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Afghanistan: the Prospects for a Real Peace

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Afghanistan: the Prospects for a Real Peace Afghanistan: The Prospects for a Real Peace By Anthony H. Cordesman With the assistance of Grace Hwang E-Book Version: July 7, 2020 Please provide comments to [email protected] Photo: BEHROUZ MEHRI/AFP via Getty Images Cordesman: Afghan Prospects for Peace July 7, 2020 2 Afghanistan: The Prospects for a Real Peace Anthony H. Cordesman Afghanistan is sometimes referred to as the “graveyard of empires.” In practice, it has been the “graveyard of Afghans” – a nation where outside powers have always found it more costly to remain in Afghanistan than their presence there was worth. Russia – like so many of Afghanistan’s past conquerors – has survived and has prospered from leaving. The United States might also follow suit, as it has never faced a serious strain from its role in Afghanistan and can leave regardless of the success or failure of its current efforts to leave as part of a negotiated peace deal. It is the Afghans that face the risks from any peace process and the costs of any failure to create peace that actually brings stability and security. They have now been in a state of war since the late 1970s – for more than four decades and for longer than the lives of the vast majority of today’s Afghans. And, far too much of Afghanistan’s history has been repeated during this period. Afghanistan has had long periods of peace – and even its own empires – but time after time the nation has divided, become a regional backwater, or succumbed to civil war. Today, as was in the past, the nation’s leaders and factions have served their own interests, divided the nation, and plunged it into civil war – all at the expense of their peoples. The end result undermined Afghanistan’s development and its capability to defend its own interests. The Burke Chair is issuing a new “e-book” that addresses these issues in depth. It is entitled Afghanistan: The Prospects for a Real Peace, and is available on the CSIS website here. As this analysis shows, history repeats itself whether is its forgotten or not, and it does so in the United States as well as in Afghanistan. As was the case in Vietnam, the current peace effort seems to be at least as much the result of a United States effort to leave the country as it is one to find a real peace. As the analysis shows in depth, it is also a peace effort that so far has failed to address Afghanistan’s current level of dependence on U.S. military forces and massive amounts of U.S. civil and military financial aid. The peace effort is also ignoring critical structural problems in Afghan politics, governance, economy, and the creation of effective security forces. The analysis uses a wide range of data, maps, and charts to compare key official and outside sources on each of these issues. These sources include comparative excerpts and data from the latest security and threat reporting by the Department of Defense (DoD), the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), the Lead Inspector General (LIG), the UN, NATO, and the Resolute Support (RS) Command. In the process, the “e-book” also addresses the present and future role of U.S. aid, the role of U.S. and allied military forces, and the impact of present withdrawal plans. This comparative analysis also addresses reporting on Afghan politics, governance, Afghan security force development, and on Afghan economics and popular needs by the IMF, UN, World Bank, CIA, Afghan government, and other sources. These sources – and various NGO and media reports – are compared in depth, and the key differences between them are analyzed in detail. A Taliban and a Central Government that Both Fail the Afghan People The analysis does find some reasons for hope, but it is also finds more problems than solutions. It finds that there is a serious risk that the U.S. may leave without having created a peace that can offer lasting stability and the security. Cordesman: Afghan Prospects for Peace July 7, 2020 3 The peace agreements to date do more to expedite a U.S. and allied withdrawal than create the conditions that can lead to a lasting and secure peace. It finds that the Taliban remains committed to its ideology, and furthermore, that the Taliban has good reason to negotiate, but the group has more to win by negotiating rather than seeking a real peace. Its ongoing military progress, its rising hopes for U.S. withdrawal, and its commitment to its ideology are all key reasons. A wide range of sources – including the major sources of official U.S. reporting on Afghanistan – indicate that the leaders of the Afghan central government are now a major threat toward the ability to create a lasting peace and a state than can meet the needs and hopes of the Afghan people. More broadly, sources like the World Bank, IMF, UN, and various NGOs provide data that show that the portions of Afghanistan under the central government’s control are a “failed state” by any standard. There are substantial official sources that show that Afghanistan was not winning against the Taliban before the peace agreements, even with massive U.S. combat air and intelligence support as well as with the extensive support from allied forces and cadres of U.S. special forces, elite units, train and assist forces, and intelligence operators. Security remains a critical and growing problem even with major outside U.S. and allied support. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are making progress, but reporting by the two U.S. inspector generals – the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and the Lead Inspector General (LIG) – show that the ground forces are years away from being able to stand on their own with any confidence, and there are no current plans to create an Afghan Air Force that could provide the level of combat capability the U.S. and its allies have provided since 2013. The civil development of the country poses equally difficult challenges to any effort toward creating a secure and stable peace. Afghanistan has steadily fallen behind the pace of development in other poor regional states. It has regressed in many ways since the Afghan monarchy began to collapse in a mix of internal power struggles in the 1970s. It continued to do so during 1972 to 1989, in spite of a massive Soviet effort. It did so under the Taliban before 2001. It has done so in spite of the massive U.S. and international aid effort that began in 2001. Afghan elections have not produced either a working political system or effective governance in the areas controlled by the central government. Afghanistan has not moved towards effective economic development and does not adequately meet the basic needs of its people. Its current economy can only function if it is supported indefinitely by massive outside aid, and if it remains heavily dependent on being the world’s major source of opiates. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the current peace efforts in Afghanistan are uncertain at best. So far, the peace agreements simply layout a possible schedule for negotiations and U.S. withdrawals, rather than define a real peace. It is far from clear that the Afghan central government and the Taliban can reach a stable, workable peace agreement. The Afghan government has critical military weaknesses and civil flaws, creating serious questions as to whether it can lay the groundwork for some compromise with the Taliban or survive on its own. Most of these Afghan problems are the fault of Afghan politicians and leaders, and it is unclear that Afghanistan’s politics and governance can improve to the point where the central government either wins a peace or wins a war. Cordesman: Afghan Prospects for Peace July 7, 2020 4 Moreover, it is unclear that the United States will continue to support the Afghan government if a peace settlement fails. The U.S. is already cutting its forces and has not made any public commitments to enforce a peace or stay if the negotiations fail. Furthermore, U.S. strategy has changed to focus on competition with China and Russia, the United States faces major new resource constraints because of the Coronavirus crisis, and Afghanistan is no longer a main center of terrorist threat to the United States. Structure of the Analysis The analysis begins by examining the challenges the United States faces in leaving Afghanistan and the new pressures the Coronavirus crisis has put on U.S. spending – crises that could affect both the peace process and U.S. willingness to remain in Afghanistan if the peace process falters or fails. It describes both the cuts the United States is already making in Afghan forces and the impact of phasing out all U.S. forces in time to meet the 14-month deadline set in the peace agreements. The analysis then addresses the risk of the current peace effort devolving into an extension of war by other means, the challenges posed by Afghanistan’s internal weaknesses, and the efforts to create effective Afghan security forces that can stand on their own. It shows that both the Afghan central government and the Taliban pose serious problems. This is made clear in the next three sections of the analysis, which address the critical problems in Afghan governance, in the development of Afghan national security forces, and in the Afghan economy – summarizing the key quantitative data in each area. Finally, the assessment concludes with a brief analysis of whether the United States should withdraw from Afghanistan if the Afghan central government continues to be a failed state or if the current peace agreement breaks down because of its failures.
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