Afghanistan Turmoil and Its Implications for Pakistan’S Security (2009-2016)

AFGHANISTAN TURMOIL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN’S SECURITY (2009-2016)

By MUHAMMAD TARIQ Reg. No.11-AU-RM-M.PHIL-P/SCIENCE-F-5 Ph. D (Political Science)

SUPERVISOR Dr. JEHANZEB KHALIL Co-Supervisor Dr. Manzoor Ahmad

DEPARTMENT OF POLITCAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ABDUL WALI KHAN UNIVERSITY MARDAN Year 2018

AFGHANISTAN TURMOIL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN’S SECURITY (2009-2016)

By MUHAMMAD TARIQ Reg. No.11-AU-RM-M.PHIL-P/SCIENCE-F-5 Ph. D (Political Science)

Dissertation submitted to the Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan in the partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Ph. D in Political Science

DEPARTMENT OF POLITCAL SCIENCE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, ABDUL WALI KHAN UNIVERSITY MARDAN YEAR 2018

Author’s Declaration

I, Muhammad Tariq__hereby state that my Ph D thesis titled, “ Afghanistan Turmoil and Its Implications for Pakistan’s Security (2009-2016) is my own work and has not been submitted previously by me for taking any degree from this University i.e. ABDUL WALI KHAN UNIVERSITY MARDAN or anywhere else in the country/world. At any time if my statement is found to be incorrect even after my Graduate, the University has the right to withdraw my Ph D degree.

Name of Student: Muhammad Tariq Date: 10 January, 2018

Plagiarism Undertaking

I solemnly declare that research work presented in the thesis titled “AFGHANISTAN TURMOIL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN’s SECURITY (2009- 2016)” is solely my research work with no significant contribution from any other person. Small contribution/help wherever taken has been duly acknowledged and that complete thesis has been written by me. I understand the zero tolerance policy of the HEC and Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan towards plagiarism. Therefore, I as an author of the above titled thesis declare that no portion or of my thesis has been plagiarized and any material used as reference is properly referred/cited. I understand that if I am found guilty of any formal plagiarism in the above titled thesis even after award of Ph D degree, the University reserves the right to withdraw /revoke my Ph D degree and the HEC and the University has the right to publish my name on the HEC website on which names of students are placed who submitted plagiarized thesis.

Student/Author Signature:______Muhammad Tariq

Certificate of Approval

This is to certify that the research work presented in this thesis, titled, “Afghanistan Turmoil and its Implications for Pakistan’s Security (2009-2016) was conducted by Mr. Muhammad Tariq under the supervision of Prof: Dr. Jehanzeb Khalil. No part of this thesis has been submitted anywhere else for any other degree. This thesis is submitted to the AWKUM in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the field of Political Science Department of Political Science University of Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan.

a) Student Name: Signature:______

b) Supervisor : Name Signature:______(Designation & Office Address) Signature:______………………………………. ………………………………. c) HoD: Name Signature:______(Designation & Office Address) ………………………………. ………………………………. d) Concerned Dean : Name Signature:______(Designation & Office Address) ………………………………

………………………………

DEDICATED

MY MOTHER

WHOSE PRAYERS, LOVE AND PATIENCE TOOK ME TO THE APEX OF GLORY AND TRANSFORMED MY DREAM INTO REALITY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All praise be to Almighty Allah, the Lord of the world, the creator of the heavens and the earth and the most Generous Who taught man by the pen, that he knew not. It is all by the grace of Almighty Allah, Who bestowed the researcher with the courage, determination and persistence to complete this study. The researcher was fortunate enough to have Dr. Jehanzeb Khalil as his supervisor for this Ph D dissertation. His practical experience, extensive knowledge, everlasting encouragement and constant inspiration helped him achieve this goal.

The researcher has the honor to express his deepest gratitude to Dr. Manzoor Ahmad, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science in Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan, Pakistan for his kind and precious assistance throughout this study.

The researcher offers his sincerest gratitude to Dr. Abdull Ghaffar for his expert knowledge and invaluable views regarding the topic and relevant information therewith, constructive criticism, scholastic guidance, kind and timely suggestions. He had always been too nice and kind to render help that kept the researcher on the right track.

The researcher is extremely thankful to his mother whose benign attitude and prayers enabled him to undertake this dissertation in time and motivated him from time to time. It is due to the prayers of the mother that enabled the researcher to complete this study and who had been a source of inspiration throughout this process.

Muhammad Tariq

January 10, 2018

ABSTRACT

This study aimed at investigating Afghanistan Turmoil and its Implications for Pakistan’s Security (2009-2016). In the International Politics there are neither permanent friends nor foes but what prompts one to action is the national interest. The same is the case with Pak-Afghan Relations in terms of security paradigm. It is a matter of great concern that security in Afghanistan has a direct bearing on the overall security of Pakistan. Relations between the two countries remained quite normal during the Russians invasion of Afghanistan whereby Pakistan provided all logistic support to Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan fought under the banner of Jihad against their enemies. Though all support was provided to Afghanistan through the Durand Line, the entire tribal areas remained peaceful and tranquil. In the current “war on terror” initiated by the International Community, under the patronage of the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 incident, Pakistan suffered a lot though the battle ground of terrorism was Afghanistan. The long porous border with its treacherous nature made the terrorists cross the border to Pakistan and took refuge in the tribal areas of Pakistan while some also entered the settled areas of Pakistan and particularly the provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan but the provinces of Sindh and Punjab also did not remain calm. The most tragic event in the history of the country was the attack on the Army Public School Peshawar that was conducted in the most barbaric way resulting in the martyrdom of innocent students. This event triggered the National Action Plan that had hitherto been in defunct form. The country saw mixed amalgam of peace parleys and initiation of military operations aiming at eliminating terrorism and insurgency. Of all the

8 military operations conducted against the terrorists, Operation Zarb-e-Azab, has been the most successful one in dismantling the networks of terrorists with their sanctuaries. This study was undertaken to find out the causes of turmoil in Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan. It also focused on analyzing the role of National Counter Terrorism Authority in countering terrorism in Pakistan and the achievements of the National Action Plan. Qualitative method of study comprising both primary and secondary sources were utilized for collecting the data and its analysis. Theoretical Framework was provided by the ‘Borderland Theory’. Findings and Recommendations testify the fact that the Pak- Afghan border should be properly managed and the National Action Plan needs to be implemented in true letter and spirit in the whole country for bringing peaceful law and order situation. List of Abbreviations

ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ANSF Afghan National Security Forces ANA Afghan National Army

ATTA Afghan Transit Trade Agreement

ASWAJ Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat

ATA Anti-terrorism Act

AJK Azad Jammu & Kashmir

APHC Afghan Peace High Council BSA Bilateral Security Agreement

BLA Balochistan Liberation Army CARs Central Asian Republics

CCPO Capital City Police Officer

CD Compact Disk

CEO Chief Executive Officer CFLCTW Cyber Forensic Laboratory Counter Terrorism Wing

CIA Central Investigation Agency

CJS Criminal Justice System

CTD Counter Terrorism Department

CRP Comprehensive Response Plan

CDP Comprehensive Deterrence Plan

CSF Coalition Support Fund CFLCTW Cyber Forensic Laboratory of Counter Terrorism Wing CPEC China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

DG Director General

DIG Deputy Inspector General of Police

DIS Directorate of Internal Security ETIM East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement

FC Frontier Corps

FC Frontier Constabulary

FBI Federal Board of Investigation

FCB Frontier Corps Balochistan

FMU Financial Monitoring Unit FTO Foreign Terrorist Organization

GDP Gross Domestic Fund GWOT Global War on Terror

GHQ General Head Quarter GTIJU German-Turkish Islamic Jihad Union

HBIED Human Borne Improvised Device HuT Hizb-u-Tahreer

IB Intelligence Bureau ICRD International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

IJU Islamic Jihad Union

IMF International Monetary Fund

ISIS Islamic State Group or Daesh ISPR Inter Services Public Relations IEDs Improvised Explosive Devices

IS Islamic State ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and Levant

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence

ISW Institute for the Study of War IMNC Interior Ministry and Narcotics Control

IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IJU Islamic Jihad Union

IMNC Interior Ministry and Narcotics Control ISI Inter-services Intelligence

ICRD International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy

JA Jamaat Ansarallah

JeM Jaish-e Muhammad JI Jamat-e-Islami JIAP Jinnah International Airport Karachi

JIT Joint Investigating Team JuD Jammat-u-Dawwa

KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

LI Lashkar-e-Islam LIFG Shiite Libyan Islamic Fighting group

LMG Large Machine Gun

LeT Lashkar-e-Tayyaba

LeB Lashkar-e-Balochistan LTTE Liberation of Tamil Tigers Elam

LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhnagvi

MPA Member Provincial Assembly

MITNOR Militancy in the name of Religion

MWM Majlis-i- Wahdatul Muslimeen

MOI Ministry of Interior

MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MIT Ministry of Information and Technology NDP National De-radicalization Program

NR3C National Response Centre for Cyber Crimes NWA North Waziristan Agency

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS National Directorate of Security

NACTA National Counter Terrorism and Authority NACTES National Counter Terrorism and Extremism Strategy

NISP National Internal Security Policy

NAP National Action Plan

NGO Non-governmental organization

NLI Northern Light Infantry

OBL Osama Bin laden

OFS Operation Freedom’s Sentinel

OEC Overseas Contingency Operation QCG Quadrilateral Coordination Group

PATA Provincially Administered Tribal Areas

PBC Pakistan Body Count

PTI Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf

PDI Provincial De-radicalization Institutes PPO Protection of Pakistan Ordinance PEMRA Pakistan’s Electronic Media Regularity Authority

PCNA Post Crisis Needs Assessment

RRF Rapid Response Forces

RSM Resolute Support Mission RAW Research & Analysis Wing

SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorists SMG Sub Machine Gun

SATP South Asia Terrorism Portal SPA Strategic Partnership Agreement

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization

SEEA Shaoor Foundation for Education and Awareness

SC Supreme Court

SOPs Standard Operating Procedures

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SR Sindh Regiment

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan

ST Sunni Tehrik

SLIFG Shiite Libyan Islamic Fighting group

SPM Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan

TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

TNSM Teheik-e-Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi

TIP Turkistan Islamic Party

TJP Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan

TNJF Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafaria

UBA United Baloch Army

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

USFOR-A United States Forces – Afghanistan US-ABC US-Afghanistan Bilateral Commission

UNDOC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNSC United Nations Security Council VBIED Vehicle Borne Explosive Device

WTO World Trade Center LIFG Shiite Libyan Islamic Fighting group

LMG Large Machine Gun

LeT Lashkar-e-Tayyaba LeB Lashkar-e-Balochistan

LTTE Liberation of Tamil Tigers Elam LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhnagvi

MPA Member Provincial Assembly

MITNOR Militancy in the name of Religion

MWM Majlis-i- Wahdatul Muslimeen

MOI Ministry of Interior

MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MIT Ministry of Information and Technology NDP National De-radicalization Program

NR3C National Response Centre for Cyber Crimes

NWA North Waziristan Agency

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS National Directorate of Security NACTA National Counter Terrorism and Authority

NACTES National Counter Terrorism and Extremism Strategy

NISP National Internal Security Policy

NAP National Action Plan NGO Non-governmental organization

NLI Northern Light Infantry

OBL Osama Bin laden OFS Operation Freedom’s Sentinel

OEC Overseas Contingency Operation QCG Quadrilateral Coordination Group

PATA Provincially Administered Tribal Areas

PTI Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf

PDI Provincial De-radicalization Institutes PPO Protection of Pakistan Ordinance

PEMRA Pakistan’s Electronic Media Regularity Authority

PCNA Post Crisis Needs Assessment

RRF Rapid Response Forces RSM Resolute Support Mission

RAW Research & Analysis Wing SDGT Specially Designated Global Terrorists

SMG Sub Machine Gun

SATP South Asia Terrorism Portal

SPA Strategic Partnership Agreement

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization

SEEA Shaoor Foundation for Education and Awareness

SC Supreme Court

SOPs Standard Operating Procedures

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SR Sindh Regiment

SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan

ST Sunni Tehrik

SLIFG Shiite Libyan Islamic Fighting group

SPM Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan

TTP Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan TNSM Teheik-e-Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi

TIP Turkistan Islamic Party

TJP Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan

TNJF Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafaria

UBA United Baloch Army

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

USFOR-A United States Forces – Afghanistan US-ABC US-Afghanistan Bilateral Commission

UNDOC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNSC United Nations Security Council

VBIED Vehicle Borne Explosive Device

WTO World Trade Center

Contents Chapter 1: Afghanistan Turmoil and its Repercussions

1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Statement of the Problem ...... 2 1.2 Objectives of the Study ...... 3 1.3 Research Questions ...... 3 1.4 Significance of the Study...... 4 1.5 Theoretical Framework ………………………………………………………………...…..4 1.6 Literature Review …………………………………………………………………….……7 1.7 Research Methodology ...... 10 1.8 Insurgency in Afghanistan …………………………………………………………….. ….10 1.9 Taliban from 2005-2014 ...... ….. 13 1.10 Current Situation in Afghanistan………………………………………………………………………………..…… 15 1.11 Threat Environment and Security Measures ……………………………………………………………..…… 17 1.12 US Counter Terrorism Mission ……………………………………………………………………………………..…..18 1.13 NATO led-Resolute Support Mission ………………………………………………………………………..…… 19 1.14 Resolute Support Mission Troop Contributing Nation, as of November 2015………….……..….20

1 .15 Afghanistan Threat Assessment……………………………………………………………….…………….…………21 1.15 .1 Figure showing Insurgents and Taliban in Afghanistan as of December 2015……..………….22

1.15.2 Greater Kandahar ………………………………………………………………………………………………..…………23

1.15.3 Herat………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……….24 1.15.4 Greater Paktia……………………………………………………………………...……24 1.15.5 Capital Region……………………………………………………………………….….25 1.15.6 Nangarhar…………………………………………………………………………..…...25 1.15.7 Kunar and Nuristan...... 26 1.15.8 Tajik North ...... 26 1.15. 9 Map showing Taliban Attacks in Afghanistan from 2009-2016 ...... 27 1.15.10 Graph representing civilian deaths & Injuries Greound Engagemenents 2009-2016 .. 28 1.16 Pak-Afghan Relations and its Importance……………………………………………………..………………..…28 1.17 Bilateral Security Agreement ...... …… 30 1.18 Indian Military Aid to Afghanistan ...... 31 1.19 US and Afghanistan: BSA and Taliban Negotiations ...... 33 1.20 Afghan-US Bilateral Security Agreement: Implications for Pakistan ...... 33 1.21 Strategic Partnership Agreement...... 34 1.22 New Heroes in Afghanistan ...... 36 1.23 Reintegrating Afghanistan ...... 38 1.23.1 Table showing Reintegration in Afghanistan ...... 39 1.24 U.S war in Afghanistan………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 42 1.25 Human Death Toll in Afghanistan………………………………………………………………………………….. 45 1.25.1 Civilian people killed in Afghanistan 2001- 2016…………………………………………………………..….45

1.25.2 Figure showing Deaths & Injuries in Afghanistan 2009- 2016……………….……………………...….46

1.25.3 Table showing total deaths and injuries in Afghanistan from 2001-2016……………..…………47

1.25.4 Chart showing deaths and injuries in Afghanistan from 2001-2016……………………..……..….47

1.26 Issuance of Fatwa against Taliban and Daesh ...... 48 1.27 Capture of Kanashin District in Helmand by Taliban ...... 49 1.28 General Asks to bomb TTP hideouts in Afghanistan ...... 50 1.29 Peace in Afghanistan ...... 50 1.30 Afghan government’s peace deal with Hizb-e-Islami Group ...... 55 1.31 Afghanistan’s Future ...... 55

Chapter 2

2 The Borderland and Resultant Threats ...... 58 2.1 The Porous Border ...... 60 2.2 Neo-Taliban ...... 64 2.3 Al-Qaeda ...... 66 2.4 Haqqani Network ...... 66 2.5 Peshawar Tragedy ...... 69 2.6 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan ...... 69 2.6.1 TTP Internal Conflicts and factions...... 70 2.6.2 Peshawar School Attack condemned by Afghan Taliban ...... 71 2.6.3 Divergence between Afghan Taliban and TTP ...... 71 2.6.4 Classification of TTP Groups and Movement in Pakistan ...... 72 2.7 Profile of Leading Terrorists in the Region ...... 73 2.8 Foreign Fighters in Pakistan ...... 75 2.8.1 Foreign Fighters in FATA ...... 76 2.9 FATA – Pakistan’s complex Tribal region ...... 77 2.9.1 Pakistani Tribal Areas and its Governance ...... 77 2.10 Peace Deals with Tribal Areas and Taliban………………………………………………….……………………..77

2.11 Suggestions ...... 78 2.11.1 Comprehensive Counter-insurgency policy ...... 78 2.11.2 Formation of Anti-Terrorist Fund ...... 79

2.11.3 Effective Rule of Government and Reintegration of Tribal Region ...... 79 2.11.4 Government and Public should be on the same page ...... 80 2.11.5 Discouraging VIP Culture...... 80 2.11.6 Address the Root Cause of Problem ...... 81 2.12 Cross Border Security ...... 81 2.12.1 Movement of Persons and Vehicles ...... 82 2.12.2 Cross Border Infiltration ...... 83 2.12.3 Drug-Trafficking ...... 83 2.12.4 Afghanistan-Pakistan-Indian Complex ...... 84 2.12.5 The Narcotics Problem ...... 85 2.12.5 (a) Afghanistan Opium Survey)……………………………………………………………………………………86

2.12.5 9(b) Regional distribution of Opium Poppy Cultivation 2015- 2016………………………..……87

2.12.6 Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade Issue ...... 87 2.12.7 Pashtun Nationalism across the Durand line ...... 88 2.12.8 Strategic Depth and the Durand line ...... 91 2.12.9 Durand line and the 9/11 ...... 93 2.12.10 Pak-Afghan Border Management ...... 97 2.12.11 Legal Basis for Fencing the Durand line ...... 98 2.12.12 Remedies for the Border Improvement...... 99 2.12.13 Pakistan, Afghanistan to set up bilateral mechanism to address border issues ...... 99 2.13 A History of Peace Agreements and Military Operations ...... 100 2.13.1 Shakai Agreement (2004) …………………………………………………………………………………….………101

2.13.2 Sararogha Peace Deal (2005) ...... 102 2.13.3 Miranshah Peace Accord (September 2006) ...... 103 2.13.4 Khyber Agency Pact (2008) ...... 104 2.13.5 Swat Agreements (2008)...... 106 2.13.6 Observations...... 108 2.13.7 Militants’ View ...... 108 2.13.8 United States’ view...... 108 2.13.9 Pakistan’s View ...... 109

2.13.10 Drawbacks of the Peace Deal ...... 109 2.14 Military Operations ...... 111 2.14.1 Operation Al-Mizan ...... 111 2.14.2 Operation Zalzala ...... 112 2.14.3 Operation Rah-e-Haq ...... 112 2.14.4 Operation Raah-e-Raast ...... 113 2.14.5 Operation Black Thunderstorm ...... 113 2.14.6 Operation Sher Dil ...... 114 2.14.7 Operation Rah-e-Nijat ...... 114 2.14.8 Operation Koh-e-Safaid ...... 115 2.15 Failure of the Peace Agreements and Future Strategy...... 116

Chapter 3 3 Sectarianism and Counter Terrorism Policy

3.1 Resurgence of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan ...... 119 3.1.1 Chart showing sectarian groups in Pakistan……………………………………………………………………125

3.2 Causes of Sectarianism in Pakistan ...... 126 3.2.1 Support for Sectarian Organizations...... 127 3.2.2 Rift between Sunni and Shia ...... 127 3.2.3 Failure of the Criminal Justice System ...... 127 3.2.4 Inadequate Madrassa Reforms ...... 128 3.2.5 Political patronage of the Sectarian Organizations...... 128 3.2.6 Failure of Anti-Terrorism Courts to provide speedy justice ...... 128 3.2.7 Role of External Factors ...... 129 3.2.8 Process of Islamization in Pakistan ...... 129 3.2.9 Chart representing causes of sectarian violence in Pakistan……………………………………….....130

3.3 Execution of Mumtaz Qadri ...... 130 3.3.1 Controversial Views of Leaders over the execution of Qadri ...... 132 3.4 Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Policy ...... 134

3.5 Types of Militancy in Pakistan ...... 136 3.5.1 Militancy in the name of religion (MITNOR) ...... 136 3.5.2 Internal Dimension of MITNOR ...... 137 3.5.3 External Dimension of MITNOR ...... 138 3.5.4 Foreign Militant Organizations Based in Pakistan ...... 138 3.5.5 Pakistani Militant Organizations Carrying Out Militant Acts Abroad ...... 138 3.5.6 Geopolitical Factors...... 139 3.5.7 Sub-Nationalist Militancy ...... 139 3.5.8 Ethno-Political Militancy ...... 140 3.5.1 a Figure showing types of Militancy in Pakistan...... 141 3.5.1 b Brief Sketch of the Three Types of Militancy in Pakistan ...... 141 3.6 Total Death Casualties in Militant Attacks ...... 142 3.6.1 Figure showing casualties in militant attacks ………………………………………………………………...142

Figure showing four pillars of NACTES…………………………………………………………………………… 143

Graph showing militant's profile…………………………………………………………………………………..144

3.7 Neutralization of Militant Ideology...... 144 3.8.1 Reducing the Manpower of the Militants ...... 145 3.8.2 Dismantling the Support Network of the Militants ...... 147 3.8.3 Choking Funds of Militants ...... 147 3.8.4 Disrupting Weapons Supply Network ...... 147 3.8.5 Disabling Communication System of Militants ...... 148 3.8.6 Destroying Militants’ Sanctuaries ...... 149 3.8.7 Securing Militants’ Targets...... 152 3.9 Zero Tolerance against Terrorism ...... 152 3.10 Government’s Action against the banned outfits ...... 154 3.10.1 Figure showing the arrest of terrorists ...... 154 3.10.2 Figure showing recovery of national assets ...... 155 3.10.3 Arrest of Terrorists under NAP …………………………………………………………………………………..…155

3.10.4 Chart showing arrest of militants in the country under NAP …………………………………………156

3.10.5 Chart showing reduction of incidents in Karachi and Balochistan…………………………….……157

3.10.6 Figure showing execution of action against hate- materials…………………………………………..158

3.11 Muslims must unite to fight terrorism: Gen Raheel ...... 158 3.12 Future Scenarios of Pakistan ...... 159 3.12.1 Aftermath of the Peshawar Tragedy ...... 160 3.13 Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a hard assault on Terrorists ...... 160 3.13.1 Zarb-e-Azb strikes militancy hard as TTP factions break away ...... 162 3.13.2 Group splits and Army assault make TTP feel the heat ...... 162 3.14 Death of Omer Naray, Mastermind of Peshawar tragedy ...... 163 3.14.1 Execution of the Attackers of APS ...... 164 3.15 Kabul and Afghan Taliban...... 164 3.15.1 Murree Talks and Haqqanis ...... 166 3.16 Human Death Toll in Pakistan …………………………………………………………………………………….….167

3.16.1 Figure showing death and injured casualties in militant attacks in 2002-2016…………….168

3.16.2 Table showing death and wounded casualties in Pakistan………………………………….………..168

3.16.3 Death casualties and injuries in Pakistan from 2001- 2016…………………………………………..169

3.16.4 Table showing fatalities in Pakistan from 2009-2016 ………………………………………….……….170

3.16.5 Chart showing fatalities in Pakistan from 2009-2016…………………………………..………...…...170

3.16.6 Chart showing combined death and injured casualties in Af-Pak 2001-2016…..…..……….172

3.16 Establishment of Military Courts …………………………………………………………………………………172

3.17 National Action Plan and Terrorism …………………………………………………………………….175

3.17.1 National Action Plan and Foreign Policy of Pakistan ………………………………………….177

3.17.2 National Action Plan and Civil-Military Imbalance …………………………………………..178

3.17.3 Hurdles in the Way of National Action Plan …………………………………………….………...180

3.17.4 Causes for the Imbalance of National Action Plan ……………………………………………………….180

3.17.5 Call for effective Implementation of National Action Plan ...... …. ….………181 3.17.5. a. High Level Meeting Discusses Internal Security, NAP Implementation ...... 182 3.18 Incidents of Terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during 2016...... 182 3.19 (a) Chart showing comparative analysis ...... 184 3.19(b) Chart showing death and injured casualties during 2016……………………………….……………184 Chapter 4 Achievement of the NAP and Operation Zarb-e-Azab

4 Operation Zarb-e-Azab ...... 185 4.1.1 PAF wins trophy for Operation Zarb-e-Azab ...... 188 4.1.2 FATA after Operation Zarb-e-Azab ...... 188 4.1.3 Education in FATA ...... 189 4.1.4 Political Issues...... 190 4.1.5 Economic Backwardness ...... 191 4.1.6 Legal Impediments ...... 191 4.1.7 Possible Solutions ...... 192 4.1.8 FATA and its Security ...... 194 4.2 Pak-Afghan Relations...... 194 4.2.1 Prospects of Cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan ...... 196 4.2.2 Taliban’s Attack on Ghazni Jail in Afghanistan ...... 197 4.2.3 Taliban Attack on Kunduz Province ...... 198 4.3 Lessons from the fall of Kunduz ...... 201 4.4 United States and the War on Terror ...... 203 4.5 Terrorists’ attack on PAF Camp Badaber Peshawar ...... 204 4.6.1 Mullah Omer’s Death: Challenges for Pakistan ...... 206 4.7 Death of Mullah Omer Mansur…………………………………………………………………………………..……..208

4.8 New Taliban Leader ...... 210 4.9 Killing of Al-Qaeda and Taliban during summer ...... 211 4.10 Afghan Spies in Pakistan ...... 215 4.10.1 Banned Outfits in the post Mullah Mansour Era ...... 216 4.11 Budgeting For Security...... 218

4.12 Suicide Bomb-blast in Mardan ...... 219 4.13 Threat of Extremism...... 221 4.14 Suicide Bomb-blast in Shabqadar (Charsadda)...... 221 4.15 Bomb blast in Lahore ...... 224 4.15.1 Chronology of Terror incidents in Lahore (2009-2016) ...... 229 4.15.1 (a) Table showing Death casualties and injuries from 2009 to March 30, 2016 ...... 232 4.15.1(b) Chart representing death casualties and injuries 2009-2016…………………………………...233

4.15.2 Lahore Attack and RAW ...... 233 4.15.3 Exposure of Indian Espionage Network in Pakistan ...... 237 4.15.4 Arrest of Afghan Intelligence Officer ...... 237 4.15.5 Executions of Terrorists ...... 238 4.16 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan ...... 239 4.16.1 The ISIS and other Militant Organizations ...... 240 4.16.2 Pakistan’s Military Success in Operation Zarb-e-Azab ...... 241 4.16.3 An Analysis of Crimes in Pakistan during 2015 ...... 241 4.16.4 Chart showing criminal cases in Pakistan in 2015…………..…………………………………………….242

4.16.5 Chart showing murder cases in Pakistan in 2015………………………………………………………….243

4.16.6 Chart showing gang-rape cases in Pakistan in 2015……………………………………………………..244

4.16.7 Table showing cases of kidnapping and abduction in Pakistan in 2015………………………..245

4.16.8 Graph showing cattle theft, motor theft and general theft cases in 2015……………….…..247

4.17 National Action Plan in 2016 ……………………………………………………………………………………..…..248

Chapter 5

5.1 Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations ...... 250 5.2 Findings…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…..….250 5.3 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….266

5.4 Conclusion ………………………………………………………………………………..283 5.5 References ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……286 Annex A, Three Research Papers ......

Chapter 1

Afghanistan Turmoil and Its Repercussions

1 Introduction

Afghanistan has been facing a persistent threat from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist groups such as Taliban, the Haqqani network and, to some extent with lesser degree, from the Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. These networks are in search of an opportunity to reassert their authority and prominence in the sphere of the government whenever and wherever they find any lacunae in the state machinery. The Taliban were even able to capture the provincial center of Kunduz in September 2015 but the Afghan security forces, in collaboration with the coalition forces, soon recaptured Kunduz just two weeks after the capture. The period from 2007 to 2013 saw the worst security scenario in Afghanistan with its direct impact on the security of Pakistan and particularly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On March 7, 2009, President Obama announced an additional deployment of 21,000 US forces for the security of Afghanistan. Many incidents of terror and insurgency overtook the country coupled with increased violence, atrocities and issues of governance creating great security concerns for the country. Prior to 2011, the US commander in Afghanistan remained worried about the insurgent use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and President Hamid Karzai resultantly banned importation of chemical fertilizers (Katzman, 2014 p 12). On August 16th 2011, about 30- U.S soldiers were killed by the Taliban while in 2012 only 15 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan were declared “poppy free” (Rosen & Katzman, 2014, p13). During this era, bombs were used by some insurgents in the turbans as they were considered as a sign of honour and integrity and were not usually checked. The Taliban also formed ‘shadow governors’ in 33 out of 34 provinces, although many provinces of Afghanistan were still having minimal presence of Taliban and insurgents. The death of Baitullah Mahsud in 2009 and Hakimullah Mahsud in November 2013 in drone attacks further exacerbated the security situation in Pakistan.

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) officially ended its thirteen years combat mission in Afghanistan on December 28, 2014. A residual of International

Forces and US will remain in Afghanistan under the auspicious patronage of the new NATO-led advisory mission “Resolute Support Mission” (RSM) for the next two years (McNally & Bucala, 2015) to train and assist the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and provide security across Afghanistan. FATA is the adjacent region with Afghanistan and is directly affected by any development and security concerns taking place there. During the February 2015 visit of Gen. Raheel Sharif to Afghanistan, Chief of the Army Staff declared in open terms that the “enemies of Afghanistan are the enemies of Pakistan” (Sehgal, 2015,p,10). The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif reaffirmed this during his visit to Kabul in May 2015 urging that, “Afghanistan’s enemies will be treated as the enemies of Pakistan’s”.

The tribal areas of Pakistan have not suffered so much economically, socially and politically in the last 500 years as they suffered in the post-US intervention period. It is also on record that peace existed in the tribal areas of Pakistan even during the 1980s when the Soviet war was fought in Afghanistan despite the fact that all logistics for Mujahedeen in Afghanistan were supplied through the tribal areas of Pakistan. The writ of the government remained unchallenged by the people of FATA and there was no breach of authority and law and order situation in the country while in the latter case, the situation is quite the reverse where the non-state actors in the post- September 2001 tragic episode challenged the writ of the government. Security situation in western tribal areas of Pakistan reached the climax with a sense of insecurity, uncertainty and terror. The Government of Pakistan, in order to cope with the imbroglio of security, brought in the National Counter Terrorism and Authority (NACTA) with the task of framing strategies for countering terrorism and insurgency across the country. In continuation of the efforts against terrorism and insurgency, National Internal Security Policy (NISP), Operation Zarb-e-Azab and National Action Plan (NAP) were put into action for restoring the lost confidence of the people over the government but despite that, the security of common masses is still at stake.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The ongoing crisis in Afghanistan has a direct bearing on the security paradigm of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA due to the Durand Line, which is of great strategic

29 importance for the security of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The September 2001 attacks on the United States set ablaze the major powers with security threats by the non- state actors as a result of which counterterrorism strategies were adopted by them. The US established the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 while National Counterterrorism was set up in 2004 followed by Great Britain, where British Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre was set up in 2003 with the establishment of Office for Security and Counterterrorism. The Government of Pakistan set up National Counter Terrorism Authority in January 2009 to adopt a strategy for countering terrorism and insurgency across the country. Despite these measures, attack on Army Public School Peshawar in December 2014, attack on Bacha Khan University Charsadda in January 2016, heinous attack in Shabqadar (Charsadda) in District Courts (Katchery) on March 7, 2016 and bomb blast in a Coach in Peshawar on March 17th, 2016 and Lahore bomb- blast on March 27,2016 have caused irreparable loss to the country. The focus of this study is to analyze Afghanistan’s crisis and its implications for the security of Pakistan with particular reference to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). This study was undertaken to investigate and analyze the factors which have caused unending insurgencies in Afghanistan, bearing a direct impact on Pakistan and the measures (both defensive and offensive) taken by Pakistan so far, have also been discussed under the purview of this study.

1.2 Objectives of the Study I) To identify and analyze the factors responsible for Afghanistan’s crisis II) To investigate the implications of Afghanistan’s crisis for the security of Pakistan III) To analyze the role of National Counter Terrorism Authority in countering terrorism in Pakistan IV) To analyze the achievements of National Action Plan 1.3 Research Questions I) What are the factors responsible for Afghanistan’s crisis? II) What are the implications of Afghanistan’s crisis for the security of Pakistan? III) What role does NACTA play in countering terrorism in Pakistan? IV) How far is National Action Plan successful in achieving its goals?

1.4 Significance of the Study

The study is significant as it is the first of its kind in that; this focuses on the hurdles in the way of carving out a viable strategy for countering insurgency and terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan has been faced with the dilemma of militancy and insurgency since 9/11, is still suffering from the pangs of it, and has suffered irreparable losses. It is a fact that NACTA was established in 2009 in Pakistan while NAP was established in 2014 but still no fruitful strategy has been evolved for eliminating terrorism from Pakistan. It has failed to eliminate militancy and terrorism either because of some flaws in these sectors or due to lack of proper implementation of the National Action Plan. It is an admitted fact that terrorism has been viewed as one of the most serious problems to be resolved by the government of Pakistan (both by the local government as well as by the International Community). This study will prove to be a scholarly document for the policy makers, planning departments and resultant policy implementation for resolving different issues of terrorism and militancy. Enough literature is available on terrorism and militancy and for the resolution of different dimensions of militancy in Pakistan and across the Pak-Afghan border. This study has taken into consideration two important components: NACTA and NAP for the resolution of the problems of terrorism and militancy in Pakistan. This will address the gap in the existing literature by taking into consideration the targets and achievements of NACTA and NAP. Last but not the least; this will have its implications for the counter-terrorism strategy during the stipulated time.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The writings of Michiel Baud & William Van Schendel (2009) and various other scholars denote the key aspects of knowledge used in the sphere of theoretical framework for this study. Their scholarly work in the field of theoretical framework (Borderland Theory) stands out in the contemporary scholarship as intellectually robust in its attempt to address threats and challenges emanating from the porous borders. Accordingly, their research work creates the foundation and has been used to weave together the various narratives of the theoretical framework.

National borders are political constructs, imagined projections of territorial power appearing on the map of the world in precise form but they reflect the mental images of politicians, lawyers and intellectuals (Baud & Schendel, 2009,p 211). They play an important role in the security paradigm of a country: revolutionaries take refuge behind them in case of insurgency and militancy while seeking protection of another’s sovereignty. The local inhabitants adjoining the border area cross the border whenever services or products are easily available or more attractive on the other side and traders & local merchants seize the opportunity to sell and buy their products without paying taxes. The border region, all over the world, has its own social dynamics and historical development. Issues of security from terrorist attacks are a major concern, driving many border security considerations. Security risks/implications emanating from border encompass criminal activities, trafficking in drugs, smuggling of weapons and other illegal contraband, and human trafficking (Wermuth et al, 2007).

David Collins opines that smuggling is a typical border activity when a state tries to impose restrictions on the border trade that are not acceptable to some of those living in the borderland and that cannot be enforced (Collins, 1985). It is a fact that cross border smuggling may be an extension of the existing trade that has been made illegal through legislation of the country. The Pak-Afghan border, along the FATA region, has been a major transit route for large-scale smuggling operations from Afghanistan territory into Pakistan, became a safe haven for Al-Qaeda and a base for Taliban to conduct cross border attacks and infiltration (Studies, 2007). Militancy and insurgency working under different non-state actors’ networks in Pakistan, played havoc with the lives of the common masses in the post 9/11 scenario in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and resulted in the irreparable loss to the people of Pakistan (Feyyaz, 2015).

Weiner is of the view that sometimes a border makes its distinction by cutting through an ethnically distinct population as in the case of Blochis who are divided by the border region of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran (Connor, 1985). Such is the case with the people of Pakistan in the province of Balochistan and along its western border where the local people have been deprived of some of the basic needs of life that make them backward from the rest of the people of the country. This sense of frustration gets further

32 momentum when the major chunk of population does not share the power with them in the sphere of the government. In such a state of affairs, some of the local people who are power hungry get transformed into the non-state actors by having the support of the warlords coupled with the sympathies of the local population.

In some cases Borderland becomes rebellious normally led by the non-state actors or regional elites and directly challenges the writ of the state over the borderland. In such a situation, the rebellions attempt to establish a self-styled counter government. The objectives of such movements may range from regionalist, separatist, or irredentist movement to an eve local or native in nature. Looking at the history, one may come across many examples that such movements go forward with or without the recognition of international sanctity (Lintner, 1990). The case of non-state actors along the Pak- Afghan border is a glaring example of rebellious border where the state has failed to establish its authority since the U.S involvement in Afghanistan. They not only fight against the government but also fight among themselves and terrorists of other networks with the episodes of infiltration into the bordering countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The border region provides ample space of safe havens to the non-state actors and in such a case; the local population becomes unruly and opposes any move of the government that goes against the wishes and whims of the people.

Border Management is the only viable solution to the issue of the non-state actors along the Pak-Afghan border but the government of Afghanistan has mistaken it and local population as this would hamper them from meeting their relatives and friends whom they meet on daily basis. Border management refers to a condition when everything goes well on the border but whenever the government of Pakistan for its proper management takes any step; opposed by local people and Afghan government strongly bopposes it. If it not properly managed, it may develop into an even worst region with various guerilla groups in the form of ethnic, left wing and drug related and would be engaged in an unending fighting against the state machinery and each other for years and would transform the area into a separate state.

1.6 Literature Review

Pakistan’s uncertainty is caused by the insurgency and cross border infiltration from the neighboring country of Afghanistan. This has resulted in the worst security situation in Pakistan and particularly FATA and KP. The Establsihment Department alongwith the government of Pakistan has initiated a joint action against the terrorists and is determined to eradicate terrorism from every nook and corner of the country. Khan (2005) elucidates the Durand Line, its topography, the issue of Pashtunistan across the border and power politics with its impact on the Pak-Afghan relations. He also deals with the various tribes that reside along both sides of the border and share common identity. Rahi (2014) discusses the significance of the Pak-Afghan border, the major issues related to it and the basic issues concerning the Durand line particularly the issue of Pashtunistan. He also stresses that the Afghan people should now accept the legality of the border as an international border. Pineu et al (2012) describe the cross border infiltration along the Durand line by the militants, the current securitization of the border area: shortcomings and biases. They also throw light on the role of mullahs, tribes and prejudices. Zetterlund (2009) discusses the Key Drivers behind the Rise of Taliban and the subsequent Talibanization of FATA. It particularly focuses on the security dynamics of Pakistan’s Border Areas. Khan (2011) discusses the post-9/11 scenarios in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the challenge of religious militancy and extremism in Pakistan, interests and concerns of external powers and crisis and weak governance in the wake of post- September 2001 episode. Markey (2008) discusses the threats in Pakistan’s tribal belt arising out of various terrorist networks, U.S policy in the tribal areas, major offensives in the areas, worse security situation and negotiations over border control. Concrete measure need to be taken for the border one of them most secure borders of the world as president Barrack Obama in 2009 termed it to be one of the most dangerous borders of the world.

Katzman (2015) describes the size of residual forces in Afghanistan after the drawdown scenario. He also describes the ‘Resolute Support Mission’ and the “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel” that replaced the “Operation Enduring Freedom”. He elaborates the role of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the high profile attacks of the militants that

34 jeopardize the security of Afghanistan. McNally et al (2015) discuss the various aspects of NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and strategies of the U.S government towards the NATO forces and likely size of the residual force has been dealt with in a lucid way. They also elucidate “Operation Resolute Support” to ensure the security of Afghanistan in critical situations. It mainly focuses on the security of Afghanistan in the post drawdown scenarios. Hooper et al (2014) discuss Post-U.S Withdrawal Scenarios Affecting Pakistan, Pakistan’s domestic challenges, and Pakistan’s emerging priorities in the Region in the post-2014 transition -2014 Afghanistan: Likely Scenarios and impact on Pakistan, Pakistan’s traditional and non-traditional challenges, and National Internal Security Policy of Pakistan and termed it as a cogent counter terrorism policy. Despite long stay of 13-years by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), security of Afghanistan is still facing many challenges from the insurgents and the security of Pakistan has been greatly affected, facing the worst security scenarios.

Quinn, (2015) discusses American military intervention in the foreign countries particularly Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, counter-terrorism policy, increased use of drone attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It also discusses the budgetary constraints of the U.S. government and the criteria adopted by the U.S. government for the use of force and intervention in the terrorist countries. Schroden et al (2014) have discussed the role of the Afghan National Security Forces in the security matters of the country, threat assessment in Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario and current threats in the country and Afghan districts by security tiers. Schrooden et al (2014) throw light on the threat assessment in Afghanistan, assessment of the ANSF, assessment gaps; Taliban’s offensive in the south and east of Afghanistan coupled with current threat assessment and its repercussions on the region. The insurgency of Afghanistan bears a direct impact on the security of Pakistan and any development in Afghanistan compels Pakistan to reconsider its strategy and existing policy. Coping with the threats and challenges Pakistan needs to adopt measures that upholds the cause of its national security and interest.

Jamal et al (2015) discuss the background, formation and ideology of TTP and also the role of TTP in the Peshawar School attack of December 16, 2014. Operation

Zarb-e-Azab, tribal regions and people of the region, value of Frontier Crimes Regulations and peace deal with the Taliban by the government circles have dealt with in a thorough way. Malik (2015) sees Pakistan in 2015 in the light of worst security situation in the country. She lays special emphasis on Peshawar Attack as a tripping point in the breakdown against Taliban, Operation Zarb-e-Azab, the establishment of Military Courts, internal political interactions, and Strategy towards Afghanistan and India. He mainly focuses on operation Zarb-e-Azab as a crackdown against the terrorists. Israr (2015) enumerates the role played by madrassas in giving an impetus to militancy and the lack of regulation and oversight in this regard. She also describes the role of National Security Plan and steps taken by the government for the regulation of madrassas. Nielsen et al (2015) discuss the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies of Afghanistan and Pakistan with particular focus on counter-militancy operations in Pakistan the prism of counter terrorism strategy. It also discusses the experiences gained by Pakistan while fighting against the challenges posed by militancy, extremism, and counterterrorism. It also takes into account the geo-political situation faced by Pakistan in the wake of its convergent and divergent experiences while fighting against militancy. Ahmad (2014) explores the counterterrorism strategy in the post 9/11 incident and its ineffectiveness in counter-productivity in uprooting extremism, terrorism, and insurgency. He also analyzes the various factors that have contributed to inefficacy of the counterterrorism strategy. Khalid et al (2015) discuss Pakistan’s internal security issues after 9/11, homeland security structure of Pakistan and dimensions of domestic security of Pakistan. This particularly focuses on the role of ant-terrorism law and NACTA in eliminating terrorism and extremism from the Pakistani society. Saffee (2015) discusses the Operation Zarb-e- Azab complemented by the National Action Plan and brief sketch of the dysfunctional NACTA and how the need arose to implement a comprehensive security strategy in the wake of December 16, 2014 Peshawar school tragedy. Zaidi (2013) discusses the role of national security structure and the role of NACTA in adopting various counter terrorism strategies for eliminating terrorism and insurgency from the country. Haqqani (2005) discusses the transformational changes in the various concepts in Pakistan and elucidates Pakistan from Islamic Republic to Islamic state, Afghan Jihad, defending ideological frontiers and jihad without borders. To counter insurgency and terrorism, the government

36 of Pakistan embarked upon different strategies to cope with this menace and make Pakistan a peaceful country.

Khanyari (2013) discusses the talks between the government and Taliban of Pakistan. She also elucidates the various political parties in Pakistan and their affiliations with the religious groups. She also discusses the Right-wing parties and Liberal parties. Hussain (2012) discusses the peace talks between Afghan government and Afghan Taliban and streamlines the reasons of their unsuccessful nature. He suggests the remedies and measures on account of which the peace talks can be made successful. Parvez (2015) discusses the types of militancy in Pakistan, various banned militant groups in Pakistan and the different strategies adopted by the government for countering terrorism and extremism. Peace process is one of the best viable solutions to the stalemate of insurgency and terrorism both in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

1.7 Research Methodology

This study was qualitative in nature for which both primary and secondary sources have been utilized. Primary sources include interview of experts, political analysts, religious scholars, prominent journalists and statements of government’s functionaries. Political/strategic analysts have been approached to get their expert views regarding threats and challenges arising out of the insurrection of Afghanistan. Secondary sources have also been utilized in the research and include books, research journals, magazines and articles.

1.8 Insurgency in Afghanistan

Insurgency has been there in Afghanistan since long but to understand its nature in the current scenario, it is necessary to look into the emergence of Taliban that has caused this menace to the security of Afghanistan and it is of great concern for the security paradigm of Pakistan. Threat assessment in Afghanistan can be predicted on understanding the past and present security scenarios of insurgencies in Afghanistan in order to form judgments about the future. This can be done through the analysis of three

37 cases in Afghan history when insurgents launched major offensives against the state machinery of the country (Schroden, Norman, & Meyerle, 2014).

The period (1989–1992) when the Soviet military withdrew from Afghanistan and various insurgent groups (at the time, known as the Mujahedeen) attempted to overthrow the government and establish their authority over the governmental sphere. It ushered in the beginning of a civil war in the country and catered for a new era in the country where the withdrawal of the Soviet forces destined civil war among the various tribes of the Afghan people. The period (1994–2000) when the Taliban first emerged on the map of Afghanistan and conquered much of Afghanistan, and al Qaeda established bases in the country, with the self-styled Islamic government by Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the country and imposing strict Islamic laws. The strict measures imposed by them aroused the wrath of the international community and consequently decided to get rid of the Taliban and Al- Qaeda network for their alleged involvement in the 9/11 incident. The period (2006–2009) when the Taliban resumed the offensive against the government and sought to retake large areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan by conducting various offensive attacks in the country and creating a state of anarchy. This showed a great blow to the security apparatus of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as they have spent a period of almost 8 years and insurgency still erupted in the country by directly challenging their authority. The current insurgency in Afghanistan owes its origin to the post-September 2001 scenario in the country when it drew the attention of the world for the alleged attacks on the Twin cities of the United States. This period commences from 2001 and extends to 2005 in which the Taliban aligned itself with the thinking of Jihad in the Middle East, by using whatever financial facilities were available to them (Nielsen & Syed, 2015, p 31). During this era, the major source of their income and revenue generation was Opium production even though its cultivation and business was termed as Haram (illegal) by Taliban on many occasions (Nielsen & Syed, 2015,pp, 32-33). It was during this time that Mullah Omer became the most wanted man for the United States and its allied forces that transformed the Taliban from a strict Islamic organization into a movement based on the Machiavellian doctrine in which end justifies the means. But he applied strict Islamic

38 doctrinaire to counter wrong doings and crime, very much against the interest of the west. This transformation gained great momentum as severe punishments were inflicted by the Taliban on those who got involved in illegal activities and criminal enterprises. From 2002 to 2005 the United States focused on Iraq and paid little attention to Afghanistan. With this view in mind, the United States placed Hamid Karzai on the throne of Kabul with limited powers from 2002 to 2005 and barred him from entering into any peace negotiation with the Taliban by threatening to stop all sorts of support if he did (Nielsen & Syed, 2015,pp 32-33). As a result of this Afghan government was installed in which Taliban were ignored as a political actor and stakeholder. But the organization of Taliban had still the scattered support of various well-wishers and supporters in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Though this support got increased in some areas of the country and had ramifications for the remote areas in the country yet it was never based on the actual support for the local Taliban lacking genuineness. More often the support for Taliban was procured through intimidation, extortion, bribery and other criminal activities (Nielsen & Syed, 2015 p32). The scattered nature of the Taliban having safe havens in the remote areas of the country, made it difficult for the government and its nominees to hold peace talks with, and was considered as another uphill task for the government. The lack of coherence on part of Taliban under a single leadership further added to the complex situation of the law and order as they split up into many factions working under the nomenclature for their vested interests in the post- September 2001 scenario. The pre-occupation of the United States in Iraq from 2002 to 2005, gave Taliban an opportunity for their resurgence and they thought over the matter of gaining their lost prestige in the remote provinces of Afghanistan far beyond the reach of Afghan government. This enabled them to gain more momentum in their transformation by intimating and influencing the local politicians and power structures in the eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 2007, pp19-21). The gravity of situation compelled President Hamid Karzai in 2004 to hold peace talks with the more moderate group of Taliban despite harsh opposition from the United States (US). Thus, even after lapse of a period of three years the government of Karzai failed to consolidate its authority over the country and was compelled by the circumstances to initiate the process

39 of peace deal with the Taliban, who had taken the responsibility of the 9/11 and against whom the ISAF had started operation. The deal of peace talks were declined by the Taliban when the NATO took over the ISAF and started its military operations against the terrorists (Giustozzi, 2007, pp19-21). 1.9 Taliban from 2005-2014 The activities of Taliban remained very low till 2008 as a result of the military operations by the NATO forces but the situation changed drastically in 2009 when attacks by the Taliban, road side bombs and even large scale ambushes were conducted (Guistozzi & Reuter, 2011). In 2009 to early 2010, the Taliban were at the apex of their power in Zhari, a primarily Pashtun district in Afghanistan’s Kandahar province. They controlled almost all of the rural areas, rarely challenged by the government or the Canadian Forces. Taliban members openly roamed around, maintaining a few hundred full-time fighters and administering justice in several courts; their governor interacted with the population. They grew over-confident, exposing themselves, showing their judges’ and administrators’ faces and identities (Guistozzi 2011-2012, p 18). Attempts by the Taliban had started in 2005 to capture parts of Afghanistan but they could not succeed and were retreated by the NATO forces on each occasion. Since 2009, frequents attempts were made by Taliban to gain control over certain areas and establish their self-styled government based on Islamic Sharia. By the early 2010, Taliban had been able to bring under control northern part of Baghlan, several Districts in the south and north of Kunduz, most of the northern Takhar and parts of Jozjan and their military control or influence (Guistozzi & Reuter, 2011,p 1). During this period, the Taliban even attacked German troops in Kunduz province and pursued them to retreat. It is also a fact that the Taliban, who had been perceived as a Pashtun Movement by the western analysts and Afghan government, extended their sphere of influence in 2009 for the non-Pashtuns and formed cells in Uzbek and Tajik areas. As a result of this movement, Uzbek, Turkmen and a smaller number of Tajik entered into the ranks and file of Taliban. In spring 2010, a heterogeneous group of insurgents with ethnic multiplicity appeared in the Northern part of Afghanistan, giving more momentum to insurgency and militancy in the country. This influence brought a new trend in the recruitment strategy of Taliban by extending their sphere of influence to non-Pashtun dominated provinces such

40 as Aryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e-Pol and Takhar, where the approach of Taliban was based upon religious and ideological approach rather an ethnic one (Guistozzi & Reuter, 2011 p 2). The sphere of influence by Taliban can be gauged from the fact that shadow administration was formed by Taliban in the areas captured and controlled by them with particular emphasis on justice, taxation, education and health. The justice system delivered by hem was based on quick and non-partisan basis through mobile courts, normally comprising a mullah and two assistants travelling on motor bikes. The verdicts awarded by them were seen with great veneration by the common people. This system of justice was highly appreciated by them as it worked in the areas that were within the accessibility of Taliban. Such was the system of justice that even people from the neighboring areas would take their cases to them as speedy justice was delivered by them (Guistozzi & Reuter, 2011 p 3). Cases were decided quickly having no concept of bribes, but still, it lacked sophistication and pleading of cases by the counsel. The education system delivered by them was based on strict doctrine of Islamic law; an example of this can be quoted from the province of Kunduz girls schools were closed down and were banned from participating in schooling in spite of occasional protests by the villagers. The Taliban don’t seem to have a coherent anti-Non-governmental organization (NGO) agenda. In the northern provinces of Afghanistan, NGOs were asked by the Taliban authorities to register themselves with their authorities. In some cases the NGOs were attacked by them but the source of funding mattered a lot in this regard since the USAID- funded NGOs were greatly opposed by them. Their (Taliban) more lenient and permissive attitude of the NGOs is motivated by the pressure from the local population where they seek employment (Guistozzi & Reuter, 2011). Taliban are not the only monolithic groups fighting against the state machinery of Afghanistan, besides them, several other groups are also fighting against the government. But all of them are linked to Taliban one way or the other way, depending upon their ideological chemistry and way of preaching their ideology. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is the most noteworthy group using the northeastern Afghanistan as staging area for their activities to infiltrate to Central Asia (Guistozzi & Reuter, 2011,p3). In contrast to this is the Hizb-e-Islami Group led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar, often referred to as (HIG), is not very active militarily in the Greater North but is often at odds with the

Taliban. The only exceptional case is the Badakhshan province, where the stronger Hizb tolerates and supports the few active Taliban there. The situation is quite different in other provinces, for example in March 2010; the Hizb was defeated by the Taliban in Baghlan. The relationship between Taliban and Al-Qaeda is very difficult to define as the former are saturated in the Greater North (It includes the nine provinces of Afghanistan’s northeast and north: the ‘north’ includes the Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-e-Pol, Balkh and Samangan and the ‘northeast’ comprises Kunduz, Baghlan, Takhar and Badakhshan) while the latter have a very low profile in the area. Although Taliban have not yet been able to take complete control of any province in the country but some key districts have been captured by them, particularly in Helmand and the North (BROWN, 2017, p 4).

By the end of 2014, Taliban were reported to have got control of some of the key areas such as Ghazni, Kabul where incidents of IEDs were very rampant and they were believed to have formed safe havens in Wardak, Kapisa and Logar provinces (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015,p 16). The insurgents got such a strong hold that they collected taxes, ran schools,and even oversaw a rudimentary court system (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015, p 16). 1.10 Current Situation in Afghanistan December 2015 marked nearly one year into United States Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) focused on developing Afghan’s institutional capacity to enhance security and stability across Afghanistan (Department of Defence, 2015). During the first year of transition, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) had to face bitter situation from the insurgents. The security forces of the country were confronted with law and order situation in the provinces that were previously declared ‘secure’ but insurgency had penetrated deeply even into the well secured areas. Despite all the challenges faced by the Afghan Forces, they have a firm will to carry on their security mission across the country vis a vis the insurgents and terrorists with a strong determination to protect the Afghan nation and make it a peaceful country in the world. It does not mean that the security forces of Afghanistan lack professional soundness and expertise. The case of Esa Khan Laghmani,

42 who is referred to a Ghazi, for killing a terrorist in the premises of Afghan Parliament, is a glaring example in this regard.

Currently the US Forces in Afghanistan mainly focus on the sphere of training, advising, and assisting the Afghan Security Forces and supporting counter-terrorism operations against the remnants of Al-Qaeda and its co-partners. The presence of US forces in Afghanistan was clarified by the U.S. President, Barrack Obama on October 15, 2015 stating that the US forces, with the current strength of 9,800, would stay in Afghanistan through most of 2016. This showed that the US still were not sure over the security capabilities of the Afghan Forces and wanted to have presence for another year (The News ,January1, 2015). By the end of 2016, the United States and NATO will not completely withdraw from Afghanistan as even beyond that period a force with strength of 5,500 will remain in Afghanistan and particularly in Kabul and Bagram, besides limited presence in the eastern and southern part of Afghanistan. This strategy of the United States aims at an enduring commitment to the Afghanistan and its security forces in the long run. Their presence in Afghanistan will further strengthen the security capabilities of ANDSF since the United States is cognizant of the nascent security strategies of Afghanistan. The main objective of the presence of the forces of the United States is to provide security to the entire Afghan people from the internal as well as external threats of terrorism and maintain peace and stability in the country.

The Afghan government has been able to hold control of the country to a great extent. It is a fact that Taliban could not get control of the provinces and big cities but they ensured their presences in most of the key cities by capturing some of the distrits and key areas. By the end of 2016, the government of Afghanistan was in control of 63 % of Afghanistan’s 407 Districts (BROWN, 2017). The government is losing its control in some of the areas while Taliban are gaing more momentum with new zeal as they have been treating their fighters as cannon fodders (BROWN, 2017)., showing their strong dermination. Moreover, the death of Mullah Mansour in a drone attack has reduced the chances of negotiations with the government. Lawlessness has prevailed in capital city of Kabul where incidents of kidnapping are on the rise. Incidents of abduction and

43 kidnapping have become very common, where ranson as low as $ 5,000 is demanded from the employees and lower class businessmen (BROWN, 2017).

1.11 Threat Environment and Security Measures

Security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated in the second half of 2015 when the insurgents made their way into some of the provinces, particularly Kunduz and Helmand. The Afghan security forces have to confront insurgency even in the provinces that were previously secure, as Kandahar (BROWN, 2017). They had to encounter many incidents of insurgency but they were able to get control over the insurgents. Despite episodes of insurgency in many parts of the country, the security agencies of Afghanistan have been able to have control over the entire country with no room giving to Taliban and other insurgent groups. The efficiency of Afghan security forces can be gauged from the fact that Taliban have been confined to their traditional strongholds in the provinces of Helmand in the South and Logar and Wardak in the east, Kunduz and northern Afghanistan.

The death of Mullah Omer in July 2015, though he was reported to have died in 2013 but the news of his death was kept secret for strategic purposes by the new Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansur, according to some analysts. Mullah Mansur’s strive to consolidate his leadership position in Afghanistan, compelled Pakistan and other interlocutors to emphasize the importance of political reconciliation and talks with the Taliban. Resilience of Taliban in the second half of 2015 shows the determination of Taliban to continue their fighting against the state machinery of both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Department of Defence, 2015). From the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan it can be prognosticated that Taliban and Haqqani network can be very lethal for the security of the country. The presence of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant-Khorasan (ISIL- K), named after an area that once included parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan__has now been active in Afghanistan since mid-2014 (Katzman & Thomas, Afghanistan: Post- Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, 2017) in the eastern province of Nangarhar remains a concern of insecurity for Taliban, the government of Afghanistan, the regional and international community.

Pakistan’s increased dialogues with the Taliban and Afghan government in the early part of 2015, had created a ray of hope for the improving security situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan but a number of events that took place in the second half of 2015 including the several high profile attacks in Kabul in the month of August and attack on the Pakistani Airbase at Badaber Peshawar in the month of September 2015 further worsened the Pak-Afghan relations and challenged bilateral cooperation between the two countries (Department of Defence, 2015). Cordial relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are the sine qua non for progressing against the terrorist and militant groups along both sides of the Durand Line. In the post-December 16, 2014, the government of Afghanistan and Pakistan had agreed to conduct joint military operations against those terrorist groups that posed threat to the security of the other country. Nevertheless, the wanted terrorists of Pakistan shouldering the responsibility of major attacks in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) such as attacks on Army Public School Peshawar in December 2014, Bacha Khan University Charsadda 2016 and attack on NADRA 2015 office Mardan are allegedly claimed to have taken shelter in Afghanistan.

1.12 US Counter-terrorism Mission

U.S Counterterrorism mission in Afghanistan largely remains focused on the defeat of Al-Qaeda and its co-partners, protection of the U.S Forces in Afghanistan and prevents it by providing a safe haven to the terrorists that aim at planning acts of terrorism in the Afghanistan that affects the whole region. Counter-terrorism efforts have made it possible that there has not been any major terrorist event in any part of the world since 9/11. It is on account of the counter-terrorism strategy that security has been ensured in most parts of Afghanistan but the presence of other extremist groups in Afghanistan such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant_ Khorasan Province can put at jeopardy the interest of the United States, its allies and co-partner in maintaining security in the country (Department of Defence, 2015). The counter-terrorism strategy of the United States gives limited jurisdiction to the United States over the Afghan territory in case of any untoward security situation in the country. Their main objective of the foreign forces in Afghanistan, at present, is to assist the Afghan Security Forces in

45 maintaining law and order situation in the country and provide assistance to ISAF under the Resolute Support Mission.

1.13 NATO-led Resolute Support Mission

The NATO-led Resolute Support Mission was launched in Afghanistan as a consequence of NATO draw down from Afghanistan by December 2014. The Resolute Support Mission was started on January 1, 2015 with the emphasis on the building of Afghanistan’s capacity in the key sectors of security. The Resolute Support Mission was initiated in furtherance of the completion of ISAF mission in Afghanistan and focuses on the training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF at the Afghan National Army (ANA) corps. The Resolute Support (RS) mission is a continuation of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), signed in Kabul on September 30, 2014 between the United States and the government of Afghanistan and later on ratified by the Afghan Parliament on November 27, 2014 before going into effect on January 1, 2015 (Department of Defence, 2015). The SOFA describes the terms and conditions for the deployment of NATO forces in Afghanistan as a part of the Resolute Support Mission in the country.

As of November 2015, the Resolute Support (RS) mission comprised troops from 40 nations of the world (25 NATO Allies and 15 partner nations), consisting of 11,385 NATO and 1,725 partner personnel across 21 bases totaling 13,110 personnel (detail of the nations showing the number of troops in Afghanistan is given in the following table). The United States still remains the largest force contributor in Afghanistan in the present scenario. The following table shows the list of the countries providing the strength of the military personnel that will remain a part of the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the NATO drawdown from Afghanistan.

1.14 Resolute Support Mission Troop Contributing Nation, as of November 2015

Nation Personnel Nation Personnel Albania 43 Latvia 23 Armenia 65 Lithuania 14 Australia 229 Luxembourg 1 Austria 10 Mongolia 233 Azerbaijan 94 Montenegro 14 Belgium 60 Netherlands 83 Bosnia 53 New Zealand 8 Bulgaria 126 Norway 46 Croatia 106 Poland 113 Czech Republic 222 Portugal 10 Denmark 90 Romania 650 Estonia 4 Slovakia 39 Finland 82 Slovenia 7 Georgia 856 Spain 326 Germany 850 Sweden 27 Greece 4 FYR of Macedonia 39 Hungary 102 Turkey 509 Iceland 2 Ukraine 8 Ireland 7 United Kingdom 395 Italy 760 United States 6,800  Numbers of Personnel are NATO 11,385 approximate as they change on Non-NATO 1,725 daily basis Total 13,110

1.15 Afghanistan Threat Assessment

Afghanistan has been facing a persistent threat from both the Afghan insurgency and extremist groups such as Taliban, the Haqqani network and to some extent with lesser degree from the Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. These networks are in search of an opportunity to reassert their authority and prominence in the sphere of the government whenever and wherever they find any lacunae. The Afghan National and Defense Security Forces (ANDSF), during this time were able to repulse the insurgent attacks with both the offensive and defensive strategies. In some areas, Taliban were able to gain control over certain areas but soon they were overcome by the ANDSF with the assistance of coalition forces. Taliban were even able to capture the provincial center of Kunduz in September 2015 but Afghan Security forces, in collaboration with the coalition forces, soon recaptured Kunduz in the early month of October, only a few days later, after the capture by Taliban.

