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TM September 25 2020 Issue THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION SEPTEMBER 25, 2020 VOLUME XVIII, ISSUE 17 p.1 p.3 p.5 p.7 Brian M. Perkins Brian M. Perkins Animesh Roul Michael Horton BRIEFS Houthi Offensive in Tehreek-e-Taliban Pa- Will Egypt Send Marib Represents kistan Factions Re- Troops to Libya? Dual Threat to united for ‘Holy War’ Yemeni Government Against Islamabad TURKEY COURTS AFRICAN STATES AS neutrality and its historical dogma of non-interference. FRANCE SEEKS EU PARTNERS Short of that support, Ankara still has much to gain from strengthening its diplomatic and economic relations with Brian M. Perkins Algeria. Turkey’s increasingly assertive military and economic role Close economic and security partnerships with countries has seen the balance of power across several key re- in the region are likely to help blunt the outward percep- gions begin to shift, particularly in the Mediterranean tion of Turkey as a purely conquering force by demon- and the Maghreb, where Ankara’s role in Libya has sig- strating a commitment to mutually beneficial investment nificantly changed the geopolitics of North Africa. in the region as a whole, rather than simply doing so by Ankara has sought to turn the tide of the Libyan war by force in the Maghreb’s most vulnerable state. That is not attempting to enlist neighboring countries as military to say that under the surface Ankara will not engage in partners, and if that route fails, as more passive collabo- plans to influence domestic politics across the region—it rators or supporters of Turkish involvement. surely will—but that its partnerships will be publicly touted as the opposite. Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria in particular, have unsur- prisingly found themselves on the receiving end of Strengthening ties with Algeria is also a powerful hedge Ankara’s largesse, much to the chagrin of other Maghre- against France and other European powers that have bi and European states (Middle East Monitor, January been particularly hawkish in their stance toward Turkish 27). France, specifically, is deeply concerned not only involvement in the region, particularly in Libya and the with Ankara’s designs on the eastern Mediterranean, but eastern Mediterranean. France’s waning influence in the also Turkey’s courting of Algeria. region creates an opportunity for a significant shift to occur and for Turkey to become a preeminent force While Ankara would likely brim at the chance to gain across the region. For its part, however, Algiers is unlike- Algeria’s military involvement in Libya—a prospect that ly to step back and jeopardize its relationship with is considerably slim due to the country’s dug-in stance of France in any significant way in the near-term. 1 KADHIMI FACES TOUGH ROAD TO EXPEDITED While Turkey is jockeying to gain partners in Africa, ELECTION France has steadily increased its efforts to organize the Mediterranean states, including Egypt, in opposition to Brian Perkins Turkey. Most recently, France has stepped up its efforts to swing Italy and Spain in favor of imposing EU sanc- The Trump administration’s plans to decrease the num- tions on Turkey (Euro News, September 10). If France ber of U.S. troops in Iraq from 5,200 to 3,000 will come manages to lobby a unanimous EU vote for sanctions on at a critical time for the country and for Iraqi Prime Min- the country, Ankara will have tough decisions on how to ister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Kadhimi, who came to power proceed with its power game across Africa. after parliament approved a new government in May, inherited a country in crisis that is torn between the Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor United States and Iran while still fighting the remnants of what appears to be a slightly resurgent Islamic State (IS). As if the task of righting the ship was not daunting enough, Kadhimi announced that the country’s next par- liamentary elections would take place in June 2021, rather than the originally scheduled May 2022. In this shortened timeframe, Kadhimi will need to carefully po- sition the U.S. troop drawdown in a manner that ap- peases the Iranian-backed Shia militias, which he simul- taneously has in the crosshairs of his precarious crack- down on corruption. Kadhimi has made little secret of his desire to restruc- ture the government’s relationship with the Popular Mo- bilization Units (PMU) and his disdain for the groups that fall under its umbrella, but answer directly to Iran. This fact was particularly evident in late June when the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) raided the Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) headquarters in Baghdad (Al Jazeera, June 26). His position toward the United States and Iran, however, has been intentionally ambivalent in public, allowing him to position himself as independent and make his anti-corruption campaign appear