to be addressed. A continuation of the goals so far achieved depends especially on education and jobs for women.

The reality of a genuinely secret ballot in Afghanistan is lacking, given the pressures of undue influence, intimidation or coercion and violence or the threat of violence. Voting in tribal blocs continues to be a factor in the outcomes, and whilst this seems to have declined the initial round of the 2014 presidential election, it cannot yet be considered solved. There needs to be a greater focus on anonymity and autonomy in the voting process, which will lead to citizens voting more freely.

In the three presidential elections examined here, rampant and blatant fraud from voters and officials has been a recurring theme. Without change in this area, the prospects for Afghanistan to hold free and fair elections with legitimate outcomes are very low. It is clear that one of the biggest challenges to successful and effective elections to enable a post-conflict democratically viable Afghanistan is fraud.

As the international forces leave Afghanistan, the country will have to become more self-reliant as it continues on its path towards democracy. For things to change in the five key areas substantially for the next presidential election in 2019, considerable work needs to be done by international Page 68 of 93

observers to assist Afghan officials in organizing free and fair elections in what is likely to be a state with major divisions and perhaps internal conflicts. And this effort will need to be coordinated and effective, otherwise Afghanistan may retreat from the progress that has been made so far.

There are some positive signs in Afghanistan that the experience of these three presidential elections is helping the democratic process, with the three main findings in this area being that:

the 2004 election was generally accepted as legitimate by the international community;

there has been some blurring of the tribal lines in the first round of the 2014 presidential elections; and

increased access to, and availability of, media to find out information about the elections has strengthened one of the important accountability mechanisms.

That elections happen at all in Afghanistan is one – very basic – indicator of success. This sentiment is echoed by RAND (2014, p.2) where it is argues that the “relative success of Afghanistan’s founding election— that it was actually held, widely participated in, and generally accepted as legitimate by Afghans and the international community—was, in historical perspective, not unusual”. But without further improvements in governance and public security, the criminal elements such as warlords and criminal gangs in Afghanistan will flourish. Whilst simply holding an election in Afghanistan is considered a success from the international community, it is the quality of leadership and governance that follows the election that will determine long-term success. And this is a factor about which we cannot be definitive. A successful election must be judged as much on the destination and outcome, as on the journey and processes towards its result.

While elections may be important instruments of peacebuilding, if they are done poorly they will actually hinder the process and exacerbate division. The three main findings of this work about the impediments to successful elections are:

that the citizens of Afghanistan need to know more about elections and democracy – civic education is crucial;

that the incidence of fraud and the lack of consequences for fraudulent behaviour bedevils the electoral system and undermines the democratic transition; and

that the international community must not be complacent about the shortcomings of Afghan elections, and must continue to support a processes it was instrumental in starting.

These findings show that whilst there has been some positive steps, the three Afghanistan presidential elections have a considerable way to go before democracy is sustainable. Page 69 of 93

Teaching democracy and democratic values is a difficult task, made even more difficult when many of the officials involved are chiefly looking out for their own interests. This process is also logistically difficult when it is aimed at an entire population instead of a smaller group of people, such as a local election. The first presidential election held in Afghanistan post 9-11 was ambitious, as it was a large venture undertaken in an ill-equipped country. Although there was United Nations and international support, the electoral process would perhaps have been better served if there had been smaller more localised elections first. This sentiment is echoed by Reilly (2008, p.15) when he notes that “hasty, rushed or premature elections have become common for several reasons: the need to ‘do something’ quickly, to start the process of political development and, of course, to have an identifiable ‘exit strategy’ for international involvement”. Political necessity trumped organizational prudence. Granted, there was a second (parliamentary) election in 2005, but both the 2004 presidential and the 2005 elections were Afghanistan-wide events. With more people having to be taught about democracy and the electoral process at the same time, fraudulent behaviour was harder to identify and check.

The problem of fraud is significant, and is likely to continue in Afghanistan elections for the foreseeable future. There are few disincentives or consequences for fraudulent behaviour. This will remain perhaps the biggest single transitional challenge - apart from security - not only for Afghanistan, but for the international community. This goes hand in hand with the ethnic, tribal and religious divisions when votes are cast, as it increases the ambiguity and diminishes the fairness of the elections. Unfortunately, Kraemer (2010, p.637) notes that the countries that are contributing resources (both material and people) to the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan have been gradually lowering their expectations about the prospects of a democratic Afghanistan. Their commitment remains despite the view, echoed by Smith (2014b), that “Afghanistan’s democratization so far has been superficial”; whether such a commitment will stand the test of time remains to be seen.

The future of Afghanistan

As much as it may be a blow to the international system and the international actors that have played a part in the removal of the Taliban and the rebuilding process, the prospects for elections assisting in enabling a post-conflict democratically viable Afghanistan seem low. Elections have so far highlighted major weaknesses in Afghan institutions and divisions in Afghan society.

Though this work is concerned with analysing the presidential elections in Afghanistan since 2004, and not about predicting the future, nevertheless some of the trends noted here will continue to play a part in the development of Afghanistan in the years to come. I hazard some brief comments on these matters below. Page 70 of 93

With, as noted by NATO (2014), the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams and transitioning the security responsibility at the end of 2014, there will be an increasing focus on the ability of Afghanistan to govern and secure itself. With the current security situation, Afghanistan needs to prove to the world and to itself that it can become self-reliant and self-functioning without sinking into civil war. Unfortunately without a lighter, leaner, longer-term military presence the prospects do not look good. Furthermore, the Taliban and warlords need to be engaged in any long-term political settlement.