Despite the long stay of coalition forces in Afghanistan, the country still faces threats of existential nature from the terrorist and extremist networks positing direct threat to its stability. Opium cultivation coupled with drug-trafficking and resultant revenue from it still forms major part of its economy. Most of the criminal networks in Afghanistan are financed through the opium and revenue generated from it. Kidnapping and extortion have been on the rise in some areas of the country by the low-level criminal activities (Department of Defence, 2015). Since April 2015, there has been a tremendous increase in the attacks of Taliban over the key cities of Afghanistan. These attacks were conducted under the patronage of their de facto leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansur. The campaign of Taliban attacks intensified in August 2015 after the news of the death of Mullah Omer announced in July by the new leader Mullah Akhtar Mansur in order to consolidate his leadership position (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015,p,1). Taliban have been fighting against the governmental machinery in the provincial headquarters and key districts showing temporary success in some areas such as Kunduz.

Another threat that has emerged recently in some parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan is the Islamic State (ISIS) and the areas where this menace was seen was Afghanistan-Pakistan affiliate, Wilayat-Khorasan, where these elements are engaged in

48 fighting against Taliban for control of areas and authority of the government (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015 p 1). The ISIS remained active in the Province of Nangarhar where they are facing tough resistance from the ANSF and coalition forces (Fahim, November 5,2015). According to a survey conducted by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), all the important districts of Afghanistan were examined for the disposition of militant groups and Taliban (from July to December 2015) and the survey was re-conducted a fresh where 200 out of 409 Districts were found to be receiving threat of insurgency and terrorism.

All the district centers where the Taliban and other militant groups tried to have gained their grip are represented in the following figure (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015,p,2).

1.15.1 Figure Showing Insurgents and Taliban in Afghanistan as of December 2015

It is important to note that result did not remain the same throughout the reporting It is It It is important to note that result may not remain the same during the time (July to December 2015) of the survey. For example, security situation in Herat Province is worse

49 than it was in December. But this prognosticates the presence of insurgents, Taliban and ISIS, which are engaged in fighting against the state machinery as well as against one another for the sake of struggle for power or power- politics. The situation in Kunduz may also be different in the sense that it fell to the hands of Taliban in October but was soon taken back by the ANSF with the assistance of the U.S Resolute Support Mission (RSM) working in Afghanistan under the patronage of NATO. Similarly, the ISIS has emerged as a new threat both to the government of Afghanistan as well as the Taliban. The death of Mullah Omer in July 2015 gave another opportunity for the further splintering of Taliban as some contested the very leadership of Mullah Akhtar Mansur as a unified leader. This resulted in clashes between the parent group of Taliban led by Mullah Akhtar Mansur and the splintered one led by Mullah Rasool Akhund.

Insurgency has been on the rise in Afghanistan in many provinces where this menace has been witnessed. Zabul and Kunar provinces constitute the major sanctuaries for Taliban & insurgents and their measures are either defensive or intent to consolidate contiguous area control. Activities of the Taliban are mainly offensive, targeting provincial capitals in the southern, eastern and northern Afghanistan, and are involved in frontline insurgent activities against the government.

1.15.2 Greater Kandahar: Greater Kandahar (Loy Kandahar) is a larger entity and comprises Zabul, Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan Provinces, by constituting a coherent human and economic system of Durrani Pashtuns. Kandahar is the area where Mullah Omer emerged in 1990s. Currently many militant groups have support zones in Zabul and Ghazni provinces of Afghanistan. It is also important to note that Osama Bin laden (OBL) referred to Zabul and Ghazni as one of the most desirable sanctuaries for the Al- Qaeda on account of its high fortifications (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015,pp,3-4). Various factions in Zabul, who are loyal to Mullah Akhtar Mansur, have contested his rival, particularly Mullah Rasool Akhund, who has also the support of the ISIS elements formerly from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Mullah Mansur Dadullah, who was strong supporter of Mullah Rasool Akhund, died in fighting in Khak-e-Afghan, Zabul on November 12, 2015 (Shah & Jolly, 2015). After this incident, the Khak-e-Afghan has become a strong sanctuary for the ISIS elements. Thus

50 the Taliban, besides facing tough resistance from the Afghan government, are also facing resistance from the elements of ISIS that have made safe havens in Afghanistan’s sensitive provinces. Moreover, the injury of Mullah Akhtar Mansur on December 2nd, 2015 in an encounter with the ISIS is another point of concern for the Taliban (Hamid, 2015). Taliban have been in the de facto control of Tarin Kowt, the provincial capital of Uruzgan since March 2015 (Ahmad 2015) while they have also been in control of some areas in Helmand province. The Taliban also claimed to have conducted an attack on Kandahar, which shows an increase in the momentum of Taliban’s insurgency. So, Taliban’s insurgency is on the rise with an increased threat to the law enforcement agencies in the provinces of Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015,pp,3-4). The control zones of Taliban stretch over to the neighboring Farah, Nimruz, and Ghor provinces of Afghanistan, which reflects the cross- border access of transit-route facilities and infiltration of insurgents to the Baloch areas of Iran and Pakistan.

1.15.3 Herat: The activities of Taliban from Helmand also extend to the provinces of Herat, Farah and Badghis, showing the penetration of insurgent activities into the neighboring areas as when they find any gray area (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015). The province of Heart is ethnically diverse inhabited by many races but several areas, including Shindand are majority Pashtuns.

1.15.4 Greater Paktia: Greater Paktia comprises the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, and Khost and forms a larger Ghilzai Pashtun tribal region with Logar, Wardak, and part of Ghazni. Militant attacks by Taliban have been observed in these areas and particularly Ghazni City while it has also been observed that the Haqqani network is operational in this region between the border of Pakistan and Kabul, by using sanctuary and transit- routes to plan attacks against the capital (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest,December 10, 2015). The presence of Haqqani network can be ascribed to the fact that the Shura that selected Mullah Akhtar Mansur as the new leader of Taliban in July 2015 also selected Siraj Haqqani as his deputy, which shows that the elements of insurgency have their roots in this region (Iyenger, July 31,2015).

1.15.5 Capital Region: The Capital region comprises Kabul, Parwan, and Kapisa, some of the northern most parts of Logar and Wardak, and the western most parts of Laghman and Nangarhar. Kabul, being the Capital of Afghanistan, is under the control of the ANA but the constant flow of people displaced by insecurity, coupled with the proliferation of crimes, provides a magnetic force for the insurgency. The growing interdependence of insurgency and organized crime, combined with fluid alliances between the Haqqani network, the Taliban, the Hizb-e-Islami group (Report A. , The Insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland, 2011). This marriage of compromise by the insurgents has made it easy for the insurgents to penetrate into the city and strike high profile attacks and which still plays an important role in facilitating infiltration of insurgency into the capital. This has also resulted in the formation of ‘Shadow Governors’ in the capital city of Afghanistan. The Haqqani network is the most active insurgent group in Kabul and has been involved in conducting many high profile attacks in the capital such as the two strikes on the Indian Embassy in July 2008 and October 2009 respectively (Report A. , The Insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland, 2011). Upon pressure from the government of Kabul, the Haqqani network and Taliban changed their strategies of carrying on their activities through the local imams of the mosques. The arrest of mullahs by the law enforcement agencies mitigated the attacks to a greater extent. Besides, Kabul city, the province of Kabul contains some insecure areas such as Surobi district, the Uzbin and Musayi valley areas. According to local Afghan officials, seven to ten separate insurgent groups, comprising five to ten men each operate in the city (Report A. , The Insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland, 2011).

The death news of Mullah Omer in July 2015 provided an impetus to the attacks by Taliban and the Haqqani network (Rasmussen, 2015). Of all these regions, Kabul has been witnessing increased attacks of insurgency as was confirmed by the U. S. Embassy on 30th November the danger of an imminent threat (States, 2015). Taliban reportedly claimed a VBIED attacks on NATO convey on 22 August, 2015 and an attack in Kabul near the Spanish Embassy on 11 December 2015 (Press, December 11, 2015).

1.15.6 Nangarhar: The province of Nangarhar has elements of ISIS’ Wilayat Khorasan, to which several Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan) pledged allegiance in

October 2014 following a dispute over leadership and splintering within the TTP. This supportive faction of the ISIS was pushed by the Pakistani military across the border into the Southern part of Nangarhar (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, December 10, 2015). The faction of Wilayat Khorasan entered into an encounter with Taliban militants and resultantly took control of many villages by implementing strict version of Islamic law over the local population (Ghambir, December 3, 2015). Wilayat Khorasan is also engaged in launching attacks in Jalalabad (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, December 10, 2015). The provinces of Nangarhar and Jalalabad are facing security threats not only from the Taliban but also from the Wilayat Khorasan, which shows the worst security situation in the country in the post-NATO drawdown scenario from Afghanistan.

1.15.7 Kunar and Nuristan: This region of the country is mainly mountainous, remote and comprises the ethnic minority of Nuristan, among the other ethnic and linguistic groups. On account of its mountainous nature this area was declared by Osama Bin Laden to be primarily a sanctuary for the Al-Qaeda (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015). Militant activities by the Taliban and other insurgent groups have been observed in these provinces with varying degrees.

1.15.8 Tajik North: The Tajik areas of Northern Afghanistan are divided into three main power centers: Panjsher, Balkh, and Badakhshan. In the late 2015, activities of Taliban were witnessed in the provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, and Baghlan provinces (Lewis, McFate, Denburg, & Forest, 2015). Militants in this region are responsible for the broad urban offensive against the city of Kunduz and many other District centers in October 2015. As a result of Taliban offensive, Kunduz fell to Taliban in October but was retaken by the ANSF after a period of two weeks (Norland,December 13, 2015). The threat from Taliban remains high in this area for the Taliban had established strong sanctuaries and area control here. Major Taliban offensives are represented in the following map from 2009-2014 with focus on those areas where they have been conducting more frequent attacks.

1.15. 9 Map Showing Key Provinces of Taliban Attacks from 2009-2016

The Pak-Afghan border (Durand Line) has been the key concern for the law enforcement agencies of both the countries and on account of its windy and treacherous nature remains a safe haven for the various insurgent and terrorist networks, comprising the Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Khorasan Province, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). These extremist sanctuaries across the border region remain a security challenge to both Afghanistan and Pakistan and pose a threat to the security of both Afghanistan and Pakistan by directly affecting regional stability.

1.15.10 Civilian Deaths and Injured- Ground Engagements by Region (2009-2016)

900

800

700 Southern

600 Eastern Northern 500 North Eastern 400 Western 300 South Eastern Central 200 Central Highlands 100

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

The above graph shows the deaths and injured casualties of the civilians in Afghanistan. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) urged the government to adopt a viable strategy regarding protection of the civilians and mitigation of the casualties (UNAMA, July 2017, p 30). It also urged the ANSF to ensure security of the civilians and warned to take into account those who are responsible for negligence in duties and causing loss to the people. Officials giving orders for misuse of weapons or explosives were to be dealt with an iron hand.

1.16 Pak-Afghan Relations and its Importance Relations between the two countries have occasionally been at ease and remain a critical sphere of enhancing security and stability in the region. Relations between the two countries are prompted by mutual cooperation since the coming into power of Ashraf Ghani as both the countries have made joint efforts through their leaders to improve relations in the field of security. The first half part of 2015 saw improvement of relations and an atmosphere of friendship and mutual trust seemed to exist between the two countries but the latter half of the same year reversed the situation with the occurrences

55 of events of insurgency in Afghanistan in the month of August followed by terrorist activities in September in Peshawar. This resulted in an atmosphere of blame game as each blamed the other for providing shelter to the terrorists of the other country. Bilateral tensions increased in the latter half of 2015 with the incidents of cross border firing between the security forces of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The incidents of Badaber Airbase and attack on Bacha Khan University were the further flaring points of concern for both the countries as the perpetrators of these terrorist attacks were allegedly claimed to have taken shelter in Afghanistan. Since then an atmosphere of mistrust exists between the two countries. Recently the issue of Torkham Border is another area of great security concern for Pakistan for the Afghan people have violated the norms of International law by removing the gate. One of the greatest issues in the Pak-Afghan relation is the Durand Line, which has not been recognized by the Afghan government as an International Border though it has been recognized as a legal border between the two countries by the government of Afghanistan on many occasions. It was the 9/11 episode that made the people of Afghanistan turn against the government of Pakistan on open forums for siding with the Uitede States and the allied forces by fighting the war on terror. Relations between the two countries entered such a worst scenario that the ‘blame game’ started in which most of the insurgent attacks in the respective countries were said to be conducted by the militants of the other countries and the militants were supposed to be taking refuge in the other country. This border has been used, in the past, by the terrorists for conducting attacks and taking shelter there. It was this border that was used by the smugglers and outlaws for illegal activities and sale of drugs. Moreover, the presence of the Indian troops in Afghanistan providing assistance and training to the security forces of Afghanistan is another destabilizing factor in the Pak-Afghan relations. It is also a fact that India does not share any border with Afghanistan but it (India) wants to be there to have access to the the CARs and Middle Eastern Countries. India also wants to destablise Paksitan in the region by sandwiching it on both its eastern and western borders. The greatest irony in the Pak-Afghan relations is that Paksitan offerd its services to Afghanistan in terms of training and providing

56 assistance to the Afghan Security Forces but the offer had always been turned down by the latter.

1.17 Bilateral Security Agreement The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) is a security agreement between the United States and Afghanistan and promises the presence of about 10,000 security personnel in Afghanistan after the drawdown of ISAF/NATO forces from Afghanistan with the aim of training, supporting and providing financial assistance to the Afghan Security Forces (ANSF). Besides this, the troops would provide logistics, air communications, intelligence sharing and support to the Afghan National Army (ANA). The troops are supposed to be adjusted in five to six bases and to be retained by the United States in Afghanistan (Agarwal, 2014). The troops could also be employed against counter-terrorism operations in the most sensitive areas of Afghanistan as enshrined in the terms of BSA while the responsibility for maintaining law and order situation would lie with the Afghan National Army.

The peak of the NATO operations in Afghanistan was during 2010-2012, where the strength of the International Troops stood at 1, 48,000 wherein they had full authority and command over military operations in Afghanistan. But since the drawdown was also in the offing in 2012 and consequently the Afghan National Army was raised from 70,000 to 3, 52,000 by the end of the same year (Agarwal, 2014). Out of it, the strength of the ANA was 1, 49,000 while the remaining was the police force. During this time, the U.S-led forces have conducted sustained “Summer Military Operation” as well as “Spring Offensive” to counter Taliban and terrorism (Tariq, 2015,pp,121-122). The US- led forces conducted military operations in the sensitive areas such as Helmand and Kandahar where Taliban were crushed but the influence of Taliban diverted to the west and north of Afghanistan. Even the troops on ground, air strikes, drone attacks, embedded intelligence and the international security forces could not prevent them from Taliban from conducting attacks across the country (Agarwal, 2014). Kabul that remained under the close guard of security forces also had to witness the attacks by Taliban and other insurgent groups.

The existence of BSA adheres to three cardinal principles: security in Afghanistan, building up the Afghan National Army and providing financial support to the ANA. Security in Afghanistan can better be maintained if the key installations and most sensitive areas remain under the patronage of the United States and provide assistance to the ANA in other security measures. Sensitive installations of the country should also be guarded by the foreign troops as they are well equipped with all modern warfare techniques. Building up the Afghan National Army requires the capacity to provide training to Afghan army on modern lines which can be accomplished through pacts and treaties with different countries. The United States could help to build training academies in Afghanistan and make arrangements for employing foreign instructors in Afghanistan. India has already been providing training assistance and support to the Afghan National Army. Pakistan has also offered training capabilities to Afghanistan but the latter has so far declined the offer in explicit terms. Financial assistance hinges on how the International Community has been sincere towards the war stricken Afghanistan. This assistance needs to be delinked with the BSA as it needs to be rebuilt in all parlances. It is also worth mentioning that the BSA is considered to be the sine qua non for the Afghan security. But the irony of the fact is how can a force of 10,000 to 12,000 maintain security in the war-stricken Afghanistan and can achieve the desired results of security in the entire country what could not be achieved by the 1, 50,000 troops in more than 13 years during their stay.

1.18 Indian Military Aid to Afghanistan

India has its own strategic interest in Afghanistan mainly to curtail Pakistan, China and Russia. Though India does not share any border with Afghanistan but is always there to ensure its presence in the country (Tariq, 2015, pp,15-21). Afghanistan by itself would not be interested in India and its military support to it as according to some of the analysts, this assistance would not be productive (Studies , 2014). Afghanistan wants to strengthen its counterinsurgency capacity and for this purpose requires equipments from helicopters to communication tools (Agarwal, 2014). Owing to the difficult terrain and extent of threats in Afghanistan, it is extremely necessary for the Afghan forces to be well equipped with an adequate system of warfare that are actually

58 utilized in fighting against the insurgents and terrorists. Indian assistance to Afghanistan is strategic in the sense that military aid is political in terms which shows solidarity to the Afghan government and its people. The nature of Indian insurgency is quite different from that of Afghanistan and air power can be used for suppressing the insurgency due to the hilly areas. India can provide help and assistance to Afghanistan in implicit terms but not in explicit terms as it cannot ignore Pakistan because Afghanistan is requesting for weapons that can be used against internal insurgency as well as any external threat. The assistance of India to Afghanistan is an alarming point for Pakistan because Indian presence in Afghanistan would pose Pakistan double threats; one at the eastern side and the other at the western side. If India helps out Afghanistan at any rate then Pakistan has a better option to help the LTTE (Liberation of Tamil Tigers Elam) in Sri Lanka to equalize the balance. This would help in maintaining a sort of balance of power in the region.

1.19 US and Afghanistan: BSA and Taliban Negotiations

The BSA and negotiations with the Taliban were the two major issues confronted by the United States during the whole of 2013. The future of U.S-Afghan Relations is dependent on the smooth working of the bilateral security agreement of the two countries resulting in an efficacious security system. The BSA has a life span of about 10 years and would determine the future trajectory of relations between the US and Afghanistan and would particularly focus on US future aid and advice on governance to Afghanistan (Studies, 2014). The US had been insisting on the signing of BSA as without it, the US would not be able to keep its security forces in Afghanistan after the drawdown of foreign troops by 2014. The BSA was incorporated with a view to give legitimacy to the US-led forces in Afghanistan in the post-drawdown scenario. Former President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai had refused to sign the documents of BSA but in September 2014 the issue of Afghan Presidency was resolved as result of which Dr. Ashraf Ghani was elevated as the President of Afghanistan on September 29, 2014 and one day after his ascending to the throne of Presidency, he signed the documents of BSA. At present the NATO forces are involved in the training of Afghan National Army and law enforcement

59 personnel. The ANA does not have an air support of its own and is not in a position to have its own till 2017 and would be dependent on the U.S. air support till that time.

1.20 Afghan-US Bilateral Security Agreement: Implications for Pakistan In the wake of growing security risk in Afghanistan both the United States and Afghanistan agreed upon the signing of Bilateral Security Agreement that extended the presence of the United States in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (Observer, November 29, 2013). The agreement guarantees “immunity” to the American forces maintaining law and order in Afghanistan and only the Americans will have the exclusive authority to exercise jurisdiction over their forces and Defense Department Civilians working with them. The economy of Afghanistan, to a great extent, remains dependent on war and drug. According to a report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) opium cultivation covered more than 200, 000 hectares in 2013, showing a 36% rise over the last year. While a report of 2007 showed the cultivable land for opium as more than 193,000 hectares. There has been an increase in this sector showing roughly 5,500 tons, which is equal to an increase of 49% since 2012. Executive Director of UNODC, Yuri Fedotov, has expressed his great concern over the growing trend of opium cultivation in Afghanistan and has the International Community to carve out a viable strategy for its eradication. To overcome this menace, both the government of Afghanistan and the International Community should adopt counter-narcotics measures and should be made an integral part of their policies but the war-stricken government of Afghanistan under the leadership of President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah is unable to deliver on anything substantial on these fronts. Strict action against the poor farmers will help reduce the problem to a great extent but that will not be a sound decision unless the real culprits are brought to the book. They cannot do anything on their own but are rather the tenants or paid servants of the terrorists and big drug-traffickers who normally bask in the sun of some functionaries of the government. In the presence of this context, Pakistan needs to reassess the situation since this would mean the presence of the United States and its Allied Forces for an indefinite period and it has suffered a lot for standing by them in the war against terrorism. All those networks that fight in Pakistan under the banner of Jihad such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have been

60 creating security concerns for it since the decision of standing by the American Forces. The TTP on account of its leadership vacuum faces the issue of splintering into various factions under new leaders, that would weaken their position but it is blessing in disguise for the government as it would enable them to enter into peace negotiations with some of the factions. By doing so, it should also need to find new venues of peace with those who are stubborn towards peace but the law enforcement agencies should try to avoid killing the top leadership of TTP and make a room for table talk. The government of Pakistan needs to devise strategies for the demobilization of militants by contracting an agreement with the TTP and engage the demilitarized people into the mainstream economic activities. Since the tribal areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan across the Durand line have been frequently used for drug-trafficking and resultant economy, there is a greater need on part of both to strengthen the anti-drug trafficking through the tribal areas of Pakistan. This is an uphill task and Pakistan needs to be helped by the United Nations and other volunteers. But the most important thing is to find a way out for the political settlement of Afghanistan by including all the stakeholders in the decision making power of the country and particularly the Taliban as they are now the main actors in the country. For a peaceful Afghanistan, their involvement in the government would be positive step towards the establishment of a consensus based democratic government. Pakistan has repeatedly made it clear that it stands for the democratic values in the country and is ready to play a vital role in the reconciliation process. Pakistan looks at the situation from a pragmatic point of view and is of the view that any power vacuum in the post-2014 scenario would prove detrimental to the entire region. In practical parlance, approval of the BSA means the prolonged presence of the ISAF whereby Taliban and other insurgent groups would carry on their activities. In such a case Afghanistan is destined to suffer the pangs of turmoil and the resultant political uncertainty would have serious implication for Pakistan. 1.21 Strategic Partnership Agreement The BSA was followed by the broader “Strategic Partnership Agreement” (SPA) entered into between President Obama and President Hamid Karzai on May 1, 2012 (Katzman, 2015,p13). The agreement envisaged the commitment of the United States to

61 the stability of Afghan government and development for many years after the transition is complete. The SPA took one year for completion after negotiations that broadly focused on two particular issues: firstly, control of Afghanistan over detention centers and secondly, a halt to or control over nightmares raids by insurgents on the U.S forces. The BSA also aimed at overcoming the public Afghan discomfort over the issues such as the March 2011 burning of the Holy Quran by a Florida pastor, the mistaken burning of several Qurans on February 20, 2012 by US soldiers; and the March 11, 2012 killing of 16 Afghans by a soldier of the United States, Sergeant Robert Bales, who was arrested and tried in the United States (Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S.Policy, 2015). The BSA has a life span of ten years and would represent an outline of post-2014 relationship between Afghanistan and the United States. The major provisions of the BSA center around the following few principles (Tariq, 2015,pp,121-122):

I. A commitment to continue to strengthen U.S-Afghan close cooperation and relations to secure a stable Afghanistan. This strongly implies that some security forces will stay in Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario but does not describe out- rightly the number of troops mentioned in the documents. The documents broadly focused on negotiations on the BSA. II. The U.S .administration will provide training, arms and assistance to the Afghan security forces. But this remained silent about the dollar amounts and the system to be provided for these measures. III. Afghanistan will be designated as a “Major Non-NATO Ally”, a designation which is reserved only for close U.S allies. In line with that pledge, the then US Secretary, Clinton announced that designation to Afghanistan on July 7, 2012 which enables Afghanistan to receive (sale, donation) US weaponry of the same level of sophistication as that which is sold to US-NATO allies and cares for provision of funds and training facilities to lease defense articles. IV. There will be no “permanent” US bases or the use of Afghan facilities for use against neighboring countries, but the agreement envisages the facility that would allow long term U.S. use of Afghan facilities in the years to come. Though such

permanent facilities are explicitly prohibited by successive National Defense Authorization Acts over the past several years as to establish a permanent base in Afghanistan. V. The administration also pledged to request for economic aid to Afghanistan for the period of (2014-2024) but no specific amount was mentioned in the documents. The Afghan government tried to get an amount of $ 2 billion specified in the agreement of document. VI. Both the countries will make a U.S-Afghanistan Bilateral Commission (US-ABC) to monitor implementation of the SPA. This was further given impetus by the visit of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, President and Chief Executive of Afghanistan to the United States in March 2015, wherein the U.S administration announced that U.S. Secretary of State John, Kerry will visit Afghanistan later in 2015 to co-chair another meeting of the commission, which last met in May 2015.

In October 2011 the Loya Jirga was called by the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai to give endorsement to the SPA and Afghan insistence on control over detentions and approval authority for U.S.-led night raids. From November 16-19, 2011 the traditional Loya Jirga consisting of 2030 members gave approval to Hamid Karzai both for the pact and the suggested conditions. The final SPA was ratified by the National Assembly of Afghanistan on May 26, 2012 by a vote of 180-4. The SPA replaced the earlier strategic partnership agreement, created on May 23, 2005 when Hamid Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration” (Katzman,S 2015, p29).

1.22 New Heroes in Afghanistan

Afghan Parliament (Wolesi Jirga) was so thankful for saving the lives of the Parliamentarians that they recommended him for giving promotion in the army (Yusufzai 2105). The soldier who has done this tremendous job hails from the eastern province of Laghman, has now assumed the name of Esa Khan Laghmani and has been referred to as Ghazi by many Afghans because he is believed to have fought a real Jihad in their eyes.

Media men also conducted many interviews with him and glorified him as a national hero by publishing many articles about him in both the print and electronic media.

Afghan people need such heroes at such a critical juncture of transition in their history when Taliban are on the offensive after launching their annual “Spring Offensive” titled as ‘Azam’. This shows the true worth of the Afghan National Army to counter insurgency while only 14,000 NATO troops are there in Afghanistan in the post- drawdown scenario (Yusufzai 2105). This act of bravery by Esa Khan, on one hand shows the valor and strength of the Afghan security forces but on the other hand, shows the lacunae in the security system of Afghanistan. Taliban also claim that their suicide bombers have dodged the maximum Afghan security forces by reaching their target at Kabul. The fact that the suicide bombers carried weapons and explosives to the gate of Parliament by crossing many barriers of security and law enforcement agencies leaves a question mark on the security of Afghan National Army. Supporters of Taliban consider the Suicide bombers to be their heroes to show their fidayee capacity by offering the supreme sacrifice of their lives for the true spirit of Jihad against the pro-western government of Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. By fighting against the Taliban, the government of Afghanistan uses the term Jihad while the Taliban also use the term Jihad by fighting against the pro-western government of Afghanistan. The term jihad and Mujahedeen have been used in Afghanistan for the last 37 years to motivate people to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Islam. These terms are often misused by the rival parties to justify their acts of killings and sacrifices in the country. But ambiguity still pervades over the exact definition of Jihad and Mujahedeen as each rival party ascribes the terms to its side.

The bravery of Esa Khan can inspire the entire Afghan soldiers for countering a well calculated attack by the Taliban. Thus the government would be in a better position to further strengthen their security capabilities and capacities. The law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan should learn a lesson from this episode to such an extent that every soldier of the country could become Esa Khan but should keep in mind that no lacunas are left on any checking and security point. On the other hand, this may also weaken the will-power and determination of the Afghan Taliban as a first failure in the

64 drawdown scenario of Afghanistan. There are also chances that Taliban may rejuvenate their fighters with new courage and spirit.

1.23 Reintegrating Afghanistan Afghanistan has been suffering from the horrors of war and political instability since 1979 when the Soviet forces made incursion into Afghanistan. These have now made the people undergo great miseries and are now fed up with the presence of foreign troops, state of civil war and have been cherishing for peace now. The common masses in Afghanistan require nothing more than peace and stability in the country as the situation is once again turning towards insecurity and moving from bad to worse (Javed, 2016). It is unfortunate that some people in Afghanistan still think that peace and stability in the country can be brought only through a full-fledged war against the Taliban. With the resurgence of violence with ever more intensity, the prospects of peace in Afghanistan seem bleak again since political disorder and insecurity have again overpowered the country. President Ashraf Ghani has shown his dark frustration about the future of the war-torn Afghanistan. The expectations of reconciliation with Taliban have been dashed to the ground after the death of Mullah Akhtar Mansour in the Naushki drone attack. Taliban have been refusing to enter into peace talks with the government by setting hard preconditions, and intensifying their attacks but it is also important that the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) consisting of Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States and China, play an important role to bring Taliban to the negotiating table with the government of Afghanistan.

Over a couple of years, a powerful lobby has developed in Afghanistan whose stakes are better served in case the country remains unstable. Some analysts are of the view that the Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah has been trying to deploy Indian troops in Afghanistan to prove that the biggest hurdle in the way of peace talks in Afghanistan is not Taliban but the vested interest group in Afghanistan (Javed, 2016). It is also being reported that the United States and India, during their meeting of February 10th,, 2016 in Washington, had agreed to deploy about thirty thousand troops in Afghanistan to safeguard the interest of the United States there while President Ashraf Ghani has been

swayed as an anti-Pakistan lobby. Ashraf Ghani has been blaming Pakistan for every bomb-blast and incident of terrorism and militancy (Javed, 2016).

The process of reintegration started in Afghanistan in 2000 where many military and insurgent groups aligned themselves with the government of Afghanistan. Here is a list of a few commanders who aligned themselves with the government.

1.23.1 Table showing Reintegration in Afghanistan

Name year Former Location Reasons for Reintegration Designation Mullah Syed Abdullah 2007 Military Ghor Coercion: Intimidated after his Commander commander, Mullah Abdul Jalil was killed. Mullah Abdullah 2010 Military Helmand Coercion and grievances: Captured by Commander ISAF forces and offered assistance. Noor Ahmad 2010 Military Helmand Coercion and grievances: Intimidated by Commander Afghan and ISAF forces and offered assistance. Syed Ahmad 2009 Military Kapisa Grievances: some of his grievances Commander addressed; offered employment in ANP Mullah Abdul Salam 2007 Governor Helmand Grievances and perception of war: Akhund developed grievances with Taliban; also appeared to view the war as turning against Taliban Suleiman Amiri 2010 Military Herat Grievances: some of his grievances Commander addressed; promised a job in ANP Mullah Aminullah 2010 Military Helmand Coercion and grievances: Captured by Commander ISAF forces and offered assistance to address grievances. Muhammad Anwar 2009 Military Helmand Grievances: Developed a range of Commander grievances with local Taliban Abdul Wahid Rais 2005 Military Helmand Grievances: Developed some grievances Baghrani Commander with the Taliban, including their support of al-Qaeda; offered support from President Karzai Mullah Bahauddin 2006 Military Badghis Grievances: Unhappy with the Taliban Commander harassment of local civilians and other Taliban practices Mullah Ebrahim 2006 Military Kandahar Grievances: Offered support from Afghan Commander government and held grievances against Taliban Habiullah Fauzi 2005 First Ghazni Grievances and perception of war: Secretary Assessed that Taliban would lose; Islamabad increasingly developed grievances with embassy Taliban Mullah Abdul Ghayas 2007 Military Ghor Coercion: intimidated after his Commander commander, Mullah Abdul Jalil was killed

Haji Syed Hazrat Gul 2006 Military Kunar Grievances: local tribal leaders and Commander Afghan government vowed to address key grievances; developed grievances with local insurgents Musa Hotak 2002 Deputy Miadan Perception of war: Assessed that Taliban minister was losing war planning

Malem Jan 2005 Military Kapisa Grievances and perception of war: Commander Developed grievances with local Haqqani leaders and concluded that ISAF forces would win Haji Kaduz 2009 Military Helmand Grievances: Developed grievances with Commander local Taliban; ISAF and Afghan forces offered him employment with ANP Mullah Abdul Samad 2001 Deputy Kandahar Perception of war: Concluded that Taliban Khaksar minister lost the war interior Abdullah Khan 2009 Military Helmand Grievances: Developed grievances with Commander local Taliban Naeem Kuchi 2005 Military Logar Coercion and grievances: Captured by Commander U.S. forces and agreed to support Afghan government; some of his grievances addressed Mullah Muhammad Isa 2009 Military Badghis Grievances: Unhappy with the Taliban Commander harassment of local civilians and other Taliban practices Abdul Hakeem Munib 2001 Deputy Paktia Perception of war: Concluded that the minister, Taliban was losing the war public works Mullah Naqib 2001 Alikozai Kandahar Perception of war: Concluded that the Tribal leader Taliban was losing the war Tor Jan Pirzai 2001 Military Helmand Perception of war: Concluded that the Commander Taliban was losing the war Mullah Rahim 2008 Military Helmand Coercion: Concerned that he would be Commander killed by U.S. forces, especially after the targeted killing of several colleagues Maulvi Arsala Rahmani 2005 Minister of Paktika Grievances and perception of war: higher Concluded that Taliban would lose war, education and increasingly developed grievances with Taliban Mullah Abdul Salam 2001 Military Zabul Perception of war: Concluded that the Rocketi Commander Taliban was losing the war Maulvi Abdul Samad 2006 Military Badghis Perception of war and grievances: Commander Promised support; may also have been believed that Taliban was losing in Herat and Badghis Rahmatuulah Sangaryar 2008 Military Uruzgan Coercion and grievances: Promised Commander assistance by Afghan government following capture and detention in Guantanamo Bay

Maulvi Shafiullah 2006 Military Zabul Grievances: Offered a range of incentives Commander to reintegrate, including amnesty Abdul Wahab 2009 Military Herat Coercion: Wanted protection against U.S. Commander Rahmatullah Wahidyar 2005 Deputy Paktika Grievances and perception of war: minister Concluded that Taliban would lose war, martyrs and increasingly developed grievances with Taliban Syed Wali 2009 Military Herat Coercion and grievances: Targeted by Commander ISAF forces; promised employment opportunities Mullah Muhammad 2006 Military Kandahar Grievances: Promised assistance by Zaher Commander Afghan government to address key grievances Maulvi Ahmad Shah 2010 Military Helmand Coercion and perception of war: Commander Intimidated by ISAF and Afghan forces; may also have concluded that Taliban was losing war

Note: The list is taken from “Reintegrating Afghan Insurgents” by Seth G. Jones produced by the National Defense Research Institute, Rand Corporation in 2011.

On the basis of the above reintegration process, some of the key conclusions are as following:

I. In 36 % of the cases, the insurgents reintegrated because of that and other insurgent groups losing the war and cannot win it, at least in a specific area. II. In 33% of the cases, coercion or use of force was the main factor in the process of reintegration. III. In 71% of the cases, insurgents reintegrated that because of grievances. Afghan and ISAF units addressed key grievances or effectively exploited grievances that had suffered among insurgents.

1.23.2 Figure showing Reintegration Process through chart

1.24 United States’ war in Afghanistan

Recently thirteen US Generals warned President Obama of the United States of dire consequences if he reduced the U.S troops in Afghanistan. They urged him to maintain the current level of troops in Afghanistan in the national interest of the United States. According to National Interest Magazine, Afghanistan is a place where ISIS and Al-Qaeda are still functional and it is also believed that the Afghan Taliban are emerging in a stronger position ever since 2001 (The Times of Islamabad, June 6,2016).

This demand from the US Generals came at a time when President Barrack Obama has decided to reduce the current strength of the U.S forces in Afghanistan by 2017. The strength of the U.S forces currently stands at 9,800 in Afghanistan under “Resolute Support Mission” and is likely to be further reduced to 5,500 in 2017 (The Times of Islamabad,June 6, 2016). It is a fact that at least over 140,000 US and NATO soldiers were part of the Allied Forces in the operation “Enduring Freedom” in 2010- 2011 which lasted till December 31, 2014. This war caused heavy loss to the United States whereby the U.S spent over $ 685 billion in Afghanistan since 2001. The U.S is currently supporting 350, 000 soldiers of the ANSF with the annual grant of $4 billion.

During this war the U.S has lost 2271 soldiers and officers with total casualties of 3407 of the Allied Forces in Afghanistan. It is also on record that thousands of soldiers have been permanently declared unfit either mentally or physically after the war (The Times of Islamabad,June 6, 2016).

Taliban have made significant progress in the provinces of Kunduz and Helmand and emphasized to do away with peace talks with the government of Afghanistan, particularly in the post-Mullah Mansour’s death scenario. Fearing great security concerns in some of the sensitive areas of the country, Commander RSM, General Nicholson urged President of the United States, Barrack Obama not to reduce the current strength of the U.S forces in Afghanistan. President Obama also ruled out the possibility of peace in Afghanistan in the current scenario as the death of Mullah Mansour has exacerbated the security situation in the country. Now, there is not the only threat from the Taliban in Afghanistan since many other non-state actors have also emerged such as the IS- Khorasan which is based in the eastern Afghanistan, and poses a great threat to the security of Afghanistan. Though most of the militants of the IS are the disenfranchised Taliban or TTP but still the flag of ISIS has been hoisted in some areas of the country where they enjoy hegemony.

Another area of concern in Afghanistan is the increased ratio of Opium Cultivation, which caters for one of the greatest sources of revenue generations for the non-state actors. This cultivation that had gone to “zero” during the time of Mullah Omer (1996-2001), but has now reached its peak since 2001. The period of Mullah Omer was far better in terms of ban on the cultivation and production of puppy. Now, a clear distinction exists among the various terms of Taliban under different eras, in the post- Mullah Omer era, i.e. Post-9/11 as Mullah Omer was dethroned from the office of Ameer ul Momineen in Afghanistan. The ISAF took the responsibility of controlling the law and order situation in the country and pledged to make Afghanistan, law abiding and democratic country. Despite all the efforts, the country still suffers from numerous ills such as insecurity, drug-trafficking, opium cultivation and insurgency.

The problem of refugees which Afghanistan has been witnessing since 1979 when the Soviet intervened in Afghanistan, has also worsened resulting in the inflow of over 6

70 million refugees to Pakistan and Iran. The inflow of these refugees into Pakistan has caused great security concerns to Pakistan, the horrors of which are still borne by Pakistan and particularly the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on account of its close proximity with Afghanistan. This civil war may be even worse than the war of 1990’s as that war was only confined to Afghanistan but now it has taken into its garb the regional states such as Pakistan, India and Iran and hence resulted in the spirit of rivalry and competition among them for power-hegemony.

The main objectives of the United States in invading Afghanistan centered over a few objectives:

I. To eliminate Osama bin Laden for the alleged September 2001 attacks on the Twin Cities of the United States. II. To dismantle Al-Qaeda for its alleged involvement in the 9/11 incident.

III. To eliminate Afghan Taliban for hosting and protecting Osama bin Laden. IV. To eliminate terrorism and drugs cultivation from Afghanistan. V. To make south Asia and the world free from terrorism. The purpose of the United States and the allies in invading Afghanistan was to make it free from terrorism and militancy and make it a peaceful country but despite their long stay of 13 years there, terrorism has increased in Afghanistan with deep repercussions on Security of Pakistan. Now, since the United States has embarked upon the policy of drawdown of the NATO forces from Afghanistan, security has taken the worst position while some fears are expressed by them regarding the future security of Afghanistan:

I. Kabul fears the weakness of the ANSF in case America quits Afghanistan. II. Drug business in Afghanistan and particularly at the Pak-Afghan border and the repatriation of Afghan Refugees crises would further complicate security situation. III. Though Al-Qaeda has been weakened yet it has given place to the birth of IS- Khorasan. The U.S war in Afghanistan against terrorism and militancy has resulted in huge losses to both the Afghan as well as the Allied Forces in terms of security personnel

and civilians from the two sides. Here is a brief sketch of the U.S war in Afghanistan and the number of death casualties as well as injuries during a period of about 15 years.

1.25 Human Death Toll in Afghanistan

Since the U.S invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, a great number of civilians have lost their lives. According to an estimate, the number of casualties stands at about 31,000 but the number may be greater than this. The war that had entered Afghanistan began to intensify in 2007 and since 2011 it became to intensifier with a gradual decrease in 2012 but it again intensified in 2013 and in 2014 it reached its peak point. From 2015 onward, there has been a gradual decrease in the incidents of militancy and terrorism (Crawford, 2016,pp 3-6). This can be represented through a graph.

1.25.1 Civilian People killed in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2016

4000 3,701 3,5453,630 3500 3,133 2,969 Civilan Killed 3000 2,792 2,769 Series 2 2375 2,412 2500 Series 3 2,118 2000 Series 4 1,582 Series 5 1500 Series 6 929 1000 Series 7 400 450 413 Series 8 500 230 Series 9 0

According to a report of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), not only the Afghan Civilians have made sacrifices, contribution of the pro- government forces showing a percentage of about 41% as a result of direct violent clashes. Like the civilian death toll, this percentage also decreased to about 12% during 2012 and 2013 but after that period, the pendulum again reversed to a higher degree.

Even in this category the ratio was higher during 2014 (Crawford, 2017, pp 2-6). It kept on increasing at a slow rate during 2015 and 2016 as the the incidents of insurgency gained more momentum. After 2011, there was a decrease in the incidents of terrorism but the year 2013 saw the rise in these incidents that kept on increasing at a gradual rate till 2016.

1.25.2 Figure Showing Deaths and Injuries in Afghanistan 2009 -2016

The above figure shows the number of deaths and injuries during the period of 2009 to 2016. There are ups and downs in the two numbers; sometimes there was an increase in the number of deaths while there was a decrease in the number of wounded people and vice versa in during the stated period. The number of civilian deaths stood at 11,349 while the number of civilian injuries stood at 20,533. Thus the total number of casualties amounted to 31,883 since 2009 to 2016 (Crawford May 2017).

1.25.3 Table showing total death casualties and injuries in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2016

Category of people Killed Wounded

Afghan Civilians death from 2001 to 2015 29,818 37,412

Afghan civilians from Jan-June 2016 1,601 3,565

Afghan Military and Police 30,470 17,000

Taliban and other Militants 42,100 19,000

U.S Forces till July 2016 2,371 20,179

U.S Allies till July 2016 1,136 3,800

Contractors Reported by U.S DOL 1,650 15,348

Unreported Contractor Estimate 1,890 Unknown

NGO Workers 382 299

Journalists 24 Unknown

Total 111,442 116,603

1.25.4 Chart showing Deaths & Injuries from 2001-2016

As a result of the war on terror in Afghanistan, the number of killed including all the civilians, security personnel of Afghanistan and the ISAF stood at 111,442 from 2001 to June 2016 while the number of wounded people including all categories stood at 116,603. The above tables and chart show that the incidents of terrorism/ militancy intensified in 2007 and grew intensifier till 2011 followed by a gradual decrease of incidents in 2012 and 2013 but 2014 saw the intensity of incidents. However, 2015 prognosticated a slow decrease of the incidents. The non-state actors in Afghanistan, now does not comprise only the Taliban but comprise a number of set of actors that has been responsible for the insecurity in Afghanistan and Pakistan and most of the religious scholars have issued fatwas against them.

1.26 Issuance of Fatwa against Taliban and Daesh

70,000 Indian Ulema and Clerics have recently issued a Fatwa against Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Daesh, declaring them to be “Non-Islamic Organizations” (Rai, July 25, 2016). According to a report of the Times of India, Mufti Muhammad Saleem Noori, one of clerics, who passed on the Fatwa, said that, “Nearly 15 lac Muslims (1.5m) has recorded their protest. Around 70,000 clerics from across the world, who were parts of the event, passed the fatwa”. The report further goes on to add that another cleric, Hazrat Subhan Raza Khan Chairperson of the influential Dargah Aala Harzrat, said that the Fatwa was issued during the Urs (a religious ceremony to commemorate the death- anniversary of pious and noble people) this year, following the Paris attacks of Bataclon (Rai,July 25, 2016). This was done with a view to carry the message that the Muslim community condemns terrorism and extremism of all kinds.

1.27 Capture of Kanashin District in Helmand by Taliban

The activities of Taliban tended to increase in 2016 and succeed in capturing some of the key areas but the situation was reversed by the security forces of Afghanistan in collaboration with the RSM. Taliban has recently control over the poppy-growing District (Kanashin) of Helmand Province in the Southern part of Afghanistan. The area fall to Taliban after heavy fighting that resulted in the injury or death of 20 police personnel, according to Abdul Majeed Akhunzada, deputy director of the provincial council (AVT Khyber 3 July, 2016). The fall of the district into the hands of Taliban, which is also a bordering district of Pakistan and poppy-producing area means that Taliban are in control of about 60% of Afghanistan as per report of Abdul Majeed Akhunzada. He further added that the area of Marjah, Sangin, Garmser, and Dishu Districts have already fallen to the hands of Taliban.

The fall of Kanshin district was followed by a report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) stating that the government has lost 5% of the territory at the end of January 2016 (AVT Khyber, 3 July 2016). According to report that was released a week ago, said that 65.6% of districts across Afghanistan were under the “influence or control of government” at the end of May 2016, which is a decrease of from 70.5% from at the end of January this year. It is said that out of the total

407 Districts of Afghanistan, 368 were under the control or influence of government, 36 or 8.8% were under the control or influence of insurgents, while 104 or 25.6% were considered “at risk” (AVT Khyber, 3 July 2016).

1.28 General Asks to bomb TTP hideouts in Afghanistan

General Raheel Sharif on June 10, 2016 in a meeting with senior officials of the General Head Quarter (GHQ) raised a demand for targeting the TTP and their commander Maulana Fazlullah, who is hiding in Afghanistan. Talking to the Richard Nicholson, Commander Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan and the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Oslo in while they were on their visit to the GHQ (Such TV 2016). General Raheel Sharif said that Pakistan will not allow Indian and Afghan Intelligence agencies to foment terrorism in the country”. According to a communiqué of the ISPR, the regional security situations with respect to border management and peace and stability in Afghanistan in the post May 21, 2016 US drone strike environment came under discussion. Pakistani Army Chief also reiterated on this occasion that Pakistan was committed towards war against terrorism and stands for the effective border management with Afghanistan so as to promote regional peace and stability (Such TV 2016).

Chief of the Army Staff, while expressing his concern over the May-21 drone attack near Naushkai in Balochistan resulting in the death of Mullah Akhtar Mansour, highlighted the drone strike negatively because it badly affected the mutual trust between Pakistan and the United States and the gains made by Pakistan during the war on terror. He told the visiting dignitaries that it was unfortunate that Pakistan was blamed for the instability in Afghanistan. It is an admitted fact that Pakistan has always worked for a long term peace and stability in Afghanistan under the Quadrilateral Coordination Council (QCG) 1.29 Peace in Afghanistan To resolve the issue of Afghanistan and bring peace there is a Herculean task since it has been struck by civil war after the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan. The period from 1996-2001 marked the beginning of a new era in Afghanistan where

Afghanistan was ruled by Taliban under Mullah Omer, who carried out strict ‘Self- styled’ Islamic law, which irritated the regional and international actors. Major Powers have expressed concern with the bringing of peace into the country by taking into confidence the main stakeholders of the country. With this end, a new formula was carved out for the peaceful settlement of the country known as the 6+1 formula. According to this formula, a meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) on peace in Afghanistan was recently held, which was attended by the representatives of China, US, Afghanistan and Pakistan and decided to take action against the “irreconcilable elements “in the best interest of Afghanistan and the entire region. Despite high expectations, the Taliban neither in Kabul nor in Islamabad have shown any positive response against this decision of the new development. Rather they have rejected their participation in the talks and have not shown any readiness to review the decision (Abbasi, 2016). President Ashraf Ghani on the very next day came on the stage to Taliban, “You face a historic test, war or peace but peace is the only way forward”. He further added that despite the long 14-years insurgency Taliban has not been able to get victory on any front. On the other hand, they have succeeded in devastating their country and remain in power in Kabul would ever be a receding mirage. The Taliban rebutted the statement of the Afghan President by stating that “US has illegally occupied Afghanistan, killed hundreds of thousands of our fellow citizens and committed millions of other crimes in the country and this process is going on with growing violence”. The rebuttal further stated that, “we want to repeat our stance once again that until the occupation of foreign troops ends in Afghanistan, until Taliban’s names are removed from global blacklists, and until our detainees are released, talks with the government yield no results”. Talban think that the US and the Afghan government want to impose their will upon them and intend to weaken their position by initiating the peace process. They (Taliban) are weary of the US and the Afghan government as they force them to come to the peace process which is tantamount to subdue them to the Afghan government by losing their personal identity (Abbasi, 2016). President of Afghanistan, Mr. Ashraf Ghani, in an interview with Saleem Safi bluntly reiterated that the presence of the NATO forces in Afghanistan and their extension there is in the best interest of the country. He rejected the view that the ISAF

78 are exhausted in Afghanistan and urged that they still need International Support for bringing peace and stability in the country (Safi, 2016). He rejected the view of Safi saying that NATO forces have been fighting in the forefront in the post-2014 scenario and stated that it is the security forces of the country that have been fighting in the frontline for maintaining law and order in the country. In reply to a question by Safi, he said that the SIAF is doing well under his command and are not doing anything against his orders. It was he who ordered the ISAF to conduct operation Mullah Mansur as he was the mastermind of Peshawar School attack in December 2014. He also said that the Afghan forces are fighting in the front line and have made innumerable sacrifices for their motherland. People to people relations between the two countries are better but state-to-state relations are not good and a lot of work is required to improve this relation. Joint strategy would be the best option to resolve the issue of terrorism and insurgency. Safi also questioned the presence of Maulana Fazlullah in Afghanistan and no action has, so far, been taken against him in this regard. The President rebutted that his government has conducted 11 attacks against him but also raised the issue that though Mullah Omer and Mullah Akhtar Mansur had their sanctuaries in Pakistan yet no action was taken against them by the security forces of Pakistan. The latter was having a Passport issued in Karachi and had been travelling over that. After all, peace can only be maintained in the two countries if the two refrain from the blame game and undertake joint strategy towards this end. With this objective, four-party negotiations had been held with the intention of finding a viable solution to the war-torn Afghanistan by removing the hurdles in the way of peace deals between the Afghan government and Afghan Taliban. However, both the parties agreed to reach a permanent settlement to the issue and decided to have face-to- face talks in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad. The Afghan government has handed over a list of 10-members to Pakistan so that it represents the Kabul in the direct peace talks with Taliban. Taliban have also furnished a list comprising prominent leaders such as chief of the group’s political office in Qatar, Sher Muhammad Abbas Stanikzai, and former head of the group’s political office in Qatar, Syed Tayyab Agha, Nek Muhammad and Abdul Salam Hanafi, who are also members of Taliban office in Qatar. Mullah Akhtar Mansour,

Taliban’s leader and two of his deputy commanders, Sirajuddin Haqani, the member of Haqqani network, Haji Muhammad Ibrahim and Mullah Muhammad Rasul and is Deputy Abdul Manan (Abbasi, 2016). It is pertinent to mention that soon after the publication of the list by the Taliban, political office of Taliban issued a statement denying that the group had intention to take part in the peace negotiations. The statement further added that neither Mullah Akhtar Mansour has authorized any member of the group to enter into peace parleys with Afghan government nor the group’s political office in Qatar had any information about timeline, set for such peace parleys. Some news have also been emerging that there some efforts were underway by the High Peace Council of the country and the Afghan government and that some secret negotiations have been held with the political representatives of Taliban in Qatar (Abbasi, 2016).

But the fact is that Taliban are still adamant to come to talks with the Afghan government unless the American withdrew from Afghanistan. They have also stated that they can only join the peace talks if a timeframe is set for the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan. Some analysts are also of the view that Taliban are concerned about the guarantee of their decisions reached at the peace parleys between the Afghan government and Taliban. However, according to Vahid Mojdeh, an Afghan political analyst, such a guarantee would require the presence of third conference, which is to be held in the presence with the representatives of Russia, India and Iran. According to Vahid Mojdeh, these countries have the capacity to force the United States for guaranteed withdrawal from Afghanistan. The four party (China, US, Pakistan and Afghanistan) negotiations would prove failure as there are divides among these four countries over certain issues while Taliban are only concerned with the withdrawal of the U.S forces from Afghanistan which is only possible through the three countries, Russia, India and Iran.

Peace talks between Afghan Taliban and Afghan government can bear fruit if there would be zero foreign intervention, particularly by the United States in Afghanistan. Other parties including both the internal and foreign sides need to play an earnest role towards the success of the peace process in Afghanistan. But on the practical side, the United States and allied forces don’t want to provide security and peace in Afghanistan

80 and that is why Washington has not shown any willingness for the same (Abbasi, 2016). It is also a fact that America is also pondering over the options of replacing Taliban and for keeping insecurity prevalent in Afghanistan. Officials of the United States have recently spoken of the reactivated role of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan besides highlighting the increased role of ISIS in Afghanistan (Abbasi, 2016). Unfortunately, in some cases, the government of President Ashraf Ghani is in line with the policies of the United States by talking about the return of Al-Qaeda in the country.

1.30 Afghan government’s peace deal with Hizb-e-Islami Group

The government of Afghanistan is likely to sign peace deal with militant group of Hizb-e-Islami (HIG), a group that has been on fight with Afghan government for the last 15 years. A draft peace accord reached at between HIG chief Gulbadin Hekmatyar and the government of Afghanistan. The tentative peace pact, which comes after two months of negotiations through the efforts of Afghan Government, United States, China and Pakistan to restart last year, has collapsed talks held with Mullah Akhtar Mansour (Weinbaum , June 8, 2016). Now, Kabul and Washington are expressing the hope that the recent dramatic change at the helm of Taliban, coupled with HIG agreement, will create the momentum needed to revive a broader peace dialogue under the intricate agreement with Afghan Peace High Council (APHC), the HIG has agreed to cut ties with other anti- government insurgent groups (Weinbaum, June 8, 2016). Through this peace parley, the HIG will adhere to the Afghan Constitution and would contribute towards efforts that would help stabilize the country.

Leaders of the HIG expect that in return of their submission to the Afghan government, all their prisoners would be released from the Afghan prison. They also hope that the HIG-connected members whose families are refugees in Pakistan and Iran should be repatriated to their country. Returning fighters will receive amnesty and may eventually be incorporated into the Afghan Security Forces (Weinbaum, June 8, 2016). Key leaders of the HIG are also promised housing and other facilities while officers have been directed to facilitate their re-entry to Kabul and Afghan political system. They have been assured of the fact that their organization’s name will be removed from the ‘International Sanction’s Blacklist’. But one controversial point still haunts the mind as

81 like other militant groups, the HIG also wants the withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan while the Afghan government is of the view that the ANSF still lacks the professional expertise to cope with the security challenges of war-torn Afghanistan. Gulbadin Hekmatyar is a veteran politician of the HIG and has been famous for making a name when he was a student and who killed his fellow student and political rival in Kabul University. In 1976, he was also implicated in the assassination attempt of Ahmad Shah Massoud.

1.31 Afghanistan’s Future

President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah are not on the same page since they are going to complete tenure of almost two years in September 2016, which was brokered by the US Secretary of State, John Kerry in September 2014. Differences have surfaced on some of the key issues between the two ruling classes over the key appointments such as the Ministries and Directorates of National Directorate of Security (NDS) are run by the acting Ministers and Directors (Yousafzai 2016 pp 38-40). So, the future of Afghanistan is going to be marred by internal differences, failure of Afghan peace process and precarious security situation.

The death of Mullah Omer Mansour in May 2016 in a drone attack is a sign of victory for the Afghan Government, the strength of the U.S forces under the patronage of Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan but on the other hand, it is a severe blow to the peace prospects in Afghanistan. Afghan Taliban have been weakened largely as result of the death of their key leaders in drone attacks but this will have a negative impact on the future trajectory of peace talks with the Afghan governments as they were already having agreements with Gulbadin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-e-islami Group (Yousafzai 2016 pp 38-40). The Afghan government will lose the ground for which it has been struggling hard for the last two years.

The United States and Afghanistan have been accusing Pakistan of harboring terrorism in Afghanistan by providing sanctuaries in its tribal areas. To allay these grievances, the government of Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-e-Azab in June 2014 in

North Waziristan and has been successful in producing the desired results by hitting hard the terrorists. This operation has proved quite successful in curbing terrorism but sheer lack of cooperation on the other side of the Durand Line has minimized the effectiveness of this operation as most of the terrorists infiltrate into Afghanistan through the tribal areas.

The Quadrilateral Cooperation Council (QCC) was established for ensuring peace and stability, after the fifth Heart of Asia Istanbul Conference, which was hosted by Pakistan in Islamabad. The QCC comprises the United States, China, Afghanistan and Pakistan, which works for a supporting and patronizing a successful Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process in Afghanistan. The main purpose behind the creation of the QCC was to make efforts for bringing peace and stability in the country by reaching at peace process among the various stakeholders of the country. Pakistan has been successful in arranging a round of peace talks in Murree in March 2016, yet despite holding five meetings in Murree in March this year, nothing fruitful and impressive has come out of these meetings.

Thus, the future of Afghanistan has mixed chances of both dark and bright picture depending on the type of government of Afghanistan. In case of democratic set up, based on the wishes of the people and giving representations to all the multi-ethnic groups in the affairs of the government would result in the establishment of a consensus based government and is likely to provide a panacea for all the ills of the insurgency and terrorism. Nevertheless, if it is not based on the doctrine of giving representation to all the multi-ethnic groups then it may be deemed to face the same fate of insurgency and terrorism that it has been indulged in since the withdrawal of the Soviet Forces from there. In the latter case, it would provide stage of security concerns for itself as well Pakistan and the regional powers and may be deemed to draw the attention of the world towards the civil war stricken Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan needs to play its due role in the reconciliation process of Afghanistan and should try its level best to restrict the role of India in Afghanistan so as to protect itself from being sandwiched on both of its eastern and western borders. Pakistan’s support for one group with the sheer exclusion of other groups, may lead to create more complications for the Pakistan since she had a

83 bitter experience in 1980s when this support was extended to Taliban which resulted in the strengthening of the Northern Alliance, and who spread anti-Pakistan hostilities in the region.

Chapter 2 2 The Borderland and Resultant threats for Pakistan National Borders have been of great, strategic, political, and economic and security concerns for the countries sharing the border. It is through them that they have the choice of having good or bad neighbors. They (National borders) are political constructs, imagined projections of territorial power. Although they appear on the maps of the world in deceptively, precise forms but they reflect the mental images of politicians, lawyers, and intellectuals (Baud & Schendel, 2009, p,19). People usually ignore border when it suits them but when it goes against the interests of the people, they challenge the political status quo of the borders. Borders play an important role in the security paradigm of a country: revolutionaries take refuge behind them in case of insurgency and militancy, seeking protection of another sovereignty. The local inhabitants adjoining the border area cross the border whenever services or products are easily available or more attractive on the other side and traders and local merchants seize the opportunity to sell and buy their products without paying taxes. The border region, all over the world, has its own social dynamics and historical development.

The study of border or borderlands has been considered in terms of legal, geographical and geopolitical perspectives up to now (Prescott, 1987, pp 33-34). Recently the creation of a transnational migration has opened up a new area of concern which leads us to the historical effects of borders than in the politico-legal aspects of their creation .The term border encompasses various terms such as Frontiers, boundary and border. Boundary is usually used in diplomatic discourses on the precise location of border but in general, parlance it also refers to dividing line between different peoples or cultures (Barth & ed). The term border is normally preferred where psychological differences are discussed and regions rather than lines drawn on maps are taken into account. Frontier, on the other hand, refers to the territorial expansion of nations or civilizations into empty areas (Turner, 1961,pp267-275). Border security is of paramount significance. It includes air, land or sea, people or cargo; modes of transportation; technology, intelligence, law enforcement, trade and other economic considerations. Issues of security from terrorist attacks are a major concern, driving many border security

85 considerations. Security risks/implications emanating from border encompass criminal activities, trafficking in drugs, smuggling of weapons and other illegal contraband, and human trafficking (Wermuth & al, March 8,2007.)

The Pak-Afghan border has played the most significant role in the entire history of Pakistan in so far as security is concerned. The area is also known as the tribal areas as it is inhabited by the Pashtuns on both side of the border. For years they kept intact their own Modus Operandi and Modus Vivendi despite pressure from the empires of India and Central Asia (Spain, 1957 p 135). For centuries, the tribal area has served as a buffer state between the empires of India and Persia. However, in spite of the pull from the two sides, the people of tribes have been able to keep their own way of life in the hills (Hayat 2005: xvii). The administration there is still carried out by the government by means of Jirga, or tribal assemblies, the Pakhtunwali, or the Pathan Code of Conduct. The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) though introduced in 1901 when the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) now the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) was given the status of a province, is still in operation. Each tribal area with its own Jirga is a unit in itself and it is, therefore, necessary to have a brief sketch of some of the important tribes in this area. Though some changes and reforms have been brought in some areas yet the government needs to give it the status of a full-fledged province or submerge it into the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. FATA consists of seven tribal agencies- Bajaur, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and Orakzai. The society is predominantly Pashtun exhibiting strong tribal structure with rich ethnic and cultural heritage. The area is inhabited by more than two dozen of Pashtun tribes with a population of 4.45 million, showing a growth rate of 3.76% as per population census of 1998. The area has three administrative set ups, viz the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), the FATA Secretariat, and the FATA Development Authority (FDA) (Center, 2016).

The tribes on both sides of the border have been entering into matrimonial relations, trading and feuding with one another since long (Sial, 2005,p 2). The most important thing is they also share a common religious sect known as the Sunni or Hanafi Islam. These people across the border have been participating in the wedding and death

86 ceremonies of one another and usually visit one another even on minor occasions. The tribes have been living together for countries and even today the Pak-Afghan border has a great symbolic significance as thousands of people use it on daily basis for their routine activities. Muhammad Sadiq, Ex Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, says that some 52,000 Afghans crossed the border into Pakistan every day in 2009 for business, jobs, medical treatment, education or to visit their near and dear ones (Sadiq, 2010,p2). 2.1 The Porous Border

The recent clashes between Pakistan and Afghanistan have created an atmosphere of tension and hostility between the two countries. This is due to Afghanistan’s un- pragmatic approach and Pakistan’s inexplicable reluctance to address the complex issue of border management. According to the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, Pakistan has deployed 20, 0000 (2 Lac) security forces on the Pak-Afghan border (Ashraf Ghani, July 23, 2016). The Pak-Afghan border is mainly porous and has 200 crossing points out of which a few areas like Torkham, Chaman, Ghulam Khan and Angorada have limited presence of law enforcement agencies. Consequently, cross border movement along these areas remain unchecked and unsupervised (Safi, 2016). Safi shared his personal experiences of how people crossed borders into Afghanistan without any restrictions. He also told that in the last days of the government of President Hamid Karzai, he (Saleem Safi) had to fly from Islamabad to Kabul, where he had to be joined by Israr Atal, a Pashto poet, Karan Khan, a Pashto singer and Aqeel Yusufzai, a prominent journalist. All of them, being celebrities, had visited Kabul many times without any legal documents. Safi further told that this time they also wanted to join him in Kabul but they were told to follow the legal procedure this time, resultantly they got a visa from the Afghan Consulate in Peshawar and came to Kabul through Torkham.

