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AFGHANISTAN La Situation Sécuritaire À Jalalabad

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AFGHANISTAN La Situation Sécuritaire À Jalalabad COMMISSARIAT-GÉNÉRAL AUX RÉFUGIÉS ET AUX APATRIDES COI Focus AFGHANISTAN La situation sécuritaire à Jalalabad 20 février 2018 (Mise à jour) Cedoca Langue du document original: néerlandais DISCLAIMER: Ce document COI a été rédigé par le Centre de documentation et de This COI-product has been written by Cedoca, the Documentation and recherches (Cedoca) du CGRA en vue de fournir des informations pour le Research Department of the CGRS, and it provides information for the traitement des demandes d’asile individuelles. Il ne traduit aucune politique processing of individual asylum applications. The document does not contain ni n’exprime aucune opinion et ne prétend pas apporter de réponse définitive policy guidelines or opinions and does not pass judgment on the merits of quant à la valeur d’une demande d’asile. Il a été rédigé conformément aux the asylum application. It follows the Common EU Guidelines for processing lignes directrices de l’Union européenne pour le traitement de l’information country of origin information (April 2008) and is written in accordance with sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008). the statutory legal provisions. Ce document a été élaboré sur la base d’un large éventail d’informations The author has based the text on a wide range of public information selected publiques soigneusement sélectionnées dans un souci permanent de with care and with a permanent concern for crosschecking sources. Even recoupement des sources. L’auteur s’est efforcé de traiter la totalité des though the document tries to cover all the relevant aspects of the subject, the aspects pertinents du sujet mais les analyses proposées ne visent pas text is not necessarily exhaustive. If certain events, people or organisations nécessairement à l’exhaustivité. Si certains événements, personnes ou are not mentioned, this does not mean that they did not exist. organisations ne sont pas mentionnés dans ce document, cela ne signifie All the sources used are briefly mentioned in a footnote and described in pas qu’ils n’ont jamais existé. detail in a bibliography at the end of the document. Sources which have Toutes les sources utilisées sont référencées de manière simplifiée dans les been consulted but which were not used are listed as consulted sources. In notes en bas de page. À la fin du document, une bibliographie reprend les exceptional cases, sources are not mentioned by name. When specific références bibliographiques complètes. Les sources simplement consultées information from this document is used, the user is asked to quote the sont également reprises dans une liste. Dans des cas exceptionnels, la source mentioned in the bibliography. source n’est pas mentionnée nommément. En cas d’utilisation d’une This document can only be published or distributed with the written consent information spécifique contenue dans ce document, il convient de citer la of the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless source telle que mentionnée dans la bibliographie. Persons. La publication ou la diffusion du présent document est interdite sauf accord écrit du Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides. WTC II, bd du Roi Albert II 26 A, 1000 BRUXELLES T 02 205 51 11 F 02 205 51 24 [email protected] www.cgra.be AFGHANISTAN. La situation sécuritaire à Jalalabad 20 février 2018 (mise à jour) Table des matières Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3 1. Historique de la ville de Jalalabad ................................................................................... 5 2. Situation actuelle et développements récents ............................................................... 10 3. Typologie de la violence ................................................................................................ 11 3.1. Jalalabad (ville et district) ............................................................................................ 13 3.1.1. Nombre d’incidents ................................................................................................ 13 3.1.2. Nature des incidents .............................................................................................. 13 3.2. Behsud ...................................................................................................................... 16 3.2.1. Nombre d’incidents ................................................................................................ 16 3.2.2. Nature des incidents .............................................................................................. 16 3.3. Surkhrod ................................................................................................................... 18 3.3.1. Nombre d’incidents ................................................................................................ 18 3.3.2. Nature des incidents .............................................................................................. 18 4. Cibles et victimes des violences .................................................................................... 20 4.1. Statistiques ................................................................................................................ 20 4.2. Analyse ..................................................................................................................... 20 5. Auteurs des violences .................................................................................................... 22 5.1. État islamique (ISKP) .................................................................................................. 22 5.2. Talibans ..................................................................................................................... 23 6. IDP et réfugiés .............................................................................................................. 25 7. Impact des violences sur la vie quotidienne .................................................................. 29 7.1. Fonctionnement des services publics ............................................................................. 29 7.2. Accès aux services de base .......................................................................................... 30 7.3. Accessibilité ............................................................................................................... 31 Résumé ............................................................................................................................. 34 Bibliographie ..................................................................................................................... 35 Contacts directs ................................................................................................................ 35 Sources écrites et audiovisuelles ......................................................................................... 35 Liste des sources consultées ............................................................................................... 42 Page 2 de 43 CG – 825 F AFGHANISTAN. La situation sécuritaire à Jalalabad 20 février 2018 (mise à jour) Introduction Dans le présent COI Focus, le Cedoca décrit les conditions de sécurité dans ville de Jalalabad, chef- lieu de la province de Nangarhâr, à l’est de l’Afghanistan. La période couverte par ce rapport s’étend du 1er mars 2017 au 31 janvier 2018. Les recherches effectuées dans le cadre de ce COI Focus se sont clôturées le 15 février 2018. Ce document constitue une mise à jour du COI Focus éponyme du 9 juin 2017. Ce COI Focus ne contient pas de description d’ensemble du conflit en Afghanistan, ni de la situation dans la province de Nangarhâr. Bien que l’analyse des conditions de sécurité dans la ville de Jalalabad en soit le thème central, une partie des informations (notamment celles ayant trait à la typologie de la violence) traitent aussi du district de Jalalabad et des districts voisins, Behsud et Surkhrod, respectivement au nord et à l’ouest de la ville de Jalalabad. Effectivement, plusieurs sources signalent qu’il existe une plus vaste zone urbaine qui englobe des parties de Behsud et de Surkhrod. Si c’est nécessaire, le Cedoca précisera si les informations concernent uniquement le chef- lieu ou le district de Jalalabad. Le Cedoca remarque que la couverture factuelle des conditions de sécurité n’est pas exhaustive. Étant donné le peu d’accessibilité aux zones et aux communautés affectées par le conflit, les journalistes et les chercheurs ne sont pas souvent en mesure de livrer un rapport détaillé sur ces régions. Par contre, dans les grandes villes, la plupart du temps ils peuvent suivre la situation de plus près. Les organisations internationales mentionnent également que des restrictions méthodologiques empêchent de donner un aperçu exhaustif du conflit. À titre d’exemple, l’on retiendra la distinction entre civils et forces combattantes. Si des hommes en âge de combattre font partie des victimes, ils ne sont pas toujours comptabilisés dans le rang des civils même s’il n’est pas établi qu’il s’agit de combattants1. Pour des raisons de sécurité, les enlèvements sont fréquemment tus dans la presse2. Ces dernières années, les informations et données quant aux conditions de sécurité se font de plus en plus rares, moins transparentes et politiquement orientées3. Depuis le printemps 2017, le Cedoca ne dispose plus de chiffres relatifs aux conditions de sécurité qui, par le passé, étaient fournis par un analyste en matière de sécurité, occupant une
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