Afghanistan’s government needs to become a symbol of the country's unity and civility, overcoming ethnic and tribal differences. This requires not just robust and fair electoral procedures, but strong and fair leadership. Perhaps unity might be assisted by an appropriate ceremonial head of state. Once choice would be the eldest child of the last King, Zahir Shah, or the heir apparent, Ahmad Shah, Crown Prince of Afghanistan. Although the possibility of getting a 79 year old man who lives, as noted by Bhatia (2003, p.75) and Wax (2010) as a retiree in Washington D.C. to return to his troubled homeland to govern would be an almost impossible task. My point, however, is that unifying national symbols are important.

Further research possibilities in this area

Assuming the democratic transition in Afghanistan continues, there will be further elections. This also means further opportunities for corruption, further accusations of fraud, and further bloc voting. Should the victor of the 2014 presidential election see out his initial and subsequent term, the 2024 presidential elections would provide a fascinating opportunity to reassess the five key areas: openness, suffrage, secrecy, fraud, and sustainability to gauge whether they have improved. The election in 2024 may mark the second time in the history of Afghanistan that there is a democratic transfer of power. Research up to and including the 2024 election instead of at the end of the one term election of 2019 would be able to provide a comparison to the 2009 Karzai election, and see how the 2014 winner attempts to hold onto the power they have. If there is a repeat of the immense fraud from 2009 in 2019, then it would be fair to say there the hopes and dreams for a democratic process in Afghanistan would be significantly undermined.

At a more granular level, information noted above that in 2014 the province of Paktia the leading candidate in the province has such a small percentage share of the vote compared to previous years is puzzling. This is worth further research outside the scope of my study to gauge if this happens again, and in different provinces, and why.

To track a generational change in Afghanistan regarding the electoral process would also be an interesting research project; to see the young Afghans of today engaging with elections and Page 71 of 93

democracy would be a major achievement, and for all of this to happen without significant bribes, corruption and ambiguity would be positive. Such changes would also feed into the 2024 presidential elections, giving the teenagers in Afghanistan who are familiar with pop culture, social media and the influx of globalisation the opportunity to express their own democratic views and beliefs in a secret ballot, instead of following the directions of their parents, elders or religious leaders.

Election results, above all, need to be believable by the candidates, the citizens and the international community. Further elections will provide more research possibilities to gauge the believability of the results in Afghanistan.

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Appendix

After the first round of voting, June 2014

The political situation in Afghanistan is fast moving, and this theses – while it explores issues in the recent past – ended with the election data from June 2014. As the results were being written-up, major political developments were in train, and this Appendix is an attempt to bring the reader up- to-date (August 2014) and to reflect briefly on the developments as they pertain to my topic.

As with the previous presidential election in 2009, no candidate received over 50 percent of the vote in the first round. A runoff election was held on June 14, and resulted in more allegations of fraud from candidate Abdullah Abdullah. This time, the allegations were more boisterous and targeted. U.S. Senator John Kerry brokered a deal that would see, as highlighted by Crowley (2014) “Afghanistan’s election commission, under international supervision, audit every one of the eight million ballots cast in the June 14 runoff”. This process will take a long time, and both candidates agreed to abide by the ruling. The recount was brokered after preliminary results of the run off ballot released by the IEC (2014e) showed Ashraf Ghani in the lead with 56 percent, whereas Abdullah won 44 percent. This is in comparison to the first round, in which Ghani secured just 32 percent, compared with Abdullah’s 43 percent.

The Nation Democratic Institute (2014) expressed deep concern over the dispute emerging from Afghanistan’s June 14 presidential runoff election, reporting that some provinces received significantly higher voting numbers than in the first round. The province of Khost, from the IEC (2014c) website recorded 113,083 total votes in the first round of the Presidential election, and there are reports that in the second round, somewhere in the vicinity of 400,000 votes had been cast. Considering that the total population of Khost, as shown by Central Statistics Organisation (2014) including children was 546,800 in 2012-13 this is a major indicator of corruption.

As there was an impasse regarding the results of the run-off, the United States Secretary of State John Kerry, as reported by Kleinman (2014), Abdullah and Ghani have agreed in early July 2014 that the United Nations will oversee a recount of the run-off, with both candidates agreeing to abide by the results. The outcome of this will be that the election loser will be appointed ‘chief executive officer,’ who would serve under the president, (Lee, 2014). This means that all the ballots from the run-off will be sent to Kabul for auditing and recounting, an arduous process in itself, and the recounting of tampered ballots would surely ensue. The recounting process has resulted in, unsurprisingly, nothing but trouble, and was ongoing as at the 20th of August (Constable, 2014). The deal brokered by Kerry, as reported by Jeong (2014a) threatens to fall apart “with fistfights breaking Page 73 of 93

out in the auditing centre where disputed ballots are being assessed and that process being halted numerous times”.

In early August, John Kerry was again called in to broker yet another deal between the two candidates. The original deal brokered between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani, as noted by Jeong (2014b) “had fallen apart in the four weeks since it was reached”. As reported by Lee (2014) it would set an inauguration date before the end of August, with the United States believing that the NATO summit of 4 September providing the opportunity for the new leader to introduce his cabinet. Once the new Afghan government is created, it would convene a Loya Jirga to formalize the chief executive post as a prime minister. There have now been two deals regarding the disputed election results from the 2014 presidential elections; perhaps there will be more.

The unity government deal brokered by Kerry undermines the electoral process almost as much as the corruption, fraud and other factors that have been shown throughout this work to case a major question-mark over whether Afghan presidential elections have enabled a post-conflict democratically viable Afghanistan.

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Figures Figure 1 Item removed due to copyright reasons Figure 2 Item removed due to copyright reasons Figure 3 Item removed due to copyright reasons Figure 4 Item removed due to copyright reasons

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