Safi told that he also had to attend a meeting with the then President Hamid Karzai in the Afghan President House but his friends, Israr Atal, Karan Khan and Aqeel Yusufzai were not allowed to accompany him on the plea of not having a valid “entry and exit stamps” on their passports. Though they urged that security staff at the Torkham Check Post did not bother about the entry and exit stamps yet they were refused entry. It is also a deplorable fact that the attackers of Bacha Khan University and Badaber Airbase

Camp Peshawar used this route to carry on their nefarious designs of terrorism and extremism (Safi, 2016). Hence this border is not only a source of smuggling but also a source of law and order situation for both the countries. Safi urged that he had been talking about the border management for the last ten years but no one took the matter seriously. Hina Rabbani Khar, former Foreign Minister of Pakistan and Muhammad Sadiq, former Pakistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan agreed on border management in the Chequers Summit held in February 2013 which was facilitated by the British Prime Minister David Cameron. It was a positive development initiated by the government of the United Kingdom (UK), the creator of the Durand Line, and played the role of a facilitator and guarantor. However, unfortunately, the issue was pushed into the background for not paying any proper attention to it.

Border Management has different contexts and connotations to different people. To some people, it means border sealing and border fencing while others think it is a costly undertaking and will not materialize. Some others are worried about this border management would bring to the fore the issue of Durand Line between the two countries. Border Management according to Saleem Safi does not connote the sealing or fencing of the Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan’s border with Iran and China are based on the assumption of border management and those borders are neither sealed nor fenced.But they despite that, they are properly managed and regularized. Pakistan has not constructed walls on borders with either of the two countries but no one dares cross the border illegally without proper legal documents. People know that crossing the border without valid legal documents would put them behind the bars.

Border management has different mechanisms and neighboring countries may agree to them according to their own needs and peculiars conditions. For example, Pakistan has a different border management with China, Iran and India. Similarly, the United States has a different border management system with Mexico and Canada. Border Management with Afghanistan does not mean putting up a Berlin Wall or curbing trade activities with Afghanistan or stopping the movement of the people. It means a mechanism to manage, regularize, and facilitate people’s movement, enhance legal trade

88 and control the free movement of extremist elements, who are playing havoc with the peace and tranquility of the people at large.

The core issue between the two countries however lies over the validity of the Durand Line that adds further fuel to the security and stability of Pakistan. Afghanistan does not recognize the Durand Line as an International border and Kabul blames Islamabad for the insurgency in Afghanistan to destabilize the government of current President and install a government of its choice. Islamabad in retaliation alleges that Kabul has given shelter to Baloch nationalist insurgents and allows India to use Afghan territory to add fire to the insurgency in Baluchistan (Sadiq, 2010,p 2). From a legal point of view Afghanistan’s claim about the illegitimacy of the Pak-Afghan border finds no substance and their stance on this point is quite weak as it was signed in 1893 in an official way. The Afghani people are of the view that the Durand Line was forced upon them in a coercive way but the government of Afghanistan has reconfirmed the Durand Line Agreement after the death of King Abdur Rahman and his successors three times: in 1905 (Anglo Afghan Pact), 1919 (Treaty of Rawalpindi) and 1921 (Anglo Afghan Treaty) (Brasseur , 2011, pp,12-13). This agreement was confirmed by three successive Afghan Governments and has also been recipient of many emoluments from the British Government till 1920. Moreover, the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 led to continued annual payments and shipments of weapons by the British to the Afghan King until 1920’s, thus making it very difficult to hypothesize any reasoning that the Durand Line was signed under duress (Room, 2004). Though Afghanistan claimed that the border had been drawn under duress and was forcibly imposed upon them, it had in fact confirmed and reaffirmed the demarcation of this international border on a number of occasions, including in agreements concluded in 1905, 1919, 1921, and 1930 (Hasan, 1962,p 14). But in actual practice Afghanistan has been denying this fact which has become the bone of contention between the two countries. The Durand line is an International border between Pakistan and Afghanistan and does not divide the Pashtun community, a nation of over forty million populations with sixty percent of the population residing in Pakistan (Beg, 2015). Historically they have maintained a sort of influence in the affairs of Afghanistan as a result of which no ruler can govern without their actual support and consent in Kabul. They are the main factors

89 behind the security paradigm of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the seventies, when the Soviets enthroned Hafeezullah Ameen at Kabul, a ruler of their choice, the Pashtuns revolted and formed their support base in the Pashtun tribal belt of Pakistan. Subsequently, the Pashtuns were joined by the Americans and Pakistanis in their covert war which was carried out most overtly against the Soviet’s occupation of Afghanistan. The ‘Jihadis came in droves from seventy countries of the world, establishing the base of Islamic resistance along the Durand Line…’ was how the CIA puts it. The Soviets lost the war and the American went against the law of nature as they denied the power sharing to Afghan Mujahedeen who were the ultimate winners of the war. This led to a state of civil war in Afghanistan, followed by the emergence of Taliban in 1995, who took control over most of the territory of Afghanistan by 2001 when the Americans intervened there for the vengeance of 9/11 incident. Afghanistan was occupied and pulverized but could not be defeated. Now as the drawdown of ISAF/NATO has been in the offing, the Americans and their proxy government at Kabul are once again denying Taliban power sharing in the government. Hence Taliban has started the “Spring Offensive” against the government (Beg, 2015). The Americans should also realize that war is not the only option because they have been trying for the last twenty five years to demolish the Al-Qaeda but failed to achieve the desired result. Pakistani Ambassador in Afghanistan Syed Abrar Hussain, in an interview with Salim Safi also stressed that when peace could not be restored in Afghanistan by 48 different countries of the world then it is illogical to expect the same from Pakistan (Hussain, July 24, 2016). Now, the ghosts of Al-Qaeda gaze into their eyes such as Daesh in Syria and Iraq, Takfiris in Libya, Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko haram in Nigeria, the Houthis in Yemen, Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, emerging as the new base of resistance. No one is there to challenge except the Iranians and Hizbullah, who too are getting exhausted as a result of heavy casualties. In the very embryonic stage of Pakistan, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission into the United Nations, on the sole plea that Pakistan’s northwest frontier “should not be recognized as a part of Pakistan until Pashtuns of that area had been given the opportunity to opt out for independence” (Hasan, 1962, p15). Despite Afghanistan’s harsh opposition, Pakistan’s request was entertained and was

90 admitted into the United Nations. In retaliation of that Afghanistan has been bent upon jeopardizing the security of Pakistan. Thereafter, Kabul launched a series of low-level attacks against Pakistan, which was the beginning point of cross border infiltration, terrorism and militancy. The long history of the two neighboring countries charging each other with a blame game of providing safe havens to the terrorists of the other’s enemies has created an atmosphere of mistrust between the two countries. This is mainly due to the Pak- Afghan border that has resulted in a blame game by both the countries. Pakistan has been blaming Afghanistan for its support to the cause of Baloch Nationalism and separatist movement though it provided help and training facilities to the Afghani brethren during 1979s when they were attacked by the Russians. They also extended recognition to the government of Taliban in 1996s when they ascended the throne of Kabul (Bajorai, 2009). The borderland has earned a bad name for Pakistan in the International Politics since it is one of the longest porous borders in the world. Due to its strategic location, the border has been very important for the trade and transit activities of Pakistan with Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. Pakistan gives due importance to the socio-ecnomic aspect of Afghanistan and believes in the trade with Afghanistan as per terms of the ATTA signed in 1965 in which Karach to Torkham and Karachi to Chaman routes were selected for trade (Hussain, July 24,2016). It is unfortunate that it has rather served as the hub of many illegal activities such as drug-trafficking, smuggling of illegal goods to the neighboring countries, criminal enterprises, and ample space of sanctuaries for the native as well foreign terrorists, has added to the notoriety of this border. 2.2 Neo-Taliban The western border of Pakistan has been of great strategic, religious and ideological importance for the security paradigm of Pakistan (Tariq,2015 p,124). It acted as a staging ground for Mujahidin operations against the Russians in 1980s. The area served as the birth-place of Al-Qaeda in 1988, Taliban movement in 1994, and is currently the nourishing place of Neo-Taliban. The Neo-Taliban that has recently emerged in the Pak-Afghan border area has grown into a complex religio-political movement with three distinct but overlapping objectives (White, 2008). The first objective is focused westward on fueling the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and

91 destabilize the elected government. The second one is globally oriented and is concerned with providing sanctuary to Al-Qaeda and plans to conduct terrorist attacks against the western interest. The third one is directed against the state of Pakistan itself and particularly the tribal areas and province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for the establishment of a self styled- Islamist rule. Its main focus is on the destabilization of Pakistan by disrupting its ties with the United States and western powers. Of all the three objectives, the third one is of prime importance for the security paradigm of Pakistan as it poses a challenge to a number of important bilateral and regional issues between Islamic politics and the state in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This network poses the most serious challenge to the security agencies of Pakistan, particularly the tribal areas and some of the adjacent settled areas. The government needs to focus on strengthening the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies, improve interaction between Pakistan and Afghanistan with special reference to border management, and create strong bond of coherence between the civilian government and law enforcement agencies in the country so as to do away with insurgency (White, 2008). The insurgency posed by Neo-Taliban is parasitic in nature and is dependent upon bases deep in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Tariq, 2015 pp 121-122). They are not only confined to the tribal areas but have also extended to the settled areas of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa such as Swat, Mardan, Charsadda, Peshawar and Kohat. As a result of the terrorist attacks by this network, the centre of their gravity has got diffused whereby the distinction between the settled and tribal regions has been blurred. Recent attacks in Peshawar on Army Public School resulting in the losses of about 148 innocent students and staff, is a glaring example of their exacerbated activities. The mastermind of these attacks is the alleged Khalifa Omar Mansur who is said to have taken refuge in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan (Yusufzai ,May 21, 2015). The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been rocked by militancy over the last few years and resembles more like the ungoverned tribal areas. The organizations of the Neo-Taliban are functional in places such as Swat, Khyber, Darra Adam Khel, South Waziristan and Peshawar. In the wake of their current activities, the Neo-Taliban may have more chances of penetration into the tribal areas and the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with greater ramifications for the whole of Pakistan. Their activities will be an issue of great secuirty

92 security concern for the country. Even the religious parties that share a common political view regarding the West and Sharia are also ambivalent about their goals and are threatened both directly and indirectly by the expansion of the movement (White, 2008). 2.3 Al-Qaeda One of the most serious threats causing security implications for Pakistan many come from the Al-Qaeda, though, it has been greatly affected by the military operation and drone attacks of the NATO yet it still continues to survive. Currently led by Ayman al Zawahiri, it also includes a number of senior leaders such as Abdul Rahman Al Sharqi, Abu Zyed Al-Kuwaiti, Hamza Al-Ghamdi and Abdul Rahman Al-Magrebi. Presently, it lacks a cohesive power to create a sanctuary either in Pakistan or Afghanistan but still it has created a symbiotic strategy in the region. It has established close relations with the Haqqani Network and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) so it has not confined itself to just one particular geographic area or one particular militant unit. Moreover, some of the Al-Qaeda allies have focused on Pakistan and have involved in the operations of Afghanistan. Now, the Al-Qaeda serves as a sort of network having established close relations with the Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Harkatul Jihdai-i-Islami and Harkatul- Mujahedeen. It has also established limited ties with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Some of its senior rank Pakistanis includes Abdullah Al-Sindhi, Ahmad Farooqi, Osama Nazir and Hasan Gul, who was murdered in October, 2012. Of all the groups of Al-Qaeda, the Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and the Haqqani Network may pose great security threat to the existence of Pakistan in the US draw-down scenario as they would be free to a greater extent for their preaching and mobilization (Jhones, 2013,p 2-3). These groups are and would likely continue to be; a range of Islamic extremist groups in the region, especially, along the porous Pak-Afghan border areas. A draw-down of the NATO forces from the region would significantly reduce the ability of the United States to conduct operations against terrorists throughout the region and potentially allow a resurgence of these militant groups. 2.4 Haqqani Network The Haqqani Network has been regarded as one of the most terrorist networks in the world, currently led by Jalalauddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin. It is claimed to have safe havens on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border and is involved in various

93 terrorist activities across the country (Kronstadt, 2012,pp 29-30). On account of its involvement against the forces of the ISAF in the eastern part of Afghanistan it is fared that that this network would create great security risks for both Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to an expert, “The Haqqani Network represents a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and US national security interest in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan’s most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates”. This network has been instrumental in conducting acts of terrorism against the interest of S the United States and Afghanistan on the soil of Afghanistan; particularly against the sensitive installations of both the countries. For example, in June 2011, an assault on Kabul’s Intercontinental Hotel caused the death of 18 people. In September 2011, another tuck bomb attack in the province of Wardak left 77 Americans injured and killed 5 Afghans. On September 13, 2011, it executed a 20-hour long assault against the American’s security forces in Kabul leaving 16 Afghans dead, 5 police officers and 6 children among them. It is due to the severity of the security of the security situation in the country that some analysts are of the view that this network should be dealt with an iron hand. It is an un-denying fact that Jaladuddin Haqqani was once an ally of the United States in the Soviet War against Afghanistan but since in the International Politics there can be neither permanent friends nor foes. Looking at the world Politics through this doctrine, he then joined the Taliban regime (1996-2000), serving as its Minister for Tribal Affairs. Since 2001, this network openly opposed the Karzai government and US intervention in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2013,p13). It now works under the supervision of Jalauddin’s sons Sirajuddin, Badruddin and Nasiruddin recently killed in November 2013 at Bara Kao, Islamabad by unknown Motorcyclists. Badruddin was reportedly killed in August 2012 in a US or Pakistani strike. This group is instrumental in creating great security concerns for Pakistan with the neighboring arch-rival, India and great powers such as the United States. For this reason, Pakistan has also faced harsh criticism from both India and US. It has claimed responsibility for two attacks on India’s embassy in Kabul (July 2008 and October 2009),

94 and had shown involvement with other groups in attack on a CIA base in Khost, Killing 7 CIA officials in December 2009. It was also involved with other insurgent groups on June 28, 2011 and September 10, 2011, truck bombing attack in Wardak Province injuring 77 US soldiers. US officials are of the view that attacks on the US Embassy and ISAF headquarter in Kabul on 13 September 2011, was the work of this group as was the 4th August 2013 attacks on India’s Consulate in Jalalabad. The militants of this group were held responsible for the murderous attack of an Indian author named Sushimta Banerjee in Afghanistan on September 5, 2013. Sushimta had then managed to escape from the clutches of Taliban and had written a book for the advocacy of women’s rights. As compared to either Taliban or Al-Qaeda, this faction is less ideological and is interested in earning funds through illicit business and activities in far-flung areas of Pakistan, the Persian Gulf and in Khost province of Afghanistan. Being a parasite faction of Taliban, it can come to settlement with the government provided the leader of Taliban agrees to such terms, said by a top Haqqani commander (Ahmad, November 13, 2012). Their alliance can be quoted form the fact that when on June 18, 2013, the Taliban office was opened at Doha (Qatar), a Haqqani representative was reportedly stationed at the office. Moreover, it has also been reported that the US officials met the Haqqani representatives in United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2011 (Rosenberg, 2011). Owing to its terrorist activities, US commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David Patraeus advocated in July 2010 that the Haqqani network may be termed as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the “Foreign Immigration and Neutralization Act” (Perlez et al, June 25, 2010). A number of Haqqani top leaders had already been termed as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under the Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SGPT) vide executive order 13224. Due to its involvement against the Indians and the United States at global level, this may create great security implications for Pakistan as geographically Pakistan is bounded by both India and United States from East to West. The factor of US may be taken from the perspective of Afghanistan as the United States is already there under the guise of NATO/ISAF.

2.5 Peshawar Tragedy On December 16, 2014, some unknown terrorists entered into the premises of Army Public School Peshawar and killed 145 innocent people in the most brutal way; the casualties comprised mostly the children. This incident shook the entire nation and the International Community as this was one of the deadliest attacks in the history of Pakistan. The inhuman attack on the Army Public School by heavily armed men was accepted by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and warned that the school was attacked as a consequence of the ongoing operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan (Jamal & Ahsan, 2015, p, 19). Chief spokesman of TTP Muhammad Khorasani said on the eve of this occasion, “We want them to feel the pain,” sadness, terror and anger have gripped Pakistanis more severely than ever after the recent attack killing young children. This assault by the TTP on the innocent school children left the whole community in terror and horror and shifted the focus from militant groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS to the TTP Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This reminds us of the hot stroke of terrorism as to how much have Pakistan suffered on account of militancy and terrorism. During the last decade the number of Pakistani casualties due to frequent militant attacks is more than 55,000 and the country has suffered financial losses worth 103 billion dollars due to terrorism. Foreign office spokesman of Pakistan opined that they have been very active partner of the international community in countering terrorism. He further added that they are taking strict measures against terrorists on their soil and expect all the nations to do the same to eliminate this nuisance (Baabar 2014). 2.6 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a militant group that was officially established in December 2007 under the leadership of militant commander Baitullah Mehsud. The founding objectives of the new radical group were to enforce Sharia, to unite against NATO and foreign forces in Afghanistan and carry out “defensive jihad” against Pakistan Army and law enforcement agencies of Pakistan (Taliban-American Foreign Policy Council). The TTP was formed out of those heterogeneous groups that fought in Afghanistan during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and it emerged as an alliance of fighters and radicals that came of diverse backgrounds, tribes, ethnicity and nationalities.

The TTP is not confined to KP only though Pashtuns are said to be in majority yet it has a cohesive induction of Arab, Uzbek, Chechen and Punjabis among its rank and files. Most of the members of TTP are believed to belong to all the seven agencies of FATA, frontier regions and some districts of KP such as Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner and Malakand (Jamal & Ahsan, 2015, p 20). It has often targeted military personnel, members of law enforcement agencies, civilians as well as politicians for political and religious grounds. Schools, colleges, mosques, markets, offices and foreign diplomats have been target of their attacks. Moreover, the militant attack on Jinnah International Airport Karachi on June 8, 2014 killing 36 people was claimed by this group.

2.6.1 TTP Internal Conflicts and factions Since the TTP is a loose network of heterogeneous elements that is why a few factions have announced to part ways with the central leadership. The cause of conflict among the ranks and files of the various factions being disagreement on certain issues such as attacks on civilians, law enforcement agencies and Pakistani authorities, peace talks with government and more autonomy in the tribal areas of Pakistan (Brown & Saifi, June 2, 2014). In May 2014 a breakaway faction occurred for the first time led by TTP commander based in South Waziristan, Khalid Mehsud alias Khan Syed Sajna. This was the first ever split from the TTP since it was established. It broke up from the main TTP on the grounds of some issues such as public places attacks, extortion, un-Islamic practices and kidnappings. The TTP spokesperson for the newly-formed faction, Azam Tariq stated in a statement that the factions that have splintered from its original organization are TTP Sajna faction, led by Khan Said Sajna (Khalid Mehsud); Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, led by the Mohmand Agency commander Omar Khalid Khorasani, the TTP Shehryar Mehsud faction and the TTP Punjab (Brown & Saifi, 2014). The exact number of TTP members are not known but roughly the number of TTP fighters range from 500-8000 (Abbas 2009). The core points initially laid out by the organization upon its formation in December 2007 were: 1. Enforce sharia 2. Unite against coalition forces in Afghanistan.

3. Perform defensive jihad against the Pakistani Army 2.6.2 Peshawar School Attack condemned by Afghan Taliban Differences in ideas and goals between TTP and Afghan Taliban came to the surface over the attack on Army Public School Peshawar where the latter condemned the assault on innocent children, men and women and declared the attack as against Islamic Principles while the TTP accepted the responsibility. The Afghan Taliban claims that it has always condemned the killing of innocent people and children and has expressed sorrow and grief over the tragic incident (The News,December 17, 2014) the statement is available at the official website of Afghan Taliban. 2.6.3 Divergence between Afghan Taliban and TTP The literal meaning of the word Taliban connotes “students studied at a religious madrassa” is generally used to denote Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Muhammad Umar and who ruled Afghanistan during 1996-2001 and seeks to reclaim their lost power before the American invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11 incidence. Gilles Doronsoro of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington describes the similarity between the word Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan formed in 2007 and the original Afghan Taliban formed in 1994. He opines that the two terms creates confusion and baffles both the experts and common populace alike. He furthers explains that the Afghan Taliban represents a “genuine national movement” incorporating not only a network of fighters but also a shadow government in many provinces. In contrast, the TTP represents a far looser group of divergent elements unified mainly by their animosity towards the law enforcement agencies and the government of Pakistan. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan was formerly launched as a separate force led by Baitullah Mehsud with the sole aim of enforcement of Islamic law in Pakistan. Scott Shane of the New York Times writes Pashtun ethnicity and interpretation of Islam as practiced in Saudi Arabia called “Wahhabism” are the only two common features between the two Taliban movements (Shane , 2009). Mr. Strick van Linschoten, a Dutch researcher who lives in Kandahar (Afghanistan) and has interviewed many members of the Afghan Taliban says that the Taliban commanders and their groups don’t bother about what is happening to their Pakistani brethren across the border. Afghan Taliban is very harsh by nature and observes strict observance of Islamic injunctions in the areas governed by them. They executed

98 severe punishments, including executions and lost local and International support for their movement. 2.6.4 Classification of TTP Groups and Movements in Pakistan The TTP has split up into various groups, some of which comprise the following groups: Mehsud Group: This is a core conglomerate group of the Tehrik-e-Taliban that includes Baitullah Mehsud’s group, his affiliates across the Durand line, as well as Maulana Fazlullah group. This group has been instrumental in waging a Jihad against the Pakistani state and military personnel for supporting America’s War on Terror. • Muqami (Local) Taliban: This group is said to be pro-government group and includes Maulvi Nazir (South Waziristan) and Gul Bahadur (North Waziristan). It has primarily focused on supporting the Afghan jihad against the foreigners. • Punjabi Taliban: The Punjabi Taliban has previously focused on sectarianism in Pakistan and was involved in many such activities, cause of Kashmir and India-centric but is now allegedly allying with the TTP. • Niche groups: This group is represented by the cleric of Red Mosque (Khateeb of Lal Masjid) Maulana Abdul Aziz in Islamabad. It has its specific ambitions with fighters known as Ghazi Force and is now interlinked with TTP (Siddique, 2010-12).

Summary of Militant Groups operating from Pakistan

Group Name Sectarian background Regional activities Overlapping membership

Al-Qaeda in Pakistan Salafist Has facilitated attacks inside and TTP, Afghan Taliban, other Outside Pakistan and has planned Deobandi militant groups. international attacks from Safe havens within Pakistan

Jaish-e-Muhammad(JM) Deobandi Traditionally focused on Indian- Al-Qaeda, TTP, Afghan Harkat-ul- Jihad-al-Islami administered Kashmir but have Taliban, Deobandi sectarian (HUJI) Harkat-ul-Ansar, operated in Afghanistan( and continues militant groups and Jamiat- Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and to do so);factions have targeted the e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) Similar Pakistani state.

Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) Deobandi Historically anti-Shia, have operated TTP, Afghan Taliban, And Sipah-e-Sahaba-e- in Afghanistan for decades ;currently Al-Qaeda and other Pakistan (SSP) targeted Pakistani state with the Deobandi militant groups TTP and allied groups and JUI

Hizbul Mujahideen Jamaat-e-Islami Active in Indian administered Kashmir Jamaat-e-Islami (HM)And al-Badar

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Deobandi Targets the Pakistani state, with some Afghan Taliban, Deobandi (TTP, Pakistani Taliban) commanders mobilizing fighters in militant groups in Pakistan Afghanistan. and possibly al-Qaeda

Lashkar-e-Tayyba Ahl-e-Hadith Fights in Indian administered Although historically linked with Kashmir and the Indian hinterland; al-Qaeda, its modern ties to the Limited out-of-theatre operations group are subject to debate.

Source: C. Christine Fair, “Lashkar-e-Tayyba and the Pakistani State” Survival, 53:4, 29-52 2.7 Profile of Leading Terrorists in the Region Maulana Fazlullah: Maulana Fazlullah, the militant commander from Swat Valley became the new leader of TTP in the late 2013 following the death of Hakimullah Mehsud in a drone attack in village Darpak Khel, Waziristan. Fazlullah is believed to be very revengeful and ruthless commander. He is also known as ‘Mullah FM’ for instigating the common masses

100 through FM (Frequency Modulation) Radio stations for preaching his messages to the people at large (Jamal & Ahsan, TTP-Analyzing the Network of Terror, 2015). Hakimullah Mehsud: Hakimullah Mehsud who was killed in a drone attack on November 1, 2013 was deputy to the TTP Commander Baitullah Mehsud and was known to be one of the ablest commanders of TTP and masterminded many attacks on the vehicles of NATO supply heading towards Afghanistan. In 2007, Hakimullah engineered the kidnapping of about 250 Pakistani soldiers and were kept hostages in South Waziristan while the Shias among them were killed very ruthlessly. The rest of them were released through prisoner exchange between them and the government. He remained the leader of TTP since 2009 to 2013. During this time he gained great reputation for being aggressive, brutal and revengeful besides being young and smart. He commanded the TTP forces in many parts of KP and FATA such as Orakzai, Khyber, and tribal areas (Jamal & Ahsan, 2015, p19). Baitullah Mehsud: He was termed as “more dangerous than Osama bin Laden”, and has played the most critical role in the deteriorating security situation of northwestern part of Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud was a very active leader of the TTP who took over as its leader in 2009 selected by forty council members representing seven tribal agencies of FATA and several districts. According to estimates, he had round about 20,000 fighters under his command and sent a wave of terror at local as well as global level through them embarking upon a series of attacks across Pakistan killing hundreds of civilians, soldiers, and police and intelligence officials. He was also charged with bombing the Marriott hotel Islamabad in 2008 and the assassination of ex-prime minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto. Mehsud was once quoted as saying that only jihad could bring peace. Baitullah Mehsud and his wife were assassinated on August 5, 2009 in a US Central Intelligence Agency drone attack in South Waziristan (Jamal & Ahsan, 2015,p 6). Mangal Bagh: He is one of the mysterious and radical Islamic warlords who belong to the Afridi tribe, the biggest clan in the entire Khyber Agency. In the early age of his life he fought on the side of Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviet forces. After returning home, he joined the secular Awami National Party (ANP) but later on, he drifted to religious militancy and sided with fiery cleric Mufti Munir Shakir. Mangal Bagh rose to power in Khyber Agency as the leader of Lashkar-e-Islam due to absence of effective governmental control in the region. He ruled Bara over Tehsil till

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June 2008 until he and his armed men were driven out during military operation. From there, he fled to a distant valley of Tirah to reorganize his men, which has since become a sanctuary and nourishing place for militancy. Unlike other militant groups, Lashkar-i- Islami group of Mangal Bagh is not pro-Taliban as he once explained on an occasion, “Ours is a reformist organization trying to promote virtue and prevent vice. We rid Bara of drug-traffickers, gamblers, kidnappers, car-snatchers and other criminals and we want to cleanse Jamrud and all of Peshawar of those selling drugs & liquor and running gambling dens (Yusufzai, May 11,2008). Though frequently invited by Baitullah Mehsud along with his supporters to come forward and join the TTP but he declined on each occasion saying that he didn’t want to fight against the law enforcement Agencies of Pakistan. He was killed by a drone attack in July 2016. Abdullah Mehsud: One of the strongest leaders of Taliban in South Waziristan, who fought against the U.S. forces and the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. He was captured by the US forces in 2001 and sent to Guantanamo Bay where after being detained for two years he was released for being proved to be innocent. Soon after his release, he returned to South Waziristan, where he rebuilt his force to fight against the US soldiers and government of Pakistani. His force was believed to comprise 5,000 Taliban and was involved in the kidnapping of two Chinese engineers. Owing to the growth of saturation of the terrorist networks and increase in their resultant brutal activities, the government of Pakistan had to embark upon new strategies of both stick and carrot policies, keeping in view the severity of the security situation in the area. Pakistan is a country where not the native terrorists but also the foreign terrorists and personnel of secret agencies of other countries sway under the guise of diplomatic missions. Foreign fighters in Pakistan come from both the Muslim as well as the non- Muslim countries of the world. 2.8 Foreign Fighters in Pakistan Security situation deterioration in Pakistan has been greatly affected by foreign hand including militants from the Middle East, Western Europe, India, Russia and Central Asian Republics, chiefly Uzbekistan and has proved to be a source of strength for the militants across the Pak-Afghan border. 2001 was a landmark in the history of both Afghanistan and Pakistan as it saw the fall of Taliban in Afghanistan and provided an

102 opportunity to many foreign extremist groups to find sanctuary in Pakistan across the border. The entrance and presence of groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the German-Turkish Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Al-Qaeda, the Chinese (Uighur) East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Turkistan Islamic Party, Chechen militants, Jundullah faction, is regarded by many as the key factors leading to the rise of Taliban movement in Pakistan that later emerged in the form of Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Jamal & Ahsan, 2015,pp25-26). The exact number of foreign fighters in Pakistan is not known but according to a report of July 2007 presented before the then Prime Minister, Mr. Yusuf Raza Gilani; their strength is more than 8000. The government of Pakistan has not confirmed this report and states their number to be 1,000 as per a news report. The same news report testifies that the number of foreign fighters in Pakistan has been on the rise since 2007 inducting militants from the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe following the increase of US troops in Afghanistan. Southern part of Afghanistan is considered by many foreign fighters to be a safe haven for them and fighters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Syria and some from India and Bangladesh prefer to stay. While the eastern provinces of Afghanistan such as Kunar, Nuristan, Paktia, Paktika, Khost and Pakistani tribal areas bordering these areas are preferred by fighters from Morocco, Algeria, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan (Jamal & Ahsan 2015,p 26). 2.8.1 Foreign Fighters in FATA The rise of militancy and insurgency in FATA region of Pakistan is also seen as an awful impact from Syria’s War as well as the crisis in the Middle East countries. But the defeat of Taliban in 2001 following the US intervention of Afghanistan the same year, without properly sealing and selective fencing of the border has failed to confine the terrorists within it, has been regarded as one of the main reasons leading to the influx of foreign terrorists into Pakistan. The Taliban along with the al-Qaeda allies and Afghan refugees flee into the region of FATA, Pakistan’s tribal areas in order to escape U.S attacks and seek refuge there. The foreign militants utilize the Islamic slogans and stiff resistance to the American intervention of Afghanistan is some of the means through which the fighters have gained the sympathies of local inhabitants in FATA. Some of these foreign fighters got mixed into the local tribes by getting married there thus

103 strengthening their position in FATA. Some scholars and experts believe that rugged nature of tribal lands and hospitality of local inhabitants are the two factors that have attracted the infiltration of foreign fighters into FATA. Other supplementary factors include the Pashtuns’ honor code of Pukhtunwali, sense of generosity and rocky nature of the area have also led to the rise of militancy regardless of the fact whether the guest is a criminal, a friend or an enemy (Rakisites, 2012, p 75). 2.9 FATA – Pakistan’s complex Tribal region The Tribal Areas of Pakistan called FATA comprise seven agencies and are exclusively inhabited by the Pashtun Community. They decided to join Pakistan rather than India after Pakistan got independence in 1947. These tribal lands have their own style of Jirga system and Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and consist of seven areas called tribal agencies: Khyber, Bajaur, Orakzai, Kurram, Mohmand, North and South Waziristan (Hayat, 2005,pp.23-25). 2.9.1 Pakistani Tribal Areas and its Governance Although the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan vests the President of Pakistan with executive authority over the region but in reality Islamabad has very limited authority over the tribal agencies. The real powers and authority rest with their respective political agents who represent the federal government. The appointed governor of KP in Peshawar manages bureaus that provide health care and basic education. 2.9.2 Changing Scenario of Tribal Region after 9/11 and Afghan invasion The 9/11 episode changed the entire edifice of the International Politics and soon after it, FATA came under the scrutiny of the United States as Taliban and al-Qaeda members were supposed to have taken shelter there. The tribal region which had remained untouched by the government presence since independence in 1947 saw Pakistan's strong army entering the area in 2003 for the first time to fight the rebels. The influx and rise of the Taliban disturbed the political balance in the tribal areas, where tribal leaders had a difficult time choosing sides as they were getting killed questioning the Taliban's growing power or working too closely with Islamabad. 2.10 Peace Deals with Tribal Areas and Taliban In 2004, the government of Pakistan signed a peace deal with the local Taliban represented by Nek Muhammad in South Waziristan whereby they agreed to live

104 peacefully and not use the soil of Pakistan for any militant activities. This was for the first time that the government f Pakistan signed a peace deal with Taliban. The treaty could not produce the desired results and was regarded as a failure since the TTP emerged with new zeal and vigor in 2007. The government of Pakistan continued the peace process and signed treaties with different tribes of Mohmand agency in August and September 2007. Another peace deal was signed by the government with pro-Taliban militants and tribal leaders in Bajaur Agency in March 2007. Other peace treaties by the government of Pakistan with the tribal leaders of North Waziristan and Taliban have met the same fate of failure as the first one such as Miranshah Peace Accord (2006), Khyber Agency Pact (2008) and Swat Agreements (2008). Besides, the three major agreements by the government with Taliban in “Shakai”,” Sararogha” and” Swat”, Pakistan also entered into many unwritten peace deals with various groups of militants in the tribal areas. The peace talks of 2014 between the civilian leadership of Pakistan and the TTP was held directly between the two counter-parts. The government of Nawaz Sharif was represented by Maj. Rtd Irfan Siddiqi, Prime Minister’s advisor on National Affairs, Maj. Retired Muhammad Amir, former ISI official, Rahimullah Yusufzai, senior journalist and Rustam Shah Mohmand, former Ambassador to Afghanistan. While the TTP team was represented by Maulana Sami ul Haq, Maulana Abdul Aziz, former chief cleric of the Lal Masjid in Islamabad, Professor Mohammad Ibrahim of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), and Mufti Kifayatullah, a former lawmaker of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazal Rehman Group (JUI-F) from Mansehra. The latest peace negotiation ended in utter fiasco as Pakistan initiated extensive military operation soon after the attack on Jinnah International Airport Karachi (JIAP). 2.11 Suggestions A few suggestions would help resolve the issues of terrorism and insurgency and the country would need to adopt some policies that are in consonance with the smooth functioning of the country. 2.11.1 Comprehensive Counter-insurgency policy Years of ongoing violence, inhuman killing, suicide bombing, loss of innocent lives, assets and wealth due to severe militancy and brutality inflicted by extremists in almost every part of Pakistan and specially FATA and KP requires a cogent,

105 comprehensive and integrated strategy involving military, political, religious, social and institutional solutions on urgent basis for a long term peace and stability in Pakistan. The current policies of the government regarding the peace talks with TTP and other militant groups have proved to be quite futile because of little or no coordination among the key actors of the society which confirms that without proper harmonization policies would continue to prove unsuccessful. Comprehensive consultation and unison among Pakistan’s key stakeholders are one of the effective ways to eliminate the menace of terrorism of militants very easily. Moreover, there is great need to educate the young generation and specially the teenagers as they fall victim to the nefarious designs of the terrorists. Civil Society and media can also play greater role in this regard. Providing employment opportunity to the youth may also contribute to improve security situation in the region. 2.11.2 Formation of Anti-Terrorist Fund To regain the lost prestige of Pakistan in the wake of worse security situation in the country, there is greater need to establish an anti-trust Fund and be placed under a social worker and benefactor such as Abdul Sattar Edhi. The personality of Abdul Sattar was considered to be beyond doubt for he was a role model for the whole country on account of his honesty and integrity but since he died a couple of months ago, this task can better be undertaken by the government of Pakistan itself provided the process is fully transparent as most of the people don’t believe in the government. To ensure transparency of the funding, weekly and monthly reports of the funding should be made public and the management of the organization should also be accountable. 2.11.3 Effective Rule of Government and Reintegration of Tribal Region The government of Pakistan needs to focus more on FATA and extend political, administrative and institutional reforms so as to integrate the whole of FATA into a unified structure of well-organized society. The loosely governed FATA along the Pak- Afghan border has been ignored for years by the federal government of Pakistan in terms of employments, basic education and health facilities, justice system, and rule of law and extension of uniform system as compared to other parts of the country. Their self- styled government and Jirga system was greatly shattered by the drone attacks, militancy and resultant military operations as thousands of people have been displaced as a result of

106 these exigencies and the displaced persons have been termed as IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons). Supporters of the tribal system contend that the interference by the army for the very first time since 1947 to crush down rebels and insurgents was highly seen as an offence by the local authority. Whatever reason may be put forward by either party, the government of Pakistan should reintegrate the whole of FATA under an effective system of government and provide them with all opportunities of life as are enjoyed by the rest of Pakistanis. This requires a long term strategy as correcting the complex system of FATA would be a Herculean task but short term strategy could also do a lot by building roads and providing basic services of life. 2.11.4 Government and Public should be on the same page For a coherent policy and understanding it is necessary that both the government and people of Pakistan must be on the same page. History testifies the fact thatpast wars, attacks of militancy, as well efforts by government and military operations all over the world have proved that no war can be won without full participation of the people. Any action by the government of Pakistan needs to be cogently supported by the people whole-heartedly whether military operation or policy of zero option for the opposition from any quarter. The strength of the TTP is well off to survive massive military attacks, endure government policies and bouncing back the government leaves any sector to include every region. In order to rid the menace of terrorism, militancy and other networks, it is the responsibility of the government to take into confidence the local masses so as to create a bridge between the government and the people. This will do invaluable help in reducing terrorism and militancy from every nook and corner of the country. 2.11.5 Discouraging VIP Culture Extirpating VIP culture from Pakistan has been a longstanding and fairly suitable demand of the citizens of Pakistan which has been paid no heed by the officials as they feel pride in walking among an army guard and high protocol. Pakistan has suffered a lot on account of this style of culture by providing extraordinary security to high profile officials, including civil, political and military personnel. Most often the militants have taken advantage of disguising themselves as wearing the uniform of a military personnel or police by wreaking havoc as nobody dared to check their identity being security

107 personnel. It should be made mandatory upon the high profile officials that no political or military figure should be allowed to carry personal guards and that no one should ever be allowed without proper identification anywhere specially in the sensitive areas such as public parks, airports, railway stations, bus stops and public gatherings. 2.11.6 Address the Root Cause of Problem Protests and dialogues, war and peace, negotiations and diplomacy – Pakistani nation has been through it all. But still the issue of extremism, the fear of terrorism, and the number of fatalities and casualties remains the same, rather has been on the rise despite so many efforts. The reason for this uncertain state of affairs and unchanged scenario is that the root cause of terrorism has not been addressed properly by the high ups. Government officials, armed forces, think-tanks, civil society, representatives of the various groups of Taliban, religious and political scholars and media personnel need to be integrated over a unified strategy to get to the root of radicalism and to eliminate it once for all by addressing the radical mindset. The international community, particularly the United States and its allied partners in the war on terror have been engaged for over a decade against this nuisance but all efforts have proved futile due to the failure to focus on internal aspects and root cause of terrorism. A slight hint of information is usually enough to dismantle the whole area that provide shelter to suspected targets without caring a pig for the innocent people and civilians in the area. Prompt actions without deliberations and coordination among the global leaders are the reason that radicalism and extremism is spreading to even the regions where this menace was scarcely seen or heard of before. There is a greater need for global, comprehensive, and integrated efforts to exterminate terrorism from the world at large. It must also be taken into account that clearing out radicals from one’s own territory would not be enough for long, as existence of extremism in any region of the world is equally threatening for all 2.12 Cross Border Security Pakistan is greatly concerned about insurgencies in its tribal areas along the Pak- Afghan border in KP and Balochistan. In FATA, the security concern is TTP (Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan) and other networks such as the Haqqani network, the Neo-Taliban and foreign fighters. The TTP has now developed rivalries within it and does not have a single leadership. This threat will surge with U.S withdrawal and it is most likely that

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Pakistan will have to send in more force to this belt. Separatist movements of Baluchistan and their external support through Afghanistan and foreign force is another security issue. Pakistan has been mentioning its reservations on Indian support for insurgencies in its border areas. Although, it is believed that with the US withdrawal, this support will decrease but the potential and connections of these terrorist outfits will keep on daunting security agencies (Wazir, 2012, pp,93-94). The negative impacts on the security of Pakistan are appreciable on policy making elite and it has been taking serious steps since 2012 specially in order to ward up the danger of insecurity and instability in Pakistan (Naqvi, 2015,p,207). The Afghan refugees, who have taken refuge in Pakistan since long, have been directed by the government of Pakistan to leave country but most of them are adamant to do so for they have made investments in many enterprises and have made homes and properties in the cities. With the withdrawal approaching nearer, Afghan population has started its inflow into Pakistan for fear of insecurity (Dawn, January 1, 2014). Pakistan has clearly given its policy direction to respond this and its Ambassador to United States, Jalil Abbas Jillani, stated that Pakistan deemed complete withdrawal of coalition forces in the best interest of Afghanistan. 2.12.1 Movement of Persons and Vehicles Due to the porous nature of the Pak-Afghan border, there is a number of naturally occurring crossing points though some in the shape of passes. Of the two established routes, one is Torkham route in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) while the other one is Chaman in Baluchistan Province. There are more than 900 posts on Pakistani side of the border while only 120 check-posts are maintained by the NATO and its allies on the other side of the border. More than 50000-60000 people cross the border through these routes besides using the passes on daily basis (Neil, 2010, p 8). It is extremely difficult to check every individual, vehicle, criminal, militant, and terrorist as these people transit the area on regular basis. Pakistan does not and has never denied the cross border movement but stresses that security in the present scenario is the joint responsibility of Pakistan, Afghanistan, US forces and NATO. To strengthen relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan it is therefore utmost necessary that joint security operations be conducted for the stability of the region.

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2.12.2 Cross Border Infiltration

Since 9/11 security situation has deteriorated in Afghanistan which has a direct bearing on Pakistan due to the long porous Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan is of the view that the worst security scenario of Pakistan is because of the failure of the fight on war on terror in Afghanistan since US intervention there. This has catered for an increased improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, suicide bombing, target killing, and other terrorist activities inside Pakistan. The group of militants mostly responsible for these attacks have their origin and sanctuaries across the border and comprise Afghan, Chechen, Uzbek and Tajik fighters who find an easy access to Pakistan through the border area (Neil, 2010,p 9). The government of Pakistan maintains that militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan are provided arms, ammunition and weapons by the intelligence agencies of both India and Afghanistan. Soon after the attack on Army Public School Peshawar on December 16, 2014, Chief of the army Staff of Pakistan, General Raheel Sharif visited Afghanistan on the very next day to debar the Afghani Taliban from entering Pakistan for terrorist activities.

2.12.3 Drug-Trafficking

The government of Taliban in Afghanistan (1996-2010) had been successful in eradicating poppy and opium from Afghanistan but the fall of Taliban government saw huge growth in opium and poppy cultivation. It has now reached a maximum record growth and provides 90% of the world opium supply (Ministry of Counter Narcotics, 2016). In 2008, poppy production reached 7,700 metric tons cultivated over 157,000 hectares of land (Blanchard, 2009, pp,11-12) while more than 70,000 hectares of land was used for the cultivation of cannabis. It is roughly estimated that the illegal drug trade of Afghanistan may exceed $ 3.4 billion equivalent to about 33 % of the GDP of the country (Blanchard, 2009) (Saikal, 2006). Opium was the major source of funding for Mujahedeen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and even now it has become the greatest source of revenue for the insurgents. This enormous increase in the drug industry of Afghanistan is becoming a major threat to the security of Pakistan. About 35% of the total drug production from Southern Afghanistan is mainly smuggled through Dalbadin and Chaghi (Balochistan) areas to the countries of the Gulf and Yemen (Neil, 2010). This

110 link between the drug trade and revenue generation by militants is a matter of serious concern for the region.

According to a report of the UNODC, published on May 19, 2017, the cultivable area of poppy increased from 182,000 to 201,000 hectares. Similarly, potential Opium production saw 43% increase almost touching 4,800 tonns in 2016 (UNODC, May 19, 2017 ). This enormous increase in the Opium production in the country caters for about 235,000 full times jobs to the people while the farmers earns upto 57% of their household income for their survival (UNODC, May 19, 2017 ).

2.12.4 Afghanistan-Pakistan-Indian Complex

2014 is remarked as the most crucial year in the history of Afghanistan as the United States has reduced its military forces in Afghanistan. The foreseeable future of Pak-Afghan relations will matter a lot in the post-drawdown scenario as this will usher in a new era for the future security paradigm of both the countries (Tariq , 2015,pp 17-19). The future trajectory of relations among Pakistan, Afghanistan and United States will either undergo new security challenges or the region will see peace and stability. Due to the excessive involvement of India in Afghanistan and its readiness to provide assistance to the law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan on modern lines, is but complicating its diplomatic ties with Pakistan. This will put the country on the weak side of security as Pakistan is already having security problems on its eastern border. As a result of the war on terror by the United States in Afghanistan and Indian interest therein has placed Pakistan on high security risk on western border too. Thus the insecurity in the country on both of its eastern and western border is going to make Pakistan sand witch and would is going to cause it spend more and more on defense. Pakistan-Afghanistan cross border issues and infiltration has been further exacerbated by the Indian involvement in Afghanistan, particularly in the wake of drawdown of NATO/ISAF from Afghanistan. Pakistan has been blaming Afghanistan for providing base to the Indians for brewing trouble in Baluchistan. Afghanistan denies these charges. On the other hand, both India and Afghanistan charge Pakistan of supporting Taliban which has worsened the relations of Pakistan with these two countries. In order to keep itself strong and stabilized, Pakistan has sought weak Afghan

111 state that could not join hands with India against the integrity of Pakistan. With this philosophy in mind, Pakistan seeks to maintain strategic depth in Afghanistan so as to reduce risks to its national security under the doctrine of colonial-era strategic policy (Saikal, 2006). Afghanistan border issue with Pakistan surfaced during the 20th August, 2009 presidential election. Dr. Ashraf Ghani, a prominent Pashtun presidential candidate stressed upon open border between Pakistan and Afghanistan during a live TV debate similar to the style of open border policy of the European Union. This would increase exchange and enhance economic development between the two countries besides improving security (Rubin & Siddique, 2006). He did not talk about the legality of the border nor did he mention anything whether it is an international border between the two countries or not. The Durand line issue is often discussed among the various political circles and particularly among the Pashtun community who have been reiterating that they will never recognize it as an international border and stress that Afghanistan will make a demand for its return as soon as it gains military power and economic strength. Such threatening remarks from Afghanistan contradict even the remarks of their own politicians such as Dr Ashraf Ghani who is the upholder of open border policy.

2.12.5 The Narcotics Problem

Since 1979 both Pakistan and Afghanistan have been blaming each other for the expansion of narcotics trade across the Pak-Afghan border. Taliban are the direct beneficiary of this illegal trade which is shouldered by the warlords of both Afghanistan and Pakistan and generates about $ 80 million revenue in drug trafficking. About 65,000 drug cultivators reside in Helmand province of Afghanistan (Neil, 2010, p 8). Narcotics revenue of Afghanistan is about half of the GDP (Gross Domestic Products) which fact is evident from the estimate that 25 lac people depend on it directly and also deal in it. This has increased the black market economy of Afghanistan meant for the terrorist groups involved in criminal and terrorist activities. According to a report, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran are facing major problems of opium addiction. 94% of world opium production transits the region, i.e. 55% through Iran having 2 million addicts, 30% through Pakistan having 3 million addicts and the remaining 15% through Central Asia.

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The total area that was used for opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 201,000 (182,000-201,000) in 2016 ((UNODC), October 2016). This shows an increase of 10% from 2015. The Northern regions and Badghis province observed strong increases where security situation has deteriorated since 2015 ((UNODC), October 2016). It is also noteworthy that 93% of the total opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan took place in the Southern, Western and Eastern regions of the country, according to a survey of the 2016. Of all this, the Southern region accounted for 59% of the cultivation, the Western for 25% and the Eastern 9%. The remaining regions (Northern, North- Eastern and Central) together accounted for 7% ((UNODC), October 2016). Of the 7%, of the opium produce, 3 5 is produced by the North-eastern region, 0.2% by the Central region while 3.9% is produced by the Northern region.

2.12.5 (a) Afghanistan opium survey 2016

2015 Change 2016 from 2015 Net opium poppy 183,000 ha + 10% 201,000 ha cultivation (163,000-202,000) (182,000- (after eradication) 221,000) Number of poppy-free 14 -1 13 provinces Number of provinces 20 +1 21 affected by poppy cultivation Eradication 3,760 ha -91% 355ha Average opium yield 18,3 kg/ha +30% 23.8kg/ha (weighted by cultivation) Potential production of 3,300 tons, +43% 4,800 tons opium (2,700-3,900) (4,000-5,600)

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2.12.5 (b) Regional distribution of opium poppy cultivation, 2015-2016

Region 2015(ha) 2016 (ha) Change 2015 (ha) 2016(ha)as (2015-2016) as % of % of total total Southern 119,765 117,987 -1% 66% 59% Western 44,308 51,067 +15% 24% 25% Eastern 12,242 17,608 +44% 7% 9% North- 4,056 6,298 +55 2% 3% eastern Central 321 398 +24% 0.2% 0.2% Northern 1,875 7,951 +324% 1.0% 3.9% Rounded 183,000 201,000 +10% 100% 100% total

The purpose of showing the data of 2015 and 2016 in tabular form is to indicate that there was a rapid increase in the produce of opium poppy cultivation during this era. So, one of the major source of funding of the militants is the narcotics trade. To do away with this activity, it is necessary to fence off the border but it will also be an uphill task to fence off such a long border. But inter-community and intra-community trust of both the countries will definitely do an invaluable service for strengthening of relations. Regional trust building comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and Iran would also be a contributing point. Alternative programs need to be introduced by the regional and international community to ward off this menace forever. The creation of a joint counter- narcotics force with authoritative power for taking strict measures against the culprits will really be a great contribution.

2.12.6 Pakistan-Afghanistan Transit Trade Issue

Due to the landlocked nature of Afghanistan, it is entirely dependent on transit trade facilities from the neighboring countries particularly Pakistan. Informal transit trade existed across the Durand line long before the creation of Pakistan. However, a formal Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1965 whereby Pakistan offered some unilateral concessions to Afghanistan in lieu of transit facilities (Neil, 2010, p 8). Peshawar-Torkham and Chaman-Spin Boldak crossing points were primarily agreed upon between the two countries (Hussain, July 24, 2016).

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Imports by Afghanistan were exempted from the custom duties, service charges, port levies and handling fees as a result of this agreement. Pakistan did not forecast the reverse impact on its industry at that time. But as the volume of trade increased foreign smuggled goods markets sprang up in Peshawar through Bara bazaar (the Khyber Agency), Chaman, Quetta and Rawalpindi. This practice continued for more than a period of three decades till 1996 when the government of Pakistan banned seventeen items and put them under the category of ‘negative list’, upon the strong demand of the local traders. The process of reduction in trade items continued and seven trade items were excluded from the list in 2001 while in 2004 upon request by the Afghan government; Pakistan reduced this list to six items only. The bulk of the list was reduced to only three items: tobacco, cooking oil and auto parts in August 2005. Cooking oil was also removed from the negative list in 2006. Afghanistan has enjoyed many transit trade facilities since 1965 along the Pak-Afghan border and is now in demand of access to the Karachi port and the Wagah border (an Indo-Pakistani transit route), also claiming for the removal of the remaining two items from the negative list. Such a demand by the Afghan government is not in line with the ATTA.

2.12.7 Pashtun Nationalism across the Durand line

The Pak-Afghan border drawn during the British era has passed through many stages of problems of state building and conflict between the two nations and has consequently resulted in the problems and conflict for Pakistan. Afghanistan has been refusing the validity of the border as an internationally drawn and rather stresses that it has been drawn by a colonial power and they (the Afghanis) were forced to sign the agreement in duress. Firstly, since the very appearance of Pakistan on the map of the world in 1947, successive Afghan governments promoted the idea of ‘Greater Pashtunistan’ urging to include the Pashtun parts of Pakistan into the areas of Afghanistan. The unresolved nature of the Pak-Afghan border was used as a tool of nation building by the Afghan governments that challenged the territorial integrity and solidarity of Pakistan. Afghanistan views the Durand line demarcating the 2,640 km or 1,610 miles as a colonial border drawn between the British India and Afghanistan and in the mid-1940s refused to accept the treaty and inculcated the idea of Greater

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Pashtunistan, which included Dir, Swat, Chitral, Amb, Baluchistan and the princely states of Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Las Bela (Dupree & Pazhak, 2003,p,7). This imbued the Pashtuns of North-West Frontier Province ( now, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) with the idea of an independent nation for which Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan strived hard and started the Khudai Khidmatgar movement which earned him the title of ‘Frontier Gandhi’ but his demand was not accepted by the British Government (Hussain, 2005).

The Afghans continued to challenge the validity of the Pak-Afghan border after the creation of Pakistan. King Nadir Shah was the only exception and to some extent King Zahir Shah who was near to acknowledge the legality of the border as well as the NWFP and FATA as parts of Pakistan (Mazari, 1978, p 45). The Afghans also object that it was forced upon King Abdur Rahman Khan and that too for a period of 100 years that got expired in 1994 and that the agreement was made with the British Government and not with Pakistan, hence not binding in the present circumstances (Brasseur, 2011,p 13).

Pakistan, being a successor to the British government has always upheld the norms of International Law and has recognized the Durand line as an international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan has also asked Afghanistan that the latter has recognized the border on many occasions urging that the border terminated Afghan sovereignty over the territory or influence over the people residing east of it while Pakistan as successor to the British government derived full sovereignty over the area and had all the rights and obligations of a successor state (Sheikh, 2009). This stance of Pakistan was upheld by the British government in 1956 before the British parliament (Mazari, 1978). Pakistan’s position over the Durand line was also supported by the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in its ministerial meeting held in March 1956 (Hayat, 2005,pp, 207-209). This was further vindicated by the U.S Special Representative for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Marc Grossman in 2012 saying that the United States recognizes the Durand line as the International Border between Pakistan and Afghanistan (Dawn, 2012).

Violent clashes erupted between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1950 in the border region (Dawn, 2012). In September 1960, incursions by the Afghan forces into Bajaur Agency led to a tussle between Afghan forces and Pak Army (Dupree & Pazhak,

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2003,pp,5-6). These tensions were followed by breakdown of diplomatic relations between both the countries. In 1960s, the Government of Afghanistan continued to celebrate ‘Pashtunistan Day’ and tried to internationalize the issue of Pashtunistan and also raised the issue in the United Nations (Hussain A. , 1966). But successive Afghan governments have failed to gain international support for the Durand line. Between1973 and 1978 King Daud of Afghanistan continued to garner support for the idea of Pashtunistan and resultantly supported insurgencies in Balochistan and NWFP (KP) while in retaliation, Pakistan supported Zahir Shah, the Afghan opposition of King Daud (Roy, 2002,p, 149).

In 1975, Zulfiqar Ali’s support for an insurrection in Afghanistan by Islamist Radicals failed as a result of which some of the leaders sought refuge in Pakistan and turned into Mujahedeen in the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (Weinbaum & Harder, 2008). Pashtuns form majority in KP and also in Afghanistan as well as along the Pak-Afghan border but demand by the Afghans for a separate state of Pashtunistan has occasionally garnered support in the majority of Pashtuns. After the independence of Pakistan, the Pashtun organizations such as the Khudai Khidmatgar movements were banned in Pakistan in 1948 while successor Pashtun Parties such as Awami National Party that was formed in 1957 remained on the borderline between autonomy and independence.

Till 1970s, the question of Durand line was exploited by the various Afghan governments to threaten the territorial integrity of Pakistan. The issue of Pashtunistan along the Pak-Afghan border is quite obvious from the context of Afghanistan’s other borders. Afghanistan’s borders with other countries were also drawn during the British Rule. Afghanistan’s boundaries with Russia [present Turkistan and Uzbekistan], and Persian [now Iran] were drawn by the British government but neither Afghanistan nor the successor Central Asian States of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan ever bothered to challenge the validity of the border (Omrani & Ledwidge, 2009,pp, 48-56). Moreover, there are also no reports of insurgency and cross border infiltration or any issue of nationalism and sub-nationalism and relations among these states have been normal. It is an admitted fact that Pashtuns reside on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border but they

117 have different tribal structure and are not as closely knitted as perceived by the Afghani people (Khan & Wagner, 2012). On this side of Pakistan, all the Pashtuns are not imbued with the spirit of Pashtun nationalism, only a few tribes in KP and Baluchistan were concerned with this idea. Fate of the Pashtuns was decided by them themselves in 1947 when they opted for referendum and decided to join Pakistan. Inside Afghanistan, there has always been a struggle for power and dominance between the Pashtuns and other ethnic groups. All ethnic groups in Afghanistan are opposed to the dominance of Pashtuns and work in close coordination to oppose any move initiated by them. The question of Greater Pashtunistan could also prove to be injurious to the interests of other ethnic groups as this would establish their superiority in Afghanistan relegating them to minority. If, after all, the issue of Grater Pashtunistan can materialize then it can be detrimental to the cause of other ethnic groups in Afghanistan and even Pakistan.

2.12.8 Strategic Depth and the Durand line

In the post-Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan served the role of a frontline state of the United States and was assisted with financial and military aid to fight against the Soviet forces under the banner of Jihad in the region. During the war the Pak-Afghan border (Durand line) was the battle ground and training camp for the local as well as foreign troops of the Muslim countries. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan played the most significant role and provided training to the Mujahedeen from Afghanistan and volunteers from the Arab world in the tribal areas along the Pak-Afghan border (Khan & Wagner, 2012). It is again this border now that has deteriorated the entire security paradigm of Pakistan and whenever and wherever there is any incident, the terrorists and insurgents mastermind and seek refuge there.

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, the triangle between Pakistan, Afghanistan and India underwent drastic changes. The Durand line that has hitherto served as the open border between Pakistan and Afghanistan turned into an important instrument of the foreign policy of Pakistan. From the Soviet withdrawal’s onward relations among Pakistan, Afghanistan and India remained independent on one another in the context of Durand line. Former Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, General Mirza Aslam Baig while outlining Pakistan’s National Strategy stated that Afghanistan

118 would be transformed into a hinterland of Pakistan in order to secure a “strategic depth” for Pakistan in case of any conflict with India (Khan & Wagner, 2012). It was in this context that Taliban were supported by Pakistan in Afghanistan to have a better strategic position over India. In the context of safe haven Pakistan had two basic points of national security and interest; firstly Afghanistan was to be used as a safe haven for the militant groups that can be utilized against India in case of Kashmir-conflict (Hussein,2012) and secondly it would help in countering the demand for a greater Pashtunistan from the Pashtun nationalist groups in Afghanistan. So far, this concept of strategic depth has proved to be against the national interest and security of Pakistan as thousands of Afghani people get their entry into Pakistan on daily basis. Pakistan has never enjoyed the doctrine of safe haven but has been enjoyed by the Afghan insurgent groups and other militant groups. On December 16, 2014, some militants entered the premises of Army Public School Peshawar and started killing the innocent students and staff in the most brutal way. On December 17, 2014, Chief of the Army Staff General Raheel Sharif paid a visit to Afghanistan and urged the government of Afghanistan to hand over the mastermind of the attacks to Pakistan and also start operation against the terrorists.

The concept of strategic depth has triangulated the dispute of Pakistan with India to Afghanistan and established parasitic nature among the three states, each dependent upon the other. The army of Pakistan during the Soviet war in Afghanistan fought in the guise of religious card. General Zia-ul- Haq’s Military Coup in 1977 was also another contributory factor initiating the process of Islamization in Pakistan that encouraged the various jihadi groups for training capabilities and fighting under the umbrella of jihad (Holy war). The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan was taken as a successful strategy and led to establish the belief amongst the military establishment of Pakistan that jihad can also be used as a strong element against India (Haqqani, 2005). Whether fruitful or not but this doctrine has deterred both Pakistan and India from another nuclear war since the late 1980s. In 1990s, Kashmir became a hot spot in the region and was perceived as the most dangerous place in the world but it failed to bring about another international intervention in Pakistan. On the contrary, it provided for the creation of violent groups in Pakistan such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and the Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen that have proved to be harmful to the security of Pakistan to such an extent that the

119 government of Pakistan had to ban most of the militant groups fighting under the guise of Jihad.

Since Soviet’s invasion in Afghanistan, Pakistan has played the most important part in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Upon Soviet withdrawal from there, Afghanistan was faced with multiplicity of problems ranging from a power struggle to civil war. Initially Pakistan supported its ally, Gulbadin Hekmatyar and his Hizb-e-Islami Group but when Pakistan felt that he (Gulbadin) has failed to achieve dominance there then Pakistan diverted its attention towards Taliban, a local group from Southern Afghanistan. In 1994 when Taliban took control of Kandahar, Pakistan backed up the movement militarily and logistically. The extensive support rendered by Pakistan to Taliban made it the “godfather of Taliban” (Archive, 2007). It is also an established fact that religious students from across the border were provided religious education as well as training in the religious madrassas of Pakistan while the porous border gave them further impetus to cross the border without any hurdle. When Taliban ascended the throne of Afghanistan in 1996, Pakistan was also one of the three states to give diplomatic recognition to Taliban (Rais, 2009,pp,57-58).

But even here the strategy of Pakistan failed to bring the efficacious results. Pakistan’s support for Taliban was fraught with security of Pakistan on both the eastern and western border due to Indo-Russia rivalry. It was only a partial success although the Taliban regime was suited to the interest of Pakistan. Pakistan’s support for Taliban did not suppress the issue of Greater Pashtunistan rather it gave forth to exacerbate security situation inside Pakistan. The Taliban regime was not in a position to recognize the Durand line as international border, nor to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States nor agreed to stop the destruction of Buddha statue in Bamiyan Province in Afghanistan.

2.12.9 Durand line and the 9/11

The incident of 9/11 compelled the regional powers to reshape their foreign policy in the context of Taliban as being the enemy of the United States. Pakistan, being a supporter of Taliban was forced by the United States to abandon its support for Taliban in

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Afghanistan. US President made a clear statement, “Either with us or with the Terrorists”. In order to secure its frontiers and national interests, particularly via-a-vis India, Pakistan complied with the United States (Musharraf, 2006). In the post-military operations by the NATO/ISAF, thousands of militants from Afghanistan fled to KP and Baluchistan across the Durand line. The tribal areas became safe haven for the foreign as well as local militants and served as bases for attacks by the militants. Taliban and Al-Qaeda formed their bases there and used the border as resting place to attack the western forces in Afghanistan. This deteriorated the security of Pakistan and for the very first time in its history it has to encounter such a worst security situation along the western border with Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s role in the war on terror cannot be gainsaid as it did its best to fight against terrorism and with this perspective in mind, sided with the United States and its allies. As a result of becoming a partner of the U.S-led invasion of Afghanistan, it also gained the status of a ‘major non-NATO ally in the region and the western world but despite that received harsh criticism from the western powers as well as the government of Afghanistan. Pakistan has been accused of cross border terrorism and supporting Taliban by the Afghan government. This charge by Afghanistan against Pakistan has but resulted in the strained relations between the two countries.