free from outside interference or motives. The withdrawal of U.S. troops will, to a certain extent, help to appease the pro-PMU politicians who had earlier called for the government to expel the United States from the country. If, however, Kadhimi does not success- fully wrest some power away from the Iranian-backed PMUs, it would risk creating a political imbalance that could allow for their continued preponderance working up to the snap election. On the other hand, too strong of a move against the PMU will almost certainly spell disaster for his time in office. Much of Kadhimi’s actions thus far—including the anti- corruption campaign and election date change—have been in response to key demands from the mass protests that swept the country in late 2019. Gaining the support of the people is critical, but time and time again 2 it has not proven to be enough in the face of a political field dominated by small, self-interested factions, many Houthi Offensive in Marib of which are directly connected to the PMU. Kadhimi’s Represents Dual Threat to best hope is likely to maintain his ambivalence to the United States-Iran conflict and tread carefully in who he Yemeni Government ensnares with his anti-corruption campaign (Arab Week- ly, September 19). Biding his time and avoiding creating Brian M. Perkins the wrong enemies, be it the people or the PMUs, is likely the only way the Iraqi government will see any The oil-rich governorate of Marib has increasingly be- continuity. come the focal point of the war in Yemen as the Houthis’ Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor. determination to take control of the strategic gover- norate has intensified over the past several months. Marib is the last remaining stronghold in the north for Yemen’s internationally recognized government and is a key strategic territory not only due to its oil fields, but also because it could set the stage for the Houthis to eventually move into key southern governorates, where fractures between the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and pro-government forces show no signs of abat- ing. A Houthi success in Marib would mark a critical tip- ping point in the war and a major defeat for the gov- ernment and Saudi coalition, leaving them essentially hemmed in by the Houthis on one side and the South- ern Transitional Council on the other. In such a scenario, the Saudi coalition and the Yemeni government would be left with few options other than negotiating from a position of considerable weakness or dragging the los- ing fight on for far longer than the coalition likely has the will for. The Houthis’ military offensive in Marib has coincided with other critical developments that have undermined the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia’s ability to control any outcomes in Yemen. Among the most critical developments, which also has serious implications for the battle for Marib, was the Southern Transitional Council’s withdrawal from the troubled Riyadh Agree- ment—the Saudi-sponsored power-sharing deal meant to deescalate fighting between the STC and pro-gov- ernment forces, most critically forces affiliated with Islah (Middle East Monitor, August 27). Beyond air superiority, the Saudi coalition and Yemeni government have few advantages in their fight against the Houthis in Marib. Persistent turmoil and uncertainty has plagued the pro-government ranks, which is largely an incoherent, cobbled together fighting force from dif- ferent regions and governorates and with disparate po- litical motivations, hindering the government’s ability to dictate strategic and operational priorities. Higher levels within the coalition have also experienced continued 3 tumult, as evidenced by King Salman’s sacking of coali- ment forces from being used to shore up the frontlines tion forces commander, Prince Fahd Bin Turki (Al in Marib. Jazeera, September 1). Brian M. Perkins is the Editor of Terrorism Monitor. The pro-government coalition’s limitations only magnify the fact that the battle for Marib will, in all likelihood, be won or lost not through sheer military force, but through either the Houthi or the government’s ability to gain support, or acquiescence, from the governorate’s key tribes, particularly the powerful Murad tribe. The Saudi coalition has steadily poured money into the gover- norate and, early on in the war, the tribes of Marib put up a stiff resistance to the Houthi’s incursions. That same resistance, however, is not guaranteed in perpetuity and history has shown that the tribes of Marib have deftly shifted their alliances to ensure their survival or for their own enrichment. The battle for tribal loyalty is already well underway, with the Yemeni government claiming tribal fighters are being integrated into its forces and the Houthis claiming that countless tribesmen have defect- ed and are now fighting the government (Twitter.com/ hussinalezzi5, September 5).
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