Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan

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Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan Journal of Strategic Security Volume 2 Number 4 Volume 2, No. 4: November/ Article 2 December 2009 Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan Steve A. Young Sam Houston State University, [email protected] Imdad Hussain Sahito Shah Abdul Latif University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons pp. 17-30 Recommended Citation Young, Steve A. and Sahito, Imdad Hussain. "Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan." Journal of Strategic Security 2, no. 4 (2010) : 17-30. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.2 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan Abstract As President Obama is in the midst of deciding whether additional U.S.combat forces are needed in Afghanistan in addition to the 21,000 troops recently committed, he must realize that additional armed forces are only a stopgap measure in Afghanistan's downward spiral into an 'undergoverned' failed state. Similarly, as Pakistan's fragile and fractured civilian government continues to appease the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen with Taliban cultural values led by Baitullah Mehsud and others, it comes closer to the concept of a "misgoverned" failed state, possessing a small arsenal of nuclear arms. The problem for the U.S. administration is that neither of these countries can be allowed to fall further into disrepair. At the same time each requires a different and unique approach to the threat of "Talibanization" that faces each country—the control of territory within each country by Islamic radicals seeking to impose their ultraconservative interpretation of shar'ia law onto the general populace. Generally acknowledged is the belief that what has tentatively worked in Iraq, that is, the additional U.S. troops and employment of former Sunni insurgents to help fight foreign fighters associated with al-Qaida, will not work in either fghanistanA or Pakistan. While a regional approach to the conflict in these two countries is warranted, fghanistanA and Pakistan are on two different economic, social, and political playing fields. Hence, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution for the two countries, especially one that draws on the Iraq playbook. In addition to its internal political problems, Pakistan also faces the issue of al-Qaida and Taliban training camps positioned in its literal back yard, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA or Tribal Areas). Resolution of the War on Terror cannot come to fruition without addressing the problems that exist in the Tribal Areas. This largely self-governed terrain has come under Taliban influence and serves as a safe haven for Taliban and foreign-fighter cross-border attacks into fghanistanA and, more recently, large- scale attacks into Pakistan itself. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss4/ 2 Young and Sahito: Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanista Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan By Steve A. Young, Ph.D. and Imdad Hussain Sahito, Ph.D. Introduction As President Obama is in the midst of deciding whether additional U.S. combat forces are needed in Afghanistan in addition to the 21,000 troops recently committed,1 he must realize that additional armed forces are only a stopgap measure in Afghanistan's downward spiral into an 'under- governed' failed state. Similarly, as Pakistan's fragile and fractured civilian government continues to appease the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organization of Pakistani Pashtun tribesmen with Taliban cultural values led by Baitullah Mehsud and others, it comes closer to the concept of a "misgoverned" failed state, possessing a small arsenal of nuclear arms. The problem for the U.S. administration is that neither of these countries can be allowed to fall further into disrepair. At the same time each requires a different and unique approach to the threat of "Talibanization" that faces each country—the control of territory within each country by Islamic radicals seeking to impose their ultra- conservative interpretation of shar'ia law onto the general populace. Generally acknowledged is the belief that what has tentatively worked in Iraq, that is, the additional U.S. troops and employment of former Sunni insurgents to help fight foreign fighters associated with al-Qaida, will not work in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.2 While a regional approach to the conflict in these two countries is warranted, Afghanistan and Pakistan are on two different economic, social, and political playing fields. Hence, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution for the two countries, espe- cially one that draws on the Iraq playbook. In addition to its internal political problems, Pakistan also faces the issue of al-Qaida and Taliban training camps positioned in its literal back yard, the Federally Adminis- tered Tribal Areas (FATA or Tribal Areas). Resolution of the War on Ter- ror cannot come to fruition without addressing the problems that exist in the Tribal Areas. This largely self-governed terrain has come under Tali- ban influence and serves as a safe haven for Taliban and foreign-fighter cross-border attacks into Afghanistan and, more recently, large-scale attacks into Pakistan itself. 17 Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010 Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2, No. 4 Journal of Strategic Security Afghanistan: An Exercise in Persistence? Three issues stand out when one considers the political, economic, and social situation in today's Afghanistan: 1. Since 2005, the Taliban have increased the frequency and lethality of their insurgency. 2. It is the world's largest producer of both white and black/brown heroin. 3. Its current government is largely ineffective and corrupt. These three factors should figure prominently as the U.S. administration's Pakistan policy evolves over the coming months. In October 2001, the United States responded to the tragedy of Septem- ber 11 by joining forces with the Northern Alliance militia to oust the Tali- ban from Afghanistan and take revenge upon the al-Qaida leadership. Our new ally's charismatic leader, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated two days before the September 11 attacks by suspected al-Qaida suicide bombers posing as journalists. In the wake of these events, small groups from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) persuaded remaining Northern Alliance leaders that the U.S. mili- tary was coming to help them take control of Afghanistan. The initial coordinated effort was eventually supported by U.S. air strikes. By the end of November 2001, the strategic northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif and the capital of Kabul were under the control of Northern Alliance forces, thus signaling the end of Taliban rule. Kandahar fell shortly thereafter in Janu- ary 2002, setting up the final push to capture al-Qaida leader Usama bin Ladin at Tora Bora, a remote and geographically formidable region located in the mountains on the Pakistani border opposite the Pakistan city of Parachinar. After several failed attempts to locate and capture ibn Ladin, including Operation Anaconda, coupled with inactivity by Ameri- can commander General Tommy Franks, there was no large U.S. troop presence at Tora Bora despite CIA requests, and ibn Ladin escaped with likely Pakistani assistance across the Afghan border.3 As a result of the conflict, the United States had relatively quickly pushed aside the Taliban and remaining foreign fighters, but not necessarily dis- mantled their residual fighting capability. Nevertheless, even after having missed the chance to capture ibn Ladin at Tora Bora, there at least now existed an opportunity for nation building. In the wake of the U.S.-sup- ported Northern Alliance push, there were opportunities to speedily establish a working representative government and begin soft power pro- 18 https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss4/2 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.4.2 Young and Sahito: Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanista Reviving the United States' Commitment to Pakistan and Afghanistan grams to win local Afghan support even while continuing to employ force against the Taliban and al-Qaida remnants. Unfortunately for Afghani- stan and the American publics, the military effort stalled and the hearts- and-minds program was limited to a few well-meaning and modestly effective Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Meanwhile, the Bush adminis- tration turned its attention to Iraq and essentially abandoned the War on Terror in Afghanistan at a time when significant progress was seemingly attainable. From the beginning of 2002 until approximately 2005 the security situa- tion in Afghanistan remained relatively calm. But in the adjacent border area with Pakistan, the Taliban and what was left of the foreign-fighter contingent began to reconstitute themselves. Eventually, these forces started returning to their former strongholds in
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