US-Pakistan cooperation on the war on terror caused the latter irreparable loss. In 2003, Pakistan started a series of military operations in FATA against the militants that shook the entire edifice of the security system of Pakistan. The militants in the tribal areas took up arms against the government machinery and challenged the writ of the government by stating to convert Pakistan into an Islamic state envisioned by the Taliban. In July 2007, the militants took the siege of Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in the Capital city of Islamabad but the situation was soon controlled by the Pak army as a result of which many militants and army personnel lost their lives including Maulana Abdul Rashid, the Khateeb of the Masjid. Following the violent siege of the Red Mosque, more than forty different militant groups from the tribal areas got together and formed the Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007 under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud (Rana, Sial, & Basit,2010,p 169). Formation of the TTP was a major blow to the security

121 of Pakistan because since then Pakistan never had a calm and soothing day especially in KP and FATA region. The government had to launch many military operations in FATA and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) usually followed or proceeded by Peace deals with the militants and tribal elders. Thus a sort of civil war has overpowered Pakistan since then and a tug of war has been there between the militants on one side and the law enforcement agencies and civilian population on the other side. Currently operation Zarb-e-Azab is in line with the eradication of militancy and terrorism from the entire society, particularly the tribal areas that are notorious for their un-ruled nature.

In contrast to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in the pre-9/11 era, India continued to provide utmost support to the Northern Alliance --comprising all anti- Taliban elements. During this time India provided huge financial support to the Afghani people and became the biggest non-Western donor to Afghanistan. India’s increased interest in Afghanistan can be gauged from the fact that the former runs four Consulates in Afghanistan; that is at Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad and its high popularity among the Afghani people is tantamount to Pakistani defeat there. In spite of Pakistan’s political, economic, logistic and moral support on almost all major events, particularly during the Soviet invasion, Pakistan has not been able to achieve its strategic goals in Afghanistan vis-à-vis India and Pashtun Nationalism with the Afghan Taliban groups. Indian excessive involvement in Afghanistan is also testimony to the fact that Pakistan has to abandon its notion of strategic depth in Afghanistan and rather focus on the prevention of Indian encirclement.

To avoid further accusations of cross border infiltration from the Pakistani side by the Afghani people as well as the western powers, Pakistan had to make selective fencing of the border at critical junctures where illegal trade and infiltration was at the high peak (The Washington Post, December 26, 2006). This was being done with a view to strengthen the border security and avoid the charges leveled by Afghanistan on Pakistan. In this regard Pakistan had to strengthen its border security with more than 180 border check posts to contain infiltration into Afghanistan in 2002 (Rana, Sial, & Basit, 2010). But this too faced Pakistan with severe criticism from the Afghani circles to such an extent as to state that this would divide the Pashtun ethnic tribes along both sides of the

122 border. Pakistani authorities, in order to strengthen its security and prevent accusations of cross border infiltration and illegal trade, had to install a biometric system at the Chaman border crossing known as ‘Bab-e-Dosti’( Friendship Gate) in Baluchistan in January 2007 having eight computerized doors, six for pedestrians and two for vehicles. Pakistani government received criticism from the Afghani people to such an extent that the angry mob attacked the ‘Gate’ on the very second day of its installation and consequently the system had to be done away with. The biometric system was installed by the government of Pakistan on experimental basis and was never meant to divide the Pashtun or the ethnic groups on both sides of the border. Its main purpose was to replace the previous permit system by issuing the border passes on the basis of computerized national identity cards issued by the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). These moves were taken by the government of Pakistan to monitor the border and movement of militants and terrorists along the border but the Afghani people thought that this would deprive them of meeting their relatives and near and dear ones residing on this side of the tribal belt. Thus every security measure adapted by Pakistan has been taken by the Afghani people in the negative sense which created many problems for both the countries and relations between the two worsened.

The Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan comprising seven agencies have been one of the greatest challenges to the security of Pakistan on internal and external fronts. The government of Pakistan conducted many military operations to clear the areas of militancy but due to weak political, economic and military strategy, no fruitful results have been obtained by the previous military operations. The militants on each occasion regained their strength with new zeal and spirit and had to adapt new strategy to counter the operations. All the military operations with the exception of Swat operation and Red Mosque operation were conducted in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Even the present operation Zarb-e Azab is conducted in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This is the only operation that seems to be efficacious in eliminating militancy from FATA and KP as no major attack has been witnessed by any quarter since December 16, 2014, when a major attack on Army Public School in Peshawar was brutally conducted.

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Support for the militant groups as an instrument of foreign policy by Pakistan has proved to be counterproductive to the national interest and security of Pakistan whether its support for the Taliban or Kashmiri freedom fighters. The creation of TTP whose ideology has been inspired by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda has faced Pakistan with another violent conflict. The TTP has been held responsible for many attacks against the civilian and military installations in Pakistan. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007 has been ascribed to the TTP. The attack on the General Head Quarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi in October 2009, the attack on Mehran Naval Base in Karachi in 2009 and the murder of Shahbaz Bhatti in 2011 have been linked with the TTP.

2.12.10 Pak-Afghan Border Management

There have been occasions in the history of Afghanistan when it angled on the side of acceptance of the Durand line to be an international border. Afghanistan has recognized the Durand line in terms of visa issuances, trade and transit facilities. Afghanistan demonstrated acceptance of the Durand line at the third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan when it agreed to ensure security and development through modern border management mechanism (PILDAT, March 2015). It is also an admitted fact that Afghanistan along with the United States of America (USA) and Union Soviet of Socialist Republic (USSR) in the Geneva Accord of 1988, accepted the Durand line as an international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Another occasion was in the post 9/11 scenario when the United States deployed its forces in Afghanistan and ordered the forces to stay on the Afghan side of the Durand line. This was the de jure recognition of the Pak-Afghan border by the U.S and Afghanistan. Moreover, the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSC) on Afghanistan including 1267 reaffirm the recognition of the Durand line to be an international border where the principle of non-intervention as enshrined in the international law applies. The Bonn Agreement and International Agreement on Afghanistan in 2010 also testifes the acceptance of the border to be an international border between the two states and the principles of these agreements form the basis of bilateral security agreement between Afghanistan and the United States. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also maintained the position of the border to be of

124 international nature in its judgment in the Atlantique Aerial Incident of Case between Pakistan and India (Justice, 2014).

Pakistan as successor state to the British India has also abided by the Agreement of the Durand line signed in 1893 to be of international nature. It has also been confirmed by the official representatives of the British government. For example, Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for the Commonwealth in his speech to the British House of Commons on June 30th, 1950, proclaimed in these words, “it is his Majesty’s view that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the Government of India and of his Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom in these territories and that the Durand line is the international frontier” (Institute, 2003).

2.12.11 Legal Basis for Fencing the Durand line

The Durand line or Pak-Afghan border has been described as one of the most volatile and dangerous borders of the world mainly due to the presence of terrorist networks and safe havens for these networks. These outlaws and fugitives have been taking shelters there and is the nourishing place for these organizations though they are conducting activities against the interests of both the states. In parlance of International law, both Pakistan and Afghanistan are compelled by the UNSC Resolution No.1373 to deny safe haven to the terrorists and those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit acts of terrorism against the other states and its citizens. Pakistan’s ongoing operation Zarb-e- Azab shows its commitment towards international obligations to counter terrorism and militancy particularly along the border. An important question arises whether Pakistan can fence the Durand line on its side for reasons of security without having the consent of Afghanistan. The Security Fence Act 2006 provides for the fencing of border on unilateral basis. The USA-Mexico border has been fenced by the USA unilaterally by the United States of America under this Act. This has been considered lawful under the International Law as the United States of America as a sovereign state is entitled to protect its territory, integrity, and national security through the implementation of policy of immigration (Tavares, 2007,pp 33-34). Pakistan can fence out the Pak-Afghan border on its own side unilaterally due to pressing security concerns from the terrorists and militants emanating from the infiltration of the border.

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2.12.12 Remedies for the Border Improvement

The government of Pakistan and Afghanistan needs to legislate on a comprehensive strategy for the terrorists and infiltration of the border so as to thwart the danger of insecurity and instability in the region. The joint legislation would resolve all outstanding issues of infiltration and cross border terrorism and would help in strengthening the relations between the two countries.

For establishing proper security along both sides of the Pak-Afghan border it is necessary to carve out a combined security strategy for curbing terrorism and infiltration across both sides of the border. Combined force of the two countries comprising security personnel from both sides will do an invaluable service to strengthening the border security. Joint ventures by the intelligence agencies of both the countries regarding sharing of information about insurgency, terrorism and cross border infiltration may contribute a lot to strengthen security of both the countries. The severity of the situation can be gauged from the fact that Pakistan has deployed about 1, 82,000. Army personnel on the Durand line for maintaining peace and security along the border region (Bajwa, November 22, 2015).

2.12.13 Pakistan, Afghanistan to set up bilateral mechanism to address border issues

In order to address border issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a mechanism for the resolution of border was evolved by the leaders of both the countries, which will address the core issues of violence and terrorism across the border areas and particularly the cross border infiltration. The proposed mechanism will be co-chaired by Sartaj Aziz, adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on foreign affairs and Salahuddin Rabbani, Afghan foreign minister, with the participation of the National Security Advisers of the two countries.

Pakistan and Afghanistan will set up a high-level bilateral mechanism to coordinate on security issues and amicably address border-related matters, officials said on Friday, and days after violent border clashes left casualties on both sides. The decision was taken during a meeting between Pakistan Prime Minister’s Adviser on Foreign

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Affairs Sartaj Aziz and Afghan Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tashkent. Afghan National Security Adviser Haneef Atmar was also present at the meeting. Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to constitute a high-level bilateral mechanism for consultation and coordination on issues relating to bilateral relations and cooperation, including security, movement of people and vehicles between the two countries and other relevant issues, according to a joint statement issued after the meeting.

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) countries and observer members attend SCO summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, June 24, 2016. (Source: Sputnik/Kremlin/Mikhail Klimentyev/via REUTERS)

2.13 A History of Peace Agreements and Military Operations

In the post-9/11 scenario Pakistan served the role of a frontline state in the war on terror which exacerbated the security situation in Pakistan, particularly in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. To purge its tribal areas from local and foreign militants, Pakistan started a series of military operations such as Operation Al-Mezan in 2002. Under this

127 operation, Pakistan entered FATA for the very first time since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. In order to carry on the operation about 80,000 military and paramilitary troops were deployed in the region (Report A. , "Pakistan Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,", 2006, pp,14-19). In March 2004, the government of Pakistan launched military operation in Kaloosha village of South Waziristan with the sole objective to eradicate the menace of militancy from the area. The results proved the contrary; the militants pushed the troops, inflicted heavy losses to them and took many officials hostages. To avoid huge casualties on both sides, the government soon embarked upon peace deal with the militants in the same year (Khan, February 19, 2004). Peace deals were signed with almost in the areas of operation or where militancy was on the high rise. 2.13.1 Shakai Agreement (2004) The first peace agreement of its kind known as the Shakai Agreement, was signed on March 27, 2004 between the government of Pakistan and pro- Taliban militant groups, represented by commander Nek Muhammad at Shakai, South Waziristan. Nek Muhammad was a very charismatic Yargul Khel Wazir known as the Che Guevara of Wana, was a tough task master commander who provided sanctuary to the chief of Uzbek militants Tahir Yaldochev in the military operation of Kaloosha (Tajik, 2011,p 18). As per the terms of this agreement the government agreed to release all the prisoners held during military operation, would pay compensation for the casualties and collateral damage caused during the military operation, no action will be taken against Nek Muhammad and other wanted individuals, foreign Mujahedeen were allowed to live peacefully in Waziristan, local Mujahedeen would not take any action against the government of Pakistan and Mujahedeen-e-Waziristan would not participate in any action in Afghanistan. This peace accord failed on account of disagreement over registration of foreigners with governmental authorities. The government asked the militants to get registered “foreigner fighters” in their respective areas but the militants rebutted that there was no such clause in the agreement. This agreement remained in force for less than 50 days when the military operation was re-launched on June 11, 2004 while Nek Muhammad was killed in a U.S drone attack on June 19, 2004 (Mehsud, March 18,

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2004). It was for the first time that an attempt was made by the government of Pakistan to restore peace and stability in the region. This endeavor proved successful for a short time but it received a setback on June 8, 2004 when Wali Rehman was killed in a drone attack inside Pakistan (Mehsud & Khan, 2014). Observations A) This agreement increased the power and strength of the militants and the tribal dissidents were morphed up in to a more powerful group becoming a permanent feature of the tribal landscape that further reinforced their polarization. B) Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in the war on terror in support of the United States and reliance on the military means further militarized Pakistan. C) The militants gained great momentum as they were given equal status to that of the government. 2.13.2 Sararogha Peace Deal (2005) The militancy that remained confined to the Ahmadzai tribes of South Waziristan, started penetrating to the Mehsud dominated tribes of South Waziristan in the spring of 2004 (Dilawar, October 5, 2004). The militancy in Ahmadzai tribe was spearheaded by commander Abdullah while in the Mehsud tribe it was led by Baitullah Mehsud. This peace agreement known as Sararogha Peace deal was signed between the government of Pakistan and pro-Taliban militant group represented by Baitullah Mehsud on February 22, 2005 at Sararogha, South Waziristan (Shahid, February 9, 2005). The government took the initiative in order to bring peace and stability to the Mehsud territories. According to the terms of this agreement, Baitullah and his group agreed neither to harbor nor to support any foreign fighters in the area, Baitullah and his group would not attack any government functionary nor damage official property, and would not put any obstacle in the way of any developmental activity. No action would be taken by government against Baitullah Mehsud and his group for their past actions. However, they would be treated according to law if found involved in any terrorist or criminal activity. Any culprit involved in any anti-state activity and found in the Mehsud area would be handed over to the government. Moreover, any issue not covered under this agreement would be resolved through mutual consultation between the political administration and

129 the Mehsud tribe. Political administration was empowered to take legal action if any clause of the agreement is violated. Observations I. The agreement kept silent about cross border infiltration or attacks. II. It did not have any clause regarding the surrender of foreign fighters. III. It also did not mention whether militants would surrender their weapons or not. IV. The peace deal became controversial after rumors spread that money had been paid to the militants during negotiations. V. Abdullah Mehsud, the second most in command in the region, abnegated the agreement. 2.13.3 Miranshah Peace Accord (September 2006) The militancy that began in the Ahmadzai Wazir’s territories of South Waziristan in 2003 spread to the Uthmanzai Wazir areas of North Waziristan in 2005 (Report, 2006,pp, 15-17). The writ of the government got weakened in the North Waziristan as the militants attacked the personnel of security forces and their convoys. The political administration remained confined to governmental buildings due to worse security situation in the region. The government opted for a peace deal with the militants of North Waziristan on September 5, 2006 when the cost of military options exceeded the benefit. It was agreed between the two parties that militants would not attack law enforcement personnel, government property nor would take recourse to target killings. Writ of the government would prevail and no parallel administration would be established in the region. If any issue arises between the parties then political administration would resolve the issue as per traditions of FCR after consultation with the Uthmanzai tribes. There would be no cross-border militant infiltration in Afghanistan but crossing the border for business, trade, commerce and meeting relatives as per local tradition was relaxed. No terrorist activity would be tolerated in the adjacent districts of North Waziristan. All foreigners dwelling in North Waziristan should either leave Pakistan or live peacefully in accordance with law and current peace deal. This should apply to the foreigners as well local people residing in the tribal area. All captured government property during the operation including vehicles, weapons or any other equipment would be returned by the militants.

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The government agreed to grant them the following concessions. All individuals arrested during the military operation would be released and would not be rearrested for their previous charge. The government agreed to release all political benefits and would remove all newly designated checkpoints on the roads. Old fashioned Levies and Khasadars would be posted on the roads as were in vogue prior to the operation. The government would do away with all land and air operations and would return all vehicles, weapons, and other equipment captured during the operations. The government would pay collateral damage to the affectees and all outstanding issues would be resolved as per local customs. No restriction would be placed on carrying weapons as per tribal tradition but carriage of heavy weapons would not be tolerated in any case. This agreement should come into force upon the withdrawal of army from the check posts. As per the terms of the agreement, a 10- member committee was to be established comprising clerics, tribal elders, and representatives of the political administration. It was to be held responsible for creating a link between the government and the Uthmanzai tribes to review and ensure the proper implementation of the agreement. Those not abiding by the terms and traditions of the agreement and disturbing peace and harmony of the area would be proceeded against. The agreement was signed by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq. The peace deal broke down on May 20, 2007. Observations A) A huge amount of money was transferred to the militants from Pakistani government’s coffers. A vague term, “foreigners”, a ‘euphemism for Al-Qaeda and other militants’ was used (Roggio, September 6, 2006). About 100 mid-level Taliban and Al-Qaeda commanders were released from the custody of the government. B) During the signing of the peace deal security covering was provided by the militants while their flag was fluttering over the scoreboard of the stadium (Roggio Septyember 6, 2006). 2.13.4 Khyber Agency Pact (2008) Pak Army started operation “Siraat-e-Mustaqeem” (Right Path) in 2008 against the militant outfits in order to counter the impending danger of the militants who were

131 consolidating their position in Peshawar and to keep open the supply line of NATO forces via Khyber Pass. This operation was prompted by the abduction 16 Christians, including two priests on June 21, 2008 by the workers of Lashkar-e- Islam (News, June 23, 2008). After a couple of days, the area was cleared and resultantly peace deal was signed between the government, represented by political agent and an 18 member Jirga of the Afridi tribes. The terms of the agreement stressed that there would be no assault on the law enforcement agencies and installations of the government nor would there be target killings. No parallel administration would be set up in the area and any issue arising there would be resolved through Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) and as per local tradition. However, the government would have the prerogative of the Armed Patrolling in the area. The foreigners residing in the Bara sub division should immediately leave Pakistan and no incursion should be tolerated into Peshawar and settled areas. The tribes and Khasadars would be responsible for the protection of the area and no government official and law enforcement personnel would be threatened. The Khasadars should be given job protection and would not be compelled to resign job. There should be no impediment in the way of developmental work and guarantee for peaceful behavior of any criminal would be given by the concerned tribe. No training camp would be allowed to be operated against the government of Pakistan. However, action against any militant camp including any suicide camp would be taken by the concerned tribe and the government as per traditions and the FCR. Display of unlicensed weapons in the premises of government offices and Bara bazaar would be banned except for those authorized by the Peace Committee of Afridi tribes. No propaganda would be allowed against the government of Pakistan and its institutions. Observations: A) Mangal Bagh, the leader of Lashkar-e-Islam alleged that the aim of the operation was to please the US and its allies. The timing of the operation was significant in the sense that it was launched before the Prime Minister's upcoming visit to the US B) The operation targeted "vacated buildings, used by banned organizations," and "not even a single leader or fighter of these organizations was captured." C) Mangal Bagh insisted on continuing his struggle against criminal elements in Bara.

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D) On the day of peace deal, five Frontier Corps personnel were killed and three wounded in Khyber Agency (Roggio, September 6, 2009). 2.13.5 Swat Agreements (2008) The first peace agreement in Swat was reached at between the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, led by the Awami National Party and followers of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) or movement for the implementation of Shariah law led by Sufi Muhammad on April 20, 2008. According to the agreement, the government of KP accepted the right of every Muslim to work ‘peacefully’ for the enforcement of Shariah. The TNSM dissociated itself from the elements attacking the security forces and a fatwa was issued in this regard claiming that attacks on security personnel was considered against the teachings of Islam. TNSM pledged to cooperate with government and renewed its pledge to support the state institutions and enable the state to restore its writ in the region. The agreement was very fruitful and paved the way for the release of Sufi Muhammad, who had been in jail since February 2002. The second Swat peace agreement was signed on May 21, 2008 between the militants of Swat operating under the command of Maulana Fazlullah and the Awami National Party-led by the provincial government. It was a 16-point handwritten accord written in Urdu. During the peace accord, the militants were represented by their spokesperson Muslim Khan, Ali Bakht, Maulana Muhammad Amin, Mehmood Khan and Nisar Khan, while the government team was represented by senior ministers Bashir Bilour and Rahimdad Khan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Minister for Environment, Wajid Ali Khan, Awami National Party provincial President Afrasiab Khattak and Member Provincial Assembly (MPA) Shamshir Ali. The deal took place in two rounds. The first round of talks was held in Chakdara on May 9, 2008 in which both sides agreed to a ceasefire while the second one was held on May 11, 2008. After reaching consensus on the outstanding issues the peace deal was signed on May 21, 2008. The clauses of the agreement stressed that the militants agreed to accept and honor the writ of the federal and provincial governments. Shariah would be implemented in Malakand Division in true spirit. The militants would not castigate the religion of other citizens. Cases of the imprisoned militants would be reconsidered and a decision about their release would be made. Personnel of law enforcement agencies, government

133 officials, buildings and installations, police stations, police officials, police lines, army, Frontier Corps, Frontier Constabulary, bridges, roads and electricity installations would not be attacked. Private militia was banned. The Taliban would denounce and disown suicide attacks, remote-controlled bomb blasts and bomb blasts in all private or government buildings and shops. All foreign militants would be handed over to the government and Army would be sent back to the barracks. Barber shops, markets or other places visited by women should not be attacked. The government would sympathetically look into the damage caused during the operation of the security forces and would make arrangements for the compensation to all the deserving victims. The Taliban agreed not to oppose campaigns for vaccinating children against polio and other diseases, and would not obstruct women’s education. Complete ban on display of weapons should be observed and only licensed ones would be allowed. Incidents of abduction, vehicle theft, and vehicle-snatching would be condemned and all those places where militants and suicide bombers were trained or explosives were made would be dismantled and destroyed. Every time a peace agreement is at hand, the U.S drones strike the tribal area. Pakistani Army is fighting Washington’s war against its own people, and is killing innocent tribesmen ‘Mujahedeen’ would and continue ‘jihad’ against US-led forces in Afghanistan and if Pakistan tries to stop them, they would fight against Pakistani forces as well. Talk on FM radio channels would be made only subject to rules of the authorized license. Local Taliban should coordinate with the local administration regarding the investigation of incidents of murder, robbery, theft, crimes and other such cases. In order to purge the society of criminal activities the government should take action against oppressors, kidnappers, thieves, dacoits, and bribe takers. The government also agreed to establish an Islamic University in Imamdheri which would be run by a joint venture of the government and Taliban. To put this agreement into practice, an11-member joint committee was named to ensure the implementation of the agreement. The government was represented by Wajid Ali Khan, MPA, Dr. Shamshir Ali, and Deputy Inspector General of Police, Malakand Range, District Police Officer Swat and District Coordination Officer Swat. Maulana Muhammad Amin, Ali Bakht, Muslim Khan, Mehmood Khan and Nisar Khan represented the Taliban.

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2.13.6 Observations The agreement did not mention anything about Maulana Fazlullah, supreme commander of Taliban whether he had been granted amnesty or not. The agreement was violated by the hard-core Jihadi elements such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and non-local militants, mostly from Punjab. Soon after the agreement, Said Jamal, a militant commander, announced the establishment of a Sharia Court in Swat for settling local disputes. Two girls’ schools were torched and a policeman was murdered only hours before signing of the peace agreement. The militants continued to run training camps in the hilly areas. They carved out ‘no-go’ areas and nominated their ‘governors’ there. Almost 400 Swat policemen resigned after the peace deal, most likely because they feared reprisal attacks by militants. The Swat militants had reportedly said that they would not abide by the peace agreement if a similar deal was not reached with the Tehrik-e-Taliban in Waziristan, a stipulation which was not included in the Swat peace deal. Different views have been expressed by the militants, the United States and the government regarding the Peace Deal. 2.13.7 Militants’ View A) Peace Agreement is at hand every time while the U.S Drones strike the tribal area. B) The government of Pakistan is fighting the war of Washington against its own people and is killing the innocent tribesmen without any cause. C) Mujahedeen would fight jihad against the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan and if the government of Pakistan resists, they would fight against the government forces as well. 2.13.8 United States’ view A) Analysts of the United States looked at the peace deals through the prism of tactical moves by the militants as they wanted to seek benefit from the government without changing their violent activities. B) Ceasefires were used by the militants to erect a parallel system of government replete with Shariah Courts, taxation, and recruitment of militants’ own police force.

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C) Peace deals are used by the militants to weaken the state institutions of Pakistan and prolong insurgency rather than curtailing it. D) Peace deals had in no way reduced violence and militancy. E) The government of Pakistan appeared to take a harder stand against Al-Qaeda in order to please the United States and a more permissive posture against Taliban, who in turn worked with other militant groups to strengthen their own position. 2.13.9 Pakistan’s View A) The three core Pakistani defense concerns are of the view that Indian threat should not be contained in any case nor would be permitted to develop pressure over Pakistan regarding retention of nuclear weapons. B) To take on the militants, Pakistan deployed 120,000 forces to take on the militants, compared to the combined NATO/ISAF of 50,000 in Afghanistan. Pakistan established 669 patrolling posts while Afghanistan only had 69 posts along the border. Pakistani security forces suffered more casualties than the 40- nation NATO/ISAF operating across Taliban. C) The United States was interested in eliminating only Arab Afghan fighters in the region. US drones did not take action when information about Pakistani Taliban was shared. 2.13.10 Drawbacks of the Peace Deal If peace is to be measured in terms of the number of attacks on the law enforcement agencies including military and Para-military forces then it becomes very clear that the tribal areas mostly remained peaceful in the aftermath of signing of the peace deals with the government while incidents of target killings of tribal elders, sporadic attacks on government functionaries and installations, attacks on boys and girls schools, beheadings of alleged criminals, forceful closing down of barber shops, bombing of CD shops and display of force by the militants gained momentum and were still there. The main flaw in these peace deals was that the decision in tribal areas was made entirely by the military personnel. So, they were never on the same page. The flaw in the peace agreement with Ahmadzai Wazir and Mehsud Wazir was that they (militants) were between the military and the militants while focusing mainly on areas of concern for the military, i.e. attacks on the security persons. This resulted in giving a free hand to the

136 militants. These agreements placed the militants at par with the state which emboldened them to challenge the writ of the government whenever they found an opportunity. Another flaw on part of the government was that the agreements were signed by them in the quarters of the militants which according to the traditions of the tribal system meant that the government was at fault thus resulting in the undermining position of the government. The process of “military-militant agreements” has paralyzed the local and administrative structures. The signing of agreement with the militants by the army further emboldened the militants that they need not bother about other institutions of the state. A sort of hatred got developed in their minds against the state institutions. The peace deal of Miranshah signed in 2006 with the tribal people of North Waziristan had a very weak base as the military had vacated most of the area prior to the signing of the agreement. The text of the government testified the fact that the militants imposed heavy demands on the government for not attacking the military and its installations. The agreement seemed more to be an appeasement rather than peace agreement. The signing of the Shakai Agreement was the first slippery point for the government in legitimizing the militants as the major stakeholder that consequently eroded the administrative structure (Ali, April 23, 2004). The initial peace agreements were made in a very furtive way to such an extent that the names of the signatories were kept confidential as in the case of Shakai Agreement. Their names were neither made public nor shown to the media men. Another flaw in these peace deals was that the regional and international stakeholders as NATO/ISAF and United States in particular were not taken on board when the agreements were signed. The drone strikes were operational even during the signing of the peace deals which showed distrust on part of the government. These strikes not only violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Pakistan but also undermined the ability of the state to ensure the promised peace and cessation of bitter hostilities between the government and militants. No harsh mechanisms were evolved regarding the cross border infiltration by the militants. The local tribal elders who were entrusted with the responsibility of guarantors were also weak enough to deter the militants from their terrorist activities. Moreover the militants considered weapons to be of viable nature for all the issues which again showed their stubborn nature for coming

137 around to any flexibility. The stubborn attitude of Taliban compelled the government and the security agencies to initiate military operations against them. 2.14 Military Operations Frequent incidents of militancy and insurgency became a matter of routine in FATA and KP resulting in the exacerbation of security situation. Suicide attacks, bomb blasts, target killings, indiscriminate firing on the mob and improvised explosive devices added further fuel to the worries of the people as well as the government. Security situation went from bad to worse and from worse to worst in the days to come. Some analysts are of the view that violence across both sides of the Pak-Afghan border is a coordinated strategy of Al-Qaeda, the TTP, Afghan Taliban and foreign fighters to cause damage to the relations among Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States by increasing an atmosphere of mutual distrust. According to Shah Nawaz Tanai, former Defense Minister of Afghanistan, Taliban elements in both the countries have helped each other in the fight against the Soviets and this cooperation extends even today (Khattak, 2012). Other experts opine that the recent rise in the cross border infiltration is a coordinated strategy to sabotage Pakistani military operation against the Haqqani network (Dawn,August 6, 2012). The government of Pakistan, in order to clear the area of insurgency and militancy, conducted many military operations in KP and FATA region with the sole aim of purging the area of terrorism and militancy. These operations include Operation al-Mizan, Operation Rah-e- Haq, Operation Zalzala, Operation Thunderstorm, Operation Rah-e-Raast, Operation Sher Dil, Operation Rah-e-Nijat, Operation Koh-e- Safaid and Operation Zarb-e-Azab. 2.14.1 Operation Al-Mizan The first military operation against the militant groups in the history of Pakistan was operation al-Mizan which lasted from 2002-2006 covering a period of almost 4 years. This operation was conducted during the reign of General Pervez Musharraf where around 70,000-80,000 forces were deployed in FATA. The army conducted a cordon and search operation lasting for fourteen days along a 36 km area west of Wana that had fallen under the command of militants, including Nek Muhammad Wazir, Noor-ul-Islam, Haji Muhammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas, and Maulvi Abdul Aziz, all suspected of facilitating of foreign fighters in South Waziristan (Khan, 2004). In 2003, Ayman al-

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Zawahiri issued a fatwa calling for the murder of General Pervez Musharraf in consequence of which several assassination attacks were made by South Waziristan based militants on him. After the death of Commander Nek Muhammad, Baitullah Mehsud was chosen as the commander of the militants in South Waziristan. Since the force deployed was huge in number and the loss of security personnel ranged from 1,200 to 1,500 army soldiers. This loss was due to lack of information on part of the law enforcement agencies, methodology of enemies, and their hideouts and knowhow regarding the terrain. The army had to suffer huge casualties at the initial stages as full convoys became the target of the Taliban militants. This operation caused heavy losses to the army personnel. After all, General Safdar Hussain, in charge of Frontier Corps and XI Corps declared victory saying that they had accomplished the mission assigned to them (Khan, April 2004). 2.14.2 Operation Zalzala This operation was launched in January 2008 in South Waziristan Agency against Baitullah Mehsud and his group. The operation aimed at clearing the areas from the forces loyal to Baitullah Mehsud. The aim of the operation was not to target those who fought against the state machinery in Afghanistan and Kashmir but those elements of the Mehsud Network who had challenged the writ of the government. In a few months, the army cleared the areas of Spinkai, which was a strong hold of Mehsud and captured some villages and towns in the area (Abbas, May 19, 2008). This operation proved quite fruitful and cleared most of the parts of South Waziristan Agency. The security forces claimed to destroy over 4,000 houses whereas 200,000 locals were displaced by this operation (Ali, November 8, 2008). This operation proved quite fruitful in suppressing militancy in South Waziristan. The army captured computers, weapons, and improvised explosive devices into its possession. 2.14.3 Operation Rah-e-Haq Operation Raah-e-Raast was conducted against the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e- Muhammadi (TNSM) militant group in Malakand Division. The first phase of this operation was launched in November 2007 by the law enforcement agencies in collaboration with local police to clear Swat Valley but the militants soon infiltrated into the area and captured key areas. The second phase of this operation was launched in July

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2008 and continued throughout the year (Amin, October 19, 2007). This operation was carried out at the request of the provincial government and remained in force for three months, resulting in the death of 36 military men, 9 civilians and 615 militants (The News, July 21,2008). The third phase of this operation was carried out in January 2009 with the slogan to “shoot on sight” and consequently curfew was imposed in major cities of Swat. The TNSM retaliated by attacking schools and security personnel. The fighting came to an end in February 2009 through the popular peace agreement of Malakand Accord. However, the situation deteriorated in April 2009 where the militants occupied the shops and government buildings particularly in Swat, Buner and Shangla. The militants embarked upon attacks on police stations, frontier constabulary personnel, offices of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and established their own check posts along the roads (Abid,April 24, 2009). 2.14.4 Operation Raah-e-Raast This operation was started in Swat in May 2009 and continued till July. This operation was launched to clear the area of militancy and Taliban. But in the last week of May, a major offensive took place in Mingora whereby a few villages were captured by the militants. On May 30th, 2009 the militants were able to regain the control of entire Mingora destroying concrete bunkers, confiscating arms, ammunitions, and explosives hidden in the caves and other hilly areas (Khan, May 21, 2009). This was the most successful operation in eradicating militancy from Swat, Buner, Shangla and suburban areas. It proved its efficacy in bringing the displaced persons back to home. Taliban never raised again in Swat with the exceptional case of attack on Malala Yusufzai who received serious injuries and was shifted to the United States for treatment who is still residing there along with her parents. She has been awarded with Nobel Prize for peace. 2.14.5 Operation Black Thunderstorm Operation Black Thunderstorm was started in April 2009 and continued till June. This operation was started as a result of huge growth of militancy in Swat, Mingora, Shangla and Lower Dir. Huge problem of refugee hit the area as they had directly challenged the writ of the government and the main function of the operation was to restore the writ of the government as challenged by Taliban. In the initial stage the operation saw the unbearable refugee crisis but it was later on brought under control.

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2.14.6 Operation Sher Dil This operation was started in Bajaur Agency in August 2008 and continued till February 2009 and caused huge displacement of the local and tribal population. The main reason behind this operation was that in 2008, Qari Zia- ur- Rehman and other militants had pushed government-armed local security personnel. Its main objective was to crush all the militant groups that threatened the security of Pakistan. By June 2008, more than security 72 check posts had been destroyed and civilian government had been disrupted through a major bank robbery and suicide bombings against officials. The army and Frontier Corps units launched operation Sher Dil jointly on September 9, 2008 when the local militants ambushed the military convoy in Loe Sam (Khan, 2009). During this operation, more than 1,000 militants were killed while 63 security personnel got martyred though security forces were faced with some tunnel complexes meant for hiding people and storing materials such as weapons, ammunitions, radio frequency lists, guerilla warfare manuals, propaganda and bomb making instructions (Jhones & Fair, 2012,pp 33- 35). This operation was similar to the present operation Zarb-e-Azab in methodology. This has also close resemblance to the Operation Raah-e-Raast, operation Black thunderstorm, and Operation Sher Dil as in all these operations the strategy of the government was to bring in aerial support prior to the ground troops. This enabled the troops to move forward in the area with force and enthusiasm as they were being guarded aerially.

2.14.7 Operation Rah-e-Nijat The failure of Operation Zalzala manifested itself in the years of 2008 and 2009 when Baitullah Mehsud and TTP Network took recourse to violence across the country from their base in Waziristan. 2008 witnessed 2,148 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian attacks in Pakistan (Report , 2009). Operation Rah-e- Nijat was launched in June 2009 in South Waziristan in which round about 30,000 troops participated. Its main objective was to capture the ground lost to Taliban during insurgency and the military showed its valor by recapturing the lost ground. This operation caused irreparable loss to Taliban though most of them fled to Afghanistan and took refuge there. The main focus of this operation was to undermine the TTP and its infrastructure in South Waziristan and its strong hold within the tribe. In the initial stages of the operation, launched during the summer of

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2009, Pakistani Army and Air Force was assisted by US military and Central Investigation Agency (CIA). Upon the escalation of violence, ground military attacks were initiated by Pakistani forces with the assistance of Pakistani helicopter gunships and fixed wing aircraft (Mehsud, October 18,2009). The 11th Corps was in overall command with three sub-divisions: the 7th based in Miranshah, the 9th in Wana, and the 14th in Jandola. Besides, two special Services groups ‘battalions and two infantry brigades were deployed there. The main objective was to dismantle the TTP stronghold at Laddah, Makin, and Sararogha. These areas were considered to be the strongest areas of the militants. Pakistani ground units conducted search and clearance operation along important places in Waziristan such as Central Waziristan road and the road running through Ahmadwam and Ragha. Pakistani army had been successful in disrupting the TTP command and control system and by December 2009 was able to get control of Ladha, Makin, and Sararogha (Dawn, December 28, 2008). This operation continued till January 2010 and army had been able to clear several villages of South Waziristan and seize heavy weapons from the militants (Dawn, January 2, 2010). 2.14.8 Operation Koh-e-Safaid This operation was conducted in Kurram Agency where only 4,000 troops participated. They were supported by heavy artillery, armor units and airpower. This operation was conducted by infantry battalion from the Sindh Regiment (SR) and the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) having peculiar specialty in mountain warfare unit. One- fourth of the population of the agency amounting to nearly 100,000 residents was displaced by this operation. By going through all the military operations, many lessons can be learnt as far as Pakistani law enforcement agencies are concerned. The army of Pakistan went through many stages of trial and error due to the peculiar nature of the terrain though it is one of the best armies in the world. Pakistani army, besides being trained as a force in the art of conventional warfare, is now well- equipped in the art of fighting unconventional warfare in an efficacious way. The ground forces are well acquainted with hideouts, sanctuaries, terrain, area, local tribal system and population. During Operation Al-Mezan, the first operation in South Waziristan the army showed some lack of precision and accuracy against the militants. While in the operations that followed, the army showed

142 improvement especially in Operation Sher Dil, Operation Raah-e-Raast, and Operation Raah-e-Nijat. The army was in a better position to clear the area of insurgency, establishing liaison with the local tribal elders for improving security situation and develop rehabilitation program of the displaced personnel. The last decade, if on one hand saw irreparable losses of civilians and military personnel during the operations, target bombing and attacks also witnessed the hardest and toughest training Pakistani army would ever venture. In the recent combat operations, the army received an apparent aerial support and most sophisticated weapons also came under the use of Pak army. Of all the operations, operation Raah-e-Raast was the most fruitful operation as it achieved the efficacious results and removed militants from the area more effectively with the assurance to return of displaced persons back to their homes. 2.15 Failure of the Peace Agreements and Future Strategy The Peace Agreements were followed by military operations which show failure of the peace deals as these operations were conducted in the very same areas where the deals were signed. It was due to some of the facts that Taliban lacked the support of any political party that could give them proper representation. They were not structured in a hierarchical way but compartmentalized in a horizontal way. The peace deals were taken separately in every area and did not have any binding effect for the rest of militancy-hit area. The fighters did not believe in border or frontier but were fighting their own causes and not countries as a separate identity. In making any new peace deal the following points need to be considered. I. In most of the previous agreements the government negotiated usually from a very weak position, demanding too little from the militants’ whereas the militants made heavy demands from the government in retaliation. The government agreed to most of the demands in haste which encouraged the militants for making further unjust demands. In future the government should negotiate from a very strong position and inculcate a sense of fear among the militants as was felt by the government in the previous deals. II. In the previous deals, only the Taliban and government were parties to the deal whereas the local population was ignored that was the ultimate sufferer. In any

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new peace deal the local population as well as the civil society must be taken into confidence so as to make the process more effective and transparent III. All the peace deals with the exception of the Swat deal were conducted under the auspicious patronage of the military regimes with minimum or no input from political parties. There is a pressing need for the new deals to be initiated by the democratic government for their legitimacy. IV. The presence of military personnel in the areas of the civilians acts as a magnet for militancy as the militants take it to be a constant threat to their family members and relatives. They should be removed from the civilian areas and deployed only in the affected area and along the Pak-Afghan border. V. There is a greater need to introduce reforms in FATA on modern lines and give more incentives to the people besides giving education free of cost in all government institutions. Seats should be increased for the students in all professional institutes and those domiciled as category-A (those people who live in the tribal areas are called category-A while those who belong to FATA but live in the settled areas are given the domicile of category-B) should be given more preference. VI. In the case of peace deals in Waziristan it was observed that the only objective before the state was to get security for the army from the attacks of the militants. The militants got encouraged by the weakness of the state and extended their attacks to schools, hospitals, public gatherings, mosques and developmental projects with to spread terror and horror among the common populace. VII. There is a pressing need on part of the government to ban all the prohibited weapons across Pakistan and cancel all the already issued licenses. This should remain the exclusive property of the government and only by kept by the law enforcement agencies. The government should launch a clean-up operation throughout the country taking into possession all the prohibited weapons and allowing only the licensed pistols. VIII. A uniform peace deal extending to all the seven agencies and frontier regions should be reached into between the government and the militants. This should have a representation of all the militant groups and need to be signed by the top

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leadership of the militants and not their nominees. The mainstream religious parties should be at the same page irrespective of being Sunni or Shia. Moreover, the government should include all leaders of the mainstream political parties besides the civil society and media men. IX. The foreign fighters should be dealt with an iron hand and the government should exert diplomatic pressure on their respective countries and pass on resolutions against them in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) urging them to be declared as terrorists for creating violence on foreign land. X. The Durand Line should be recognized by the people of Afghanistan as an international border and should not preach the view among the common masses of FATA that it has divided the Pashtun nationality into two nations though it is a fact that on both sides of it reside Pashtuns but after all, they are the ultimate sufferers in case of militancy as well as military operations. Due to the sabotaging activities of the various terrorist groups, the government of Pakistan and law enforcement agencies first contracted into peace agreement with the terrorist groups but when they were given certain concessions by the government, they got encouraged and took more subversive actions against the government and common masses. Security situation worsened to such a great extent that the government had to initiate military operations, which to a greater extent, brought peace and security to the tribal areas and the settled areas. But still the government needs to resolve the issue of the Durand line with its neighboring country as our country is already having trouble on its border with India. With the resolution of the border management, Pakistan may find itself secure on its western border and one of the issues of non-state actors with their sanctuary would be done away with, once for all.

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Chapter 3 3.0 Sectarianism and Counter-Terrorism Policy of Pakistan Sectarianism has paralysed the entire edifice of the security system in Pakistan and has wrought havoc with the increased gap between the Sunni and Shia sects of the Muslim population in the country. This has also created further dissensions among the Muslims, adding fuel to the country’s wounds that has already been hit by the increased acts of terrorism/establishing a self-styled form of state within the stae through suicide acts and target-killings. History of sectarianism is not new in Pakistan but it dates back to the era of General Zia-ul-Haq. 3.1 Resurgence of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan Sectarianism is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. It is deeply rooted in the entire human history. This is one of the main obstacles in the way of our national integration and has been an aspect of insecurity and instability. Due to the geo-strategic location of Pakistan in the region, it has paralyzed our entire security paradigm. Some of the factors that have contributed to the worse security situation in the country comprise; the Iranian factor on account of its majority Shia population, Pakistan’s participation in the war on terror as an ally of the western powers, Pakistan’s proxy war in Afghanistan, the process of Islamization in Pakistan by General Zia ul Haq and dissentions among the various religious parties particularly between the two main stream religious parties as Sunni and Shia over the interpretations of Islamic teachings. The word sectarianism has been derived from “sect”, which means a body of people having diverse views on the same religion (Wilson, 1982). In common parlance, sectarianism means adherence to a particular sect, or party especially in a bigoted and chauvinistic way. In Sociological parlance, it is the religious study which means a group split in the mainstream religion on the grounds of doctrine (Wilson, 1982). In Islam there are two main sects, Shia and Sunni. The latter are the followers of Hazrat Ali (RA) while the former follows the teachings of the Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (S.A.W). Islam does not permit these dissensions but they are created by the orthodox theologians themselves. In a multiple society like Pakistan sectarianism creates violence and strife as followers of the sect adhere to their respective ideologies and do not compromise with others. Hence they stick to a particular sect or religion, develop the feeling of self-

146 righteousness and adopt an attitude of abhorrence toward the other sects of the same religion (Andrew Feenberg.1983).

The Shia population in Pakistan constitutes 15-20% of the total population while the Sunnis form majority. Both the communities had been living smoothly till 1980s and were enjoying peace and unity when a chain of events created rift between the two. The anti-Ahmadi movements of 1974 were one of the starting points of the rift when they (Shias) were declared non-Muslims by the 2ndAmendment to the Constitution of 1973, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Afzal, Iqbal, & Inayat, 2012, p7). Sectarianism is as old as Pakistan itself but the intensification of these conflicts found manifestation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The current militant sectarianism in Pakistan owes its origin to both internal and external political trends that began in 1970s and 19870s. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 was a hallmark in the history of Pakistan as it gave birth to sectarianism in Pakistan (Hussain, 1993). General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s process of Islamization in the country alienated many Shias who thought the movement to be a majoritarian attempt to make the country more Sunni while Iran was fully propagating its revolution of 1979 to the entire Shia community outside Iran. Consequently, by the mid- 1980s, Iran-backed groups and clergy dominated religious Shia activism in Pakistan (Rafiq, 2014). There has been a sharp increase of sectarian resurgence in Pakistan since 2007. Since 2007 to 2011, Pakistan witnessed 631 incidents of sectarianism on the alarming point that led to the deaths of over 1,649 people. In 2010, about 509 people were put to death and 1,170 injured as a result of 57 incidents of sectarian violence. 2011 saw a decrease in the incidents of sectarianism and 30 incidents were recorded resulting in the death of 203 people and 297 injuries (Yusuf, 9 August 2012). There was again an increase in violence in 2012 and from January to May 177 people were killed in 51 incidents (Portal, 2012). In the recent times, most of the violence has been due to Shia- Sunni conflict which is tantamount to terrorism and extremism. According to an estimate the Shias are responsible for about 70% of deaths between 1985 and 2005 (International Criss Group, April 18, 2005). In addition to this, the inter-sectarian violence between Deobandi and Barelvi has also been on the rise; hundreds of Barelvi worshippers are reported to have been killed in more than 70 suicide attacks at shrines during the period of 2005-2010. As a result of this rising conflict, two prominent Barelvi leaders had been

147 assassinated in 2009. Mufti Sarfaraz Ahmad Naeemi, a great cleric, who was very vociferous against Pakistani Taliban and spoke against them on many occasions, was killed in a suicide bombing in Lahore. Similarly, Hamid Saeed Kazmi, the then Pakistani Minister for religious affairs, was shot by two unknown gunmen (International Criss Group, April 18, 2005).

Sectarian violence between Sunni Deobandi and Shia Muslims has witnessed escalation in the recent years, as a result of which the country has suffered approximately 23, 00 deaths in the four provinces of Pakistan between 2007 and 2013. Besides this, the Kurram Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas received at least 1,500 deaths since 2007 (Rafiq, 2014). Since Kurram Agency remains under the grip of Shias as a result of the number of deaths, is the largest one as compared to the rest of tribal areas and Pakistan. This violence is perpetrated by local networks but the sectarian phenomenon has also close links to regional security and stability. Pakistan has been mainly hit by the Shia-Sunni rift, mainly exacerbating the security concerns of the entire nation and Particularly in Karachi, Quetta and Kurram Agency.

The current sectarian resurgence particularly Shia-Sunni clashes dates back to the mid-2000s and most arguably as an aftermath of Pakistan’s direct participation in the war on terror after 9/11. A glaring example of it was in 2006 when the Taliban fighters seeking a safe haven in the north-western tribal belt of Pakistan exploited the decade old sectarian tension by launching attacks in the tribal region of Kurram Agency against the Shia tribes based in Parachinar. The Deobandi Taliban are ideologically anti-Shia but their sectarianism has an element of pragmatism as they used to enter into Afghanistan through Kurram Agency which was under the control of local Shias who put obstacles in their way. This anti-Shia campaign by the Taliban has led the Shia Community to strengthen their position in the North-western region of Pakistan, i.e. Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Taliban, as retaliation gave an impetus to the reorganization and remobilization of extremist Sunni groups across the country. The tussle between Shia and Sunni is one of the main factors for the worst security situation in Pakistan. A few main actors are responsible for this worst scenario in Pakistan.

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I. Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWAJ): The ASWAJ is the new name of the banned Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). This is an organization of Deobandi militant extremists who have been instrumental in carrying out attacks against the Shia community since 1985, whom they think to be infidel. Rivalry has also been developed against the Barelvi sect in the recent years. The SSP has strong affiliations for the TTP and sends men for recruitment along the tribal belt for training and support (Yusuf, 9 August 2012). The SSP has a political base too as it has elected members to Pakistani Parliament or offered strong support to politicians from mainstream political parties, particularly in the Punjab province. Due to its increased involvement in sectarian violence, the government of Pakistan banned this organization (ASWAJ) in March 2012 but it still remains operational. II. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ): This group is an offshoot of the Sunni sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). It believes in the spreading of terror to force the government to declare Shia community as non-Muslims and establish an orthodox Sunni Islamic system in the country (Zahid, 2007). The LeJ has recognized itself to be one of the most feared groups and is involved in approximately 350 incidents of terrorism. Most of its members fled to Afghanistan when it was banned in 2001 by the government of Pakistan. It was declared as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in January 2003 by the United States. According to a security analyst, “the LeJ has become a key player in the nexus between al- Qaeda, Taliban and sectarian groups because of its ability to exploit its network of mosques and madrassas in just about every district of Pakistan” (International Crisis Group, 2009). Since the LeJ is an anti-Shia extremist organization of the Sunni group considering them to be infidels and is involved in sectarian violence in Karachi, Baluchistan, and Southern Punjab and has carried out numerous attacks against the interests of Iran in Pakistan. It focused on sectarian violence against Shias in Balochistan in 2012. Since that it has divested itself of anti-Shia activities and has allied itself with other militant groups and carries out attacks against the western and Pakistani government’s interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Having developed close ties with Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it also

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provides weapons, finances and recruitment facility, intelligence reports links the assassination of Muhtarama Benazir Bhutto in 2007, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, to this group (Yusuf, 9 August 2012). This group is also accused of assassination attempt on Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif in 1999. This group was linked with the kidnapping and murder of U.S journalist, Daniel Pearl by the Pakistani authorities in 2002. This was also held responsible for the bombing of a Shiite Libyan Islamic Fighting group (LIFG) in Karachi resulting in the death of over 40 people in July 2003 (Firdous, 2009).

Sectarian violence visited Parachinar, a town of Kurram Agency on December 13, 2015 when an improvised explosive device (IED) wrapped in a sack exploded, killing at least 25 people while some others were injured when they were busy in buying the second hand clothes, almost the poor people of the society. According to Israr Hussain, who was the in- charge of the Bomb Disposal Squad (BDS) stated that 35-40 kg of explosives had been used in the explosion. Responsibility of the incident was claimed by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Al Alami and Ansarul Mujahedeen based in South Waziristan, said that the target was Shia Community. Ali bin Sufiyan, a spokesman of the LeJ said to a foreign channel that the attack was carried out as a retaliation of the support given to the Rafizis the support for the Syrian President Basharat-ul-Asad and the Iranian government. Sufiyan further added that if the Rafizis did not restrain from supporting the ongoing conflict then they should face more attacks (Dawn,December 14, 2015).

It is also a matter of concern that Parachinar has a population of 50,000 people and has been under the strict security of law enforcement agencies for quite a long time. Army personnel and paramilitary Levies have established their check posts on all important points and routes leading to the main bazaars and a proper system of search and identification system exists. This shows the inadequacy of security measures taken by the government to safeguard the innocent masses from terrorists’ acts of perpetration. But the irony of the fact is that the terrorists have once again used the traditional method of IED which shows the inadequacy and lack of resources by the law enforcement agencies to eradicate extremism and terrorism. The government should embark upon a

150 policy which should have all encompassing-measures to counter all acts of terrorism and extremism with strict entry system to the main bazaars and markets.

III. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): The TTP is a conglomeration of FATA based militant groups that seek to overthrow the government of Pakistan and establish a self-styled government of their vision of Islamic law. This has been waging a campaign of suicide attacks and target killings against the high ups of Pakistan since 2007, the year of its emergence on the landscape of Pakistan. Recently it has emerged as the largest militant organization of our country and has provided funding, logistic support, training and safe havens to militant organizations allied with Deobandi sectarian groups such as LeJ and ASWAJ. IV. Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SPM): The SMP is a Shia organization that was established in 1993 to protect the Shia community from the extremist Sunni militant groups. This group reinvigorated itself in 2008-2009 and is most operational in the urban areas of Lahore and Karachi. It has been accused of being involved in tit for tat killings of the prominent Sunni doctors of the LeJ and ASWAJ and also accused of receiving funding and support from Iran. In May 2011, four militants affiliated with SMP were arrested in Karachi for attacking Saudi Arabian Consulate with a grenade attack. V. Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan(TJP): The TJP is an offshoot of a Shia political party, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafaria, founded in 1979 with the aim of protecting Shia community from the Sunni oriented interpretations of Islamic law by General Zia ul Haq and widespread discrimination against the Shias in the army ranks and government departments (Yusuf, 9 August 2012). Its origin dates back to Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqah Jafaria (TNJF). As the Shia leadership considered TNJF to be too offensive so they changed it to TJP in 1994 (Firdous, 2009). The TJP is well organized represented by Allama Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi. The TJP has several affiliated groups such as Sipah-e-Abbas, Sipah-e-Ahle-Bait, Imamia student’s organization and Imamia organization. It was twice banned but still continues to operate under different names. Primarily, Sunni oriented it is but is also involved in sectarian violence and anti-state activities. Currently the Sipah-e-Muhammad

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has emerged as a splinter group of the TJP and is involved in the anti-SSP campaign, violence and target killings. VI. Sunni Tehrik (ST): The ST is a Barelvi Sunni group cum political party working to safeguard the interest of Barelvis against sectarian attacks by the Deobandi groups. This group is well organized comprising 4,000 Sunni Barelvis, mostly operational in Karachi. The militant sect of this group retaliates against sectarian attacks by the ASWAJ and tries to gain control of rival sects by land acquisition. VII. Jundullah: The Jundullah is a newly formed anti-Shia militant group having close ties with ASWAJ, LeJ and the TTP. Its activists have been arrested in connection with a blast in December 2009 in Karachi resulting in the death of 40 people. On account of its close ties with the Pakistani Taliban, Jundullah has also been instrumental in launching attacks the security forces of Pakistan.

3.1.1 Sectarian Groups in Pakistan

Tehrik-e- Sipah-e- Taliban Muhammad Pakistan Pakistan

Tehrik-e-Jafria Sunni Tehrik Pakistan

Jundullah

Sectarian violence poses a direct threat to the security and stability of Pakistan because conflict between the mainstream religious parties of Pakistan is extremely detrimental to the security and stability of Pakistan. One of the main causes of militancy is the huge rift among the religious parties especially the Sunni and Shia are directed

152 against each other and are also involved in anti-state activities at large scale. They have their own vested interests and want to establish their own hegemony in the region while some of them have close nexus with the militant groups that are basically centered against the government of Pakistan and want to form a self-styled government of their own as per the interpretation of Islamic law envisioned by them. Though some of these have a political background, despite that a few prominent religious scholars have lost their lives due to the harsh sectarian violence of the rival sect. The sectarian group represented by the Deobandi, on one extreme side whereas the Shias and Barelvis, on the other extreme side have been bent upon destroying each other. On special occasions such as Independence Day, Pakistan’s day, and Muharram, the metropolitan cities such as Lahore, Karachi, Quetta and Peshawar remain under tight security and senior police officials fear sectarian tensions to escalate across the country.

In the absence of a long term strategy, sectarian violence may increase at an alarming ratio and put the security of Pakistan at jeopardy. It is feared that situation like Baluchistan may arise and ordinary citizens may fall a prey to the violence. The concept of tit for tat is vanishing away and indiscriminate killings of innocent people will take its worst form. Law enforcement agencies, judges, lawyers and other departments concerned with criminal and justice system may be at high risk.

Sectarian violence in Pakistan may also affect regional stability in terms of security. Close cooperation and coordination between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistani LeJ in a joint effort to target Shia Hazaras may facilitate cooperation among the various militant groups across the Pak-Afghan border. This may in turn complicate Pakistan’s relations with Iran as Iran is mostly inhibited by the Shia community. Pak-Iran relations are threatened by a proxy war in Afghanistan following the drawdown of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014. This can put Pak- Iran gas pipeline at high risk as Shia-Sunni tussle would be a tussle of two countries and ideologies and not of two countries.

3.2 Causes of Sectarianism in Pakistan

A number of factors contribute to the sectarian violence in Pakistan which has put at stake the entire security within Pakistan.

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3.2.1 Support for Sectarian Organizations: Some militant groups in Pakistan have enjoyed financial and operational support from the security establishment of Pakistan regarding asymmetric warfare against India. These groups also received funding and assistance from the foreign governments particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia in context of fighting proxy war for political and ideological dominance in the region. Currently the Sunni organizations of ASWAJ and LeJ have been supported by Pakistani Taliban and al- Qaeda with funding, recruitment, training, sanctuary and logistical support. The current resurgence in Pakistan can be ascribed to the nexus between Taliban and various militant groups.

3.2.2 Rift between Sunni and Shia: This is another important factor contributing to the increased sectarian violence in Pakistan. The 15% Shia population residing in Pakistan is strongly supported by the Iranian government in the metropolitan cities of Quetta, Karachi and Rawalpindi. Even the Baloch separatist movement has an element of ethnic background. Moreover the tussle between the mainstream religious parties over the interpretation of Islamic teachings is a step towards sectarianism.

3.2.3 Failure of the Criminal Justice System: Failure on part of the law enforcement agencies to arrest the hot criminals involved in criminal activities, is another lacunae in the justice system of the country. The process of prosecution and trail is slow which results in the encouragement of the militants for further incidents. The Criminal Justice System of Pakistan has bleak conviction rates as 75 % of the alleged terrorists are acquitted by the anti-terrorism courts (Overdorf, August 31, 2011). The poor low conviction rate is due to the politicization of Pakistani police force; poor evidence- gathering and investigation techniques by the concerned officials particularly the forensic department. Inadequate security provisions for the judges, public prosecutors and eye- witnesses also lead to the acquittals of the criminals. Intimidation by the militant organizations also helps in the acquittal of the militants. Moreover, lack of evidence leads to the release of the criminals. In the case of LeJ leader, Malik Ishaq who was involved in many murder cases of Shias, the Supreme Court failed to have enough evidence as a result of which he was released from jail in July 2011.

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3.2.4 Inadequate Madrassa Reforms: According to a report of Ministry of Religious Affair’s 2012 the number of registered madrassas in Pakistan is 18,000, whereas the actual number could be as high as 40,000. These madrassas are purely run on sectarian basis especially the Deobandi have been highly financed by the government of Saudi Arabia since 1980s that has resulted in the huge growth of madrassa. The number of registered madrassas in 2002 was 10,000 out of which 7,000 were Deobandi, 1,585 Barelvi and 419 Shia (Rahman, 2008). The government of Pakistan asked the religious madrassas in 2002 to get registered with the government but only 10% complied with the order as per report of International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) (Abbas , 2011). These madrassas collect and receive funds and finances under the guise of jihads and scholarships for the poor and orphan children.

3.2.5 Political Patronage of the Sectarian Organizations: The state’s use of sectarian organizations as proxies since 1980s in order to execute the goals of foreign policy vis-à- vis Afghanistan and India has resulted in the aggressive competition among the various religious groups. They have received political patronage and handouts for carrying out these proxies. Resultantly sectarian leaders have tried to make inroads into the political clout of Pakistan, particularly in the Punjab Province. Throughout 1990s the ASWAJ, the then SSP supported candidates of the PPP and PML-N in the elections. In 1995, an SSP candidate was appointed as a provincial minister because the PPP needed majority inside Punjab Assembly. In the local elections of Punjab in 2010, Rana Sanaullah, Punjab’s provincial minister and representative of PML-N campaigned for Muhammad Ahmad Ludhianvi, the leader of the ASWAJ in district Jhang.

3.2.6 Failure of Anti-Terrorism Courts to provide speedy justice: The Anti-Terrorism Courts established in 1997 have failed to provide the efficacious results and do not provide summary trials and justice in the country. There is a greater need to streamline the existing system with a view to bring about drastic reforms vis-a-vis speedy trial and justice system irrespective of any political affiliation or party. The Anti-terrorism Law should adopt strict measures and should extend its jurisdiction to murder and criminal cases so that common masses may not get themselves involved in the criminal activities. The investigation system should be made more transparent and those experts in legal

155 field may be inducted to elicit the hidden facts and bring to the book those involved in the abetment and instigation of the case.

3.2.7 Role of External Factors: The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran ushered in a new era in Iran and called for the propagation of the movement behind its frontiers. The movement gained great popularity in the region and succeeded in creating a Shia- activism in Pakistan by the mid of 1980s. This created a great loss to the security of Pakistan as alien activists found its entry into the mainstream religious parties of the country. Thus huge rift got developed between the two religious parties, each accusing the other for acts of extremism at the expanse of the other.

3.2.8 Process of Islamization in Pakistan: The second amendment to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, declared the Ahmadis as non-Muslims which created a sense of deprivation among the minor religious groups and particularly the Shia Community within Pakistan. The process of Islamization by General Zia-ul-Haq was another blow to the Shia group as this was viewed by them to establish a majoritarian Sunni society in the country that will sabotage the Shia community. Moreover, personal enmity and personal grudges among the various castes also added to it as most of them fought under the guise of shias

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3.2.9 Chart representing Causes of Sectarian Violence in Pakistan

Failure of Causes of criminal Sectarain Judicial Violence System

Inadequate Rift between Madrassa Sunni and Shia reforms

Political Role of patronage of external the sectarian factors organization

Process of Islamization

3.3 Execution of Mumtaz Qadri

Mumtaz Qadri, who gunned down the then Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer on 4th January 2011, was executed in Adyala Jail on 29th February 2016 in tight security (Asghar, Yasin, & Ali, March 1, 2016). Governor Salman Taseer had given his views over the blasphemy laws which were controversial in nature resulting in his murder at the hands of his own security guard, Mumtaz Qadri, who belonged to the Barelvi School of thought. The execution was carried out in strict security and everything was conducted in the most furtive and swift way so as to avoid any untoward security situation from the Barelvi or other sectarian group. The information was shared on a ‘need to know’ basis and the family of Qadri was brought to the jail for the last meeting on the pretext that he (Qadri) was unwell and wanted to meet his family (Asghar, Yasin, & Ali, March 1, 2016). The news of his execution was kept secret from his supporters and religious parties’ personnel but once his death news was leaked out, it spread like a wild fire in the major cities of the country. Soon the students left schools and universities and observed strikes as demonstration while blocking the roads particularly in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and other metropolitan cities. The religious parties were particularly more concerned about the execution and showed strong reaction against this act of the

157 government. Ameer Jammat-e-Islami, Siraj ul Haq offered his absentia funeral prayers while other religious and sectarian groups also offered his absentia funeral prayer.

According to the report of Police sent to Punjab Home Department, Qadri was executed at Adyala Jail at 4:35 am on 29th February 2016 while DIG Rawalpindi, Superintendent Adyala Jail, a judge of the Anti-terrorism Court and two doctors were present on the spot. The dead body was handed over to the brother of Mumtaz Qadri after the doctors confirmed the death of Qadri. The dead body was taken to his ancestral village, Sadiqabad area in the Rawalpindi Division and his funeral prayer was offered in the historic Liaqat Bagh, where he was buried in the Athal Village in Bara Kahu;

Religious parties and Qadri’s supporters strongly reacted to the decision of the government on this move and declared it as tantamount of the killing of justice. Those who spoke against the government on this occasion included the Sunni Tehrik, whose leader Sarwt Ejaz condemned it as the murder of justice; the Milli Yakjehti Council, an alliance of the religio-political parties, announced protest against the government across the country; the Majlis-i- Wahdatul Muslimeen (MWM), said that this execution was hurried and had plunged the country into uncertainty and chaos. It demanded the same fate for Mumtaz Qadri with which Raymond Davis was forgiven. Even the Shuhda Foundation of the Lal Masjid, which is traditionally opposed to the Barelvi school of thought to which Mumtaz Qadri belonged, has criticized this act by saying that it was contrary to the principles of Sharia and that they will hold a conference over this issue very soon.

However, in the midst of criticism and condemnation from the various clerics, the reformist clerics hold a different view and state that it was the implementation of the decision of the court. Hafiz Tahir Ashrafi, a reformist cleric, observed that the execution of Mumtaz Qadri was the implementation of the laws of the state and it is the responsibility of the state to provide security and protection to its citizens (Asghar, Yasin, & Ali, March 1, 2016). Chairman of the Pakistani Ulema Council, in a statement supported the act of execution and stressed that it was the responsibility of the state to provide protection to the citizens and that nobody has the right to challenge the writ of

158 the state. He went to the extent of saying that a civilized society would be turned into a barbaric and brutal society if decisions are taken on emotional grounds.

The government of Pakistan is determined to keep on executing the criminals at death row but the reaction of the nation on the execution of Qadri is quite unique in nature. The reaction shows how far the society has drifted itself from the lofty ideals of the state on which it was founded. Though Pakistan is not an extremist society still extremism has made penetration into the society. The extremists find it easy to project its influence over the common masses and society as is evident from the current demonstrations over the execution of Mumtaz Qadri. Qadri’s supporters’ vandalized property closed down markets forcibly and caused huge loss of work hours by disallowing the people to reach their duty stations. The security machinery of the state stood back rather than challenge the protestors by violating the law.

3.3.1 Controversial views of various leaders over the execution of Qadri

Controversial views have been expressed by various political leaders and particularly by members of religious political parties over the execution of Mumtaz Qadri. The religious parties held demonstrations in different parts of the country condemning the act of execution. Some of them expressed their views in very blunt manner and threatened to hold demonstrations against the government of hanging Qadri. Maulana Fazalu Rehman, leader of Jamat Ulema -e- Islami (JUI) along with Siraj ul Haq, Ameer Jamat-e- Islami (JI) and other religious scholars held press conference in which Maulana Fazalu Rehman strongly condemned the government and termed the death of Qadri as an act of ‘judicial killing’ and vowed to carry on demonstrations against the government as Qadri stood for the protection of Prophet-hood and its sacredness. Leaders of Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) tried to dissociate themselves from giving any statement over the execution. Mr. Naeem-ul-Haque, central information secretary of the PTI tweeted that his party wished to dissociate completely from certain posters glorifying convicted killers but their coalition partner Jamaat-e-Islami is very vocal against the government which again shows duplicity in the views of coalition partners (Khursheed, March 3, 2016). From this controversial nature of statements by the religious leaders it

159 becomes pretty clear that the religious parties do have some elements of terrorism and spreading of sectarianism and parochialism in the country.

Firstly, Mumtaz Qadri belonged to the Barelvi caste of religion and there has never been harmony and smoothness of this sect with any other religious sect in our country. Bitter rivalry exists between the various religious groups particularly of Barelvi with Hanafi etc. They even condemn the rival groups as heretic but the question is when their political scoring demands they enter into unity and harmony for the sake of vested interests.

Secondly, the religious leaders who now hold demonstrations and processions against the government did not raise any voice against the government of Pakistan when Mumtaz Qadri was sentenced to death by the Court nor did they raise any voice when his ‘mercy petition’ was rejected by the president of Pakistan. They even had the opportunity to hire a leading counsel for Mumtaz Qadri during the trail but they did not do.

Thirdly, the religious leaders who are now very vociferous against the government did nothing during the entire period of trail of Mumtaz Qadri. They remained like silent spectators during the period of trail and never bothered to stage any demonstration in his favor or get any Fatwa issued to the effect that Mumtaz Qadri had actually saved the cause of Prophet-hood and his Sunnah but there did not seem any harmony between the religious parties.

Fourthly, according to a report of the New York Times, Mumtaz Qadri was a member of the Elite Force of Punjab and was removed from the service of Special Branch several years ago for having extremist religious views (Khursheed, 2016). He was reinstated into the Special Branch in 2008 when Shahbaz Sharif became the Chief Minister of Punjab. This paper further adds that the IG special branch, Nassir Khan Durrani had also released a report last year that Mumtaz Qadri and 10 policemen had close nexus with the terrorist groups and had suggested that he should not be deployed on VIP and protocol duties.

Fifthly, if the law enforcement agencies knew that Mumtaz Qadri was having links with the terrorist groups then he should not have been deployed on the VIP duties.

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He should rather have been posted at some other place. The government and law enforcement agencies need to have strict surveillance over the officials of the Intelligence Bureau and Special Branch on account of their nature of job.

The law enforcement agencies need to think over the deployment of the protocol and VIP duties and should deploy those personnel who are free of politics and sectarian affiliations. Only those with a spotless service record should be deployed at the duties. This can help a lot in reducing the threat of terrorism and sectarianism in the country and would be step towards a smooth functioning Pakistan.

3.4 Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Policy

Operation Zarb-e-Azab is the largest anti-terrorism campaign initiated by the Army of Pakistan against the terrorists encompassing 1,80,000 of security personnel fighting for the cause of our country. Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif while addressing the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly said, “This operation is complemented by all-inclusive National Action Plan. It encompasses police and security actions, political and legal measures and social economic policy packages, aimed at countering violent extremism”

The nuisance of terrorism and extremism, according to some analysts, date back to the post-Soviet-Afghan era while others argue that its origin may be ascribed to the 9/11 incident and its post war on terror scenario when Pakistan played the role of a frontline state. To curtail this menace, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed the National Counter-Terrorism Bill in 2013 and reinvigorated the dysfunctional National Counter- Terrorism Authority (NACTA) theoretically shaped in 2010. As a consequence of it, the government of Pakistan announced its first ever National Internal Security Policy (NISP) February 25th, 2014. The attack on Army Public School Peshawar on December 16, 2014 was a tripping point for the nation to show its strong resolve towards fighting terrorism and extremism. The terrorist attacks on Mastung and Safoora provided further security impetus to the nation to revitalize its resolve to eliminate terrorism from the entire soil of Pakistan. The national resolve to fight terrorism and extremism brought about the creation of National Action Plan in January 2015 leading to the formation of Military

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Courts across the country and restoration of death penalty as execution. The National Action Plan was given legal protection through the passage of the 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill on January 7th, 2015 (Saffee 2015, pp 2-5). The formation of the Military Courts was validated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in its landmark judgment on August 5, 2015 but declared that its decisions are subject to judicial review by the Apex Court (Express Tribune 2015).

The NACTA is an autonomous body directly responsible to the Prime Minister. Its jurisdiction includes collection and dissemination of intelligence/information to the relevant stakeholders for threat assessment, coordination and formulation of counter- terrorism strategies and action plans, research and review of legal reforms, and most importantly, liaison with international entities for intelligence sharing. The NISP works under two components, the soft component and the hard component (Saffee 2015 pp 2-5). The former encompasses the Comprehensive Response Plan (CRP) striving for participative political processes and public support against extremism. It initiates action through dialogue, rehabilitation and restoration of Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs), socio-economic development and reforms. It aims at formulation of a national narrative against terrorism and extremism and a national de-radicalization strategy aiming at the reconciliation of all the societal forces. It also aims at engaging the youth in social and healthy activities and integrates madrassa education into the mainstream of education system. The hard component or the Composite Deterrence Plan (CDP) aims at capacity building of National Internal Security Apparatus (NISA), coupled with arms control. It proposes to develop and integrate national database, along with strict measures to guard against cyber-crimes. Regulation of Afghan Refugees and the formation of a Directorate of Internal Security (DIS) for the coordination of intelligence of intelligence based operations, also falls within its ambit. Moreover, modernization of the law enforcement agencies, formation of a Rapid Response Force and Counter-Terrorism Department are some of the proposed measures of modernizing the national security apparatus (Nations, 27 Feb 2015).

The policy of NISP since its incorporation has brought about significant success in the security paradigm of the country. 215 criminals were executed by the government

162 till December 2015 showing a significant improvement of security strategy. On August 24, 2015 while addressing a Press Conference, the Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan said that the law enforcement agencies had carried out 62,000 operations under NAP resulting in the arrest of 68,000 people. According to another report of January 2015 of the NAP, 72 organizations working within the country have been prosecuted. While according to some reports 11,000 Deobandi Madrassa have been declared as “sensitive” but exact information is yet to be established as some figures from civil- military agencies ascertain it to be somewhat between 18,000 to 33,000 (Report P. , 2015). 470 people were arrested in the Province of Punjab between January and May on the chare of hate literature, out of which 260 was prosecuted resulting in the conviction of 24 culprits. According to a report of the Punjab Police submitted before the Senate Committee in the month of February 2015 disclosing that some 900 organizations received millions of Rupees from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and fourteen other Muslim and Non-Muslim countries (Dawn TV 11September 2015).

3.5 Types of Militancy in Pakistan

Militancy in Pakistan does not function under a single heading rather it functions under three broader headings.

I. Militancy in the name of religion (MITNOR) II. Sub-nationalist Militancy III. Ethno-political militancy

3.5.1 Militancy in the name of religion (MITNOR)

This includes all those groups that carry on activities of militancy and extremism and use religion to justify their acts of perpetration. This is the worst type of militancy as they misinterpret the religion in order to justify their acts. People of this group attract the young generation for the accomplishment of their objectives and teach them the morals that appeal to their sentiments and link them directly to the paradise making it possible for both the motivators and perpetrators to take recourse to atrocious activities. It can further be categorized into two dimensions, the internal dimension and the external dimension.

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3.5.2 Internal Dimension of MITNOR

The internal dimension of MITNOR aims at conducting attacks and acts of extremism and terrorism across the country. Currently this poses the most detrimental threat to the security of Pakistan as it is faced with threat of internal security and nobody feels secure of it. Its worst manifestation is in the form of suicide bombing and has been considered as the significant modus operandi of this group (Parvez, National Counter Terrorism and Extremism Strategy, 2015). Its targets range from security machinery of the state to the critical infrastructure, inter alia, segments of civil society through the use of sophisticated terrorist attacks. It manifests itself in various forms such as Sunni-Shia clashes, Intra-Sunni (Deobandi-Barelvi), communal (Anti-Christian, Sikh etc.), anti- liberal political parties, anti-military, violence to enforce Sharia in some parts of the country as in the case of Swat. As a result of this threat round about 50,000 people were killed including more than 5000 security personnel (Ministry, 2013). Their targets have been from the highest political personalities to the sensitive state security institutions such as the attack on President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf in 2003, attack on Benazir Bhutto, ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan in 2007, Aftab Ahmad Sherpao and Asfandyar Wali in 2007 and 2009 respectively, Bashir Bilour in 2012, Pakistan Ordnance Factory Wah in 2008, Army GHQ Rawalpindi in 2009, Police training School Manawa Lahore in 2009, Mehran Naval Base Karachi in 2011, PAF Airbase Kamra in 2012, Peshawar Airport in 2012, 2014,Karachi Airport and naval Dockyard in 2014, Bannu Jail in 2012 and DIK jail in 2013 (Parvez, 2015,p 1). Besides their involvement in crimes of heinous nature they are also reported to be involved in organized criminal activities like abduction for ransom, bank robberies, smuggling in various parts of the country. Their modus operandi varies from single suicide bombing to sophisticated assaults on hard targets like GHQ. It is also a fact that the TTP and some foreign militants have their safe havens in the tribal belt (FATA) of Pakistan along Afghanistan and the shifting of its commander, Mullah Fazlullah to the Kunar and Nuristan Provinces of Afghanistan has added a new external component to the worsening security situation of Pakistan (Parvez, 2015, p 3). This sort of support provided by Afghanistan through clandestine designs is indicative of the fact that Afghanistan has been providing enough support to the outlaws and terrorist fleeing from Pakistan. The threat arising out of MITNOR is so serious in

164 nature that ex Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Pervez Ashraf Kiyani had to say that the main threat to the security of Pakistan is internal and not external.

3.5.3 External Dimension of MITNOR

The external dimension of MITNOR is a group of organizations and terrorists that are involved in criminal activities outside Pakistan though they have their safe havens in Pakistan. They add to the deteriorating security of Pakistan by getting themselves involved in various assaults conducted in foreign countries. This does not include a single group or element but includes three categories:

I. Foreign Militant Organizations based in Pakistan II. Pakistani Militant Organizations carrying out militant acts outside Pakistan III. Geo-political factors

3.5.4 Foreign Militant Organizations Based in Pakistan

There are some foreign militant organizations that have bases in Pakistan particularly in FATA such as Afghan Taliban and Jundullah. These networks usually carry on their activities in their respective countries but mostly in Pakistan. For example the AQ’s involvement was claimed in a number of attacks in Pakistan as in the suicide attack on Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 2003, Marriot Hotel in Islamabad and Danish Embassy in Islamabad in 2008. Jundullah is claimed to have conducted a number of attacks in Pakistan but is also alleged by the Iranian government for killing 154 Iranian citizens since 2003. The owning of the attack on jail in DIK in 2012 posted in a video through YouTube and the sophisticated attack on Karachi Airport in 2014 is indicative of the fact that foreign militant organizations have their existence in Pakistan and have close collaboration with the local militant organizations on Pakistan particularly the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ) and the TTP (Parvez, 2015,p 3).

3.5.5 Pakistani Militant Organizations Carrying Out Militant Acts Abroad

There is no denying the fact that some organizations, though based in Pakistan yet are involved in carrying out militant acts abroad. These countries include Afghanistan, Iran and India and claim that militant acts are perpetrated in their countries by the

165 militants based in Pakistan (Parvez, National Counter Terrorism and Extremism Strategy, 2015). The Indian government has ascribed the attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 to Jaish-e-Muhammad and Mumbai attacks in 2008 to Lashkar-e Tayyiba besides criticizing them for their involvement in the Indian Held Kashmir. Jaish-e-Muhammad has also been blamed by Afghanistan for its involvement in Afghanistan by carrying out attacks in Afghanistan over the Indian Consulate in Herat in 2014. The TTP is also criticized for its attempted attack on Times Square in USA for abortive bombing by Faisal Shahzad in 2010 (Parvez, 2015, p 3). This dimension of militancy has made a bad impression of the Pakistanis abroad and has been condemned as supporting terrorism in the region.

3.5.6 Geopolitical Factors

Geopolitics has played the most significant role in making Pakistan a country more prone to terrorism and militancy. Reference must be made to 1979 where the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s supportive role for the Taliban, policy of the United States towards Soviet Union and Afghanistan, establishing a Shia theocracy in Iran and its spillover effect into Pakistani society. It was the geopolitical factor that different states fought proxy wars in Afghanistan for vested interests. It is this factor that India and other foreign states play their roles in Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario. The geographic location of Pakistan is also an important factor as both Pakistan and Afghanistan has commonality in many respects and many areas adjoining each other and the Durand Line has provided many hide-out along both sides of it.

3.5.7 Sub-Nationalist Militancy

The aspect of militancy spread by the sub-militancy primarily in Balochistan poses a serious threat to the security paradigm of Pakistan. It preaches sectarianism and violence and flames the seeds of militancy in the country. During 2013 a total of 1717 terrorist attacks were conducted in the country out of which 441 were conducted in Balochistan by the Sub-Nationalist elements constituting about 25.6% of the total attacks (Report P. S., 2014). Out of 2451 people killed as a result of militancy in Pakistan in 2013, the number of killed as a result of Sub-nationalist terrorism was 303 constituting 12.3% (Report P. S., 2014, pp, 10-11). Similarly out of the 60 militant organizations

166 banned by the government of Pakistan, 14 are Sub-nationalist militants and 13 have their origin in Balochistan while 01 in Sindh. So far as their involvement in terrorist activities is concerned, they have diversified targets from the Sui gas Pipelines (a total of 216 attacks from 2005-2014 (Portal September 18, 2014) to the bombing of railway tracks in 2013 killing 32 and injuring 152 (Parvez, 2015,p 4).

3.5.8 Ethno-Political Militancy

Another type of militancy working in Pakistan under the nomenclature of ethno- political militancy comprises different ethno-militant groups particularly in Karachi and are Urdu-speaking and Pashtun communities. Recently the Balochi and Rural Sindhi have also become part of the group. The People Aman Committee Lyari is the only ethno-militant political group representing the Balochis living in Lyari out of the 60 banned militant organizations banned in 2011. For Karachi 2010 and 2011 were the worst years on account of militancy since 1000 and 1891 people fell victim to terrorism respectively (Yusuf , 2012, p 10). In 2010, some 26 target killers were arrested in Karachi and were investigated by a Joint Investigating Team (JIT) comprising officials from police, Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Inter-services Intelligence (ISI). These were found to have nexus with some of the mainstream political parties (Report, 2014,p11). The ethno- political militancy received a setback in the year 2013 in Sindh as 183 incidents happened in Karachi while 10 incidents happened in the rest of the Sindh causing the death of 234 people. These deaths mostly pertained to political parties. The attacks by the ethno- political nationalists in the year of 2013 formed 11% of the total terrorist attacks and the deaths from these were 9.5% of the total deaths accrued by the terrorism in that year (Report P. S., 2014). This type of militancy in terms of MINTOR and sub-nationalism poses serious threat to the security of the country which adversely affects the economy of the country.

A brief sketch of militancy in Pakistan is given by the following figure. All the three types of militancy have wrought havoc to the entire security paradigm of the country by engaging itself in the extreme line of terrorism. The worst situation has been witnessed in the country during the period from 2009 to 2016 when the government and security analysts/strategists embarked upon various tactics to overcome the menace of

167 insurgency and terrorism in the country and make it the most secure country in the world. Despite all the efforts taken in this regard, the country is still lingering on the verge of security state as there have been ups and downs in the security of the country by fits and starts.

3.5.8 (a) Figure showing types of Militancy in Pakistan

3.5.8 (b) Brief Sketch of the Three Types of Militancy in Pakistan

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The above chart gives a brief sketch of the three types of militancy in Pakistan in the year 2013 in terms of incidents reported to the police and those killed in such attacks.

3.6 Total Death Casualties in Militant Attacks

The following chart shows the number of death casualties resulting from the above mentioned types of militancy. These death-casualties include both civilians as well as security personnel. These charts focus on three important points:

1) Since the MITNOR carried 64% of the terrorists attacks in the country but their share in the number of death-casualties is 80%, showing an average of two persons killed per attack. 2) The number of attacks carried out as result of Sub-nationalist attacks stood at 24% but their share in the death-casualties was 11% showing an average of less than one person killed per attack. 3) The ethno-political attacks showed 12% of the terrorist attacks but their share in the number of victims killed is 9% giving an average of approximately one Person killed per attack.

3.6.(a) Figure showing Death casualties in the Militant attacks

The following table shows the militant organizations that have been banned by the government of Pakistan. Of all these organizations, the number of MITNOR stands at 45,

169 the number of Sub-nationalist organizations is 14 while only one Ethno-political organization has been banned.

3.6 (b) Figure showing Four Pillars of NACTES

Terrorism has crippled the entire society of our country and has caused irreparable loss to the whole nation at large. A number of factors have contributed to it for carrying out the terrorist activities but four of these are more important while looking at terrorism from close quarters:

I. Militant’s Ideology II. Militant’s Manpower III. Militant’s Support network IV. Vulnerability of Militant’s Likely targets

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3.6.(c)Graph Showing Militant’s Profile

Vulnerability of Militant's Likely Targets

Militant's Support Network

Militant's Manpower

Militant's Ideology

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

There seems to be close overlapping among these four pillars as long as terrorism and terrorist activities are concerned while for counter-strategy these have to be treated as distinct entities. In order to adopt a sound counter-terrorism strategy, a few measures need to be implemented.

3.7 Neutralization of Militant Ideology

The raison d’être for any militant organization is its ideology which compels them to take recourse to militant activities for the accomplishment of the ideology. It is the degree of acceptability of this ideology that determines the success or failure of the militant organization. A militant ideology resonating with some strata of the society is likely to lead to recruitment of the more members for the organization, procuring more donations and a wider sympathetic support for the network (Parvez, 2015, p 9). While neutralizing the ideology of the militants, one has to keep in mind the following strategies:

I. One of the most important strategies is to develop and disseminate a counter narrative to the militants.

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II. Addressing the very root-cause and factors that provide an impetus to breed militancy III. Taking effective actions and deterrent measures against those criminalizing acts and actors that develop and disseminate the militants’ narrative. IV. Thus countering the narrative of the militants is the prima facie task of NACTES

3.8.1 Reducing the Manpower of the Militants

Manpower is the backbone for carrying out any terrorist activity and caters for the success or failure of militancy. From the perspective of counter-terrorism strategy there is great need to reduce and crumble the cohesive strength of the manpower of the militants (Parvez, 2015,pp 10-11). This can be done in two ways:

I. To prevent new recruitments of volunteers in the circles of militants II. To neutralize the existing strength of the militant organizations

Recruitments of fresh volunteers into Militant organizations can be stopped by researching the processes, networks, feeding areas and timing of the militants’ system to induct new volunteers. This can be integrated with intelligence sharing process by the various law enforcement agencies in coordination with the intelligence department. This can be done in the following ways:

I. The organizations which act as a front for the recruitments of militants need to be identified through a joint venture of intelligence and investigation and those involved should be proceeded as per law. II. The sources of communications of the militants, i.e. use of internet, websites, personal pages, twitters and face books etc. provide ample opportunity to the recruitments of the militants and hence need to be proceeded against. III. Policies of the state need to be reviewed in order to overcome the use of proxies in regional conflicts as it provides the opportunity of exacerbating the security situation in the country. IV. Actions of the law enforcement agencies should be reviewed so as to establish the rule of law in the country as some of the actions of the law enforcement agencies are not in consonance with the doctrine of the rule of law and human rights.

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As regards neutralization of the existing ranks of the militant organization is concerned, it must be dealt with a combination of carrot and stick policy so as to get maximum result. Some of the proposed suggestions in this regard comprise:

I. Initiation of a National De-radicalization Program (NDP) under the strict supervision of NACTA for the de-radicalization and rehabilitation of militants, particularly those who are imprisoned to wean them away from militancy. The NDP will also have to have its provincial set up to be called as the Provincial De- radicalization Institutes (PDI) so as to achieve maximum results in curbing militancy. II. Another important measure of reducing the manpower of the militants is through large number of arrests and convictions by enhancing the capacity of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) through the law enforcement agencies. This pertains to the police department, prosecution, courts and prisons. The primacy of police cannot be denied in counter-terrorism measures but there is still need to ensure the security of witnesses and all elements of the criminal justice system involved in countering terrorism and extremism. These include the investigators, prosecutors, anti-terrorism courts and other members of the prison department. III. The primacy of police in counter-terrorism not only enhances the capacity of its specialized organs like Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) and Rapid Response Forces (RRF) but also the realization of the timely role played by the police department at the respective police stations by the interaction with the community. Close relations between police and community can help in leveraging the effectiveness of the police in countering terrorism since in most of the cases the local people know much about the local networks of the terrorists, who normally do not want to share information with the police on account of fear of the militants as well as lack of confidence in the police (Parvez,2015,pp 15-16). Establishing close and improved relations between the police and the community is the important pivot of the National Counter Terrorism and Extremism Strategy (NACTES). IV. Another important measure is the capacity building of intelligence agencies by enhancing their ability for using modern technology, greater connectivity and

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communication, approachability to the national information centers. Close liaison between the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies through NACTA is needed to ensure availability of information to the end users in real time. The intelligence agencies also need to be brought within the ambit of law to avoid abuse of their authority in the guise of counter terrorism. V. Taking concrete steps to prevent physically the members of terrorist groups or potential volunteers coming from parts of the country while going to their safe havens for seeking refuge.

3.8.2 Dismantling the Support Network of the Militants

For a sustained campaign of the militants, a support network of the militants is the sine qua non of the organization. In order to cripple the campaigning capacity of the militants it is very much necessary to dismantle the support network of the militants. Thus provisions of all sorts of weapons, financial assistance and facilitation should be curbed at all costs. Supporting network encompasses a number of components but a few of them need great concentration.

3.8.3 Choking Funds of Militants

Funds and financial assistance are the lifebloods of the terrorist organizations. For any militant act and terrorism, provisions of training facilities for the militants, buying of weapons and successful undertaking of terrorist operations are the very foundations of an activity. A significant strategy of the government is to identify and choke the sources of the funding to the militant organizations. Those involved with the funding of the organizations should be dealt with an iron hand.

3.8.4 Disrupting Weapons Supply Network

The terrorists need weapons, chemicals, explosives, biological, radiological and other nuclear weapons that are necessary to undertake criminal and terrorist activities. In the face of advanced technology and increased computerization of the system by Pakistan, the terrorists also adopt new strategies and tactics to explore new dimensions of militancy. An important goal of the NACTES is to identify and disrupt supply of all types

174 of weapons to the militants. A lot needs to be on part of the government. The government should amend the Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) in order to incorporate new forms of weapons in terrorism like suicide bombing, Human Borne Improvised Explosive Device (HBIED) Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). The use of technology as a weapon by the militants also needs consideration of the government for proper legislation and should be declared as criminalized. The community members, public representatives, social workers and members of civil society should also coordinate with the law enforcement agencies to identify the sources of weapons supply, distribution network and prepare periodical reports to be shared with all concerned. It is important to note here that since the explosives play an important role in the weaponry of the terrorists, both the indigenous as well as the smuggled chemicals needs to be regulated and monitored by a regular institution. The government should take stringent steps regarding the sale and purchase of the explosives and must ensure that they don’t fall into the hands of the militants and terrorists. Moreover the license holders should be kept under strict supervision of the government at district level and should be subject to furnish an undertaking on monthly basis that the weapons and explosives have not been sold to the terrorists and other militant networks. The policy of new licenses should be reviewed and should be made extremely difficult so as to discourage further proliferation of the weapons and explosives.

3.8.5 Disabling Communication System of Militants

Communication system is the very foundation for a speedy, secure and sustained mechanism of the terrorists and the militants. In the wake of modern communication system and facilities the terrorists are also used to avail the modern equipments for the accomplishments of their self-styled activities. One of the most important strategies of the NACTES is to dismantle the communication system of the terrorists. The government should lay emphasis on finding a complete picture of the ways and means and the different resources through which the terrorists communicate amongst themselves. The available information should be pooled to the law enforcement agencies so as to cripple down their network.

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In the modern time communication through cell phones, land lines and internet is the easiest available form of communication between the militant networks. The initiative of the government regarding checking and blocking the unregistered SIMs and those issued on fake Identity Cards needs to be continued and those involved after a prescribed date should be brought to the book. According to an estimate, out of 130 million SIMs being in use, almost half of these is registered through fake ID cards through this move round about 40000 SIMs have been blocked which is a sound and healthy step towards curbing the activities of the militants. Similarly, ban on the use of phones and mobile by the militants and criminals in the prison is also a good step towards dealing with militancy and criminals and would help a lot in improving the law and order situation in the country (Parvez, 2015, p19).

It is a well-established fact that the internet is the main source of recruiting, collecting funds, training and communication within the militant organizations. The use of internet needs to be studied and countered by effective legislation on cyber terrorism. There is a greater need to strengthen the Cyber-crime Investigation Unit of FIA called the National Response Centre for Cyber Crimes (NR3C) as well as the existing Cyber Forensic Laboratory of Counter Terrorism Wing (CFLCTW). Capacity building of these units will weaken the communication and recruitment structures of the militants at large. This will leave lesser space of cyber-crimes for the terrorists and the militants across the country and particularly the tribal belt of Pakistan. Moreover, the Counter-terrorism Departments (CTDs) at the Provincial and District levels need to be equipped with IT wings operated by IT professionals to respond quickly to the threat of terrorism.

3.8.6 Destroying Militants’ Sanctuaries

It is a fact that all militant activities are not carried out with the use of sanctuaries and there are cases that terrorist activities are carried out without their use. In Pakistan the case is usually seen through the prism of sanctuaries that are supposed to be provided by the tribal belt of Pakistan. The western tribal belt of Pakistan known as the Durand Line is very notorious for such activities and has been alleged as the safe haven for the local as well as the foreign terrorists. These safe havens serve the terrorists to plan attacks as the mountainous areas and caves there provide them with better opportunity to seek shelter

176 after the accomplishments of their task. But in the broader sense, safe havens of the militants are of three types. First the semi governed territories like FATA, B areas of Balochistan and tribal areas of Punjab. Second, no go areas of Karachi where law enforcement agencies of the country are reluctant to enter either due to the sympathies of the local people for them or they are intimidated by the ruthless militants or criminal cartels (Parvez, 2015,p 21). Third, the safe havens in Afghanistan across the Durand Line. As regards the first category, it is in larger national interest to have all the areas falling within the jurisdiction of Pakistan under the same and one law. A few drastic reforms would serve the purpose to some extent;

I. Introducing Constitutional and Political reforms with the aim of streamlining FATA, B areas of Balochistan and Tribal areas of Punjab. This would also serve the purpose of the country regarding the issue of missing persons by the FC or “dumped bodies” or mass graves discovered in some parts of Balochistan. Reforming B areas would also mean the extended jurisdiction of the normal criminal law where police is accountable to judiciary. II. Introducing a comprehensive economic development coupled with the development of infrastructure would cater for good governance encompassing speedy justice for these areas. III. Strengthening those who are against militants and militancy in these areas by providing them with full support so as to isolate the militants. IV. Direct military action against those who sabotage the public peace and continue to attack the state of Pakistan and live in or make use of those areas of Pakistan as safe havens for terrorist activities by planning terrorism in Pakistan or somewhere else. This also plans for the taking over of civilian administration after the areas have been cleared by the military.

As regards the second category, “no go areas of Karachi”, the following actions need to be taken:

I. Political parties should make compromises in order to resolve to dismantle their respective militant wings by opening it up to legal action where necessary. It is a matter of bargain where the political parties, community members and the law

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enforcement agencies should stand at the same page. Those political parties that are not ready to compromise should be kept under observation by the secret agencies and treated as per the Anti-terrorism Act (ATA). If, despite that any political party or any of its members persists to garner support/logistics/safe havens to the militants, it must be sued in a court of law and banned for all purposes. II. The areas falling within the ambit of ‘no go areas’ should be opened up for all public purposes and those disturbing the peace and tranquility of the area must be dealt with an iron hand. These areas must be cleared of the terrorists with the empowerment of the police to enhance its capacity building instead of relying on Rangers or the military for short term operation. III. De-politicization of the police department coupled with their capacity building, absolutely transparent and effective accountability system would improve the situation a lot.

As far as the third category is concerned, improved border control by Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to reduce the risk of border crossing for infiltration and insurgent activities, is the sine qua non, for the security of both countries. This requires the capacity building of the various departments, involved in the border control and intelligence sharing by the law enforcement agencies of both the countries. This also involves gaining the support and sympathies of the local population for achieving maximum results in terms of security.

I. Intense bilateral as well as multilateral diplomatic efforts need to be made at local, regional and international level to dissuade both the countries from providing sanctuaries to the outlaws of each other. II. A joint border force of both the countries comprising equal numbers from both the countries should be stationed at the border to check infiltration of the terrorists and militants across the border. III. A joint court of experts should be made of the representatives of the two countries so as to try cases of infiltration and border crossing without permit.

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The current Operation Zarb-e-Azab is directed towards the dismantling of the safe Havens of terrorists.

3.8.7 Securing Militants’ Targets

Vulnerable targets make it easier for the terrorists to carry out their acts of terrorism and militancy in a successful way. To dismantle all the likely targets of the militants will be a great achievement of the government as this would give them an opportunity to crumble the terrorists. The NACTES can do this job through the joint venture of the government, private sector and the civil society.

3.8.8Chart showing the pillars of NACTES

3.3.8

3.9 Zero Tolerance against Terrorism

While the wounds of Peshawar’s School attack on December 16, 2014 are still fresh calling for a renewed resolve to exterminate terrorism from the society. At the same time it is also a fact that it had brought both the Pakistani state and society on the same page by carving out a unified narrative of zero tolerance against terrorism (Rana,December 6, 2015). To put this strategy more viable, the government of Pakistan brought in the National Action Plan (NAP) and since then there has been a tremendous decrease in the acts of terrorism across the country. It is through the NAP that some drastic changes need to be incorporated in the existing security paradigm of the country.

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The operational and technical assistance coupled with the capacity building of the police is an area which needs greater attention. Training programs for police need to be reformed and should be converted into technology led policing with particular emphasis on management, intelligence gathering and information sharing among the various units of law enforcement agencies. De-politicizing of police would also help a lot to make it a more professionally sound force. This in no case denies the fact that it has made no progress in improving the law and order situation of the country. The existing laws of the state are sufficient to cope with the acts of terrorism provided the law enforcement agencies are well trained and equipped on modern lines (Rana, December 6, 2015).

Another gray area is the failure of the government to check the publication and posting of hate-speeches and materials through various sources such as online pages, print media, videos, calls and messages. These pose another greater security challenge to the governmental machinery of Pakistan. Besides this, the government needs to have a vigilant look at the mindset of the sectarian class which causes religious persecution. There is a greater need on part of the government to have a sound counter hate speech strategy so as to overcome the issue of hate speech and relevant materials (Rana, December 6, 2015). This can be done by taking into confidence the civil society, and the entire community. Some volunteers and paid servants should be inducted at the local level to cooperate with the police and intelligence department so as to report those involved in the matter. This would greatly redress the issue of posting and publication of hate speeches and relevant materials.

The military operations in FATA have weakened the terrorists’ network and have crippled their capacity to move freely. But on the other hand, they (military operations) have compelled the terrorists to flee to Afghanistan across the Pak-Afghan border thus resulting in the increased insecurity of the border. To counter this risk, two strategies need to be adopted: Firstly, political and administrative reforms in FATA will not only deny the support and sanctuaries of the militants but would also help in improving the local security structures. Secondly, joint border security comprising equal military personnel from Pakistan and Afghanistan would help a lot in the better management of

180 the border. The joint force needs to be monitored by the Army Chiefs of both the countries and political representatives of the respective governments.

3.10 Government’s Action against the banned outfits

The government of Pakistan through its untiring efforts against terrorism and extremism has made healthy improvement in the field of security but still more has to be done to gain maximum output. Interior Minister of Pakistan, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan has expressed his satisfaction over the performance of the law enforcement agencies by stating that strict measures have been taken against members of the proscribed organizations, human traffickers and proclaimed offenders (Dawn, March 1, 2016). The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) in its resolve against mega corruption cases, have taken into custody 1,011 human traffickers, 290 proclaimed offenders, 17 most wanted traffickers, 84 court absconders and 620 general arrests during the ongoing campaign (Dawn, March 1, 2016).

3.10.1 Figure showing the arrest of terrorists

1,200 1,000 800 600 Series 1 400 Series 3 200 Series 2 Series 2 Series 1 0 Series 3

Besides this, the FIA has also achieved a laudable progress in the in the field of recovery of fines etc. Through its Economic Crime Wing (ECW) the FIA recovered Rs. 2.4 billion

181 in 2014-2015 as compared to the recovery of Rs.706 million during 2011-2012. The Anti-corruption Wing of FIA recovered Rs.14.8 billion in2014-2015 as compared to 2011-2012 where this recovery stood at 7.1 billion while the ratio of fines collected through fine was Rs. 165.05 million (Dawn, March 1, 2016).

3.10.2 Figure showing recovery of national assets

Recovery through fines Rs. 165.05 million Series 3 Recovery in 2011-2012 by the ATC Wing Series 2 Rs.7.1 billion while Recovery in 2014-2015 Rs.14.8 billion Series 1 Recovery in 2011-2012 Rs. 706 million by ECW Wingwhile recovery in 2014-2015 Rs. 2.4 billion

0 1 2 3 4 5

3.10.3 Arrest of Terrorists under National Action Plan

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On July 25th, 2016 Mr. Ehsan Ghani, Coordinator National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) while addressing the media men, stated that 70,000 terrorists have been arrested under the National Action Plan (NAP) in the country since it was put into vogue. He said that 8,852 armed militants and non-state actors from the various banned outfits have also been arrested from different parts of the country while 11 others were killed in retaliation (The News 26 July, 2016). As a result of the establishment of helpline 14,000 suspected people have been arrested while 126 accounts amounting to Rs.1 billion of the banned organizations had been frozen.

3.10.4 Chart showing arrest of militants in the country under NAP

Arrest of suspected people 14,000 and Total arrests 126 accounts 70,000 worth Rs 1 billion frozen

Militants arrested 8,852 and 11 killed

Talking about the Karachi operation, he said that there had been a reduction of 70% in target-killings and murders while a reduction of 80 % in the terrorist incidents. About Punjab he said that efforts were being made to ensure that extremists and militants do not get a strong foothold there. In Balochistan, security situation has been brought under control to a greater extent where 625 Fararis had surrendered to the law enforcement agencies and the government was in contact with the estranged Baloch Nationalists. He also reiterated that the deadline for the repatriation/return of Afghan Refugees to Afghanistan had been set at December 31st, 2016. As a result of the NAP

183 since it was initiated, a total of 2,159 terrorists have been killed while 1,724 terrorists have been arrested by the law enforcement agencies.

3.10.5 Chart showing reduction of terrorist incidents in Karachi and Balochistan

Terrorist incidents in Karachi reduced by 80% 2,159 terrorists killed in Balochistan 1,724 terrorists arrested in Balochistan Target killings in Karachi reduced by 70%

According to a report of the achievements of the NAP presented before the National Assembly on July 22nd, 2016 the Interior Ministry and Narcotics Control, (IMNC) 332 persons had been executed under the Anti-Terrorism Act so far. The report also stated that 98.3 million SIMs had been blocked for dismantling communication networks of terrorists. At least 933 URLs and 10 websites of militant organizations have been blocked by the Ministry of Information and Technology (MIT). The report also detailed that 2,337 cases were registered over hate speeches and hate materials while 2,195 people were arrested and 73 shops sealed.

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3.10.6. Figure showing executions and actions against hate materials

Executions under NAP 332

Blockage of SIMs 98.3 million

URLs blocked 993

Websited blocked 10

Caes of hate material registered 2,337 Arrests for hate materials 2,195

Shops sealed 73

3.11 Muslims must unite to fight terrorism: Gen Raheel

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Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif on Tuesday, July 26th, 2016 emphasized the need for the world and Muslim Ummah to unite in fighting the menace of terrorism. Gen Raheel met Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo and discussed the emerging security challenges with him, an Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) statement said. “The COAS met the Egyptian president, regional security and prevalent/emerging security challenges were discussed,” DG ISPR Lieutenant-General Asim Bajwa said in a tweet (The News 27 July , 2016)

Gen Raheel attended training drills by the Egyptian Special Forces and appreciated their skills and capabilities. President Sisi acknowledged the successes made by the Pakistani Army in fighting terrorism and militancy and its efforts for attaining regional stability. Earlier, the COAS visited the Egyptian Special Forces in training and witnessed their activities and exercises. He appreciated their skills and capabilities. Later, the COAS met Sheikhul Azhar Ahmed El Tayeb at Al Azhar University who appreciated Pakistan’s efforts towards eliminating terrorism. General Raheel Sharif emphasized the need to harness Muslim youth and enlighten them towards technological advancement, moderation and harmony (The News 27 July , 2016).

3.12 Future Scenarios of Pakistan

2014 has been one of the bloodiest years in the history of Pakistan. It claimed to have engulfed not less than 7,500 casualties with Peshawar School Attack as the worst act of brutality that was condemned all over the world. The eastern border with Afghanistan remained flare-up due to cross border infiltration and militancy. Security also remained worse mainly in tribal region as a result of cross border movement and trafficking, failing due to political sensitiveness and divergence. Cross border movement of non-state actors had a deep impact on counter-terrorism efforts as Pakistani state tried its level best to eradicate terrorists and insurgents. Sanctuaries of the terrorists were targeted through military operations particularly through Operation Zarb-e-Azab that has proved to be the most successful of all military operations up to now. The question of safe havens and sanctuary remained a moot point in the Pak-Afghan Relations as well as the ISAF. The barbarous act of school killings in Peshawar opened up new era of better

186 security cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan which has made us realize that peace and security could not be maintained in the region unless both the countries tackled terrorism impartially as a common goal and objective. Joint intelligence sharing practice was started by both the countries’ intelligence agencies.

3.12.1 Aftermath of the Peshawar Tragedy

In the aftermath of Peshawar Tragedy the government of Pakistan formed an all parties committee to reach a consensus based National Action Plan to prioritize and strategize counter-terrorism measures. The initial reaction shown by the government of Pakistan was the lifting of moratorium on death sentence and creation of military courts in the country. We hope for the stable security situation of Pakistan in future but in the wake of present insurgency and militancy it seems a Herculean task to see any ray of hope. The situation may seem to worsen further as most of the executed terrorists were not the high profile terrorists and were mainly charged with criminal activities and murder cases. It is also an admitted fact that most of the terrorists and militants whether imprisoned or at large still benefit from the wide loopholes in the judicial system, lack of evidence resulting from evidence protection, threats to the lives of prosecutors and judges as well as investigation officers.

3.13 Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a hard assault on Terrorists Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan has been facing a new and direct threat of severe nature since June 2014 when Pakistani army entered into North Waziristan – a region which is considered as a nourishing sanctuary for militant groups. The decision to take recourse to assault by Pakistani army is termed as climax to years of violence, attack and killing that took a heavy toll on Pakistan, and also terminated peace talks between TTP and government, so as to root out militants from Pakistan for good. More than a thousand of terrorists have been killed in the massive military operation by the Pakistani army called Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Round about 25,000 - 30,000 military troops are reported to have taken part in the military operation. The operation began in June 2014 shortly after TTP’s strike on the Jinnah International Airport Karachi (JIAK), Pakistan’s most commercial and economic hub. Till now Pakistan Army has so far cleared 90 % of North Waziristan Agency (NWA) of terrorists and militants and has been quite successful in eliminating

187 the Haqqani network and East Turkistan Movement from the area, according to published reports. According to Maj. General Zafarullah khan, Commander military operation Zarb-e-Azab the armed forces have killed 1,198 terrorists and injured 356 during the ongoing military operation launched in June 2014 (Malik, November 16, 2014). Operation Zarb-e-Azab has been one of the toughest wars fought by the Pak Army against the terrorists and extremists. Since the Army has an experience of many clean-up operations against the insurgents so it has to be fought with different mechanism and strategy as it is not a conventional war but rather a battle of minds and a battle of narratives (Abbas 2015). In case any involvement of extraneous hand is found as evidence, it cannot be possible without the help of local facilitators and sympathizers. Thus even the foreign elements cannot sabotage the peace and prosperity of the local people without their facilitation and spying. In the war against terrorism, Pakistan has already made huge sacrifices resulting in the death of over 60,000 people including thousands of the personnel of law enforcement agencies (Abbas 2015). This death toll is much higher than the death tolls of wars of 1965 and 1971 as those were conventional wars and this one is fought with a different strategy. Those wars ended in weeks and were directed against external aggressors whereas this one may take a few years or even decades to eradicate terrorism and extremism since it has deeply penetrated into our society and has taken Pakistan into the verge of civil war. War is measured in terms of relative gains and that relative gains with some fineness to be converted to perceptions to trigger for another push. This aims at uprooting extremism from the entire society and establishes a society which is free of all the nuisances of sectarianism and extremism. Operation Zarb-e-Azab has provided us with the relative gains which turned to perceptive gains creating the space for politics and diplomacy to establish its foothold on strong basis (Chaudhry, September 16, 2015). There never will be the perception of the last terrorist in our society with hope and prosperity to prevail in the society. This will remain a war of perceptions interposing with political prominence that further the smooth space and squeeze the evil away from the entire society.

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3.13.1 Zarb-e-Azb strikes militancy hard as TTP factions break away The TTP organization, soon after the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, following a US drone attack, fell a victim to crises and differences seemed to weaken a lot. The announcement of new factions from the parent TTP was a huge blow to its integrity as the terrorists were weakened which showed the triumph of Pak Army and government. The latest break-away faction belonging to the Mehsud tribe, led by Khalid Mehsud, is now considered to be a key group of the TTP comprising the various factions under its umbrella. According to Azam Tariq, a spokesman of the group, “The TTP leadership has fallen into the hands of a bunch of conspirator whereby the role of individual ideologies has increased and the umbrella organization is involved in criminal activities like robbery and extortion. The activities that have created rift among the Taliban comprise such issues as bomb attacks on public places, extracting money from madrassas and other such institutions is looked down upon by some groups with abhorrence and deviating them from their real cause (Sherazi 2014). 3.13.2 Group splits and Army assault make TTP feel the heat As per reports of Dr. Ashraf Ali, president of FATA Research Centre in Islamabad, the division in the TTP has been of good omen as no significant attacks inside Afghanistan has been made jointly by the Fazlullah led-faction and the Haqqani network. Thus relations between the two factions have been greatly affected as a result of this dissention. Other contributory factors including the US drone strikes, financial problems, Pakistani military operations, and precision in air strikes by the US have compelled the foreign and local militants to leave the region for good. Senior journalist Mushtaq Yusufzai, who has been in the region since 2011, says that the operation Zarb-e-Azab will also cause irreparable loss to the foreign fighters in Waziristan. Another political analyst and independent researcher, Dr. Raza Khan, concludes in his report that foreign fighters in Pakistan are victims of severe pressure partly due to growing split in the TTP and partly due to massive military operation by the Pakistani Army in the North Waziristan. He further suggests that the military operation and drone attacks may either eradicate militancy or would compel the foreign fighters to find new sanctuaries inside Afghanistan or to join jihadist conflicts in North Africa, Syria or Iraq (Khan, August 27, 2014).

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Operation Zarb-e-Azab has proved to be the most successful operation in suppressing terrorism and militancy from the country but it is also a fact that due to heavy blow on the terrorists resulting in their crumbling down from the safe havens. Most of the terrorists usually wait for the opportunity and strike when they find any occasion. Since the religious seminaries have provided great impetus to spreading terrorism under the guise of jihad and holy war, it is also pertinent to mention that Pakistan must stop sponsoring charities, seminaries and actors within Pakistan who are involved with collecting funds for jihad.

Personally stricken by a sense of grief over the massacre of Peshawar School incident leaving 148 lives martyred, Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif took a series of decisive measures (Bokhari, July 21, 2015). His visit to Afghanistan just one day after the incident shows his strong determination by delivering a tough message to Afghan’s top leaders for taking action against Taliban sanctuaries by stepping up action against militants on Pakistan’s own turf. Even after the lapse of almost two years of the tragedy, the action of military operation still continues. To bridge the widening gap between Pakistan and Afghanistan, top Afghan military leader was invited to preside over a prestigious military passing out parade in Abbottabad. This was a very positive move taken to bridge the division between the two countries

3.14 Death of Omer Naray, Mastermind of Peshawar tragedy

Mastermind of the attack on Army Public School Peshawar, Omer Mansour Naray alias Khalifa Khalid Khorasani was claimed to have been killed by a drone attack in Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan. The news was confirmed by the Commander Resolute Support Mission, General John Nicholson who telephoned Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif about the death of the APS carnage (ATV Khyber 13 July 2016). According to Commander RSM, Omer Mansour Naray was killed along with four other terrorists in Nangarhar province. Inter- Services Public Relations (ISPR) also confirmed the death news of APS carnage and declared it to be a huge blow to the terrorists in 2016 on account of the increased actions by the law enforcement agencies against the terrorists and their sanctuaries.

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3.14.1 Execution of the Attackers of APS

In continuation of improving law and order situation in the country and culminating the war against terrorism and extremism, four convicted of the charges of massacre of Army Public School involved in the attack of December 16, 2014, were executed in the Central Prison of Kohat on December 2nd, 2015 (The News, 2015). Those convicted murderers were; Mujeeb- ur- Rahman alias Ali alias Najeebullah, Sabeel alias Yahya, both of whom belonged to Khyber Agency along with Hazrat Ali hailing from Darra Adam Khel and Maulvi Abdul Salam. The convicts’ case was tried by the Military Court and was consequently sentenced to death though they appealed for clemency before the President of Pakistan but their clemency appeal was turned down by the president. Since their case was tried by the military court so their ‘Black Warrant’ was signed by Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Raheel Sharif. Parents of the slaughtered children also demanded for their public execution so that they may become an example for the rest of the terrorists but they were executed in Kohat Prison.

The execution of the convicted terrorists will have a very positive effect on the security of the country since the outlaws will remain in a perpetual fear of execution. Though there is also pressure on the government of Pakistan from the Human Rights Institutes conveying that death penalty is against the norms of international human rights yet the government has rejected all pressures for the sake of national interest and restoration of law and order situation. Till January 2016, the number of executed terrorists in Pakistan stood at 332. The government of Pakistan should not show any leniency and clemency towards the convicts of terrorism and extremism and must deal all convicted with an iron hand. Pakistan is the most sufferer country in the aftermath of 9/11 tragic episode and should adopt laws conducive to its own environment.

3.15 Kabul and Afghan Taliban

A meeting between the Afghan Government and Afghan Taliban was arranged by the Intelligence Assets of the country keeping in view the gross security concerns. (Bokhari, July 21, 2015). The meeting is going to produce fruitful results in the future set up of Afghanistan as both the parties have consented to carry on the process with a view

191 to bring stability in country. This will usher in a new era in the history of the country as attempts are being made to stabilize Afghanistan after the country has undergone more than three-decades of bloody history since the invasion of USSR in the country in 1979. By reaching at a patch up in between the two parties, will be extremely beneficial for the stability of Afghanistan since billions of dollars could not do what was expected in the form of stability in the post-9/11 scenario.

The Murree talks between the two rival parties hosted by Pakistan are a real breakthrough in the future stability of the long war stricken Afghanistan. One finds recognition in the Afghan establishment that Ashraf Ghani is the best available partner of Pakistan in the current state of affairs. Stability in Afghanistan is the cry of the day and failure of talks would mean the extended civil war in Afghanistan in the face of unitary government. The civil war will have a spillover effect on Pakistan due to the long porous border and would create great space for the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan to operate out of Afghanistan (Yusuf, July 21, 2015). The Murree talks have also unfolded the mysterious role played by Pakistan in the internal set up of Afghanistan.

Since 1996 and particularly the post-9/11 period has proved Afghan Taliban to be a monolithic group taking directives from the single leader, Mullah Omer. Thus peace can be restored in Afghanistan if the high command and senior lieutenants are convinced that their interests could best be served through negotiated talks. The death of Mullah Omer in 2015 may leave a question mark on the monolithic nature of the Afghan Taliban but the fact is, negotiation has not been stopped. The role of Pakistan has been regarded as very crucial because of its traditional leverage over the Taliban Shura and the reportedly presence of the movement’s senior officials on its soil (Yusuf, July 21, 2015). This is confirmed by the fact that Pakistan’s experience in trying to persuade the Afghan Taliban to enter into formal dialogue with the Kabul in the past few months with a view to reach a viable solution to the issue of civil war and reach an agreed upon formula for the affairs of the government.

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3.15.1 Murree Talks and Haqqanis

To reach a viable solution to the Afghan problem, Pakistan initiated the process of peace and stability in Murree (a famous city of KP) in order to bridge the gap between the government and Taliban. The Haqqani group was fully represented, and their participation in the peace process was a significant development because they are regarded as the key actors in the Afghan insurgency (Rana, July 12,2015). This is the right time to engage the Haqqanis in the peace process as Kabul needs all options to be utilized for bringing and peace in the country. Engagement of the Haqqanis in the peace process is also significant in the context of the internal crisis within the ranks and files of the so-called Quetta Shura that has minimized the position of the latter in the bargaining process (Rana, July 12,2015). Contrary to Quetta Shura, the Haqqanis are still considered to be a unified force and are regarded as the most potent group of insurgency in Afghanistan. Their operational outreach extends to Southern Afghanistan, the areas surrounding Kabul as well as Northern Afghanistan. They have a history of more than 40-years of insurgency in Afghanistan and have an experience of dealing with the states such as the United States and Saudi Arabia. Besides, they have an experience with a variety of non-state actors including the Northern Alliance, the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Pakistani militant groups (Rana, July 12,2015). The Quetta Shura is considered to be a heterogeneous group and is lacking a charismatic leader to change its strategies for holding talks with the government. It is difficult to bring them to talks mainly because of the internal differences among the Taliban commanders.

Moreover, the parallel economy developed by the Haqqanis in the bordering region of Afghanistan and Pakistan has increased their stakes in the Afghan peace negotiations. The new generation of this group is more eager to share power with stakeholders in Kabul. Prospects of future engagements in the peace process of Afghanistan are brighter as they have already shown their consent to back up any peace move initiated by the Mullah Omer-led Taliban. They have never expressed to have direct talks with the Afghan government. On account of its homogenous character, the Haqqanis have an edge over the Quetta Shura which is stricken by differences and dissensions.

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Security situation is changing very rapidly in the region which will have a direct impact on the non-state actors. Taliban are facing internal crisis and a challenge from the IS, the Haqqanis can also face similar challenges from the IS resulting in further grouping and dissensions. Foreign groups including the IS and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement are making inroads to the areas controlled by the Haqqanis. A clash of ideologies can overpower and damage the interests of Haqqanis. This shift of ideologies may prove very detrimental to the interest of the Haqqanis resulting in increasing insurgency and militancy. Border security between Pakistan and Afghanistan may worsen as differences and dissensions among the members of the network may remain concerned with their increasing influence and hegemony in the region. Thus a directionless unrest may overpower the bordering region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This may also put the peace process of Afghan government with Taliban at jeopardy that will greatly affect the peace in the region. Talks with the Taliban suffered a breach upon the death of Mullah Omer in July 2015.

3.16 Human Death Toll in Pakistan

Activities of the militants and terrorists showed an overall decrease in the 2015 as compared to the previous years. The peak of the militant attacks were mainly from 2007 to 2014 but 2015 and 2016 like 2006 have witnessed very lesser attacks and the number of casualties have also been less (Crawford, 2016 pp 10-14). This is due to the fact that the Operation Zarb-e-Azab and the National Action Plan has been producing fruitful results which are a good sign for the security paradigm of Pakistan. The Human death toll and injuries are represented through the following charts and tables. It is evident from the following graphs and tables that the the incidents of militancy and terrorism were at its peak in during 2009 followed by 2010. While the incidents saw gradual ups and downs during the internecine period from 2002 to 2016.

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3.16.1 Figure showing death and injured casualties in Pakistan in Militant Suicide Attacks during 2002 to June 2016

The government of Pakistan and law enforcement agencies, in hot pursuit of the terrorists and militants, has also killed thousands of civilians during the military operations and other encounters with the terrorists. Though military operations against the militants are still in progress yet there has been an enormous decrease in the number of civilian death and injured casualties.

3.16.2 Table showing Death and Wounded Casualties in Pakistan

Category of People Killed Injured/Wounded

Pakistani Civilians 22,100 40,792

Security Forces Personnel 8,214 14,583

Militants/ Terrorists 31,000 11,415

Contractors Reported by US DOL 42 134

Unreported Contractor Estimate 48 unknown

NGO Workers 92 87

Journalists 53 unknown

Total 61,549 67,011

Source: South Asia Terrorism Potal (SATP) & Pakistan Body Count (PBC) (2017)

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It is a fact that though Pakistan was not directly involved in the war on terror yet it has suffered a lot in terms of both human deaths and injured casualties. It is also a fact that Pakistan did not suffer so much during the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 though most of the supplies of weapons and logistic support was provided to the Afghan people through tribal areas of Pakistan. The number of death toll in Pakistan from 2001 to June 2016 including all sources stood at 61,549 while the number of injuries stood at 67,011. The combined death casualties and seriously wounded people in both Afghanistan and Pakistan during 2001 to 2016 stands at nearly 173,000 and round about 183,000 respectively (Crawford, 2016 p14).

3.16.3 Death Casualties and Injuries in Pakistan from 2001 to June 2016

22,100 Civilians Security Forces 8,214 8,214 61,549 Militants Contractors 31,000 Unreported contr: 48 NGO workers 92 Journalists Total 61,459 42 53

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3.16.4 Table showing Fatalities in Pakistan from 2009 to 2016

Year Civilians Security Terrorists/insurgents Total per personnel year 2009 2324 991 8389 11704 2010 1796 469 5170 7435 2011 2738 765 2800 6303 2012 3007 732 2472 6211 2013 3001 676 1702 5379 2014 1781 533 3182 5496 2015 940 339 2403 3682 2016 610 293 895 1798 Total during 16,197 4,798 27,013 48,008 2009 to 18 December2016 Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) (19 December 2016)

3.16.5 Chart showing Fatalities in Pakistan from 2009 to 2016

14000

12000

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0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

By looking at the statistical data from 2009 to 2016, it becomes very clear that 2009 was the peak of terrorism in Pakistan in all respects. The number of fatalities in terms of security personnel as well terrorists was the highest one. The total fatalities amounted to

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11704 followed by 2010 in which the total fatalities reached 7435 in which the share of terrorists killed was more than 5000. From 2010 onwards, the number of incidents of terrorism became to decrease with the total number of casualties including all sectors was 6303 followed by 6211 in 2011. In 2013 there was again a decrease in the incidents of terror with a total death toll of 5379 followed by a slight increase in 2014 where the pendulum of casualties reached 5496. In June 2014 the initiation of Operation Zarb-e- Azab and in December the National Action Plan that was put forward in the country in the post-December 2014 Peshawar school attack, there has been a tremendous decrease in the in the incidents of terror in 2015 with the total death toll standing at 3582 while in 2016 the number of death casualties encompassing all sources stood at 1798 till December 2016. There may be a slight difference in the number of death casualties and injuries as the data has been collected from different sources but the data in all cases s based on year-wise incidents and casualties is the same as for example 2009 was the peak of casualties. Afterwards there has been a gradual decrease in the incidents of terrorism with alternate ups and downs.

It is also an admitted fact that the combined death toll and injured casualties in both Pakistan and Afghanistan is extremely high since the moves against the war on terror and counter-insurgency was initiated in the aftermath of 9/11. Since 2001, the number of death casualties and injuries in both the countries is 173,000 and 183,000 respectively. Out of this the share of Afghanistan in death and injured casualties is 111,451 and 115,989 respectively while that of Pakistan is 61,549 and 67,011 as per statistical data. The most agonizing fact is that though Pakistan was not involved in the in the 9/11 episode yet the way it has suffered, is beyond understanding. One of the major causes for this is the religious factor as the Al-Qaeda and Taliban mainly considered them to be strictly religious minded with their self-styled version of Islamic principles. The second important reason may be the tribal structure of the people living across both sides of the Durand Line since the two countries have a long history of coexistence and have entered into matrimonial relations that keep them closely knitted. The third reason may be the treacherous and windy nature of the Durand Line replete with safe havens for the terrorists and provide ample space to them in case of hideouts. The fourth reason may be the tough and stubborn attitude of the tribal people who never bowed before any authority

198 and had been following their own norms of life. The fifth reason may be the tightening of the security system at the Pak-Afghan border because it has proved to be hub of economic activities for the tribal people and has served as the earning market for most of the terrorists.

3.16.6 Chart showing combined Death casualties and wounded people in Afghanistan and Pakistan during 2001 to 2016

Combined Death and injured Casualties

Death casualties Injured Casualties 173,000 183,000

Owing to the Pak-Afghan border and its treacherous nature on account of the mountainous nature it has served as a safe havens for the terrorists and militants across the border and has caused irreparable losses of humans, besides the infrastructure. The war in Afghanistan had greater security ramifications for our country that compelled the government of Pakistan to take certain important steps such as the establishment of the Military Courts and the initiation of the National Action Plan. These steps were taken with a view to counter terrorism/militancy and make Pakistan a more prosperous country.

3.17 Establishment of Military Courts

In the aftermath of Peshawar tragedy, amendment was made to the Army Act of 1952 resulting in the establishment of military courts to have jurisdiction over the trial of terrorists and militants. These courts became functional and within weeks, convicted six

199 terrorists by sentencing them to death. The executions were stayed by the Apex Court of Pakistan as contravention to the 21st Amendment to the constitution of Pakistan (Hussain 5 July,2015). The proponents of the new move justify it on the grounds of International Humanitarian law and Geneva Conventions of 1949 as such courts have been envisioned under them. Moreover, article 245 of the constitution of the Pakistan also make provisions for furnishing a new framework of trail under the domestic “law of conflict” as the country is faced with an extraordinary security situation- almost a state of war. The creation of military courts in the aftermath of Peshawar tragedy was highly welcomed by all the circles in the country. These courts would best serve the purpose of eradicating terrorism from the country as people have lost confidence in the judicial system of the country on account of its slow process. They have been established for a period of two years and its extension will be considered by the National Assembly of Pakistan. The positive sign of these courts is that they provide the trail on speedy basis by taking strict measures to get stability and security, and free the country from the menace of terrorism.

The tragedy of Peshawar on December 16, 2014 has been regarded as one of the bloodiest episodes in the history of Pakistan but prior to that in 2013, three different tragic incidents resulted in the death of 189 people and the injury of 393 people including two suicide bombs at Saint Church Peshawar, a car bomb at Qissa Khwani Bazar and a bomb blast at a bus targeting government employees (Khan ,7 January 2015). The Church attack was the deadliest one in the history of Pakistan on a minority in which 127 people were killed and 250 were injured. So, in Pakistan 2013 and 2014 saw the worst security situation in the metropolitan city of KP, i.e. Peshawar. But the bloodshed did not end the next year and the PAF Camp Badaber Peshawar incident foresaw that the terrorists were still haunted with the revenge, and particularly targeting the security personnel, school children and even the minorities. The gruesome fact is that they are not sparing the places of worship and take recourse to attack when they find any opportunity. The recent example is the Badaber episode when most of the martyred were those who were either busy in offering prayers or preparing for the prayer. In such a worst scenario, the functioning of the military courts is very much necessary as Pak Army has a very high esteem in the eyes of the entire nation. They would be in a better way to provide speedy justice and execute the hot criminals without any discrimination.

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It is also an admitted fact that the country has one of the most stringent legal regimes for the terrorists. The execution of 150 criminals prior to the commencement of Ramazan, involved in heinous cases of crimes is testimony to the fact that the country is delivering a sound system of justice. There has been a false impression that the militants and terrorist are not being punished, a situation created by the governmental decision to place a moratorium on execution of death sentences (Hussain, The Express Tribune 5 July 2015). There may be problems in some cases were justice may not be timely delivered where neither the judge nor the prosecutor nor the investigator may be safe.

In the face of controversial nature of the military courts there is a greater need to streamline the civil and criminal judicial system of Pakistan as the military courts have been criticized on the grounds of being created through a notification without having amended the existing law of the land. Their criticism founds substance in article 3 of the Geneva Conventions that extended to TTP and Al-Qaeda, including the provisions that call for protection and humane treatment of captured and surrendered militants as prisoner of wars but they cannot be tried, sentenced or executed save by a “regularly constituted court encompassing all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as indispensable by civilized people” (Hussain, July 5, 2015). Under this doctrine, the sentence of conviction of six terrorists was stayed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan as no information was given about the trial and conviction, the names of the accused, names of Judges, prosecutors, defense counsel and place of trail. Under the Pakistani Army Rules of 1954, the Criminal Procedure Code and Qanun-e Shahadat Order, these are applicable to trail by the military courts.

In a country like Pakistan where terrorism and militancy has played havoc with lives of ordinary people and where insecurity pervades in some of the key areas of the country, extraordinary security measures can provide protection to the common masses as per requirements of security standards. Common man needs protection and security in all cases and wants to earn a few pennies for his family but the fear of insecurity haunts him often. Strict security measures and dealing the terrorists with an iron hand, is the cry of the day. It is also an undenying fact that law enforcement personnel in Pakistan have been greatly targeted by the terrorists in the post-2001 scenario resulting in irreparable loss to

201 the security personnel and many prominent officials have lost their lives. Pak Army has been appreciated as the custodian of the geographical frontiers of the country and people repose more confidence in it. Military Courts can function well in a speedy manner and can dispense justice through summary trail. The government of Pakistan should make amendment to the constitution whereby only culprits involved in acts of terrorism can be tried, sentenced and executed while the rest of the criminals can be tried through the Criminal Procedure Code of the country.

3.18 National Action Plan and Terrorism

The National Action Plan (NAP) announced by Pakistan in the aftermath of Peshawar Tragedy was highly welcomed by the entire nation but nothing substantial has come out of it as was envisioned by the nation. Delaying tactics was condemned by Justice Jawad Khawaja, judge of the Supreme Court, who lambasted the government for its inaction on the NAP even after elapsing a period of six months (Farooq, 2015). Foreign funding and NGOs are some of the hurdling factors in the way of procrastination of functioning of NAP. To put these issues in perspectives, some defining characteristics need to be explored (Farooq, July 14, 2015). Firstly, the terrorists and extremists have strived to gain the sympathies of target populations by exploiting the shortcomings in the existing social, economic and governance system that has discriminated the poor class of the society. Secondly, they have utilized an ingenious amalgamation of utilization of natural resources and most probably the donor funding. Thirdly, they have been able to augment their income with funds generated from organized criminal activities. Lastly, the informal money exchange systems in Pakistan and various Islamist Trusts still seem to be active in Pakistan, notwithstanding the ban and crackdown on these organizations by the government of Pakistan.

Militant organizations in Pakistan have depended mostly on the ‘Hawala’ (guarantee) or informal banking system in Pakistan where funds are transferred on personal guarantees of the sender without scrutiny or accountability by the government. The government has estimated that the ‘Hawala’ system in Pakistan has accounted to $2.5 billion entering the country each year till 2002 as compared to only one $ 1 billion dollar entering through formal banking system. Till 2002, there were an estimated 1,000

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Hawaladars (guarantors) in Pakistan with some dealing in as large amounts as $ 10 million (Farooq, The News, 14 July 2015). Though this system has been greatly decreased in the wake of government’s crackdown against this illegal system of money transferring yet it cannot be ruled out that as a source of money transfer on the personal guarantee of Hawaladar.

In Pakistan two major funds have been utilized by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates: Al- Rasheed and Al-Akhtar trusts. The Al-Akhtar Trust in Pakistan is estimated to have received about $100 million between 1999 and 2002 from the two banks in Karachi. This amount was transferred from the all over the western hemisphere, particularly places like New York, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (Farooq, 2015). The State Bank of Pakistan in 2002 froze the accounts of Al-Akhtar and Al-Rasheed under an Al-Qaeda Specific Resolution (1333) of the United Nations General Assembly. Despite the fact that both the trusts were outlawed by the US treasury with their accounts frozen, they received $ 10 million each in 2006. This amount was ostensibly collected by a UK-based organization which also reportedly transferred $20 million to its own account in a local bank of Quetta (Farooq, 14 July 2015). In 2004 and afterwards, Al-Rasheed trustees changed strategies and transferred funds to some individuals and two sub-organizations: Al-Ameen and Islam Welfare Foundation that are really nom de guerres for the Al- Rasheed trust. Similarly Al-Akhtar invested heavily by purchasing property while this strategy was followed by several other militant organizations.

To streamline the system of money laundering the government of Pakistan has created a Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) within the State Bank of Pakistan. The main function of the system is to ensure the transfer of money through legal and formal ways and do away with illegal activities. Now, under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997, money laundering has been regarded as a crime and those involved should be dealt with according to the law. The government needs to rectify the whole system of money transfer and strengthen the judicial system so as to protect the entire system of the country.

The entire political set-up is determined to implement the National Action Plan in true spirit and reiterated the parliament on 12th November 2015 to take all positive

203 measures to bring about a drastic change in the life of lay man (The News, 13 November 2015). It is also an admitted fact that the implementation of the NAP is a joint responsibility of all the institutions working within the proper bounds of the constitution. The decisive action by the government regarding implementation of the NAP over the last two years has produced successful results against terrorism and extremism, said a government official. The success of the strategy has been possible due to the political consensus among the various political parties, bold actions by men and soldiers of the armed forces, coordinated efforts by the provincial governments, law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies. The basic logic behind all this was the national interest as Pakistan had suffered a lot in the post 9/11 scenario and particularly the law enforcement agencies became a direct target of the terrorists and extremists. Thus the implementation of the NAP in letter and spirit is the sine qua non for paving the way good governance in the country.

3.18.1 National Action Plan and Foreign Policy of Pakistan

Implementation of the NAP, according to some politicians, requires the foreign policy to be reviewed according to needs of the nation. Chairman Senate, Mian Raza Rabbani, on November 12th, 2015 suggested to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Nawaz Sharif to call an in-camera joint session of both the Houses for a detailed discussion on the foreign policy and National Action Plan against terrorism (The News, November 13, 2015). He opined that NAP and foreign policy need to be reviewed in the larger interest of the nation. Law–makers in the Senate expressed deep concern over the deploring situation prevalent in the country and feared that Pakistan was becoming a national security state instead of a welfare state as respective governments had acted against principles of policy in the constitution. It was also urged to mend ways as we should learn from mistakes of the past and the panacea of the entire ills lie in adhering to the principles of policy concerning the federation to take the nation ahead. Political atmosphere in Pakistan depends on security consideration and the extent of measures taken for the safety of the country and the masses. Decisions here are taken on the grounds of security consideration rather than welfare of the people.

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3.18.2 National Action Plan and Civil-military Imbalance

December 16, 2014 was the day that wrought havoc to Peshawar on account of the attack on the Army Public School Peshawar. The spirit of unity showed by the nation on that occasion may be the same but when it comes to the enforcement of the NAP, the civil government and army do not seem to be on the same page as there was complete harmony between the two in the initial stage of the plan.

Firstly, one of the reasons for the imbalance may be the presence of Daesh that emerged during the last 11 months in Pakistan though its presence was denied by the government but now it has admitted that their presence can be seen even in the federal capital (The News 13 November, 2015).

Secondly, a brief sketch of the NAP gives a bleak picture when it comes to counter extremism like taking steps against hate speech, printing material of banned outfits and scrutiny of school text books.

Thirdly, security situation in Karachi has also added to worsening the imbalance between the two pillars. Since the NAP was put into vogue, security has improved on many fronts and the army has achieved much success in the 11 months as the army was near the culminating point of eradicating terrorism but Karachi has at the same time been described as the most problematic city for financing the terror network (The News, November 13, 2015). As a result of Rangers gaining additional powers, more raids were conducted by it and broke some big networks, a nexus between terrorism and politics was revealed. Moreover, situation within police and law enforcement agencies also presented a dismal picture. It is also a matter of concern that if on one hand, security situation has improved a lot in Karachi but on the other hand, extremists have made their inroads into the interior Sindh such as Jacobabad, Ghotki, Shikarpur and Sukkhar, as per reports of the intelligence agencies. Situation between the army and civilian government worsened when the intelligence agencies unleashed the facts in Sindh where two lobbies work; the alleged Indian Network of Research and Analysis (RAW) and the terror financing. In such a grim situation the state could be called as the “Security Risk State”

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Now, the top leadership of the army has expressed its concern over the government’s failure to enforce the NAP to match the success of the operation. In the aftermath of the attack on the Army School Peshawar, a draft of the NAP was reached at between the army and the civilian government according to which the responsibility of the army was to destroy the network of the terrorists and extremists, dismantle their sanctuaries and eliminate them from all quarters of the country and particularly the sensitive areas, whereas the responsibility of the civilian government was to bring in major reforms in the constitution. The 20th Constitutional Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 was incorporated by the civilian government allowing the civilian government to establish Military Courts and promulgated the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO) allowing the governmental authorities to keep any suspect under remand for 90 days. However, this 90 days remand of the suspect was linked with the process of Joint Investigation Team (JIT).

The PPO was a landmark in the history of Pakistan as it was directly linked to the security of the country. It brought about a drastic change in the security paradigm of the country because it restored the execution of the criminals since ban had been imposed on the executions of the criminals by the previous government since it was in contravention of the human rights. The withdrawal of ban on execution also brought the wrath of the International Actors to Pakistan but the civil cum military leadership of the country rejected the International pressure as Pakistan has become a ‘Security Risk Country’ instead of a welfare country. Besides this, three main major reforms were part of the PPO- documents; Police Reforms, FATA Reforms, and Madrassa Reforms. The civilian government is committed to eradicate radicalism and terrorism from the society, ensure ban on literature spreading hate and contempt and take measures through Pakistan’s Electronic Media Regularity Authority (PEMRA) that the media do not magnify the terrorists and their alleged organizations.

3.18.3 Hurdles in the Way of National Action Plan

In the aftermath of Peshawar tragedy both the Civil and Military leadership were determined over the implementation of the NAP and worked in coordination to that end. The civil-military marriage over security issues were highly appreciated by the political

206 circles of the country and seemed determined to work unitedly for the sake of national interest. But after a period of 11 months, a gulf developed between political parties and army over some clauses of the consensus-documents. Since both the civilian and army leadership had agreed on the NAP, the religious parties have now raised the issue of deleting the term “Religious Terrorism” and replace it with the generalized term Terrorism. Another hurdle had come from the Judiciary regarding the Military Courts when the Supreme Court got the right of appeal against any decision of conviction by the military court (The News, November 13, 2015). In the case of appeal before the Apex Court mixed results have come as in some cases the convicts were given relief while in some of the cases the decisions were upheld. Moreover, it is also signifying to note that nothing has been done regarding the reforms of the three sectors. No improvement has been made in the police department as it should have been depoliticized and cleared from those personnel having a criminal record or involvement with the criminals and culprits. Madrassas also suffered the same fate as the government has to compromise on madrassa reforms. Some of the political parties’ forms the religious class are opposed to any such reforms which may be termed as religious or madrassa reforms. So, status quo exists on the issues of police and madrassa reforms. As far as the issue of hate speeches and abhorrence of material is concerned, the government has done little work since printed material is still available in the market. The governments of Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the role models on this issue as they deal with the perpetrators with an iron hand. Our government should have sought guidance from these countries to do away with this nuisance once for all.

3.18.4 Causes for the Imbalance of National Action Plan

The NAP was a well-planned document based on the consensus of the political parties and the military as it brought the civilian and military leadership on the same page. A few factors that took place prior to the Peshawar attack may be held responsible for this rift. Firstly, the ‘Politics of Dharna’ at D-Chowk of Islamabad had created uncertainty in the various circles and as a result of it the very important visit of the Chinese President was postponed. Secondly, the government’s decision to have negotiation with the Taliban though with some reservations from the army fearing that it

207 would give space to the suspected militants and terrorists. The apprehension in this regard from the army was that the operation had already been delayed. Thirdly, the sanctuaries of the terrorists and extremists in FATA and particularly in North Waziristan caused great problems since the terrorists organized attacks on different areas. The increase of international pressure on the civil and military circles of Pakistan over security issues resulted in huge drone-attacks on the Pakistani territory. Fourthly, the failure of civil administration and particularly the police department to cope with controlling security situation and bring in peace and harmony was another factor for its failure.

3.17.5 Call for effective Implementation of National Action Plan Chief of Milli Yakjehti Council, Allama Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi on July 26th, 2016 urged that the National Action Plan (NAP) should be implemented in true letter and spirit. He said elements and factors responsible for the killing of innocent people over the past two decades should be exposed (Dawn,July 27, 2016). Addressing a press conference here, he said individuals and groups, who had been supporting militant organizations in the country for years, should be exposed. The government should take action against those who provided financial resources to terrorists, he added. Allama Naqvi was accompanied by his party’s provincial president Akbar Hussain Zahdi and general secretary Liaquat Ali Hazara.

National Action Plan, if implemented in true spirit, would provide a panacea for all the ills and evils of that has made the entire humanity insecure. The civil-military marriage is the only remedy through which this menace can be overcome once for all from our society. Local population and civil society has also to its due role in this regard as it is not a private problem of a single individual but we have to fight it through mutual efforts.

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3.18.5. a. High Level Meeting Discusses Internal Security, NAP Implementation

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif presided over a meeting of high level officials on August 1, 2016 to review the internal security situation in the country and implementation of the National Action Plan. The meeting also reviewed the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azab and its successful achievement in curbing terrorism from the country. The prime Minister also urged that terrorism has become a global threat and Pakistan has been able to overcome this nuisance as a result of the current successful military operation and the implementation of the Nation Action Plan (AVT Khyber, August 1, 2016). He appreciated the role played by the security agencies by making huge sacrifices for the sake of the country. The meeting was also attended by the Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Lai Khan, Finance Minister, Ishaq Dar, DG ISI, Lt. Gen. Rizwan AKhtar, and DG Intelligence Bureau (IB).

3.19 Incidents of Terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during 2016

According to a report of the News International Newspaper, there has been a tremendous decrease in the incidents of terrorism in the province of Khyber

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Pakhtunkhwa, including target killings, attacks on the personnel f security, and suicide attacks during the last six year (The News, October 9, 2016). A report of the Home Department unleashed some 4,120 incidents of terrorism and target killings, besides 116 suicide attacks and 894 bomb blasts. It further opined that 1,287 attacks were conducted on the personnel of law enforcement agencies while target killings and rockets attacks had a share of 507 and 316 respectively. It is also a fact that since the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azab and National Action Plan, there has been a decrease in the incidents of terrorism/ insurgency. The report said that in 2015, the incidents of bomb blasts and hand grenade recorded were 184 while they were reduced to 89 in 2016 till October 9, 2016, showing a positive sign of overcoming the terrorism/insurgency. In comparison to the attacks on the law enforcement agencies there has also been a decrease from 189 to 122. During the last year the number of rocket attacks stood at 11 while the current year did not record any such incident, while the incidents of target killing dropped to a decrease of 23 % as compared to 2015.

In Pakistan, the number of casualties in terms of death and injuries during 2016 is also on the declining line. From January to December 18, 2016 the number of civilian death casualties stood at 610, while the number of security personnel was 293, the number of terrorist who were killed stood at 895 with the total death casualties standing at 1798. Those who got injured as a result of these terrorist activities aggregated at 1369 (South Asia Portal, 2016).

So, 2016 has been of good omen to the people of Pakistan so far security is concerned. There has been a reduction of the incidents of terrorism and insurgency in the whole country but it does not connote that there was no episode of terrorism in the country. Some of the areas witnessed some incidents of criminal nature coupled with some of the issues of terrorism/ insurgency but it is also a fact that the National Action Plan has produced fruitful results in some of the sensitive areas that were frequently stricken by terrorism. Moreover Operation Zarb-e-Azam is also one of the most contributory factors in reducing this menace. The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA have never been affected by insurgency and have never faced such a worst security situation as they did during the current American intervention in Afghanistan.

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3.19 (a) Chart showing comparative analysis

180 160 160-180 140 140-160 120 120-140 100 80 100-120 60 80-100 40 Series 3 60-80 20 0 Series 2 40-60 bomb blasts 184 20-40 grenade Category 3 Series 1 attacks 0-20 Category 4

3.19 (b) Chart showing Death casualties and injuries during 2016

Civilian Security deaths personnel 610 death 293

Terrorists Injuries 895 1369

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Chapter 4

4 Achievements of the National Action Plan and Operation Zarb-e Azab

Though Operation Zarb-e-Azab was started in June 2014 against the banned outfits and militants in Pakistan yet upon the initiation of the National Action Plan in the aftermath of the Peshawar School Attack it was given great momentum. Since the Operation Zarb-e-Azab it has produced the most fruitful results in clearing FATA from the insurgents and terrorists. According to a report of the DG ISPR, Asim Salim Bajwa, the army has cleared an area of 4,304 square kilometers and restored the writ of the government (Dawn Report, 4 April, 2016). The spokesman further added that the ongoing military operation was conducted in the extremely hostile terrain and harsh weather conditions. All the heights of over 9,000 feet have been cleared of the terrorists; their sanctuaries have been destroyed with the recovery of huge coach of arms and ammunitions. The area of Shawal is quite difficult and treacherous for it always remains covered with snow showing less visibility. The temporarily displaced persons (TDPs) are progressing at a high speed and 37,012 families showing a percentage of 36 have been returned to their homes.

In the first and second phases of the operation in the North Waziristan, 94 developmental projects of different types were completed while work on 153 different projects is still in progress in phase three. The terrorists have used the soil of Pakistan in terms of sanctuary as well as by targeting its population in the most ruthless way. Although there has been a plethora of efforts and initiatives to rid the country of this menace yet the most decisive blow against this menace has come from Operation Zarb-e- Azab. The strategy and vision adopted by Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif, and the country has observed a substantial decrease in the terrorist attacks (Times, May 2016). The success of war against terrorism has won General Raheel Sharif a great fame since he has shown his skill of getting things done for his commitment of making a “terror free Pakistan”. General Raheel Sharif, from the very first day since he took over as Chief of the Army Staff was determined to eliminate terrorism and extremism from every nook and corner of the country. His plan was based on a multi-

212 pronged approach with a national action plan, supported by the political will of the country. At the heart of this approach was the strategy of Operation Zarb-e-Azab, which was named after the sword of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) and was not only conceived as an operation but also as a concept.

DG ISPR, Lieutenant General Asim Salim Bajwa in an interview said that, “our objective has been to eliminate terror without discrimination and to attack the entire chain of the terrorist networks, from sleeper cells to facilitators, to financiers”. He stressed that, “our challenge remains that we share a border of 2600 km with Afghanistan, and the terrorists slip across the border, which requires us to improve our border management, which his not ideal”. But despite this obvious challenge, Operation Zarb-e-Azab has achieved a remarkable result, particularly in the tribal areas that nurture the highest saturation of terrorist networks. The first target of this operation was the North Waziristan Agency (NWA), which on account of its rugged nature, had become an obvious choice for the terrorist networks. Within a period of less than two years, the Operation Zarb-e-Azab has been able to clear 89% of the area free from the terrorist networks such as the Haqqani Network, Daesh and their affiliates, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETM) (Times W. , 2016). During this operation a total of 118 Pakistani officers and 398 soldiers have lost their lives while more than 2000 terrorists have been killed.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced in the last month that Operation Zarb-e- Azab in North Waziristan has entered the last phase so as to “clear the remnants of terrorists from their hideouts”. He also urged that the deeply forested ravines in the area serve as the frequent infiltration routes for terrorists between Pakistan and Afghanistan and has remained the last bastion of terrorism in the area (Times, May 2016). The aim of the last phase of the operation is to isolate the terrorists and sever their links with abettors elsewhere. Pakistani military is also seem to have succeeded where 11 years of the drone attacks, that was started in the era of U.S President George W. Bush and increased heavily during the era of President Barrack Obama but produced little impact on eradicating terrorism and terrorist networks. These attacks have been referred to in the media as “the drone war”.

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The other area of great concern has been the operation in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which borders Afghanistan through the Khyber Pass and other routes. It has become a theatre of militancy and terrorism in the post- 9/11 scenario. Pakistani military, through Operation Zarb-e-Azab, has managed to bring 87 % of the territory under control and has been successful in dismantling the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI), Daesh and its affiliates. A total of 900 terrorists have been killed in this operation. Casualties during this operation have been high, the army has managed to recover 253 metric tons of explosives from both the North Waziristan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which had a potential of killing 134,000 civilians (Times, May 2016). Those apprehended as a result of this operation have been tried in Military Courts, which is the major criticism on it.

The third major focus of Operation Zarb-e-Azab has been Pakistan’s port city of Karachi, which has, in the recent years been, infamous for its reputation as one of the world’s most dangerous city security wise. The city of Karachi has been ravaged by a criminal underworld and networks of Islamist militants who have been engaged in targeted killings and extortion rackets. Chief of the Army Staff has issued special directives to the Rangers to address terrorism and crimes in Karachi. The Ranger is a specialized paramilitary force better trained than police and can cope well with the security challenges. Since June 2014, the Rangers have conducted 7000 operations and apprehended 12000 terrorists and facilitators. As a result of this operation there has been 70% decline in the targeted killings, 85 % decline in extortion, 90% decline in kidnapping and abduction, and 30% decline in murder and terrorism (Times, May 2016). Prior to this operation by the Rangers, Karachi had been experiencing an average of 250 incidents a month but the current average has been reduced to 10 a month.

The security crackdown by the Rangers on Islamist militants and criminals has brought recorded crimes down sharply. This has also developed the confidence of the people whereby the prices jumped 23% last year to a record high, outpacing the national average of 10 %. The primary detractors of operation Zarb-e-Azab in Karachi have been the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), who claims the operation, is a witch-hunt against them.

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4.1.1 PAF wins trophy for Operation Zarb-e-Azab

Operation Zarb-e-Azab, on account of its successful military operations against the terrorists have brought a good name to the nation and have received laurels from both the internal as well as external actors. An aircraft of C-130 Aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has won Concours D Flegance Trophy Air Tatoo Show 2016 at Royal Force Base Fair Ford, United Kingdom (UK) (Yusufzai, ''Man from Bara'', 2008) (Tribune july 12, 2016). Over 50 Nations all over the world participated in the show in which the PAF has been able to carry the day by grabbing the first position. Air Marshal, Asad Lodhi and Vice Chief of Air Staff, visited the venue on July 17, 2016 and congratulated on the PAF for bringing laurels to the country. The contingent of the PAF comprising air and ground crew participated in the various competitions and events organized at the Royal International Air Tatoo Show 2016. This is the second time that PAF has won the prestigious trophy to the nation by participating in an event in July 2006 and had won three trophies in that event (Tribune, July 12, 2016).

4.1.2 FATA after Operation Zarb-e-Azab

Pakistan has been engaged in fighting against insurgents and militants for more a decade. Over these years, some specific anti-terrorism and counter militancy operations have been conducted in the terror infested areas. Before and during these operations, many peace agreements between the government and terrorists were signed with a view to bring lasting peace to the region but these have been unsuccessful in most of the cases. In some of the cases, peace was brought as a result of these peace agreements and that too in the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but on the whole, the TTP and other outlawed terrorist outfits blatantly kept targeting some important installations of the government and public places such as educational institutes, army installations, airports and the common people at large, particularly when there used to be some great rush. Such an incident occurred on June 8, 2014 when 10 terrorists entered Jinnah International Airport Karachi (JIAP), killing 18 people while 18 people were injured in the incident (Ahmad, 2016). The heinous attack on Army Public School Peshawar, killing 148 innocent people, including 132 school children aging between 8 to 18 years and later on,

215 on June 20, 2016 four terrorists wielding AK-47s stormed into Bacha Khan University Charsadda, killing 20 people including a professor of Chemistry.

According to DG ISPR, the operation has been successful in achieving its main objective by rooting out the sanctuaries of the terrorists and training centers of the TTP in the terror-stricken tribal areas. This claim has been corroborated by Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) claiming that prior to the commencement of Operation Zarb-e-Azab, terrorist attacks had packed to 154 a month in Pakistan, but now this figure has been dropped down to 71 % a month (Times, 2016).

For reinforcing the achievement of terrorism, militancy and incidents of extremism, the civil government needs to come forward with concrete strategies by empowering the tribal people on political, economic and educational fronts. By introducing these reforms in the tribal areas, there is greater possibility of improvement in the various sectors. There is also the possibility that FATA should be merged into the main stream of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa so that the people of tribal areas may not feel a sense of alienation and deprivation. If these much-needed reforms are not introduced at the earliest, there is great likelihood that the tribal areas may once again become the nourishing places of militancy and terrorism where the area may become the breeding ground for terrorism and militancy with ample opportunities of hideouts for these people.

4.1.3 Education in FATA

Despite the importance of education in the modern world, the government of Pakistan has paid very little attention to education sector in FATA. The area still lags far behind than the rest of Pakistan in terms of education. It is regrettable to mention that there is not even a single university in the entire FATA and the literacy rate in the region is 22% __far below than the nationwide rate of 58%. According to the survey of Shaoor Foundation for Education and Awareness (SEEA), the literacy rate among the women in the tribal areas is 3%. The said report also describes the reasons for this low literacy rate by stating that inaccessibility to school, poor quality of education, low retention rate, militancy and extremism, migration of people coupled with local traditions and customs (Ahmad, June 2016). The government has hitherto ignored the youth of FATA by

216 depriving them of quality education and modern professional knowledge. But now practical steps have been taken by the Army by building educational institutions and technical training centers with the aim of hindering the youth from being indulged into terrorist and extremist activities. It is a fact that lack of proper education has brought about economic issues in the tribal areas because a large number of people in the tribal areas lack technical and professional education so as to be employed somewhere in the country.

4.1.4 Political Issues

Besides educational problems, FATA is also hit by political problems which have added to their miseries. The people of FATA have representation in the National Assembly and Senate with the ratio of 12 and 8 respectively as per Article 51, 59 and 247 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973. But unfortunately the area still remains under the direct executive control of the President of Pakistan. The area is administered by the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who acts as an agent of the President of the Republic. Each tribal agency is administratively headed by the Political Agent. But the most regrettable fact is that the laws framed by the National Legislature of the country are not applicable to them, who are empowered to issue regulations for the peace and good governance of the tribal areas. Similarly each Frontier Region is administratively headed by the Deputy Commissioner (DC) who exercises the same powers as are enshrined upon the Political Agent. Politics in FATA is patriarchic since cultural, traditional and social practices have kept FATA women at bay from decision making powers. If the women of these areas are denied representation in the political and administrative affairs of the state then the areas would miserably fail to develop and would further degenerate. It is a deplorable fact that hand-picked Political Agents are appointed to run the administrative affairs of the tribal areas which have given ample space to the maliks and sardars with considerable wealth and lands and maintain a strong hold over the administration. This has resulted in the corruption, mismanagement, nepotism, and misappropriation of large sums of money. If political reforms are not introduced in the tribal areas as per modern lines, the area would degenerate into an abysmal depth, where the terrorists would regain their lost field.

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4.1.5 Economic Backwardness

The economy of the tribal areas is less developed as compared to other parts of the country. It is the most impoverished and least developed area in the country. Persistent economic deprivation of FATA has pushed the tribal people towards terrorist and militant outfits such as TTP and foreign spy agencies, e.g. the RAW to acquire money in order to make both ends meet (Ahmad, 2016). Despite having the population of 2.4%, it makes up only 1.5% of the country’s economy. The poverty line in the area is about 60% of its population while the employment rate ranges between 60% and 80%. According to available data, only 7% of the total land of FATA is cultivable while the remaining 93% of the land is barren, mountainous and unproductive. Of the 7% cultivable land only 3%s irrigated while the remaining 4% is largely dependent on rains. Most of the land and property belongs to Maliks and Khans while more than 50% of the inhabitants of FATA do not their land.

The horrible fact is that the political administration enjoys unlimited financial powers with no checks and power system and results in the embezzlement of developmental funds afforded by the government as well as foreign donors. According to Ayaz Wazir, former ambassador to Afghanistan, ‘had the fund been utilized honestly and sensibly, FATA would have become the most developed and modern area in the country (Ahmad, 2016). Moreover, millions of Afghans that migrated to the tribal areas of Pakistan in 1979 as result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has also created problems for Pakistan and particularly the tribal areas. They have been mounting burden on the economy of FATA and Pakistan. Besides, the tribal areas of Pakistan have also become the hub of black marketing___ drug trade, opium cultivation, and smuggling etc. The result is the exacerbation in the poverty, which caters for militancy and terrorism.

4.1.6 Legal Impediments

FATA also lacks the legal system as is enjoyed by the rest of Pakistan. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC) of the country and Peshawar High Court (PHC) do not extend to the tribal areas of the country. All the civil and criminal cases are decided under Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) by the Jirga. Now, this law has been

218 known as the Black law on account of the unchecked discretionary powers by the jirgas and consequent gross human rights violations. It is unfortunate that this outmoded law has been in force in the tribal areas since 1948 and employed under the influence of big landlords and political vendettas to take revenge on the poor and suppressed people. Resultantly, a large number of disgruntled people opt for terrorist and militant organizations to settle their scores with the big landlords and political vendettas.

4.1.7 Possible Solutions

If the government is sincere in making FATA a peace-loving area, free of terrorism and militancy then it should take some concrete steps to safeguard the interests of the people at large. It is indispensible to educate qualitatively the local population of the tribal areas so that they may realize their true worth, fundamental political, socio- economic, and legal rights, and also the nefarious designs of the terrorists/militants. Proper mass education is the only way which can be easily employed to change the life style of the people of FATA. Introducing modern and state-of-the art education would help a lot in improving the condition of the people of FATA. It is the cry of the day to construct more and more schools and colleges modeled on modern lines in the tribal areas but it is also lamenting that there is not even a single university in the entire FATA. Through the construction of these schools, the lessons of democracy and liberalism coupled with an effective counter-terrorism narrative against Taliban’s ideology be developed. Moreover, the youth of the area need to be trained in technical and professional education so as to meet the requirements of the modern times. This would help in placing them at par with the rest of the country and improve their financial position.

It is also a necessary fact that the people may be empowered politically by abolishing non-democratic traditions such as establishing a sort of representative assembly with members elected from across the tribal areas so as to deal with issues of day to day life. For this purpose FATA should be provided with local bodies comprising their own local representatives so that power may be transferred from the few elites to common masses at the grass roots level. This will ensure good governance, transparency, responsibility, participation and responsiveness and aim at the political maturity of the

219 people of tribal area. Unemployment is one of the main impediments in the way of terrorism as was once pointed out by former Chief Justice of Peshawar High Court, Justice Dost Muhammad Khan, stating that that government could overcome terrorism and militancy by providing permanent jobs to the people of FATA as they are falling into the hands of this nuisance through unemployment. The war-torn tribal area should be linked to the rest of the country by rail and roads through China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will earn huge capital markets to the tribal areas. Since the tribal areas is commercially rich in marbles, copper, limestone, fine-quality coal, manganese, gypsum, chromites, iron ore and coal. These could better be utilized only by the proper networks of routes and access of supply to the markets of these natural resources. Moreover a policy of public/private partnership would help a lot in utilizing the services of the respective sectors for the benefits of the public at large. This would result in bringing the youth at par with those of the developed areas of the country, thus diverting them from the detracted path of terrorism.

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) which has been there since the British regime needs to be withdrawn and replaced with the existing criminal law of the land. This obstructive law has given a sort of shelter and protection to the people of FATA in the wake of any criminal activity and is tried under it. This should be scrapped as soon as possible since it has been a big hurdle in the way of speedy trial and justice. In this context the government should take into consideration the recommendations of Peshawar High Court to the Parliament in April 2014 regarding making suitable amendments to Article 247(7) of the Constitution of 1973 of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan so as to extend the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to the whole of FATA.

According to John Seeley, democracy is a form of government in which all the members of the society have their due share. The people of FATA need this democratic share in terms of educational, political, economic, and legal rights. If these reforms are not introduced at the earliest then FATA would degenerate into the abysmal depth of terrorism and militancy. The government needs to pay more attention to the tribal areas of Pakistan that have earned the stigma of militancy/terrorism to Pakistan and has made it a nourishing place for the outfits and criminal enterprises.

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4.1.8 FATA and its Security

Security situation continues to be very volatile in the tribal areas of Pakistan and particularly in the areas bordering Afghanistan. The drawdown of foreign combat forces from Afghanistan as well as developments in U.S-Pakistan and Afghanistan’s relations are major factors. The on-going military operation of Zarb-e-Azab in FATA and its possible outcomes could also be seen as potentially contributing factors in the volatile security situation. Extremist militants in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, sectarian violence against Shias and Baloch insurgency in Baluchistan, target killing in Sindh and presence of hard core Jihadis in Punjab are unpredictable, predicting a gruesome picture of the country by having a direct bearing on the security situation of the country. For decades, the Pakistani state cultivated radical and militant groups as per requirements of regional foreign policy instruments in order to have influence in the region particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Some of these have increasingly become an internal menace and have been posing threat of heinous nature to the security of Pakistan. Most militant groups have their headquarters in FATA, provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Baluchistan – areas which have never been brought fully under the state’s control as they have been enjoying their own security system and Frontier Crimes Regulation. Several attempts to establish peace accords between Pakistan and insurgent groups within the last decade have failed. The latest attempt of a peace process in the spring of 2014 never reached to the level of substantive negotiations. The breakdown of talks was succeeded by a large-scale military operation with the purpose of bringing the area of North Waziristan under control and with a vision to abolish the archaic tribal rule in all of the areas. The Post Crisis Needs Assessment (PCNA) – Pakistan’s main peace- building and development strategy for the border region foresees long term interventions up to 2020 for the restoration of peace

4.2 Pak-Afghan Relations and Future Prospects

It is security concerns that has brought both Pakistan and Afghanistan together in so far as its pressing requirements are concerned as Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and

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Afghan intelligence agency NDS, have agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for coordinated intelligence operations against militants along the Pak-Afghan border after working for years against each other (Yousafzai, May 21, 2015). This happened recently and is now being put to test as already some intelligence sharing has taken place. This deal faced harsh criticism inside the Afghan Parliament where Members of Parliament labeled Pakistan as an enemy, but Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Pakistani government seem determined to make it work and improve relations between the two countries. Both Islamabad and Kabul seem determined to eradicate terrorism and cross border infiltration. Such is the uncertain nature of Pak-Afghan ties that after Karachi attack on Ismailis on May 13, 2015 Islamabad asked Kabul to close down RAW (secret intelligence agency of India) training camps in Afghanistan. Earlier in Kabul, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that the government of Pakistan would dismantle sanctuaries of militants harming Afghanistan if found in Pakistan. Prospects of Pak- Afghan military intelligence cooperation can be improved if serious concerns are shown by both the countries. No joint venture has been made by the two countries regarding proper border management, but drafts of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) being exchanged; no joint operations being conducted but there could be coordinated operations along the border areas (Yousafzai, May 21, 2015). Afghan forces took two actions against Pakistani and Afghan Taliban in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan but didn’t achieve much. U.S drone strikes were increased not only in Kunar and Nangarhar but all over Afghanistan to target the militants and insurgents.

But any Pak-Afghan military cooperation regarding security or military operation will be vulnerable to political and security situation of both the countries. Other countries such as Iran and India have interests in Afghanistan that is why peace cannot be restored in Afghanistan. This interest of alien hand in Afghanistan is fraught with high security risks for Pakistan. Any development in Afghanistan whether stability or instability has a direct impact on Pakistan whether negative or positive. Former President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai memorably described Afghanistan and Pakistan as conjoined twins (thus inseparable). According to prominent journalist Rahimullah Yousafzai one can change friends but not neighbors (Yousafzai, 2015). Afghanistan and Pakistan have to co-exist, being close neighbors and sharing many cultural and ethnic spheres. There have been

222 border clashes between the two countries whereby Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul and Consulate in Herat were attacked many times and even staff members were killed. Such was distrust and mistrust that Afghan government under Hamid Karzai opposed the construction of Dassu Dam, arguing that it would affect Afghanistan even though it is far away on River Indus and has no concern with the Afghan territory.

For better and cordial relation between the countries it is very necessary to develop consensus of opinion on almost all outstanding issues. The two countries need to refrain from the blame game and in case of any suspicious activity; a thorough scrutiny should be conducted by the joint investigation team of the two countries. The safe havens should be destroyed and conveted to check posts to be used for the purpose of surveillance. Regular meetings at Foreign Minister’s level need to be arranged for the redressal of outstanding issues. The issue of Durand Line and Pashtunistan should also be resolved according to the consensus of the two countries so as to avoid any future untoward action.

4.2.1 Prospects of Cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan

More than one lac (100,000) Pakistanis are working in Afghanistan in various projects. Most Afghans in the government of Afghanistan that are enjoying jobs on high echelons particularly in the bureaucracy and international organizations while thousands of Afghans are educated in Pakistani educational institutes. About 70-80 % Afghans seeking treatment abroad come to Pakistan for the purpose of treatment. Over 50,000 Afghans used to cross the Pak-Afghan border as per official crossing points at Torkham and Chaman to Pakistan without visa and any permit (Numbers decreased after APS attack on Dec 16, 2014). Afghanistan is the 3rd largest export market for Pakistani goods after U.S and China. Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan increased from $26m during Taliban rule in 2001 to $1.2b in 2010 & $2.4b in 2014. If we include informal trade annual figure is estimated at over $5b. Pakistan used its resources to assist Afghan armed groups and warlords; it is now also investing in Afghan people. Pakistan needs to extend cooperation to all Afghans instead of befriending a particular ethnic group (Pashtuns) or militant faction (Taliban). Pakistan gave $500 million for Afghan reconstruction projects (Yousafzai , May 21, 2015). The ongoing Pakistan-funded projects – 2nd Torkham-

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Jalalabad roads, hostel of Rehman Baba School and Jinnah Hospital in Kabul, Aminullah Logari Hospital in Logar, and Nishtar Kidney Centre in Jalalabad are some of the areas sponsored by Pakistan. Besides these Pakistan has held medical/eye camps, completed projects--rebuilt Rahman Baba School Kabul, Engineering Faculty Mazar-i-Sharif, Allama Iqbal Faculty of Humanities, Kabul University, Sir Syed Post-Graduate Faculty and Nangarhar University. These projects have been greatly indebted to Pakistan (Yousafzai, May 21, S 2015).

Pakistan is currently providing 3,000 scholarships to Afghan students for studying in different Professional Colleges and Universities in Pakistan, besides educating thousands of Afghan Refugee’s children. Kabul and Islamabad want to take formal trade to $5b. Currently Afghanistan exports to Pakistan are around $200 million. Relations between the two countries are troubled by the Durand Line and issue of Pashtunistan, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s support for Afghan Mujahedeen and later Taliban, ongoing conflict in Afghanistan-Pakistan region involving world and regional powers and non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Jihadi groups, low-level insurgency in Baluchistan, India’s role in Afghanistan. Almost 3 million Afghan refugees live in Pakistan, including 1.7 million registered (some unregistered refugees left after recent crackdown by the law enforcement agencies). Perhaps nowhere else in the world so many refugees (5million at one stage) lived for so long in another country without causing major social strife. President Karzai once said Durand Line border was “a line of hatred that raised a wall between two brothers.” Also alleged Pakistan asked him on every of his 20 visits to recognize Durand Line. Afghan Mujahedeen refused to accept it despite close ties to Pakistan. Taliban used to remark there should be no borders between Muslims.

4.2.2 Taliban’s Attack on Ghazni Jail in Afghanistan

On Sunday night, September 14, 2015 some Taliban attacked a central Jail in the Ghazni city of Afghanistan and released round about 355 criminals from the jail involved in different cases of heinous nature (The News, September 15, 2015). Of the 355 released prisoners, 148 were involved in cases of serious nature for attacking the security forces while 207 were convicted for other such charges and only a few were involved in cases of

224 minor nature. The insurgents were wearing the uniform of police according to Ministry of Interior (MOI). This was confirmed by the Deputy Provincial Governor of Ghazni, Maulvi Muhammad Ali Ahmad (Times , September 15, 2015). The insurgents stormed at the main gate with an explosion and started firing continuously as a result of which seven policemen were killed but five insurgents were also put to death.

This was a big blow to the law enforcement agencies of Afghanistan as a few days earlier the Taliban had been able to reach the Afghan Parliament crossing so many security checkpoints but to the utter dismay of the insurgents, a young and energetic soldier Muhammad Esa put all the insurgents to death in the premises of the parliament. The drawdown of ISAF from Afghanistan prognosticates Afghanistan for a chaotic situation and worse security situation as law and order seem to worsen due to the inefficiency and incompetency of the Afghan security forces. The Afghan security forces will still take time to gain control over the outlaws and insurgents as they are going to strengthen their position and security capabilities vis a vis the insurgents.

The Ghazni Jail episode finds close nexus with the tragic episode of PAF Badaber Camp Peshawar that was perpetrated quiet close in time and frequency having an interval of only three days which shows the reinvigorating worth of the Taliban. Both of these incidents caused huge losses to respective countries. In both of the incidents traditional methods of assault and warfare were adopted by the insurgents. In Afghanistan, the attack was conducted in the guise of Police Uniform while in Peshawar episode, the attack was perpetrated in the guise of FC Frontier Constabulary (FC). One can analyze that Taliban and insurgents are still using the traditional methods of warfare while conducting acts of terrorism and barbarism. The law enforcement agencies should focus more and more on adopting strategies so as to pervert any possible future threat and acts of terrorism/ insurgency.

4.2.3 Taliban Attack on Kunduz Province

On September 28, 2015, Afghan Taliban made an unexpected attack on the Kunduz Province, took control of the entire province and hoisted its own flag on the District Headquarter while setting the government buildings on fire. They also had a

225 successful assault on the Central Prison of Kunduz and released about 500 prisoners (The News, September 29, 2015). Earlier, on September 14, 2015 Taliban had been successful in releasing 355 prisoners as a consequence of attack on the Ghazni Central Prison. This second successful attempt by Taliban within a period of less than two weeks shows the growing popularity of Taliban and their precision of attacks. This is the first ever huge victory of Taliban after a span of 14 years since their ouster from power by the United States and its allied partners in 2001. Afghan security forces failed to retreat such a massive attack by Taliban which again shows the lack of professionalism of the Afghan forces as they had also failed in the Ghazni attack. Afghan Commander, Murad Ali Murad confirmed the attack by Taliban. The attack compelled the security forces to flee for personal security.

The breach of a provincial capital by Taliban after 14 years was of a very fierce nature as fighting raged the capital city and resulted in the extrication of 500 prisoners. This is first biggest victory of Taliban after a period of nine months since the NATO combat mission in Afghanistan came to an end in December 2014. It also marks a severe psychological blow to the western-trained Afghan security forces for the second time in the month of September this year. Police spokesman of Kunduz, Syed Sarwar Hussain also admitted that Taliban had taken control of the city but their forces were still resisting them in some areas (The News, September 29, 2015). Irreparable loss was caused to the local Headquarter of the National Directorate of Security, which is the main intelligence agency of the country that was put on fire. The Taliban also claimed to have got control of the 200-bed government hospital where the wounded people were provided treatment by the Taliban.

The fall of Kunduz will have great repercussions for the rest of Afghanistan as this would add a lot to the image of the new Afghan Taliban commander, and he would also utilize this opportunity to divert the attention of the insurgents and of the public over the rift that goes on inside the Taliban over the nomination of leadership of Taliban. It is also horrifying that Taliban have claimed to have sent armed troops to the provincial hospital for the treatment of their men. It is also important to note that on September 27, 2015, a tragic incident occurred in the eastern province of Paktika during a volley ball

226 match in which 13 people were killed and 33 wounded but this has been denied by Taliban (The News, September 29, 2015).

The takeover of Kunduz province by the Taliban has raised many questions on the security measures of the Afghan government. This has given a clear message to the Afghan government and the United States that the Taliban are capable of seizing any city and province in Afghanistan despite the fact that they have been fighting against the NATO forces for more than fourteen years. The energies of Taliban have not yet been exhausted and often time they fight with new zeal and fervor. The gains from the war seem marginal on part of the United States as the Taliban still remain a unified force despite the death of Mullah Omer (Prashad, 2015). One of the aims of the Afghan war in the war against terror was to suppress the Al-Qaeda while certainly the command and control section of Al-Qaeda operational at the international level was disrupted by the allied forces but it still remains intact as a force. Now, the Al-Qaeda’s old allies had moved to the Northern part of Afghanistan and for the Kunduz attack the Taliban had to rely on three associates: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and Jamaat Ansarallah (JA). These groups are detrimental to the security paradigm of the neighboring countries and particularly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for their easy accessibility to these countries.

People in the law enforcement agencies also tend to move towards the insurgency and terrorism which has further jeopardized the security situation at regional level and global level. The defection of Gulmurod Khalimov to ISIS, a colonel in the Tajik Special Forces, is very deplorable for the regional security as he had been to the United States three times for being trained as a soldier to fight against terrorism and insurgency (Prashad, October 7, 2015). People like these are aware of the ground realities of lapses in the existing structure of security. They know the knowhow of modern warfare and tactics of fighting in a different way. The insurgency of Iraq and Syria has compelled personnel like these to opt for the activities of the Non-state actors for getting their self- styled demands realized. The Al-Qaeda grew in strength in this way in the old times. Both the Al-Qaeda and ISIS have strong links of identity and work in close collaboration as during the attack on Kunduz by the Taliban, the ISIS struck ten Afghan Army and

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Police posts in Nangarhar province. The rich mining wealth of Afghanistan lies between Kunduz and Nangarhar provinces and have inroads into the Xinjiang province of China. By capturing these two provinces the insurgents can have easy access to mining wealth of Afghanistan as well as the resources of China. This can form a trajectory of three nations and can prove to be harmful to the security of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan.

4.3 Lessons from the fall of Kunduz

The fall of Kunduz to the hands of Taliban has faced Afghanistan with a new dilemma of security and has testified the predictions of the analysts that Taliban may reemerge in Afghanistan with greater strength and force. It has also an alarming call for the United States and allied force that further drawdown of ISAF from Afghanistan will leave the security gaps unfilled and will fill Afghanistan with grave security risks (Sehgal, October 11, 2015). This has put in question the capabilities of the ANSF that has claimed on many occasions that it is well equipped to cope with any untoward situation arising out of extremism, insurgency and terrorism. The decrease in the counter- terrorism strategy of the United States would further worsen security situation in Afghanistan. The fall of Kunduz gives double message to the ISAF as well as the ANSF that Non-State Actors in Afghanistan are hard to fight and cannot be eliminated completely as the ISAF could not eliminate them during its 14-years of stay in Afghanistan. The subsequent struggle by the ANSF to regain Kunduz is prognosticative of the fact that the security system of the entire country needs to be streamlined as per the requirements of the international standard. Only an effective security system coupled with an integrated political leadership can save the country and take it out of the existing quagmire.

Both the ISAF and security forces of Afghanistan should learn from the fall of Kunduz and the “lessons must be learnt” not forgotten. But it is also an eye opener for Pakistan that it will have a direct bearing on the security of Pakistan since Pakistan sided with the ISAF in the war against terror in the aftermath of 9/11 tragic episode. The government of Pakistan also needs to ponder over the threat of impending terrorism and extremism to both Pakistan and Afghanistan on account of the alignment of the Haqqanis and Al-Qaeda to the new Taliban leader, Mullah Mansur. The threat of ISIS in Pakistan is

228 another Hanging Sword of Damocles with the nexus to the Taliban. Great concern was expressed by Gen. Raheel Sharif, (COAS) while on a visit to Afghanistan in February 2015 (Sehgal, October 11, 2015). The General reiterated that the enemies of Afghanistan were the enemies of Pakistan. The same feelings were expressed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz Sharif in May 2015 during his visit of Kabul urging that Afghanistan’s enemies would be treated as the enemy of Pakistan.

Nawaz telephones Ashraf Ghani to express sorrow over Kabul attack

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif telephoned Afghanistan's President Ashraf Ghani on July 25, 2016 to express his sorrow and grief at the Kabul terrorist attack, which took place on July 23rd, 2016. According to details, the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif spoke to Ashraf Ghani and told him that terrorism was a mutual enemy of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. President Ashraf Ghani told Nawaz that Pakistan and Afghanistan had both suffered due to terrorism over the past decade and the only way forward for both countries was to work together to eliminate this menace altogether (Dawn,July 25, 2016). The Pakistani Premier conveyed his feelings of sympathy and grief over the loss of lives in Saturday's Kabul attack and said that the people of Pakistan

229 were with the people and government of Afghanistan in their time of need. Nawaz also said that Pakistan believed in combating terrorism and militancy via sincere and joint efforts with Afghanistan. Nawaz also assured Ghani of Pakistan's full cooperation in the investigation of the attack.

President Ashraf Ghani thanked Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and appreciated his condolences. Ashraf Ghani also said that Pakistan and Afghanistan were united in the fight against terrorism. A deadly bomb blast in Kabul on Saturday had claimed the lives of 80 people and injured scores of others. A protest march led by members of the Hazara Community was the main target of the attack. Both the top leaders agreed to work in close collaboration with each other as the enemies of both the countries were the same that has put the security apparatus on high alert for the last 15 years.

4.4 United States and the War on Terror

In the post-9/11 scenario, the United States started the Global War on Terror (GWOT) with the sole aim of curbing terrorism having no restriction of time and space. This allowed the United States to strike anywhere and wherever it wished to have found any clue of terrorism. The GWOT was replaced by the Obama administration with a new name as Overseas Contingency Operation (OCE). Irrespective of the nomenclature, the United States since 9/11 spent huge amount of money and available resources over the war against terrorism. According to a Congressional Study conducted in December 2014, the total bill over the past thirteen years stood at $ 1.6 trillion (Prashad, 2015). Thus the United States is spending $ 8.36 million per hour on the war that has not yet ended. While according to an estimate conducted by the Watson Institute of Brown University in 2011 the cost of the war showed to be almost double of that amount, which stood at the range of $2.3 to $2.7 trillion (Prashad, 2015). The costs to human lives from this terrible war have also been very astounding. About a quarter million of people have died in Afghanistan with one millions of people displaced during the war. The catastrophic results of the war on terror have been very horrible in the modern world because modern techniques of warfare have been applied by the United States and allied forces but victory still seems to be a far cry for them. They have jumped into the abysmal depth of the ocean where retreat is possible but where victory does not seem to shape their future

230 destiny. The United States has spent enormous amount of money in Iraq and other countries of the world but could not grip the security situation in their own hands. The United States should also learn from the situations of Iraq and Afghanistan that war is not the only alternative and issues of international nature cannot be resolved through wars only. The ISIS has now become a very vibrant element in some of the countries and this can spend much more of the United States’ wealth as it is not confined to a single state. It is operational in many countries of the world and has gained momentum as a non-state actor of international level. These attacks on Ghazni and Kunduz had great security implications for Pakistan as they were close in time and accuracy to the attacks in the settled areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. After these attacks, a series of terrorist attacks started in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that resulted in great losses to the human beings.

4.5 Terrorists’ attack on PAF Camp Badaber Peshawar

On September 18, 2015 early in the morning, some terrorists dressed in the uniform of Frontier Constabulary (FC) entered PAF Airbase Badaber Peshawar from two different gates that were equipped with rocket-launchers, hand-grenades and automatic weapons. The terrorists after entering through two different gates further split into smaller groups while carrying on their mission (News, 2015). The incident took the lives of 29 officials including 16 worshippers who were busy in offering their prayers and 7 others who were making preparations for the prayer in their barracks. Security forces led by the Quick Reaction/Response Force (QRF) cleared the base after exchange of firing that continued for a couple of hours resulting in the death of 13 assailants. The 29 officials also included a Captain (Asfandyar) that was martyred in the incident. The total number of death-casualties stood at 42. The incident was the second biggest one in Pakistan after a period of about 9 months when on December 16, 2014 some terrorists had entered Army Public School in Peshawar as result of which 147 people, including 122 teenagers of the school were killed in the most brutal and barbaric way. In this episode the group of assailants comprised eight attackers that had entered the Masjid and had killed those who were busy in offering prayers and preparing for the prayers, were gunned down in the proximity of the mosque. While the seven other assailants were

231 killed on the other side of the base as they had used that gate for the accomplishment of their mission according to DG Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Asim Salim Bajwa (News, 2015).

Responsibility for the incident was claimed by Khalifa Omer Mansur, who is said to belong to Adizai village, which is located in the remote area of Peshawar district on the boundary with the tribal area of Darra Adam Khel and who is said to have taken refuge in the Nangarhar province of Afghanistan (The News, Sep 19, 2015). Khalifa Omer Mansur is considered to be the faithful servant of Maulana Fazlullah who has also taken shelter in Afghanistan. Khalifa Omer is the same person who took the responsibility of the gruesome attack on the Army Public School Peshawar last year in December 2014. Thus a close relation seems to exist between the incidents that happened in Peshawar within a period of about 9 months and that too in the city of Peshawar and whose responsibility has been claimed by the same mastermind. The strategy of the terrorists was not a different one as they wore the uniform of FC and were equipped with mostly the traditional weapons of warfare that are used by the terrorists

Thus the drawdown of NATO forces from Afghanistan is more likely to worsen the security situation of Pakistan and in particular the security of KP and FATA since they are bordered by the areas of Afghanistan. The porous Pak-Afghan border has been very detrimental to the security paradigm of Pakistan and particularly the adjacent areas. About 2.5 million Afghan Refugees are still residing in different areas of Pakistan but mostly they reside in Peshawar and FATA and the terrorists seek refuge in the ‘Safe Havens’ after the accomplishment of their mission in the targeted areas. It is also a fact that about 25,000-35,000 Afghans enter Pakistan on daily basis through the Torkham border of Khyber Agency. According to DG ISPR, Asim Salim Bajwa, it is very difficult to keep a vigilant eye on every entrant coming from across the border region (The News, September 19, 2015). Since people across the border have close relations and family affiliations that bond them together and meet their relatives and friends on a routine basis. Other routes are also used by the population for the purpose of meeting their relatives besides the different passes that connect the two countries are also used by the population. The people across both sides of the border oppose any move adopted by the

232 government and law enforcement agencies for the purpose of security as they have been un-ruled for many years and have their own code of life and FCR to be governed.

4.6.1 Mullah Omer’s Death: Challenges for Pakistan

The announcement of the death news of Mullah Omer by Taliban leadership has created great controversy and leadership vacuum in Afghanistan for the Afghan Taliban, giving rise to uncertainties for the Afghan Taliban regarding the future fate and peace prospects in Afghanistan. Keeping secret the news of his death by Khalifa Omer Mansur, raises many questions as to whether he wanted to maintain his control over the Afghan Taliban or strengthen his position as a new leader or prevent uprising of dissentions among the Taliban (Masood, 2015). Delaying the death news of Mullah Omer for about two years shows lack of confidence on part of Omer Mansur as he assumed that orders issued in the name of Mullah Omer would be carried out in true spirit and would not be questioned by the Taliban. Being a hermit since US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, it was easy and most expected to hide the news of his death though he was considered by some of his followers to be infallible. It is also important to mention that he was believed by some journalists to have died at a hospital in Karachi while other asserts that he died in Afghanistan in 2013.

With the death news now an open secret, Mullah Omer Mansur faces a challenge of exerting the authority of himself as a legitimate and supreme leader of Taliban. It is also a matter of concern as to why did he keep secret the news of his death for such a long time. One can derive from it the fact that he lacked confidence in himself but it can also be derived that he kept the secrecy for strategic purposes as the two major attacks in Peshawar, one on December 16, 2014 and the current one of PAF Airbase Badaber (Peshawar) on September 18, 2015 and the responsibility of both are claimed by Omer Mansur. The new Afghan Taliban commander seems to be a revengeful and stubborn leader who has refused to have peace talks with the government of Afghanistan. It may also be derived that Omer Mansur may have kept the news of Mullah Omer’s death for strategic purpose and would strive to gain advantage over the government and keep all the discordant Taliban united under his leadership. It is also significant to note that the new Afghan Taliban commander has not been successful in unifying the entire Taliban of

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Afghanistan. The stubbornness of Afghan leader by declining to have peace talks with the government has a direct bearing on the Taliban leadership of Pakistan. The latter usually follow the doctrine of the former in case of any development while showing their consensus on most of the important issues.

In the peace negotiations that were carried out between the government of Afghanistan and the insurgents, there was no representation from Taliban which further substantiates the view that Taliban are not interested in any peace initiative with the government of Afghanistan. But the other side of the picture says that leadership tussle is going on there inside the top circles of Afghan Taliban and there is possibility of splintering of the Taliban movement. Some groups under the leadership of Mullah Zakir have threatened to dissuade itself from the Taliban led by Mullah Omer Mansur. In case of dissociation from the main body, there are threats that they may join the Islamic State (IS) or Al-Qaeda which will further complicate the security situation in Afghanistan as the government had to face a new threat of insurgency. There are also possibilities that foreign insurgents may avail the opportunity and would join hands with the new group of insurgents.

It is the cry of the day that both Pakistan and Afghanistan need to focus on security concerns as the prime responsibility of both the countries lie with regard to strengthen the overall security apparatus and particularly the border security from which both would suffer and benefit. Both the countries need to focus more on the joint security as they are passing from bad to worse security scenarios. The recent storming of Ghazni Central Jail in Afghanistan by Taliban in which 355 prisoners were released while just after three days of this incident the tragedy of PAF Camp Badaber (Peshawar) happened in which many 41 people lost their lives have close nexus with each other as the two incidents were conducted in the uniform of law enforcement agencies. The main point of concern here is that the perpetrators of the attack take shelter in the safe havens and sanctuaries that mainly lie on the Pak-Afghan border. It is also important to note that the Islamic State (IS) is making inroads into Pakistan and the security of FATA should be the central focus for the government of Pakistan as improved governance of far-flung areas in Pakistan is too critical (The News, 2015). The popularity of the IS falsifies the view

234 that it will be difficult for the movement to find its way into Afghanistan as the presence of the movement has been seen in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kandahar, and Helmand (The News, 2015). The new threat would keep on alert the security agencies of both the countries and would further adopt measures to avert any untoward threat that would jeopardize the security of the country. Moreover, the death of Mullah Omer would place Pakistan on a challenging position to renew its ties with the new Taliban leader since Pakistan has enjoyed cordial relations with the Taliban during the leadership of Mullah Omer. Taliban leadership remained faithful to Pakistani government during Taliban era but the incident of 9/11 turned the situation in the reverse direction by making the soil of Pakistan a hot ground for the insurgent activities.

4.7 Death of Mullah Mansour

The United States killed Mullah Omer Mansur, leader of the Afghan Taliban in a drone attack inside Pakistan on May 21, 2016 (Baabar, 23 May, 2016). According to US officials, the Saturday strikes were allowed by the President of the United States, Barrack Obama that included multiple of drone attacks showing the preparedness of the US to go after top leadership of Taliban (Baabar, 23 May 2016). The news of Mullah Mansur’s death was confirmed by the Chief Executive of Afghan Government Abdullah Abdullah as well as the top intelligence agency also said that he (Mullah Mansur) had been killed. The Chief Executive further added on a twitter that he was killed in a drone strike; his car was attacked in a drone attack near Naushki in Dalbadin, a District of Balochistan just bordering Pakistan (Baabar, 23 May 2016). John Kerry, US Secretary of State, stated that the United States had conducted a precision air strike targeting Mansur “in a remote area of Afghanistan-Pakistan Border”. Mansur posed a “continuing, imminent threat” to the United States’ personnel and Afghans. Kerry stressed that those who stood in the way of peace would be dealt with an iron hand and that act was justified since he stood in the way of peace process in Afghanistan. He also added that both the leadership of Pakistan and Afghanistan were notified of the Saturday air strike and also told that he had talked to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif on telephone. A statement of the President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani said that on Sunday the Taliban wanted to end bloodshed by having agreed to peace talks with the government but the drone attack opened a new

235 chapter for them as well as the Taliban leadership (Baabar, 23 May 2016). Diverse views were expressed by the various personnel of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States.

I. A US official of Washington said that Drones targeted Mansur and another combatant in a vehicle in a remote area of Balochistan, southwest of the town of Ahmad Wal. II. An official of the Pakistani government said that a car had been blown up in the area where two unidentified men had been killed. III. One of the commanders of Taliban, who dismissed the report of the death of Mullah Mansur in a drone attack, said that the attack had created alarm in the ranks and files of Afghan Taliban as well as Pakistani Taliban.

It is also a fact that in December 2015, Mullah Mansour was reportedly wounded and possibly killed in a shootout at the house of an insurgent leader in Pakistan but Taliban released the audio of Mullah Mansur dispelling the death news (Baabar, May 23, 2016). Main security agency of the Afghan government, National Directorate for Security (NDS) also confirmed the death of Mullah Mansur. Pakistani officials have said that they have recovered two dead bodies from the smoldering vehicle at the scene of the attack that were beyond recognition. However, the government of Pakistan on Sunday confirmed that the U.S had shared information with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Chief of the Army Staff General Raheel Sharif late Saturday that drone attack had been carried out in Pakistan along the Pak-Afghan border in which Mullah Mansur had lost his life (Baabar, 23 May 2016).

A spokesman of the Foreign Office of Pakistan condemned the attack as voilative of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Moreover, this will also have a negative impact on the Afghan peace process with the Taliban and other non-state actors. The US is trying to justify the death of Mullah Mansour by stating that Mullah Mansour was against the peace process in Afghanistan but it is not based upon any solid reasoning as it was Mullah Mansour himself who authorized the Murree round of Peace Talks in the name of Mullah Omer. Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada, the new Taliban leader, in his very first announcement made it clear to continue fighting against the government of Afghanistan. As long as the insurgents are in un-defeating position, they do not come to

236 the negotiating table. The same is the case with Taliban, who have been fighting against the U.S and Afghan government for the last fifteen years and have largely remained undefeated. US Presidential Candidate, Donald Trump has recently said, “I think you [American Forces] have to stay in Afghanistan for a while, because of the fact that you are right next to Pakistan, which has nuclear weapons and we have to protect them”.

The US House of Representatives has recently passed a bill to the effect that Pakistan will have to take strict action against the Haqqani network; otherwise their share of aid under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) will be reduced. Despite, accusing Pakistan of all the enmity of Afghanistan, the US needs to carve out a comprehensive plan to clear Afghanistan as well as the Pak-Afghan border areas from TTP and other such like non-state actors. Only then can peace and stability be restored in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan and the entire region provided these non-state actors are removed once for all. Besides, parties in the unitary government should also bury the hatchet and bridge their differences by overcoming all their internal differences in order to make Afghanistan stable and prosperous.

4.8 New Taliban Leader

The Afghan Taliban on May 25, 2016, confirmed the death of Mullah Mansour and announced the appointment of Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada, as a new “emir” of Taliban. Spokesman of Taliban, Zabihullah Mujahid through a communiqué conceded that Mulah Akhtar Mansour had been killed in a drone strike by the “American tyrant” somewhere “between the border regions of deserts of Kandahar and Naushki District of Balochistan” (Khan ,26 May 2016). Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada is Noorzai Pashtun and is said to be in his 50s who belongs to the South-western province of Kandahar’s Punjwai District. He is believed to be non-combatant and is well known for his extensive knowledge in the field of Islamic jurisprudence.

According to Rustam Shah Mohmand, former Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, “Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada has been chosen as a new leader to ensure and maintain unity”. He further said that he was un-controversial leader and would manage the movement for some time. Sirajuddin Haqqani and Maulvi Muhammad Yaqub

237 were also chosen to be his deputies. The communiqué also stressed by assuring all “mujahedeen and the people at large not to worry”, saying that they would continue to carry the torch of Islam and jihad till the Day of Judgment under the newly appointed leader, Sheikh Haibaullah Akhunzada”.

Maulvi Muhammad Yaqub, the twenty-something son of Mullah Omer, is a recent graduate form a Madrassa and lacks fighting experience on the war-field. Analysts are of the view that his selection mainly aims at the point that he would keep the entire Afghan Taliban united. It is also a fact that both Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada and Maulvi Muhammad Yaqub lack experience on the battle-field but analysts think that Sirajuddin Haqqani, the leader of Haqqani network, would really enjoy real powers by conducting major attacks and war enterprises (Khan, 26 May 2016). Sirajuddin Haqqani is believed to be a Khalifa among the Afghan Taliban and is regarded by the United States as the man responsible for the death of hundred of U.S and thousands of Afghan security personnel. He is considered to be the head of most lethal and deadly insurgent network and has head value of $10 million by the United States. Rustam Shah Mohmand said that the nomination of Sirajuddin Haqqani would have created great problems for Pakistan as he “leads his own group which he has aligned with Taliban. “The network of Sirajuddin Haqqani operates in Khost, Paktia, Paktika, and Kabul while the Taliban have sway in the much of Afghanistan. His nomination as the new emir of Taliban would have created more complications and caused more divisions. Rustam Shah Mohmand prognosticates that he sees the future of Afghanistan bleaker and thinks that a new impetus of war in Afghanistan after Ramazan would overpower the country (Khan, May 26, 2016).

4.9 Killing of Al-Qaeda and Taliban during summer

According to a survey undertaken by the Jang Group and Geo Television Network most of the formidable leaders of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban were either captured or killed on the Pakistan and Afghanistan soil during the hot summer stretching between April and October (Shah, May 25, 2016). It is also during the merciless hot summer that the death of the much feared Afghan war-lords like Mullah Omer, Jalalauddin Haqqani and Mullah Mansour have surfaced in the western social media. Mullah Omer, the founder and

238 spiritual leader of Taliban was reportedly said to have died his natural death in April 2013 but his death was confirmed on July 29, 2015 by the Afghan government and Taliban leadership.

The death news of Jalalauddin was revealed by British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on July 31, 2015 stating that the Afghan founder of the militant Haqqani network had died due to protracted illness. The British media stated that Jalalauddin died as a result of long illness and was buried in Afghanistan. His death-news came just two days after the confirmation of the death of Mullah Omer. The BBC had reported that Jalalauddin was an Afghan guerilla who had fought against the Soviet forces during their occupation of Afghanistan in 1980s. The US officials have admitted that Jalalauddin was a prized asset of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at that time. However, he allied himself with the Taliban after they took power in Afghanistan in 1996 and served as a Cabinet Minister under the supreme leadership of Mullah Omer (Shah, May 25, 2016).

Osama Bin Laden, another supreme leader of the Al-Qaeda network was gunned down by the U.S marine in the picturesque town of Abbottabad on May 2, 2011. On September 15, 2012 another important operative of Al-Qaeda known as Ramzi Binalshibh was captured in Kaachi and handed over to the Federal Board of Investigation (FBI). Mullah Abdul Razzak, another prominent stalwart of the Afghan Taliban was captured by the Afghan forces on April 1, 2003 from the rugged mountainous region north of Afghanistan while his son Abdul was killed on September 5, 2002 after trying to shoot the then Afghan President, Hamid Karzai (Shah, 25 May 2016).

In April 2003, Khalid bin Attash or Walid bin Attash, who was believed to be the main suspect of the October 2000 attack on the American Naval Ship “US Cole” at Aden was captured in Karachi and was handed over to the U.S authorities for further investigation. Another prominent member of the Taliban, Mullah Ghausuddin was killed in gun battle in the Zabul province of Afghanistan. Maulvi Nek Muhammad, another senior commander of the Taliban in South Waziristan was hit by a US drone attack in Pakistan for having links with the Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omer. On July 30, 2004, after a long- 14 hour operation, a Tanzian national and most wanted terrorist of the Al- Qaeda known as Ahmad Khalfan Ghailani was arrested in Gujrat city of Punjab. He was

239 much wanted to the U.S for being involved in the attack on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. In August 2004, an Al-Qaeda computer wizard, known as Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan was arrested in Lahore for having close links with Khalfan Ghailani, who was arrested in Gujrat just a few days ago.

On May 2, 2005, another senior stalwart of the Al-Qaeda Abu Faraj al-Libi or Mustafa al-Uzayti was arrested in Mardan, a District of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). He was handed over to the US authorities where he was sent to the Guantanamo Bay for further investigation. Libyan by origin, Libi was believed to be an Al-Qaeda’s number three at the time of his arrest and the head of the organization functional in Pakistan. In May 2006, credible US Wire Agency Associated Press had revealed that a man called Mustafa Setmarian Nasar was seized during a sting operation in the city of Quetta. The dual Syrian-Spanish national was carrying a head value of $5 million. Nasar was involved in Madrid train bombing in Spain in 2004 and was also wanted to the government of Spain, who was suspected to be the planner of London bombings of July 7, 2005.

On May 14, 2008, chief of Al-Qaeda’s external network, Abu Sulayman Jazairi, was killed by the American forces. He was a senior trainer, an expert, and an operational commander tasked with the planning attacks on the west. On July 28, 2008, Abu Khahab al Masri, who was the chief of Al-Qaeda’s weapons of mass destruction program and master bomb maker, was killed. On July 3, 2009, Mufti Noor Wali, a suicide bomber trainer for the Al-Qaeda and Taliban, was killed in Pakistan. On August 5, 2009, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a US drone strike while he was staying with his second wife at his father-in-law’s house in Zangar area of South Waziristan. He was the most feared militant of Pakistan, accused of scores of suicide bombings and attacks in Pakistan.

In August 2009, another strong man of the Al-Qaeda, Tohir Yuldashev, was killed in a U. S predator air strike, shortly after the death of Baitullah Mehsud. He was an Uzbek by birth, had lost a leg and an arm in the drone attack on August 27, 2009 and was rushed to a hospital in Zhob District of Balochistan, and where he later succumbed to injuries. On September 14, 2009, an Uzbek Jihadi leader and close Al-Qaeda ally,

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Najmuddin Jalolov, was murdered. On May 21, 2010, top Al-Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu Yazid, also known as Sheikh Saeed al Misri, who was an eminent leader of Al-Qaeda and top financial supporter, was severely injured by a U.S air strike and subsequently succumbed to injuries. On May 28, 2010, the US airstrike in Pakistan claimed to have taken the life of Osama bin Ali bin Abdullah bin Damjan al Dawsari, who was supposed to be a key link and supporter of Taliban in South Waziristan.

In June 2010, Abu Ahmad, who was an Al-Qaeda military commander and who had conducted operations in Afghanistan, lost his life in an airstrike by the U.S. On September 14, 2010, a stalwart of Haqqani network known as Saifullah Haqqani and also a cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani was hit by a U.S airstrike. On June 13, 2011, another formidable terrorist of the Al-Qaeda network, known as Ilyas Kashmiri was hit down by a U.S airstrike in South Waziristan. He was considered as one of the most important strategists with much experience in the war-field and was also considered to be the successor of Osama bin Laden after his death. On August 22, 2011, Attiya Abd al Rahman, a senior commander of AL-Qaeda and who had served as Osama bin Laden’s chief of staff and top ranking military commander, was killed by the airstrikes of the U.S. On September 11, 2011, Abu Hafs al Shahri, a senior Al-Qaeda leader and Chief of Operations, was hit by a US airstrike. On September 30, 2011, Haleemullah, a deputy commander to North Waziristan Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadar, was targeted by the U.S airstrike. On October 13, 2011, Abu Miqdad al Masri, a member of the Shura of Al- Qaeda and who was involved in the external operations of Al-Qaeda, was killed by the U.S drone attack. Jan Baz Zadran, a deputy of Sirajuddin Haqqani, was also taken down on October 13, 2011.

On October 14, 2011, a senior Al-Qaeda operative, Ahmad Omer Abdul Rahman, was killed by a U.S drone strike. He had close ties with the Haqqani network and was the son of the “Blind Sheikh” the spiritual leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group, who is in the prison of the United States for his involvement in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center (WTO). On April 29, 2012, a well known operative of Al-Qaeda known as Abu Usman Adil, who was the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMOU) and was concerned with the expansion of the movement in Afghanistan, was struck by a US

241 drone attack. On June 4, 2012, Abu Yahya al Libi, a Libyan by birth had served the Al- Qaeda as Chief of Staff and senior cleric was struck by a U.S drone strike. Mullah Dadullah, another senior commander of Taliban, was killed by the British and American Special Forces in Afghanistan in the summer of 2012. Mullah Dadullah was the self- proclaimed leader of Taliban in the Bajaur Agency of Pakistan that borders Kunar province of Afghanistan.

4.10 Afghan Spies in Pakistan

Terrorism in Pakistan mainly owes its origin to the presence of foreign elements in the state of Pakistan. Of all the foreign elements, the spies of India and Afghanistan are on the top of the list of the law enforcement agencies. Six agents of the Afghan Intelligence Agency National Directorate of Security (NDS) who were involved in target- killings and bomb-blasts in different parts of Balochistan were arrested on Thursday, May 26, 2016, according to Mir Sarfaraz Ahmad Bugti, Home Minister of Balochistan (Shahid, May 27, 2016). Those who were arrested were identified as five Afghan nationals while the sixth was a Pakistani national but all of them were on the payroll of the NDS and stayed at different Refugee Camps of the Afghan.

Five of them were identified as Mehboob, Asmatulllah, Abdullah Shah, Ahmedullah, and Noor Ahmad Nourazi, who are residents of the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand, while the sixth spy was identified as Muhammad Shafi who belongs to the Pishin District of Balochistan. The Home Minister said that two of the spies were involved in carrying out bomb blasts while four of them were involved in target-killings in different parts of Balochistan. At least 40 innocent people are reported to have been killed by these spies in different parts of Pishin and Chaman.

The agents confessed their crimes, when they (spies) were shown videos of their crimes and said that they had been working for the NDS and pay them heavy amount of ransom. Upon interrogation, the spies said that they were taken to Kandahar and Kabul by the officials of NDS where they met senior officials of the NDS including General Malik, General Momin and General Naeem Baloch who persuaded them (spies) to conduct bomb blasts and target-killing, said Asmatulllah in his video statement. Noor

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Ahmad Nourzai in a video statement confirmed that they confessed that NDS had paid them Rs.15 million in Kabul and further said that they had been receiving Rs. 250, 000 a month and Rs. 80,000 per target-killing. The arrested spies had also acquired the National Identity Cards issued by the NADRA after paying Rs. 30,000 to 40,000 to the officials of NADRA (Shahid, May 27, 2016). They also admitted the fact that they had been trained in Afghanistan for carrying out subversive activities in Balochistan.

The Home Minister of Balochistan said the secret agents of Afghanistan (NDS) and India (RAW) who have been residing in the Afghan Refugee Camps are attempting to foment unrest in Balochistan and destabilize Pakistan but our security forces have been able to foil their nefarious designs. He also recalled the event when Afghan Army Officer, Roozi Khan who belonged to Helmand Province and was arrested in the Chaman city of Balochistan. He urged for the soon repatriation of the Afghan Refugees to their motherland otherwise the government of Pakistan would be compelled to expel them from Pakistan through the law enforcement agencies. Any further delay would force the people of Balochistan to push refugees back to their country forcibly.

4.10.1 Banned Outfits in the post Mullah Mansour Era

According to a report published in the daily The News, a number of banned outfits are still recruiting Jihadis in different parts of the country. This has put a question mark on the functioning and implementation of the various strategies to eliminate terrorism from every nook and corner of the country. The National Action Plan also seems to have some weak areas in the implementation process in the aftermath of which some terrorist organizations are still operating in the country (Gishkori, May 28, 2016). Some of the major banned outfits are still recruiting young students to wage jihad in the Indian Held Kashmir and Afghanistan. These non-state actors have created great security concerns for Pakistan as they are not only fighting in the Indian Held Kashmir and Afghanistan but also in Pakistan where they find an opportunity. The Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) Punjab in its 111 pages confidential report has revealed that 32 proscribed terrorist organizations with 9 splinter groups are operational in different parts of the country and have now become “ a nursery for spreading terrorism in the country” (Gishkori, May 28, 2016).

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Banned Organizations like Islamic State (Daesh) and Hizb-e-Tahreer (HuT) are also gaining momentum by establishing a special wing in the country where their commanders are recruiting militants and extremists. These terrorist networks are carrying out their activities in the adjacent areas of Bahawalpur, Muridke, Sialkot and southern parts of Punjab (Gishkori, 2016). The HuT is enticing the young blood in the colleges and universities through social media by motivating them to wage a war against the US interests in the country. The Jaish-e Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) are still nourishing militants and who, after submerging into Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP), al- Qaeda and al-Daesh (Islamic State) etc. are seriously damaging the state institutions. The LeT and LeJ have established 2,200 offices across the country. The estranged followers of JeM and Jammat-u-Dawwa (JuD) were found to be joining hands with Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan and Al-Qaeda.

The document further revealed that the United Baloch Army (UBL), Lashkar-e- Balochistan (LeB) is funded by the Indian premier intelligence Agency, Research & Analysis Group (RAW) and other foreign organizations. The followers of Baloch organizations are demanding freedom from the government of Pakistan and also denying the claims to have received funding from the Indian government and other foreign organizations. The secret document also stated that Al-Akhtar Trust operating under the leadership of Maulana Shah Hakim of Khanqa Imdaya Ashrafia Karachi was supporting fighters in Afghanistan and Iraq. Al-Akhtar Trust is also claimed to have provided logistic support to the followers of banned organizations in Pakistan.

Some of the workers of Jamat-e-Islami (JI) who had accepted Jihad by heart also joined hands with militant groups after they believed that their party would not let them conduct jihad, counter terrorism officials wrote in their findings. But the JI has strongly rebutted the findings of the Counter Terrorism Department Punjab against its followers being engaged in terrorist activities. Chief spokesman of the JI, Professor Ibrahim strongly rebutted the charges and said that the party believed in peace and patriotism.

Spokesman of the JuD, Yahya Mujahid denied the charges of their party being involved in the activities of terrorism and said that their organization was only involved in welfare activities. He further opined that,” we are a peaceful organization having

244 nothing to do with the LeT. Our Jammat is against banned outfits and its followers never joined hands with militant groups like Daesh, etc (Gishkori, 2016).

4.11 Budgeting For Security

One of the most important features of this financial year budget is the winding up of the military operation in North Waziristan. With the successful culmination of the military operation in the Shawal Valley in the mid-April 2016 that was started seven years ago in May 2009 with the constant fighting between the army and the TTP which continued till the capture of Shawal Valley, will be wound down (Husain, May 31, 2016). It is also important to mention that last year the government was forced to seek relaxation of 0.3 pc of Gross Domestic Fund (GDP) in the budget deficit target set with International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is tantamount to Rs.100 billion. This was done with a view to meet the extraordinary, unbudgeted and “one-off” expenditures arising out of Operation Zarb-e-Azab against the terrorists. In the current financial year’s budget, there is an increase of Rs.100 billion under the same head one more time, to meet the challenges of “capacity building of the armed forces’ as well as the cost related to the Internally Displaced Persons(IDPs) (Husain, 2016). However it also includes the cost of creating one division of security for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

The non-stop fighting between the army of Pakistan and the militant groups since 2009 has caused heavy toll in blood and treasure from the country. During this operation the areas from Swat, Bajaur, and Khyber to South Waziristan and North Waziristan have been mainly the main concerns for the law enforcement agencies. According to a report of the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), of the 60, 000 military and civilian casualties during this operation, the country has suffered more than 47,000 casualties during the period when these combat operations were started in Swat and the tribal agencies in 2009. More than two million people have been displaced due to fighting which has put Pakistan on number 10 in the world in terms of the largest Internally Displaced Persons. By all means the seven years long combat by the Pak Army against the militants has been the most ferocious and heavy death-casualties fight that the army has ever undertaken. This has also cost a heavy budget on defense resulting in a 50 pc increase since 2009 which coincidently was the first year when the defense budget was presented in the

245 parliament since 1964, as a proportion of total expenditure it has remained constant at around 12 pc (Husain, May 31, 2016). The military operations appear to have largely been paid for through grants, and in 2010 the finance ministry approved grant expenditure for the Malakand Operations amounting to Rs.93 billion.

There has been a tremendous increase in the militant attacks in Pakistan in the month of November as compared to the month of October. It has recorded a total of 52 militant attacks resulting in the death of 53 people including the death of 22 security personnel and 74 injuries including 12 security personnel. The month of November recorded 43 attacks of militancy in which 101 people lost their lives while 110 received injuries (The News, December 5, 2015). It is also important to note that there has been a tremendous increase in the militant attacks in the month of November but the death casualties and injuries have almost been reduced to just a half. A considerable increase was also observed in FATA while the rest of provinces also witnessed an upsurge in militant attacks.

4.12 Suicide Bomb-blast in Mardan

December has not proved to be of good sign for Pakistan and particularly the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Last year (2014) in the month of December a huge barbaric act of brutality overtook Army Public School Peshawar and this year on 29th of December 2015 Mardan was overtaken by a huge bomb blast suicide attacker in which 26 people were martyred while 56 people were severely injured in the incident (The News, December 30, 2015). The incident occurred at the gate of National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) office where the suicide bomber blew him off when he was resisted by the security guard as per report of Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) Mardan, Saeed Khan Wazir. He further added that the incident could have caused more losses had the suicide bomber succeeded to enter the office as great number of applicants were present there at the time of the occurance to make computerized National Identity Card for themselves.

The responsibility of the attack was shouldered by Ihsanullah Ihsan, a spokesman of Jamaat ul Ahrar- a breakaway faction of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (The News,

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November 13, 2015). Spokesman of Jamaat ul Ahrar further said that NADRA was on the target of their Jamaat on account of its important role in the war against terrorism (Dawn, 30 Decemmber 2015). According to eye witnesses and sources the bomber parked his motorcycle near the NADRA office and wanted to enter the office but the brave security guard stopped him for body search. The bomber first fired at the security guard and then blew him off when he found no way of entry into the office. The brave security guard identified as Pervez Khan sacrificed his life but could not let the bomber enter the office. Mr. Tariq Munir, an employee of NADRA informed that all employees of the office were safe save Pervez Khan who was martyred at the main gate for not allowing the suicide bomber come in. Sajjad Khan another employee of the office and who received several injuries said that he was busy in his routine work in the office when a huge blast overpowered the gate of the office.

Police officials negate any presence of militants in the District of Mardan but District Nazim Mardan, Himayatullah Mayar claims that the outlaws of TTP’s Mohmand and Khyber groups had been active in different parts of the District (Dawn, December 30, 2015). Police officials further stated that there had been no possibility of attack on the office of NADRA as the law enforcement agencies had been the target of terrorists for quite a long time. But at the same time they also admit that they have sent two letters to NADRA regarding strengthening their security but they failed to comply with the directives. In the face of gross security situation in the province of KP it was imperative for the officials of NADRA to have strengthened their security vis a vis installation of the Close Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras. Barriers should have been constructed at the main entry of the office since the office remains over-crowded with people in most of the time.

This attack was the first one in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa since September 2015 after the attack on Badaber Airbase in which 29 people were martyred. According to security officials there has been a sixty percent decrease in the terrorist attacks since Operation Zarb-e-Azab was launched in June 2014 (Dawn, December 30, 2015). Incidents like this shows that the terrorists are still active in some parts of the country and have not been suppressed completely.

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4.13 Threat of Extremism

The incident of suicide bombing in Mardan is a grim reminder of the existing terror threat in the country since FATA and KP has been the targets of terror attacks in the aftermath of the 9/11 scenario. The gravity of security situation recently took a new shape when the Counter Terrorism Department of Punjab reveled that they broke up an alleged cell of the Militant Islamic State in Sialkot (Dawn, Decmber 31, 2015). The cell comprised eight members with propaganda materials in their possession and was planning to conduct a series of attacks in different parts of the country. In the wake of current gross security concerns across the country the presence of ISIS cannot be denied in different parts of the country as the threat of ISIS haunts the minds of the world politicians and leaders with fears of security concerns. Even if the ISIS does not have any existence in Sialkot or any other part of the country, it is an important to keep in mind Karachi and Lahore. The former is noteworthy on account of the Safoora Goth gang with university educated gang involved in different criminal activities and the latter where a professor of a well-known private university was allegedly found to have links with Hizbu Tahrar (Dawn, December 30, 2015). These two incidents suggest that utmost care is necessary and vigilance must be taken in respect of all important installations with a system of checks and balances on the activities of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies.

The involvement of educated people in terrorism/militancy is not a new phenomenon in the security paradigm of the country. The assassination of Daniel Pearl in 2002 was linked with Omer Sheikh, educated in the high echelon educational institutes of Pakistan and the United Kingdom. This suggested an early link between the countries of higher education and militant recruitment. Al-Qaeda, too has tried to enlist among its ranks men from the educated middle and upper middle class.

4.14 Suicide Bomb-blast in Shabqadar (Charsadda)

Worst security situation in KP still hover the atmosphere as the terrorists made a suicide attack in Shabqadar Tehsil of District Charsadda in Katchery on March 7th, 2016. The suicide bomber first started firing at the two security guards who were standing at the

248 gate of Katchery in which both of the security guards were killed and managed to escape into the main area of Katchery. Finding no way of escape, the suicide bomber blew him off that caused huge loss to the vehicles and human lives. 17 people including two police officials and four women were martyred in the incident while 31 people were injured (The News, March 8, 2016). It is also reported that some of the injured people are in critical condition. According to the people who were present in the Katchery and remained safe in the tragedy, reported that a 25 years young terrorists entered the premises of the Katchery and started firing mercilessly at the security personnel and then entered into the rush of people where he blew himself off near the car parking.

Responsibility of the attack was shouldered by the TTP’s splinter group Jamaat- ul-Ahrar and proclaimed it as a revenge for the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri while an alleged facilitator of the terrorist was arrested for having links with the terrorist groups (The News, March 8, 2016). The arrested facilitator was taken to an undisclosed place by the law enforcement agencies for interrogation and investigation. The militant group said that the court and judges were their targets for their alleged un-Islamic practices. Jamaat- ul-Ahrar group has become very active in the recent years in the acts of terrorism and extremism but it is also a fact that we cannot altogether link it with the execution of Mumtaz Qadri as the terrorist activities are already in the country under different nomenclature with their ulterior motives. The myth of martyrdom is one of the most important key factors in the terrorist activities.

One thing still haunts the mind of the local people over the poor security arrangements made in the area and locality of the courtyard. The incident of Bacha Khan University is still fresh in the minds of the people which caused irreparable losses of human lives on January 20th, 2016 resulting in the death of 21 innocent lives, mostly students. CCTV Cameras had not been installed at the main gate or any other area of the Katchery. Security agencies are also showing laxity in the performance of their duties since it was the second largest attack in the District of Charsadda within a period of two months. The law enforcement agencies need to focus on all important public and private installations particularly in the District of Charsadda to face any untoward security situation in the area. It is also lamenting that only two security guards were stationed at

249 the main gate of the Katchery with no other assistants while the rest of the area of Katchery was left at the mercy of God. The government should focus on the main problem that deployment of security staff at the entry gate cannot only serve the purpose of security. There is a pressing need to deploy security personnel at all critical points in the installations of the government and private sector to avoid any unseen situation in future.

The District of Charsadda is strategically very important for its bordering with Mardan, Peshawar and Mohmand Agency. The recent two incidents are an eye opener for the law enforcement agencies besides the Mohmand Agency where a remote-controlled bomb blast killed two Pakistani employees of the US Consulate last week. The events of terrorism also compel us to think that the death-penalty and Operation Zarb-e-Azb have not been successful to eradicate terrorism from all nooks and corner of the country. This also raises a question mark on the implementation of the National Action Plan that directly deals with the eradication of terrorism from the country. After all, terrorism and extremism has deeply penetrated into our society and has long history of 15 years mainly after the terrorist attacks on the twin cities of the United States. Some of the analysts also opine that by siding with the United States in the war against terrorism, Pakistan entered into an alien war the crops of which are Pakistan still reaping. If Pakistan had not complied with the designs of the United States then there was also the fear of the wrath of the United States as Pakistan’s strategic and geographic location compels the leaders to take decisions in the best interest of the nation. We could not ignore the Indian and the Russian factor as in the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan openly sided with Afghanistan. It is also true that there has been tremendous decrease in the terrorist attacks in the Province of Sindh and Balochistan but Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and tribal areas of Pakistan are far from being safe as is obvious from the recent attacks. The settled areas of KP that are critical in security issues include Peshawar, Mardan and Charsadda. The settled areas of KP as well as the tribal areas that have suffered the most in this war are still unsafe and insecure while they are not even fortunate enough to have their security acknowledged by an uncaring state.

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4.15 Bomb blast in Lahore

At least 69 people including women and children were killed and 340 injured in a bomb blast in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park, Lahore on March 27, 2016 (Ahmad & Dogar, 2016). This was the bloodiest attack of 2016 in Punjab for most of the attacks were conducted by the insurgents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. This shows the change in strategy of the terrorists as park was targeted instead of the government functionaries and installations. Till now, most of the attacks and bomb blasts were either conducted in Masajid or government functionaries, or installations. Responsibility of the attack was shouldered by the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar group, a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The incident occurred on Sunday coincided with Easter where most of the visitors were busy in their routine work in the park when a suicide bomber blew himself off in the great rush of people. The children were busy on swings and enjoying other recreational activities when the incident occurred at about 6:35 in the evening. The suicide-bomber managed to enter the park and blew himself off near Gate No.1 causing great chaos and panic in which some of the children and weak ones got killed and injured as a result of stampede. The blast was so huge and thundering that it was heard for long in kilometers away from the spot and parts of the body were collected from the whole ground.

According to a spokesman of the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, Ehsanullah Ehsan, who called from an Afghan number from an unknown place to the News (Ahmad & Dogar, 2016) saying that their target was not the women and children but the Christian Community that were busy in celebrating the Christmas there. He also conveyed the message through his call that they (militants) have arrived Lahore and the government of Nawaz Sharif should note that more attacks would be conducted in the province. He further added that it was the first of the attacks planned by them in the current year. The Jamaat-ul-Ahrar is a splinter group of the Taliban led by Omer Khalid Khorasani, initially having its base in Mohmand Agency, FATA. It shifted to Afghanistan in October 2008 when the law enforcement agencies started military operation against it. It parted ways with the TTP, which is headed by Afghanistan-based Maulana Fazlullah. Its fighters usually stage attacks in Afghanistan’s provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar and Pakistan’s Peshawar & Charsadda districts of KP province and Mohmand region of FATA (Ahmad & Dogar,

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2016). The Jamaat-u-Ahrar, after taking responsibility of the Lahore incident, issued the potage and identified the suicide bomber as Salahuddin Khorasani (Dawn, 2016). The Jamaat also claimed responsibility for the suicide-bombing of two Churches in Youhanabad Lahore in March 2015, resulting in the death of 15 persons. It also warned the government for the start of a new campaign, “Sound of Thunder” and further stated that ‘Pakistan is a land of war’ where there is no place for non-Muslims. It also stressed the need that the Jews, the Christians, and Zoroastrians, living in Pakistan have neither converted to Islam nor are they paying Jizya (a type of tax paid by the non- Muslims while living in a Muslim country). The Jamaat-ul-Ahrar is the splinter group of TTP that originated in Mohmand Agency. Currently it is believed to have found sanctuary along the Pak-Afghan border in the eastern Afghanistan and has recruited militants from Punjab to its cause (Dawn, March 29, 2016). This incident has pushed the country into an even darker and new phase since spokesman of the alleged Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, claimed that the target of the attack was the Christians who were busy in a crowded recreational park in Lahore. It is a fact that the terrorists have targeted the Muslims as well as non-Muslims alike wherever they found any opportunity but making statements in the post-incidents of terrorism is testimony to the fact that a new war between the Muslims and non- Muslims may erupt. Pakistan has been the reaping the crops of the decisions taken by the then government of Pervez Musharraf to side with the United States and its allies in the war against terrorism and has since been suffering a lot on account of the attacks of terrorism and insurgency.

As a consequence of this attack, crackdown was started in the Punjab province against the terrorists and banned outfits. According to Asim Bajwa, Director General (DG), Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), about 63 militant organizations are operating in Punjab and a list of 1600 terrorists and their facilitators has been finalized for action against them (Dawn, March 29, 2016). It is also worth mentioning that FATA has undergone military operations, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have been zones of conflicts for over a decade and Karachi has been undergoing an anti-militant and anti-criminal operation. Punjab, due to its size and population, has largely remained unaddressed over the years.

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This attack seems to have similarity with the attack of Army Public School Peshawar as in both of these attacks; children were made the targets of brutality. The number of death-toll is the other point of semblance while in the Peshawar attack the number of death casualties was 148 and injuries of almost the same number whereas in this case the death casualties is 69 and injuries 340 with some in critical condition. In Bacha Khan University the death toll was 21 with considerable number of injuries. In December 2016, a bomb blast in NADRA office Mardan caused the death of 26 people and 56 injuries. During the period of less than four months, four major terrorist attacks have engulfed many innocent losses with severe injuries, has put the national security apparatus at jeopardy. The horrible fact is that the terrorists change their strategies by using different tactics particularly in the areas where security is not sufficient to meet the threat and challenges; ranging from school to university, NADRA office to Courts, and government installations to public parks.

The tragic episode at Lahore is another blow to the security paradigm of Pakistan since insurgency has been there in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Balochistan but Punjab, that has hitherto been calm and smooth to some extent, also became a victim to the incidents of terror and insurgency. It does not mean that prior to this incident; there were no incidents of terrorism but the severity of this incidence on Sunday, coincided with Easter and the resultant responsibility of the Jamaat-ul-Ahrar claiming to target the Christian Community created another security concern for the country. This reminds us of the quote of Quaid-e-Azam when he said on the creation of Pakistan; you are free to go to your temples or any other place of worship in this free land of Pakistan. Chief of the Army Staff, Gen .Raheel Sharif is reported to have said, “We must bring killers of our innocent brothers, sisters and children to justice and will never allow to these savage [dehumanized beings], to overrun our life and liberty (Hussain, March 31, 2016). In context of this statement, it is possible to identify three essential features of the counter terrorism strategy which posits direct threat to the security of Pakistan:

First, in prosecuting this war against countering terrorism the state aims at establishing its writ over its territory. The fact is that militant groups have emerged in Pakistan as rival counterparts to the state power within its geographic domain. This has

253 resulted in an atmosphere of insecurity and violence in the country. Max Weber defines the state as an organization having monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and in case any militant group establishes its authority through violence and terror then the state has a right to establish its writ through coercive means otherwise, it would cease to exist (Hussain 31 March, 2016). As a consequence of it, Operation Zarb-e-Azab that was undertaken in June 2014 for countering terrorism is a war of survival for the country.

This operation, in comparison to the previous military operations, is the most successful one in some respects. It has decimated the militant forces of Taliban, destroyed their sanctuaries in FATA, and re-settled the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their homes in a short period of time. But recently, a series of terrorist attacks by the insurgents have shown that the coalition of militant extremist groups have the capacity to retain to launch high-profile attacks against the undefended targets in the urban areas where ever they find any lacuna in the security structure. For example the attack against Bacha Khan University on 20 January 2016, the District Courts (Katchery) in Charsadda on 7 March 2016 and the Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park Lahore on 27 January 2016. Most of the attacks were conducted in KP but the attack in Lahore is unique in the sense that it was the first of its kind in the province of Punjab in which both the Muslims and Christians became a victim to terrorism. It is therefore imperative to launch Operation Zarb-e-Azab in Punjab as to curb terrorism in the thickly populated province of the country that constitutes more than half of the population of the country. It is the only way to investigate suspected links between political organizations and support networks of the terrorists through selective-intelligence based operations.

Second, the principal function in which the state tries to establish its legitimacy over the citizens through rule of law and what Rousseau calls as “Social Contract” for the protection of life and liberty of the individuals. Contextualizing this quote of Rousseau with the statement of Gen Raheel Sharif by stating that preventing the terrorists from trying to, “overrun our life and liberty” is sine qua non for the legitimacy of the state. Protection of the life and liberty of the individuals involves safeguarding the institutional environment in which citizens can engage in social life which helps in enriching human civilization by making life and freedom meaningful.

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Third, the challenge arising out of terrorism is the need to develop a counter-terror narrative at the national level. This is extremely necessary in order to defeat the terrorists in their ideological capacity for the mobilization of their support, recruitment and then indoctrination of the innocent, malleable minds to put on suicide belts (Hussain 31 March, 2016). The word ‘Religion is derived from the Latin word ‘Religio ’meaning to re-establish the ligament with God. The fabric of this ligament in Islam is love and the bond of affinity as all human beings are brethren unto one another. Almighty Allah says in the Holy Quran, “there is no coercion in Islam”. There can also be no coercion in Love. The most common attribute of this love which Almighty Allah ascribes to Himself is Rahman. Looking all human beings through the prism of this affinity, all human beings are expected to show love and reverence towards one another.

The ideology which the terrorists indoctrinate excludes the spirituality of love emanating from religion as a result of which it (religion) becomes an empty form that the terrorists use as an instrument of coercion for the achievement of their worldly affairs coupled with political power and wealth. Religion enjoins love and care, the terrorists preach hatred to kill; religion calls for the pursuit of enlightenment and truth, the terrorists rely on ignorance and falsehood; religion calls upon human beings to nurture their God-given sense of beauty and love caring for fellow human beings. Thus the ideology which the terrorists preach is the very anti-thesis of religion and what they practice for the fulfillment of their mundane political power and wealth is devoid of any religion.

Operation Zarb-e-Azab that was put into practice in June 2014 and the National Action Plan with a 20-point agenda that was put into practice in December 2015, have not been able to produce the desired results of restoring peace and stability in the country. It is important to mention that operation Zarb-e-Azab that had hitherto been confined to FATA needs to be spread over to the all sensitive areas of the country. The NAP is operational in the whole country but there is pressing need to implement it in true spirit so as to curb the menace of terrorism and insurgency once for all.

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4.15.1 Chronology of Terror incidents in Lahore (2009-2016)

Lahore, the heart of Pakistan, is one of the most important cities of Pakistan and has also seen many incidents of terrorism ever since NACTA was introduced in the country. Here are some of the incidents that Lahore witnessed since 2009 (Shah, March 28, 2016):

I. On March 3, 2009, a convoy carrying members of Sri Lankan team in two buses were fired near Qaddafi Stadium Lahore resulting in the injury of Six Sri Lankan cricketers and death of over a half dozen of Policemen and two civilian. II. On March 30, 2009, at least eight police recruits and a civilian were killed in Manawa Police Training School Lahore when ten terrorists entered the premises of the training school where 750 recruits were present unarmed in the morning parade. The encounter lasted for about eight hours in which 93 cadets and civilians were injured. Three of the attackers blew themselves off to avoid being arrested; three attackers were taken into custody while a suspect was captured in a field near the school. III. On March 7, 2009, a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle loaded with 100 kilograms of explosives near the office of Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) and the Inter Services intelligence (ISI) on Queen’s Road Lahore. This resulted in the death of 27 people and injury of 326 people, besides 40 vehicles were destroyed in the attack. This was the second largest attack since 9/11, the first one was conducted on March 8, 2008 where at least 24 people were killed and 200 injured in the twin suicide bombings in Lahore. One of the attacks hit the FIA building in which 21 people including 16 police men were killed while the other incident hit the posh locality of the Model Town. IV. On June 12, 2009, a suicide-bomber hit the Jamia Naeenia Madrassa, situated on Allama Iqbal Road in the city’s Garhi Sharu area, soon after the Friday prayer in which the anti-Taliban Sunni cleric, Sarfaraz Naeemi among seven other were assassinated. V. On October 15, 2009, three separate attacks were carried out at the FIA building on Temple Road, the Manawa Police Training School and the Elite Police

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Academy at the Bedian Road. These attacks engulfed 38 people including 14 security personnel and 20 wounded. VI. On December 7, 2009, terrorist attacks stuck three provincial headquarters, with highest casualty rate in Lahore. Two powerful bomb blasts 30 seconds apart, within a radius of 30 meters in the busy Moon Market in Lahore’s Allama Iqbal Town, resulted in the death of huge loss of 100 people. VII. On March 8, 2010, a suicide bomber killed at least 16 people and wounded more than 60 others. The bomber rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into a building that housed an anti-terrorist wing of the FIA. The explosion was so huge that it also damaged the nearby religious school. VIII. On March 12, 2010, two suicide bombers attacks in Lahore occurring 15-20 seconds simultaneously resulted in the death of at least 45 people including nine soldiers and wounded more than 100 others. Both of these targeted the vehicles of the army passing through the busy bazaar of Lahore Cantonment. IX. On May 28, 2010, two Ahmadis’ worship places in the city’s Garhi Shahu and Model Town localities, 15 kilometer apart, were blasted by the terrorists simultaneously in which 100 people lost their lives. X. On May 31, 2010, at least 8 people were killed and 40 were injured when three terrorists entered into the premises of the Lahore hospital and started firing indiscriminately at security guards and attendants. XI. On June 3, 2010, two low-intensity bomb explosions in Lahore resulted in the injury of 5 people with no death casualty. XII. June 26, 2010, a series of bombing in Lahore resulted in the injury of 7 people. XIII. On July 1, 2010, two suicide attacks in the globally renowned saint’s shrine, Hazrat Data Sahib in Lahore lost the lives of at least 50 people, besides 200 others were hurt. One suicide bomber exploded his detonation in the underground section of the Data Darbar Complex while the other chose the upstairs area for the detonation. Both the explosives were packed with the ball bearings to maximize the death toll and injuries. XIV. On September 1, 2010, at least 38 people lost their lives while more than 250 were injured as a result of a series of three bomb explosions targeting a Shia

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procession taken out to observe the martyrdom of Hazrat Ali (RA), the fourth caliph of Islam. XV. On January 25, 2011, at least 16 people were killed while 70 people were injured as a result of a suicide bomb explosion in a mourning procession of Hazrat Imam Hussain near its concluding point at the Karbala Gamay Shah at Lahore’s historic Bhatti Gate. XVI. On April 24, 2012, a five kilogram detonator implanted at a Railway station in Lahore caused death of 3 people. XVII. On July 5, 2012, a retired Major, the security in-charge of the Chief Minister of Punjab, was injured as a result of an explosion at his residence. XVIII. On July 12, 2012, an attack on the Police Academy at the early hours of the morning by the masked Tehrik-e-Taliban gunmen resulted in the murder of 9 police cadets hailing from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. XIX. On August 1, 2012, two bomb explosions in the Badami Bagh Fruit Market area, Lahore resulted in the death of 2 people. XX. On July 7, 2013, a bomb blast killed 3 people in the Anarkali Food Street area of Lahore. XXI. On October 10, 2013, a bomb blast outside a restaurant in Anarkali Lahore killed 1 person and injured 16 people. XXII. On November2, 2014, an attack at the Wagah Border killed more than 60 people including 10 women and 8 members of the same family while leaving behind 110 injured. XXIII. On February 17, 2015, at least 8 persons were killed at the deadly attack on the heavily- fortified Police Lines, Qilla Gujjar Singh Lahore. XXIV. On March 15, 2015, two bomb blasts at the Roman Catholic Church and Christ Church at Youhanabad, Lahore killed 15 persons when the Christians were busy in their worships. XXV. On June 29, 2015, at least 1 police personnel were killed while in retaliation 4 terrorists were killed during search operation in Lahore.

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XXVI. On November 26, 2015, three police constables received bullets injuries as security agencies had haunted down Haroon Bhatti, one of the founding fathers of the banned Lashkar-e-Jhangvi at Badami Bagh area, Lahore. XXVII. On March 27, 2016, terrorist attack on the Gulshan-e-Iqbal Park, Lahore resulted in the death of 69 persons and 340 injured persons.

4.15.1 (a) Table showing Death casualties and injuries from 2009 to March 30, 2016

Year Death- casualties Injuries 2009 144 425 2010 257 662 2011 16 70 2012 14 01 2013 4 16 2014 60 110 2015 28 03 2016 69 340 Total 592 1627

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4.15.1. (b) Chart representing Death casualties and injuries from 2009 to March 30, 2016

700

600

500

400 Dath toll

300 Injuries

200

100

0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

The Lahore bomb-blast ought to have brought the state institutions united; the federal, the provincial, the civil and the military leadership to work jointly for the elimination of terrorism and militancy. The two important pillars of the state, the civilian government and the military seem to have withdrawn into their respective camps in the two metropolitan cities of Rawalpindi and Islamabad (Dawn, 30 March, 2016). The former seems to be having reservations over the military operations in Punjab and still have soft corners of resuming dialogues and peace initiatives with the Taliban while the latter wants to extend operation Zarb-e-Azab to Punjab where more than 61 banned militant outfits are functional. The military has a long history of countering terrorism in the country and is the only trusted law enforcing agency in the country that can maintain peace and security in the country.

4.15.2 Lahore Attack and RAW

Commander Kul Bushan, an Indian agent of Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), was not the first Indian spy to be arrested on Pakistani soil for his involvement in the

260 terrorist activity. History of the arrest of the Indian spies on Pakistani soil is testimony to the fact that RAW has a hand in the terror incidents in Pakistan.

Here are a few cases of the agents of RAW who were caught in Pakistan and were involved in various terrorist activities in Pakistan.

I. Ravindra Kaushik (1952-1999) who assumed the name “Nabi Ahmad Shakir” was sent to Pakistan across the border in 1975 on a mission at the age of 23 years after attaining extensive training in Delhi for two years (Shah, March 31, 2016). He was taught Urdu and Punjabi languages, was given religious education and was acquainted with the topography and other details about Pakistan. Ravindra Kaushik was able to get a civilian job of a clerk in the Military Accounts in Pakistan Army and even married a local woman, who was the daughter of a tailor in one of the Army Units, fathering a son from that woman. He kept on passing information from Pakistan to RAW from 1979 to 1983. The fact regarding the true identity of Ravindra Kaushik got revealed to Pakistan when in September 1983, the Indian intelligence agencies sent Inayat Masih to Pakistan to remain in touch with Ravindra Kaushik alias Nabi Ahmad Shakir.

Inayat Masih was arrested by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan who upon interrogation revealed the true identity of Ravindra. Resultantly Kaushik was captured and interrogated for two years at Sialkot (Shah, March 31, 2016). In 1985 he was given death sentence by the Pakistani court but his sentence was converted to life imprisonment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. He was kept in various jails of Pakistan for a period of 16 years but he succumbed to Pulmonary Tuberculosis and heart disease at the Multan jail.

II. Sarbajit Singh also known as Manjit Singh, another RAW agent was convicted of terrorism and spying by the Supreme Court of Pakistan for a series of bomb attacks for having killed 14 people in Lahore and Faisalabad during 1990. Sarbajit Singh instead claimed that he strayed into Pakistan from his village through border three months after the bombings. He was given death sentence under the Pakistani Army Act but the decision was upheld by Lahore High Court

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in 1991. His death sentence was repeatedly postponed by the then Pakistani regime. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the review petition of Sarbajit Singh in March 2006 when his lawyers failed to appear before the court for hearing. While he was still languishing in a prison in Lahore when he was attacked by his jail-inmates with bricks, sharp metal sheets, iron rods and blades on April 26, 2013. Sarbajit Singh received severe injuries and remained in Lahore hospital where he died after a period of six days.

The irony of the situation lies in the fact that he (Sarbajit Singh) was disowned by RAW earlier but on his death declared three-days mourning and demanded a compensation of Rupees ten million from the government of Pakistan for his legal heirs. It is also important that following the attack on Sarbajit Singh in a prison, a Pakistani prisoner in the jail of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) was attacked fatally by an allegedly convict fellow on May 2013. Sanaullah was hospitalized in a hospital in Chandigarh but later on died on account of receiving multiple organ failure as a result of heavy stroke.

III. It is also worth mentioning to say that a few Indian spies who were arrested by the Pakistani authorities for their alleged involvement as spies of RAW, were released by the Pakistani government as “goodwill gestures” and on the plea of “humanitarian grounds”. Kashmir Singh is an example of such a context, which had spent 35 years in a Pakistani prison before he was released by Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf through ‘Presidential Pardon’. Kashmir Singh served the Indian Army between 1962 and 1966 and entered the Pakistani ground though the assumed name of Ibrahim. He was arrested by the Pakistani authority in 1973, subsequently sentenced to death by the military court of Pakistan, was kept in solitary confinement in seven different jails for 17 long years but was released on March 4, 2008, who entered India through Wagah Border (Shah ,March 31, 2016). IV. Another Indian spy, Surjeet Singh was released at the age of 73 after spending more than 30 years in a Pakistani prison.

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According to Indian news channel, a few spies who were sent to Pakistan and whose detail of being sent to Pakistan was revealed as per detail of September 26, 2013. A few of them are mentioned are here:

I. Ram Parkash: He was trained as a photographer for almost a year before he was sent to Pakistan in 1994. He was taken into custody in 1997, while returning India, and was interrogated in Sialkot’s Gora Jail for a year and kept under detention before a court imprisonment for a period of ten years. During interrogation, Ram Parkash revealed that he had crossed the border roughly 75 times in three years period before being apprehended by the Pakistani security authorities. He was sent back to India on July 7, 2008. II. Om Parkash: Om Parkash was sent to Pakistan on a spy mission in 1998. His family members and relatives opine that they had no clue of the whereabouts of Om Parkash. III. Vinod Sawhney: He was the president of Jammu Ex-Sleuths Association, had worked as a spy for an intelligence agency. He was a taxi driver by profession before he was lured to work as a sleuth by an intelligence official, who had boarded his taxi as a passenger. He was sent to Pakistan in 1977 but was arrested the same year. After interrogation and investigation, he was sentenced to jail for 11 years. He was sent to India in March 1988 after spending 11 years in a Pakistani prison. IV. Suram Singh: Suram Singh, who entered Pakistan in 1974 as per his personal statement but was apprehended by the Pakistani Rangers on the border itself. He was interrogated in Sialkot’s Gora Jail for four months and spent round about thirteen years and seven months in different Pakistani jails before he was handed over to India in 1988. V. Balwir Singh: He was sent to Pakistan in 1971 but was taken into custody by the Pakistani authorities. He was sent back to India in 1986 by completing his 12 years of imprisonment in Pakistani jails. On receiving no support from the agency and officials that had sent him to Pakistan, Balwir Singh sued them in the Indian Court in 1986 where he was given compensation relief to be paid to him in three months but the compensation never came to him.

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VI. Devut: Devut who is said to have gone to Pakistan somewhere during 1990s and was deported to India on December 23, 2006 after spending many years of imprisonment in Pakistan. VII. Sunil: He was sent to Pakistan somewhere in April 2011 and is still said to be languishing in a Pakistani prison. VIII. Daniel: He started spying for the Indian intelligence agency in 1992, while crossing the border to Pakistan; he was arrested in 1993 by Pakistani security agency. He was repatriated to India in 1997 after spending his period of imprisonment in Pakistan. IX. Tilakraj: He is reported to be languishing his period of sentence in a Pakistani jail. X. Satpal: He was sent to Pakistan in 1999 to spy on Pakistan when the Kargal war was still in operation. He died in a Pakistani jail after a year whereby his dead body was handed over to the Indian authorities upon his death.

4.15.3 Exposure of Indian Espionage Network in Pakistan

On November 2, 2016 a big network of Indian spies was arrested in Pakistan for its alleged involvement in terrorism in Pakistan. The network comprised five diplomats who were employed as Indian diplomats in the High Commission of Pakistan. The network was arrested in the light of investigation of the arrested RAW agent Kalbushan Yadew (Baabar & Aqdas, November 3, 2016). Rajesh Kumar Agnihotri was identified as RAW station chief, while Balbir Singh was identified as an officer of the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB), who is yet to be declared as persona non grata by the government of Pakistan. Others of the network include, Amardeep Singh Bhatti, visa attaché, Madhawan Nanda and Vijay Kumar. The government of Pakistan is in touch with the government of India to investigate the case further but the latter is denying the charge.

4.15.4 Arrest of Afghan Intelligence Officer

After the arrest of RAW agent in Pakistan, an agent of the Afghan Intelligence Officer was arrested by the Frontier Corps Balochistan (FCB) in the border region of Chaman area of Balochistan along the Pak-Afghan border and recovered weapons,

264 explosives, and other materials from his possession (The News, April 7, 2016). According to a spokesman of the Frontier Corps, the FC raided a house in Shahedan and the Afghan spy was arrested from the house who was residing there while engaged in running spy and anti-peace activities. The seized recovery from the Afghan official included four magazines of the Sub-machine gun (SMG), one sniper scope, one Large Machine Gun (LMG) belt, three Motorola sets, 11 Motorola antennas, bundles of prime cord, 25 small ball bearings, 10 large ball bearings, 18 explosive batteries, 25 battery sticks, one switch button, 18 battery connections, one pistol cover two empty ammo bags, 75 detonator fuses, 11 kg of explosives, one night vision scope and other items (The News, April 7, 2016). The Afghan suspect is now under investigation and interrogation by the security agencies of Pakistan. Interior Minister, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan praised the role of the FC Balochistan by arresting the secret servant of the Afghan government and directed for the further tight security of the border region with Afghanistan and Iran. Anwarul Haq Kakar, a spokesman of the government of Balochistan stated that the arrest of the Afghan official was a link in the chain of events starting with the arrest of Kul Boshan Yadew, the Indian agent of RAW. The IG, FC Balochistan, Maj-Gen. Sher Afghan urged that they would continue their efforts to carry on their pursuit of arresting the terrorists and officials of the foreign secret service until the area was cleared of the terrorists. The security forces in various operations in the area conducted on April 6, 2016 killed 15 terrorists of the banned outfits in the military operation in Johan area of Kalat and also destroyed their hide-outs (The News, April 7, 2016). Sanaullah Zehri, Chief Minister of Balochistan stated that the Frontier Corps and provincial security forces are engaged in “targeted Operations” in Balochistan. According to the Home Minister of Balochistan government about 92 militants have been killed in the past four months (Dawn, April 4, 2016). From the arrest of foreign spies on Pakistani land, it is quite evident that the separatist movement in the province is supported by the foreign hand such as India and Afghanistan.

4.15.5 Executions of Terrorists

According to a report of the Amnesty International, an increase of 54% has been seen in the executions at global level in 2015. Pakistan stands out to be on the top of the

265 list of punishments of executions where 326 people were hanged in 2015 (Dawn, April 8, 2016). Thus Pakistan is only behind Iran and China where the number of people executed each year is very large. China executes huge number of people but does not release any report regarding the execution of criminals. The trigging point for the restoration of moratorium of execution in the country was the tragedy of APS School Peshawar in December 2014. Throughout the world 140 states have abolished the death penalty either through law or in practice but Pakistan has decided not to follow in the footprints of those states that have abolished this sentence. But it is also an admitted fact that since the restoration of moratorium on criminals, there has been a tremendous decrease in the criminal and insurgent activities though the international community is against this move of Pakistan. The aftermath of Peshawar tragedy was a trigging point for the restoration of death-punishments in Pakistan and has up to now helped a lot in the reduction of terrorist activities.

4.16 Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Omer Khalid, the current leader of Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, was one of those Taliban who emerged in Mohmand Agency and who faced stiff resistance from one village in Prang Ghar that refused to surrender to his demand. That one village had control over certain key areas and routes through the mountains that separated Mohmand Agency from Bajaur Agency and which opened routes to Lower Dir and Swat. Another militia, connected with the TTP was marching towards Mingora. The other militia was led by Maulana Fazlullah and it succeeded in capturing village after village in the valley and eventually reached the village Mingora. Prang Ghar was very important for the security of Swat and FATA and the attempt to capture it was motivated by the need for a direct overland supply line between Swat and Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

The year 2009 was very crucial in the history of KP as military operation was launched in Swat in the month of May as a result of the increased activities of the TTP there coupled with the escalation of drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan in which one of the drone attacks resulted in the death of Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of TTP. The movement suffered a setback for some time on account of leadership crisis and loss of territory but soon it gained momentum when the leadership issue was overcome. The

266 movement has been instrumental by undertaking acts of terrorism and extremism across the whole country. It is also a fact that many of its important leaders were killed by the drone attacks yet it has not suffered a complete setback since the security of the whole country has been jeopardized. All important installations on the public as well as private side have been indiscriminately targeted by it.

4.16.1 The ISIS and other Militant Organizations

The presence of ISIS cannot be ruled out in Pakistan altogether as is evident from most of the cases of their presence being felt in some parts of the country. According to analysts, majority of the supporters of the ISIS belong to the urban areas and are mostly educated. It stands in contrast to the rest of the militant organizations in which most of the supporters are uneducated. Though their presence has been repeatedly denied by the government yet the government of Punjab admitted the threat when the Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) busted an ISIS cell in Daska, Sialkot. They had been recruiting personnel for the war in Syria. The CTD recovered laptops, Compact Discs (CDs) and other materials meant for publicity. Almost all these individuals are influenced by ISIS propaganda on social media. They also used to communicate with each other on social media to avoid being detected.

In Pakistan, there are two low-hanging fruits, ripe for the organizations to pick with ease. One is the well-educated urban youth, who-despite their modern outlook and general approach, towards religion are confused about the place of faith in the world. The second is the footprint already left by the sectarian or Wahabi Jihadi Organizations like the Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The organization is successful in recruiting women within its ambit as is evident from a case when in December 2015 a Lahore-based married woman who left for Syria to join the ISIS along with her three young children, the eldest being fifteen years of age while the youngest being nine years of age.

The ISIS is a militant organization that is different from other militant organizations because it has its own concept of an Islamic state and wants to develop the state envisaged by it in the geographic space that it currently occupies. It actively seeks

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Hijrat to this Dar ul Islam as it is the best place for the Muslims as envisioned by them. Stern and Berger, in their book, ‘ISIS: The State of Terror’, opine that ISIS does not take the masses for granted; it is the influence that extends beyond the elite, beyond its strategies and loyal fighting force, out into the world. Its propaganda is not simply a call to arms; it is also a call for the non-combatant men and women alike, to build a nation alongside the warriors, with a role to be played by engineers, doctors, filmmakers and even traffic cops.

4.16.2 Pakistan’s Military Success in Operation Zarb-e-Azab

According to Director General Inter services Public Relations, Major General Asim Saleem Bajwa, during the current Operation Zarb-e-Azab that was launched in June 2014, round about 3,400 terrorists have been killed while at least 488 soldiers of the security forces have lost their lives in the military operation during the last 18 months. During the operation the 18 months’ operation, 1914 security personnel have been injured while 887 hideouts of the militants have also been destroyed. He also added that 183 hardcore terrorists have been killed while 21,193 terrorists were arrested during the ongoing military operation. The arrested terrorists have been put to interrogation by the law enforcement agencies in order to confirm their involvement in the anti-state activities.

4.16.3 An Analysis of Overall Crimes in Pakistan during 2015

It is a fact that there has been a tremendous decrease in the crime ratio in Pakistan during the last year yet it is on record that Punjab leads the country in this regard followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and the Balochistan. According to a survey 633,600 criminal cases were registered in Pakistan during the last year, out of which 383,055 casese were registered in Punjab with a population of 100 million, showing a percentage of 61%, followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with a population of 27 million showing a percentage of 24%,. Sindh showed a registration of 12% with the population of 55 million (Manzoor, 2016). Out of the rest of the three percent (3%) Balochistan, Islamabad, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir shared criminal cases.

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4.16.4 Chart showing Criminal Cases in 2015 in Pakistan

Punjab population 100 million, cases 61%

Total KP population Balochistan criminalcases 27 million, cases 3% in Pakistan cases 24% 633,600

Sindh population 55 million,cases 12%

Out of the 9,486 murder cases registered in the country during 2015 almost half of the cases happened in Punjab amounting to 4,422, with a percentage of 46%, followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with a number of 2496 having a percentage of 26.3%. Sindh, followed with a number of 1907 showing a percentage of 20% while 412 murder cases were registered in Balochistan showing a percentage of 4.3%, whereas 116 cases were registered in Islamabad with a percentage of 1.2% (Manzoor, 2016).

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4.16.5 Chart Showing Murder cases in 2015

Total murder cases 9,486

KP 2496 Punjab 4422, showing 46% showing 26.3%

Sindh Balochistan 412, Islamabad 116, 1907,showing showing 4.3% showing 1.2% 20%

The number of cases pertaining to gang rape registered in the country during 2015 was 272, out of which 213 cases were registered in the province of Punjab showing a percentage of 78.3%. Sindh had 30 cases of such nature with a percentage of 11%; Islamabad had 26 such cases with a percentage of 9.5%, while only 03 such cases were registered in KP (Manzoor, April 20, 016).

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4.16.6 Chart showing gang-rape cases in Pakistan in 2015

Gang rape cases in Pakistan in 2015 were 272 Punjab 213, showing 78.3%

Sindh 30, showing 11% Islamabad 26, showing 9.5%

KP 03, showing 1.10%

Punjab witnessed highest number of cases of abduction and kidnapping where 17,932 cases were registered in the country during 2015 in which Punjab had lion- share amounting to 13315, showing a percentage of 74.25%. This was followed by Sindh with the number of registered cases 2871 showing a percentage of 16%, 1,116 of such cases happened in KP showing a percentage of 6.2%, while 227 people were abducted in Balochistan, 89 in Islamabad, 34 in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and 279 in AJK (Manzoor, April 20, 2016). Cases of kidnapping for ransom numbered 232 in the country, out of which 92 happened in Sindh, 63 cases in Punjab, 49 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 19 in Balochistan, 08 in Islamabad while 01 case was registered in Gilgit-Baltistan.

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4.16.7 Table showing cases of Kidnapping and Abduction in Pakistan in 2015

Kidnapping Abduction

Province Cases % Cases %

Punjab 13315 74.25% 63 27.15%

Sindh 2871 16% 92 39.65%

KP 1116 6.2% 49 21.12%

Balochistan 227 0.49% 19 8.18%

Islamabad 89 0.66% 08 3.4%

Gilgit 279 1.55% 01 0.43%

Total 13,315 Total 232

A total of 93 cases of highway dacoities happened in the country in which 53 occurred in Punjab, 26 in Sindh, 01 in KP, 9 in Balochistan, 3 in GB, and 01 in AJK. The cases of petrol pump dacoities in the country were 28, in which 19 cases were registered in Punjab, 08 in Sindh while only one such case happened in Balochistan. A total of 192 cases of highway robbery were witnessed by the country in which 152 such cases occurred in Punjab with a percentage of 77.5%, followed by Sindh with 32 cases, 03 such cases in KP, 06 in Balochistan, 02 in GB and 01 in AJK. While 2,197 other cases of dacoities were registered in the country during the year of 2015, in which the number of cases in Punjab was 1242, with a percentage of 56.5%. Sindh received 820 such cases having a percentage of 37%, Balochistan received 55 such cases followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with 48 cases, followed by Islamabad with 25 such cases, 04 in GB, while 2 in AJK. It is also important to note that dacoities and robberies were not committed under just one heading rather they were carried on under different headings. The cases of robberies stood at 14, 833 in the country out of which 11,607 were witnessed by Punjab

272 with a percentage of 78.25%, Sindh received 2,545 such cases having a percentage of 17%, KP received 230 such cases, 177 cases were received by Balochistan, while 208 cases were witnessed by Islamabad, 14 cases by GB and 51 in AJK. Cases of burglaries stood at 15736 in the country, out of which 12762 cases were witnessed by Punjab with a percentage of 81%, Sindh had 1323 such cases with a percentage of 8.4%, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa witnessed 878 such cases with a percentage of 5.5%, Balochistan received 162 cases, 330 in Islamabad, 56 in Gilgit-Baltistan and 225 in Azad Jammu & Kashmir.

A total of 6502 theft cases of cattle happened in the country in 2015 in which Punjab witnessed 5837 such cases having a percentage of 90%, Sindh witnessed 437 such cases, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa witnessed 97, Balochistan had 53 such cases, 21 in Islamabad, 22 in GB and 35 in AJK. A total of 27067 cases of Motor vehicle theft/snatching occurred in the country during 2015 in which 18231 such cases were recorded in Punjab, almost showing two-third of the total cases, Sindh recorded 5967, KP recorded 1094 such cases of theft, Balochistan 876, Islamabad had 714, GB 47 while AJK witnessed 135. Cases of general theft recorded in the country during 2015 was 32400 in which 27452 such cases were received by Punjab with a percentage of 84.7%, Sindh had 2615 such cases, KP had 1178, Balochistan 248, Islamabad 512, in which 266 cases occurred in Railways, GB 60 and AJK 69.

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4.16.8 Graph showing Cattle theft, Motor theft and General theft cases in 2015

60000 Column1 50000 Column2 40000 AJK

30000 GB

20000 Islamabad GB

10000 Balochistan

0 KP Balochistan Cattle theft Motor theft General theft Islamabad GB AJK 27452

A total of 4507 fatal accidents occurred in the country during 2015, in which Punjab had a share of 2468 fatal accidents, 611 in Sindh, 985 in KP, 155 in Balochistan, 132 in Islamabad, 1 in Railway, 35 in GB, and 120 in AJK.

Cases under Arms Act totaled in the country in which the number of cases recorded in Punjab was 40005, Sindh received 10246 such cases, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 21327, Balochistan 974, Islamabad 942, in which 25 were recorded in Railways, 229 in Gilgit-Baltistan, and 242 in Azad Jammu & Kashmir.

Cases registered in the country under prohibition order were 51,589 were registered in Punjab 7,781, were witnessed by Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa received 32,432 such cases, Balochistan had 1,178, Islamabad had 600 cases of such nature, 94 in Railways, 100 in Gilgit-Baltistan, and 692 in AJK. Under other local and special laws, 43,873 cases were registered in Pun jab, 4,054 in Sindh, 40,931 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 969 in Balochistan 228 in Islamabad, 912 in Railways, 7 in Gilgit-Baltistan and 348 in Azad Jammu & Kashmir.

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As already discussed in detail, 2009 was the peak point of incidents of terrorism and insurgency in Pakistan. There were vicissitudes in these incidents until 2014 as this was the year of NATO drawdown from Afghanistan that also had great ramification for Pakistan where the Peshawar School attack in December 2014 was one of the most tragic events in the history of the country. Afterwards, there was a gradual decrease in these tragic episodes and 2015 saw the lesser events of terrorism because of the Operation Zarb-e-Azab and National Action Plan, followed by 2016 where there was an enormous decrease in these incidents. As compared to the previous years, starting from 2009 till 2016, the latter has the least number of tragic incidents. The country is moving towards stability.

4.17 Nation Action Plan in 2016

By March 2016, the number of Speedy Trial Courts was 11 whereby 190 cases were transferred to these courts. By March 2016, 414 persons had been executed under the ATA or PPC. A Counter Terrorism Force was established with a force of 10, 816 out of which 7,816 were available until March 2016 (Ramay, 2016). It is also important to note that some considerate headway has been made to attain this objective in almost all provinces. Since police is the first line of internal defence, all four provinces have developed special counter terrorism units under their respective counter-terrorism departments – Counter Terrorism Force in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Special Security Unit in Sindh, Anti-Terrorism Force in Balochistan and Elite Police and Counter Terrorism Force in Punjab. Besides this, a standard form meant for the registration and regulation of Deeni Madrassas has been prepared with inputs from NACTA, Ittehad Tanzzim ul Madaris Pakistan (ITMP), provincial government s and intelligence agencies. Mapping exercise on agreed parameters has been completed in Punjab and Islamabad Capital Territory, but still going on in Sindh (80%), KP (75%), and Balochistan (60%). 182 suspected madrassas have been closed down, most of them were situated in Sindh. Moreover, 190 madrassas were found to be foreign funded (Ramay, 2016).

Operations to curb militancy in Punjab, reforms in FATA (including legal, administrative and development strategies), and reconciliation efforts in Balochistan (including rehabilitation of Fararis) are being carried out. It is pertinent to mention that

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500 Fararis have surrendered so far.It is also important to mention that the government has been working to stop printing and publication of hate material that nurtures sectarian strife among the extremist groups. As of 31 August 2016, 2477 cases have been registered against hate speech/material, 2,440 persons arrested, and 70 shops closed. On charges of misuse of loudspeakers, 14,450 cases have been registered, 14,876 people arrested, and 3,448 pieces of equipments confiscated (Ramay, 2016). According to the data collected by National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) in 2015, the murder cases decreased by 28.5 % as compared to 2014. The statistics of 2016 seem to follow a similar pattern, with 24% decline in murder incidents in the first half. Similarly, US State Department data states there were 1,009 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2015 compared to 1,823 in 2014 – a 45 % decrease.

By July 2016, the Pakistan Rangers deployed in Karachi had claimed the arrest of 533 criminals since June 2014 when Karachi operation started. Overall, the terror incidents have decreased up to 60 % in the city. According to sources within police, 3,000 hard-core criminals have been arrested, while 246 terrorists, 38 kidnappers and 10 extortionists killed so far in police encounters. Additionally, 15,400 illegal weapons have been recovered from the custody of criminals operating within the city of Karachi by the law enforcement agencies.

The National Assembly has also approved the ‘Prevention of Electronic Crime Bill 2015’, with the aim of filtering the social media sites to enable vigilance against cybercrime. The NAP has been to make progress in some of the areas by making some achievements.

i) Establishment of Counter Terrorism Financing Units in all Counter Terrorism Departments at provincial level ii) Linkages with international think tanks and intelligentsia inter alia iii) FATA paln of action iv) Cyber Security Bill

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Chapter 5 5.1 Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations

Summary: - This dissertation focused on Afghanistan Turmoil and its Implications for Pakistan’s Security. The fact that insurgency and turmoil has been there in Afghanistan owes its origin to the post-Soviet withdrawal era from Afghanistan that destined it to suffer the pangs of civil war. The multi-ethnic society in the country coupled with different tribes having diverse opinions on most of the issues relating to government and refusing them denial in the set up of the government is another contributory factor for the insurgency and terrorism. The turmoil there is not affecting only the country of Afghanistan but owing to the long porous Pak-Afghan border Pakistan is directly affected with any development and risk factor. The 9/11 episode was the most agonizing factor in the Pak-Afghan relations when the former stood by the United States and Allied Forces in the war against terrorism but the latter took it as an alien war and Pakistan dragged itself into it. The war entered Pakistan through the Durand Line and then made it a flaring country in the world with the occurrence of tragic events like Peshawar School attack and many more tragic events that compelled the government to bring in the NAP in true spirit and utilize all the techniques of modern warfare. The core objectives of the study were to identify and analyze the factors responsible for the crisis of Afghanistan, investigate the implications of Afghanistan’s crisis for the security of Pakistan, and to analyze the role of National Counter Terrorism Authority in countering terrorism in Pakistan and also to analyze the achievements of National Action Plan. Methodology for the study was qualitative in nature for which both primary and secondary sources were taken into account. Primary sources focused on interview of experts, political analysts, religious scholars and prominent journalists and statements of government’s functionaries. Secondary sources included books, research journals, magazines, articles and other archival sources. All available resources were utilized for conducting the dissertation. 5.1 Findings

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1) Taliban have been fighting in Afghanistan since 1990s as a result of which they came to power in 1996 but were dethroned by the NATO forces and its allies in 2001 with the establishment of a democratic government in Afghanistan whereby Hamid Karzai was placed on the throne of Kabul. The ISAF/ NATO were able to maintain peace and stability in the country but it could not last long and security of the country entered the worst scenario during the period from 2007 to 2013. The major source of finance and revenue of Taliban have come from opium and drug-economy. 2) There has been increase of attacks by Taliban on the key sectors and sensitive security installations during the period of 2007 and onwards. These attacks found great momentum under the leadership of Mullah Akhtar Mansour when the death news of Mullah Omer was announced by Akhtar Mansour in July 2015 though reports circulated in some circles that Mullah Omer died in 2013 but the news was kept secret by Akhtar Mansour to consolidate his leadership position. As a result of the insurgent activities, great progress was gained by Taliban in some provinces such as Kunduz, Helmand and Nangarhar. These provinces became the centre of attention by the ISAF and regional powers besides Afghanistan on account of its security lapses. 3) Another threat that has recently overpowered Afghanistan is that of ISIS, which is seen in Afghanistan-Pakistan affiliate Willayat-Khorasan, where they are engaged in fighting against Taliban as well as against the governmental machinery for power struggle. The ISIS has hold in the provinces of Nangarhar and Herat where security worsened during the period of 2015. Kunduz is another province struck by the anti-state elements and security took the worst manifestation from day to day. It is also a matter of concern that with the emergence of the ISIS, the number of non-state actors increased and it became another enemy for the law enforcement agencies. 4) The death of Mullah Omer provided opportunities and challenges to Taliban since the new leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour emerged on the scene of Afghanistan as the nominated successor to Mullah Omer but soon he was faced with certain

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challenges of unified leadership. He faced stiff opposition from Mullah Rasool Akhund, who revolted against the authority of Mullah Akhtar Mansour. 5) Pak-Afghan Relations worsened in the post Army Public School Peshawar attack, followed by a series of other tragic episodes; Badaber Airbase tragedy, attack on Bacha Khan University Charsadda and the tragedy of NADRA office Mardan, each causing huge losses to the people. The perpetrators of these attacks were allegedly claimed to have taken shelter in Afghanistan as in some cases telephonic calls were made from unknown Mobile numbers from Afghanistan. 6) The Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) signed between Afghanistan and the United States, is a great hurdle in the way of reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Taliban and other stakeholders in Afghanistan would not be in a position to enter into any negotiation and peace parley with the government without the prior consent of the United States since this will tie both the incumbent nations for a period of ten years. 7) Indian aid to Afghanistan and cooperation in the field of assisting/training the ANSF is another sore point for Pakistan. Though Pakistan offered to train the ANSF on modern lines yet the offer was turned down by Afghanistan and in retaliation accepted the offer of India. Indian strategic interest in Afghanistan is against the very norms of Strategic Depth by Pakistan. Indian presence in Afghanistan is a matter of great concern for Pakistan since Pakistan is already on bad terms with India on the eastern side while this will also make Pakistan sandwich on its western border too. Moreover India does not share any International border with Afghanistan but its presence there and offer of services in the various fields is to weaken the position of Pakistan. 8) The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed between Afghanistan and the United States, having a life span of ten years, would enable the American forces to have their presence in Afghanistan for the upcoming ten years. This would greatly ensure the dominance of American forces over the Afghan. 9) Security lapses have been observed in the existing structure of ANSF though they are, at present, helped by the ISAF with strength of round-about 10,000 security personnel. A glaring example of this was seen on the attack on Afghan Parliament

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when the terrorists made an attack on the Parliament but the attack was countered by a soldier named Esa Khan Laghmani, who was greatly venerated by the people at large. He was termed as an Afghani hero who was bestowed upon great prizes and laurels by the government and general people. 10) U.S experts still see Afghanistan to be a security risk state and with this view in mind, 13 U.S Generals have recently warned President Obama of the United States of dire consequences if he reduced the strength of coalition forces in Afghanistan and urged him to maintain the current strength of forces in Afghanistan. Despite 14 long years of stay by the coalition forces, the U.S is still haunted with the acts of terrorism and extremism in the country that could be another challenge for the entire globe. 11) It is a common perception that peace cannot exist in Afghanistan on account of diverse population and the excessive role of non-state actors for they are not given their due representation in the affairs of the government. With this end, a meeting of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group was held which was attended by China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States whereby it was urged by the participants to take joint action against the “irreconcilable elements” in Afghanistan. 12) One of the well known causes of tension between Pak-Afghan relations is mainly due to the lack of resources of the Pak-Afghan border management. At present there are 200 crossing points on the Pak-Afghan border with limited number of security personnel. Security on some of the border points is tight particularly at Torkham, Chaman, Ghulam Khan and Angoor addah. 13) Border management does not refer to border-sealing or border-fencing since the common man refer it to the above two connotations. It connotes improving the security system of the border on modern lines so as to meet the needs of curbing terrorism and militancy across both sides of the border so as to do away with the game of accusation and counter-accusation of. Pakistan’s border with China and Iran is based on the doctrine of border management though it is neither sealed nor fenced. It also does not mean curbing trade activities or stopping the movement of the people who have common bondage of relations and caste resemblance.

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14) Pashtun population has been playing an important role in the affairs of the government of Afghanistan as far as the making and unmaking of rulers are concerned. The Pashtun population of Afghanistan revolted against the enthronement of Hafeezullah Ameen when he was elevated to power by the Russians in 1970s. They started Jihad against the Soviets, assisted by the Americans in which they got victorious but when they were denied power-sharing in the country, again they revolted and some of them emerged under the guise of Taliban in 1995. 15) The Americans and western powers should also realize that war is not the only option because they have been trying for the last twenty five years to demolish Al-Qaeda but failed to achieve the desired result. Now, the ghosts of Al-Qaeda gaze into their eyes such as Daesh in Syria and Iraq, Takfiris in Libya, Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko haram in Nigeria, the Houthis in Yemen, Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, emerging as the new base of resistance. No one is there to challenge except the Iranians and Hizbullah, who too are getting exhausted as a result of heavy casualties. 16) The western border of Pakistan is very important from the political, religious, security and strategic point of view. Having served as the nourishing place of sanctuaries for Mujahedeen in 1980s, the birth place of Al-Qaeda, the emergence of Taliban and is now the staging ground for Neo-Taliban. The Neo-Taliban has three distinct objectives. The first one is focused westward on fueling the Afghan ongoing conflict and dethroning the elected government. The second one is globally oriented, providing sanctuary to Al-Qaeda and plans attacks against the interest of west. The third one is focused on Pakistan itself by carving out a sphere of influence and impact within the tribal areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the adjacent settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) for the establishment of a self-styled Islamist Rule. Its main focus is also centered round the destabilization of Pakistan so as to disrupt its cooperation with the United States and its partner allies. 17) The insurgency of Neo-Taliban is parasitic in nature and is dependent on bases of FATA as a result of which the FATA and settled districts of KP have been

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blurred. Owing to this blurring, the districts of Swat, Mardan, Charsadda, Peshawar and Kohat have been greatly affected by terrorism and militancy. They are mainly functional in Swat, Khyber, Darra Adam Khel, South Waziristan and Peshawar. 18) The Haqqani Network has been regarded as one of the most detrimental groups and has created great security risks for Pakistan. It has been responsible for the deterioration of relations of Pakistan with its neighboring countries particularly India and Afghanistan. It has shouldered the responsibility of Mumbai attacks in 2008 and 2009 and has been instrumental in conducting many attacks against the U.S forces in Afghanistan. This network has bases in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and Khost and has established close liaison with the Al-Qaeda and other terrorist networks. 19) The attack on Army Public School Peshawar in December 2014 was one of the bloodiest attacks in the history of Pakistan leaving 145 innocent people dead most of whom were the students. Responsibility of the attack was claimed by the TTP through its chief spokesman who urged that the attack was undertaken as a consequence of the ongoing Operation Zarb-e- Azab that has killed most of their fellows. This attack shifted the focus of the law enforcement agencies from Al- Qaeda and other terrorist networks to the TTP. 20) The TTP was formed in 2007 under the leadership of the militant commander Baitullah Mehsud out of the heterogeneous groups that fought in Afghanistan during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It emerged as an alliance of fighters and radicals that came of diverse backgrounds, tribes, ethnicity and nationalities. The founding objectives of the new radical group were to enforce Sharia, to unite against NATO and foreign forces in Afghanistan and carry out “defensive jihad” against Pakistan Army and law enforcement agencies of Pakistan. 21) Owing to differences among the members of the TTP over some issues, it started to split into various factions in 2014 due to leadership vacuum. Some of the major issues over which it broke from the main group included attacks on civilians, personnel of law enforcement agencies, peace parleys with government and more autonomy in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

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22) Clear distinction exits between the ideologies of Afghan Taliban and Tehrik-e- Taliban.The former has clear motto to establish an Islamic government in Afghanistan and clear it of foreign forces while the latter has different agenda to fight against the law enforcement agencies of its own country and has even divisions and dissentions amongst its ranks and files. 23) It is an admitted fact that the Southern part of Afghanistan is considered by many foreign fighters to be a safe haven for them and fighters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Syria and some from India and Bangladesh prefer to stay. While the eastern provinces of Afghanistan such as Kunar, Nuristan, Paktia, Paktika, Khost and Pakistani tribal areas bordering these areas are preferred by fighters from Morocco, Algeria, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan. These foreign fighters easily infiltrate into Pakistan through the tribal belt and keep themselves engaged in different insurgent and terrorist activities. 24) The tribal areas of Pakistan have remained ignored by the government of Pakistan since 1947. It had its own system of running the affairs of the government based on the doctrine of FCR and Jirga system. The area was not provided with basic necessities such as education, health, and other facilities of life. Resultantly, the area remained far behind from the rest of the country in many respects. Some of the greatest flaws in the tribal areas of Pakistan were the inaccessibility of the common law enforcement system and the lack of jurisdiction of the Judicial Courts System over the issues confronted by the people. 25) Terrorism is a global issue and despite the joint efforts by the United States and its allied partners under the umbrella of NATO/ISAF has not produce the desired results by exterminating this nuisance from the society. Though they stayed in Afghanistan for about 13 years but still terrorism and militancy has not been overcome by the security agencies of the ISAF and the ANSF. 26) The government of Taliban in Afghanistan (1996-2010) had been successful in eradicating poppy and opium from Afghanistan but their fall saw huge growth in opium and poppy cultivation. It has now reached a maximum record growth and provides 90% of the world opium supply. Opium was the major source of funding

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for Mujahedeen during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and even now it has become the greatest source of revenue for the insurgents. This enormous increase in the drug industry of Afghanistan is becoming a major threat to the security of Pakistan. About 35% of the total drug production from Southern Afghanistan is mainly smuggled through Dalbadin and Chaghi (Baluchistan) areas to the countries of the Gulf and Yemen. 27) Both Afghanistan and Pakistan hold different opinions regarding the Pak-Afghan border, the former believes in the doctrine of ‘Open border policy’ and is against the closing/fencing of the border while the latter believes in the policy of border management and fencing of the border for curbing terrorism and militancy across the border. Any move to fence it, is strongly opposed by the former and has taken recourse to violent activities on such acts. 28) Due to the landlocked nature of Afghanistan, it is entirely dependent on transit trade facilities from the neighboring countries particularly Pakistan. Informal transit trade existed across the Durand line long before the creation of Pakistan. However, a formal Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA) was signed between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1965 whereby Pakistan offered some unilateral concessions to Afghanistan in lieu of transit facilities and Peshawar-Torkham and Chaman-Spin Boldak crossing points were primarily agreed upon between the two countries. Imports by Afghanistan were exempted from the custom duties, service charges, port levies and handling fees as a result of this agreement. With the passage of time, the volume of smuggled goods increased to an alarming ratio in the markets of Peshawar and adjacent areas, Chaman, Quetta and Rawalpindi, bearing a negative impact on the economy of Pakistan. 29) During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the latter was highly assisted by Pakistan on strategic grounds but the strategy of Pakistan did not materialize. It helped Taliban partly to secure the notion of strategic depth in Afghanistan in case of any attack by India and partly to serve its own interest in the region. Afghanistan had been denying the validity of the Durand Line and had been in search of the creation of Greater Pashtunistan but the then Taliban upon coming into power did not do away with the issue of Pashtunistan. They (Taliban)

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imposed strict doctrines of Islamic law that irritated the International Community resulting in their isolation in the world. 30) Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States against the war on terrorism has caused irreparable loss to the security structure of Pakistan. It had to initiate military operations against the extremist religious organizations that irritated the extremists to such an alarming ratio that they had to siege the Red Mosque in the capital city of Islamabad in 2007. The operation against the militants of the Red Mosque resulted in the death of many religious scholars including its khatteb, Maulana Abdul Aziz and others. It was in the aftermath of this incident that the TTP came into existence in 2007. 31) In contrast to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban in the pre-9/11 era, India continued to provide utmost support to the Northern Alliance, comprising all anti- Taliban elements. During this time India provided huge financial support to the Afghani people and became the biggest non-Western donor to Afghanistan. India’s increased interest in Afghanistan can be gauged from the fact that the former runs four Consulates in Afghanistan; that is at Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad and its popularity among the Afghani people is tantamount to the defeat of Pakistan in the region. 32) The government of Pakistan entered the tribal areas for the very first time in 2002 when law and order situation worsened in the area. This was the beginning of the military operations in the area which were followed by the peace deals with the militants and terrorists. The operations could not produce the efficacious results as this gave the militants an opportunity to reassert their authority in the area after the conclusion of the operation. 33) The Shakai Agreement, the first of its kind in the history of Pakistan was signed between the government of Pakistan and Pro-Taliban, proved a failure and remained in force for less than 50 days. As a result of this agreement, the government of Pakistan agreed to grant some concessions to the local Taliban; to release all the prisoners held during the operation, allowed the foreign Mujahideen to live peacefully in tribal areas, the government to pay collateral

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damages for the losses and no action would be taken against Nek Muhammad, leader of Taliban. 34) The Sararogha Peace Agreement was the other peace agreement that was signed by the government of Pakistan with Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of Taliban in 2005. Through this agreement, the government agreed not to take any action against Baitullah Mehsud and his colleagues for their past actions provided they are not involved in fresh cases of criminal activities. Baitullah Mehsud agreed not to support any foreign fighter in the area and would not attack any government functionary or any personnel of the law enforcement agency. 35) The Miranshah Peace Deal was a huge blow to the government of Pakistan. It was in this deal that it agreed to grant some concessions to the tribal people where they were even allowed to carry weapons as per the tradition of the tribal system but were disallowed to carry heavy weapons. Now this allowance for the carriage of weapons showed weakness on part of the government and the militants gained an upper hand over the government 36) The signing of the Shakai Agreement was the first slippery point for the government of Pakistan for giving legitimacy to the militants as the major stakeholder that consequently eroded the administrative and political structure of the government. The initial peace agreements were made in a very furtive way to such an extent that the names of the signatories were kept confidential as in the case of Shakai Agreement. Their names were neither made public nor shown to the media men. Another flaw in these peace deals was that the regional and international stakeholders as NATO/ISAF and United States in particular were not taken on board when the agreements were signed. The drone strikes were operational even during the signing of the peace deals which showed distrust on part of the government. 37) In most of the peace agreements that were contracted with Taliban, the government negotiated usually from a very weak position, demanding too little from the militants’ whereas the militants made heavy demands from the government in retaliation. The government agreed to most of these demands in haste which encouraged the militants for making further unjust demands. In these

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deals, only the Taliban and government were the parties to the deal whereas the local population was ignored which was a great flaw. 38) Sectarian violence is also one of the most noteworthy factors in the worst security situation in Pakistan. The tussle between Sunni and Shia sects has been viewed as a great contributory factor as a result of which thousands of deaths and casualties visited some of the key areas in Pakistan, particularly Parachinar and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 39) Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is an offshoot of the Sunni sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) which believes in the preaching of terror and forces the government to declare Shia community as non-Muslims and establish an orthodox Sunni Islamic system in the country. On account of its terrorist activities it was declared as Foreign Terrorist Organization in January 2003 by the United States. Since the LeJ is an anti-Shia extremist organization of the Sunni group considering them to be infidels and is involved in sectarian violence in Karachi, Baluchistan, and Southern Punjab and has carried out numerous attacks against the interests of Iran in Pakistan. It focused on sectarian violence against Shias in Baluchistan in 2012. Since that it has divested itself of anti-Shia activities and has allied itself with other militant groups and carries out attacks against the western and Pakistani government’s interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 40) It is also a fact that some militant groups in Pakistan have enjoyed financial and operational support from the security establishment of Pakistan regarding asymmetric warfare against India. These groups also received funding and assistance from the foreign governments particularly Iran and Saudi Arabia in context of fighting proxy war for political and ideological dominance in the region. Currently the Sunni organizations of ASWAJ and LeJ have also been supported by Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda with funding, recruitment, training, sanctuary and logistical support. 41) The execution of Mumtaz Qadri on February 29, 2016 was another event in the history of Pakistan that further exacerbated the security situation in Pakistan. He was executed for he had assassinated the then Governor of Punjab on January 4, 2011 publicly in Islamabad for having expressed his views on the blasphemy

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laws. Qadri belonged to the Barelvi school of thought and his execution aroused the sentiments of his caste against the government. 42) Attack on the Army Public School Peshawar was a tipping point in the history of Pakistan for it reinvigorated the dysfunctional National Action Plan, which was given more practical manifestation and provided coverage for the creation of Military Courts for speedy trail and justice. The Military Courts were given further legality by the Apex Court of Pakistan declaring them to be constitutional while the Apex Court will have the power to review its judgments. 43) Some of the prominent persons and institutions that have fallen a victim to the attacks of the terrorists’ successful and abortive attacks include President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf in 2003, attack on Benazir Bhutto, ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan in 2007, Aftab Ahmad Sherpao and Asfandyar Wali in 2007 and 2009 respectively, Bashir Bilour in 2012, Pakistan Ordnance Factory Wah in 2008, Army GHQ Rawalpindi in 2009, Police Training School Manawa Lahore in 2009, Mehran Naval Base Karachi in 2011, PAF Airbase Kamra in 2012, Peshawar Airport in 2012, 2014, Karachi Airport and naval Dockyard in 2014, Bannu Jail in 2012, DIK jail in 2013, Army Public School Peshawar in 2014, Badaber Airbase in 2015, NADRA office Mardan in 2015, Bacha khan university Charsadda in 2016, and District Courts Charsadda in 2016. 44) The safe havens in Pakistan are not only the FATA and adjacent areas as they are thought to be. In the broader sense, safe havens of the militants are of three types. First the semi governed territories like FATA, B-areas of Balochistan and tribal areas of Punjab. Second, no-go areas of Karachi where law enforcement agencies of the country are reluctant to enter either due to the sympathies of the local people for them or they are intimidated by the ruthless militants or criminal cartels. Third, the safe havens in Afghanistan across the Durand Line. 45) Security situation keeps on changing very rapidly in the region having a direct impact on the non-state actors, as has been observed in many cases. Taliban are facing internal crisis that surfaced in the post-death scenario of Mullah Omer and a challenge from the IS. The Haqqanis can also face similar challenges from the IS resulting in further grouping and dissensions. Foreign groups including the IS,

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the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement are making inroads to the areas controlled by the Haqqanis. A clash of ideologies can overpower and damage the interests of Haqqanis. This shift of ideologies may prove very detrimental to the interest of the Haqqanis resulting in increasing insurgency and militancy. 46) The government needs to make amendment to the constitution in a manner that only terrorists and militants should be tried under the military courts while accused of other offences may be tried under the Criminal Procedure Code. It should be made the sole prerogative of the Military Courts to try such cases with no power of review by any court of the country as this would result in the multiplicity of the judgements. 47) Militant organizations in Pakistan have depended mostly on the ‘Hawala’ (guarantee) or informal banking system in Pakistan where funds are transferred on personal guarantees of the sender without scrutiny or accountability by the government. Though this system has been greatly decreased in the wake of government’s crackdown against this illegal system of money transferring yet it cannot be ruled out that as a source of money transfer on the personal guarantee of Hawaladar. But still militants have benefited a lot from this system of money which has greatly affected the security structure of the country. They have received huge amount of money through Al-Akhtar Trust and Al-Rasheed Trust. 48) It is a fact that in the initial stages of the NAP, there was complete harmony between the Army and Civilian government but after a period of 11 months gulf started between the two pillars over certain issues such as the religious parties had reservation over the term ‘Religious Terrorism’ while another issue is the creation of Military Courts and when the Supreme Court passed a judgment clarifying that it can review the judgments of the Military Courts. Moreover, the government also failed to bring in reforms in the police department as was determined. So, status quo exists on the issues of police and madrassa reforms. As far as the issue of hate speeches and abhorrence of material is concerned, the government has done little work since printed material is still available in the market.

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49) Operation Zarb-e-Azab has shown great success in countering militancy and terrorism. The first target of this operation was the North Waziristan Agency (NWA), which on account of its rugged nature, had become an obvious choice for the terrorist networks. Within a period of less than two years, Operation Zarb-e- Azab has been able to clear 89% of the area free from the terrorist networks such as the Haqqani Network, Daesh and their affiliates, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. 50) Besides educational problems, FATA is also hit by political problems which have added to their miseries. The people of FATA have representation in the National Assembly and Senate with the ratio of 12 and 8 respectively. But unfortunately the area still remains under the direct executive control of the President of Pakistan. The area is administered by the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who acts as an agent of the President of the Republic. Each tribal agency is administratively headed by the Political Agent. But the most regrettable fact is that the laws framed by the National Legislature of the country are not applicable to them, who are empowered to issue regulations for the peace and good governance of the tribal areas. Similarly each Frontier Region is administratively headed by the Deputy Commissioner who exercises the same powers as are enshrined upon the Political Agent. Politics in FATA is patriarchic since cultural, traditional and social practices have kept FATA women at bay from decision making powers. 51) The recent trend of security personnel to join the militant groups is a new phenomenon that has further complicated the scene of security at global level. People in the law enforcement agencies also tend to move towards the insurgency and terrorism which has further jeopardized the security situation at regional and global level. The defection of Gulmurod Khalimov to ISIS, a colonel in the Tajik Special Forces, is very deplorable for the regional security as he had been to the United States three times for being trained as a soldier to fight against terrorism and insurgency. People like these are aware of the ground realities of lapses in the existing structure of security. They know the knowhow of modern warfare and tactics of fighting in a different way

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52) The militants usually carry on their activities in the most sensitive areas of the country as in the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The tribal areas of Pakistan have inroads to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) while the rich mining wealth of Afghanistan lies between Kunduz and Nangarhar provinces and have inroads into the Xinjiang province of China. By capturing these two provinces the insurgents can have easy access to mining wealth of Afghanistan as well as the resources of China. This can form a trajectory of three nations and can prove to be harmful to the security of Afghanistan, China and Pakistan. 53) It is an admitted fact that terrorism in Pakistan is mainly due to the presence of the foreign elements in the premises of Pakistan. A glaring example of this is the presence of Afghan and Indian spies who have been involved in different activities of militancy and insurgency in order to exacerbate the security situation in the country. In May 2016 the arrest of 6 Afghan Spies [who also confessed their crimes] on the Pakistani ground in Balochistan is testimony to the fact that alien hand is directly involved in the deteriorating security in our homeland. 54) Elements of the ISIS are found to have existence in parts of Sialkot, Karachi and Lahore. In Sialkot they have been found while busy in the distribution of pamphlets etc. In case of Karachi and Lahore, the former is noteworthy on account of the Safoora Goth gang with university educated gang involved in different criminal activities and the latter where a professor of a well-known private university was allegedly found to have links with Hizbu Tahrar. 55) The involvement of educated people in criminal activities is not a new phenomenon in the security paradigm of the country. The assassination of Daniel Pearl in 2002 was linked with Omer Sheikh, educated in the high echelon educational institutes of Pakistan and the United Kingdom and suggested an early link between the countries of higher education and militant recruitment. Al- Qaeda, too has tried to enlist among its ranks men from the educated middle and upper middle class. 56) It is a fact that militant groups have emerged in Pakistan as rival counterparts to the state power within its geographic domain. This has resulted in an atmosphere of insecurity and violence in the country. Resultantly, the government has to

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5.3 Recommendations

1) It is an undenying fact that Taliban have been fighting in Afghanistan since 1990s but the real fact is that they have been ignored from the governmental power and authority as a result of which a sense of deprivation has got developed in them. Though they are the stakeholders in the Afghan set-up, yet they are not given representation in any sphere of the government. The elevation of Hamid Karzai to the post of President-ship of Afghanistan was wholly and solely based on the wishes of the Americans. Nobody can deny the fact that during the reign of Taliban from 1996 to 2001, there was no opium cultivation and drug economy in the country but with the culmination of their power, the major source of revenue of Taliban have come from opium and drug economy. Giving them representation in the set up of the government would do an invaluable service towards security. 2) Some of the provinces of Afghanistan such as Kunduz, Helmand and Kandahar have been hit hard by the insurgents and terrorists and have frequently fallen victim to their activities during the stay of NATO forces. These can be overcome and controlled if the Taliban are given representations in these provinces and that too according to their population in these provinces. The government of Afghanistan needs to bring some drastic changes in the existing constitution so as to give representation to all the tribal groups and sects so as to resolve the issue of tribal representation/communal tribes. This can help a lot in saving the war-torn country from the clutches of terrorism and militancy. 3) The government of Afghanistan needs to give special attention to sensitive areas of the country and particularly the province of Willayat-Khorasan where the elements of ISIS have penetrated and has been causing security problems for the state. The ISIS is seen to have been engaged in war against the state machinery as well as the Taliban. If the government fails to control the ISIS in the initial stages then it would also cause great security fuss in the country like Taliban and other insurgent groups. The ISIS has also penetrated into the provinces of Helmand, Nangarhar, Herat and Kunduz where security situation is worsening day by day. The government should pay more attention to the sensitive areas creating strong

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links between the general population and the public so as to create an atmosphere of mutual trust and harmony. This would mitigate the burden of the law enforcement agencies by sharing the burden of responsibility with the common man. Volunteers should also play an important role in maintaining law and order in the country. 4) Taliban stood united under the charismatic leadership of Mullah Omer, but his death provided them the opportunity of disunity and separation from the main group. Successor to Mullah Omer was Mullah Mansour who faced stiff resistance from Mullah Rasool Akhund because he challenged the authority of Mullah Mansour to be undisputed leader of Taliban. Moreover, the death of Mullah Mansour in drone attack further weakened the movement of Taliban and new leader, Mullah Haibatullah has little experience on the war-field but is said to be great scholar of religion. Grouping and faction-formation within the Taliban is very fruitful for the security of Pakistan and the region as this would make it easy for some factions to enter into peace parleys with them. 5) Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have occasionally been normal but the post-2014 scenario added further fuel to the fire when Army Public School Peshawar was attacked in the most brutal way and whose perpetrators were alleged to have taken shelter in Afghanistan after the attacks were conducted. Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan urged the government of Afghanistan to take strict action against the terrorists but the latter was neither ready to take against nor hand them over to Pakistan. Not only this, this was followed by a series of terrorist incidents in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa such as the attack on Badaber Airbase Peshawar, attack on NADRA office Mardan, attack on Charsadda Katchery and attack on Bacha Khan University Charsadda. The culprits in these cases were reported to have fled to Afghanistan and in most of the cases telephone calls were received by the media men from unknown numbers from Afghanistan confessing the responsibility of the criminal acts. Such acts of barbarity and their confession through various spokesmen is another bone of contention towards the stanglated relations between the two countries.

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6) The Bilateral Security Agreement entered into between the United States and Afghanistan, should be implemented in true spirit in Afghanistan but it should not hinder the authority of the Afghan government while making any peace and security agreement with any faction and group in Afghanistan. Whatever the period of viability of the BSA might be, it should have jurisdiction over the sensitive installations of the country with no power to put any hindrance in the way of the government. 7) Pakistan needs to mobilize its products in Afghanistan and should focus on developing strong links in the fields of economics and security sector so as to overcome the menace of terrorism and insurgency, that has hitherto crippled the entire structures of both the governments. Joint security venture will do invaluable service to regional stability. Moreover Pakistan should do away with the notion of Strategic Depth in Afghanistan for it has not provided any shelter to Pakistan in case of any security threat rather it is the latter that has taken advantage of this doctrine. 8) The government of Afghanistan should focus on the internal security by making its law enforcement agencies stronger and leaving dependence on the ISAF. This will help them strengthen their internal security structure vis a vis the non-state actors. They should keep the ISAF forces in their country for some time but when their nascent security institutions are developed, they should rely on their native forces. 9) To overcome security measures as was observed by the Afghan security forces while its Parliament was attacked by the terrorists, only Esa Khan Laghmani showed his true worth who shot down the terrorists to death. It is important to mention that the law enforcement agencies of the country are still nascent and needs practical experience of warfare though at present they are assisted by the ISAF/NATO in the most sensitive areas. The government should install CCTV cameras on all important buildings/installations so as to take precautionary/safety measures and make arrangements for a vigilant watch by the security agencies round the clock. The government should also note that the ISAF is still in the

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country but the terrorists are showing their worth indicating that they are capable of reaching any sensitive installation/ key point in the country. 10) Keeping in view the gross security situation in Afghanistan, recently thirteen U.S Generals advised President Barrack Obama not to reduce the current strength of NATO forces in Afghanistan otherwise they would face dire security consequences. The view of the U.S Generals sounds well in the current state of affairs since the democratic government of the country is facing many challenges of security and foreign relations. Even the Chief Executive Ashraf Ghani has a soft corner for Pakistanis while the President Abdullah Abdullah is against the attitude of the former for having friendly relations with Pakistan. For a friendly neighbor, it is necessary that both the President and Chief Executive of the country should be on the same page. This will avoid multiplicity of decisions and differences of opinions on all important issues of national interest. 11) Peace in Afghanistan is a far cry and most of the analysts and strategists are of the view that the diverse population and increased role of the non-state actors make it impossible for the smooth affairs of the state to function. The role of the Quadrilateral Coordination Group comprising Pakistan, Afghanistan, China and the United States would be of great help in resolving the issues of sectarianism and civil war. For a diverse population all over the world, democracy has been recommended as the best form of government. All the sects should be given proportional representations in the affairs of the state as per their population. The QCG would help resolve the issue of “irreconcilable elements” in Afghanistan by coverting it into a democratic government. 12) Both Afghanistan and Pakistan should try to resolve the issue of Border Management. Both are bent upon not to give heed to the opinion of the other on account of their strict reluctance. Such like issues are usually resolved by the policy of give and take but this has not proved to be productive over here. It is a strange irony that the former does not assess the true connotation of the word border management because to them it signifies sealing of the border but it is a misperception as this would not seal the border but would rather mange it properly for security purposes. It does not matter to increase the number of check

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posts and install metallic gates at all the entry points. Tightening security at the critical points of Torkham, Chaman, Ghulam Khan and Angoor Adda might prove to be a step towards border management. It is also important that Pakistan’s border with China and Iran is based on the doctrine of ‘Border Management’ though they are neither sealed nor fenced. Hence Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan should be based on border management as that of China and Iran. 13) Pashtun Population have been playing important role in the history of Afghanistan on account of their support for making and unmaking of the rulers. Their importance is such that they can make and even dethrone the ruling men from power. The latter phenomenon was observed when Hafeezullah Ameen was enthroned by the Russians in 1970s but as they (Pashtuns) were against his raising to power, they revolted against him and started the holy war of jihad against the Russians. Another example was in the post withdrawal scenario of Russians from Afghanistan when they were refused power-sharing by the government of Afghanistan, again they revolted and some of them got converted to Taliban. It is on the basis of this ground reality that they should in no case be ignored from power sharing and should be given due share in the affairs of the government as per their population. They should be considered as the main stakeholder in the affairs of the government so as to avoid any insurgency and militancy in the country. It is an admitted fact that when they are ignored from any prerogative of the government they would take recourse to rebellion. 14) The Americans and Western powers should also learn a lesson from their experience in Afghanistan that war is not the only solution to insurgency and militancy. If war had the potentiality to cure for the ills then they would have solved the problems of insurgency, extremism and militancy but they could not do so during their 14 years of stay in Afghanistan in which all the new strategies of modern warfare were adopted and utilized by them to gain the maximum results but no efficacious results were obtained. In 2001 only Al-Qaeda was the enemy of the western powers but now there has been a tremendous increase in their enemies as new non-state actors have emerged on the scene of the world that have directly challenged the authority of the western powers in the Muslim Countries. They

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need to give special attention to the world movements such as Daesh in Iraq and Syria, Takfiris in Libya, Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Houthis in Yemen, Taliban in Afghanistan, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These movements are getting penetrated into the whole world. The whole world should frame a viable strategy for the resolution of issues in the countries where they are gaining momentum otherwise they would pose threat of more sever nature to the International Actors and they would be faced with multiplicity of movements. 15) Pakistan needs to pay great attention to its western border that has been of great strategic importance for its security. This has proved to be a place for the sanctuaries of Mujahedeen in their war against the Russians, birth place for the Al-Qaeda, the emergence of Taliban and now staging ground for the neo-Talban. In the post-9/11 incident it became the focus of the entire world when it was adopted as sanctuary by the terrorists when the Americans started the war against terrorism. Most of the terrorists fled to this region and took shelter over there. Not only this, they also challenged the writ of Pakistani government and were bent upon establishing their self-styled rule in the FATA region and adjacent region by strict adherence to their self-styled way of Islamic values. In order to counter their moves, the government of Pakistan had to adopt many tactics of peace and military operations but security in the country is still a cry in the wilderness. At first their activities were confined to the tribal areas but soon they extended their activities to the adjacent areas and then to the whole of Pakistan. In order to achieve maximum results of security, the government should embark upon a policy of ‘carrot and stick’. The policy of carrot in the areas where the insurgents are willing to enter into peace parleys with the government and the policy of stick where they are reluctant to have peace deals. 16) The government should take into account the activities of the neo-Taliban to such an extent that it should have a close and vigilant watch on its activities because they are parasitic in nature and are dependent on other terrorist networks for getting their designs realized. These organizations has worsened the law and order in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to such a great extent that the areas of

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Peshawar, Mardan, Swat, Charsadda and Kohat are the most affected areas next the tribal areas of Pakistan. The government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa should focus more and more on the security of these areas and should prepare a plan for the endurance of security by appointing volunteers to make timely communication with the law enforcement agencies. The number of security personnel needs to be increased at all sensitive and public installations. The private firms should also ensure their personal security by installing CCTV cameras, appointing their personal security guards provided their complete data is registered with the nearby police stations. This will lessen the burden over the security agencies. 17) The Haqqani network has been a great security concern for the country by conducting attacks against the interest of Pakistan on the neighboring countries and western powers. The attack on Indian Parliament of Mumbai in 2008 and 2009 and against the interest of United States in Afghanistan has earned Pakistan a bad name of terrorist state. The law enforcement agencies should focus more on this network by dealing with it with an iron hand and bring to the book those who are its facilitators. If some of its leaders are in favor of peace with the government of Pakistan then the government needs to show a soft corner for them so as to reach the real responsible culprits in the events of terrorism at local level as well at global level. Strategies produce better results if the government holds peace parleys with some of the soft liners. Even there are factions among the TTP that are not in consonance with the central leadership of the party, the government should approach those so as create a bridge among them. This will weaken their position vis a vis the law enforcement agencies and would result in decreasing insurgency. 18) The government of Pakistan needs to have peace negotiations with the top command of TTP so as to avert future incidents like that of Army Public School Peshawar. Spokesman of the TTP urged on the event that it was undertaken as retaliation of the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azab that had engulfed most of their fellows. The attack drew the attention of the whole world towards the attitude of barbarism adopted by this group in killing the juvenile members of the community most of whom were students of class nine. December 16, 2014 was

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observed as the ‘Black Day’ in the history of KP when such a large number of students and staff members of the school were martyred in the most brutal way. 19) Some of the core objectives of the formation of TTP under the command of Baitullah Mehsud in 2007 were to enforce Sharia but it has deviated from this principle and is bent upon destroying the innocent people without any cause. Other moves of the TTP included waging war against the NATO forces in Afghanistan, and carrying out ‘defensive jihad’ against the Army and security personnel of Pakistan. So far, they have focused more on the latter aspect of their ideology, bringing Pakistan on the verge of security risk state. What they need to know is not the fabricated doctrine of Jihad and that too by conducting it against their own brothers’ makes no sense nor does it fall within the ambit of the definition of the so-called Jihad. 20) The TTP started to split into various factions owing to leadership vacuum and partly over the definition of Jihad. Some of the major issues over which it broke from the main group, included the attacks on civilians, peace process with the government of Pakistan and law enforcement agencies. This means that the group is split over its own ideology and is having divergence of opinion on some of the issues. Keeping in view the divergence of views, the government should initiate the process of dialogue with the soft liners by granting them some concessions. This will make the bridge more widened between the various factions of the TTP resulting in the further weakening of the group. 21) Clear distinction exists between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. It is also necessary to delink the former from the latter since there is huge difference between the ideologies of the two. The former group is not fighting against the Afghan Government and is interested in expelling the foreign forces from the country while the latter is fighting against the law enforcement agencies as well as the state machinery for the establishment of their self styled government in the country. The TTP has been involved in targeting the public and private installations on equal footing hence it is the duty of the private sector to cooperate with the public sector to point out those grey areas where the terrorists use to seek refuge after committing their nefarious designs.

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22) The southern part of Afghanistan has been criticized for providing shelter to the terrorist networks of foreign terrorists hailing from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, UAE, Kuwait, Jordon, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Syria and India. Not only this, foreign fighters from Chechnya, Morocco, Algeria, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan also have their hideouts. The great tragedy is that these people after committing acts of terrorism and insurgency cross the border to Pakistan and take refuge into the tribal areas of the country thus disturbing the peace and tranquility of the entire region. Both the government of Afghanistan and Pakistan need to take joint action against these networks so that both the states are esteemed high in the eyes of the International Community. A Joint security force comprising equal number of security personnel from both the countries should monitor the Pak-Afghan border by keeping a vigilant eye over all those penetrating into the tribal areas of the other country. They should also have a court system to try the arrested criminals and inflict severe punishment. The Judges need to be well versed in the Islamic, British and International Law so that it has zero chance of being taken to the International Court of Justice. 23) The tribal areas of Pakistan comprising seven agencies should be brought under the direct control of the government of Pakistan. The tribal system based upon the Malik and Sardar coupled with FCR should be replaced by the Pakistani law so as to do away with discrimination and all the people be treated equally on the same land. It should be merged into the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or given the status of a separate province bringing it at par with the rest of other provinces of Pakistan. Moreover, the administrative law of the country should replace the office of the Political Agent that has been exercising numerous powers of judiciary. 24) Terrorism has become a global phenomenon in the post 9/11 episode and is not only restricted to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The United States and the allied forces could not uproot it from the land of Afghanistan during a period of fourteen years; hence it is the joint responsibility of the entire world to take collective action against them. There is also need to initiate legislation at global level based

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on world terrorism law and World Terrorism Court for trying the convicted people and resultantly inflicting severe punishment. 25) There is great divergence in the attitude of Taliban towards poppy and opium cultivation and its transaction. This was observed in the recent years of post-9/11 scenario when they relied on opium and drug-economy for their subsistence while they totally obliterated it when they were in power from 1995-2001. Thus nobody can define the exact nature of Taliban regarding their true values of Islam; if a thing was illegal during their regime then it ought to be illegal during the current regime. But the irony of the situation is that they define things in terms of their relative gains and losses. To gain the sympathies of the lay men they should have clear locus standi about the legal and illegal things. The basic thing is they are concerned about their own way of looking at the things from their self styled approach of life. 26) Both Pakistan and Afghanistan need to develop consensus of views regarding the true nature and demarcation of the Pak-Afghan border. Pakistan looks at the situation on the current basis of ground realities while the former believes in the doctrine of ‘Open Border Policy’ making it all the time free and for use but that is against the interest of Pakistan. It is thorough this border that the terrorists fled to Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 and entangled Pakistan in many security issues and made it a burning country and particularly FATA and the adjacent areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Proper border management is the only way in which lies the safety of both the countries. Biometric system needs to be installed on all the entry and exit gates so as to be used in case of emergency and detect the real culprits. Walk through gates should also be installed there to check the passersby and pedestrians. 27) Owing to the land locked nature of Afghanistan, it is dependent upon Pakistan for its transit trade through sea. It is therefore quite necessary to boost the transit trade facilities between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The formal Afghan Transit Trade Agreement signed between the two countries in 1965 needs to be revived in true spirit though Pakistan has already given some unilateral concessions to Afghanistan on Peshawar-Torkham and Chaman Spin Boldak routes. Proper

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checking on these points would increase the trade of both the countries and would cater for cordial relations between the two countries. Pakistan should give some more unilateral concessions on goods on account of the land locked nature of Afghanistan. 28) Both Pakistan and Afghanistan needs to resolve the issue of Durand line as this is the bone of contention between the two countries. Afghanistan negates the validity of the border being drawn without the consent of its people during the British Regime and is not now binding upon them. The fact is Afghanistan has never raised such an uncompromising issue in the post partition period of Pakistan. According to Afghan government and Taliban, Pakistan’s decision to stand by the United States in the war against terrorism was the most displeasing point to the Afghan government and people because Pakistan dragged itself into the war of an alien power. It is also an admitted fact that Pakistan whole-heartedly helped its Afghan brethren when it was invaded by the Soviet forces in 1979 and it was due to the joint efforts of Pakistan that Afghanistan won the war against the Russians. But even at that time they could not forget about their stance on the Durand Line and the issue of Pashtunistan. Recently the Durand Line has become the most controversial border between the two countries, and Afghanistan is not ready in any case to recognize it as an International Border with Pakistan. The border should be properly managed with biometric system and walk through gates to be installed at all the entry and exit points so as to detect any suspicious and doubtful activity. Fencing should also be provided at all the windy and mountainous passes that are used by the non-state actors for the infiltration of criminal enterprises. But the most important thing is that both the countries need to make their countries security risk free states in the world, they need to make some concessions to each other and adopt the policy of ‘give and take’ that could resolve all the outstanding issues catering for blame game against each other. 29) The taking sides of Pakistan by the United States in the war against terror made it suffer an irreparable loss because Pakistan has to reconsider its foreign policy and has been still suffering the pangs of insecurity and sense of security risk. Security in the country took such a worst shape that the government of Pakistan had to

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start military operations in the tribal areas as well as the settled regions to eradicate terrorism from the country. The war against extremism and insurgency is still in operation but no substantial results have been obtained till now. Though there has been a tremendous decrease in the incidents of terrorism and extremism as a result of military operations yet the desired results have not yet been achieved. These operations were started as a last resort by the government as security situation has worsened to such an extent in the country that the terrorists took siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad in 2007. The government should urge all the religious institutions to get them registered to respective Federal and Provincial governments and provide them with a uniform syllabus to be taught there. The syllabus should remain under the supervision of the ‘Board of Ulema’ to be appointed by the government and should also scrutinize all the curricular and co-curricular activities of the respective madrassas. All the religious institutions should remain permanently under the patronage of an inspection team to be constituted for the purpose of having a vigilant watch on all the activities going on inside the institutes. 30) Due to the increased role of India in Afghanistan it has worsened the relations of Pakistan with Afghanistan. This can be gauged from the fact that India runs four Consulates in Afghanistan and has been providing help to the Afghanis in almost all spheres including security and paramilitary trainings but when the same is offered by Pakistan, Afghanistan refuses it bluntly. It is very important for Pakistan to get the influence of India decreased in Afghanistan otherwise it will make Pakistan a sandwich on both of its Eastern and Western borders. For a secure Pakistan it is therefore utmost necessary to make its borders secure for which bilateral relations with both Afghanistan and India need to e improved. 31) The worst security situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan is due to porous border with Afghanistan which has been frequently used by the local as well as foreign infiltrators. These infiltrators have made Pakistan as the most security-risk state in the region most of whom hail from the Muslim countries and a few from the non- Muslim countries. The non-Muslims mostly come from the Indian secret agency of RAW who works in Pakistan under the guise of diplomatic missions. The

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recent arrest of five Indian diplomats in Pakistan is a glaring example of foreign hand being involved in the deteriorating law and order situation in the country. It is on account of the presence of non-state actors and terrorists in the tribal areas of Pakistan that the government had to sign peace deals with them and upon non- compliance by them the government had to initiate military operations in the affected areas. The government is still doing a lot in this regard to do away with this nuisance once for all but no efficacious results have been obtained so far. Improvement of security in one area is soon followed by the worst security scenario in the other area/province. Currently the province of Balochistan is the most suffered one in terms of terrorist attacks as during a short period of about 20 days, two heinous terrorist attacks were conducted in which huge number of precious lives were lost. The occurrence of first attack in a police training school and the second one at the shrine of Hazrat Shah Noorani were viewed by all and sundry as the brutal acts of terrorism and extremism. The terrorists keep on changing their strategies from time to time, area to area, institution to institution, schools/universities to District Courts and Police training centers to Shrines of the martyred people. It is extremely difficult to station a security guard and security personnel at all points of the public and private places for if a man/woman cannot feel secure in mosque or graveyard, where can he/she be sure which are the most God-fearing places for the Muslims. 32) As it is clear that in most of the peace deals with the Taliban and other non-state actors the government of Pakistan negotiated from very weak position as the rival side was given certain privileges by the government without making some demands from them in retaliation. In any new agreement to be signed with them, the government should plead its case from the strong footing and make huge demands on them so as to make it extremely difficult for them to commit any act of terrorism in future. This will discourage the terrorists and further weaken their position vis a vis the state. It is also necessary for the government that in case of any new peace process, the International Actors such as the ISAF/NATO and allies must be taken on board so as to make the peace treaty more viable and substantial.

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33) The government needs to introduce such policies that the differences between the various sects and particularly the Shia and Sunni are minimized as these two have always been at logger heads. The differences between the two sects are so far apart that each accuses the other for harming the cause of the other. Some of the top leadership of the two sects has lost their lives on account of the fiery speeches against the other group. What they need to understand is the fact that Islamic religion does not believe in extremism and give ample space for tolerance to the other religions. If the true philosophy of Islam is understood, then that day is not far off when there will be complete peace and harmony in the country. Compromising attitude in the relations and public dealing are the philosophies that lead to better understanding of the situation creating an atmosphere of trust and peace loving in the society for a long life. 34) The government should make Peace Committees in the most sensitive areas of the country that are directly hit by the clashes of Sunni and Shia rift. The peace committees should consist of equal number of members from both the sects and should hold joint sessions and gatherings by inculcating among the common masses of the two groups the spirit of living in a friendly and brotherhood manner. They should preach the lesson of peaceful coexistence with their fellow brethren and should refrain from issuing fatwa against their fellow beings declaring them to be infidel. 35) The hard liners of the Sunni Community such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi that has very hard attitude towards the Shia Community and has been stressing the government of Pakistan to declare them as non-Muslims, should be made to have a soft corners for the Shia Community so as to make our country as tolerant loving country in the world. This group believes in the philosophy of terror and insurgency and has been involved in various acts against the interest of the government of Pakistan and Iran. The fact is they are not only using the native land of our country but also make our relations worse with our neighboring country, Iran which is mostly inhabited by the Shia population. They are also responsible for the worst security situation of our country with Afghanistan where the northern alliance that has cordial relations with the Shia Community of Iran.

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On account of its involvement in various terrorist activities, its criminal activities can be controlled in areas where they are rampant such as Karachi, Balochistan and Southern Punjab. The government should take recourse to such steps whereby the volunteers may be directly involved in the maintenance of law and order. 36) It is also a fact that in the past some of the jihadi organizations enjoyed the financial support of the establishment and security agencies especially those groups that were engaged in fighting against India. In the post-9/11 scenario, such like supports caused huge loss to Pakistan since not a single institution of the country remained safe from the atrocities of these organizations. In the post- Army Public School Peshawar attack, the government bluntly urged that the concept of ‘Good Taliban’ ceased to exist in Pakistan and urged that all the terrorist organizations, good or bad would be dealt with an iron hand. Thus National Action Plan was rejuvenated in the country with new zeal and spirit to clear the country of all sorts of terrorism and extremism. The plan has been successful in bringing the terrorists to the book by initiating crackdown against them and restoring the moratorium therein. As a result of the crackdown against these networks the ASWAJ and the LeJ ceased to receive support from the Al- Qaeda and Taliban in terms of funding, training, recruitment, sanctuary and logistic support. The government has been successful in controlling the funding agencies of the foreign countries but still a lot is to be done to do more and more to clear the country from all sorts of terrorism and insurgency. Monitoring Units need to be established at all the District levels so as to check funding and donor agencies and make reports to the government at regular intervals. These Units should have close liaison with the government and those organizations that commit terrorism in the name of jihad. 37) The religious scholars in collaboration with the government of Pakistan should preach broadmindedness in all religious affairs and avoid parochialism of all sorts in day to day life. The government should constitute committees of religious scholars comprising members from all the sects and stratum of religion so as to reach at consensus on most of the controversial issues and where no consensus arises, the same may be referred to the ‘Reconciliatory Committee’ to be

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constituted for the purpose. The Reconciliatory Committee should comprise equal number of religious scholars from all the religious sects with expert knowledge about Islam and its injunctions. It should even enlist foreign religious scholars of well repute all over the Muslim world. It should have the power of adjudication over the issues in controversy and present suggestions to the relevant section regarding the matter in hand. 38) The Military Courts should be given more powers to try cases of terrorism and extremism as people have strong confidence in the integrity of Pak Army. Their jurisdiction should be extended to all cases that fall within the ambit of terrorism, extremism, insurgency and militancy and should dispense justice in a speedier manner. Their decisions should not be reversed by the Supreme Court or any other institute of the country for they have been established for the purpose of uprooting terrorism and related menaces from the entire society of the country. 39) All the safe havens providing sanctuary to the terrorists should be destroyed and converted into the security check posts. They are not only there in FATA and Balochistan but are there in the shape of facilitation centers at the time of committing such like activities. In our country three categories of sanctuary have been found out by the law enforcement agencies. Firstly FATA should be given the status of a separate province or merged into the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The government also needs to focus more on the B-areas of Balochistan and place them at par with the rest of the settled areas of the country. Secondly, the ‘no-go-areas of Karachi’ should be converted into the settled areas like the rest of Karachi and personnel of the law enforcement agencies should be stationed at the affected areas. Thirdly, the Durand line should be properly managed. 40) It is also a fact that security situation has been changing from time to time and never remained constant as is clear from many instances of non-state actors that suffer too much on account of the threat which is faced by them from other terrorist organizations. When the United States and its allied forces started the war on terrorism in 2001, they were confronted with only the Al-Qaeda but now that is not the only combatant force. Other actors such as the ISIS and the TTP etc.

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have emerged on the scene of the world that are of great security concern to the interest of the Regional and International Community. Each terrorist organization has its own leader and is not on good terms with the other group posing challenge to the security of the concerned state. Both the Regional and International actors need to focus on the activities of these networks and should take strong measures to cope with the security challenges at local as well as at global level. Efforst should be made to prepare a force of the entire nations of the world having representation from the countries on the basis of population so as to draft laws relating to security of the states and inflict severe measures upon those countries that are involved in the terrorist activities on the foreign land. 41) The government of Pakistan should take strong measures and action against the facilitators and financial of the terrorist networks in the manner as was taken against the Al-Akhtar and Al-Rasheed Trust for they were banned and their funds were frozen in the banks. All such organizations should be proceeded against with an iron hand and provided with exemplary punishments. The Hawala system along with Hawaldars should vbe given exemplary punishments.

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5.4 Conclusion

Afghanistan has a very bitter history of wars with foreign countries because of the multi-ethnic society. The society is not framed into a well-organized structure of government since long and has resulted in the shabby system of government for the country. On account of the heterogeneity of population and denying them representation in the affairs of the government has resulted in a state of anarchy and civil-war and has given an opportunity to the involvement of foreign hand in the affairs of Afghanistan. Foreign hand has such a role in the affairs of the country that even the rulers are made and unmade with their consultation or rather they are directly enthroned by them. The Russians intervened in their affairs directly in 1979 when they invaded the country but it was with the collaborative efforts of Pakistan that they were forced to leave the country. Similarly, in 2001 they were again intervened by the United States and its allied forces under the auspicious patronage of ISAF, who embarked upon the strategy of drawdown there from in 2014. At present, the strength of the ISAF stands at round about 10,000 forces hailing from 20 different countries of the world under the Resolute Support Mission.

The geographic location of Afghanistan in the region has made Pakistan suffer a lot in terms of its long porous border, which is not recognized by the former as an International Border, and is another area of security concern for Pakistan. The long porous border coupled with its windy nature and mountainous areas provides ample space for the infiltration of insurgency and terrorism. The tribal areas and subsequent bond of relationship among the tribal people along both sides of the border is also one of the main causes of insecurity in the country. This family relation bonds together the Pashtuns of two different countries, has been providing impetus to the issue of Pashtunistan by the Afghanis, and is totally against the recognition of the border with its neighboring country.

The Pak-Afghan border known as the Durand line is of great strategic importance for the security paradigm of Pakistan and is the hub of many social, political, economic and security activities. Afghanistan, being a landlocked country depends mainly on sea and land routes of Pakistan. The border has been used for the business purposes by both the countries but mainly the smugglers and outlaws to get their nefarious designs realized

310 use it. Through this border, opium and related items was supplied to the tribal areas of Pakistan and have been the cause of insecurity in the tribal as well as the settled areas of Pakistan. Not only this, in the post-9/11 tragic episode, most of the Afghans that were blamed for their involvement in the incident, not only fled to Pakistan through this belt and sought to take refuge in the tribal areas as they provided ample space of sanctuary to the terrorists and insurgents.

The insurgents not only took refuge in those areas of Pakistan but also started to work against the interest of Pakistan by conducting suicide bombing and other terrorist incidents in the tribal areas. Soon they permeated into the settled areas of the country and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa became the direct target of terrorist activities. The cities of Peshawar suffered a lot in terms of worst security scenario and faced a good deal of suicide incidents, bomb blasts, target-killings and heinous attacks on the personnel of law enforcement agencies in which some key officials lost their lives. The city of Swat and Buner became so much affected where episodes of terrorism became the order of the day and as a result of these attacks, the government had to initiate military operations in the areas of Swat and Buner till they were cleared of the terrorists. The city of Mardan, Charsadda and Peshawar were the next to suffer the pangs of insecurity where they afflicted with major attacks of terrorism.

The turning episode of all these was the attack on Army Public School Peshawar that provided a trigger to the implementation of Nation Action Plan and the restoration of the moratorium to the criminals involved in serious cases of murder and acts of terrorism. In the initial stages of the NAP, there seemed a coherent consensus on the action of the government over the implementation of NAP. Complete harmonies of views existed among the various politicians and were devoted towards the national integrity. The passage of time saw the differences in the views between the politicians as well as the civil-military disharmony that rose to the surface over some issues including the decisions of the Supreme Court that reversed or got the power of review over the decisions of the Military Courts. This civil-military imbalance caused the slowing down of the implementation of the NAP and provided further impetus to the deteriorating security situation in the country.

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The establishment of the Military Courts was highly welcomed by the various circles in the country. For the purpose of its legality, it was passed from the legislative assembly by incorporating 21st Amendment to the Constitution of 1973 but a setback was caused by the verdict of the Supreme Court whereby it held that the Supreme Court had the power to review the orders passed by the Military Courts against the terrorists. Even the High Courts of the province have the power to review such decisions as on November 17, 2016 death sentence of three culprits was stayed by the Peshawar High Court. The question is not the issue of jurisdiction of the courts whether civil or military but the most important thing is that common people do not have trust over the way the trial is conducted in the civil courts as they take too much time in the transaction of the case and people begin to disappoint from judiciary. The Anti-terrorism Act was brought in the country in 1997 but till now no substantial results have been achieved by the ATC and people are fed up with the ordinary civil law for it takes a lot of time while dealing with a case of criminal nature. The procedure of the courts is very slow and most of the time is spent in the trial and then the appellate review and remanding the case back to the courts, the issue of jurisdiction of cases by the courts is another impediment in the way of slowing down the court’s procedure. It would have been according to the wishes and aspirations of the people if the High Courts and Supreme Court could not have the power to review the judgments of the Military Courts. They believe in the doctrine of speedy disposal of the cases.

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